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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. M

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Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, my

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Speaker 1: name is Noel. They called me Ben. We are joined

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Speaker 1: with our super producer Paul Mission controlled decade. Most importantly,

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Speaker 1: you are you. You are here, and that makes this

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Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know enough about us

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Speaker 1: Part two. Yeah, and this is one of those part

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Speaker 1: two's where you do not have to immediately stop and

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Speaker 1: listen to part one. If you want, we can give

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Speaker 1: you the quick and dirty gist right now. You see,

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Speaker 1: a while back back in the day our brain Trust,

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Speaker 1: which is a very high faluting name for us, we

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Speaker 1: decide it that we wanted to go legit and get

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Speaker 1: an actual call in number, which I think was I

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Speaker 1: don't know about you guys, but it's always kind of

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Speaker 1: a childhood dream of mine. Yeah, I mean, we were

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Speaker 1: doing the call in show. It's just not live, and

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Speaker 1: it was definitely a dreamline to do a live call

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Speaker 1: in show. Yeah, we'll get there one day. Man. It's

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Speaker 1: tough in the podcast space, as they like to call

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Speaker 1: because you know, we record these weeks out, so we'd

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Speaker 1: have to let people know when we're recording and they

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Speaker 1: have to sync up. I guess it could be done,

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Speaker 1: but this is the next best way of doing it.

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Speaker 1: I think it becomes that Mr. Show sketch where the

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Speaker 1: pre recorded college show. So we're a little bit like that.

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Speaker 1: Maybe you know, who knows, Maybe one day we'll do

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Speaker 1: a live call in show. Let us know if you

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Speaker 1: think that's a cool idea or if you think it's

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Speaker 1: the worst idea we've ever had. Seems pretty terrible. We've

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Speaker 1: had some stinkers, but it's true. We created a call

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Speaker 1: in number, and if you want to call the number

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Speaker 1: while you're listening to to day's episode, feel free to

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Speaker 1: do so. The number is one eight three three st

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Speaker 1: d w t K. That's std w I t K. So. So,

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Speaker 1: as we often say the best part of this show

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Speaker 1: is you and your fellow listeners, we give that a

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Speaker 1: lot of lip service. But as we said in our

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Speaker 1: previous episode, we like to put our money where our

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Speaker 1: mouth czar collective mouth, our collective mouth. Yeah, the dastardly

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Speaker 1: mouths are the mouths are I like that? Like not

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Speaker 1: to be confused with the Nasal emperor. Right. It always

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Speaker 1: seems this is so unrelated, you guys. But a long

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Speaker 1: time ago one of my friends made an observation. At

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Speaker 1: least in US politics. They said, whenever someone is appointed

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Speaker 1: the tsar of something, and because remember we used to

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Speaker 1: be just rife with czars overflowing people who are ours

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Speaker 1: of things, uh, they told me that was always a

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Speaker 1: sign the policy was sinking and they were looking for

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Speaker 1: a scapegoat. Oh and I don't want to ruin the

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Speaker 1: illusion by googling this and finding several successful as ours,

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Speaker 1: which I'm sure out there, at least in the US sense,

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Speaker 1: and then maybe not so much in Russia. I also

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Speaker 1: like successful as are successfuls are. So what we would

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Speaker 1: like to do today is continue continue responding to some

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Speaker 1: of these excellent and candidly some of these very strange

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Speaker 1: messages that you and your fellow listeners have left for us,

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Speaker 1: like the following listen, I need you to investigate why

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Speaker 1: China keep sending people random packages from Amazon. I don't know.

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Speaker 1: I know you guys are Unreddit, I know you noticed it,

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Speaker 1: but keep sending people random packages for no reason. And

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Speaker 1: it seems like what Reddit says is that they're doing

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Speaker 1: it so they boost their numbers and get verified on amazons.

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Speaker 1: Saw a post on redd at the other day where

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Speaker 1: a guy got nipple covers. Guys, a guy got nipple

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Speaker 1: covered randomly sent to him from China with no explanation.

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Speaker 1: We need to investigate the conspiracy. Thank you. Just so

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Speaker 1: everyone knows, that was an anonymous call. It sounds like

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Speaker 1: my friend Brad, but I don't think it is. You can,

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Speaker 1: I you can either confirm nor deny that that is Brad.

