WEBVTT - The Massive Economic Impact If China Invades Taiwan

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 1>Tracy, you know, for years, I've always thought that if

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<v Speaker 1>you want to be like a smart sounding pundit at

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<v Speaker 1>the beginning of the year and someone ask you, like,

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<v Speaker 1>what risks are you thinking about right now, you like

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<v Speaker 1>stroke your chin and look off and you say, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>really worried about like geopolitical risk. And that's always like

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<v Speaker 1>a safe answer anytime any year. Like that always makes

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<v Speaker 1>you sound sophisticated.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, unexpected geopolitical risks are an evergreen category of punditry.

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<v Speaker 3>This is true.

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<v Speaker 2>There is one specific risk within that category that I

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<v Speaker 2>feel like has come up every year for almost as

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<v Speaker 2>long as I can remember, and that is the risk

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<v Speaker 2>of something happening between China and Taiwan. And I have

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<v Speaker 2>a really embarrassing confession to make, Okay. I wrote my

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<v Speaker 2>dissertation on I wrote it in Beijing, and it must

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<v Speaker 2>have been in like two thousand and five or two

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<v Speaker 2>thousand and six, predicting that China would invade Taiwan before

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<v Speaker 2>the Beijing Olympics. I think that was like two thousand

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<v Speaker 2>and eight or something.

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<v Speaker 1>So when people talk about the risk of China invading

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<v Speaker 1>Taiwan or attempting to formally reunify, this is like twenty

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<v Speaker 1>years people have been talking about this and it keeps not.

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<v Speaker 2>Happening, Yes, and getting it wrong consistently for twenty years,

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<v Speaker 2>or at least I have.

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<v Speaker 1>But it does seem right like for whatever reason. And

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<v Speaker 1>we'll get into it that we are once again in

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<v Speaker 1>a wave of heightened concern. And you know, there are

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<v Speaker 1>two very active wars happening right now currently between Russia

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<v Speaker 1>and Ukraine, the Israel and Hamas war, and so the

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<v Speaker 1>idea of war, unexpected war is on people's minds. And

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<v Speaker 1>then we know that tension has been building in various

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<v Speaker 1>ways Taiwan. There was all of the angst over the

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<v Speaker 1>Nancy Pelosi trip a couple of years ago, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>and the heightened awareness that the world has on semiconductors

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<v Speaker 1>that are manufactured in Taiwan, and sort of a more

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<v Speaker 1>aggressive posture I believe from Xi Jinping and the military

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<v Speaker 1>of more aggressive war games and exercises. So many people

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<v Speaker 1>are concerned about some prospect of a hot conflict in

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<v Speaker 1>the next few years.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you mentioned semiconductors and I feel like this is

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<v Speaker 2>really the key thing, which is in the past two

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<v Speaker 2>or well, I guess four years now, since the outbreak

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<v Speaker 2>of the global pandemic, we have had a sort of

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<v Speaker 2>crash course in the importance of the Taiwanese economy to

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<v Speaker 2>the broader world. And I feel like that's sort of

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<v Speaker 2>done a couple things. So one, it's made everyone a

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<v Speaker 2>lot more nervous about what could happen if that supply

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<v Speaker 2>chain gets disrupted again, although in a very different way.

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<v Speaker 2>And then secondly, maybe it's given a little bit of

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<v Speaker 2>ammunition to China to saber rattle on this issue even more. Right,

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<v Speaker 2>if it threatens something against Taiwan, the whole world now

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<v Speaker 2>knows what's at stake.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's absolutely right. So this is one of these

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<v Speaker 1>things that is you could feel it building more and

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<v Speaker 1>more people are talking about it. My understanding and what

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<v Speaker 1>I've seen is people say, oh, in DC, everyone is

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<v Speaker 1>like obsessed with this question. I don't feel like that's

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<v Speaker 1>as much the case in New York, but I do

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<v Speaker 1>get the impression that in DC talk of a war

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<v Speaker 1>is very high. And so I think, like, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we have to do more on this, And I think

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<v Speaker 1>geopolitics in general, thinking back to some of our conversations

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<v Speaker 1>with Zultan et cetera about you know, the sort of

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<v Speaker 1>rearranging world, like, we need to dive into these questions

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit more.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, And the other reason we need to do it

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<v Speaker 2>is Taiwan is holding an election. In fact, we are

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<v Speaker 2>recording this on January ninth. By the time this episode

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<v Speaker 2>comes out, the election will have been held and so

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<v Speaker 2>we'll know who the winning candidate is. But in the meantime, like,

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<v Speaker 2>there is clearly a big reason to discuss this.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, Well, I'm very excited. We have two of our

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<v Speaker 1>colleagues here at Bloomberg that we've never had on the

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<v Speaker 1>podcast before, but they are the perfect guests to discuss

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<v Speaker 1>this because they've been doing a lot of work in

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<v Speaker 1>this area. We're going to be speaking with Jennifer Welch,

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<v Speaker 1>chief geoeconomics analyst at Bloomberg Economics, and Gerard De Pippo,

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<v Speaker 1>Senior geoeconomics analyst at Bloomberg Economics. They've both published a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of work on some of these questions related questions

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<v Speaker 1>wargaming the risk the economic stakes involved here, and so

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to start to go down our path of

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<v Speaker 1>understanding this tension better. So, Jennifer and Gerard, thank you

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<v Speaker 1>so much for coming on odd lots.

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<v Speaker 3>Thank you so much for having us.

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<v Speaker 4>Glad to be here.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a sort of very basic, I don't know,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe it's not basic zoom od question. You know, we

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<v Speaker 1>talked to like normal talk to economists who you know,

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<v Speaker 1>they have their recession forecast or forecast of soft landing, whatever,

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<v Speaker 1>and I sort of have some idea of how they

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<v Speaker 1>go about, you know, modeling different scenarios when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to wargam and modeling the odds of a war or

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<v Speaker 1>modeling how a war might go if one were pursued.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you economics analysts, like, what is the toolkit

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<v Speaker 1>that you have to actually go about modeling the risks

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<v Speaker 1>and the outcomes of a war.

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<v Speaker 3>That's a great question, and let me dry it. I'll

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<v Speaker 3>start off, and then if you want to jump in

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<v Speaker 3>as well, so on the first part of your question

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<v Speaker 3>of how do we estimate the probability of war? To

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<v Speaker 3>be perfectly candid, this is definitely more art than science.

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<v Speaker 3>What we did in the case of our recent project

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<v Speaker 3>on Taiwan and the trajectory we might see in the

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<v Speaker 3>Taiwan Strait was take a look at sort of baseline conditions,

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<v Speaker 3>what are the sort of structures in place there that

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<v Speaker 3>lean towards stability or that lean towards increasing tensions and

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<v Speaker 3>even to the extreme of a crisis or conflict, And

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<v Speaker 3>we examined all those key variables and their trajectory and

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<v Speaker 3>what weight they might have to be candid. This is

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<v Speaker 3>an area of a lot of debate among people who

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<v Speaker 3>focus on the Taiwan Street. You know, to what extent

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<v Speaker 3>does Beijing wield the most agency over it versus Taiwan,

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<v Speaker 3>versus the United States, which has historically been a key

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<v Speaker 3>balancing power in the street. And then from there we

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<v Speaker 3>kind of developed our sense of probabilities. But again, this

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<v Speaker 3>is a really complex and dynamic geopolitical environment. The election

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<v Speaker 3>that Taiwan will be having in advance of this recording

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<v Speaker 3>is an example of how things can really shift at

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<v Speaker 3>quick notice depending on how events like that turn out.

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<v Speaker 3>But overall, we think our sense of what the risks

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<v Speaker 3>of crisis or conflict in the Strait are are meant

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<v Speaker 3>to be, you know, standing the test of time and

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<v Speaker 3>looking out over the next five years. And then in

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<v Speaker 3>terms of how we study what the outcome of a

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<v Speaker 3>war would be were one to happen. This is a

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<v Speaker 3>little bit more of a rigorous process, and there are

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<v Speaker 3>a lot of think tanks, a lot of internal government entities,

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<v Speaker 3>not just in the United States, but Japan, Taiwan, all

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<v Speaker 3>around the world that are increasingly looking at how a

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<v Speaker 3>crosstright conflict could play out, and it often is very

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<v Speaker 3>much focused on the military dynamics. That's historically the origin

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<v Speaker 3>of these war games is testing military tactics and battle

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<v Speaker 3>plans and playing out how different scenarios can produce different

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<v Speaker 3>outcomes depending on sort of what you go into the

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<v Speaker 3>battle with and how different conditions can change those outcomes.

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<v Speaker 3>So for that particular exercise, there's a lot of different

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<v Speaker 3>variations of war games related to Taiwan out there, and

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<v Speaker 3>a lot of them produce a variety of results. It

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<v Speaker 3>really depends on kind of the assumptions going into it on.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, for example, how does the worst start, is

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<v Speaker 3>there any warning of it, how prepared is Taiwan to

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<v Speaker 3>defend itself? Does the US get involved? But what all

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<v Speaker 3>of them point to is a war would be incredibly

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<v Speaker 3>costly at all sides. Most of the war games focus

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<v Speaker 3>on sort of the military and the humanitarian impact of that.

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<v Speaker 3>But we looked at also the economic impact, and what

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<v Speaker 3>we found is especially for China, Taiwan, and the United States,

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<v Speaker 3>but also the global economy, the toll would be quite

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<v Speaker 3>immense were the cross street tensions to erupt into a

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<v Speaker 3>broader conflict.

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<v Speaker 4>Maybe this is obvious, but I think it's worth pointing

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<v Speaker 4>out that we're dealing with something that is mostly beyond

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<v Speaker 4>the historical sample set. So normally, when you're trying to

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<v Speaker 4>model something, you think of what's happened before. You think

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<v Speaker 4>of like Tetlock's book Super Forecasters, where they talk about

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<v Speaker 4>outside in analysis, right, you look at what's happened before

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<v Speaker 4>they might be analogous and say, what are the chances

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<v Speaker 4>that would apply in this case. Of course, there are

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<v Speaker 4>many wars in history, including wars that are happening right now,

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<v Speaker 4>but there aren't that many that involve China, and there

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<v Speaker 4>are none that involve cross rate conflict. And there aren't

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<v Speaker 4>actually that many to involve a major essentially continental power

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<v Speaker 4>seizing an island power, right, And so it actually is

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<v Speaker 4>a quite limited sample set. And what we essentially do

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<v Speaker 4>with think of plausible outcomes and then kind of back

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<v Speaker 4>in relative probabilities at least compared to other outcomes, and

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<v Speaker 4>then say, okay, that tells you, sort of cumulatively, what

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<v Speaker 4>the odds are of these of these scenarios.

