1 00:00:00,560 --> 00:00:03,760 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Missed in History Class from how 2 00:00:03,800 --> 00:00:13,680 Speaker 1: Stuff Works dot com. Hello, and welcome to the podcast. 3 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:17,919 Speaker 1: I'm Scary Dowdy and I am joined again by Jonathan Strickland. 4 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:21,480 Speaker 1: Hey there, So Jonathan has has joined me as part 5 00:00:21,480 --> 00:00:24,159 Speaker 1: of this little series that we're doing while Debilina is 6 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:27,960 Speaker 1: on maternity leave. Um having different podcast co hosts on 7 00:00:28,000 --> 00:00:31,360 Speaker 1: the show to talk about their shows specialty. So in 8 00:00:31,480 --> 00:00:34,440 Speaker 1: Jonathan's case as the co host of Tech Stuff, that 9 00:00:34,600 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: is of course technology, but we're also going to be 10 00:00:37,400 --> 00:00:41,159 Speaker 1: talking about history, So technology in history. And last time 11 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:46,560 Speaker 1: we talked, we were discussing cryptography, specifically cryptography as used 12 00:00:46,640 --> 00:00:50,440 Speaker 1: by the Axis Powers during World War Two. That's correct, yes, 13 00:00:50,479 --> 00:00:54,000 Speaker 1: And we were really focusing mainly on the Enigma machine, 14 00:00:54,040 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 1: which I think everyone would say is probably the most 15 00:00:56,240 --> 00:00:59,640 Speaker 1: famous machine as far as cryptography goes. It's one of 16 00:00:59,680 --> 00:01:01,600 Speaker 1: those that a lot of people, even if they don't 17 00:01:01,600 --> 00:01:04,680 Speaker 1: really know a lot about cryptography, often they'll say Enigma machine. 18 00:01:04,680 --> 00:01:07,840 Speaker 1: That sounds familiar. Wellen Alan Turing is so big these days, right, 19 00:01:08,040 --> 00:01:11,680 Speaker 1: He's finally getting the credit that was long due, and 20 00:01:11,760 --> 00:01:15,399 Speaker 1: he is so closely connected to the Enigma machine and 21 00:01:15,480 --> 00:01:18,039 Speaker 1: breaking that code that Yeah, a lot of people have 22 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:21,800 Speaker 1: heard about it recently. Definitely, definitely, and hopefully they don't 23 00:01:21,840 --> 00:01:24,000 Speaker 1: think that it was a device used by the Riddler. 24 00:01:25,000 --> 00:01:28,160 Speaker 1: Different Enigma if they've listened, If you guys have listened 25 00:01:28,200 --> 00:01:31,440 Speaker 1: to that episode, you already know how that machine works. 26 00:01:31,440 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 1: And we also talked a little bit about the Japanese 27 00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:37,759 Speaker 1: code Purple, which is a very different but also um 28 00:01:38,240 --> 00:01:41,920 Speaker 1: a similar more similar to the Enigma than some of 29 00:01:41,920 --> 00:01:43,720 Speaker 1: the other codes we're going to be talking about today. 30 00:01:43,920 --> 00:01:46,600 Speaker 1: Right now, because some of the stuff we're going to 31 00:01:46,720 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 1: talk about is related to the Enigma, I was going 32 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:52,600 Speaker 1: to give just a quick overview of the Enigma so 33 00:01:52,680 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 1: people can remember how that works. It was a machine 34 00:01:55,880 --> 00:01:58,920 Speaker 1: that had three or more rotors in it, and those 35 00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:01,680 Speaker 1: rotors you would pose Asian in a very particular way 36 00:02:01,720 --> 00:02:04,320 Speaker 1: to send a message. The person who's receiving the message 37 00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:08,160 Speaker 1: has another Enigma machine. They set their rotors to the 38 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:10,519 Speaker 1: same position that you have yours at, and you would 39 00:02:10,560 --> 00:02:12,600 Speaker 1: determine this by a codebook. You would each have a 40 00:02:12,639 --> 00:02:17,120 Speaker 1: codebook that would have the date and possibly even the time, 41 00:02:17,800 --> 00:02:21,040 Speaker 1: and what setting you needed to have your Enigma machine 42 00:02:21,080 --> 00:02:24,440 Speaker 1: set at. Look like a typewriter with a big bunch 43 00:02:24,440 --> 00:02:26,320 Speaker 1: of lightbulbs on the other end of it. When you 44 00:02:26,360 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 1: would press a key, a light bulb would light up, 45 00:02:28,520 --> 00:02:30,680 Speaker 1: but it wouldn't be the light bulb that corresponds with 46 00:02:30,720 --> 00:02:34,359 Speaker 1: the letter you push never never. That letter would be 47 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:38,200 Speaker 1: determined by the pathway that the electric current takes through 48 00:02:38,200 --> 00:02:41,320 Speaker 1: those rotors. The rotors would turn each time you'd press 49 00:02:41,360 --> 00:02:44,760 Speaker 1: a key, so that pathway changes each time, introducing an 50 00:02:44,760 --> 00:02:49,320 Speaker 1: element of randomness or pseudo randomness into your message. So 51 00:02:49,360 --> 00:02:52,280 Speaker 1: that way, as you continue to type out this message, 52 00:02:52,440 --> 00:02:57,000 Speaker 1: the key becomes hard to crack. And ideally the only 53 00:02:57,040 --> 00:03:00,079 Speaker 1: way you can decode this message is if you have 54 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:03,120 Speaker 1: that Enigma machine or an Enigma machine with the same 55 00:03:03,240 --> 00:03:06,440 Speaker 1: rotors set the same position, and the codebooks that you 56 00:03:06,639 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: have everything ready to go. Because with all of these 57 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:13,040 Speaker 1: different combinations, all these possible combinations, you have in turn, 58 00:03:13,120 --> 00:03:16,639 Speaker 1: almost an endless possibility of ciphertext that you're going to 59 00:03:16,720 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 1: be produced. Effectively endless. It is that does have an 60 00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 1: end because once you get all the way through all 61 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:25,200 Speaker 1: of the rotors, depending on how many rotors there are 62 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:28,080 Speaker 1: that could be three or four, uh, you do have 63 00:03:28,320 --> 00:03:30,880 Speaker 1: a finite number of combinations. But it's such a huge 64 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:35,320 Speaker 1: number as to be astronomical alright, which is pretty tough 65 00:03:35,360 --> 00:03:38,280 Speaker 1: if you've got a pencil and paper. And because of that, 66 00:03:38,320 --> 00:03:44,840 Speaker 1: because of the astronomical possibilities, the Nazis did consider the 67 00:03:44,960 --> 00:03:48,080 Speaker 1: Enigma unbreakable. They did so much so that it's going 68 00:03:48,120 --> 00:03:50,160 Speaker 1: to play a big role in part of what we're 69 00:03:50,160 --> 00:03:57,360 Speaker 1: gonna talk about. That. Yes, I think it's definitively hubrious. 70 00:03:57,920 --> 00:04:00,720 Speaker 1: All right. So now that we've sort of refreshed or 71 00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:03,600 Speaker 1: Jonathan has refreshed to you on how the Enigma machine were, 72 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:06,760 Speaker 1: we're going to talk about the Allied version of it, 73 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:10,160 Speaker 1: almost something called the Type X machine. It was the 74 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:13,839 Speaker 1: British variation specifically of the Enigma, and the full name 75 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 1: of it was the ari A Royal Air Force Enigma 76 00:04:17,160 --> 00:04:20,320 Speaker 1: with Type X attachment. So they didn't even really bother 77 00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:24,360 Speaker 1: changing the name. It is an Enigma, We've just modified it. Yeah, 78 00:04:24,440 --> 00:04:27,119 Speaker 1: And it was it was like the big daddy version 79 00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:30,240 Speaker 1: of the Enigma. Now, the Enigma could run on battery power. 80 00:04:30,680 --> 00:04:33,120 Speaker 1: You could hook up a big battery to the Enigma 81 00:04:33,160 --> 00:04:35,599 Speaker 1: and that would power it because really the only power 82 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:37,640 Speaker 1: that needed was to generate this electric current that will 83 00:04:37,760 --> 00:04:40,760 Speaker 1: light a light bulb. That's all it was doing. Yeah, 84 00:04:40,920 --> 00:04:44,080 Speaker 1: the the Type X not so much. It used a 85 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:46,719 Speaker 1: C power. You had to plug it in because it 86 00:04:46,800 --> 00:04:49,840 Speaker 1: was it was a monster huge. You would not move 87 00:04:49,880 --> 00:04:52,800 Speaker 1: one of these things, so you couldn't have a lot 88 00:04:52,839 --> 00:04:56,760 Speaker 1: of them out in the wild. But it was. It 89 00:04:56,839 --> 00:05:01,680 Speaker 1: was built on the same sort of premise as the Enigma, 90 00:05:01,839 --> 00:05:07,760 Speaker 1: and it was therefore very secure if you used it properly. Now, 91 00:05:08,920 --> 00:05:11,880 Speaker 1: the interesting thing to me about this is not so 92 00:05:11,960 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 1: much how it was different from the Enigma. It didn't 93 00:05:14,960 --> 00:05:18,320 Speaker 1: use light bulbs, for example, use teletype machines, so you 94 00:05:18,320 --> 00:05:22,360 Speaker 1: would actually type out your message and a cyphered version 95 00:05:22,400 --> 00:05:25,800 Speaker 1: would be uh produced. To the Enigma with a two 96 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:28,120 Speaker 1: man job, right, you had to have one person to 97 00:05:28,240 --> 00:05:30,640 Speaker 1: type in the letters and another person watching the light bulbs. 