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Speaker 1: I don't think. I don't think it is. What it

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Speaker 1: sounded like somebody doing a Brad impression, doing an impression

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Speaker 1: with somebody else, So you can either Brad firm nor

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Speaker 1: Brad and I that right correct? So yeah, I also

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Speaker 1: wondered if it was someone who was playing with their

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Speaker 1: voice a little bit. But this is a really interesting topic.

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Speaker 1: It's something that I was not aware of. Were you

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Speaker 1: guys aware of this beforehand? I honestly thought it was

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Speaker 1: a joke. You too, Yeah, and you know, the guy

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Speaker 1: took a bit of a joking tone. And also the

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Speaker 1: whole nipple covers thing, it was an emotional roller coaster

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Speaker 1: very much. So um and you know, the the the

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Speaker 1: scientific term for nipple covers. I believe his pasties right right,

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Speaker 1: and we should we should endeavor to cleave closely to

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Speaker 1: the realm of science, especially in the world of nipple coverings. Mm.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, that was one of my favorite lines in

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Speaker 1: that message as well, because at first he said mailing

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Speaker 1: nipple covers to this guy, and I thought, well, you know,

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Speaker 1: let let him do what he wants, as though the

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Speaker 1: conspiracy were specifically nipple cover centric, right, But instead it's

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Speaker 1: that he was not asking for these, which I think

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Speaker 1: is a totally different realm. And as it turns out,

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Speaker 1: a lot of other people, a lot, a lot, and

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Speaker 1: we'll get into that in a second, have been receiving

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Speaker 1: things that they did not ask for, everything from nipple

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Speaker 1: covers to shredded newspaper and cardboard pieces to toilet paper

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Speaker 1: or hair scrun cheese. In one particular case that we

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Speaker 1: found in an article from Forbes by Wade Shepherd two

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Speaker 1: titled Americans are receiving unordered parcels from Chinese e criminals

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Speaker 1: and can't do anything to stop them. So this may

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Speaker 1: reminds some of us of our previous conversation about unsolicited

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Speaker 1: magazine subscriptions, which spoiler alert. We do have a great

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Speaker 1: explanation for that. Is it going to show up in

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Speaker 1: this episode or is it a future episode? You guys think,

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Speaker 1: I think it's likely we might hear from end this episode,

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Speaker 1: but don't hold us to that. Okay, alright, no promises,

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Speaker 1: but there is an answer, a solution exists, and this

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Speaker 1: practice is real. You are absolutely correct, caller, and thank

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Speaker 1: you for hipping us to this. The term that has

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Speaker 1: been thrown around a lot now is empty package scalping. Right. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's this really weird phenomena where you'll get a package

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Speaker 1: that has your real name on it, has your real

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Speaker 1: address on it, and has all of your info like

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Speaker 1: you would normally be receiving a package, but it comes

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Speaker 1: from China most of the time, most of the time,

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Speaker 1: and it's shipped literally from China to you. It's not

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Speaker 1: like it's a Chinese manufacturer something that has a distributor

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Speaker 1: somewhere within the United States. It is they're sending packages

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Speaker 1: all the way over to the US into other countries

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Speaker 1: as well. Um, it's very odd, and it has something

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Speaker 1: to do with the personal information, specifically addresses and names

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Speaker 1: of people being either leaked to or taken by some

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Speaker 1: of these more unscrupulous e commerce companies. There's a couple

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Speaker 1: of loop holy elements to this story. First and foremost,

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Speaker 1: I think well now that that that's not first and foremost,

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Speaker 1: they're equally ranked and equally strange. Um, the United States

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Speaker 1: Postal Service actually gives the Chinese a subsidized postal rate

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Speaker 1: which allows them to ship these packages and not have

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Speaker 1: to worry so much about eating the cost. And there's

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Speaker 1: a reason they're shipping these packages that I would argue

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Speaker 1: as more nefarious than giving the Chinese people a bit

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Speaker 1: of a free ride. As an article also by Wade

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Speaker 1: Shepherd on Forbes refers to this practice as a Chinese businesses.

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Speaker 1: Just to be clear, right that's correct. Excuse everyone, not everybody.

