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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you welcome to stuff mom never told you?

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Speaker 1: From how Stuff Works dot Com. Hello, and welcome to

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Speaker 1: the podcast. I'm Kristen and I'm Caroline, and I'm about

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Speaker 1: to start things off with a statement that might um

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Speaker 1: cause outrage from our more science minded and very knowledgeable listeners.

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Speaker 1: I'm nervous out there, yeah, because we've got we have

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Speaker 1: a number of whip smart scientists who listen in. So

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Speaker 1: I'm just gonna go ahead and say this from my

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Speaker 1: layman's perspective. Okay, so scientists out there, keep in mind,

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Speaker 1: I'm just trying to cleverly possibly te up this episode

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Speaker 1: about the evolution of cooperation. So what I was gonna

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Speaker 1: say was that, really, if we are thinking of this

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Speaker 1: podcast universe that we magically live in, and in evolutionary terms,

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Speaker 1: you and I really shouldn't be sitting at the same table, Caroline.

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Speaker 1: Why because we should probably have separate podcasts, you know,

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Speaker 1: because the survival of the fittest and everything like, humans

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Speaker 1: are naturally selfish, right, inherently selfish creatures, So I would

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Speaker 1: really want to start the Kristen Show. So I could

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Speaker 1: battle it out on the charts and the Caroline hour.

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Speaker 1: That's right, Christians limiting me, I really would talk for

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Speaker 1: an hour. Maybe we should do it um. But as

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Speaker 1: a matter of fact, it sort of does make sense

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Speaker 1: that we are sitting across the table talking, cooperating. Yah,

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Speaker 1: we're helping each other get ahead. Together, we are getting

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Speaker 1: farther than possibly we would separately. Although you know, the

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Speaker 1: theory behind cooperation and defe acting not helping other people,

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Speaker 1: being selfish and acting in one's own self interest is

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Speaker 1: that you know, as a defector, theoretically you would you

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Speaker 1: would get ahead because you're not You're not helping your neighbor,

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Speaker 1: so you're not doling out anything, you're not incurring any costs.

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Speaker 1: But then your neighbor doesn't get anything from you, doesn't

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Speaker 1: get any help, so she won't get ahead. So but

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Speaker 1: if you both help each other, then you both get ahead.

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Speaker 1: And since we like talking about success stories and this

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Speaker 1: is just maybe the grand access story of the human

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Speaker 1: species is perhaps cooperation, because scientists would refer to us

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Speaker 1: as super cooperators because without cooperation, we wouldn't even be

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Speaker 1: able to sit here, because we wouldn't have this technology.

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Speaker 1: We wouldn't have language. Thumbs Thumbs sort of bat things

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Speaker 1: around like cats, I guess um. But the whole idea

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Speaker 1: behind this is that cooperation is a driving force in evolution.

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Speaker 1: And Martin Noack, who is from Harvard University, in two

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Speaker 1: thousand six wrote that the emergence of genomes, cells, multicellular organisms,

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Speaker 1: social insects, and human society as a whole are all

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Speaker 1: based on cooperation. Right, which is counterintuitive because I made

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Speaker 1: the reference to evolution earlier, because the theory is based

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Speaker 1: on competition and the idea of rewarding selfish behavior. But

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Speaker 1: when you actually look at biological organization, you find so

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Speaker 1: much cooperation and self sacrifice in a lot of instances. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and and I know you might be thinking this sounds

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Speaker 1: way more science e than we normally get. But don't work.

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Speaker 1: Don't worry, we'll get to the gender stuff. We are reliable,

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Speaker 1: we are cooperating in this. We bring it around a

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Speaker 1: gender every time. Right. But yeah, cooperation essentially means that

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Speaker 1: selfish replicators, you know, they're looking out for themselves, they

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Speaker 1: forego some of their reproductive potential to help one another. So,

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Speaker 1: like I said earlier, everybody gets ahead. Everybody wins and

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Speaker 1: no whak you mentioned from Harvard University. UM establish a

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Speaker 1: theory of five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation how

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Speaker 1: all of this works. And the first one makes a

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Speaker 1: lot of sense, and that is kin selection. We want

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Speaker 1: to perpetuate our our genes, and so naturally we are

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Speaker 1: more willing to cooperate with people that we are related to.