98 00:05:32,240 --> 00:05:34,040 Speaker 1: And just like that, on the other side, you had 99 00:05:34,080 --> 00:05:36,919 Speaker 1: to have someone type in the ciphered message and the 100 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:39,600 Speaker 1: person looking at the light bulbs would be writing out 101 00:05:39,600 --> 00:05:42,680 Speaker 1: the plain text uh. In this case, you would have 102 00:05:42,720 --> 00:05:46,920 Speaker 1: this sort of teletype approach, and someone on the other 103 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:50,240 Speaker 1: end would have to feed through the teletype stuff so 104 00:05:50,279 --> 00:05:52,159 Speaker 1: that you could get the plain text version out. But 105 00:05:52,200 --> 00:05:54,960 Speaker 1: you know, otherwise it's very similar. Just take the light 106 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:58,960 Speaker 1: bulbs out really and and replace it with teletype UM. Again, 107 00:05:59,160 --> 00:06:03,440 Speaker 1: very very secure cure. It had five rotors, but only 108 00:06:03,440 --> 00:06:07,279 Speaker 1: three of them would rotate. So like the Enigma machine 109 00:06:07,320 --> 00:06:10,600 Speaker 1: that would have these rotating rotors that rotate. Usually the 110 00:06:10,600 --> 00:06:13,240 Speaker 1: first one on the left would rotate every key stroke, 111 00:06:13,520 --> 00:06:15,840 Speaker 1: and then once it made a full rotation to get 112 00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:18,880 Speaker 1: back to the starting position, the second rotor would rotate 113 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:21,800 Speaker 1: one and then you could go another full rotation, the 114 00:06:21,839 --> 00:06:25,200 Speaker 1: second rotate again. So if you had a really long message, 115 00:06:25,279 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 1: it would eventually get all three rotors rotating at least 116 00:06:28,080 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 1: once or twice. In this case, you had three rotors 117 00:06:31,120 --> 00:06:33,520 Speaker 1: that could rotate. The last two were just meant to 118 00:06:33,720 --> 00:06:37,000 Speaker 1: allow you to create a good starting position, but they 119 00:06:37,080 --> 00:06:40,320 Speaker 1: would not rotate. So if you went long enough, those 120 00:06:40,320 --> 00:06:43,359 Speaker 1: first three rotors would repeat. Granted that would be a 121 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:47,560 Speaker 1: really long message, but it could happen UM. So that 122 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:51,039 Speaker 1: was another difference. The interesting thing to me two things. 123 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:54,520 Speaker 1: One is that the Germans were so confident that their 124 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:58,799 Speaker 1: Enigma machine was unbreakable, and they knew the TIPEX machine 125 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:02,240 Speaker 1: was based on the Enigma machine, they didn't really bother 126 00:07:02,279 --> 00:07:05,960 Speaker 1: to try and break the codes we're talking about. Look, 127 00:07:06,080 --> 00:07:08,640 Speaker 1: we know, our codes are amazing. No one could break them, 128 00:07:08,680 --> 00:07:12,480 Speaker 1: so including us. We couldn't break our own. They're so 129 00:07:12,600 --> 00:07:16,520 Speaker 1: why do you bother? And uh? And they employed probably 130 00:07:16,560 --> 00:07:21,160 Speaker 1: about half the number of cryptographers that the British had, 131 00:07:21,560 --> 00:07:25,480 Speaker 1: let alone the rest of the Allies, and they there 132 00:07:25,520 --> 00:07:27,520 Speaker 1: were a couple other differences with the Type X. But 133 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:31,560 Speaker 1: the other big thing was that the British had an 134 00:07:31,600 --> 00:07:36,480 Speaker 1: attitude about using a mechanical device to code things. They 135 00:07:36,520 --> 00:07:43,200 Speaker 1: didn't think of it as terribly proper. And also you 136 00:07:43,240 --> 00:07:46,600 Speaker 1: have to understand the British Navy has existed for hundreds 137 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:50,480 Speaker 1: of years. Henry the seventh essentially established the British Navy. 138 00:07:50,520 --> 00:07:53,360 Speaker 1: This is Jonathan the Admiral getting back into the show. 139 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:57,080 Speaker 1: Here's here's where my world's overlap. Yes, Henry the seventh 140 00:07:57,120 --> 00:08:00,360 Speaker 1: began to establish the British Navy, which really he got 141 00:08:00,360 --> 00:08:02,880 Speaker 1: its start under Henry the eighth. It didn't under Henry 142 00:08:02,920 --> 00:08:05,640 Speaker 1: the seventh. That was about eight votes. By the end 143 00:08:05,680 --> 00:08:07,200 Speaker 1: of Henry the Eighth's rain, it was a little bit 144 00:08:07,240 --> 00:08:09,280 Speaker 1: better by Elizabeth's rain. It was a force to be 145 00:08:09,320 --> 00:08:15,720 Speaker 1: reckoned with, partially because of weather. But this is this 146 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:19,960 Speaker 1: is a this is a storied branch of the British military. 147 00:08:20,320 --> 00:08:25,240 Speaker 1: It has hundreds of years of history, and the commanders 148 00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:28,800 Speaker 1: of the British Navy sort of looked down upon the 149 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:32,960 Speaker 1: Royal Air Force, which was in their eyes and infant 150 00:08:33,160 --> 00:08:36,240 Speaker 1: branch of the military. It was brand new, and no 151 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:40,079 Speaker 1: tiny little branch of the military that's only been around 152 00:08:40,120 --> 00:08:43,680 Speaker 1: for a few years could possibly tell a branch that's 153 00:08:43,679 --> 00:08:47,079 Speaker 1: been around for centuries what the best way is to 154 00:08:47,080 --> 00:08:51,480 Speaker 1: incipher a message that's just being ridiculous, which I think 155 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:56,560 Speaker 1: is quintessentially British. We might get some emails over this one, 156 00:08:56,640 --> 00:08:59,240 Speaker 1: but yeah, I mean, you can send those two text 157 00:08:59,280 --> 00:09:02,720 Speaker 1: stuff at Discovery dot com. But I think that's that's 158 00:09:02,760 --> 00:09:05,640 Speaker 1: a good point too, because if we're talking about this 159 00:09:05,880 --> 00:09:09,880 Speaker 1: uh advanced technology, it's obviously got to be accepted and 160 00:09:09,960 --> 00:09:14,160 Speaker 1: adopted by everybody who counts to really do its job 161 00:09:14,240 --> 00:09:16,319 Speaker 1: like it's supposed to do. It's it's not going to 162 00:09:16,440 --> 00:09:19,040 Speaker 1: help if for when, it's not going to help if 163 00:09:19,080 --> 00:09:22,360 Speaker 1: you're Germany and you're thinking that it's unbreakable because it's 164 00:09:22,360 --> 00:09:24,319 Speaker 1: based off of yours. But it's also not going to 165 00:09:24,400 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 1: help if if you don't want to use your own 166 00:09:26,160 --> 00:09:31,679 Speaker 1: countries code, right, Yes, it's and we have to remember 167 00:09:31,720 --> 00:09:35,840 Speaker 1: within all of these countries there are internal politics at 168 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:39,080 Speaker 1: play all the time, and it's very easy for us 169 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:41,559 Speaker 1: to boil down the story of World War Two to 170 00:09:41,720 --> 00:09:44,319 Speaker 1: these big, big, big ideas, But when you start looking 171 00:09:44,360 --> 00:09:48,040 Speaker 1: into it, you realize that there were no simple and 172 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:52,000 Speaker 1: easy stories here. They're all very, very complex. So even 173 00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:58,080 Speaker 1: going forward with a specific technology or approach always had 174 00:09:58,120 --> 00:10:01,440 Speaker 1: a lot of back and forth within a country before 175 00:10:01,520 --> 00:10:04,600 Speaker 1: anything was done. So it really should come as no surprise. 176 00:10:05,200 --> 00:10:09,720 Speaker 1: It's just that, uh, you wonder how things would have 177 00:10:09,760 --> 00:10:15,400 Speaker 1: been different had groups acted earlier upon these technologies. So 178 00:10:15,520 --> 00:10:18,440 Speaker 1: as the Type X ever broken, if nobody was really 179 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,760 Speaker 1: trying to break it, no, not that I can tell 180 00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:23,000 Speaker 1: as far as I know. I mean, not that it 181 00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:26,400 Speaker 1: was unbreakable. It could have been broken had they taken 182 00:10:26,480 --> 00:10:29,360 Speaker 1: the time and effort, and if they had captured codebooks 183 00:10:29,400 --> 00:10:33,000 Speaker 1: and devoted to doing it. Now, granted, you're talking about 184 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:35,680 Speaker 1: a machine that's so large that probably wasn't put into 185 00:10:35,720 --> 00:10:38,760 Speaker 1: too many areas out in the field, so that's another 186 00:10:38,800 --> 00:10:41,000 Speaker 1: thing to think about. This is not necessarily a machine 187 00:10:41,040 --> 00:10:43,880 Speaker 1: that would have been easy to capture on a ship, 188 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:47,760 Speaker 1: But what wouldn't have been as vulnerable as the Enigma 189 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:50,800 Speaker 1: machines that were out on out on ships, out on 190 00:10:50,840 --> 00:10:54,640 Speaker 1: weather boats, as you're discussing, um, in places where you 191 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:58,000 Speaker 1: could pick one up. So we haven't yet talked about 192 00:10:58,040 --> 00:11:01,240 Speaker 1: the codes Americans were using. We've talked about some code 193 00:11:01,240 --> 00:11:05,680 Speaker 1: breaking efforts, but the US was using the ether M 194 00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:09,320 Speaker 1: Mark two or Cigabra machine, and the patent for that 195 00:11:09,520 --> 00:11:13,960 Speaker 1: was filed in nineteen Yes, and it was eventually granted. 