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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with text Stuff from half

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Speaker 1: stuff Brooks dot com. Hayley, and welcome to text Us.

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Speaker 1: I'm Jonathan Strickland and I'm Lauren Day. We want to

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Speaker 1: talk about a very controversial subject. It's actually one that

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Speaker 1: we have covered on tech Stuff before, at least to

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Speaker 1: some extent. Chris and I talked about this a little

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Speaker 1: bit in previous episodes. We're talking about wiki leaks. So

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Speaker 1: before we even get into wiki leaks, we do have

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Speaker 1: to say this is an incredibly emotionally charged subject with

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Speaker 1: lots of political players, right, and Jonathan and I are

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Speaker 1: going to eight we you know, if you've listened to

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Speaker 1: the show, you probably know a little bit about a

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Speaker 1: personal politics. We're going to be really careful with this

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Speaker 1: one to to report the facts as they are and

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Speaker 1: not slam our foreheads into the microphone. Um. Also, real quick,

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Speaker 1: before we get into this, I do want to give

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Speaker 1: a brief trigger warning. It's it's a light trigger warning, really. UM.

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Speaker 1: Juliana Sang being Um, one of the so called founders

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Speaker 1: of wiki leaks, has been brought up on some rape

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Speaker 1: charges and so there will be a non graphic discussion

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Speaker 1: of that later on in the podcast. Um, if that

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Speaker 1: is the kind of thing that you would rather avoid hearing,

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Speaker 1: than perhaps you would like to uh skip the rest

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Speaker 1: of this episode now spoiler alert. Both Lauren and myself

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Speaker 1: and and with our particular political views, feel that no

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Speaker 1: one in this story really comes out being a complete hero.

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Speaker 1: It's it's it's just it's humans being humans, which means

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Speaker 1: it's complex. It's it's complex and gets kind of messy. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we're gonna get messy. But before we get messy,

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Speaker 1: let's just clear things up a little bit. Let's talk

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Speaker 1: about what wiki leaks is. Now. First of all, the

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Speaker 1: name wiki gives you this sense that it has this

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Speaker 1: sort of collaborative, open structure that allows people to come

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Speaker 1: in and add things and tweak things. Not so much.

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Speaker 1: They tried that early on in the timeline of wiki leaks,

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Speaker 1: but eventually moved away from it. The name has stuck, however, right,

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Speaker 1: and I think that I think that really what they

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Speaker 1: wanted to do was, um, it was used, was used

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Speaker 1: that that easy reading format of wikis without you know,

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Speaker 1: and then they decided to really close down the part

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Speaker 1: where hey, anyone can edit it, because that's bad times right,

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Speaker 1: right when you're talking about what it is WikiLeaks is

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Speaker 1: trying to do and uh and be yes, the sourcing

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Speaker 1: of information in order to remain um anonymous and pertinent. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: these are all things that make it. You know, if

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Speaker 1: you were to just open it up for what wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks does, it would just be a mess very quickly.

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Speaker 1: It also has created a lot of confusion among people

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Speaker 1: who are just casually following this or have just heard

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Speaker 1: about it, who think that wiki leaks has some sort

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Speaker 1: of connection to Wikipedia, which it does not know. The

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Speaker 1: Wikipedia and wiki leaks are not at all related. So

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Speaker 1: what is wiki leaks. Well, it's a not for profit organization,

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Speaker 1: and the purpose of wiki leaks is to publish information

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Speaker 1: that would uh normally not be available to the public. Right,

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Speaker 1: normally normally be the stuff that's either been classified or yeah,

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Speaker 1: it could be trade secret stuff, it could be a

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Speaker 1: corporate uh communications that normally would not be available to

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Speaker 1: anyone outside a certain group of people within that corporation. Really,

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Speaker 1: it's any information that would be of public interest but

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Speaker 1: is not publicly available. And in fact, WikiLeaks go so

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Speaker 1: far as to say that the organization does not want

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Speaker 1: anything that's been published elsewhere. That's not the purpose for WikiLeaks.

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Speaker 1: They also make pains to say that they do not

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Speaker 1: solicit any kind of information or files. They accept it,

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Speaker 1: but they don't solicit, which is an important distinction they

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Speaker 1: have to make so that they can, yeah, because otherwise

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Speaker 1: they could start getting charges about being a spy or

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Speaker 1: or trying to bribe officials or people in who have

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Speaker 1: access to to classified information too then share it. If

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Speaker 1: they merely accepted donations of information, that absolves them of

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Speaker 1: of some of that responsibility kind of technically, yeah, and

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Speaker 1: just at least prints a better picture of them, right

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Speaker 1: as far as it makes it more difficult to make

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Speaker 1: a case against them, doesn't necessarily mean that a case

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Speaker 1: would not be made against them and it wouldn't be successful.

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Speaker 1: But anyway, we're kind of getting ahead of ourselves now. Um.

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Speaker 1: According to Columbia University's Journalism School, I read this, there

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Speaker 1: was a very long article about wiki leaks and it's

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Speaker 1: association with the Guardian newspaper, a newspaper in the UK,

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Speaker 1: and uh, in fact, there was quite a strong relationship

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Speaker 1: between the two for a while until an event that

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Speaker 1: we will discuss later. Yeah, yeah, that will come important later.

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Speaker 1: But according to that particular article, it said that Julian Assange,

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Speaker 1: who is often referred to as a founder, found or

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Speaker 1: or at the very least the spokesperson for wiki leaks,

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Speaker 1: he's certainly the most identifiable personality associated with yeah figurehead,

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Speaker 1: if if nothing else. Yeah, Yeah, and that gets complicated too,

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Speaker 1: and we'll explain that in a bit. But according to

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Speaker 1: this article, he registered the domain name back in nine However,

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Speaker 1: every other source I could find six was the earliest

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Speaker 1: that it was actually UM registered. This is another part

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Speaker 1: that makes talking about wiki leaks challenging, in that there's

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Speaker 1: a lot of misinformation about the site itself, not just

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Speaker 1: about all the shenanigans that went on both within wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks and surrounding Wiki leaks, but just when it really

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Speaker 1: got started. Right, And part of the problem we should

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Speaker 1: mention now is that a lot of the information out

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Speaker 1: there about wiki leaks comes from either Juliana Sounds himself

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Speaker 1: or um other other personalities that have been involved with

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Speaker 1: the organization and have left it violently and bitterly. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and so so all of all of this is uh

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Speaker 1: not necessarily it's difficult to track down the exact truth. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's a lot of subjectivity here. I mean, everyone involved

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Speaker 1: has their own agenda and uh, and that doesn't that

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Speaker 1: doesn't necessarily align with the organization stated mission. Right, So

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Speaker 1: this is this is what makes this complicated. Now what

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Speaker 1: is that stated mission? Well, the whole idea here is

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Speaker 1: that what wiki leaks is trying to do is make

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Speaker 1: available information that the public that that that you know,

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Speaker 1: the organization feels the public should have access to but

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Speaker 1: otherwise would not because of the secrecy of either governmental

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Speaker 1: or corporate organizations or even just other organizations in general,

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Speaker 1: and that it's an attempt to make these organizations more transparent. Right.

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Speaker 1: They cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights UM, in

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Speaker 1: particular Article nineteen UM, which which just says that that

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Speaker 1: everyone has the right to freedom, freedom of opinion and

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Speaker 1: expression right and that they should be able to pursue

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Speaker 1: information regardless of frontiers, Which is kind of like saying,

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Speaker 1: you know, uh, a person in in say, China, who

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Speaker 1: otherwise might not have access to certain information completely has

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Speaker 1: the universal right to that, even if the Chinese government

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Speaker 1: says they don't. So in other words, it's kind of

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Speaker 1: this idea that everyone has this right regardless of what

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Speaker 1: your government says. This is the United Nations that has

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Speaker 1: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And it's not like

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Speaker 1: this is somehow legally binding for all. It's a very

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Speaker 1: nice idea. Yeah, it's it's an ideal, right, It's not

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Speaker 1: so much legal wording. It's it's saying, ideally, we would

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Speaker 1: say all people have the right to these expectations, and

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Speaker 1: one of them would be this right to freedom of expression. Now,

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Speaker 1: depending on where you are in the world, your right

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Speaker 1: to freedom of expression maybe fairly generous or it might

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Speaker 1: be really restrictive. In the United States, we like to

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Speaker 1: think that we have the freedom of speech, but there

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Speaker 1: are certain limitations. I mean, obviously, if you are using

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Speaker 1: that freedom of speech to inflict harm upon someone and

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Speaker 1: it is completely unjustified, and you know, you could be

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Speaker 1: taken to court for things things like lives, um. You know,

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Speaker 1: the whole there's the whole argument about you can't yell

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Speaker 1: fire in a crowded theater because it could cause people

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Speaker 1: your your right or freedom of expression does not override

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Speaker 1: someone else's right to safe safety right or at least

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Speaker 1: the expectation of safety. Um. And so there are a

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Speaker 1: lot of complications here. But even in the United States,

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Speaker 1: you know, it's fairly wide open people will argue as

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Speaker 1: to how wide open it is because of their own

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Speaker 1: personal views. If you go to someplace like the United Kingdom,

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Speaker 1: there rights of free speech are are more narrow. There

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Speaker 1: are very specific laws that prevent newspapers, for example, from

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Speaker 1: violating secrecy agreements. So something The Guardian had to make

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Speaker 1: some really tough decisions when they got information from Wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks onto whether or not to publish it, because it

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Speaker 1: could result in some injunctions from the government, So that

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Speaker 1: gets really complex as well. Anyway, Wiki Leaks essentially says

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Speaker 1: we don't subscribe to any of these regional concepts. We

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Speaker 1: subscribe to this universal concept and that's what it's all about.

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Speaker 1: And so they try to provide the material that journalists

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Speaker 1: can use to tell the stories that otherwise would be untold.

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Speaker 1: Right um Assan Assam said in one interview with Time

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Speaker 1: Um that this organization practices civil obedience. It tries to

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Speaker 1: make the world more civil and act against abusive organizations

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Speaker 1: that are pushing it in the opposite direction. So it's

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Speaker 1: kind of funny to call it civil obedience considering that, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know that they are directly disobeying. Yes, they're being

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Speaker 1: disobedient by by very nature. But it's it's all an

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Speaker 1: argument about who has the power responsibility if you have

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Speaker 1: a lot of you know, as as Uncle Ben would say,

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Speaker 1: with great power becomes great responsibility. Now that's that's one

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Speaker 1: of those little cliche sayings, but there is truth to that.

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Speaker 1: It's very true that if you are a governmental agency

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Speaker 1: or a corporation that has a lot of power, then

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Speaker 1: there is a certain expectation that you will use that

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Speaker 1: power in a responsible way and not do it in

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Speaker 1: such a way that you are going to violate people's rights, right.