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<v Speaker 2>Can you tell us a little bit more about how

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<v Speaker 2>you choose which scenarios to focus on, because obviously you

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<v Speaker 2>can't you can't examine the entirety of possibilities when it

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<v Speaker 2>comes to, to Jared's point, like a relatively unknown and

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<v Speaker 2>unpredictable conflict. But there are clearly some scenarios that are

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<v Speaker 2>seen as more likely than others. And I remember when

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<v Speaker 2>I was working in Hong Kong, we did a big

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<v Speaker 2>piece on the news side of things about, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>this is what a war between China and Taiwan might

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<v Speaker 2>look like. And our source for that was we went

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<v Speaker 2>out and we spoke to geopolitical experts such as yourselves,

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<v Speaker 2>and we tried to get their sense of what the

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<v Speaker 2>most likely scenarios were. But when you guys are doing it,

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<v Speaker 2>who are you talking to, what are you looking at?

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<v Speaker 4>Part of it is a constraint on how you're trying

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<v Speaker 4>to answer the question. So in this case, we're trying

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<v Speaker 4>to model economically what these outcomes are. The range of

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<v Speaker 4>outcomes is more of a gradient. I mean, in a

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<v Speaker 4>technical sense, there could be thousands of outcomes, right, but

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<v Speaker 4>you can't actually model all of that. So what we

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<v Speaker 4>tried to do was decide what are the sort of

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<v Speaker 4>key outcomes that are more or less analogous within themselves

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<v Speaker 4>than try to model that. But I should also say

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<v Speaker 4>we're putting out other pieces on the terminal that are

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<v Speaker 4>actually more detailed and maybe more nuanced than you might

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<v Speaker 4>have seen on the sort of econometric side in the

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<v Speaker 4>big take.

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<v Speaker 3>No, I think this is exactly right to kind of

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<v Speaker 3>underscore the point on some of these scenarios have more

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<v Speaker 3>direct economic implications than others. So, for example, there's a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of different variations of what a major crisis industry

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<v Speaker 3>could look like short of a war. We chose to

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<v Speaker 3>model a blockade because that's the scenario, even though it's

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<v Speaker 3>one of the more unlikely ones for a lot of

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<v Speaker 3>reasons we can get into that would have more direct

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<v Speaker 3>implications for the global economy versus something like a seizure

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<v Speaker 3>of one of Taiwan's outlying islands, where it would be

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<v Speaker 3>incredibly escalatory and risky from a geopolitical perspective, but the

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<v Speaker 3>impact to markets and to the global economy directly might

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<v Speaker 3>be less so because it's not necessarily directly affecting trade.

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<v Speaker 3>But all that to say, you know, in terms of

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<v Speaker 3>what we looked at for the big take in the

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<v Speaker 3>overall exercise was looking across the spectrum of possibilities from

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<v Speaker 3>sort of best case scenario, by which we define that

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<v Speaker 3>as sort of an enduring or stable piece, to absolute

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<v Speaker 3>worst case scenario, by which we define that as an

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<v Speaker 3>all out conflict, including a conflict between the United States

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<v Speaker 3>and China, and then everything in between, the status quo

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<v Speaker 3>kind of being the base case, something slightly worse than that,

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<v Speaker 3>which we define as increased tensions, and there there's a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of variation and what specifically that could look like,

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<v Speaker 3>but the economic implications are probably not all that different

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<v Speaker 3>across those various inter scenarios, and then major crisis short

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<v Speaker 3>of a war. Again, a lot of different variation in there,

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<v Speaker 3>but the one that we think would have the most

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<v Speaker 3>impact on the global economy would be something like a

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<v Speaker 3>blocking that directly interrupts Tree.

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<v Speaker 2>So I should just say both Jared and Jenny have

0:12:36.400 --> 0:12:40.400
<v Speaker 2>mentioned a big take, which is basically a Bloomberg piece

0:12:40.520 --> 0:12:43.440
<v Speaker 2>based on the report that they did for Bloomberg Economics,

0:12:43.640 --> 0:12:48.160
<v Speaker 2>where they're estimating the exact or rough price tag of

0:12:48.440 --> 0:12:51.680
<v Speaker 2>some sort of military action between China and Taiwan. They're

0:12:51.800 --> 0:12:55.080
<v Speaker 2>estimating the price tag at about ten trillion dollars, which

0:12:55.080 --> 0:12:59.000
<v Speaker 2>would be equivalent to ten percent of global GDP, which

0:12:59.000 --> 0:13:03.560
<v Speaker 2>would be more more than the loss from Russia's invasion

0:13:03.600 --> 0:13:07.120
<v Speaker 2>of Ukraine, the COVID pandemic, and the global financial crisis.

0:13:07.200 --> 0:13:09.920
<v Speaker 2>So some pretty big numbers there. But Jenny, I'm curious

0:13:09.960 --> 0:13:13.079
<v Speaker 2>why you say that the blockade is in some respects

0:13:13.520 --> 0:13:17.480
<v Speaker 2>a less likely scenario here, because my impression was that

0:13:17.480 --> 0:13:20.400
<v Speaker 2>that was kind of becoming I don't want to say consensus,

0:13:20.400 --> 0:13:23.600
<v Speaker 2>but like it was certainly a realistic possibility of what

0:13:24.040 --> 0:13:25.640
<v Speaker 2>military action could look like.

0:13:26.240 --> 0:13:28.600
<v Speaker 3>No, that's right, and I think it still remains a

0:13:28.800 --> 0:13:35.080
<v Speaker 3>realistic possibility. I think though, changing military dynamics suggests that

0:13:35.240 --> 0:13:39.040
<v Speaker 3>it is probably one of the tactics that is likely

0:13:39.200 --> 0:13:43.680
<v Speaker 3>lower on Beijing's list of preferred options. And I say

0:13:43.679 --> 0:13:47.680
<v Speaker 3>that because a blockade is technically an act of war,

0:13:48.240 --> 0:13:52.120
<v Speaker 3>would be incredibly risky in terms of tipping into a conflict.

0:13:52.240 --> 0:13:55.320
<v Speaker 3>For example, if China were to put in place a

0:13:55.360 --> 0:13:58.760
<v Speaker 3>true military blockade of Taiwan and Taiwan we're trying to

0:13:59.200 --> 0:14:03.400
<v Speaker 3>challenge that Beijing would be forced to either use military

0:14:03.520 --> 0:14:06.640
<v Speaker 3>force to keep that blockade in place or to have

0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:09.600
<v Speaker 3>to remove it. So it has a really high chance

0:14:09.760 --> 0:14:12.880
<v Speaker 3>of tipping into a conflict, but at the same time,

0:14:13.080 --> 0:14:17.640
<v Speaker 3>it's not guaranteeing an outcome. Right. If Beijing was going

0:14:17.679 --> 0:14:20.600
<v Speaker 3>to risk war, it would seem to make more sense

0:14:21.120 --> 0:14:26.280
<v Speaker 3>to go for the all out amphibious invasion, which has

0:14:26.800 --> 0:14:30.400
<v Speaker 3>the chance of securing control over Taiwan, whereas a blockade

0:14:31.160 --> 0:14:33.480
<v Speaker 3>isn't likely to do that on its own. All that

0:14:33.520 --> 0:14:38.520
<v Speaker 3>being said, most of our understanding of what the Chinese

0:14:38.680 --> 0:14:42.160
<v Speaker 3>military strategy might be for Taiwan and in general how

0:14:42.240 --> 0:14:45.920
<v Speaker 3>amphibious campaigns are carried out, we think that a blockade

0:14:45.920 --> 0:14:49.560
<v Speaker 3>would be likely part of their campaign, part of a

0:14:49.680 --> 0:14:53.040
<v Speaker 3>multi step process. Were they to try and undertake an

0:14:53.080 --> 0:14:57.040
<v Speaker 3>amphibious invasion of Taiwan to try and keep enemy combatants

0:14:57.080 --> 0:15:01.200
<v Speaker 3>from leaving, to try and keep any third part from intervening,

0:15:01.560 --> 0:15:04.080
<v Speaker 3>it would be part of it, but to launch it

0:15:04.160 --> 0:15:08.720
<v Speaker 3>in advance would also give a lot of time in

0:15:08.880 --> 0:15:14.080
<v Speaker 3>warning and the tendency and more recent military campaigns has

0:15:14.120 --> 0:15:17.800
<v Speaker 3>been to try and take advantage of the element of surprise,

0:15:18.080 --> 0:15:20.440
<v Speaker 3>and you lose that with something like a blockade, which

0:15:20.440 --> 0:15:24.560
<v Speaker 3>is a very obvious demonstration of force. But all that

0:15:24.600 --> 0:15:27.800
<v Speaker 3>being said, it could still very much be a realistic possibility.

0:15:28.160 --> 0:15:31.480
<v Speaker 3>Particularly one of the things that we've talked about too

0:15:31.840 --> 0:15:34.640
<v Speaker 3>is it might not take the form of an overt

0:15:34.680 --> 0:15:38.440
<v Speaker 3>campaign or an overt blockade. It could take the form

0:15:38.480 --> 0:15:41.400
<v Speaker 3>of something that looks more like what we call lawfare

0:15:41.600 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 3>or legal warfare, enacting, for example, a customs regime where

0:15:46.160 --> 0:15:49.960
<v Speaker 3>you're trying to subject all craft that are coming in

0:15:50.000 --> 0:15:53.480
<v Speaker 3>and out of Taiwan to Chinese customs. But you'd still

0:15:53.520 --> 0:15:55.760
<v Speaker 3>need to enforce that in some way, shape or form,

0:15:55.880 --> 0:15:58.680
<v Speaker 3>So it still bears a pretty high risk of tipping

0:15:58.680 --> 0:16:00.320
<v Speaker 3>into something more connect.

0:16:00.800 --> 0:16:04.480
<v Speaker 1>I have a very i don't know, maybe rudimentary question.

0:16:04.640 --> 0:16:07.640
<v Speaker 1>So I'm looking at this wargame scenario that was conducted

0:16:07.680 --> 0:16:11.400
<v Speaker 1>by the Center for a New American Security and in

0:16:11.440 --> 0:16:14.320
<v Speaker 1>their report they have like this map that looks like

0:16:14.320 --> 0:16:16.960
<v Speaker 1>a big risk board and they even have dice, so

0:16:17.120 --> 0:16:18.920
<v Speaker 1>like it's like, let's say, is that really like a

0:16:18.960 --> 0:16:22.760
<v Speaker 1>part of these sort of geoeconomics analyst toolkit to actually

0:16:22.800 --> 0:16:25.360
<v Speaker 1>have these sort of dice games and maps because you

0:16:25.400 --> 0:16:27.800
<v Speaker 1>see them in movies and the general has that stick

0:16:27.840 --> 0:16:29.760
<v Speaker 1>if they push things around. But is that actually like

0:16:30.000 --> 0:16:31.640
<v Speaker 1>a real part of how this is done or is

0:16:31.640 --> 0:16:34.000
<v Speaker 1>that just an affect for the report?

0:16:34.480 --> 0:16:38.720
<v Speaker 4>The war gaming industry is skewed heavily towards actual military scenarios.