196 00:11:14,440 --> 00:11:18,000 Speaker 1: But when was it granted two? So what happened there? Well, 197 00:11:18,040 --> 00:11:20,839 Speaker 1: what happens there is if you patent something, you have 198 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:24,000 Speaker 1: to reveal how it works. Okay, nobody wanted to do that. 199 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:29,320 Speaker 1: Why would you do that? Um? I think it's mainly, Ah, 200 00:11:29,559 --> 00:11:32,439 Speaker 1: it's a secrecy issue. Now granted, even filing for patents 201 00:11:32,480 --> 00:11:35,959 Speaker 1: means that that information gets out there. And when you're 202 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:39,320 Speaker 1: talking about a machine that's designed to cipher things, you 203 00:11:39,360 --> 00:11:42,280 Speaker 1: don't necessarily want to reveal to the world. Hey I've 204 00:11:42,280 --> 00:11:45,280 Speaker 1: got this great thing that makes unbreakable messages. Let me 205 00:11:45,320 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 1: tell you how it works. It's kind of the equivalent 206 00:11:47,400 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 1: of what we discussed in the last episode, the Japanese 207 00:11:50,880 --> 00:11:55,480 Speaker 1: annown thing Code Purple, when code red and this machine 208 00:11:55,559 --> 00:11:59,040 Speaker 1: again not that much different from the way the Enigma 209 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:01,120 Speaker 1: and Type X machine has worked in the sense that 210 00:12:01,200 --> 00:12:05,400 Speaker 1: again it uses rotors to try and randomize connections. Now, 211 00:12:05,400 --> 00:12:08,520 Speaker 1: in this case said three banks with five rotors each, 212 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:13,080 Speaker 1: so fifteen rotors total, and it wasn't not all of 213 00:12:13,080 --> 00:12:16,800 Speaker 1: those rotors were meant to guide a an electric current 214 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:18,600 Speaker 1: so that you would have a ciphered message on the 215 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:22,319 Speaker 1: other end. But this was a very complex device. Also, 216 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:27,280 Speaker 1: it was again a machine that was not terribly portable. 217 00:12:27,400 --> 00:12:30,120 Speaker 1: It was not used a lot in World War Two 218 00:12:30,160 --> 00:12:33,400 Speaker 1: for that reason. Um, that was the big drawback to 219 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:36,200 Speaker 1: a lot of these devices is that they because of 220 00:12:36,240 --> 00:12:39,720 Speaker 1: their design, they were not easy to deploy in the 221 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:42,240 Speaker 1: field and so they had very limited use. You could 222 00:12:42,400 --> 00:12:47,680 Speaker 1: use them for domestic communication, but for something to to 223 00:12:47,679 --> 00:12:50,680 Speaker 1: to issue commands and field orders, then you're not going 224 00:12:50,720 --> 00:12:53,720 Speaker 1: to get field report. That's right, that's right. So the 225 00:12:53,800 --> 00:12:57,160 Speaker 1: United States really didn't use it a lot. They depended 226 00:12:57,240 --> 00:13:02,160 Speaker 1: upon an entirely different approach that was absolutely ingenious they did. 227 00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:05,439 Speaker 1: And this was one of my favorite code related World 228 00:13:05,440 --> 00:13:08,720 Speaker 1: War two stories. It's one that Candith and Jane talked 229 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:11,400 Speaker 1: about before on this show. But we're going to discuss 230 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:14,000 Speaker 1: it some more, really focusing on how the codes were 231 00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:16,760 Speaker 1: It's the code talkers, of course, and usually you think 232 00:13:16,800 --> 00:13:19,560 Speaker 1: of the Navajo code talkers, although we're going to talk 233 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:23,120 Speaker 1: about a few other Native American tribes that were used 234 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:28,520 Speaker 1: for code purposes during the war. But the decision to 235 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:32,440 Speaker 1: use Native American languages on their own, not just as 236 00:13:32,480 --> 00:13:36,240 Speaker 1: a code wasn't anything new. Native American languages had been 237 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:40,520 Speaker 1: used before. That's right. They've been used in wartime before. 238 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:43,679 Speaker 1: And uh, they've been used in World War One. There 239 00:13:43,720 --> 00:13:48,680 Speaker 1: were the Choctaw languages used in that in that arena, 240 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:53,760 Speaker 1: but infantry chalk talk, it's it's and it proved to 241 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:56,000 Speaker 1: be a very effective tool. And there are a lot 242 00:13:56,000 --> 00:13:58,560 Speaker 1: of different reasons for this, but a big one is 243 00:13:58,600 --> 00:14:01,719 Speaker 1: that as a group, the Native American languages are so 244 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:04,800 Speaker 1: far removed from the languages found in the rest of 245 00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 1: the world that anyone unfamiliar with them it is very 246 00:14:10,280 --> 00:14:15,480 Speaker 1: difficult to understand, especially because within each individual language there 247 00:14:15,520 --> 00:14:18,720 Speaker 1: are lots of different dialects, and there are a lot 248 00:14:18,760 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 1: of different ways of saying the same same group of 249 00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:25,760 Speaker 1: phenomes where it means two different things if you depending 250 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:27,960 Speaker 1: on the way you say it, and so it's a 251 00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:30,640 Speaker 1: very complex language, and it's not at all as if 252 00:14:30,640 --> 00:14:33,360 Speaker 1: you if you know one Romance language, you can kind 253 00:14:33,360 --> 00:14:35,960 Speaker 1: of get the hang of another. That's right. In fact, 254 00:14:36,160 --> 00:14:39,040 Speaker 1: the last research I read, which was quite some time ago, 255 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:43,560 Speaker 1: said that they're the closest anyone has come so far 256 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:50,200 Speaker 1: is potentially identifying a distant relative of basic native American 257 00:14:50,280 --> 00:14:54,400 Speaker 1: languages with a language that originated out of Siberia. But 258 00:14:54,480 --> 00:14:57,200 Speaker 1: that was it. It's not that would be quite some 259 00:14:57,280 --> 00:14:59,920 Speaker 1: time ago, plenty of time for the language to evolve 260 00:15:00,080 --> 00:15:05,040 Speaker 1: dramatically and into all these thousands, and they didn't even 261 00:15:05,320 --> 00:15:09,400 Speaker 1: even the report said we can't be sure there's a connection. 262 00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:12,440 Speaker 1: It only looks like there's a potential connection, which means 263 00:15:12,480 --> 00:15:17,240 Speaker 1: that with it being so alien to the various forces 264 00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:21,080 Speaker 1: in the access powers, that's a good place to look 265 00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:23,400 Speaker 1: if you want to be able to send messages without 266 00:15:23,480 --> 00:15:25,800 Speaker 1: anyone knowing what it is you're saying, so and that's 267 00:15:25,840 --> 00:15:31,640 Speaker 1: just we're just discussing the language without any additional securities applied, 268 00:15:32,320 --> 00:15:35,120 Speaker 1: just Choctaw in this case, unless you have somebody else 269 00:15:35,160 --> 00:15:37,960 Speaker 1: who knows the language, that's going to be a pretty 270 00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 1: secure message. But the youth in World War two took 271 00:15:41,720 --> 00:15:44,200 Speaker 1: it a step further. It would be a code based 272 00:15:44,280 --> 00:15:49,000 Speaker 1: on the language. So another native speaker, another bilingual speaker 273 00:15:49,080 --> 00:15:52,320 Speaker 1: wouldn't be able to just read the code and understand 274 00:15:52,320 --> 00:15:54,280 Speaker 1: what it was saying. They might recognize the words, but 275 00:15:54,320 --> 00:15:57,320 Speaker 1: they couldn't decipher the meaning of the message. First that 276 00:15:57,360 --> 00:16:00,520 Speaker 1: I have to learn about the whole reading thing. Because 277 00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:03,320 Speaker 1: Navajo is a spoken language, not a written language, they 278 00:16:03,320 --> 00:16:06,680 Speaker 1: had to create a phonetic alphabet so that they could 279 00:16:07,200 --> 00:16:11,640 Speaker 1: represent the sounds made in the Navajo speech to have 280 00:16:11,760 --> 00:16:14,960 Speaker 1: a written version of a text or of of a message, 281 00:16:15,160 --> 00:16:18,880 Speaker 1: otherwise it would just be a voice message. And so 282 00:16:19,000 --> 00:16:21,400 Speaker 1: that there's that. You've already got to learn the phonetic 283 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:24,640 Speaker 1: alphabet to understand whatever the language is or whatever the messages. 