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Speaker 1: You know. At the same time, frequently information is withheld

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Speaker 1: by by governments, in particular because because of of of

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Speaker 1: measures of national security, because they're trying to protect um,

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Speaker 1: you know, either their their military interests or their scientific interests,

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Speaker 1: or or you know, the people and the research that

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Speaker 1: go into making that country a safe place to be. Right.

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Speaker 1: So there is a very delicate balance here, right. I mean,

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Speaker 1: you could argue that there are there's certain information that's

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Speaker 1: out there that it's good that it's secret, because that

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Speaker 1: means that the people who are doing valuable work, and

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Speaker 1: it may be valuable work that in no way is

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Speaker 1: violent towards any other person it may be completely humanitarian

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Speaker 1: work that their lives could be in jeopardy if the

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Speaker 1: information were made public, and that is something that you know,

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Speaker 1: needs to be taken into consideration. Now, the what Wicked

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Speaker 1: Leaks would say is, on the other hand, you also

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Speaker 1: have these instances where UH agencies or the military or

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Speaker 1: a corporation are behaving in an unethical or corrupt or

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Speaker 1: illegal manner, and without this information becoming public, they can

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Speaker 1: never be held accountable for that. And so if they

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Speaker 1: you know, this transparency gives accountability to those agencies. And

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Speaker 1: in fact, they go so far as to say it's

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Speaker 1: the media's role to to reveal this kind of information

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Speaker 1: to the public, to to make the public informed enough

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Speaker 1: to be good citizens, right, because this is that that

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Speaker 1: big relationship. You know, we often think of the government

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Speaker 1: as being this kind of separate entity. That is, in

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Speaker 1: some cases we think of as sort of that big

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Speaker 1: brother Orwellian idea of this this other that dictates what

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Speaker 1: we do. But in reality, at least in in you

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Speaker 1: can argue to watch right. You know, they're definitely fringe

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Speaker 1: theories about how much your your average citizen does or

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Speaker 1: doesn't have power over over these things. But but but

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Speaker 1: saying that, you know, if we take democracy in the

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Speaker 1: United States for what it's supposed to be, if we

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Speaker 1: assume that that in fact is the case, then what

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Speaker 1: Wiki Leak's role is to tell the public, Hey, this

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Speaker 1: is what your officials are up to, and if you

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Speaker 1: don't approve of that, you need to be aware of

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Speaker 1: it so that you can the next time voting comes

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Speaker 1: around behave in a way that that allows you to

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Speaker 1: get the right people in charge, assuming of course that

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Speaker 1: the right people are the ones who are running for office.

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Speaker 1: That's that's a different political discussion. That's the whole other,

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Speaker 1: whole other cannon worms. I'm honestly, I'm I'm probably coming

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Speaker 1: across is really cynical. I'm actually not at cynical. I'm

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Speaker 1: just aware of a lot of cynicism. So it's one

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Speaker 1: of those things where you kind of dance around it anyway. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: and you know, the thing is that I read one

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Speaker 1: thing about how the US Information Security Oversight Office reported

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Speaker 1: that um the number of new secrets designated as such

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Speaker 1: by the government rose from two tho nine and so

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Speaker 1: so partially what this has to do with is the

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Speaker 1: way that governments are processing information and UM and releasing

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Speaker 1: it to the public right and and to be fair,

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Speaker 1: I mean, the Obama administration in the United States specifically

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Speaker 1: said that one of its cornerstones was going to be transparency.

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Speaker 1: And so in a way, you can think of the

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Speaker 1: media in general and wiki leaks in particular in this case,

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Speaker 1: trying to hold them accountable for that claim, saying you

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Speaker 1: said you're going to be transparent. Here are all these

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Speaker 1: things that have not been reported. What is your stance

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Speaker 1: on this? And so, I mean, you know, I can't

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Speaker 1: disagree with that motivation. I think that that's very important.

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Speaker 1: I think that any nation where you have a free press,

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Speaker 1: that presses job to keep an eye and make sure

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Speaker 1: that things are not being uh, that people are not

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Speaker 1: behaving in an unethical manner or taking advantage of a situation,

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Speaker 1: and if they are, that that's reported. I think that's

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Speaker 1: very important. It's a key role in journalism, and it's

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Speaker 1: something that some people would say has really been slipping

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Speaker 1: from journalism over the last couple of decades. Again, I'm

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Speaker 1: not a journalists, so I'm not going to comment on that. Well,

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Speaker 1: that's that's another you know, there's also a lot of

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Speaker 1: ideas about out there about how entertainment based the journalism

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Speaker 1: industry is these days. Yes, yeah, the whole idea of

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Speaker 1: of the the commercialization of journalism. Uh well, anyway, Wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks does have some policies that try to guide the

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Speaker 1: organization and how it behaves. One of those is that

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Speaker 1: that they do sometimes delay or remove some details in

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Speaker 1: stories in order to protect people from immediate harm, especially

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Speaker 1: either current victims of of harm somewhere or the whistleblowers

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Speaker 1: who are reporting this information right. And then on top

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Speaker 1: of that, they also try to make sure that every

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Speaker 1: single leaked report that they receive, which by the way,

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Speaker 1: they they've set up an electronic dropbox, that's their preferred

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Speaker 1: method of receiving information is electronically, and that this dropbox

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Speaker 1: is encrypted so that again in theory, you wouldn't be

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Speaker 1: able to trace the origin of that other than being

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Speaker 1: able to see that this is original source material, but

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Speaker 1: it's not tied to any particular person. So the electronic

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Speaker 1: dropbox is supposed to be a secure way of getting

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Speaker 1: files two Wiki leaks, and they have said that they

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Speaker 1: would also receive files or or documents in other forms

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Speaker 1: like including through the mail, but they prefer not to

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Speaker 1: because that kind of stuff can be intercepted in securities

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Speaker 1: and questions, Sharon, and also also if they have a

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Speaker 1: physical mailing add dress, that makes it more difficult for

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Speaker 1: them to uh avoid entanglements, all right. So anyway, they

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Speaker 1: they do refer to their electronic drop box as being

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Speaker 1: the preferred method, and they say that everything they get

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Speaker 1: they use traditional investigative journalism techniques as well as more

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Speaker 1: modern technology based methods to verify that that information is

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Speaker 1: in fact accurate and true, and that it really is

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Speaker 1: from a verifiable source, right, that the documents are actually

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Speaker 1: from wherever the person the anonymous source says they're from.

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Speaker 1: So if an anonymous source drops off a enormous file

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Speaker 1: that is supposed to contain all these documents from the

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Speaker 1: Department of Justice in the United States, for example, they

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Speaker 1: would go through and try to verify that those were

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Speaker 1: in fact d o J documents and not just someone

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Speaker 1: using some logos or whatever to fabricate something. Right. This

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Speaker 1: is through a largely volunteer based system, they've They've reported

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Speaker 1: and again you know, these members are kind of whibbly wobbly,

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Speaker 1: but um they reported having up to eight hundred volunteer members,

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Speaker 1: mostly mostly journalists. I think helping helping them out with

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Speaker 1: stuff like this, right, and some of those volunteers have

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Speaker 1: a lot of stuff to say about wiki leaks, but

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Speaker 1: again we'll cover that probably in the second half. I

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Speaker 1: think of this of this episode. So they their policies

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Speaker 1: to verify everything, to keep it secure, and then once

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Speaker 1: they verified it, the next step is deciding on when

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Speaker 1: to publish this information. And wiki leaks has done uh well.

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Speaker 1: They've done their own journalism. They've had their own journalists right,

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Speaker 1: stories that were based off of the documents that they

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Speaker 1: had found. That I think you mentioned earlier that that

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Speaker 1: part of what wiki leaks holds very DearS that they

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Speaker 1: want to publish original material. They don't want to republish anything,

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Speaker 1: and and that's and so yes, so um so actually

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Speaker 1: doing writing an investigation, it's a big part of that.

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Speaker 1: They also will partner with existing media outlets, although there's

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Speaker 1: been sort of a contentious relationship between wiki leaks and

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Speaker 1: several high profile newspapers UH in multiple nations, and and

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Speaker 1: part of that I think has to do with the

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Speaker 1: sana's personal handling of situations. But anyway, they they their

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Speaker 1: goal is to have stories written about the information they

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Speaker 1: have because It's kind of like if you were to

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Speaker 1: walk into a laboratory that's doing scientific experiments and you

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Speaker 1: see the experiment going on, but you can't really necessarily

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Speaker 1: make any meaningful conclusion based on that. You need to

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Speaker 1: have the report written up where you can see what

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Speaker 1: the actual methodology was, what the results were, and what

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Speaker 1: the conclusions are. That's what is digestible to the average person.

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Speaker 1: Same thing with these wiki leaks reports. It's usually the

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Speaker 1: raw material is something that they hand over to journalists,

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Speaker 1: and the journalists and up rutting the stories, and then

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Speaker 1: the raw material is published along with the story, so

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Speaker 1: that way transparency that they're really going for right that way,

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Speaker 1: so that you can check their sources exactly exactly. Like

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Speaker 1: if if Lauren reads the story and then you know,

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Speaker 1: she reads one journalist's perspective on that story and they're

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Speaker 1: the way that they have taken this information and then

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Speaker 1: communicated it, she can then go to the the source material,

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Speaker 1: read the source material and see if her own interpretation

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Speaker 1: of that source material is aligned with what the journalists said.

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Speaker 1: Because remember, no matter what, we're all humans, so we

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Speaker 1: all view things through our own kind of lens in

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Speaker 1: the world, and we try and be as you know,

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Speaker 1: a journalists try to be as objective as possible, at

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Speaker 1: least most people call themselves journalists try that's the hypothetical ideal.

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Speaker 1: Yeah so, but it's it's you know, there's no way

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Speaker 1: to ever truly attain that sure And and and in

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Speaker 1: some of these cases, they the Assange and and other

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Speaker 1: folks at wiki leaks have admitted to wanting to market

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Speaker 1: some of these bigger releases, uh, to to really get

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Speaker 1: things into the public eye. Right, I don't I haven't

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Speaker 1: personally read any any ill intent to change details, but

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Speaker 1: but just to bring the most important details to the forefront,

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Speaker 1: because they are a political organization, right and when you

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Speaker 1: look at it, you're you're talking about sometimes they're getting

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Speaker 1: files that are enormous, Like they're talking about pages and

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Speaker 1: pages and pages of documentation. It's like like over over

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Speaker 1: three hundred thousand documents and ago that that's you know,

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Speaker 1: obviously way too much for anyone to just wade through

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Speaker 1: beginning to end and find the nuggets that are meaningful,

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Speaker 1: because a lot of this stuff has information that's not

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Speaker 1: really um, you know, important in the grand scheme of things.