0:16:39.000 --> 0:16:42.040
<v Speaker 4>The actual economic war games are quite rare. I mean

0:16:42.040 --> 0:16:44.880
<v Speaker 4>that's growing in part because of Taiwan issue. I have

0:16:45.080 --> 0:16:47.720
<v Speaker 4>played in a number of these, including think tanks and

0:16:47.760 --> 0:16:51.600
<v Speaker 4>in US government. The economic side is typically less sophisticated

0:16:51.720 --> 0:16:53.560
<v Speaker 4>or treated as sort of just an effect or something

0:16:53.600 --> 0:16:56.000
<v Speaker 4>in the background. And I think when you're doing military

0:16:56.040 --> 0:16:59.400
<v Speaker 4>scenarios you can do things like saying, roll the dice.

0:16:59.440 --> 0:17:00.920
<v Speaker 4>If you're fighter jets, take out the other fund.

0:17:01.000 --> 0:17:03.640
<v Speaker 1>They really do that. So there is a serious military

0:17:03.680 --> 0:17:06.840
<v Speaker 1>analyst rolling the dice on a glorified risk board.

0:17:06.960 --> 0:17:10.760
<v Speaker 4>Yes, but it's much with economics. There are far more

0:17:10.960 --> 0:17:14.240
<v Speaker 4>actors involved. And it's not like national decision making is everything,

0:17:14.280 --> 0:17:16.840
<v Speaker 4>because how do you simulate quote the market right? Yeah,

0:17:17.000 --> 0:17:19.840
<v Speaker 4>and or supply chains for that matter. And so the

0:17:19.880 --> 0:17:23.080
<v Speaker 4>body of let's say, economic war gaming literature when it

0:17:23.080 --> 0:17:25.960
<v Speaker 4>comes to Taiwan is much much smaller than the military

0:17:25.960 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 4>wargaming literature.

0:17:27.920 --> 0:17:30.520
<v Speaker 2>Well, why don't you talk to us about the economic

0:17:30.680 --> 0:17:33.600
<v Speaker 2>modeling aspect of this, because it seems hard enough to

0:17:33.760 --> 0:17:37.600
<v Speaker 2>game out what military action could actually look like, but

0:17:37.680 --> 0:17:40.760
<v Speaker 2>then when you start trying to estimate the cost of

0:17:40.880 --> 0:17:44.560
<v Speaker 2>various types of action, that seems even more complicated. But

0:17:44.640 --> 0:17:47.880
<v Speaker 2>you've put a number on it, ten trillion dollars, So

0:17:48.040 --> 0:17:49.560
<v Speaker 2>how do you actually go about doing that?

0:17:50.160 --> 0:17:52.720
<v Speaker 4>Sure? So, first I want to give credit to our

0:17:52.760 --> 0:17:56.879
<v Speaker 4>outstanding modeling team in Europe, mostly as part of Bloomberg Economics.

0:17:56.880 --> 0:17:58.760
<v Speaker 4>They did most of the actual mathwork which Jenny and

0:17:58.800 --> 0:18:02.080
<v Speaker 4>I were doing was helping to define the scenarios and

0:18:02.080 --> 0:18:05.119
<v Speaker 4>then working with them to come up with essentially like

0:18:05.240 --> 0:18:08.159
<v Speaker 4>scenario inputs that will be relevant to those scenarios that

0:18:08.200 --> 0:18:12.480
<v Speaker 4>would have relevant economic outcomes. And so we already talked

0:18:12.480 --> 0:18:15.159
<v Speaker 4>about how we develop scenarios. When it comes to the

0:18:15.200 --> 0:18:19.600
<v Speaker 4>actual modeling, you know, it's essentially layering on three things.

0:18:20.440 --> 0:18:23.560
<v Speaker 4>The first is a sort of standard wto trade shock

0:18:23.640 --> 0:18:25.920
<v Speaker 4>model which people use for tariffs and other stuff like that.

0:18:26.400 --> 0:18:29.360
<v Speaker 4>We played with tariff rates in some ways to simulate

0:18:29.359 --> 0:18:31.480
<v Speaker 4>the effect of sanctions. These models don't really have a

0:18:31.560 --> 0:18:35.080
<v Speaker 4>sort of sdning the PBOC effect button in them, but

0:18:35.119 --> 0:18:37.320
<v Speaker 4>you can get some of the trade shocks in there.

0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:39.920
<v Speaker 4>There's also a financial model that is layered on top

0:18:39.960 --> 0:18:41.919
<v Speaker 4>of you play with things like the vics and you

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:45.080
<v Speaker 4>can see how market uncertainty or capital and flows move

0:18:45.440 --> 0:18:47.960
<v Speaker 4>and what the economic outcome or effect is of that.

0:18:48.280 --> 0:18:50.560
<v Speaker 4>But actually, in this case, because we're dealing with Taiwan,

0:18:51.000 --> 0:18:54.480
<v Speaker 4>the most important factor in terms of the cumulative economic

0:18:54.520 --> 0:18:57.200
<v Speaker 4>impact was supply chain impacts. And I know you guys

0:18:57.200 --> 0:18:58.600
<v Speaker 4>have talked a lot about this on the show, the

0:18:58.640 --> 0:19:02.760
<v Speaker 4>importance of Taiwan, seeing particular for advance semiconductors. And what

0:19:02.760 --> 0:19:06.040
<v Speaker 4>we did with that was talk to various industry research

0:19:06.080 --> 0:19:09.879
<v Speaker 4>professional people, including at Bloomberg, who work on these things,

0:19:10.359 --> 0:19:14.119
<v Speaker 4>and using the OECD trade and value added data and

0:19:14.160 --> 0:19:16.840
<v Speaker 4>input output tables, so essentially estimate at the end of

0:19:16.880 --> 0:19:19.880
<v Speaker 4>the day, how much of certain sectors, and these are

0:19:19.880 --> 0:19:22.360
<v Speaker 4>generally high level sector, it's just how the data is presented,

0:19:22.720 --> 0:19:25.280
<v Speaker 4>how much of those would get knocked out if, for example,

0:19:25.600 --> 0:19:28.960
<v Speaker 4>the world did not have access at TSMC's chips. You

0:19:28.960 --> 0:19:30.680
<v Speaker 4>could debate how bad it would be, and in fact

0:19:30.680 --> 0:19:32.479
<v Speaker 4>we got a range of estimates. We took sort of

0:19:32.520 --> 0:19:35.679
<v Speaker 4>something in the middle that is like awful but not

0:19:36.359 --> 0:19:38.920
<v Speaker 4>completely apocalyptic. But I think if you look at the

0:19:38.920 --> 0:19:40.960
<v Speaker 4>bottom of the big take, there's a note explain this

0:19:41.040 --> 0:19:44.000
<v Speaker 4>that essentially we knocked out in the war scenarios something

0:19:44.040 --> 0:19:47.000
<v Speaker 4>like eighty five percent of global electronics production, so things

0:19:47.040 --> 0:19:50.200
<v Speaker 4>like smartphones and all that computer's laptops, and then something

0:19:50.280 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 4>like sixty two percent of global autos and transport. So

0:19:53.400 --> 0:19:56.040
<v Speaker 4>that's a massive shock, and it's actually doing a lot

0:19:56.040 --> 0:19:58.800
<v Speaker 4>of the work in terms of the simulation of economic impacts.

0:19:59.119 --> 0:20:01.080
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and just to add to that, shout out to

0:20:01.119 --> 0:20:04.360
<v Speaker 3>you our Bloomberg Intelligence colleagues who helped us better understand

0:20:04.440 --> 0:20:07.440
<v Speaker 3>the role that these chips play in different industries. And

0:20:07.840 --> 0:20:09.800
<v Speaker 3>the point that Jarred noted on what we call the

0:20:09.840 --> 0:20:13.399
<v Speaker 3>golden screw problem of trying to determine you know, a

0:20:13.560 --> 0:20:16.600
<v Speaker 3>chip itself might not cost that much, but it's hard

0:20:16.720 --> 0:20:20.119
<v Speaker 3>sometimes to know for sure how essential it is to

0:20:20.160 --> 0:20:22.720
<v Speaker 3>a particular product. You know, for example, could the car

0:20:22.880 --> 0:20:26.240
<v Speaker 3>be made without that chip? Is there the possibility that

0:20:26.280 --> 0:20:30.320
<v Speaker 3>the manufacturer could substitute for something else, And as Yard noted,

0:20:30.520 --> 0:20:33.560
<v Speaker 3>we worked with our BI colleagues to kind of estimate

0:20:33.560 --> 0:20:37.439
<v Speaker 3>within that range of how essential these chips are. But

0:20:37.840 --> 0:20:42.280
<v Speaker 3>our rough estimate is that chips we know are really

0:20:42.280 --> 0:20:46.080
<v Speaker 3>important to high end products like smartphones and PCs, but

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:49.879
<v Speaker 3>they also play a really critical role in other major

0:20:49.920 --> 0:20:54.080
<v Speaker 3>industries autos, home electronics, et cetera. And I think there's

0:20:54.119 --> 0:20:56.760
<v Speaker 3>a huge question of not just what happens if those

0:20:56.800 --> 0:21:00.480
<v Speaker 3>products can't get produced, but everything that relies on those products,

0:21:00.680 --> 0:21:04.520
<v Speaker 3>in particular in our more advanced service economies, what that

0:21:04.680 --> 0:21:07.280
<v Speaker 3>means going forward if you can't get new smartphones, if

0:21:07.320 --> 0:21:09.960
<v Speaker 3>you can't get new autos, and if you can't get

0:21:10.040 --> 0:21:14.440
<v Speaker 3>new PC. So I think this is an important figure,

0:21:14.560 --> 0:21:18.240
<v Speaker 3>the ten tillion dollar one and the impact that we're

0:21:18.320 --> 0:21:21.399
<v Speaker 3>estimating to advanced economies, But it is in some ways

0:21:21.400 --> 0:21:24.119
<v Speaker 3>the beginning of the conversation, because there's more work that

0:21:24.119 --> 0:21:27.119
<v Speaker 3>can be done to really refine those numbers and then

0:21:27.480 --> 0:21:29.359
<v Speaker 3>estimate the downstream impact.

0:21:29.760 --> 0:21:31.720
<v Speaker 1>I want to ask a question that actually takes this

0:21:32.080 --> 0:21:34.600
<v Speaker 1>step way back. And you know, as Tracy mentioned in

0:21:34.640 --> 0:21:36.600
<v Speaker 1>the intro, and I didn't know that you wrote a

0:21:36.640 --> 0:21:41.160
<v Speaker 1>thesis almost almost twenty years ago predicting an imminent.

0:21:42.320 --> 0:21:48.280
<v Speaker 2>Now I feel old, old and wrong, sorry, but why now?

0:21:48.520 --> 0:21:51.159
<v Speaker 1>Why are we this seems to go in waves of

0:21:51.160 --> 0:21:53.879
<v Speaker 1>people concerned, why do you like set the stage for

0:21:53.960 --> 0:21:55.720
<v Speaker 1>us of like, why are we at this point again

0:21:55.760 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 1>where people are seriously running these scenarios and doing the

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:01.440
<v Speaker 1>math and talking about this and such a high level,

0:22:01.440 --> 0:22:03.159
<v Speaker 1>like what are the conditions that have got this like

0:22:03.480 --> 0:22:06.639
<v Speaker 1>so top of mind, particularly in DC for people who

0:22:06.680 --> 0:22:07.560
<v Speaker 1>think about these things.