284 00:16:25,040 --> 00:16:27,320 Speaker 1: And then on top of that it has this code. 285 00:16:27,760 --> 00:16:30,280 Speaker 1: So for an example, I mean, I could come up 286 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:33,440 Speaker 1: to Sarah and just say a string of unrelated words, 287 00:16:33,840 --> 00:16:37,760 Speaker 1: which to anyone listening would sound like I had gone crazy, 288 00:16:37,880 --> 00:16:40,880 Speaker 1: which we call Wednesday here and how stuff works. But 289 00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:47,200 Speaker 1: because Sarah knows the code vocabulary sheet right, then she 290 00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:50,240 Speaker 1: can get a meaningful message out of that same sort 291 00:16:50,240 --> 00:16:52,760 Speaker 1: of thing here, except with the added complexity of using 292 00:16:52,760 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 1: a language that no one in Europe or Asia knew 293 00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:58,160 Speaker 1: about well. And I'm going to throw in a few 294 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:02,960 Speaker 1: more complexities here. With Vaho, it's tonal, so one spelling 295 00:17:03,040 --> 00:17:05,240 Speaker 1: can mean different things. This is something we discussed a 296 00:17:05,280 --> 00:17:08,280 Speaker 1: little bit on our Chunk Sisters episode with Vietnamese, which 297 00:17:08,320 --> 00:17:12,040 Speaker 1: is also a tonal episode. Um, So you really have 298 00:17:12,160 --> 00:17:14,800 Speaker 1: to know what you're talking about if if you're going 299 00:17:14,840 --> 00:17:18,919 Speaker 1: to be speaking Navajo and then um, like like you 300 00:17:18,960 --> 00:17:21,520 Speaker 1: were saying earlier, it's just not well known. You know, 301 00:17:21,640 --> 00:17:24,640 Speaker 1: chances are you're not going to have studied Navajo if 302 00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:30,080 Speaker 1: you are a young Japanese person, whereas you very likely 303 00:17:30,160 --> 00:17:33,280 Speaker 1: may have attended school in the United States or or 304 00:17:33,320 --> 00:17:36,919 Speaker 1: somewhere else or picked up English, and um even you 305 00:17:37,000 --> 00:17:43,080 Speaker 1: might know English colloquialism, English slang, have a familiarity with 306 00:17:43,160 --> 00:17:45,480 Speaker 1: words that might seem more secure, especially in the in 307 00:17:45,520 --> 00:17:48,240 Speaker 1: the thirties or forties than than they would now. But 308 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:51,640 Speaker 1: Navajo is a whole different level from that, right And 309 00:17:52,280 --> 00:17:54,960 Speaker 1: it's I'm glad you said Japanese because we hadn't really 310 00:17:54,960 --> 00:17:57,440 Speaker 1: pointed it out. But the Navajo code talkers were used 311 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:01,280 Speaker 1: exclusively in the Pacific Theater that that was where the 312 00:18:01,359 --> 00:18:04,440 Speaker 1: United States decided to concentrate their efforts, and in fact 313 00:18:04,480 --> 00:18:07,800 Speaker 1: they were part of the United States Marine Corps. That 314 00:18:07,880 --> 00:18:10,640 Speaker 1: was the branch of the military that employed the Navajo 315 00:18:10,640 --> 00:18:13,680 Speaker 1: code talkers. They were not the only Native American speakers 316 00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:16,399 Speaker 1: who were used in this capacity in World War Two, 317 00:18:16,680 --> 00:18:20,920 Speaker 1: but that again the most famous ones, the Comanches, for instance, 318 00:18:21,000 --> 00:18:24,080 Speaker 1: were used in Europe. They were were part of the 319 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:28,720 Speaker 1: army rather than the Marine. Um so different different Indian 320 00:18:29,000 --> 00:18:33,840 Speaker 1: Native American tribes used in different theaters, in different branches 321 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:37,320 Speaker 1: of the military for different purposes. But we have to 322 00:18:37,480 --> 00:18:41,680 Speaker 1: go back to how somebody decided to do this because 323 00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:45,720 Speaker 1: it seems like such an ingenious idea. It seems obvious. 324 00:18:45,760 --> 00:18:49,200 Speaker 1: On the one hand, Um, if you have these languages 325 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:52,960 Speaker 1: with very few speakers, they are all in your part 326 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:56,240 Speaker 1: of the world and have traditionally been kind of isolated 327 00:18:56,320 --> 00:18:58,760 Speaker 1: or language has been isolated, that seems obvious. But how 328 00:18:58,760 --> 00:19:01,199 Speaker 1: do you how do you make that jump to to 329 00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:04,680 Speaker 1: create a code based on those languages? Right? And this 330 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:08,199 Speaker 1: comes down to a man named Philip Johnston, who was 331 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:11,680 Speaker 1: the son of a Prosidant missionary and had grown up 332 00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:15,480 Speaker 1: on Navajo land and learned the language fluent and he 333 00:19:15,560 --> 00:19:19,040 Speaker 1: was fluent, and he also was I believe, a World 334 00:19:19,040 --> 00:19:21,480 Speaker 1: War One veteran, and he knew about the use of 335 00:19:21,560 --> 00:19:26,440 Speaker 1: Choctaw and so, using his experience both as a veteran 336 00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:29,800 Speaker 1: and as someone who had grown up with the Navajo language, 337 00:19:30,160 --> 00:19:36,200 Speaker 1: he suggested using Navajo as a means of communicating secret 338 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:42,200 Speaker 1: messages into across different lines. And it was a brilliant idea, 339 00:19:42,320 --> 00:19:47,520 Speaker 1: but it wasn't immediately ledged ont it wasn't. He he traveled, 340 00:19:47,560 --> 00:19:49,720 Speaker 1: he was in l A. You worked as a civil 341 00:19:49,760 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 1: engineer and uh in nineteen two he went to Camp Elliott, 342 00:19:54,480 --> 00:19:58,280 Speaker 1: which was outside of San Diego, and presented this idea. 343 00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:02,560 Speaker 1: But like you said, it wasn't something that was immediately 344 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:06,840 Speaker 1: taken up, partly because it didn't sound flexible. It didn't 345 00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:09,200 Speaker 1: sound like the codes we've been talking about earlier, where 346 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:11,840 Speaker 1: you can shift things around and you have a totally 347 00:20:11,840 --> 00:20:15,159 Speaker 1: different code. And something that's not flexible, that doesn't have 348 00:20:15,240 --> 00:20:19,440 Speaker 1: that random quality that we've been harping on the whole time. 349 00:20:19,960 --> 00:20:24,600 Speaker 1: Sounds breakable, right, But because the language was so inscrutable, 350 00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:28,240 Speaker 1: it was unbreakable. Yeah, that was better than any series 351 00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:31,960 Speaker 1: of five rotors he might have. So um he he 352 00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:34,399 Speaker 1: did get a go ahead to look into it a 353 00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:38,680 Speaker 1: little bit more, and he recruited for bilingual speakers, guys 354 00:20:38,720 --> 00:20:42,399 Speaker 1: who spoke Navajo and English fluently, and he did a 355 00:20:42,440 --> 00:20:45,240 Speaker 1: little demonstration. Sometimes the demonstration is the best way to 356 00:20:45,480 --> 00:20:48,840 Speaker 1: prove your point. He broke them up into two groups, 357 00:20:49,320 --> 00:20:53,119 Speaker 1: and one group of two received a basic sort of 358 00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:57,920 Speaker 1: field order in English. They simply translated that order into Navajo. 359 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:01,159 Speaker 1: It was passed onto the other group, who translated it 360 00:21:01,240 --> 00:21:06,879 Speaker 1: back into English. And the you know, the fear was 361 00:21:06,960 --> 00:21:09,919 Speaker 1: that maybe if you go through I'm sure if you 362 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:12,760 Speaker 1: gave me something to translate in French and then you 363 00:21:12,840 --> 00:21:16,199 Speaker 1: tried to translate it back into into English, it wouldn't 364 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:18,680 Speaker 1: be quite right. Well, yeah, if you if you use 365 00:21:18,840 --> 00:21:25,800 Speaker 1: even translate translation engines online and you translate translate the 366 00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:29,000 Speaker 1: same phrase back and forth between the same two languages, 367 00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,399 Speaker 1: do it about five times, and what you end up 368 00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:34,440 Speaker 1: with is going to be something that's resembles but it's 369 00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:38,480 Speaker 1: not identical to your first mome of telephone essentially, and 370 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:42,720 Speaker 1: when you think about military orders, specificity is very important. 371 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:46,359 Speaker 1: But in this case, with this trial example, it just 372 00:21:46,400 --> 00:21:49,360 Speaker 1: worked fine. You know, it was exactly the same message. 373 00:21:49,400 --> 00:21:53,880 Speaker 1: So camp Elliott's commanding officer was impressed by the demonstration, 374 00:21:54,040 --> 00:21:58,959 Speaker 1: and he immediately requested two hundred Navajo translators. He couldn't 375 00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:01,560 Speaker 1: get that many there or he was only allowed thirty 376 00:22:01,680 --> 00:22:05,919 Speaker 1: for sort of a further pilot project. And of those thirty, 377 00:22:06,040 --> 00:22:09,000 Speaker 1: they were ultimately twenty nine that went to basic training 378 00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:14,080 Speaker 1: outside of San Diego. And I like the description of 379 00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:16,800 Speaker 1: their life there because you think of them, they would 380 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:20,160 Speaker 1: immediately just be sequestered into this little code talker program 381 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:22,040 Speaker 1: and that would be all that they were working on. 382 00:22:22,119 --> 00:22:25,840 Speaker 1: But they were very typical Marines in training, and they 383 00:22:25,880 --> 00:22:29,520 Speaker 1: did typical marine stuff. I read an article by William R. 384 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:32,720 Speaker 1: Wilson in American History and and he said that a 385 00:22:32,760 --> 00:22:36,040 Speaker 1: writer for the Marine Corps Chevron reported that quote at 386 00:22:36,080 --> 00:22:40,280 Speaker 1: present their typical marine outfit of butting specialists, the gripe 387 00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:43,840 Speaker 1: about the things that all marines gripe about, liberty chow 388 00:22:44,160 --> 00:22:47,280 Speaker 1: and the San Diego weather. I have to take exception 389 00:22:47,359 --> 00:22:51,960 Speaker 1: to this, having been to San Diego. The weather there 390 00:22:52,000 --> 00:22:54,720 Speaker 1: I can describe as nice. You know. I was going 391 00:22:54,760 --> 00:22:58,159 Speaker 1: to say, like, these guys are the Comanche code talkers 392 00:22:58,200 --> 00:23:00,560 Speaker 1: I read about were stationed at Fort Benning in Georgia. 