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Speaker 1: It might have been important for a very specific purpose,

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Speaker 1: but you know, beyond that, it doesn't really matter so much.

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Speaker 1: So well, we'll mention a few examples of stuff like

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Speaker 1: that a little bit later. Yeah, so they you know,

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Speaker 1: this is this is their basic purpose and their basic approach.

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Speaker 1: To go into more detail, we'll have to kind of

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Speaker 1: look at the timeline and discuss what had happened throughout

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Speaker 1: the history of wiki leaks, which course is still in

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Speaker 1: existence today. I don't mean to suggest that that history

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Speaker 1: is over, but it is. It is a continuing story.

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Speaker 1: But um, but most of the most of the action

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Speaker 1: within wiki leaks was going on around Yeah, that's when

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Speaker 1: the big big stuff was going on, although it's played

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Speaker 1: a part in other stories since then, and of course

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Speaker 1: before then too. But before we get into that discussion,

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Speaker 1: let's take a quick break. Alright, so we've had an

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Speaker 1: overview of what wiki leaks is, what its purpose is,

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Speaker 1: what you know, role it's it's ideally would fill within

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Speaker 1: the world of journalism and transparency and accountability. Let's talk

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Speaker 1: a little bit about the timeline. So it was around

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Speaker 1: two thousand six that wiki leaks began to coalesce, and

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Speaker 1: it was officially launched in two thousand seven. Right, either

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Speaker 1: December two thousand six or early two thousand seven. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's right around then. The first public nations were coming

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Speaker 1: out in in December of two thousand and six, but

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Speaker 1: most folks just say that are the official launch where

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Speaker 1: we've had a thing was in early two thousand seven, right,

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Speaker 1: And and I did want to mention that this is

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Speaker 1: coming on the heels of in two thousand five, the

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Speaker 1: commission that had been investigating the nine eleven terrorists attacks

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Speaker 1: here in the United States had found that that poor

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Speaker 1: information sharing was a huge failure of the government in

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Speaker 1: the in the lead up to the attacks, of of

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Speaker 1: of preventing this sort of thing from happening, and and

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Speaker 1: that that had led to internally a lot of reorganization

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Speaker 1: of how information is shared in between different departments department. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: this this is something that we see in all levels

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Speaker 1: of organization where you have multiple departments and then the

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Speaker 1: communication between departments. Sometimes the communication within a department tends

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Speaker 1: to get bogged down by red tape. And uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: you see this all the time. If you ever read

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Speaker 1: any stories about UH police investigations that spanned multiple jurisdictions,

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Speaker 1: that's always part of the story is how complicated it

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Speaker 1: was to get the cooperation of one police office versus another,

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Speaker 1: and if their federal UH investigators, then that adds another

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Speaker 1: layer of complexity. And and it was it wasn't until

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Speaker 1: around that time that UM, I think that a lot

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Speaker 1: of agencies had been kind of resisting going digital just

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Speaker 1: because of the ease of flow of information, which isn't

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Speaker 1: really considered a good thing when you're trying to keep

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Speaker 1: things secret. UM. And but but it was after after

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Speaker 1: two five after that report from that commission, that things

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Speaker 1: started going going online. And the first story that wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks partnered with The Guardian on was for around August

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Speaker 1: thirty one, two thousand seven. It was a story about

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Speaker 1: the alleged corruption of Daniel A Rotmi, the former president

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Speaker 1: of Kenya, and it was a leaked report. The Kenyan

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Speaker 1: government had elected to keep this report secret, and UH

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Speaker 1: someone leaked the information to wiki leaks. Wiki leaks then

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Speaker 1: approached The Guardian and the Guardian was very cautious about

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Speaker 1: this kind of relationship. It was one of those things

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Speaker 1: where they saw the value in what WikiLeaks was doing.

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Speaker 1: WikiLeaks was setting itself up to be a completely independent

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Speaker 1: safe house of information leaked information. UH. The idea being

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Speaker 1: that of course anyone who would submit to it would

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Speaker 1: remain anonymous, WikiLeaks would not point the finger at anybody,

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Speaker 1: and that that information could then get to some sort

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Speaker 1: of outlet that could communicate it to the wider world.

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Speaker 1: So this was the first attempt of The Guardian and

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Speaker 1: WikiLeaks to work together. From the story I read from

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Speaker 1: Columbia University, it really did sound like Julian Assange was

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Speaker 1: a big part of this early early on, and that

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Speaker 1: that was both a good thing in the early days

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Speaker 1: and turned into a complicated thing as time went on. Um.

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Speaker 1: From what I understand, he can he can have an

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Speaker 1: effect on people, uh and make them feel like they're

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Speaker 1: not really being listened to. He's frequently described as being

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Speaker 1: a very um dynamic personality. That's a very generous way

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Speaker 1: of putting it. Uh. Yeah, people who have taught to

432
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,760
Speaker 1: him have had some pretty contentious things to say about him.

433
00:25:14,160 --> 00:25:16,680
Speaker 1: I've never met the man, so I know nothing about

434
00:25:16,760 --> 00:25:19,520
Speaker 1: him personally, nor have I had any interactions with him,

435
00:25:19,560 --> 00:25:22,160
Speaker 1: But just going from what other people said, it seems

436
00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:25,120
Speaker 1: like he seems he seems very intense. Yeah, he could

437
00:25:25,119 --> 00:25:30,280
Speaker 1: be a handful, yes, um Uh. This the WikiLeaks would

438
00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:33,120
Speaker 1: later be presented with an award from Musty International um

439
00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:37,800
Speaker 1: on behalf of the Kenyan folks who leaked this information.

440
00:25:38,359 --> 00:25:41,480
Speaker 1: Um uh. Now that's one of the awards that Wiki

441
00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:44,120
Speaker 1: leaks has won. Wiki Leaks, of course, you know, it's

442
00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:47,879
Speaker 1: it is very controversial, but there are organizations that have

443
00:25:47,960 --> 00:25:54,200
Speaker 1: recognized its role in UH in uncovering corruption and even

444
00:25:54,240 --> 00:25:58,040
Speaker 1: going so far as to uh giving enough information so

445
00:25:58,119 --> 00:26:03,359
Speaker 1: that authorities could end up pursuing and correcting problems. UM

446
00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:06,720
Speaker 1: or that people could end up going out and voting

447
00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:10,360
Speaker 1: what would what some would call a corrupt administration out

448
00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:12,000
Speaker 1: of power. This is, of course, you know, on a

449
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:16,479
Speaker 1: global scale, not not limited to just one country. Uh.

450
00:26:16,520 --> 00:26:21,359
Speaker 1: In February of two eight, a Wiki leaks report along

451
00:26:21,400 --> 00:26:24,879
Speaker 1: with The Guardian exposed a Swiss bank called Julius Bear

452
00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:30,280
Speaker 1: for money laundering uh and UH that ended up getting

453
00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:33,240
Speaker 1: Wiki leaks hit with one of their first major lawsuits,

454
00:26:33,359 --> 00:26:36,919
Speaker 1: which is not something unusual for the organization. They've been

455
00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:40,320
Speaker 1: hit with many of them. Right. Also in two eight,

456
00:26:40,440 --> 00:26:46,480
Speaker 1: they posted a bunch of scientologies secret membership manuals. Yeah. Uh.

457
00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:49,800
Speaker 1: And it's funny because there's there are some stories that

458
00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:54,359
Speaker 1: talk about how Wiki leaks expected certain things to get

459
00:26:54,400 --> 00:26:57,160
Speaker 1: a lot more attention than what they what it actually did,

460
00:26:57,200 --> 00:26:59,679
Speaker 1: and that these manuals were that was one of the

461
00:26:59,720 --> 00:27:02,439
Speaker 1: things thought that a lot more attention would be devoted

462
00:27:02,480 --> 00:27:05,920
Speaker 1: to the scientology manuals than what actually happened. And that's

463
00:27:05,920 --> 00:27:09,479
Speaker 1: another reason why wiki leaks was looking to partner with

464
00:27:09,600 --> 00:27:13,639
Speaker 1: various newspapers around the world, because they were discovering that

465
00:27:13,680 --> 00:27:17,040
Speaker 1: trying to direct people to wiki leaks to find out

466
00:27:17,040 --> 00:27:20,960
Speaker 1: about the information was tricky. Anyone who makes a website

467
00:27:21,119 --> 00:27:23,760
Speaker 1: learns pretty quickly it's hard to get folks to go

468
00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:26,560
Speaker 1: to your website. It is folks need to want to

469
00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:29,640
Speaker 1: go to your website, you can't really make them go.

470
00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:34,159
Speaker 1: So uh, you know, if WikiLeaks was going to fulfill

471
00:27:34,200 --> 00:27:37,840
Speaker 1: its mission and being this this uh depository of secret

472
00:27:37,840 --> 00:27:41,360
Speaker 1: information that could then be used by journalists, they determined

473
00:27:41,359 --> 00:27:43,280
Speaker 1: that they had to reach out to more journalists to

474
00:27:43,280 --> 00:27:46,000
Speaker 1: make that happen. Um, the next thing I have is

475
00:27:46,040 --> 00:27:49,280
Speaker 1: November two thousand nine. Do you have anything before that? Okay?

476
00:27:49,320 --> 00:27:52,720
Speaker 1: That's when they published a comprehensive list of text pager

477
00:27:52,840 --> 00:27:56,520
Speaker 1: messages that were sent during September eleventh, two thousand one,

478
00:27:56,560 --> 00:27:59,080
Speaker 1: which of course was the date of the terrorist attacks

479
00:27:59,119 --> 00:28:02,119
Speaker 1: that that that ended thousands of lives here in the

480
00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:06,520
Speaker 1: United States. Um. And they were criticized for this because

481
00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:10,400
Speaker 1: a lot of those text messages were just simple messages

482
00:28:10,560 --> 00:28:14,040
Speaker 1: from between family members or co workers to let people

483
00:28:14,040 --> 00:28:16,280
Speaker 1: know that they were all right, that they had um

484
00:28:16,560 --> 00:28:21,919
Speaker 1: managed to to stay clear of the impact zones, that

485
00:28:22,040 --> 00:28:24,800
Speaker 1: sort of thing, and that there was a real question

486
00:28:24,840 --> 00:28:29,120
Speaker 1: of is this actually newsworthy? Is this is this valuable

487
00:28:29,160 --> 00:28:32,639
Speaker 1: information to publish? Is this are is this getting a

488
00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:37,680
Speaker 1: little too voyeuristic into the personal tragedies that happened during

489
00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:39,400
Speaker 1: this day? And and and there was a little bit

490
00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:41,800
Speaker 1: of a question um. And this ties back into the

491
00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:46,360
Speaker 1: scientology bit of of whether wiki leaks was was publishing

492
00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:50,760
Speaker 1: things to get attention and to be sensational um rather

493
00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:55,120
Speaker 1: mission right. Yeah, And that's that's played wiki leaks throughout

494
00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:58,680
Speaker 1: its history as well. Like the again, the goal that

495
00:28:58,720 --> 00:29:02,920
Speaker 1: it states seems very noble in the journalistic sense, but

496
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:05,680
Speaker 1: the behavior of at least some of the people in

497
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:09,120
Speaker 1: wiki leagues may have been so is aligned quite with that.