0:22:07.880 --> 0:22:10.439
<v Speaker 3>So, I think the first thing I acknowledge is I

0:22:10.440 --> 0:22:13.520
<v Speaker 3>think Tracy was not far off and assessing back in

0:22:13.520 --> 0:22:15.600
<v Speaker 3>the two thousand to two thousand and eight period that

0:22:15.640 --> 0:22:17.879
<v Speaker 3>there was a high risk of a conflict at that

0:22:17.960 --> 0:22:22.400
<v Speaker 3>point in time. The reality is that risk ebbs and flows.

0:22:22.240 --> 0:22:25.359
<v Speaker 3>It's not a particularly necessary or I should not say,

0:22:25.480 --> 0:22:30.000
<v Speaker 3>it's not a particularly or essentially linear process, right. It

0:22:30.160 --> 0:22:33.000
<v Speaker 3>depends on the various factors at play. The two thousand

0:22:33.040 --> 0:22:35.520
<v Speaker 3>to two thousand and eight period was a period of

0:22:35.560 --> 0:22:40.639
<v Speaker 3>really heightened cross street tensions owing to an administration in

0:22:40.680 --> 0:22:44.440
<v Speaker 3>Taiwan that Beijing found to be incredibly problematic and very

0:22:44.440 --> 0:22:46.800
<v Speaker 3>close to crossing its red lines, and there were a

0:22:46.800 --> 0:22:50.240
<v Speaker 3>lot of periods of white knuckling over how, for example,

0:22:50.240 --> 0:22:52.680
<v Speaker 3>Beijing was going to respond to elections back in that

0:22:52.760 --> 0:22:56.439
<v Speaker 3>time period. What I think has evolved since then that

0:22:56.680 --> 0:22:59.240
<v Speaker 3>ads to the level of concern. Are a couple of

0:22:59.600 --> 0:23:04.320
<v Speaker 3>really important drivers of the cross street stability dynamic, and

0:23:04.359 --> 0:23:07.399
<v Speaker 3>the first one is really the military balance, not just

0:23:07.440 --> 0:23:12.480
<v Speaker 3>in this strait, but more broadly so. Since roughly two

0:23:12.480 --> 0:23:16.400
<v Speaker 3>thousand and five to the late twenty tens, China has

0:23:16.480 --> 0:23:20.440
<v Speaker 3>really eclipsed Taiwan militarily. There was a period of time

0:23:20.520 --> 0:23:23.560
<v Speaker 3>where Taiwan still had, even though a smaller force, a

0:23:23.640 --> 0:23:27.000
<v Speaker 3>much more advanced force, and that has really changed in

0:23:27.040 --> 0:23:30.560
<v Speaker 3>recent years with all of China's investments in its military modernization,

0:23:31.200 --> 0:23:32.960
<v Speaker 3>and we see that on a day to day basis

0:23:33.000 --> 0:23:37.200
<v Speaker 3>where China is just overwhelming Taiwanese forces with the amount

0:23:37.240 --> 0:23:41.920
<v Speaker 3>of military planes that's putting into Taiwan's nearby airspace. The

0:23:41.960 --> 0:23:44.960
<v Speaker 3>second piece of that dynamic, though, and arguably one of

0:23:45.000 --> 0:23:48.720
<v Speaker 3>the more impactful ones, is the changing military balance of

0:23:48.760 --> 0:23:53.000
<v Speaker 3>power between the United States and China. US now regards

0:23:53.080 --> 0:23:56.760
<v Speaker 3>China as its pacing challenge, as the military closest to

0:23:56.920 --> 0:24:02.120
<v Speaker 3>matching it, and that's particularly important closer to China, where

0:24:02.200 --> 0:24:05.600
<v Speaker 3>China has a lot of local advantages and obviously for

0:24:05.680 --> 0:24:08.919
<v Speaker 3>Taiwan being you know, just across the street, for China,

0:24:09.359 --> 0:24:11.840
<v Speaker 3>they're right sort of at the center of that. So

0:24:12.080 --> 0:24:15.960
<v Speaker 3>that's an incredibly important shift over the past twenty years

0:24:16.080 --> 0:24:18.520
<v Speaker 3>that I think Kitan's concerned. And then the third part

0:24:18.560 --> 0:24:22.720
<v Speaker 3>is the political dynamics at play Taiwan over the past

0:24:22.840 --> 0:24:28.520
<v Speaker 3>thirty years of becoming a more full fledged democracy. We've

0:24:28.520 --> 0:24:31.960
<v Speaker 3>seen that go in parallel with changing attitudes on the

0:24:32.000 --> 0:24:35.840
<v Speaker 3>island towards its relationship with China and its identity and

0:24:35.920 --> 0:24:40.040
<v Speaker 3>how that relates to that crosstraight relationship. And you look

0:24:40.040 --> 0:24:43.879
<v Speaker 3>at pulling today and the vast majority of Taiwanese identify

0:24:44.200 --> 0:24:49.280
<v Speaker 3>as Taiwanese, not as Chinese, not as Chinese, and Taiwanese Taiwanese.

0:24:49.640 --> 0:24:53.560
<v Speaker 3>And at the same time, support for unification, which was

0:24:53.600 --> 0:24:56.720
<v Speaker 3>never that high but was about twenty percent in the

0:24:56.800 --> 0:25:01.920
<v Speaker 3>nineteen nineties, has dropped to you know, below this year.

0:25:02.080 --> 0:25:05.639
<v Speaker 3>So it's it's an incredibly unpopular idea. The vast majority

0:25:05.640 --> 0:25:08.720
<v Speaker 3>of folks would just prefer the status quo, which is

0:25:09.000 --> 0:25:12.399
<v Speaker 3>de facto separation. And then simultaneous that you have on

0:25:13.359 --> 0:25:16.199
<v Speaker 3>China and the mainland, you know, a growing sense that

0:25:16.280 --> 0:25:19.480
<v Speaker 3>China is a rising power that creates both sort of

0:25:19.560 --> 0:25:22.040
<v Speaker 3>a need and an opportunity to make progress towards these

0:25:22.160 --> 0:25:26.440
<v Speaker 3>historic goals of territorial integrity and unification, which in their

0:25:26.520 --> 0:25:30.440
<v Speaker 3>minds is all leading up to this, you know, national

0:25:30.480 --> 0:25:33.960
<v Speaker 3>rejuvenation of China, and key to that is the idea

0:25:34.200 --> 0:25:38.639
<v Speaker 3>of finally bringing China back together. That's their vision for

0:25:38.760 --> 0:25:41.600
<v Speaker 3>what their end state should look like, and Taiwan is

0:25:41.800 --> 0:25:45.520
<v Speaker 3>one of the most important outstanding elements of that. So

0:25:45.720 --> 0:25:48.400
<v Speaker 3>there's really sort of these divergent forces at play where

0:25:48.440 --> 0:25:52.640
<v Speaker 3>Beijing is becoming much more focused on advancing progress towards

0:25:52.760 --> 0:25:56.960
<v Speaker 3>unification and more concerned about trends in Taiwan which are

0:25:57.600 --> 0:26:00.840
<v Speaker 3>taking the island towards the idea of a very different

0:26:01.160 --> 0:26:05.439
<v Speaker 3>sort of identity than it would share with in a

0:26:05.520 --> 0:26:08.359
<v Speaker 3>unification picture with China.

0:26:08.480 --> 0:26:10.720
<v Speaker 4>I think it's worth mentioning the economic dynamics, which I

0:26:10.760 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 4>actually think are secondary to the factors Jenny was mentioning.

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:16.159
<v Speaker 4>But the economics does matter. I think what makes it

0:26:16.200 --> 0:26:18.440
<v Speaker 4>difficult though, is that it doesn't the direction in which

0:26:18.440 --> 0:26:20.679
<v Speaker 4>it matters is not necessarily clear. Right, So when the

0:26:20.800 --> 0:26:25.160
<v Speaker 4>US and China or the PRC itself established diplomatic relations

0:26:25.200 --> 0:26:29.240
<v Speaker 4>in nineteen seventy nine, Chinese GDP was one tenth of

0:26:29.320 --> 0:26:32.280
<v Speaker 4>USGDP right now, it's something like sixty six seventy percent,

0:26:32.320 --> 0:26:36.000
<v Speaker 4>depending on which exchange rates you're using. So you might think, okay,

0:26:36.080 --> 0:26:38.199
<v Speaker 4>so China is much more powerful now, which might make

0:26:38.240 --> 0:26:39.920
<v Speaker 4>it more aggressive, But on the other hand, it has

0:26:39.960 --> 0:26:42.639
<v Speaker 4>more to lose. It's much more integrated into the global economy.

0:26:43.080 --> 0:26:46.000
<v Speaker 4>It is worth keeping in mind, however, that Chinese policy

0:26:46.000 --> 0:26:49.439
<v Speaker 4>Sugi Being's policies very much focused on industrial policy and

0:26:49.440 --> 0:26:52.359
<v Speaker 4>self reliance. In particularly, they're worried about three things. The

0:26:52.440 --> 0:26:55.520
<v Speaker 4>reliance on foreign technologies, which include semiconductors, but it's not

0:26:55.560 --> 0:26:58.879
<v Speaker 4>limited to that, important commodities so things like oil and

0:26:58.920 --> 0:27:01.280
<v Speaker 4>food and other things. And finally, the reliance on the

0:27:01.359 --> 0:27:03.800
<v Speaker 4>US dollar for international finance. And all three of these

0:27:03.800 --> 0:27:07.680
<v Speaker 4>things are Beijing as efforts under way to address with vulnerabilities.

0:27:08.000 --> 0:27:10.199
<v Speaker 4>I'm not saying this is just about Taiwan, but they

0:27:10.200 --> 0:27:12.480
<v Speaker 4>do see themselves as being vulnerable, and there's definitely a

0:27:12.520 --> 0:27:15.840
<v Speaker 4>geopolitical rationale for why they're worried about those things. And

0:27:15.880 --> 0:27:20.000
<v Speaker 4>the more powerful and essentially insulated or robust, let's say

0:27:20.160 --> 0:27:23.560
<v Speaker 4>the Chinese economy and financial sector becomes, you might think

0:27:23.640 --> 0:27:26.520
<v Speaker 4>they might have more confidence or less restraint as that

0:27:26.600 --> 0:27:29.320
<v Speaker 4>single variable is concerned. And then of course there's the

0:27:29.320 --> 0:27:31.679
<v Speaker 4>issue of Taiwan semi conductors, which is kind of like

0:27:32.280 --> 0:27:34.399
<v Speaker 4>in some ways a gun pointing in both directions, right,

0:27:34.440 --> 0:27:37.639
<v Speaker 4>because yes, Taiwan makes most of the advanced semi conductors,

0:27:37.680 --> 0:27:41.159
<v Speaker 4>but those primarily are going into inputs throughout Asia, including China,

0:27:41.440 --> 0:27:43.800
<v Speaker 4>and so you could debate whether it's deterrence or not,

0:27:44.000 --> 0:27:46.240
<v Speaker 4>because it could also mean that that Beijing believes that

0:27:46.320 --> 0:27:50.320
<v Speaker 4>other economies, particularly non US advanced economies, are less likely

0:27:50.320 --> 0:27:53.240
<v Speaker 4>to intervene for those reasons. But it is part of

0:27:53.280 --> 0:27:53.879
<v Speaker 4>the conversation.