393 00:23:00,800 --> 00:23:05,320 Speaker 1: So yeah, forbidding, I could definitely understand if you had complaints. 394 00:23:05,480 --> 00:23:09,359 Speaker 1: Humidity alone would be enough. But but San Diego, maybe 395 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:11,280 Speaker 1: they were sad they couldn't go out and enjoy it. 396 00:23:11,560 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 1: Maybe maybe I also have always said that San Diego 397 00:23:14,320 --> 00:23:17,800 Speaker 1: has essentially to weather seasons which is not on fire 398 00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 1: and on fire. Well, so regardless of how the weather 399 00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:25,200 Speaker 1: was in San Diego at the time, they were doing 400 00:23:25,359 --> 00:23:28,719 Speaker 1: basic training activities. But of course their main job was 401 00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:32,159 Speaker 1: to develop a code. Because this wasn't just going to 402 00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:36,640 Speaker 1: be Navajo. Messages were laid entirely in Navajo. There would 403 00:23:36,680 --> 00:23:40,680 Speaker 1: be extra complications in there, and it ultimately had two parts. 404 00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:44,719 Speaker 1: There was a twenty six letter phonetic alphabet which used 405 00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:49,560 Speaker 1: Navajo words to represent letters, and then there were a 406 00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:52,000 Speaker 1: few non Navo words thrown in there. I'm guessing this 407 00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: is because these letters wouldn't be represented by words in Navajo. 408 00:23:56,240 --> 00:23:58,040 Speaker 1: That was my understanding of it at least. But you'd have, 409 00:23:58,480 --> 00:24:01,480 Speaker 1: for instance, ice where the letter I think for the 410 00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:06,679 Speaker 1: letter z um to make this less obvious to break, 411 00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:13,040 Speaker 1: really frequently repeated letters, vowels or frequently repeated consonants would 412 00:24:13,119 --> 00:24:16,040 Speaker 1: have more than one code word. Associated with them, right, 413 00:24:16,160 --> 00:24:18,440 Speaker 1: which we sort of talked about in our last episode. 414 00:24:18,720 --> 00:24:21,960 Speaker 1: So it's the same sort of idea. And I also 415 00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:25,680 Speaker 1: like that they came up with other words to describe 416 00:24:25,760 --> 00:24:28,920 Speaker 1: things that would not appear in the Navajo language. The 417 00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:31,960 Speaker 1: Navajo did not have a word example, for example, for 418 00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:34,879 Speaker 1: a grenade. Yeah, so this was the second, the second 419 00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:37,480 Speaker 1: layer of this code that you'd have this alphabet, but 420 00:24:37,520 --> 00:24:41,359 Speaker 1: then you'd also have a vocabulary sheets sort of code 421 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:46,600 Speaker 1: words of military terms English military terms that needed direct 422 00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:50,760 Speaker 1: Navajo translations. And um, this would make it so much 423 00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:53,720 Speaker 1: faster too, if you're sending a message, to just have 424 00:24:53,880 --> 00:24:57,200 Speaker 1: words that equal other words, right, and as opposed to 425 00:24:57,200 --> 00:25:00,800 Speaker 1: having to spell everything out with this phonetic alphabet exactly. Um, 426 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:03,280 Speaker 1: but yeah, you were about to start talking about the 427 00:25:03,320 --> 00:25:07,520 Speaker 1: words military terms that clearly don't have a Navajo precedent. 428 00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:13,159 Speaker 1: R Grenades became potatoes. I think that's my favorite was 429 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:16,399 Speaker 1: dive bomber. My favorite is the one for Adolf Hitler. Okay, 430 00:25:16,440 --> 00:25:18,679 Speaker 1: so you know you can't just have Adolf Hitler, so 431 00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:21,480 Speaker 1: you've got to describe the man. Yeah. So in Navajo 432 00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:25,720 Speaker 1: they use the phrase mustache smeller and then MUSLINI is 433 00:25:25,760 --> 00:25:29,640 Speaker 1: pretty good to Big Gorge China. There might have been 434 00:25:29,680 --> 00:25:34,960 Speaker 1: a a slight opportunity to to uh poke some fun 435 00:25:34,960 --> 00:25:38,120 Speaker 1: at the enemy and thus uh turned them into something 436 00:25:38,160 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 1: that would be less menacing in their memorial boosting yea, um, 437 00:25:44,440 --> 00:25:47,400 Speaker 1: but it is. It is certainly colorful, and a lot 438 00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:50,520 Speaker 1: of the stories about the Navajo code talkers there are 439 00:25:51,040 --> 00:25:55,320 Speaker 1: these examples of fun or I don't know, mischievous behavior 440 00:25:55,480 --> 00:26:00,240 Speaker 1: on the Yeah, there's um the more stories are, the 441 00:26:00,240 --> 00:26:03,600 Speaker 1: more I'm thinking these men were not just brave but 442 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:07,960 Speaker 1: also a little crazy. Yeah yeah, to to go out there, well, 443 00:26:08,080 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: I mean, we're going to talk about that more. Um So. 444 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:13,800 Speaker 1: The first thing to do, though, once they developed this 445 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:18,520 Speaker 1: code was tested against other bilingual Navajo. So you're gonna 446 00:26:18,520 --> 00:26:21,119 Speaker 1: assume that if you only speak English, or you speak 447 00:26:21,240 --> 00:26:23,920 Speaker 1: Japanese and English, it's going to be pretty hard to break. 448 00:26:23,960 --> 00:26:27,640 Speaker 1: But what if the enemy gets a hold of a Navajo, 449 00:26:28,320 --> 00:26:31,800 Speaker 1: a Navajo soldier who's not a code talker. Would that 450 00:26:31,920 --> 00:26:36,399 Speaker 1: Navajo soldier be able to break this code? And they 451 00:26:36,440 --> 00:26:40,439 Speaker 1: tested that, and bilingual Navajo speakers could not break the code. 452 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:44,560 Speaker 1: So it had enough complexity in its own right two 453 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:49,359 Speaker 1: be unbreakable. It's being right, So just understanding what the 454 00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:53,040 Speaker 1: words we weren't enough to understand what the message was exactly. 455 00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:58,800 Speaker 1: So the first Navajo code talkers reported to Guadalcanal. Ultimately 456 00:26:58,840 --> 00:27:01,520 Speaker 1: there were more than four, which makes them the largest 457 00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: group of Native American code talkers during World War two. Um, 458 00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:09,120 Speaker 1: and they really accomplish a lot of important things during 459 00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:13,320 Speaker 1: the war. Not just being able to send and receive 460 00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:17,240 Speaker 1: messages so quickly, which is something we've talked about earlier. 461 00:27:17,840 --> 00:27:21,479 Speaker 1: This is taking time, machines being really hard to carry around, 462 00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:26,720 Speaker 1: user error. Yeah, if those problems are eliminated, that opens 463 00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:29,600 Speaker 1: up a lot of new possibilities. But they orchestrated that. 464 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:33,360 Speaker 1: You a GiMA landing, They sent and received about eight 465 00:27:33,400 --> 00:27:36,920 Speaker 1: hundred messages in the two days after that landing, something 466 00:27:36,960 --> 00:27:41,680 Speaker 1: I thought was particularly impressive. And the Japanese first, they 467 00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:44,240 Speaker 1: picked up on the code pretty fast, so it wasn't 468 00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:46,280 Speaker 1: just like they weren't aware of it, and that's why 469 00:27:46,320 --> 00:27:52,560 Speaker 1: it remained unbroken. Unbroken. They did know that something was happening. 