498
00:29:09,520 --> 00:29:12,680
Speaker 1: It seemed it seemed like you said, a little more sensationalists,

499
00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:15,520
Speaker 1: and that might not have ever been the intent of

500
00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:18,600
Speaker 1: the people in wiki leaks. It just maybe the impression

501
00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:21,760
Speaker 1: that everyone got from the way it was handled. Um. Now,

502
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,400
Speaker 1: getting back in, one last little thing about these these

503
00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:29,080
Speaker 1: text pager messages, UM, was that Wiki leaks said their

504
00:29:29,080 --> 00:29:32,320
Speaker 1: response to the criticism of is this actually newsworthy? Their

505
00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:36,840
Speaker 1: response was, this helps create a more complete picture of

506
00:29:36,880 --> 00:29:41,920
Speaker 1: what happened on that day. And I'm not. I mean, yeah,

507
00:29:41,960 --> 00:29:46,120
Speaker 1: it's more complete. I just don't know that it's more relevant. Sure,

508
00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:49,400
Speaker 1: sure I could, I could. I could argue that one

509
00:29:49,680 --> 00:29:51,880
Speaker 1: you know that that that could easily be argued either way.

510
00:29:52,040 --> 00:29:54,240
Speaker 1: But um, but yeah, I did want to mention also

511
00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:56,120
Speaker 1: in two thousand nine, UM, that was the year that

512
00:29:56,320 --> 00:29:59,960
Speaker 1: President Obama signed the executive order requiring a whole bun

513
00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:03,840
Speaker 1: of people who hold classified status here in the States

514
00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:08,920
Speaker 1: um to receive extra training on what actually needs classification

515
00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:14,120
Speaker 1: and UM and also forced people who who are creating

516
00:30:14,120 --> 00:30:17,880
Speaker 1: these classified documents to identify themselves on those documents. And

517
00:30:17,880 --> 00:30:20,920
Speaker 1: again this is that this is that effort for official

518
00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:25,560
Speaker 1: transparency to say, you know, let's not just blanket whitewash

519
00:30:25,640 --> 00:30:29,160
Speaker 1: everything is classified, because that just all that really does

520
00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:32,640
Speaker 1: is engender a spirit of distrust in the government to say,

521
00:30:32,640 --> 00:30:34,920
Speaker 1: like what, why are they hiding this? What else do

522
00:30:35,000 --> 00:30:37,640
Speaker 1: they have to hide? And uh, And of course, I

523
00:30:37,640 --> 00:30:40,160
Speaker 1: mean this is an ongoing story, stuff that we're finding

524
00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:43,560
Speaker 1: out about now, about things like clandestine surveillance, which are

525
00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:46,200
Speaker 1: these are stories that are breaking as we are recording

526
00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:49,360
Speaker 1: this podcast in early June two thousand thirteen. There are

527
00:30:49,360 --> 00:30:52,160
Speaker 1: all these stories about the n s A and surveillance

528
00:30:52,160 --> 00:30:54,400
Speaker 1: and cell phones and things like that. And some might

529
00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:57,280
Speaker 1: even argue that the things that happened with wiki leaks

530
00:30:57,280 --> 00:31:00,720
Speaker 1: are what kind of led to those policies, which is

531
00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:03,760
Speaker 1: the antithesis of what they were supposed to be doing.

532
00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:05,479
Speaker 1: I think I think that there's been a lot of

533
00:31:05,480 --> 00:31:07,800
Speaker 1: that actually from from I think a lot of governments

534
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:11,240
Speaker 1: have kind of cracked down on openness in response to

535
00:31:11,240 --> 00:31:13,880
Speaker 1: the sort of thing, yeah it's it's you know. And

536
00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:17,200
Speaker 1: some might argue they're cracking down on one side while

537
00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:20,640
Speaker 1: really doubling down on the shady stuff on the other side.

538
00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:24,320
Speaker 1: So it's almost like the Wookie defense. Hey it's Chewbacca.

539
00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:27,960
Speaker 1: So um, yeah, I mean, these is complicated issue. April

540
00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:33,040
Speaker 1: that's when Assane goes to the National Press Club in

541
00:31:33,160 --> 00:31:36,760
Speaker 1: d C and shows a video of a two thousand

542
00:31:36,840 --> 00:31:40,320
Speaker 1: seven incident. Now this is the the most probably the

543
00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:45,800
Speaker 1: most notorious Wiki leaks release. Yeah, of I mean, there's

544
00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:48,120
Speaker 1: been a lot of high profile ones, but this one

545
00:31:48,280 --> 00:31:51,040
Speaker 1: is like the defining one, I think. And this is

546
00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:54,400
Speaker 1: one that showed an incident in two thousand seven in

547
00:31:54,440 --> 00:32:01,080
Speaker 1: which UH two US Apache helicopter pilots allegedly executed UH

548
00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:05,320
Speaker 1: innocent people on the ground in Iraq, including to Reuter's correspondence.

549
00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:07,640
Speaker 1: The whole thing was caught on video, and Assange called

550
00:32:07,760 --> 00:32:10,800
Speaker 1: it collateral murder. That's what he named the video. And

551
00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:14,360
Speaker 1: again that seems very sensationalist. Now, at the same time,

552
00:32:14,920 --> 00:32:20,680
Speaker 1: the video itself really did portray a horrific act. Yeah,

553
00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:22,400
Speaker 1: and and I mean, and there's and there's full audio

554
00:32:22,440 --> 00:32:25,960
Speaker 1: in it, so there's this very chillingly calm discussion of

555
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:28,960
Speaker 1: everything that they're doing and um and and yeah, it's

556
00:32:28,960 --> 00:32:30,800
Speaker 1: it's you. You can you can see. I think at

557
00:32:30,880 --> 00:32:34,000
Speaker 1: least eighteen people are killed during the course of the

558
00:32:35,560 --> 00:32:38,120
Speaker 1: y and two of them were Reuters reporters, right, right.

559
00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:39,840
Speaker 1: This has been a project that had been going on

560
00:32:39,920 --> 00:32:43,920
Speaker 1: since March and had been they had received these files

561
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:47,120
Speaker 1: and UH kind of went into a frenzy of work

562
00:32:47,440 --> 00:32:50,400
Speaker 1: in Iceland putting them together. It was called Project B

563
00:32:51,200 --> 00:32:54,400
Speaker 1: and and they knew that it was big. Yeah, they

564
00:32:54,440 --> 00:32:56,479
Speaker 1: knew it was big. And and again as Sange was

565
00:32:56,520 --> 00:33:00,080
Speaker 1: trying to find a way to get more visibile be

566
00:33:00,200 --> 00:33:03,880
Speaker 1: for wiki leaks. So part of that sensationalism was in

567
00:33:03,920 --> 00:33:07,120
Speaker 1: fact intended because it was meant to to get as

568
00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:09,560
Speaker 1: much press as possible. But also, I mean, you know,

569
00:33:09,680 --> 00:33:12,960
Speaker 1: it was an absolutely pressworthy release. Yes, I mean, you

570
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,200
Speaker 1: know you can't Yeah, it was, I mean, I mean,

571
00:33:15,200 --> 00:33:18,120
Speaker 1: I was a legitimate It was a completely legitimate story.

572
00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:20,920
Speaker 1: It was something that needed to be broken because it

573
00:33:20,960 --> 00:33:24,920
Speaker 1: was people needed to be held accountable. Although it should

574
00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:28,360
Speaker 1: be said that the military never did charge those helicopter

575
00:33:28,360 --> 00:33:32,480
Speaker 1: pilots with anything illegal or the official statement was essentially

576
00:33:32,480 --> 00:33:36,080
Speaker 1: that the people were in an area where there was

577
00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:40,360
Speaker 1: a suspected um uh ambush that was going to attack

578
00:33:40,480 --> 00:33:44,880
Speaker 1: US forces and that the helicopter pilots acted responsibly. That's

579
00:33:44,880 --> 00:33:50,720
Speaker 1: the official response. So anyway, definitely was newsworthy. Uh. Then again,

580
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:52,880
Speaker 1: it was the handling of it that I think was sensational,

581
00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:57,800
Speaker 1: not the material itself, but that was again completely valid. Uh.

582
00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:04,479
Speaker 1: On the Pentagon arrested US Army private Bradley Manning on

583
00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:09,200
Speaker 1: charges of downloading and then leaking thousands of classified US documents,

584
00:34:09,239 --> 00:34:14,680
Speaker 1: including this video. And uh, that's sort of been the

585
00:34:14,680 --> 00:34:19,040
Speaker 1: The video and and the handling of Bradley Manning and

586
00:34:19,040 --> 00:34:22,239
Speaker 1: and Bradley Manning's case have been this sort of defining

587
00:34:23,200 --> 00:34:26,640
Speaker 1: element to what Wiki leaks is and the way that

588
00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:30,000
Speaker 1: it's portrayed in general. I mean, this story is still

589
00:34:30,040 --> 00:34:32,560
Speaker 1: ongoing to this day, right, I believe that the trial

590
00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:35,240
Speaker 1: for Manning is going on right now as we're recording

591
00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:38,399
Speaker 1: this podcast. Yes, it is, although it apparently it's going

592
00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:41,360
Speaker 1: much more quickly than what they had originally planned. They

593
00:34:41,360 --> 00:34:43,080
Speaker 1: thought it was going to take It was gonna be

594
00:34:43,080 --> 00:34:46,240
Speaker 1: a three month trial, but apparently there moving through witnesses

595
00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:50,759
Speaker 1: much more quickly than they had previously thought. And uh,

596
00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:53,880
Speaker 1: and there were thousands of documents involved in this, not

597
00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:57,680
Speaker 1: just the video, right right. Uh. WikiLeaks ended up publishing

598
00:34:57,719 --> 00:35:02,200
Speaker 1: over two documents from Manning. He had downloaded all of

599
00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:05,359
Speaker 1: these diplomatic cables while he was in an Iraq Army

600
00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:09,880
Speaker 1: outpost between November two thousand nine in April um reportedly

601
00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:11,960
Speaker 1: having burned them to a c d R labeled Lady

602
00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:15,239
Speaker 1: Gaga and told a told a hacker friend that he

603
00:35:15,320 --> 00:35:18,560
Speaker 1: had them. The hacker turned him in, and apparently that

604
00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:23,600
Speaker 1: hacker has since felt a great deal of conflict about

605
00:35:23,640 --> 00:35:27,960
Speaker 1: that act. UH. The charge, the main charge against Bradley

606
00:35:27,960 --> 00:35:31,840
Speaker 1: Manning is that he knowingly gave intelligence to the enemy

607
00:35:31,920 --> 00:35:36,960
Speaker 1: through indirect means. And UH because before he was arrested

608
00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:39,640
Speaker 1: and put on you know, put on trial, he had

609
00:35:39,680 --> 00:35:43,239
Speaker 1: obviously leaked these documents to wiki leaks, right, and so

610
00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:46,400
Speaker 1: in the trial I can say this because this was

611
00:35:46,520 --> 00:35:50,120
Speaker 1: reported very recently as of the recording of this podcast. UH.