0:27:54.280 --> 0:27:56.840
<v Speaker 2>Actually, this reminds me of something I wanted to ask you,

0:27:56.920 --> 0:27:59.840
<v Speaker 2>which is, you know, it's hard enough to model these

0:28:00.080 --> 0:28:03.480
<v Speaker 2>types of economic scenarios because there are so many different

0:28:03.520 --> 0:28:06.360
<v Speaker 2>factors involved, but also one of the things that makes

0:28:06.400 --> 0:28:10.280
<v Speaker 2>it difficult is you're trying to model the response to

0:28:10.440 --> 0:28:14.119
<v Speaker 2>whatever is happening. And so I'm curious, when you're looking

0:28:14.200 --> 0:28:17.960
<v Speaker 2>at something like the cost ten trillion dollars or variations

0:28:18.000 --> 0:28:21.159
<v Speaker 2>of it, depending on you know, the exact nature of

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:26.359
<v Speaker 2>the action, how much of that cost depends on or

0:28:26.520 --> 0:28:31.240
<v Speaker 2>is affected by either the wes's ability to ramp up

0:28:31.400 --> 0:28:36.560
<v Speaker 2>things like semiconductor manufacturing or China's ability to I guess,

0:28:36.800 --> 0:28:41.320
<v Speaker 2>offset a bunch of resources being diverted to war.

0:28:42.520 --> 0:28:45.960
<v Speaker 4>So we modeled one year shocks. We actually internally were

0:28:46.040 --> 0:28:48.760
<v Speaker 4>looking at and debating doing five year shocks. The five

0:28:48.840 --> 0:28:51.920
<v Speaker 4>year shocks, the confidence intervals get much much wider, and

0:28:51.960 --> 0:28:54.600
<v Speaker 4>it's because you have to make bigger assumptions as to whether,

0:28:55.040 --> 0:28:59.040
<v Speaker 4>for example, TSMC's production can move elsewhere, would private industry

0:28:59.040 --> 0:29:01.280
<v Speaker 4>have the resources and middle of the war, for example,

0:29:01.360 --> 0:29:03.680
<v Speaker 4>to get funding to say, open a fab or whatever

0:29:03.680 --> 0:29:06.520
<v Speaker 4>it's necessary. I think with a one year scenario, it's

0:29:06.600 --> 0:29:11.000
<v Speaker 4>it's it's still you know, speculative, but it's still difficult,

0:29:11.040 --> 0:29:14.080
<v Speaker 4>but it's still it's more plausible, which is that the

0:29:14.120 --> 0:29:17.600
<v Speaker 4>economy in some cases could rely more in existing inventories

0:29:17.600 --> 0:29:19.920
<v Speaker 4>of things. You would be more likely to see an

0:29:19.960 --> 0:29:23.160
<v Speaker 4>immediate shocked production safe for things like autos or electronics.

0:29:23.560 --> 0:29:26.080
<v Speaker 4>But if you're saying, okay, what about five years into this,

0:29:26.440 --> 0:29:28.600
<v Speaker 4>how much of that is back online? Then it gets

0:29:28.640 --> 0:29:31.400
<v Speaker 4>more speculative. But that is part of it. Another part

0:29:31.440 --> 0:29:33.360
<v Speaker 4>that I don't think we modeled directly is sort of

0:29:34.040 --> 0:29:38.080
<v Speaker 4>wartime fiscal impacts. So you could imagine particularly on the

0:29:38.160 --> 0:29:41.560
<v Speaker 4>Chinese side, a lot of expenditures going into you know,

0:29:41.640 --> 0:29:44.920
<v Speaker 4>wartime measures, defense, et cetera. On the other hand, if

0:29:44.960 --> 0:29:47.520
<v Speaker 4>you assume the conflict is let's say a few months

0:29:47.600 --> 0:29:50.680
<v Speaker 4>or six months, depending on what your parameters are, it's

0:29:50.720 --> 0:29:52.720
<v Speaker 4>probably not going to look like World War Two. It's

0:29:52.720 --> 0:29:56.200
<v Speaker 4>not going to be five years of ramping up and

0:29:56.240 --> 0:29:58.360
<v Speaker 4>coming back, in part because what we're talking about in

0:29:58.440 --> 0:30:01.840
<v Speaker 4>each stream case is from a US perspectively, it's mostly

0:30:01.880 --> 0:30:05.080
<v Speaker 4>a naval and air war, and the US defense industrial base,

0:30:05.120 --> 0:30:07.640
<v Speaker 4>at least in my view, doesn't really have the capacity

0:30:07.640 --> 0:30:09.800
<v Speaker 4>to replenish as force as quickly, so it's kind of

0:30:09.800 --> 0:30:12.800
<v Speaker 4>a one and done in a very powerful way. There

0:30:12.800 --> 0:30:15.040
<v Speaker 4>are others, i should say, in DC and think tank

0:30:15.120 --> 0:30:17.480
<v Speaker 4>land that talk about the potential for a long war.

0:30:17.960 --> 0:30:21.280
<v Speaker 4>I find that from a US perspective not all that credible.

0:30:38.160 --> 0:30:40.880
<v Speaker 1>Right now, we are in a period in which there

0:30:40.960 --> 0:30:46.000
<v Speaker 1>is a lot of talk about poor Chinese economic growth. Obviously,

0:30:46.160 --> 0:30:49.320
<v Speaker 1>as your model shows, and just for any common sense,

0:30:49.760 --> 0:30:52.560
<v Speaker 1>a war, how or any version of a war, would

0:30:52.560 --> 0:30:56.880
<v Speaker 1>be incredibly domestically costly at a time when already there's

0:30:57.200 --> 0:31:00.760
<v Speaker 1>concerns about growth and frustration with the Chinese economic model,

0:31:01.280 --> 0:31:06.200
<v Speaker 1>How does that play into Beijing's thinking or Hijinping's thinking

0:31:06.560 --> 0:31:10.160
<v Speaker 1>about doing something at some point, the state of the

0:31:10.200 --> 0:31:14.280
<v Speaker 1>domestic economy and the fact that any activity maybe you

0:31:14.320 --> 0:31:18.800
<v Speaker 1>would potentially reunify China and Taiwan, but would be extremely

0:31:19.120 --> 0:31:22.720
<v Speaker 1>disruptive to all of the factories in China that rely

0:31:22.840 --> 0:31:23.960
<v Speaker 1>on Taiwanese inputs.

0:31:24.960 --> 0:31:29.920
<v Speaker 4>The narrative that some people will propose is that over time,

0:31:30.560 --> 0:31:34.120
<v Speaker 4>if we assume the Chinese economy is weakening substantially, then

0:31:34.160 --> 0:31:36.560
<v Speaker 4>the Chinese leadership will be more inclined to sort of

0:31:36.560 --> 0:31:40.880
<v Speaker 4>pivot to nationalists concerns as a distraction. But it's worth

0:31:40.920 --> 0:31:43.160
<v Speaker 4>noting at least two things. One, I don't think they're

0:31:43.200 --> 0:31:45.480
<v Speaker 4>there yet. I don't think they think they're there yet, right.

0:31:45.560 --> 0:31:48.520
<v Speaker 4>I don't believe Xi Jinping is all that pessimistic about

0:31:48.600 --> 0:31:51.240
<v Speaker 4>Chinese economic growth. Is new Year's speech and other indicator

0:31:51.280 --> 0:31:54.160
<v Speaker 4>suggests that he's still fairly optimistic. You could debate whether

0:31:54.160 --> 0:31:56.200
<v Speaker 4>he ought to be, but I think that's basically right

0:31:56.240 --> 0:31:58.200
<v Speaker 4>in terms of his view. The second is that I

0:31:58.200 --> 0:32:01.640
<v Speaker 4>think we are both quite skeptic of the claim that

0:32:01.680 --> 0:32:05.000
<v Speaker 4>some people make that China might pursue a quote diversionary war,

0:32:05.440 --> 0:32:07.080
<v Speaker 4>and the reason for that is that this would not

0:32:07.120 --> 0:32:09.680
<v Speaker 4>be diversionary, it would be all encompassing, right, And so

0:32:10.080 --> 0:32:12.440
<v Speaker 4>do you really want to bet your house on a distraction?

0:32:12.520 --> 0:32:15.400
<v Speaker 4>And the answer is no. But in the longer run,

0:32:15.480 --> 0:32:19.560
<v Speaker 4>I think there is a credible argument that if the

0:32:19.640 --> 0:32:23.560
<v Speaker 4>Chinese economy is weakening, that the government might pivot to

0:32:23.600 --> 0:32:26.360
<v Speaker 4>other priorities. And in fact, we can observe they're already

0:32:26.360 --> 0:32:29.400
<v Speaker 4>pivoting to national security. Right. There's there's a greater emphasis

0:32:29.400 --> 0:32:32.440
<v Speaker 4>on national security and self sufficiency now in Chinese policy

0:32:32.560 --> 0:32:35.120
<v Speaker 4>than it was say five, certainly ten years ago, and

0:32:35.160 --> 0:32:37.720
<v Speaker 4>so over time it might be the case that it

0:32:37.960 --> 0:32:40.600
<v Speaker 4>changes their relative willingness, but at the end of the day,

0:32:40.760 --> 0:32:44.080
<v Speaker 4>they would know how cataclysmic this could possibly be. And

0:32:44.160 --> 0:32:46.440
<v Speaker 4>our general view, and Jenny might want added to this,

0:32:46.920 --> 0:32:49.640
<v Speaker 4>is that she think probably doesn't have a specific timeline

0:32:49.680 --> 0:32:51.800
<v Speaker 4>in terms of saying, on you know, twenty twenty eight

0:32:51.880 --> 0:32:54.280
<v Speaker 4>we go. It's more the timelines People talk about it

0:32:54.320 --> 0:32:56.720
<v Speaker 4>more about military readiness, which is not the same thing.

0:32:57.280 --> 0:33:00.080
<v Speaker 4>And ultimately, if I had to bet in which ness

0:33:00.080 --> 0:33:03.120
<v Speaker 4>we are if this ever does happen and be based

0:33:03.160 --> 0:33:06.320
<v Speaker 4>on perceived provocations, or crossing of red lines. It wouldn't

0:33:06.360 --> 0:33:09.160
<v Speaker 4>just be sort of a unilateral poof on the blue.