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Speaker 1: It's a it's a bundled thing that that businesses have

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Speaker 1: access to, right yes. And it has to do with

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Speaker 1: an algorithm of all things, uh these It's basically something

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Speaker 1: that these major e commerce sites all use and it's

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Speaker 1: rankings amongst themselves essentially, and it has to do with

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Speaker 1: the number of packages sent. That's one of the main

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Speaker 1: metrics that are looked at. So the more packages one

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Speaker 1: site sends over another, the higher rank they are going

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Speaker 1: to be And what's one way to game that system?

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Speaker 1: Send a bunch of trash to a bunch of people. Volume, baby,

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Speaker 1: we're operating at scale. Yeah, it's it's correct. It's it's

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Speaker 1: tricking the online retailers. We have Amazon here, it's very

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Speaker 1: very popular in China. There's Ali Baba and Talbao, which

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Speaker 1: I'm probably mispronouncing. And it's exactly as you were explaining it, Matt.

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Speaker 1: They're gaming this algorithm. They are not trying to scam

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Speaker 1: or harm you in most cases, if it's this empty

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Speaker 1: package scalping. Instead, they're trying to make it look like

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Speaker 1: they're more of a player than they may actually be.

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Speaker 1: The logic being that customers are able to see that

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Speaker 1: a retailers making a lot of sales, and then therefore

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Speaker 1: they seem more trustworthy, they seem more likely to deliver

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Speaker 1: something of value, you know what I mean. Like if

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Speaker 1: you're if you're looking online and you can buy, uh,

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Speaker 1: you can buy lit rollers, case of twelve lit rollers

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Speaker 1: or whatever, and you have two companies you can buy

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Speaker 1: them from, you'll probably go for the company that has

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Speaker 1: sold these hundreds of times. And it actually goes even

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Speaker 1: further than that. Where you are able to get verified,

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Speaker 1: like it's sort of like being verified on Twitter as

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Speaker 1: like this actually is Lindsay Lohan or Ben Boland or

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Speaker 1: Matt Frederick. And that's huge because then you know that

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Speaker 1: you're dealing with the genuine article and people. That's a

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Speaker 1: very sought after status. Um. And it very much is

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Speaker 1: in the e commerce world as well. And there's a

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Speaker 1: thing to Ali Baba has an an international wing called

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Speaker 1: Ali Express, and that's largely it seems how some of

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Speaker 1: these folks are getting on these mailing lists by placing

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Speaker 1: legitimate orders on these services and then they end up

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Speaker 1: in the system. And this practice is referred to as brushing,

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Speaker 1: and they're actually companies that specifically do this, sort of

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Speaker 1: like click farms or whatever. This is very similar to that. Whoa,

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Speaker 1: this is so odd to me that okay, let's let's

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Speaker 1: jump to that article again from Forbes where they're specifically

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Speaker 1: talking about brushing and this tactic and uh, they stayed

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Speaker 1: here that there was a team of researchers from what

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Speaker 1: was it, uh a College of William and Mary, that's right,

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Speaker 1: and they were tracking sales of four over four thousand

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Speaker 1: sellers and they all of these sellers were using this

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Speaker 1: brushing method and early some of them, I guess, and

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Speaker 1: they were noticing that people using this method were able

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Speaker 1: to raise their rankings. This is a quote here up

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Speaker 1: to ten times faster than they could via legitimate means,

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Speaker 1: which you know, unless it's illegal then and I don't

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Speaker 1: see why these companies would not do this. And here's

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Speaker 1: the thing. It is illegal in China, and also it's

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Speaker 1: illegal in the United States. But since the shipment is

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Speaker 1: happening internationally from China to the United States, it would

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Speaker 1: require like extraditing these organizations to the United States to

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Speaker 1: prosecute them under US law. And I guess once it

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Speaker 1: leaves the Chinese jurisdiction, they don't have any control over anymore. Well,

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Speaker 1: and I agreed. Check this out. Let's imagine Ben, that

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Speaker 1: you received one of these packages. It's just got it's

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Speaker 1: just got extra bubble packaging inside of it. That's it.