612
00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:54,520
Speaker 1: The defense called the senior intelligence or one senior intelligence

613
00:35:54,520 --> 00:35:59,239
Speaker 1: analyst from Manning's unit. Her name is Casey Fulton, and

614
00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:02,680
Speaker 1: Fulton's said that the unit received no specific warning about

615
00:36:02,719 --> 00:36:05,040
Speaker 1: sites visited by al Qaeda. She did say that al

616
00:36:05,120 --> 00:36:08,439
Speaker 1: Qaeda would visit sites like Facebook or Google or even

617
00:36:08,440 --> 00:36:11,920
Speaker 1: Google Maps to gather information, but she did not mention

618
00:36:12,000 --> 00:36:15,840
Speaker 1: Wiki leaks among them. And the defenses case is saying that, UH,

619
00:36:15,880 --> 00:36:19,880
Speaker 1: that there was information went directly to right well that

620
00:36:20,040 --> 00:36:22,920
Speaker 1: the al Qaeda was not using wiki leaks specifically together

621
00:36:23,000 --> 00:36:26,160
Speaker 1: information that that was not Manning's intent, and in fact,

622
00:36:26,239 --> 00:36:28,719
Speaker 1: the judge in the case has said that the prosecution

623
00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:31,880
Speaker 1: has to show that Manning had actual knowledge that he

624
00:36:32,040 --> 00:36:35,319
Speaker 1: was actually giving intelligence to the enemy through a third

625
00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:39,319
Speaker 1: party and intermediary or in some other indirect way, and

626
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:43,040
Speaker 1: that the soldier must have had quote a general evil

627
00:36:43,120 --> 00:36:46,240
Speaker 1: intent unquote, and to have known he was dealing directly

628
00:36:46,320 --> 00:36:48,400
Speaker 1: or indirectly with an enemy of the United States in

629
00:36:48,520 --> 00:36:52,239
Speaker 1: order for this particular charge to hold. Now keep in

630
00:36:52,280 --> 00:36:55,799
Speaker 1: mind this one charge out of all the trial. So

631
00:36:56,160 --> 00:37:00,400
Speaker 1: but it sounds to me that it's a it's a

632
00:37:00,480 --> 00:37:04,160
Speaker 1: really tough case to make, you know, to prove the

633
00:37:04,200 --> 00:37:08,279
Speaker 1: intent parts specifically, but improving intent is one of those

634
00:37:08,280 --> 00:37:13,399
Speaker 1: things that's uh, basically impossible, but doesn't when people don't

635
00:37:13,520 --> 00:37:17,279
Speaker 1: do it or don't don't achieve it. Now to say

636
00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:19,640
Speaker 1: they also point out that this is a military trial.

637
00:37:19,760 --> 00:37:22,360
Speaker 1: It's different from other trials in the United States. Typically

638
00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:24,840
Speaker 1: in the United States you have a trial with in

639
00:37:24,880 --> 00:37:27,600
Speaker 1: front of a jury of your peers. But in this case,

640
00:37:27,719 --> 00:37:30,120
Speaker 1: it is a judge that is overseeing the case and

641
00:37:30,320 --> 00:37:34,000
Speaker 1: her word is final at least unless you go through

642
00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:36,240
Speaker 1: an appeals process. But and you do not have exactly

643
00:37:36,280 --> 00:37:37,719
Speaker 1: the same the same rights to see what is a

644
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:40,200
Speaker 1: normal citizen in a court of law. So getting back

645
00:37:40,239 --> 00:37:45,520
Speaker 1: to two Wiki leaks back in UH July two thousand

646
00:37:45,560 --> 00:37:48,239
Speaker 1: and ten, so so Bradley Manning had been arrested. By

647
00:37:48,239 --> 00:37:51,840
Speaker 1: this point, three news organizations released separate accounts of the

648
00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,760
Speaker 1: war logs gathered from Wiki Leaks regarding the war in Afghanistan.

649
00:37:56,280 --> 00:38:02,480
Speaker 1: And in August UH, that's when another big controversial event

650
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:05,080
Speaker 1: in the history of Wiki leaks in general and Julian

651
00:38:05,120 --> 00:38:09,440
Speaker 1: Assange in particular happens. UH. Two former employees of Wiki

652
00:38:09,520 --> 00:38:13,200
Speaker 1: leaks filed rape charges against Julian Assange, and Assange has

653
00:38:13,239 --> 00:38:16,560
Speaker 1: essentially spent the rest of his life from that point

654
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:20,719
Speaker 1: evading any extradition to Sweden to stand trial for this.

655
00:38:20,840 --> 00:38:23,239
Speaker 1: All right, right, these charges were brought up in Sweden. UM.

656
00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:25,280
Speaker 1: The the two women who have brought up the charges,

657
00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:28,400
Speaker 1: their names have not been revealed to the press. UM

658
00:38:28,440 --> 00:38:31,440
Speaker 1: and UH. In Sweden there are laws about using using condoms.

659
00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:33,440
Speaker 1: If partner tells you to use one and you do not,

660
00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:37,160
Speaker 1: then you can be brought up on what is called

661
00:38:37,160 --> 00:38:40,520
Speaker 1: a rape charge and and the technical definition I shall

662
00:38:40,600 --> 00:38:45,239
Speaker 1: leave up to other political parties. Yeah. At any rate,

663
00:38:46,120 --> 00:38:50,160
Speaker 1: he has been fighting extradition since then, and at this

664
00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:55,640
Speaker 1: point he's actually um been a granted asylum from by Ecuador.

665
00:38:55,719 --> 00:38:58,560
Speaker 1: Ecuador has granted asanjea sailing. I'll tell him more about

666
00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:01,200
Speaker 1: that when we get a little further down. Yeah, that

667
00:39:01,280 --> 00:39:04,320
Speaker 1: whole the whole drama is a story and of itself.

668
00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:07,000
Speaker 1: But because again it's so hard to get to the

669
00:39:07,040 --> 00:39:09,720
Speaker 1: truth of the matter, there's just we actually talked about

670
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:12,600
Speaker 1: doing an episode just about Julian Sange, but instead of

671
00:39:12,719 --> 00:39:15,200
Speaker 1: about wiki leaks. But the more we looked into it,

672
00:39:15,239 --> 00:39:18,600
Speaker 1: the more we realize that this there's no way to

673
00:39:18,840 --> 00:39:22,600
Speaker 1: verify half the information that's out there, right, you know,

674
00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:24,680
Speaker 1: as as I said at the beginning of the episode,

675
00:39:25,080 --> 00:39:27,919
Speaker 1: all of the information about Julian Assange comes from either

676
00:39:28,000 --> 00:39:34,360
Speaker 1: Assange himself UM or from very close personal ex compatriots

677
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:36,640
Speaker 1: who are pretty angry at him. Right, So there are

678
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:39,399
Speaker 1: a lot of biases, and neither of those sources are

679
00:39:39,440 --> 00:39:45,919
Speaker 1: really necessarily reliable. So the UH in July you had

680
00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:50,040
Speaker 1: the UH, the the Afghanistan reports released. Now that was

681
00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:53,839
Speaker 1: one third of three big blocks of information that we're

682
00:39:53,840 --> 00:39:57,640
Speaker 1: going to be released UH that year. The other two

683
00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:01,839
Speaker 1: were about the ira Key War, which that information came

684
00:40:01,840 --> 00:40:06,920
Speaker 1: out in October, and then there was a huge block

685
00:40:07,040 --> 00:40:11,360
Speaker 1: of classified US diplomatic cables, and a cable is essentially

686
00:40:11,400 --> 00:40:14,760
Speaker 1: a message, So these were all these thousands and thousands

687
00:40:14,800 --> 00:40:17,719
Speaker 1: of diplomatic messages that came out in November twenty ten.

688
00:40:17,840 --> 00:40:22,759
Speaker 1: That was the trifecta of big, big bombshell releases that

689
00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:25,600
Speaker 1: came out in twenty that really established what wiki leaks

690
00:40:25,600 --> 00:40:27,560
Speaker 1: was all about. I think I think there's in November

691
00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:30,880
Speaker 1: where the ones are specifically from Manning. Yeah, yeah, and

692
00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:34,680
Speaker 1: then in September twenty a little bit earlier, that's when

693
00:40:34,840 --> 00:40:39,000
Speaker 1: Daniel dom Scheideberg left Wiki leaks, right, that's when he walked.

694
00:40:39,000 --> 00:40:41,160
Speaker 1: He had joined in two thousand eight and had become

695
00:40:41,640 --> 00:40:44,120
Speaker 1: sort of Asannge's right hand man. Yeah, he was kind of.

696
00:40:44,440 --> 00:40:47,920
Speaker 1: He was specifically a spokesperson four Wiki Leaks in Europe,

697
00:40:48,160 --> 00:40:52,600
Speaker 1: mainly in Germany, and he had a major falling out

698
00:40:52,800 --> 00:40:55,680
Speaker 1: with a Sange to the point where it went from

699
00:40:55,840 --> 00:40:58,840
Speaker 1: he and Assange sharing the same ideals to both of

700
00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:01,680
Speaker 1: them demonizing one another whenever they had the opportunity to

701
00:41:01,680 --> 00:41:03,920
Speaker 1: speak to the media. And they were roommates somewhere in

702
00:41:03,960 --> 00:41:06,960
Speaker 1: between there. So this is like talking about that band

703
00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:08,600
Speaker 1: you used to love and then they broke up, and

704
00:41:08,640 --> 00:41:10,759
Speaker 1: now no one has anything good to say about each other,

705
00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:14,920
Speaker 1: multiplied by about a billion. Right later, later on, he

706
00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:18,200
Speaker 1: would publish a book called Inside wiki Leaks, My Time

707
00:41:18,239 --> 00:41:21,359
Speaker 1: with Julian Assange at the World's Most Dangerous Website. Yeah,

708
00:41:21,360 --> 00:41:24,560
Speaker 1: he was not particularly complementary of Osange in that book

709
00:41:25,040 --> 00:41:28,000
Speaker 1: or in any of his interviews. He left to try,

710
00:41:28,120 --> 00:41:32,600
Speaker 1: and his goal was to found a competing leak site.