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Speaker 1: And the closer they're related to us than the more

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Speaker 1: likely we are to lend a helping hands, right, And

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Speaker 1: that's the whole theory behind that. As we share more

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Speaker 1: genes obviously with people were more closely related to, So

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Speaker 1: there's the whole saying of I will jump in the

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Speaker 1: river to save two brothers or eight cousins. That's sort

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Speaker 1: of the idea behind that. UM. There's also network reciprocity,

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Speaker 1: which is formed in a mixed population of cooperators and defectors. UH.

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Speaker 1: Cooperators are busy helping each other and forming network clusters,

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Speaker 1: while defectors are getting left out because they're not benefiting

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Speaker 1: their neighbors at all. And then those clusters of cooperators

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Speaker 1: end up outcome repeating the defectors because like we said,

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Speaker 1: they're pushing each other ahead to succeed. And then we

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Speaker 1: have group selection um, which maintains the competition is not

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Speaker 1: only between individuals but also between groups, and a group

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Speaker 1: of cooperators will not so surprisingly grow faster than a

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Speaker 1: group of defectors because they can actually work together. And

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Speaker 1: this is something that will also come up in later

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Speaker 1: research on like teamwork and sports. Um that it's also

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Speaker 1: come up. And one thing that you guys might have

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Speaker 1: heard of, possibly is the prisoner's dilemma, which is a

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Speaker 1: test and activity that's been reproduced in several studies. That's

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Speaker 1: known as direct reciprocity. Basically, if I cooperate now, you

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Speaker 1: might cooperate later. Tip for tat you owe me, I

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Speaker 1: owe you um. And this relies basically on repeated encounters

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Speaker 1: between the same two individuals. And it's basically, to quote

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Speaker 1: the study like a barter economy based on the immediate

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Speaker 1: exchange of goods. So first less outline quickly the prisoners

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Speaker 1: the limit is just because this comes up so often

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Speaker 1: in this line of scientific literature. Yeah, so if Kristin

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Speaker 1: and I are both suspects who have been arrested on

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Speaker 1: suspicion of a crime, uh, they separate us and you know,

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Speaker 1: good cup bad cop, and they're just like beating us

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Speaker 1: down mentally trying to get one of us to confess

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Speaker 1: or both. The theory goes and tests have shown that

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Speaker 1: when one of the suspects confesses, so like let's say

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Speaker 1: Kristin confesses to the crime, like she did it or

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Speaker 1: we did it, or I did it or whatever, she

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Speaker 1: confesses but I don't, then she's the one who's cooperating.

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Speaker 1: She receives preferential treatment, favorable treatment, so she might not

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Speaker 1: go to prison, or might not go to prison for

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Speaker 1: as long because she cooperated. When both of us confess,

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Speaker 1: the outcome is worse because it's like, well, you've lost

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Speaker 1: your leverage. And even though we both cooperated, we're both

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Speaker 1: like super guilty, so we we do not get favorable

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Speaker 1: treatment either one of us. When both of us keep

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Speaker 1: silent though we're cooperating with each other, are we haven't

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Speaker 1: offered up any information, Neither one of us goes to

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Speaker 1: prison and gets shanked or shived or shoved half or

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Speaker 1: shoved uh, And so the outcome is better for both

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Speaker 1: of us. We might both end up going to prison

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Speaker 1: for a little while, but we didn't confess, we cooperated

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Speaker 1: with each other. So the outcome ends up although it's

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Speaker 1: not the best for one of us, it's the better

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Speaker 1: for both of us. Yeah, so it's a roll of

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Speaker 1: the dice and this prisoner prisoner's dilemma game that these

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Speaker 1: researchers will often play with participants to see how selfish

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Speaker 1: we are, whether or not we will go for the

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Speaker 1: more cooperative option and just hope for the best that

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Speaker 1: the other person in the game is also thinking cooperatively. Um,

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Speaker 1: but it's it's interesting how to see how those kinds

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Speaker 1: of games shake out. And again, this will come up

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Speaker 1: when we talk more about gender. And let's briefly touch

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Speaker 1: on that fifth mechanism, which is indirect reciprocity, which is