470 00:27:52,640 --> 00:27:55,600 Speaker 1: They knew there was communication, but they could not, for 471 00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:58,000 Speaker 1: the life of them, figure out what that communication was. 472 00:27:58,080 --> 00:28:00,840 Speaker 1: They just knew that someone was talking to someone else 473 00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:03,199 Speaker 1: and it didn't make any sense. And and there was 474 00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:06,879 Speaker 1: a great article about the code talkers by Lynn Askew 475 00:28:06,960 --> 00:28:11,640 Speaker 1: in History Today, and she described one code talker hearing 476 00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:16,760 Speaker 1: of Japanese soldier come on the frequency and ask in English, 477 00:28:16,800 --> 00:28:21,560 Speaker 1: who is this? Who's this? Um? And the Navajo guys 478 00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:24,960 Speaker 1: would speak in English and usually just cuss the guy 479 00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:32,640 Speaker 1: out get off the line, something like that, yeah, your exactly. Um. 480 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:34,639 Speaker 1: We did mention though that there are a lot of 481 00:28:34,720 --> 00:28:37,320 Speaker 1: a lot of hazards, you know. He said that you'd 482 00:28:37,359 --> 00:28:39,200 Speaker 1: have to be almost crazy. I mean you could think 483 00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:41,080 Speaker 1: of that in a different way that they probably knew 484 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:43,120 Speaker 1: they were going to be drafted anyway. And this is 485 00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:46,280 Speaker 1: at least something it's a really it's a way to 486 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:49,719 Speaker 1: use a language that you've probably been forbidden from using 487 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:53,240 Speaker 1: for a lot of your life in government run schools. Um, 488 00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:55,920 Speaker 1: a way to be with your family members and your 489 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:59,160 Speaker 1: friends who you've grown up with. But it was really dangerous, 490 00:28:59,160 --> 00:29:03,160 Speaker 1: and part of that is misidentification, right. It wasn't just 491 00:29:03,520 --> 00:29:09,160 Speaker 1: the normal dangers of war, which are varied and great, um, 492 00:29:09,360 --> 00:29:12,760 Speaker 1: great as in huge, not as in wonderful. Uh. And 493 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 1: they had to deal with that, but also the very 494 00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:20,840 Speaker 1: real possibility that they would be misidentified as a Japanese 495 00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:25,320 Speaker 1: soldier by Americans who just didn't know any better, and 496 00:29:25,440 --> 00:29:29,320 Speaker 1: so very often they had to have a white escort 497 00:29:29,440 --> 00:29:31,720 Speaker 1: to go with them so that there was someone to 498 00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:35,360 Speaker 1: identify them as this guy's a Navajo code talker, he's 499 00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:39,239 Speaker 1: on our side. And kind of another scary element of 500 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:44,560 Speaker 1: that is sometimes those escorts were charged with killing the 501 00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:47,840 Speaker 1: soldier should he fall into enemy hands, and I don't 502 00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:51,400 Speaker 1: know if that ever actually had to happen. Um I 503 00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:54,680 Speaker 1: did read one account of a Navajo, a Navajo soldier 504 00:29:55,000 --> 00:29:57,400 Speaker 1: who was not a code talker, being captured by the 505 00:29:57,480 --> 00:30:01,480 Speaker 1: Japanese but because the code was strong, saying okay, I 506 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:03,400 Speaker 1: can read these words, but they don't make any sense 507 00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:06,000 Speaker 1: to me. Um I didn't see anything about one of 508 00:30:06,040 --> 00:30:09,160 Speaker 1: the code talkers being captured, but those were those were 509 00:30:09,160 --> 00:30:12,239 Speaker 1: the orders. They didn't want this unbreakable code to be 510 00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:15,560 Speaker 1: broken by a prisoner. It's just like when we were talking, 511 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:17,440 Speaker 1: well not just like, but it's similar to when we 512 00:30:17,440 --> 00:30:19,640 Speaker 1: were talking about how codebooks could fall into the wrong 513 00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:22,280 Speaker 1: hands and that compromises a code. In this case, the 514 00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:26,200 Speaker 1: codebook is a person man, and so it's a it's 515 00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:28,560 Speaker 1: it's a very real risk of war. And so that 516 00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:34,480 Speaker 1: was a grim but uh necessary reality for the soldiers 517 00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:37,280 Speaker 1: in the Pacific theater was that if we want to 518 00:30:37,360 --> 00:30:41,800 Speaker 1: keep this this code secure, a code that millions of 519 00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:45,560 Speaker 1: people are going to depend upon, then that's a measure 520 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:48,600 Speaker 1: we have to take. It's a it's a scary thought 521 00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:51,880 Speaker 1: to think about. UM. So you know, we've we've discussed 522 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:55,160 Speaker 1: the Navajo, and and we mentioned the Comanche. We should 523 00:30:55,200 --> 00:31:00,920 Speaker 1: say they're also Lakoda code talkers to hope, and um, 524 00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,920 Speaker 1: other Native American tribes as well. So, UM, it wasn't 525 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:10,000 Speaker 1: just about one tribe. It wasn't just Philip Johnson's idea. Um, 526 00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:12,400 Speaker 1: A lot of people were thinking of this. But the 527 00:31:12,520 --> 00:31:15,360 Speaker 1: reason why the Navajo code talker story or part of 528 00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,920 Speaker 1: the reason why their story is so much better known 529 00:31:18,240 --> 00:31:20,520 Speaker 1: one reason they were just the larger group, you know, 530 00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:24,160 Speaker 1: four hundred guys. Um. But it also kind of comes 531 00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:28,320 Speaker 1: down to something that got Johnson court martialed the government 532 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:31,440 Speaker 1: because they were so concerned about this code and and 533 00:31:31,760 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: just the Japanese figuring out that Navajo was even the 534 00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:37,880 Speaker 1: basis for it. That they weren't allowing the code talkers 535 00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:42,440 Speaker 1: letters to their families to go home and Um. Finally, Johnson, 536 00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:46,240 Speaker 1: back in the United States, was approached by the Navajo 537 00:31:46,280 --> 00:31:50,440 Speaker 1: Indian Affair superintendent representing some families who hadn't heard from 538 00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:53,520 Speaker 1: their sons for a long time, asking if they knew 539 00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:55,800 Speaker 1: what might be going on, if he knew what was 540 00:31:55,840 --> 00:31:59,120 Speaker 1: going on. He didn't go into too many details, but 541 00:31:59,200 --> 00:32:02,080 Speaker 1: he did explain that the boys were on this top 542 00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:06,280 Speaker 1: secret project. Word about that eventually got published, it got out, 543 00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:08,840 Speaker 1: and he was court martial But on his very last 544 00:32:08,920 --> 00:32:13,000 Speaker 1: day of work, he stole all of the code talker 545 00:32:13,320 --> 00:32:17,120 Speaker 1: documents because he was afraid, kind of rightly so or 546 00:32:17,200 --> 00:32:20,680 Speaker 1: legitimately that maybe after the war this would all just 547 00:32:20,800 --> 00:32:24,400 Speaker 1: be sort of forgotten, partly out of security, but maybe 548 00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:28,760 Speaker 1: maybe partly just in the tradition of of not giving 549 00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:32,640 Speaker 1: Native Americans a fair shake. Um, he was afraid that 550 00:32:32,680 --> 00:32:35,560 Speaker 1: nobody would know that this had ever happened, and he 551 00:32:35,600 --> 00:32:39,080 Speaker 1: felt that this was a very important historical moment, an 552 00:32:39,120 --> 00:32:41,840 Speaker 1: important part of American history right that we needed to know, 553 00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:45,200 Speaker 1: and so he took it upon himself to make sure 554 00:32:45,240 --> 00:32:48,440 Speaker 1: that story got told. It reminds me again when we 555 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:52,120 Speaker 1: talked in the last episode about Ultra and about how 556 00:32:52,280 --> 00:32:55,160 Speaker 1: top secret it was, and that there were people who 557 00:32:55,240 --> 00:32:59,120 Speaker 1: lost their jobs because they maintained that level of secrecy 558 00:32:59,280 --> 00:33:03,560 Speaker 1: uh from members of government that we're not not privy 559 00:33:03,720 --> 00:33:07,520 Speaker 1: to the to ultra that you know, they suffered the 560 00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:12,680 Speaker 1: consequences and they did it in order to maintain that security. Um. 561 00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:16,600 Speaker 1: You can see, this is serious stuff, very serious business, 562 00:33:16,720 --> 00:33:19,680 Speaker 1: and it makes sense to try and protect it as 563 00:33:19,760 --> 00:33:23,520 Speaker 1: much as you can. With the approach with the Navajo 564 00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:26,800 Speaker 1: code talkers, it's a little different than the mechanical approach 565 00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:30,800 Speaker 1: that we saw with the other attempts at cryptography, and 566 00:33:30,880 --> 00:33:35,840 Speaker 1: that to be able to become a Navajos speaker is 567 00:33:35,960 --> 00:33:40,720 Speaker 1: no small task. It's not a group that you could 568 00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:44,160 Speaker 1: easily assimilate yourself into. One thing. Yeah, we've got to 569 00:33:44,160 --> 00:33:49,600 Speaker 1: talk about the Germany anthropologists right well when we segue 570 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:53,000 Speaker 1: right into that. So there had been attempts in the 571 00:33:53,080 --> 00:33:58,560 Speaker 1: twenties by the Germans to you know, the knowing about 572 00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:04,640 Speaker 1: the what was the earlier the Choctaw use in U, 573 00:34:04,880 --> 00:34:08,120 Speaker 1: the earlier war, to pick up some of these Native 574 00:34:08,160 --> 00:34:11,879 Speaker 1: American languages, and to do that through the ruse of 575 