711
00:41:32,600 --> 00:41:35,680
Speaker 1: He felt that wiki leaks had lost sight of its ideals,

712
00:41:35,719 --> 00:41:37,640
Speaker 1: that it was not following, it was not behaving in

713
00:41:37,680 --> 00:41:40,360
Speaker 1: a way that again was aligned with its ideals. Perhaps

714
00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:43,480
Speaker 1: he felt that it was more sensationalized, the kind of

715
00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:46,560
Speaker 1: way that we've been talking about. How you know, that's

716
00:41:46,560 --> 00:41:51,920
Speaker 1: always been my personal impression, But again that's a personal impression. Um.

717
00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:54,800
Speaker 1: So he wanted to found a company called open leaks

718
00:41:55,480 --> 00:41:58,799
Speaker 1: that would be essentially a competitor to wiki leaks. Uh,

719
00:41:58,840 --> 00:42:02,080
Speaker 1: and he wanted it to be more transparent than wiki

720
00:42:02,160 --> 00:42:05,239
Speaker 1: leaks was. So he didn't want to have these kind

721
00:42:05,239 --> 00:42:10,680
Speaker 1: of deals with various news organizations where it was almost exclusive,

722
00:42:10,760 --> 00:42:12,719
Speaker 1: like a partnership saying Hey, I'm going to give you

723
00:42:12,760 --> 00:42:14,920
Speaker 1: this information and then you can run it, and you know,

724
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:17,879
Speaker 1: we'll we'll have this buddy buddy relationship. Just link back

725
00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:19,520
Speaker 1: to my site. Make sure you do that. If you

726
00:42:19,560 --> 00:42:22,360
Speaker 1: link back to my site, we're all good. He didn't

727
00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:26,040
Speaker 1: want to do any of that, but eventually he ended

728
00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:29,600
Speaker 1: up changing his tune for open leaks because it just

729
00:42:29,640 --> 00:42:34,000
Speaker 1: didn't go well. Part of it was that when he left,

730
00:42:34,080 --> 00:42:36,880
Speaker 1: one of the things he did was he copied about

731
00:42:36,920 --> 00:42:40,360
Speaker 1: thirty five hundred files and then deleted them from wiki

732
00:42:40,400 --> 00:42:46,120
Speaker 1: leaks's database, and he left with those files. Depending upon

733
00:42:46,120 --> 00:42:49,799
Speaker 1: whom you ask, he was either trying to partially sabotage

734
00:42:49,840 --> 00:42:53,720
Speaker 1: wiki leaks and establish open leaks by getting a jump

735
00:42:53,760 --> 00:42:58,520
Speaker 1: start with these files, or from his point of view,

736
00:42:58,840 --> 00:43:01,720
Speaker 1: he felt that what wiki weeks was doing was irresponsible

737
00:43:01,760 --> 00:43:05,279
Speaker 1: and endangering the information that was within these thirty files,

738
00:43:05,320 --> 00:43:07,920
Speaker 1: and he was only copying it so that that information

739
00:43:07,920 --> 00:43:11,080
Speaker 1: would remain safe until such time that he could return

740
00:43:11,200 --> 00:43:14,359
Speaker 1: those files to wiki leaks. This is why this gets

741
00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:17,160
Speaker 1: really complicated, because people get you know, they get a

742
00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:20,120
Speaker 1: little irritated at each other and then they act out

743
00:43:20,120 --> 00:43:23,520
Speaker 1: a bit. So um Anyway, open leaks never really took off.

744
00:43:23,560 --> 00:43:27,040
Speaker 1: It ended up sort of transforming into more of a

745
00:43:27,160 --> 00:43:30,239
Speaker 1: site that's designed to teach other people how to set

746
00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:34,759
Speaker 1: up sites that that can accept and publish leaked material.

747
00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,160
Speaker 1: So it really did change quite a bit. So then

748
00:43:38,200 --> 00:43:41,160
Speaker 1: we had October and November where those other big releases

749
00:43:41,200 --> 00:43:43,840
Speaker 1: came out. In two thousand eleven, that's when wiki leaks

750
00:43:43,880 --> 00:43:47,520
Speaker 1: was hit by a pretty hard blow, and it didn't

751
00:43:47,600 --> 00:43:51,400
Speaker 1: have anything to do with a lawsuit. This was a blockade,

752
00:43:51,760 --> 00:43:57,480
Speaker 1: a financial blockade. This was when several major financial companies,

753
00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:03,640
Speaker 1: banks and credit card companies all decided to end any

754
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:08,400
Speaker 1: transfer of funds towards Wiki leaks. Wiki leaks existed solely

755
00:44:08,480 --> 00:44:13,480
Speaker 1: upon uh submissions of of monetary donations to the site.

756
00:44:13,560 --> 00:44:15,920
Speaker 1: You know, people were donating money in order for wiki

757
00:44:15,960 --> 00:44:19,360
Speaker 1: leaks to keep going. This was essentially all those methods

758
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:22,600
Speaker 1: of transmission saying we are no longer allowing payments to

759
00:44:22,680 --> 00:44:25,280
Speaker 1: go to wiki leaks, So even if you want to donate,

760
00:44:25,680 --> 00:44:29,759
Speaker 1: there was no route for you to go right. Um.

761
00:44:30,560 --> 00:44:32,440
Speaker 1: It actually got to a point where Assange said that

762
00:44:32,520 --> 00:44:37,800
Speaker 1: wiki leaks had burned through of its assets UH and

763
00:44:37,800 --> 00:44:40,160
Speaker 1: and that it wasn't able to really regenerate them in

764
00:44:40,160 --> 00:44:43,640
Speaker 1: any meaningful way because this blockade was preventing payments to

765
00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:46,319
Speaker 1: go to wiki leaks. Absolutely, and this was also going

766
00:44:46,320 --> 00:44:48,799
Speaker 1: on at the same time that um or or a

767
00:44:48,800 --> 00:44:53,359
Speaker 1: little bit before this, UH servers had started withdrawing their

768
00:44:53,400 --> 00:44:58,879
Speaker 1: services from wiki leaks. Amazon dumped them, every DNS had

769
00:44:58,960 --> 00:45:02,040
Speaker 1: terminated their service, right it got to a point where

770
00:45:02,080 --> 00:45:04,719
Speaker 1: you know, you could still get there. It was you know,

771
00:45:04,760 --> 00:45:07,480
Speaker 1: they would have work around so that people could still

772
00:45:08,000 --> 00:45:11,400
Speaker 1: get to UH to wiki leaks, but it was a

773
00:45:11,480 --> 00:45:15,880
Speaker 1: lot of that that support was going away, and you know,

774
00:45:16,000 --> 00:45:19,120
Speaker 1: there were theories on all sides of this as well,

775
00:45:19,160 --> 00:45:22,040
Speaker 1: saying that was a conspiracy that these companies had been

776
00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:25,600
Speaker 1: pressured by various governments around the world to end any

777
00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:28,120
Speaker 1: support so that way wiki leaks would essentially kind of

778
00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:31,160
Speaker 1: starved to death, that no one would be able to

779
00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:33,600
Speaker 1: get there, that it would no one would be able

780
00:45:33,640 --> 00:45:35,719
Speaker 1: to financially support it, and that it would just go

781
00:45:35,840 --> 00:45:38,840
Speaker 1: away and then hey, no more problems with all this

782
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:40,920
Speaker 1: leaked information because no one has any place for this

783
00:45:41,000 --> 00:45:45,239
Speaker 1: leaked information to go. So UH, whether or not that's

784
00:45:45,320 --> 00:45:47,319
Speaker 1: true or if it was just the company saying, you know,

785
00:45:47,440 --> 00:45:49,920
Speaker 1: this is something that is going to cause us problems

786
00:45:49,920 --> 00:45:51,279
Speaker 1: and we just don't want to be a part of it,

787
00:45:51,400 --> 00:45:55,040
Speaker 1: and they were independently coming to that decision. I don't know.

788
00:45:55,480 --> 00:45:57,399
Speaker 1: I guess if there was a leak about it, we'd

789
00:45:57,400 --> 00:46:00,000
Speaker 1: find out this was. This was also around the same

790
00:45:59,880 --> 00:46:03,160
Speaker 1: time that UM that they had published in September of two,

791
00:46:03,239 --> 00:46:07,799
Speaker 1: two thousand eleven, they had published over two cables that

792
00:46:08,160 --> 00:46:11,960
Speaker 1: did not contain redactions, which means that UM that the

793
00:46:12,160 --> 00:46:16,320
Speaker 1: sources of this information and in some places victims names

794
00:46:16,320 --> 00:46:19,480
Speaker 1: and etcetera, had not been blacked out. Yeah. In other words,

795
00:46:20,080 --> 00:46:24,240
Speaker 1: there were names of individuals within these cables that someone

796
00:46:24,280 --> 00:46:28,279
Speaker 1: who is reading over this could then target, either politically

797
00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:32,160
Speaker 1: or literally target these these folks that are mentioned in

798
00:46:32,200 --> 00:46:34,480
Speaker 1: these cables, And so there were there's a lot of

799
00:46:34,480 --> 00:46:37,719
Speaker 1: criticism leveled against Wiki leaks and against Assange, saying that

800
00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:41,960
Speaker 1: it was being irresponsible and endangering people's lives. Assange has

801
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:46,799
Speaker 1: not been the most um compassionate person in regards to this.

802
00:46:46,920 --> 00:46:50,400
Speaker 1: He's often said that, uh, his goal is to save

803
00:46:50,520 --> 00:46:53,200
Speaker 1: innocent lives, but if it endangers a few people because

804
00:46:53,200 --> 00:46:56,200
Speaker 1: of the information that's revealed in these in these cables,

805
00:46:56,200 --> 00:47:00,359
Speaker 1: then that's you know, that's acceptable. I'm paraphrase thing that's

806
00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:02,759
Speaker 1: not exactly what he said. But it's it's more or

807
00:47:02,840 --> 00:47:06,360
Speaker 1: less the message that has been given collateral murder. Yeah,

808
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:08,960
Speaker 1: it's yeah. That's the problem is that the Lauren seems

809
00:47:09,000 --> 00:47:11,839
Speaker 1: to feel that this might be a little touch hypocritical,

810
00:47:11,960 --> 00:47:16,960
Speaker 1: considering the uh, the criticisms that WikiLeaks has levied against UH,

811
00:47:17,200 --> 00:47:20,600
Speaker 1: you know, governments and corporations that WikiLeaks itself seems to

812
00:47:20,640 --> 00:47:23,800
Speaker 1: be engaging in the same sort of cavalier behavior towards

813
00:47:23,840 --> 00:47:26,520
Speaker 1: people's safety. And to be fair, it is absolutely not

814
00:47:26,600 --> 00:47:30,800
Speaker 1: a parallel to compare um, uh putting putting a source

815
00:47:30,960 --> 00:47:35,400
Speaker 1: in hypothetical danger of persecution versus and Apache pilot killing

816
00:47:35,400 --> 00:47:38,680
Speaker 1: a child in a car. That's that's different. Yeah, that's

817
00:47:38,719 --> 00:47:42,640
Speaker 1: the obviously very different things. But it does seem to

818
00:47:42,719 --> 00:47:45,000
Speaker 1: suggest that there's a little bit of hypocrisy going on.