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Speaker 1: That's all it's got. Um. Do you go to some authority,

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Speaker 1: to the police, to the state department. Do you go like, guys,

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Speaker 1: I got this package full of nothing, and it's really

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Speaker 1: important and I need you to wrap me up in

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Speaker 1: some legal things. Uh, and take time out of my

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Speaker 1: life to do this, but surely there Well that's the

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Speaker 1: thing though, like you could you could complain about a

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Speaker 1: shipment that was wrong if you actually made the ship

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Speaker 1: meant to Ali Express or whatever. But if you weren't

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Speaker 1: a customer at all, you don't even have a recourse

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Speaker 1: to complain about a thing that you didn't order. Right. Well,

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Speaker 1: here's another aspect. The Chinese brushers, for lack of a

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Speaker 1: better phrase, are also impersonating the people who are supposed

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Speaker 1: to be receiving these packages in some in some situations,

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Speaker 1: and they're impersonating them not to docks them, not to

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Speaker 1: steal their credit card or financial information. They're impersonating them

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Speaker 1: purely to leave reviews for these products. And in the

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Speaker 1: case of Heaven McGeehan from Pennsylvania who was shipped the scrunches,

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Speaker 1: I believe the reviews that were written under her profile

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Speaker 1: have nothing to do with Scrunches. They're reviewing something else,

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Speaker 1: the thing they want to be known for being good

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Speaker 1: purveyors of Wow. Is this a conspiracy? I mean I

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Speaker 1: think it is, and and and here's the thing. This

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Speaker 1: is why it's probably not going to change unless somebody

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Speaker 1: really really points it out, say like I don't know

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Speaker 1: prominent conspiracy podcast to be like, did Joe Rogan? Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: Like if Joe Rogan talks about it, maybe Joe, come on,

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Speaker 1: get on this check this out. Remember that William and

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Speaker 1: Mary study from the tract over four thousand people. They

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Speaker 1: found that there's very there's not much of a risk

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Speaker 1: at all to the actual sellers, like the smaller sellers

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Speaker 1: that are doing this. They found that only eighty nine

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Speaker 1: out of the four thousand plus um sellers were actually

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Speaker 1: penalized in any way. It's like two yeah, so it's

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Speaker 1: not going to change. This is just an easy way

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Speaker 1: to do it. You take the risk and and you

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Speaker 1: raise your rankings so you can make legitimate sales. And

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Speaker 1: then there are a couple of other different forms of this. First,

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Speaker 1: I completely agree it's a conspiracy. It's a textbook definition.

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Speaker 1: People are cooperating in secret to pull the wool over

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Speaker 1: some other group's eyes. Some of the brushing just involves spots,

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Speaker 1: it's automated. Some of it will hinge more on hiring people,

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Speaker 1: like we said earlier, like a bot farm hiring people

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Speaker 1: to buy these products and then leave reviews. And then

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Speaker 1: the other one, the one we've been talking about hacking

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Speaker 1: otherwise legitimate accounts. It's a very it's a very strange hustle,

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Speaker 1: and as long as no one's being hurt, it's I mean,

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Speaker 1: it's clearly fraud. But but they're not shipping anthrax. They're

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Speaker 1: not stealing people's It's weird because they're stealing their identities

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Speaker 1: in many cases, but they're not stealing their money. But

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Speaker 1: are some of these read these online retail retailers in

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Speaker 1: China kind of notorious for having counterfeit products? Oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: So wouldn't you think that maybe some of the company

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Speaker 1: or the you know, the sellers that are trying to

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Speaker 1: up their status might three illegal means, might also be

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Speaker 1: conducting business illegally in the first place. We cannot prove

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Speaker 1: or deny that right now, at this moment, it is

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Speaker 1: the Schrodinger's package. There we go. That's nice, and we

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Speaker 1: could also we could also go a step further and

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Speaker 1: say the people that are the ultimate marks of this

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Speaker 1: con the people who are you know, a business in

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Speaker 1: China or another consumer who says I'm gonna go with

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Speaker 1: this trusty company that shipped hundreds of thousands of these

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Speaker 1: lent rollers or whatever, those are going to be the

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Speaker 1: ultimate victims, right, and it's quite possible that they would

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Speaker 1: get some kind of counterfeit, uh substandard thing, a substandard

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Speaker 1: lent roller. Yeah, you know it. It leaves more lens exact,

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Speaker 1: it actually just rules the lent out on. Yeah, or

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Speaker 1: heaven forbids some kind of second rate nipple covers. Oh

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Speaker 1: my gosh, the war wardrobe malfunctions happening left and right.