00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:15,719 Speaker 1: being a German anthropologist who goes in and studies languages 576 00:34:15,800 --> 00:34:20,279 Speaker 1: with the tribe. It was a pretty transparent plot, co 577 00:34:20,440 --> 00:34:26,080 Speaker 1: parent idea. The communities were we're wary of the outsiders 578 00:34:26,200 --> 00:34:31,040 Speaker 1: in general, not saying, but it also seen no one. 579 00:34:31,200 --> 00:34:34,359 Speaker 1: And that's why, for instance, that's why Comanche was one 580 00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,880 Speaker 1: of the languages used, because, um, it seemed like the 581 00:34:37,920 --> 00:34:44,080 Speaker 1: Comanche had had less contact with outsiders, including Germans posing 582 00:34:44,120 --> 00:34:48,359 Speaker 1: as anthropologists, than certain other tribes and might have a 583 00:34:48,360 --> 00:34:52,600 Speaker 1: better protected language. But it seemed a little hard to 584 00:34:52,640 --> 00:34:55,319 Speaker 1: believe that you could think you could just visit a 585 00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:58,200 Speaker 1: tribe for a while and pick up one of the 586 00:34:58,239 --> 00:35:01,440 Speaker 1: most complicated languages in the world. I think it's I 587 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:05,200 Speaker 1: think it just bespeaks this idea that perhaps the language 588 00:35:05,200 --> 00:35:08,560 Speaker 1: would have been more closely aligned with other known languages, 589 00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:12,160 Speaker 1: and the fact is that's not the case. And because 590 00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:16,040 Speaker 1: it is so different, it is a real challenge for 591 00:35:16,160 --> 00:35:18,719 Speaker 1: someone who has not brought up in that community to 592 00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:22,000 Speaker 1: learn the language, particularly since there weren't a whole lot 593 00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:26,200 Speaker 1: of people willing to teach it. So that was there 594 00:35:26,239 --> 00:35:28,879 Speaker 1: was a different, a totally different scene with the code 595 00:35:28,880 --> 00:35:35,080 Speaker 1: talkers than it was with the cryptography machines. Now, I 596 00:35:35,160 --> 00:35:38,279 Speaker 1: thought I might wrap all this up by talking about 597 00:35:38,400 --> 00:35:41,799 Speaker 1: how this cryptography kind of affects us today. This sort 598 00:35:41,840 --> 00:35:47,520 Speaker 1: of things that were invented during the Second World War. Um, 599 00:35:47,560 --> 00:35:51,040 Speaker 1: so you know, we we send email back and forth. 600 00:35:51,480 --> 00:35:55,080 Speaker 1: That email, usually if you're using a good email system, 601 00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:59,040 Speaker 1: is encrypted, meaning that anyone who intercepts that message should 602 00:35:59,040 --> 00:36:01,840 Speaker 1: receive just a bunch of gibberish and they have no 603 00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:05,399 Speaker 1: idea what the content of that message is. It's very 604 00:36:05,440 --> 00:36:08,960 Speaker 1: important for privacy and for security. It's one of the 605 00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:15,360 Speaker 1: reasons why, uh, people will insist on you only sending 606 00:36:15,400 --> 00:36:19,080 Speaker 1: them encrypted messages. There's certain people who have have famously 607 00:36:19,560 --> 00:36:22,200 Speaker 1: put that in blog posts. I'm thinking specifically of a 608 00:36:22,239 --> 00:36:26,120 Speaker 1: Will Wheaton, former former star of Star Trek the Next Generation. 609 00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:29,640 Speaker 1: But he says, if you want to email me using 610 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:33,000 Speaker 1: encryptid email, because I don't want messages going back and 611 00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:37,360 Speaker 1: forth in plain text that some third party could intercept. Well, 612 00:36:37,719 --> 00:36:41,799 Speaker 1: the way we encrypt messages is very similar to the 613 00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:44,759 Speaker 1: way that we were encrypting messages during World War Two. 614 00:36:44,800 --> 00:36:47,000 Speaker 1: We're using software to do it now. We're not using 615 00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:51,960 Speaker 1: big electro mechanical devices, little numbers, right right, there's no 616 00:36:52,040 --> 00:36:55,960 Speaker 1: little machines that go ping. As Chris would like to say, Uh, 617 00:36:56,000 --> 00:36:58,759 Speaker 1: it's it's all done in software. But the idea is 618 00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:03,560 Speaker 1: that you take a key that turns the message into 619 00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:07,800 Speaker 1: what looks to be just random letters, numbers, and characters, 620 00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:10,360 Speaker 1: and then the person receiving the message has an identical 621 00:37:10,480 --> 00:37:14,759 Speaker 1: key and that decodes the message. And it gets a 622 00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:18,200 Speaker 1: little more complicated than that the keys there's like public 623 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:22,400 Speaker 1: keys versus private keys. But the idea is that, uh, 624 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:26,440 Speaker 1: this is the same sort of approach to obvious skate. 625 00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:30,360 Speaker 1: What a message is meaning is from anyone that it 626 00:37:30,440 --> 00:37:34,400 Speaker 1: was not intended to go to. Same thing for passwords. Uh. Now, 627 00:37:34,600 --> 00:37:37,000 Speaker 1: of course with software we're able to get way more 628 00:37:37,040 --> 00:37:40,160 Speaker 1: sophisticated than we could during World War two, and so 629 00:37:40,239 --> 00:37:43,719 Speaker 1: the software might create a hash, which is the product 630 00:37:43,760 --> 00:37:47,400 Speaker 1: of running a message or a password through a key 631 00:37:47,719 --> 00:37:52,720 Speaker 1: that turns that into an incredibly long string of letters, numbers, 632 00:37:52,719 --> 00:37:57,239 Speaker 1: and characters. So, for example, your eight character password that 633 00:37:57,360 --> 00:37:59,640 Speaker 1: you create so that you can log into your email 634 00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:04,760 Speaker 1: within the email administrator's database, that password could be hashed 635 00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:10,000 Speaker 1: into a message that is fifty characters long or longer, 636 00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:12,880 Speaker 1: depending upon what they use. But it's using the same 637 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:18,600 Speaker 1: principles of cryptography that we're developed during World World War two. Okay, 638 00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:23,719 Speaker 1: so it's um history applied to your devices and your 639 00:38:23,840 --> 00:38:27,680 Speaker 1: internet used today. Yes, yeah, if you're using bank accounts, 640 00:38:27,719 --> 00:38:31,840 Speaker 1: if you're using email addresses, you're listening to this podcast. 641 00:38:32,480 --> 00:38:33,799 Speaker 1: If you're not, then I guess I don't know who 642 00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:37,600 Speaker 1: I'm talking to. And I mean we were we were 643 00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:41,440 Speaker 1: discussing a little bit before we recorded this, what must 644 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:46,759 Speaker 1: the cryptography systems for actual I mean we're just talking 645 00:38:46,760 --> 00:38:48,799 Speaker 1: about emails. You know, you don't want your you don't 646 00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:50,920 Speaker 1: want your bank information to get out, certainly you don't 647 00:38:50,960 --> 00:38:55,480 Speaker 1: want your emails to be read, but actual government, military 648 00:38:55,600 --> 00:39:00,000 Speaker 1: related stuff. I mean, it's it's almost hard to imagine. 649 00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:02,839 Speaker 1: And if if these machines from the thirties, forties, well 650 00:39:02,880 --> 00:39:08,160 Speaker 1: actually twenties and then seem fairly complicated to me at least, 651 00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:12,640 Speaker 1: I can't even wrap my mind around what a level 652 00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:18,000 Speaker 1: of of of cryptography must be today. It's it's pretty 653 00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:22,080 Speaker 1: it's pretty intense. And on the flip side, code breaking 654 00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:26,600 Speaker 1: has become just as sophisticated. In particular, once the development 655 00:39:26,680 --> 00:39:29,640 Speaker 1: of multi core processors happened, which I'm not going to 656 00:39:29,719 --> 00:39:32,600 Speaker 1: get too don't worry, don't worry, don't panic. I'm not 657 00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:35,040 Speaker 1: going to get too involved here, But in general, the 658 00:39:35,120 --> 00:39:39,120 Speaker 1: way a code breaking system works is it starts if 659 00:39:39,120 --> 00:39:41,600 Speaker 1: you're using a brute force attempt, which is where you're 660 00:39:41,600 --> 00:39:43,839 Speaker 1: just trying every combination you can think of in order 661 00:39:43,880 --> 00:39:47,719 Speaker 1: to try and break a code. Uh, depending on how 662 00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:51,560 Speaker 1: many characters there are. That's that's a lot of potential combinations, 663 00:39:52,320 --> 00:39:55,040 Speaker 1: and a regular processor is going through each one of 664 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:56,919 Speaker 1: those one at a time. Now, I might be doing 665 00:39:56,960 --> 00:40:00,200 Speaker 1: that at an incredible rate of speed, but still one 666 00:40:00,239 --> 00:40:02,879 Speaker 1: at the time, even super fast is going to take 667 00:40:03,719 --> 00:40:07,960 Speaker 1: ages to crack. Multi core processors made that easier by 668 00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:12,000 Speaker 1: dividing the problem up into separate problems. Each core could 669 00:40:12,080 --> 00:40:15,560 