0:33:09.520 --> 0:33:11.240
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. And I think just to add on to that,

0:33:12.080 --> 0:33:16.240
<v Speaker 3>Beijing's stated preference is still for peaceful unification, and I

0:33:16.240 --> 0:33:20.840
<v Speaker 3>think there's reasons to believe that that's true. One I

0:33:20.880 --> 0:33:25.400
<v Speaker 3>think they assess, as Yard was indicating the military readiness issue,

0:33:25.720 --> 0:33:29.080
<v Speaker 3>they haven't reached that milestone yet. And in fact, some

0:33:29.120 --> 0:33:31.680
<v Speaker 3>of the reporting that our news colleagues have done on

0:33:32.200 --> 0:33:36.400
<v Speaker 3>recent purges of senior military leaders, I think reaffirms the

0:33:36.480 --> 0:33:40.000
<v Speaker 3>idea that there might still be concerns about corruption and

0:33:40.080 --> 0:33:43.200
<v Speaker 3>the impact that that could have on readiness and more broadly,

0:33:44.320 --> 0:33:47.239
<v Speaker 3>this would be an incredibly risky and difficult campaign for

0:33:47.320 --> 0:33:51.120
<v Speaker 3>any military to undertake, you know, particularly if there's a

0:33:51.200 --> 0:33:54.200
<v Speaker 3>risk of the United States getting involved. That's no small

0:33:54.240 --> 0:33:57.920
<v Speaker 3>gamble to make, and it's not one that Chinese leaders

0:33:57.920 --> 0:34:00.760
<v Speaker 3>would take lightly. I think to Gerard's point, it's more

0:34:00.920 --> 0:34:04.520
<v Speaker 3>question in their mind, I think of whether or not

0:34:04.560 --> 0:34:07.000
<v Speaker 3>their hand is forced if they would need to take

0:34:07.040 --> 0:34:12.200
<v Speaker 3>that action to prevent Taiwan's permanent separation, which to them

0:34:12.640 --> 0:34:16.600
<v Speaker 3>is it is hard to exaggerate the importance that that

0:34:16.680 --> 0:34:20.959
<v Speaker 3>plays in their calculus and the costs that they would

0:34:20.960 --> 0:34:24.440
<v Speaker 3>be willing to pay to prevent that from happening. I

0:34:24.480 --> 0:34:26.440
<v Speaker 3>think if we were in a world in which they

0:34:26.480 --> 0:34:30.319
<v Speaker 3>felt that that was necessary to take action, even if

0:34:30.360 --> 0:34:33.480
<v Speaker 3>they didn't think they were militarily ready for it, the

0:34:33.840 --> 0:34:38.319
<v Speaker 3>economic considerations would probably not be a driving factor in

0:34:38.360 --> 0:34:42.520
<v Speaker 3>their calculus. I think what would be the overarching priority

0:34:42.560 --> 0:34:45.360
<v Speaker 3>would be preventing that from happening at all costs and

0:34:45.480 --> 0:34:49.480
<v Speaker 3>at all risks. So it really depends on I think

0:34:49.520 --> 0:34:52.759
<v Speaker 3>their perspective of whether or not that's essential, and the

0:34:52.840 --> 0:34:56.320
<v Speaker 3>economic considerations I think are more secondary in that sense.

0:34:56.880 --> 0:35:01.239
<v Speaker 2>So the obvious parallel here would be Russia's invasion of

0:35:01.400 --> 0:35:04.040
<v Speaker 2>Ukraine in the sense that it was something that was,

0:35:04.160 --> 0:35:09.000
<v Speaker 2>you know, at once long discussed, but also very unexpected

0:35:09.200 --> 0:35:11.839
<v Speaker 2>at that particular moment in time, And of course there

0:35:11.840 --> 0:35:14.480
<v Speaker 2>had also been a discussion of why would Russia ever

0:35:14.600 --> 0:35:17.680
<v Speaker 2>do this given the economic costs involved and the risk

0:35:17.719 --> 0:35:21.359
<v Speaker 2>of sanctions and things like that. How has the experience

0:35:21.520 --> 0:35:26.719
<v Speaker 2>of Russia's invasion of Ukraine affected your thinking about Taiwan

0:35:26.880 --> 0:35:28.160
<v Speaker 2>and China if it has.

0:35:28.040 --> 0:35:30.719
<v Speaker 4>It all so, Genny, you can jump in terms of

0:35:30.719 --> 0:35:32.520
<v Speaker 4>the Chinese perspective. But I'll just say kind of a

0:35:32.560 --> 0:35:36.120
<v Speaker 4>more standback perspective based on some of the work I

0:35:36.200 --> 0:35:39.520
<v Speaker 4>was doing previously at CSIS the think tank. One observation

0:35:39.760 --> 0:35:43.919
<v Speaker 4>is that the internal estimates in Russia of how bad

0:35:43.960 --> 0:35:46.520
<v Speaker 4>it was going to be for their economy were actually

0:35:46.640 --> 0:35:49.319
<v Speaker 4>worse than things ended up being. In other words, it

0:35:49.400 --> 0:35:51.520
<v Speaker 4>wasn't the case that Putin was misled in terms of

0:35:51.560 --> 0:35:53.000
<v Speaker 4>the economic pain. He actually thought it was going to

0:35:53.080 --> 0:35:53.759
<v Speaker 4>be worse than it was.

0:35:53.920 --> 0:35:54.200
<v Speaker 5>Wow.

0:35:54.239 --> 0:35:56.360
<v Speaker 4>And yet he still went, so where was the delusion.

0:35:56.520 --> 0:35:59.239
<v Speaker 4>The delusion was on the military side. He thought that

0:35:59.520 --> 0:36:00.920
<v Speaker 4>they were going to roll in the Kiev in two

0:36:00.960 --> 0:36:03.319
<v Speaker 4>weeks or whatever, and then that they could present the

0:36:03.360 --> 0:36:05.439
<v Speaker 4>world with the beta complet and eventually they we could

0:36:05.560 --> 0:36:09.880
<v Speaker 4>dial back the economic sanctions or whatever. I actually think that,

0:36:09.960 --> 0:36:12.760
<v Speaker 4>you know, there are definitely, you know, government versus private

0:36:12.760 --> 0:36:15.120
<v Speaker 4>sector blind spots, but in general, I think a lot

0:36:15.120 --> 0:36:20.480
<v Speaker 4>of people, including investors, might underweight nationalist consideration considerations more

0:36:20.520 --> 0:36:24.400
<v Speaker 4>than they should. And even believing that the Russian economy

0:36:24.480 --> 0:36:26.440
<v Speaker 4>was going to take a massive shock, he still decided

0:36:26.480 --> 0:36:28.719
<v Speaker 4>to roll the dice. And that, to me is is

0:36:28.800 --> 0:36:30.960
<v Speaker 4>not necessarily indicative of what China would do she jimping

0:36:31.080 --> 0:36:33.239
<v Speaker 4>is not Putin. I think Putin is more of a

0:36:33.280 --> 0:36:36.400
<v Speaker 4>gambler in some ways, and probably is has A has

0:36:36.440 --> 0:36:39.720
<v Speaker 4>a less sophisticated apparatus beneath him. But it is telling

0:36:39.760 --> 0:36:41.080
<v Speaker 4>that that could still happen yea.

0:36:41.120 --> 0:36:43.400
<v Speaker 3>And I think, just to add on on Beijing's perspective,

0:36:43.480 --> 0:36:45.920
<v Speaker 3>I think it's a mixed bag. I think, you know,

0:36:46.000 --> 0:36:49.280
<v Speaker 3>on one hand, the fact that the war is approaching

0:36:49.320 --> 0:36:53.600
<v Speaker 3>it's to year anniversary, when from the outset it was

0:36:53.840 --> 0:36:58.400
<v Speaker 3>largely expected that Russia's massive army would be able to

0:36:58.600 --> 0:37:02.560
<v Speaker 3>pretty quickly overwhelm Ukrainian forces, especially with a surprise attack,

0:37:03.320 --> 0:37:06.719
<v Speaker 3>is probably a cautionary tale in terms of how much

0:37:06.719 --> 0:37:11.000
<v Speaker 3>more complicated invasions can be. And Russia's invasion again is

0:37:11.000 --> 0:37:13.320
<v Speaker 3>a land invasion, which is a very different sort of

0:37:13.400 --> 0:37:17.640
<v Speaker 3>operation than an amphibious one. In some ways, the hill

0:37:17.719 --> 0:37:20.160
<v Speaker 3>is much higher to climb with the latter, so I

0:37:20.160 --> 0:37:23.239
<v Speaker 3>think in that respect it's a cautionary tale. On the

0:37:23.280 --> 0:37:25.600
<v Speaker 3>other hand, the war is not yet over, and in

0:37:25.640 --> 0:37:28.279
<v Speaker 3>particularly in this moment in time, where there's a lot

0:37:28.320 --> 0:37:31.400
<v Speaker 3>of questions about whether Western support for Ukraine will be

0:37:31.480 --> 0:37:35.359
<v Speaker 3>sustained and what the end state of the war might

0:37:35.440 --> 0:37:41.080
<v Speaker 3>look like it's not entirely a case closed for Beijing

0:37:41.160 --> 0:37:44.520
<v Speaker 3>in terms of whether or not a conflict is something

0:37:44.520 --> 0:37:47.719
<v Speaker 3>that they can endure. As Gerrard noted, the conflict has

0:37:47.840 --> 0:37:51.080
<v Speaker 3>cost Russia less in terms of international sanctions in a

0:37:51.160 --> 0:37:56.640
<v Speaker 3>probrium than Moscow likely anticipated internally, and they are weathering

0:37:56.680 --> 0:37:59.640
<v Speaker 3>the storm probably better than expected, which might in some

0:37:59.680 --> 0:38:03.439
<v Speaker 3>way provide a little bit of confidence to Beijing, which

0:38:03.520 --> 0:38:07.879
<v Speaker 3>has in many ways more economic advantages than Russia does,

0:38:08.080 --> 0:38:11.640
<v Speaker 3>and might bet on the fact that Western countries might

0:38:11.680 --> 0:38:15.000
<v Speaker 3>be less willing to sanction China to the extent to

0:38:15.000 --> 0:38:16.400
<v Speaker 3>which they've sanctioned Russia.

0:38:16.920 --> 0:38:19.280
<v Speaker 1>And I just have one last quick question. We're running

0:38:19.280 --> 0:38:22.160
<v Speaker 1>out of time here, but what is the consensus on

0:38:22.719 --> 0:38:25.799
<v Speaker 1>what the US would do in some sort of some

0:38:26.000 --> 0:38:28.680
<v Speaker 1>version of an attack? You know, what's the policy? And

0:38:28.719 --> 0:38:31.480
<v Speaker 1>then like, you know, suppose the US didn't really do anything,

0:38:31.520 --> 0:38:34.920
<v Speaker 1>and you think about ramifications. Do you think about variations

0:38:34.920 --> 0:38:37.759
<v Speaker 1>where there's spillovers in which are other partners or other

0:38:37.840 --> 0:38:41.960
<v Speaker 1>friends in the region where we have military bases, I

0:38:41.960 --> 0:38:44.399
<v Speaker 1>don't know, freak out, get anxious, and that it's sort

0:38:44.400 --> 0:38:47.440
<v Speaker 1>of like dominoes in some way depending on the sort

0:38:47.480 --> 0:38:51.480
<v Speaker 1>of confidence that other countries have in the US security umbrella.