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Speaker 1: fueled by reputation. It's essentially the idea of doing something

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Speaker 1: in order to burnish your reputation in case of a

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Speaker 1: rainy day kind of Yeah. Basically, you help somebody, and

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Speaker 1: you don't necessarily expect immediate help, but you do expect

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Speaker 1: other people to take note, possibly inform others, and based

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Speaker 1: on your now sterling reputation, you expect down the line

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Speaker 1: to get some perks. And the study shows that this

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Speaker 1: is a very human attribute, This idea of indirect reciprocity

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Speaker 1: because we have to have the ability to actually, like remember,

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Speaker 1: keep track of our social network, remember who's done what,

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Speaker 1: who's benefited home, and kind of keep tallies of you know,

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Speaker 1: who's who's helping each other. Yeah, and that whole idea

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Speaker 1: of the social network dynamics UM has received some more

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Speaker 1: insight from a two thousand eleven study out of Harvard University,

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Speaker 1: which found that UM, when it comes to cooperation and

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Speaker 1: helpfulness within the social networks, everything is constant and changing

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Speaker 1: in response to those networks of people in those networks behaviors. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: when we have when you have a dynamic social network,

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Speaker 1: basically you get to choose the people that you want

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Speaker 1: to keep hanging out with, the people who give you

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Speaker 1: the greatest benefits, who you like the best. Um, you

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Speaker 1: end up with big groups of cooperators, because nobody wants

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Speaker 1: to hang out with the selfish guy. Yeah. And the

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Speaker 1: sweet little moral of the scientific story is that nice

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Speaker 1: guys can finish first, because you want you're a coo

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Speaker 1: cooperator exactly exactly. And uh yeah, So these dynamic groups

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Speaker 1: where you can pick and choose who you hang out with,

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Speaker 1: end up having very high level levels of cooperation because

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Speaker 1: you're rewarded for cooperating by getting to hang out with

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Speaker 1: the cool kids. If you're the selfish guy who's not cooperating,

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Speaker 1: then you typically end up getting shunned, and so you

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Speaker 1: learn from that mistake. You learn from the little sting

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Speaker 1: of being shunned. So then you try to cooperate, whether

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Speaker 1: it's heartfelt or not. You want to be part of

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Speaker 1: the group. So it keep says it keeps us in

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Speaker 1: check as well our behaviors, your reputation and social networks

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Speaker 1: and basically thinking that people are watching you. Now, there's

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Speaker 1: something that comes up a lot in this podcast that's

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Speaker 1: gonna put a wrinkle in our cooperative or non cooperative behavior,

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Speaker 1: and that would be hormones. Yes, there is known evidence

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Speaker 1: that the hormone oxytocin, the cuddly feely hormone released in

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Speaker 1: the female brain, especially during an orgasm that promotes bonding.

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Speaker 1: Little boost of oxytocin will make us more cooperative. Studies

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Speaker 1: have shown that a boost of oxytocin in our brain

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Speaker 1: will make us more cooperative, which makes sense, you know

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Speaker 1: if you think about all the different traits that are

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Speaker 1: associated with oxytocin. Now, on the flip side, of that.

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Speaker 1: A study published in January of two thousand twelve from

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Speaker 1: the University College London's Welcome Trust Center for neuro Imaging

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Speaker 1: found that testosterone, yep, testosterone makes us less cooperative. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it kind of blinds you to other people's point of

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Speaker 1: view and makes you overvalue your own opinions at the

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Speaker 1: expense of cooperating. And so they did the study. They

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Speaker 1: had seventeen pairs of female volunteers working together, and they

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Speaker 1: did they had a little asterisk and they said that,

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Speaker 1: you know, we did seventeen pairs of female volunteers because

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Speaker 1: testosterone levels naturally low, and so they could have some

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Speaker 1: of the women take a pill or whatever to raise

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Speaker 1: their testosterone levels, whereas if they did that in men,

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Speaker 1: when you raise an already high testosterone level at backfires

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Speaker 1: and make some I don't know, weepy or something. Um.