819
00:47:45,480 --> 00:47:48,440
Speaker 1: I don't disagree with Lauren, is what I'm saying. UM.

820
00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:50,160
Speaker 1: But but but that's but but that is that is

821
00:47:50,160 --> 00:47:52,919
Speaker 1: my personal opinion and uh and I apologize a little

822
00:47:52,920 --> 00:47:55,919
Speaker 1: bit for injecting it. Um. This this move did did

823
00:47:55,960 --> 00:47:59,000
Speaker 1: create a great rift between WikiLeaks and UM. Several of

824
00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:02,359
Speaker 1: those newspapers or or reporting organizations that we had been

825
00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:05,760
Speaker 1: talking about them being in cahoots with earlier at The Guardian,

826
00:48:05,800 --> 00:48:09,120
Speaker 1: the New York Times, UM, a bunch of papers around

827
00:48:09,120 --> 00:48:11,560
Speaker 1: the world. Der Spiegel was another one. Yeah, it was

828
00:48:11,600 --> 00:48:16,040
Speaker 1: actually uh. And the way that Assange was handling the

829
00:48:16,120 --> 00:48:20,080
Speaker 1: relationship between wiki leaks and these news organizations was starting

830
00:48:20,080 --> 00:48:25,080
Speaker 1: to cheese them off. Like the Guardian had certain expectations,

831
00:48:25,440 --> 00:48:28,799
Speaker 1: The New York Times had certain expectations uh, And the

832
00:48:28,840 --> 00:48:30,719
Speaker 1: Guardian had felt that the New York Times was going

833
00:48:30,760 --> 00:48:33,080
Speaker 1: to be able to report on certain things which the

834
00:48:33,080 --> 00:48:36,600
Speaker 1: Guardian actually wanted to have happened, because again the Guardians

835
00:48:36,600 --> 00:48:39,279
Speaker 1: in the UK and the secrecy laws are such that

836
00:48:39,760 --> 00:48:42,279
Speaker 1: there were there were these partnerships between the Guardian and

837
00:48:42,360 --> 00:48:44,960
Speaker 1: New York Times where New York Times could publish some

838
00:48:45,040 --> 00:48:47,719
Speaker 1: stuff that would possibly get the Guardian into trouble but

839
00:48:47,760 --> 00:48:51,480
Speaker 1: would still benefit the Guardian in some way. So it

840
00:48:51,640 --> 00:48:54,359
Speaker 1: was this this kind of weird relationship that was going on.

841
00:48:54,440 --> 00:48:57,719
Speaker 1: But then Assange got essentially got ticked off at the

842
00:48:57,719 --> 00:48:59,879
Speaker 1: New York Times for the way that the New York

843
00:48:59,880 --> 00:49:02,080
Speaker 1: Time Times handled its information because one thing that the

844
00:49:02,080 --> 00:49:05,480
Speaker 1: New York Times would do is approached the government and say, hey,

845
00:49:05,840 --> 00:49:08,239
Speaker 1: we receive these cables and we plan on running with

846
00:49:08,239 --> 00:49:10,319
Speaker 1: a story, but we're letting you know ahead of time,

847
00:49:10,640 --> 00:49:13,279
Speaker 1: whereas in the UK that's generally not done. Generally in

848
00:49:13,280 --> 00:49:16,720
Speaker 1: the UK, they run the story. So that put pressure

849
00:49:16,760 --> 00:49:18,720
Speaker 1: on the Guardian. It also put pressure on a Sange.

850
00:49:18,719 --> 00:49:22,279
Speaker 1: And then Assange was apparently very much upset about this

851
00:49:22,320 --> 00:49:24,760
Speaker 1: and wanted to sever the relationship with the New York Times,

852
00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:26,600
Speaker 1: but the Guardians still wanted this relationship with the New

853
00:49:26,680 --> 00:49:29,560
Speaker 1: York Times. If this is starting to sound like the

854
00:49:29,640 --> 00:49:33,960
Speaker 1: relationships in middle school drama club, that's kind of what

855
00:49:34,040 --> 00:49:36,719
Speaker 1: it comes out to being, except the stakes are obviously

856
00:49:37,120 --> 00:49:42,359
Speaker 1: way higher. Absolutely, and uh yeah, they the newspapers five

857
00:49:42,440 --> 00:49:44,960
Speaker 1: five global newspapers found up putting out a joint statement

858
00:49:45,000 --> 00:49:47,520
Speaker 1: that said, um, we deplore the decision of Wiki Leaks

859
00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:50,560
Speaker 1: to publish the unredacted State Department cables, which may put

860
00:49:50,560 --> 00:49:53,480
Speaker 1: sources at risk. The decision to publish by Julian Assange

861
00:49:53,520 --> 00:49:56,080
Speaker 1: was his and his alone, right, yeah, because they all

862
00:49:56,120 --> 00:49:59,960
Speaker 1: had the policy of actually going through and very carefully

863
00:50:00,320 --> 00:50:05,799
Speaker 1: uh redacting any identifiable information to protect sources and to

864
00:50:05,800 --> 00:50:09,400
Speaker 1: protect people who could potentially become a victim of some agency.

865
00:50:10,040 --> 00:50:12,680
Speaker 1: And uh and you know that was an important part

866
00:50:12,800 --> 00:50:15,040
Speaker 1: of their process to the point where you had people

867
00:50:15,239 --> 00:50:19,680
Speaker 1: entire departments in charge of reviewing every single cable to

868
00:50:19,719 --> 00:50:22,520
Speaker 1: make certain that all the stuff they published was going

869
00:50:22,560 --> 00:50:25,560
Speaker 1: to be safe. And so for this move to happen

870
00:50:25,560 --> 00:50:27,759
Speaker 1: on Wiki leaks and meant that a lot of that

871
00:50:27,840 --> 00:50:31,960
Speaker 1: work was just nullified. And obviously that is a good

872
00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:36,440
Speaker 1: reason to become upset. Well. Once you get into about

873
00:50:36,560 --> 00:50:40,239
Speaker 1: May two thousand twelve, so Assange had been fighting extradition

874
00:50:41,480 --> 00:50:45,080
Speaker 1: attempts and he had been living in London while Sweden

875
00:50:45,200 --> 00:50:47,560
Speaker 1: authorities were trying to extradite into Sweden. He had he

876
00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:49,400
Speaker 1: had spent about a week in jail in December of

877
00:50:50,280 --> 00:50:53,880
Speaker 1: on on those um extradition charges. Yeah, and he had

878
00:50:54,040 --> 00:50:56,960
Speaker 1: been released on bail, been in and out of court

879
00:50:57,040 --> 00:51:02,040
Speaker 1: trying to appeal extradition, and by May two thousand twelve,

880
00:51:02,560 --> 00:51:04,960
Speaker 1: the British Supreme Court, it had gone all the way

881
00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:07,959
Speaker 1: up to the British Supreme Court said no, we're not

882
00:51:08,040 --> 00:51:10,239
Speaker 1: going to prevent your extradition. You are going to have

883
00:51:10,280 --> 00:51:12,719
Speaker 1: to go to Sweden to stand trial. That's when a

884
00:51:12,840 --> 00:51:16,840
Speaker 1: Sange then started to appeal to Ecuador the embassy in

885
00:51:16,880 --> 00:51:20,440
Speaker 1: the UK and actually saying will you grant me asylum.

886
00:51:20,480 --> 00:51:23,120
Speaker 1: And um, it was at a point where he was

887
00:51:23,280 --> 00:51:25,880
Speaker 1: in the he was staying in the embassy, he had

888
00:51:25,920 --> 00:51:29,719
Speaker 1: not officially been granted asylum by Ecuador, and then there

889
00:51:29,800 --> 00:51:33,359
Speaker 1: was going to be apparently a raid on the Ecuador

890
00:51:33,719 --> 00:51:35,960
Speaker 1: embassy in order to get a Sange out, and that's

891
00:51:35,960 --> 00:51:39,480
Speaker 1: when Ecuador said we're giving you asylum. So it's almost

892
00:51:39,880 --> 00:51:44,120
Speaker 1: it's possible that that that raid was the precipitating Yeah,

893
00:51:44,160 --> 00:51:46,520
Speaker 1: that was exactly the moment where the Ecuador said, you know,

894
00:51:46,600 --> 00:51:48,839
Speaker 1: we weren't going to but now we totally are because

895
00:51:48,840 --> 00:51:54,160
Speaker 1: now it's political. So still very complicated issue. Um, and

896
00:51:54,239 --> 00:51:57,799
Speaker 1: you know, guilt or innocence aside. It's it's one of

897
00:51:57,800 --> 00:52:02,480
Speaker 1: those stories that is really complicated and tough to to

898
00:52:02,600 --> 00:52:06,040
Speaker 1: kind of unwind and follow. So anyway, Wiki leaks is

899
00:52:06,080 --> 00:52:09,440
Speaker 1: still still a thing still around. It's still you know,

900
00:52:09,880 --> 00:52:14,720
Speaker 1: accepts leaked information. Uh. It has uncovered lots of stories,

901
00:52:14,760 --> 00:52:17,399
Speaker 1: not just with governments, but like we said, with corporations,

902
00:52:18,040 --> 00:52:21,520
Speaker 1: some of which have caused newspapers to get into trouble

903
00:52:21,560 --> 00:52:24,600
Speaker 1: for running the stories. Things like you know, major corporations

904
00:52:24,640 --> 00:52:28,359
Speaker 1: that may have fallen short on promises for doing things

905
00:52:28,360 --> 00:52:30,960
Speaker 1: like cleaning up a gasoline spill. There was a specific

906
00:52:30,960 --> 00:52:35,719
Speaker 1: example of that, UM, and it continues to fulfill that role.