0:38:51.560 --> 0:38:53.640
<v Speaker 3>There's a lot of debate about what the United States

0:38:53.719 --> 0:38:57.000
<v Speaker 3>might do, and that's in part due to intentional US

0:38:57.040 --> 0:39:00.560
<v Speaker 3>policy to make that ambiguous we call it strategic ambiguity,

0:39:00.560 --> 0:39:02.600
<v Speaker 3>about whether or not the United States would actually come

0:39:02.600 --> 0:39:06.560
<v Speaker 3>to Taiwan's defense. If we look though at statements President

0:39:06.719 --> 0:39:11.759
<v Speaker 3>Biden has made about how he personally would act in

0:39:11.800 --> 0:39:15.680
<v Speaker 3>that situation, I think that's increased folks sense that the

0:39:15.719 --> 0:39:20.200
<v Speaker 3>United States would get involved in some way. From my perspective,

0:39:20.680 --> 0:39:24.759
<v Speaker 3>I think one Beijing probably has to assume from a

0:39:24.840 --> 0:39:27.839
<v Speaker 3>military planning perspective that they would be dealing with some

0:39:27.880 --> 0:39:30.239
<v Speaker 3>sort of US intervention because that is a risk that

0:39:30.280 --> 0:39:36.040
<v Speaker 3>they can't afford to not calculate, given how important and

0:39:36.080 --> 0:39:39.520
<v Speaker 3>critical it could be to the outcome. The second piece

0:39:39.640 --> 0:39:42.840
<v Speaker 3>is I think it really in large part might depend

0:39:43.080 --> 0:39:47.240
<v Speaker 3>again on variables like is there any warning before an attack,

0:39:47.560 --> 0:39:50.080
<v Speaker 3>what is the duration of the attack, Because it's not

0:39:50.200 --> 0:39:53.800
<v Speaker 3>just a question of intent, but also process in time

0:39:54.120 --> 0:39:58.120
<v Speaker 3>to marshal a reaction to it. You know, there there

0:39:58.239 --> 0:40:00.480
<v Speaker 3>is a process lead out in the Taiwan really Act

0:40:00.520 --> 0:40:04.120
<v Speaker 3>for the President to consult Congress before officially determining what

0:40:04.239 --> 0:40:07.400
<v Speaker 3>to do. And then there's also the tyranny of geography

0:40:07.480 --> 0:40:10.480
<v Speaker 3>when it turns to where US forces are located in

0:40:10.520 --> 0:40:13.120
<v Speaker 3>their ability to respond to a conflict that is so

0:40:13.239 --> 0:40:16.600
<v Speaker 3>close to China, And then to your question about the

0:40:16.719 --> 0:40:20.920
<v Speaker 3>role that other countries in the region might play in

0:40:21.000 --> 0:40:23.440
<v Speaker 3>terms of a conflict, again, I think that's going to

0:40:23.719 --> 0:40:27.040
<v Speaker 3>really depend quite a bit on what Washington does, but

0:40:27.239 --> 0:40:30.280
<v Speaker 3>also on what Beijing does. A lot of the wargames

0:40:30.320 --> 0:40:33.240
<v Speaker 3>that we have looked at have studied the possibility that Beijing,

0:40:33.360 --> 0:40:35.480
<v Speaker 3>in an effort to try and keep the US out

0:40:35.520 --> 0:40:39.280
<v Speaker 3>of the war, might preemptively strike US forces in the region,

0:40:39.640 --> 0:40:43.760
<v Speaker 3>including some of our bases, and that could inadvertently draw

0:40:44.320 --> 0:40:46.240
<v Speaker 3>not just the United States but some of the partners

0:40:46.239 --> 0:40:49.839
<v Speaker 3>that host those bases into a conflict. So a lot

0:40:49.880 --> 0:40:53.839
<v Speaker 3>of this is very much variables at play, and that's

0:40:53.880 --> 0:40:56.360
<v Speaker 3>why these wargames can be a really valuable way of

0:40:56.440 --> 0:41:00.080
<v Speaker 3>studying potential scenarios and their outcomes, because we might not

0:41:00.080 --> 0:41:02.319
<v Speaker 3>be able to predict the future, but we have at

0:41:02.400 --> 0:41:05.399
<v Speaker 3>least a good sense of what the key variables would

0:41:05.400 --> 0:41:08.440
<v Speaker 3>be and what the future could look like depending on

0:41:08.480 --> 0:41:09.839
<v Speaker 3>how those turn out.

0:41:10.080 --> 0:41:12.279
<v Speaker 4>I was going to add in terms of sanctions, So

0:41:12.360 --> 0:41:14.640
<v Speaker 4>this is something in DC that has talked about a

0:41:14.640 --> 0:41:16.799
<v Speaker 4>lot over the past two years, is would the US

0:41:16.880 --> 0:41:20.320
<v Speaker 4>sanctioned China in any degree like it has with Russia?

0:41:20.840 --> 0:41:25.120
<v Speaker 4>And my basic view is that in a conflict, the

0:41:25.200 --> 0:41:28.640
<v Speaker 4>US probably would. People will say, but isn't China so

0:41:28.719 --> 0:41:32.359
<v Speaker 4>much bigger therefore wouldn't be much more painful? Yes, But

0:41:32.640 --> 0:41:35.280
<v Speaker 4>the question there is our US force is directly involved.

0:41:35.320 --> 0:41:37.600
<v Speaker 4>If the US is an active naval and ara war

0:41:37.640 --> 0:41:40.520
<v Speaker 4>with China, I think that the political wherewithal would be there.

0:41:40.840 --> 0:41:42.800
<v Speaker 4>But maybe the more important point, at least in the

0:41:42.840 --> 0:41:45.960
<v Speaker 4>early days is I do not believe the US and

0:41:46.000 --> 0:41:51.560
<v Speaker 4>its allies will sort of preemptively use massive sanctions unless

0:41:51.560 --> 0:41:54.720
<v Speaker 4>they're very confident that a war is imminent and therefore

0:41:54.880 --> 0:41:56.799
<v Speaker 4>that you know, and Beijing would have already planned for that.

0:41:56.880 --> 0:41:58.880
<v Speaker 4>So I actually don't think of sanctions as being a

0:41:59.000 --> 0:42:01.440
<v Speaker 4>very useful media to turn, but in a conflict they

0:42:01.480 --> 0:42:03.960
<v Speaker 4>probably would be used very quickly.

0:42:04.080 --> 0:42:07.440
<v Speaker 2>We are recording this before the Taiwan elections, and by

0:42:07.480 --> 0:42:10.400
<v Speaker 2>the time this episode comes out, we should have a result.

0:42:10.719 --> 0:42:13.440
<v Speaker 2>What are you looking out for? What are the particular

0:42:13.640 --> 0:42:15.720
<v Speaker 2>points or developments that we should be watching.

0:42:16.239 --> 0:42:18.680
<v Speaker 3>I think the key thing on everyone's mind is going

0:42:18.760 --> 0:42:21.320
<v Speaker 3>to be, well, first of all, this is an incredibly

0:42:21.440 --> 0:42:26.160
<v Speaker 3>close race, and there's probably the closest race that we've

0:42:26.200 --> 0:42:30.520
<v Speaker 3>seen actually in several election cycles. So there's a lot

0:42:30.520 --> 0:42:33.080
<v Speaker 3>of questions about what the results on Saturday night are

0:42:33.120 --> 0:42:35.800
<v Speaker 3>going to be. That's obviously the front of folks minds.

0:42:35.840 --> 0:42:37.960
<v Speaker 3>And then I think the second immediate question after that

0:42:38.080 --> 0:42:40.919
<v Speaker 3>is how does Beijing react to it? And already we've

0:42:40.920 --> 0:42:45.440
<v Speaker 3>seen signals from China indicating that elements of their approach

0:42:45.480 --> 0:42:47.719
<v Speaker 3>to Taiwan are very much going to be shaped by

0:42:47.719 --> 0:42:50.839
<v Speaker 3>the election's outcome. There have been some senior officials kind

0:42:50.880 --> 0:42:54.440
<v Speaker 3>of warning and not so subtle terms that this is

0:42:54.520 --> 0:42:57.600
<v Speaker 3>kind of a key election for Taiwanese voters to think

0:42:57.640 --> 0:43:00.960
<v Speaker 3>hard about what choices that they want to make. And then,

0:43:01.280 --> 0:43:05.080
<v Speaker 3>in more specific terms, a lot of connections between China's

0:43:05.080 --> 0:43:09.560
<v Speaker 3>ongoing investigation to taiwan trade practices and measures coming out

0:43:09.560 --> 0:43:12.800
<v Speaker 3>of that that restrict Timanes sex sports that they've signaled

0:43:12.840 --> 0:43:15.320
<v Speaker 3>they'll continue to take in the wake of the election,

0:43:15.600 --> 0:43:19.040
<v Speaker 3>depending on the policies of the new government.

0:43:19.760 --> 0:43:23.160
<v Speaker 1>Jennifer Welchin, Gerard de Pippo. Thank you both so much

0:43:23.200 --> 0:43:26.520
<v Speaker 1>for coming on odd lots fascinating conversation on a topic

0:43:26.560 --> 0:43:29.239
<v Speaker 1>that I definitely think we will be doing more on

0:43:29.320 --> 0:43:30.360
<v Speaker 1>in the opportunity.

0:43:30.800 --> 0:43:40.880
<v Speaker 5>Thank you for having us, Thank you for having us.

0:43:46.000 --> 0:43:49.239
<v Speaker 1>Tracy, I thought that was really fascinating. Well, I'll just

0:43:49.239 --> 0:43:51.759
<v Speaker 1>say I found it really helpful because there is a

0:43:51.840 --> 0:43:55.839
<v Speaker 1>lot of noise about, you know, the risk of some

0:43:55.880 --> 0:43:59.640
<v Speaker 1>sort of invasion or attack or blockade, but actually sort

0:43:59.680 --> 0:44:02.080
<v Speaker 1>of hearing about well, why now, why is there so

0:44:02.160 --> 0:44:04.360
<v Speaker 1>much talk now on how do you even attempt to

0:44:04.360 --> 0:44:06.480
<v Speaker 1>sort of quantify these risks? I thought they were a

0:44:06.480 --> 0:44:08.239
<v Speaker 1>book great at explaining that.

0:44:08.520 --> 0:44:11.800
<v Speaker 2>I learned a lot. The point about Russia actually estimating

0:44:11.840 --> 0:44:14.319
<v Speaker 2>that the economic costs of invading Ukraine were going to

0:44:14.360 --> 0:44:16.399
<v Speaker 2>be higher than they turned out to be. I thought

0:44:16.440 --> 0:44:18.440
<v Speaker 2>that was really really interesting.