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Speaker 1: But so they have these pairs of female volunteers working together,

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Speaker 1: and when given a placebo, the pairs cooperated well, performed

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Speaker 1: their assigned tasks better. But when they were given a

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Speaker 1: testosterone supplement, the benefit of cooperation was reduced into viduals

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Speaker 1: acted ego centrically and they tended to decide in favor

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Speaker 1: of their own ideas over those of their partner, So

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Speaker 1: watch out for that. Uh yeah. Dr Nick Right, who

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Speaker 1: was the lead researcher, said, too much cooperation and we

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Speaker 1: may never have our way. But if we're too self motivated,

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Speaker 1: we are likely to ignore people who have real insights.

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Speaker 1: So there is a balance to cooperation. And I mean,

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Speaker 1: if you're constantly rolling over for someone else, well, good grief,

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Speaker 1: don't do that. But then it can't be too hardheaded either. Well,

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Speaker 1: so does this mean that men and women are inherently

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Speaker 1: different as far as how they cooperate? Is there a

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Speaker 1: huge difference there? Well, I think that's the question we're

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Speaker 1: going to answer next of this podcast. Because you would assume,

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Speaker 1: based on that study that we decided about testosterone, we

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Speaker 1: know that men tend to have higher levels of testosterone

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Speaker 1: running through their bloodstream. Yeah, so you might think, well, sure,

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Speaker 1: guys aren't going to be as cooperative as women and

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Speaker 1: women are just you know, sweet little pancakes of helpfulness.

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Speaker 1: I don't know why pan aches that, you know, fluffy,

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Speaker 1: they're fluffy and put butter and um. But yeah, I

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Speaker 1: keep going. And there is some support for something called

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Speaker 1: the male warrior hypothesis. Yeah, and that's basically that men's

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Speaker 1: social behavior and psychology are more strongly intergroup driven than women's.

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Speaker 1: And there's all this stuff about, like you know, evolutionary

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Speaker 1: taking home to their women. But basically, researchers from the

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Speaker 1: universities of Kent in England and Tilburg I believe in

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Speaker 1: the Netherlands in two thousand and seven found that men

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Speaker 1: contributed more to their group if the group was competing

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Speaker 1: against other groups. So that's that that can lead us

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Speaker 1: later into a bunch of like sports theory and and

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Speaker 1: female cooperation was pretty much unaffected by intergroup competition. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: And there was a September two thousand eleven study published

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Speaker 1: of research because they are are a ton of studies

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Speaker 1: examining gender and helpfulness and cooperation, and they found that

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Speaker 1: particularly when the interests of an individual or pitted against

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Speaker 1: those of a group. Um, and men cooperate with other men.

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Speaker 1: This was interesting better than women cooperate with other women,

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Speaker 1: we should really not be getting alonger no competition and

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Speaker 1: we're two women, um, and women will cooperate more than

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Speaker 1: men in mixed sex interactions. So basically, everybody cooperates with

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Speaker 1: men better. That's what it sounds like. And you know,

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Speaker 1: I touched on evolutionary theory a second ago. But uh,

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Speaker 1: if they basically say that if everyone acted according to

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Speaker 1: self interest in hunting and warfare back in the day

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Speaker 1: with the wild beast and the mastodons, uh, no food

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Speaker 1: would be provided and all wars would be lost because

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Speaker 1: everybody would be looking out for themselves, like I don't

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Speaker 1: want to get hurt. I'm just gonna kill this wild

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Speaker 1: abest for my woman and myself, not for the rest

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Speaker 1: of you guys. And so basically men had to develop

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Speaker 1: strategies to cooperate with each other. Meanwhile, the theory behind

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Speaker 1: women's interaction and cooperation, according to the studies lead author,

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Speaker 1: is that ancestral women migrated between groups you know, as

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Speaker 1: wives are wont to do and quote, so the dynamics

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Speaker 1: among women would have been rife with sexual competition. Uh.