Speaker 1: take a bank of variations and run it through, So 670 00:40:15,640 --> 00:40:18,040 Speaker 1: you've just cut down the amount of time it takes 671 00:40:18,080 --> 00:40:22,840 Speaker 1: to break a code. Well, be be aware that usually 672 00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:25,520 Speaker 1: a code breaker, in order for them to really get 673 00:40:25,600 --> 00:40:31,200 Speaker 1: through tough crypt encryption, normally has to have some basis 674 00:40:31,239 --> 00:40:34,840 Speaker 1: to work from. So, for example, with passwords, um, you 675 00:40:34,880 --> 00:40:37,080 Speaker 1: don't want to use common words, you don't want to 676 00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:39,120 Speaker 1: use you don't even want to use common names or 677 00:40:39,120 --> 00:40:41,799 Speaker 1: anything like that. You want to try and use as 678 00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,400 Speaker 1: as random a string of letters and numbers as you 679 00:40:44,440 --> 00:40:47,719 Speaker 1: possibly can without it getting too difficult to remember and 680 00:40:47,800 --> 00:40:49,279 Speaker 1: as many Yeah, you don't want to use the same 681 00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:52,480 Speaker 1: one for multiple accounts. And the reason for that is 682 00:40:52,520 --> 00:40:58,000 Speaker 1: that code breakers have broken into databases where companies did 683 00:40:58,000 --> 00:41:01,680 Speaker 1: not store the passwords in an cryptid file, which means 684 00:41:01,680 --> 00:41:06,400 Speaker 1: they had the plain text passwords. So often if you 685 00:41:06,440 --> 00:41:08,480 Speaker 1: see enough of those plain texts, and this is this 686 00:41:08,520 --> 00:41:11,080 Speaker 1: applies to code breaking across the board. You look at 687 00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:13,520 Speaker 1: the plain text, it's not just a list. You group 688 00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:17,320 Speaker 1: those names together, so you look for frequencies how many 689 00:41:17,400 --> 00:41:22,600 Speaker 1: people are using specific words as passwords, because then you know, well, 690 00:41:23,360 --> 00:41:25,560 Speaker 1: these are the these are the words I should concentrate 691 00:41:25,600 --> 00:41:27,760 Speaker 1: on when I'm trying to break a new system, because 692 00:41:27,760 --> 00:41:31,000 Speaker 1: I know, based upon this frequency analysis, this is what 693 00:41:31,120 --> 00:41:33,960 Speaker 1: people tend to pick for their password. A lot of 694 00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:38,960 Speaker 1: times that happens to be password. Don't do that. So 695 00:41:40,160 --> 00:41:43,200 Speaker 1: the same sort of approaches were used in World War Two. 696 00:41:43,280 --> 00:41:45,200 Speaker 1: I mean that to tie it back together, when we 697 00:41:45,200 --> 00:41:48,520 Speaker 1: were talking about common salutations and common ways of ending 698 00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,759 Speaker 1: a message, that's the same thing. You're taking that frequency 699 00:41:51,880 --> 00:41:55,000 Speaker 1: that this particular phrase or word will show up, and 700 00:41:55,040 --> 00:41:58,640 Speaker 1: you're measuring that against all the intercepted messages you have 701 00:41:59,040 --> 00:42:01,359 Speaker 1: and you're trying to break that code. The same thing 702 00:42:01,400 --> 00:42:06,640 Speaker 1: happens today. So moral of the story. This has been 703 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:12,400 Speaker 1: our lesson of the day Jonathan of Texta about protecting 704 00:42:12,440 --> 00:42:16,040 Speaker 1: your passwords. Um, but it was interesting for me to 705 00:42:16,120 --> 00:42:18,280 Speaker 1: learn more about all of this. I have to say. 706 00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:21,960 Speaker 1: The code talkers really speaks more to me. There's a 707 00:42:22,040 --> 00:42:25,319 Speaker 1: human story there, there is a story, and of course 708 00:42:25,320 --> 00:42:29,000 Speaker 1: there's a story with Leshley Park too and code breakers 709 00:42:29,080 --> 00:42:32,200 Speaker 1: around the world. But UM, I don't know. Maybe I'm 710 00:42:32,239 --> 00:42:34,360 Speaker 1: just more of a language person, so it speaks to 711 00:42:34,400 --> 00:42:40,319 Speaker 1: me for that reason I am. I am more more 712 00:42:40,360 --> 00:42:45,239 Speaker 1: of a language person than a rotor person, I suppose. Um. 713 00:42:45,280 --> 00:42:47,000 Speaker 1: But it did remind me a little bit of an 714 00:42:47,080 --> 00:42:49,239 Speaker 1: article I read not too long ago in National and 715 00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:52,480 Speaker 1: Geographic that was about languages that only had a few 716 00:42:52,520 --> 00:42:56,000 Speaker 1: speakers left. And I thought about how, just how we 717 00:42:56,080 --> 00:42:59,759 Speaker 1: think of, um, of endangered plants or something could have 718 00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:03,960 Speaker 1: enormous potential value for some medicinal purpose we don't know 719 00:43:04,040 --> 00:43:07,160 Speaker 1: of yet. There's a value and language that goes clearly 720 00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:11,319 Speaker 1: outside of its cultural value and its historical value. It's 721 00:43:11,360 --> 00:43:15,000 Speaker 1: something that you don't often think of, but there's something 722 00:43:15,040 --> 00:43:17,560 Speaker 1: to it. Yeah, I can have real utility outside of 723 00:43:18,000 --> 00:43:21,400 Speaker 1: areas that you would you know, think of as being obvious. 724 00:43:21,560 --> 00:43:24,400 Speaker 1: You suddenly think that's exactly what Johnston was saying, was 725 00:43:24,440 --> 00:43:27,760 Speaker 1: that we used it before we could develop the system further, 726 00:43:28,560 --> 00:43:32,560 Speaker 1: and it's unbreakable, and he was right right. I like 727 00:43:32,760 --> 00:43:35,319 Speaker 1: that this was the last one we discussed and and 728 00:43:35,440 --> 00:43:40,040 Speaker 1: it's really the only unbreakable code. Um. So that's probably 729 00:43:40,040 --> 00:43:42,359 Speaker 1: a good place to to wrap this pull thing up. 730 00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:45,520 Speaker 1: So if you guys want to share your thoughts on 731 00:43:45,719 --> 00:43:49,920 Speaker 1: World War two and code breaking and language in general, 732 00:43:50,320 --> 00:43:53,239 Speaker 1: you can email us. We are at History podcast at 733 00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:57,040 Speaker 1: how Stuff Works dot com. We are on Facebook, and 734 00:43:57,120 --> 00:44:00,719 Speaker 1: we are on Twitter at Misston History. That might be 735 00:44:00,800 --> 00:44:03,400 Speaker 1: a Facebook and Twitter. It seemed like an appropriate place 736 00:44:03,480 --> 00:44:08,880 Speaker 1: to continue this discussion. So you can also drop Jonathan 737 00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:11,200 Speaker 1: a line too if you want to discuss more of 738 00:44:11,239 --> 00:44:14,560 Speaker 1: the technological aspects of it with him. That's right tech 739 00:44:14,600 --> 00:44:18,439 Speaker 1: Stuff at Discovery dot com. And we'll be having more 740 00:44:18,480 --> 00:44:23,120 Speaker 1: of these guest host appearances with some other podcasts later 741 00:44:23,200 --> 00:44:26,239 Speaker 1: on in September while Deeplina is finishing out her leave. 742 00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:28,319 Speaker 1: But thank you so much for joining me for this 743 00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:30,600 Speaker 1: two part ter Jonathan, and for thinking of this great 744 00:44:30,640 --> 00:44:35,120 Speaker 1: idea too. This is something that UM I certainly would 745 00:44:35,160 --> 00:44:38,160 Speaker 1: have liked to talk about, but I would be concerned 746 00:44:38,200 --> 00:44:43,560 Speaker 1: about describing um the nitty gritty of purple or enigma. 747 00:44:44,200 --> 00:44:46,480 Speaker 1: It was my pleasure. And it's funny because it was 748 00:44:46,520 --> 00:44:49,880 Speaker 1: my second choice of topic. My first choice had nothing 749 00:44:49,920 --> 00:44:54,000 Speaker 1: to do with technology whatsoever? Was it? Renaissance space is 750 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:56,120 Speaker 1: the fields of cloth and gold? Yet? Oh yeah, well, 751 00:44:56,320 --> 00:45:02,120 Speaker 1: you know, hey, maybe that can be I expect that 752 00:45:02,160 --> 00:45:04,719 Speaker 1: appearance to be done by the Admiral. Yes, I'll get 753 00:45:04,760 --> 00:45:06,880 Speaker 1: him out of storage. He's in the closet right now, 754 00:45:06,960 --> 00:45:08,800 Speaker 1: but I can. I can easily break him out. So 755 00:45:08,960 --> 00:45:12,120 Speaker 1: do you have any other code related articles? I think, 756 00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:14,720 Speaker 1: I think, I am well, I will say we have 757 00:45:14,800 --> 00:45:17,680 Speaker 1: some great articles on our site that have have to 758 00:45:17,680 --> 00:45:20,239 Speaker 1: do with code breaking, and one of them, you know, 759 00:45:20,280 --> 00:45:23,200 Speaker 1: I mentioned the multi core approach. One that is not 760 00:45:23,360 --> 00:45:27,200 Speaker 1: directly related to cryptography, but is important is how quantum 761 00:45:27,239 --> 00:45:31,000 Speaker 1: computers work. Because ideally a quantum computer is such a 762 00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:36,319 Speaker 1: parallel machine that it could run millions of different variations 763 00:45:36,360 --> 00:45:39,879 Speaker 1: of a of a of an encryption through it at 764 00:45:39,920 --> 00:45:42,279 Speaker 1: once and come up with an answer very quickly. So 765 00:45:42,560 --> 00:45:45,840 Speaker 1: if we ever do create a quantum computer that is 766 00:45:45,880 --> 00:45:50,880 Speaker 1: workable and is scalable. Then we have to totally rethink 767 00:45:50,920 --> 00:45:53,640 Speaker 1: how we encrypt things. All right, So, if you are 768 00:45:53,680 --> 00:45:56,680 Speaker 1: tired of thinking about all things historical and are ready 769 00:45:56,680 --> 00:45:59,319 Speaker 1: to look to the future, you can check out that 770 00:45:59,520 --> 00:46:03,120 Speaker 1: article and find it on www. Dot how stuff works 771 00:46:03,360 --> 00:46:12,160 Speaker 1: dot com MH for more on this and thousands of 772 00:46:12,160 --> 00:46:24,400 Speaker 1: other topics. Because it how stuff Works dot com. M H, 773 00:46:29,120 --> 00:46:29,520 Speaker 1: M M