0:44:19.360 --> 0:44:23.560
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, And in fact, Gerard made a really interesting comment

0:44:23.680 --> 0:44:28.560
<v Speaker 1>there that about investors sort of ignoring the nationalist impulse

0:44:28.760 --> 0:44:30.839
<v Speaker 1>right totally, and so this idea that everyone's like, well,

0:44:30.840 --> 0:44:32.799
<v Speaker 1>it wouldn't work. They'd lose a lot of money, they'd

0:44:32.800 --> 0:44:34.719
<v Speaker 1>lose a lot of jobs, they wouldn't be able to

0:44:34.719 --> 0:44:37.200
<v Speaker 1>sell as much oil. Therefore, it makes no sense, and

0:44:37.280 --> 0:44:40.879
<v Speaker 1>I get why, Like that's a classic investor thinking, right,

0:44:40.960 --> 0:44:43.080
<v Speaker 1>that it's like always going to come down to a

0:44:43.160 --> 0:44:47.160
<v Speaker 1>profit and laws, but the idea that no, like actually nationalism,

0:44:47.400 --> 0:44:50.640
<v Speaker 1>the nationalist impulse is a real factor in decision making

0:44:50.960 --> 0:44:53.560
<v Speaker 1>and it's not all sort of strict materialism.

0:44:53.760 --> 0:44:54.279
<v Speaker 5>I think is.

0:44:54.320 --> 0:44:57.960
<v Speaker 1>Probably a good thing in general for investors to appreciate

0:44:57.960 --> 0:44:59.759
<v Speaker 1>about both politics and geopolitics.

0:45:00.040 --> 0:45:02.960
<v Speaker 2>Of course, Like it just seems so obvious to me

0:45:03.120 --> 0:45:07.160
<v Speaker 2>that like, not everyone is ruled by pure economic considerations.

0:45:07.640 --> 0:45:09.480
<v Speaker 2>But on the other hand, there are plenty of them

0:45:09.520 --> 0:45:12.160
<v Speaker 2>at play in the China Taiwan situation. As that ten

0:45:12.280 --> 0:45:15.720
<v Speaker 2>trillion dollar prist tag actually indicates the other thing I learned.

0:45:16.080 --> 0:45:19.320
<v Speaker 2>I'm just looking at the big take that was published

0:45:19.400 --> 0:45:22.439
<v Speaker 2>based on this report. I didn't know that Bloomberg has

0:45:22.640 --> 0:45:25.880
<v Speaker 2>like a Taiwan stress index. I don't know if stress

0:45:25.920 --> 0:45:27.880
<v Speaker 2>is the right way of putting it, but basically to

0:45:28.000 --> 0:45:32.400
<v Speaker 2>see how intense the saber rattling is on this issue

0:45:32.400 --> 0:45:34.239
<v Speaker 2>at any particular moment, and.

0:45:34.239 --> 0:45:38.880
<v Speaker 1>It has it includes measures like exercises that flyovers into

0:45:38.960 --> 0:45:42.160
<v Speaker 1>Taiwanese airspace and stuff like that, so really interesting. Everyone

0:45:42.160 --> 0:45:45.520
<v Speaker 1>should go read that. It's on bloomberg dot Com the

0:45:45.600 --> 0:45:47.759
<v Speaker 1>results of their work. A war over Taiwan is a

0:45:47.840 --> 0:45:51.000
<v Speaker 1>ten trillion dollar risk to the global economy. It's one

0:45:51.040 --> 0:45:53.040
<v Speaker 1>of the cool things about working at Bloomberg is like

0:45:53.200 --> 0:45:55.279
<v Speaker 1>I'm always you know, I sort of pinch myself working

0:45:55.320 --> 0:45:58.839
<v Speaker 1>here because how many different experts and sophisticated people who

0:45:58.960 --> 0:46:01.680
<v Speaker 1>understand this stuff, the bottlers who work on these different

0:46:01.680 --> 0:46:05.040
<v Speaker 1>models went into this, so it's really quite a project,

0:46:05.239 --> 0:46:08.160
<v Speaker 1>I thought. The other interesting thing Gerard made the point

0:46:08.200 --> 0:46:10.759
<v Speaker 1>about a war, were it to happen, would not likely

0:46:10.800 --> 0:46:13.080
<v Speaker 1>be a diversionary war, and the idea, yeah, oh, it's

0:46:13.080 --> 0:46:15.560
<v Speaker 1>not gonna be one of these things where they would

0:46:15.560 --> 0:46:19.080
<v Speaker 1>do it because people morale has banned, the economy is bad,

0:46:19.120 --> 0:46:22.040
<v Speaker 1>so therefore we have to do something that actually it

0:46:22.040 --> 0:46:25.000
<v Speaker 1>would be such an all encompassing well be fair, that

0:46:25.040 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>it can't just be sort of yeah.

0:46:27.719 --> 0:46:31.279
<v Speaker 2>Also Jenny's point about the blockade, so I remember, you

0:46:31.320 --> 0:46:34.520
<v Speaker 2>know two I guess two years ago, now that was

0:46:34.640 --> 0:46:39.399
<v Speaker 2>sort of seen as the foremost possibility that China could

0:46:39.400 --> 0:46:42.760
<v Speaker 2>do something, but it wouldn't do an outright invasion because

0:46:42.800 --> 0:46:46.040
<v Speaker 2>that was so like risky and I guess would up

0:46:46.080 --> 0:46:49.400
<v Speaker 2>the stake. So much. But her point that maybe now

0:46:49.440 --> 0:46:52.759
<v Speaker 2>a blockade is basically seen as having like all the

0:46:52.880 --> 0:46:56.759
<v Speaker 2>downsides of outright military invasion in the sense that it

0:46:56.800 --> 0:47:01.440
<v Speaker 2>could bring Western allies into the conflict, but none of

0:47:01.480 --> 0:47:05.120
<v Speaker 2>the upside because it could be prolonged and you know,

0:47:05.280 --> 0:47:07.399
<v Speaker 2>drawn out, and maybe at this point it's better to

0:47:07.440 --> 0:47:10.600
<v Speaker 2>just do something quickly. That kind of shows how far

0:47:11.320 --> 0:47:13.439
<v Speaker 2>things are. Yeah, that kind of shows how much things

0:47:13.480 --> 0:47:15.840
<v Speaker 2>have changed just in a couple of years. And again

0:47:16.080 --> 0:47:18.440
<v Speaker 2>I suspect a lot of that comes from the Russia

0:47:18.600 --> 0:47:19.560
<v Speaker 2>Ukraine example.

0:47:20.280 --> 0:47:23.200
<v Speaker 1>I want to do more this year for sure on

0:47:24.080 --> 0:47:26.960
<v Speaker 1>the sort of a defense industrial base in the US

0:47:27.080 --> 0:47:30.040
<v Speaker 1>and China. And you know, you see these stories. Of course,

0:47:30.080 --> 0:47:32.880
<v Speaker 1>there was the recent Bloomberg report about how the corruption

0:47:33.239 --> 0:47:36.080
<v Speaker 1>in the Chinese military and these missiles that were fired

0:47:36.120 --> 0:47:39.720
<v Speaker 1>were actually filled with water and or not as advanced

0:47:39.760 --> 0:47:41.880
<v Speaker 1>as thought. But on the other hand, you know, we

0:47:41.960 --> 0:47:44.920
<v Speaker 1>certainly have in the US all kinds of issues with

0:47:45.000 --> 0:47:48.239
<v Speaker 1>our defense procurement and projects that get delayed forever and

0:47:48.320 --> 0:47:51.359
<v Speaker 1>overspending on certain things. So I think this is an

0:47:51.440 --> 0:47:54.520
<v Speaker 1>area of for sure more episodes to come.

0:47:54.640 --> 0:47:57.440
<v Speaker 2>We should start wargaming, Joe. We need to get some dice,

0:47:57.600 --> 0:47:58.480
<v Speaker 2>it started rolling back.

0:47:58.600 --> 0:48:00.719
<v Speaker 1>I did not really realize that it was kind of

0:48:00.760 --> 0:48:03.440
<v Speaker 1>like in the movies and they actually have these dice

0:48:03.520 --> 0:48:06.759
<v Speaker 1>and maps and boats on a map. And yeah, it's

0:48:07.080 --> 0:48:07.520
<v Speaker 1>we need to have.

0:48:07.520 --> 0:48:09.560
<v Speaker 2>Like an Odd Thoughts headquarters where we have a bunch

0:48:09.600 --> 0:48:11.480
<v Speaker 2>of maps. Oh yeah, let's do it with little like

0:48:11.600 --> 0:48:14.840
<v Speaker 2>figurines of various superpowers and we start moving them around

0:48:14.880 --> 0:48:15.240
<v Speaker 2>the board.

0:48:15.400 --> 0:48:17.400
<v Speaker 1>These are the games that you play with your friends

0:48:17.480 --> 0:48:20.640
<v Speaker 1>right in your house in Connecticut, right, all these all

0:48:20.640 --> 0:48:22.319
<v Speaker 1>these sort of gigantic board games.

0:48:22.400 --> 0:48:24.240
<v Speaker 2>Right, sometimes we play board games.

0:48:24.360 --> 0:48:25.000
<v Speaker 4>That's true.

0:48:25.120 --> 0:48:25.839
<v Speaker 2>Shall we leave it there.

0:48:25.880 --> 0:48:26.560
<v Speaker 1>Let's leave it there.

0:48:26.680 --> 0:48:29.480
<v Speaker 2>This has been another episode of the Odd Loots podcast.

0:48:29.560 --> 0:48:32.520
<v Speaker 2>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

0:48:32.600 --> 0:48:35.320
<v Speaker 1>And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.

0:48:35.560 --> 0:48:39.520
<v Speaker 1>Follow Jennifer Welch, She's at that Jenny Welch. Gerard de Pippo,

0:48:39.680 --> 0:48:43.720
<v Speaker 1>he's at GDP nineteen eighty five. Follow our producers Carman

0:48:43.800 --> 0:48:47.640
<v Speaker 1>Rodriguez at Carman Arman, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot and

0:48:47.719 --> 0:48:50.640
<v Speaker 1>kel Brooks at kel Brooks. Thank you to our producer

0:48:50.640 --> 0:48:53.080
<v Speaker 1>Moses on them for our Odd Lots content. Go to

0:48:53.080 --> 0:48:56.319
<v Speaker 1>bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, where we have transcripts,

0:48:56.360 --> 0:48:58.200
<v Speaker 1>a blog and a newsletter. And if you want to

0:48:58.239 --> 0:49:00.720
<v Speaker 1>chat about this episode or any others with fellow listeners

0:49:00.719 --> 0:49:03.680
<v Speaker 1>twenty four to seven, go to discord dot gg slash

0:49:03.800 --> 0:49:06.080
<v Speaker 1>odd lots or one of the verticals. One of the

0:49:06.120 --> 0:49:09.400
<v Speaker 1>pages in there is a defense vertical, so go on

0:49:09.480 --> 0:49:10.400
<v Speaker 1>there and the way in.

0:49:10.920 --> 0:49:13.799
<v Speaker 2>And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you think that

0:49:13.960 --> 0:49:18.040
<v Speaker 2>Joe really should expand his board game playing away from

0:49:18.120 --> 0:49:21.080
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0:49:21.120 --> 0:49:23.560
<v Speaker 2>your favorite podcast platform. Thanks for listening.