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Speaker 1: Stereotypes about catty women because all the way back back

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Speaker 1: to evolutionary times. But before I get too bummed out

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Speaker 1: about that, doctor Art Markman, who was the executive editor

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Speaker 1: of Cognitive Science UM, looked at some meta analysis on

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Speaker 1: all this, because yes, we see some gender differences here

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Speaker 1: and there, depending on group versus individual, versus who's sitting

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Speaker 1: across the table from you, versus whether or not you're

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Speaker 1: being an environment that's being monitored. And he found that

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Speaker 1: despite stereotypes, the gender differences when it comes ms to

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Speaker 1: cooperation is very small. It's almost statistically insignificant. He says, Well,

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Speaker 1: it does affect how how likely people are to cooperate

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Speaker 1: to some degree, it is not the most important factor. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's definitely fostering community and trust that helps people cooperate,

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Speaker 1: feel comfortable working together, rather than focusing on a gender balance.

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Speaker 1: So I mean, you shouldn't try to get, you know,

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Speaker 1: a room full of men, or make sure you have

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Speaker 1: an exact balance of men and women. Necessarily, just make

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Speaker 1: sure that the people you hire you know you're fostering

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Speaker 1: that temmunity feeling. Although it is interesting to see what

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Speaker 1: does happen when uh, say, we're in the room our

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Speaker 1: studio by ourselves having to cooperate away from the prying

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Speaker 1: eyes of all of our listeners. But if are you know,

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Speaker 1: when we could, we could stop and you know, not

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Speaker 1: be so cooperative with each other. But chances are when

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Speaker 1: you're being watched or monitored by some kind of an audience,

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Speaker 1: then in your reputation is kind of more on the line.

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Speaker 1: It does change how men and women will interact. It does.

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Speaker 1: And this is a study from you see Santa Barbara,

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Speaker 1: and they had men and women playing a game in

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Speaker 1: front of an audience of the same or opposite sex,

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Speaker 1: either in their home room or in an away room.

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Speaker 1: And so the theory is that while both males and

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Speaker 1: females wish to gain approval of their in group members,

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Speaker 1: in other words, the people in their home room, the

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Speaker 1: actions that are socially desirable differ across gender. So males

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Speaker 1: wish to signal that they're formidable, while females wish to

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Speaker 1: signal that their cooperative. So it has a lot to

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Speaker 1: do not so much with your gender a little bit.

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Speaker 1: Basically we cooperate the same amount, but we cooperate kind

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Speaker 1: of differently. So men cooperate less quote unquote at home

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Speaker 1: in their home room than do females, and cooperate more

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Speaker 1: when away, and they actually cooperate most when in front

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Speaker 1: of a single sex audience. Um, well, I thought it

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Speaker 1: was interesting this. Uh that that study from UC Santa

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Speaker 1: Barbara also supports UM A date a little bit dated

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Speaker 1: study and the Social Psychology Quarterly that found that again

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Speaker 1: there was a minor gender difference in cooperation. But no

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Speaker 1: matter what side women came out on whether or not

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Speaker 1: they're being more cooperative, cooperative excuse me, or defectors, we

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Speaker 1: tend to assume that we have the moral high ground. Yeah. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: we think we're more cooperative and altruistic and all that stuff.

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Speaker 1: And that that actually reminded me of our Women's Intuition podcast,

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Speaker 1: Like if you think in your brain that you're supposed

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Speaker 1: to be a certain way, you just assume that your

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Speaker 1: actions are more that way than somebody else, is kind

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Speaker 1: of yeah. Well, and also we tend to not get

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Speaker 1: as even this is all an experimental settings, but not

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Speaker 1: to get as emotionally worked up about having to hash

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Speaker 1: something out with someone else. Often though, the men were

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Speaker 1: more likely to leave um one of these prisoners dilemma

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Speaker 1: esque gay very agitated and upset, whereas when we were

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Speaker 1: like it's fine, I mean I was being as altruistic

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Speaker 1: as I could possibly be, so fluffy pankicks of cooperation

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Speaker 1: for everyone. Um. Now, we said we would get into

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Speaker 1: a little bit of sports theory, and by that I

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Speaker 1: mean just a little eaty bitty bit um. But a

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Speaker 1: two thousand four study in the Journal of Personality and

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Speaker 1: Social Psychology had a behavioral task assigned to these people

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Speaker 1: that involved shooting a basketball, and in this intergroup competition,

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Speaker 1: which is a combination of cooperation and competition, it led

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Speaker 1: to higher levels of intrinsic motivation, which we already kind

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Speaker 1: of talked about, where men were more likely to cooperate

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Speaker 1: if they were going up against a group. So basically,