907
00:52:35,840 --> 00:52:40,200
Speaker 1: Some argue that it's even possible that the whole Ossange

908
00:52:40,440 --> 00:52:44,800
Speaker 1: story could just be a smoke and mirrors for Wiki

909
00:52:44,840 --> 00:52:47,080
Speaker 1: Leaks to continue doing what it does without having to

910
00:52:47,080 --> 00:52:50,960
Speaker 1: worry about so much focus because there's this fall guy. Right. Yeah,

911
00:52:50,960 --> 00:52:53,040
Speaker 1: you've got this very flash bang kind of person over

912
00:52:53,120 --> 00:52:56,279
Speaker 1: here who's going like, look at me, extradition charges. Yeah,

913
00:52:56,719 --> 00:53:02,719
Speaker 1: and then they can continue doing their their political political work. Right. So, uh,

914
00:53:02,880 --> 00:53:07,360
Speaker 1: I doubt that anything is that planned out because life

915
00:53:07,440 --> 00:53:10,319
Speaker 1: is just complicated and messy and it's tough to ever

916
00:53:10,440 --> 00:53:14,600
Speaker 1: have a plan that, like James bondishes be very impressed.

917
00:53:14,920 --> 00:53:20,040
Speaker 1: But but you know it's possible. You know, if they

918
00:53:20,080 --> 00:53:23,200
Speaker 1: did do that, then it's it's the stuff of movie legend.

919
00:53:23,440 --> 00:53:26,640
Speaker 1: Speaking of movie legends, there is a film being made, well,

920
00:53:26,680 --> 00:53:29,359
Speaker 1: there's there. There are two films that that have been

921
00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:33,799
Speaker 1: UM in production recently. One is a documentary that was

922
00:53:34,520 --> 00:53:40,239
Speaker 1: just released I believe, um Alex Gibney's We Steal Secrets, right,

923
00:53:40,320 --> 00:53:42,960
Speaker 1: and that one focused both on a Sange and on

924
00:53:43,040 --> 00:53:47,560
Speaker 1: Manning and uh and sort of it was supposed to be,

925
00:53:47,560 --> 00:53:50,239
Speaker 1: you know, like a warts and all kind of portrayal,

926
00:53:50,400 --> 00:53:53,839
Speaker 1: and some people say that his portrayal of Assange does

927
00:53:53,960 --> 00:53:56,040
Speaker 1: give sort of a warts and all approach. In fact,

928
00:53:56,080 --> 00:53:59,560
Speaker 1: I think, you know, Assange definitely did not make that

929
00:53:59,600 --> 00:54:04,040
Speaker 1: relationship shop a sweet one because apparently he demanded outright

930
00:54:04,600 --> 00:54:06,960
Speaker 1: that if Gibney where to talk to a Sane it

931
00:54:06,960 --> 00:54:10,560
Speaker 1: would cost him a million bucks, and the documentary filmmaker,

932
00:54:10,680 --> 00:54:12,760
Speaker 1: that's probably not the best way to win that person

933
00:54:12,840 --> 00:54:16,520
Speaker 1: over to your side. No, Yeah, Sane has come out

934
00:54:16,880 --> 00:54:21,120
Speaker 1: very vocally against this documentary, which is funny because people

935
00:54:21,239 --> 00:54:24,560
Speaker 1: other people have also on both sides, have come down

936
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:27,440
Speaker 1: upon this documentary right and and some some people are

937
00:54:27,440 --> 00:54:30,840
Speaker 1: proponents of it. One uh four more Wiki Leaks employee

938
00:54:30,840 --> 00:54:35,440
Speaker 1: in particular, James ball Um reported reported it being a

939
00:54:35,560 --> 00:54:38,120
Speaker 1: very accurate portrayal, like to the point that it was

940
00:54:38,440 --> 00:54:41,279
Speaker 1: deja vu seeing the film. Now, there are some who

941
00:54:41,360 --> 00:54:47,399
Speaker 1: say that the Manning's portrayal was overly sympathetic. That they

942
00:54:47,480 --> 00:54:52,080
Speaker 1: do you know, it's hard to say that that it's

943
00:54:52,160 --> 00:54:55,919
Speaker 1: unjustified because you're talking about one person who may very

944
00:54:55,960 --> 00:54:58,799
Speaker 1: well have been acting in what he thought was the

945
00:54:58,920 --> 00:55:01,120
Speaker 1: right way to to exp supose what he saw as

946
00:55:01,200 --> 00:55:06,040
Speaker 1: unethical behavior and there's no you know, there's no official

947
00:55:06,040 --> 00:55:09,400
Speaker 1: way of doing it and any hope of it being addressed,

948
00:55:09,719 --> 00:55:11,719
Speaker 1: and so he went outside the system in order to

949
00:55:11,760 --> 00:55:14,400
Speaker 1: try and have this done. That's that's that's kind of

950
00:55:14,400 --> 00:55:16,640
Speaker 1: the story that's being told. There are other people who

951
00:55:16,719 --> 00:55:18,960
Speaker 1: say it's more complicated than that, and that you know,

952
00:55:19,000 --> 00:55:22,600
Speaker 1: it wasn't truly altruistic motivations that had him do what

953
00:55:22,640 --> 00:55:26,520
Speaker 1: he did. But again, that's a really complicated story. When

954
00:55:26,560 --> 00:55:29,200
Speaker 1: you're doing a documentary film, you have to simplify things

955
00:55:29,320 --> 00:55:34,319
Speaker 1: so that you can and so two hours long and not. Yeah,

956
00:55:34,440 --> 00:55:36,200
Speaker 1: So that was one of the criticisms I saw was

957
00:55:36,280 --> 00:55:39,759
Speaker 1: that it made uh Manning out to be more sympathetic

958
00:55:39,800 --> 00:55:43,719
Speaker 1: than than the person felt that he should be. Uh.

959
00:55:44,320 --> 00:55:47,399
Speaker 1: I think it's really hard to say that you can't

960
00:55:47,480 --> 00:55:50,000
Speaker 1: feel sympathy for someone who's being held for a military

961
00:55:50,040 --> 00:55:54,759
Speaker 1: trial that doesn't have the same same protections as a

962
00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:57,879
Speaker 1: criminal or civil case would in a normal court of law.

963
00:55:58,520 --> 00:56:03,839
Speaker 1: But you know, again, I don't know, so we don't

964
00:56:03,880 --> 00:56:06,680
Speaker 1: know the guy, don't know all the details. So uh,

965
00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:09,319
Speaker 1: you know, that will play out and the judge will

966
00:56:09,520 --> 00:56:12,480
Speaker 1: come to a decision. So the other one is, um,

967
00:56:12,760 --> 00:56:15,279
Speaker 1: it's it's a fictional film, or I mean fictional, it's

968
00:56:15,320 --> 00:56:22,880
Speaker 1: a biopic. Maybe Barnaby cumber bund in it benefitted cumber

969
00:56:22,920 --> 00:56:27,480
Speaker 1: Batch right right, I'm sorry, John Harrison? Is that John Harrison?

970
00:56:27,520 --> 00:56:30,640
Speaker 1: And um? This this film is called The fifthest Stage.

971
00:56:30,640 --> 00:56:33,960
Speaker 1: It's being directed by Bill Condon, UM and it is

972
00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:39,160
Speaker 1: slated to be released on October eleventh, um and uh.

973
00:56:39,520 --> 00:56:42,640
Speaker 1: Cumber Batch has said that Assange directly asked him to

974
00:56:42,680 --> 00:56:48,160
Speaker 1: not do the film, um, calling it a massive propaganda attack. Yeah,

975
00:56:48,480 --> 00:56:51,040
Speaker 1: then maybe it is. I haven't seen it. I don't know.

976
00:56:51,360 --> 00:56:54,200
Speaker 1: We'll have to wait yet. But if you want to

977
00:56:54,200 --> 00:56:58,840
Speaker 1: see some really cool pictures of Benedict cumber Batch looking

978
00:56:58,960 --> 00:57:03,960
Speaker 1: intense with Bleach with um, those are on the internet. Yeah,

979
00:57:04,000 --> 00:57:06,239
Speaker 1: it's uh. I remember seeing that for the first time.

980
00:57:06,239 --> 00:57:09,880
Speaker 1: I'm thinking, what the what? Uh So anyway, Yeah, this

981
00:57:10,520 --> 00:57:12,799
Speaker 1: it's a complicated story Wiki leaks, you know. It's one

982
00:57:12,800 --> 00:57:14,640
Speaker 1: of those things we actually debated on whether or not

983
00:57:14,680 --> 00:57:16,360
Speaker 1: we wanted to do a full episode on it because

984
00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:19,120
Speaker 1: it's it's a tough topic. It's and it's got a

985
00:57:19,160 --> 00:57:22,320
Speaker 1: lot of controversial elements to it, but it's important. It's

986
00:57:22,320 --> 00:57:25,240
Speaker 1: definitely one of those things that has raised a lot

987
00:57:25,320 --> 00:57:32,320
Speaker 1: of questions about, you know, transparency, surveillance, expectations of privacy,

988
00:57:32,480 --> 00:57:35,120
Speaker 1: what is classified information, I mean, and the role the

989
00:57:35,200 --> 00:57:37,080
Speaker 1: role of the media and the role of the of

990
00:57:37,200 --> 00:57:40,720
Speaker 1: the government in reporting to citizens what's going on in

991
00:57:40,800 --> 00:57:43,880
Speaker 1: their world. Yeah, and the role of the Internet and

992
00:57:44,040 --> 00:57:47,160
Speaker 1: net neutrality. I mean, all of these things have been

993
00:57:47,200 --> 00:57:49,320
Speaker 1: tied up in this and if wiki leaks had not

994
00:57:49,440 --> 00:57:52,760
Speaker 1: been a thing, the conversation might be very, very different

995
00:57:52,760 --> 00:57:55,280
Speaker 1: in all of those arenas. So we felt that it

996
00:57:55,400 --> 00:57:58,000
Speaker 1: had to be something we would cover. So hopefully you

997
00:57:58,000 --> 00:58:02,240
Speaker 1: guys appreciated and and enjoyed this episode, even though it

998
00:58:02,320 --> 00:58:05,280
Speaker 1: was one of the probably darker ones that we've done recently.

999
00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:08,840
Speaker 1: Do you have any suggestions for future episodes of text Stuff,

1000
00:58:09,200 --> 00:58:10,880
Speaker 1: Please get in touch with us and let us know.

1001
00:58:11,400 --> 00:58:13,760
Speaker 1: You can send us an email that addresses tex Stuff

1002
00:58:13,840 --> 00:58:16,600
Speaker 1: at Discovery dot com, or you can drop us a

1003
00:58:16,640 --> 00:58:19,280
Speaker 1: line on Facebook or Twitter or handle There is tech

1004
00:58:19,360 --> 00:58:21,480
Speaker 1: Stuff H. S. W. M. Laren and I will talk

1005
00:58:21,480 --> 00:58:30,200
Speaker 1: to you again really soon for more on this and

1006
00:58:30,280 --> 00:58:32,840
Speaker 1: thousands of other topics. Does it how staff works dot

1007
00:58:32,840 --> 00:58:42,840
Speaker 1: Com