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Speaker 1: intergroup competition has positive effects on enjoyment of the sport,

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Speaker 1: and so they recommend the study recommend structuring recreational activities

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Speaker 1: to include both competition and cooperation because that can facilitate

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Speaker 1: high levels of both intrinsic motivation and performance. I don't

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Speaker 1: think it supplies to me, because I hate competition or whatever,

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Speaker 1: but that's probably why I mean, we join up with

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Speaker 1: rex sports teams because it is fun. I mean, the

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Speaker 1: competition level is there enough that it's stimulating, but then

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Speaker 1: you also get the whole cooperative benefits. You get the bond,

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Speaker 1: you get to do the all hands in high five

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Speaker 1: cheer thing and poor big tubs of sports strengths on

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Speaker 1: people I've never done that, I should do that short

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Speaker 1: circuit our equipment. Um. And this whole competitive structure versus

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Speaker 1: cooperative structure translates not so surprisingly into the workplace, and

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Speaker 1: it is interesting to see how they compare in terms

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Speaker 1: of outcome, because a study published in two thousand three

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Speaker 1: in the Academy of Management Journal found that competitive structures

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Speaker 1: enhanced speed and a cooperative one enhances accuracy. Yeah, and

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Speaker 1: it makes sense if you think about it, because if

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Speaker 1: you're competing. Again, if if if Chris It and I

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Speaker 1: had different podcasts and we're recording at the same time,

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Speaker 1: and that's somehow how the universe work. That we had

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Speaker 1: to see who could record the best, the best podcast

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Speaker 1: the fastest. We we would probably be focused, yeah, more

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Speaker 1: on who would do it the fastest, because so you

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Speaker 1: would have the Caroline hour, like you said, maybe I'd

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Speaker 1: have the conger minute minute podcasts out. Yeah. But um,

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Speaker 1: the cooperative environment is really good for teams with extroverted

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Speaker 1: and agreeable members. Uh, teams low on these attributes function

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Speaker 1: better under a competitive structure, which I thought was interesting.

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Speaker 1: So I guess if you're extroverted friendly, you're more likely

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Speaker 1: to want to talk about stuff with your coworkers to

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Speaker 1: reach a solution. So I wonder if someone who swings

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Speaker 1: a little more introverted like myself, does that mean See,

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Speaker 1: I don't know, I was I was thinking about that too,

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Speaker 1: because you don't typically see introverted people like being really

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Speaker 1: cut throat in the workplace, but they do work more

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Speaker 1: into pendly. And so yeah, that that whole competitive system

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Speaker 1: is really good for people who do work independently because

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Speaker 1: it emphasizes performance differences and it rewards individuals with high performance.

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Speaker 1: So it can actually the good on the good the

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Speaker 1: good side, it can promote efficiency. On the bad side,

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Speaker 1: it can lead individuals to place their goals higher than

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Speaker 1: those of the organization. Yeah, and then there's the whole

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Speaker 1: challenge with a cooperative system that works well, like you said,

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Speaker 1: with people who are extroverted and agreeable, because if you

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Speaker 1: put them in more of a competitive reward structure, at

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Speaker 1: least according to this study, they made twice as many mistakes.

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Speaker 1: So they're rushing around me like, but I want to

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Speaker 1: talk to you about it. So, essentially, we need some

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Speaker 1: kind of balance between it all. You know, we can't

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Speaker 1: be too competitive, we can't be too cooperative. We've gotta

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Speaker 1: get things done. Essentially, we all need listen, everybody, just

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Speaker 1: be perfect, no pressure, no pressure at all, you know,

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Speaker 1: keep those ox oxetse and levels high but not too high. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: not too high. We don't want to be hugging all

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Speaker 1: the time. Yeah. But then with testoster, you know, yeah,

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Speaker 1: low but not too low. So I do want to

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Speaker 1: ask our listeners, you know, do they consider themselves to

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Speaker 1: be more cooperators or quote unquote defectors. Are you more

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Speaker 1: likely to feel like you're getting ahead if you're working

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Speaker 1: closely with other people? Do you like helping others? Do

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Speaker 1: you ever feel like you're helping others at the expense

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Speaker 1: of your own success? And with anyone surprised by the

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Speaker 1: lack of gender difference in cooperation, Yeah, because a lot

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Speaker 1: of people stereotypically, you know, anecdotally, people think that women

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Speaker 1: are inherently more cooperative. Not necessarily true, Yeah, but that

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Speaker 1: might be used as a misused as an adjective for subservient.

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Speaker 1: I digress send us an email. Mom. Stuff at Discovery

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Speaker 1: dot com is where you can send them. Okay, this

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Speaker 1: is an email from Claire about our Kathy episode. She says,

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Speaker 1: I'm a fourteen year old enthusiast of comic books and

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Speaker 1: Liz lemon Boo go clear and read plenty of both

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Speaker 1: Garfield and Cathy comics in my childhood. I wasn't aware

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Speaker 1: of the feminist backlash against Kathy until your podcast, and

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Speaker 1: frankly I disagree with it. Not only do I think

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Speaker 1: she shouldn't be held to a standard that other comics

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Speaker 1: are not held to, but if being a prominent woman

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Speaker 1: cartoonist means that she has to uphold some responsibility of

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Speaker 1: progressing women and having some sort of big, meaningful character arc,

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Speaker 1: when Garfield has only gotten fatter and John Lonelier are

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Speaker 1: the two genders in the media truly equal. I appreciate

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Speaker 1: feminism and think anyone's involvement in it is a fantastic

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Speaker 1: thing to do. But to assign someone a role like

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Speaker 1: that for something as to be blunt mediocre as a

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Speaker 1: newspaper comic strip, I think is over the top. Well,

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Speaker 1: I have one here from Madison, and it is in

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Speaker 1: response to our episode about erotica and which we mentioned

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Speaker 1: h b D s M themes in erotic literature, and

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Speaker 1: she writes, I'm a confident woman who incorporates media sum

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Speaker 1: into my sex life. I don't think safe, sane, consensual

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Speaker 1: kinky sex among adults is damaging to women. Men can

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Speaker 1: be subs too. If getting tied up and stuff is

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Speaker 1: really hot to you, then find someone else who's into it.

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Speaker 1: I appreciate you guys acknowledge a difference between actual violence

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Speaker 1: and consensual violent play of b D s M. The

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Speaker 1: key word here is that b D s M is

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Speaker 1: play Dan Savage Love, whom describes sex role play as

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Speaker 1: cops and robbers for adults with your pants off and

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Speaker 1: orgasm so true. One of my problems with fifty shades

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Speaker 1: is that it paints a picture that only screwed up,

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Speaker 1: broken people participate in bed SM. Screwed up broken people

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Speaker 1: participate in vanilla relationships too. Emotional and physical abuse is

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Speaker 1: never okay, especially in the kink community. The last thing

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Speaker 1: that we need on the news is evil kinky people

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00:25:47,119 --> 00:25:50,040
Speaker 1: do something sex crazed and evil. It's a great headline.

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Speaker 1: Most kinsters I know are extremely polite and will only

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Speaker 1: whip you if you ask nicely while you're sober. The

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Speaker 1: bottom really controls what's happening to them, since nothing else

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Speaker 1: happens without their permission. And I, on a side note,

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Speaker 1: am blushing. So thank you to Madison for that insight

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Speaker 1: on the b D s M community, and to everyone

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Speaker 1: who has written in. We have gotten a lot of

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Speaker 1: email about our Erotica episode, so much in fact, I

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Speaker 1: haven't even gotten around Toro to now, so that and

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Speaker 1: more for the next episode. Mom Stuff at Discovery dot

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00:26:23,320 --> 00:26:25,879
Speaker 1: com is where you can send your letters. You can

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00:26:25,880 --> 00:26:28,959
Speaker 1: also find us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter

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00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:33,439
Speaker 1: at Mom's Stuff Podcast, and you can head over to

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00:26:33,480 --> 00:26:36,160
Speaker 1: our website during the week to see what we're up to.

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00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:42,000
Speaker 1: It's how Stuff Works dot com for more on this

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00:26:42,160 --> 00:26:44,640
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics. Does it how Stuff works

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Speaker 1: dot com brought to you by the reinvented two thousand

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Speaker 1: twelve camera. It's ready, Are you