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Speaker 1: The shame, the ignomy. You can't go back to Dave

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Speaker 1: and Busters if you show up with some busted nipple covers.

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Speaker 1: You haven't even mentioned the chafing. The chafing. So there's

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Speaker 1: also another thing that we should mention here, and that's

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Speaker 1: when you receive unsolicited mail. Of course, as you said,

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Speaker 1: Matt whose most people aren't going to take the time

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Speaker 1: out of their day to go back to the post

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Speaker 1: office and say, this is not my case of scrunch ees,

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Speaker 1: how dare you? My address is not to be trifled with.

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Speaker 1: But it's worth looking into and being aware of what

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Speaker 1: hits your mailbox, your doorstep, or your PO box because

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Speaker 1: it can be used by someone else. You might accidentally

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Speaker 1: be on the receiving end of some drugs from the

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Speaker 1: silk Road. You don't know. You don't know it goes

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Speaker 1: to your address, it doesn't have your name on it.

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Speaker 1: Just don't open it. What's the law there though? I've

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Speaker 1: always wondered that, like, if someone does send you something

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Speaker 1: that's illegal and it comes to your address but it's

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Speaker 1: not addressed to you as an individual, are you liable

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Speaker 1: for something someone sends to your address. I guess it depends.

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Speaker 1: We're not lawyers, but it depends largely on whether or

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Speaker 1: not you open it, because if you open mail that's

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Speaker 1: addressed to someone else, it is a crime. Yeah, but

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Speaker 1: what if it is addressed to you? Huh? Okay, entrapment.

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Speaker 1: We need to probably move on. But I got it

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Speaker 1: one one last thing I should I once received a

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Speaker 1: jeans jacket in the mail from Levi as a gift

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Speaker 1: from Hillary Clinton. Yeah, and I have and I have

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Speaker 1: no idea why. It was postmarked from a place that

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Speaker 1: I had been at an event in Durham. And but

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Speaker 1: I have no idea why I got this jacket. And

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Speaker 1: it was too small, so I tried to fill out

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Speaker 1: the form to like get a replacement because it was

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Speaker 1: addressed to me, and there was like a way of

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Speaker 1: like filling out a gift return thing, but I I

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Speaker 1: sent it back in the mail hoping they would send

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Speaker 1: me the right size, and I never got the right size,

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Speaker 1: So I don't know what that was about. That was

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Speaker 1: probably my friend Kane. I think he ran her campaign

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Speaker 1: there for a little while. Yeah, and he was randomly

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Speaker 1: sending people denim, just a classic, I mean, good guy.

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Speaker 1: He liked sending denim to two people. I mean, who

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Speaker 1: doesn't like a free denim jacket. It was a black

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Speaker 1: denim trucker jacket. It was super cool. I'm really bad

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Speaker 1: it wasn't the right size. Man, I'm sorry. That's how

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Speaker 1: she lost the vote. Huh, that was it? You know how.

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Speaker 1: The biggest victim in all of this, though, who's that?

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Speaker 1: It's Mother Earth? Think of all the waste that's being

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Speaker 1: generated by this practice. Absolutely because um the heaven mcgehan

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Speaker 1: from the Forbes article, I believe received um dozens of

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Speaker 1: these shipments. So you gotta wonder how are they picking

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Speaker 1: their how are they placing their bets, you know, because

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Speaker 1: they have to know that if they send too many

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Speaker 1: to one address, they're much more likely to raise the

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Speaker 1: red flag. There's probably a scout thing to you send

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Speaker 1: a couple first, and then if those don't get reported,

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Speaker 1: it's Katie bar the door. If for anyone else wants

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Speaker 1: to be more on this, there's an excellent Wall Street

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Speaker 1: Journal article by Jillian Wong. There are also anonymous color

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Speaker 1: You are correct, there's some great Reddit threats about this.

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Speaker 1: What we did not do is establish a timeline. So

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Speaker 1: this stuff goes back to yeah, probably before it really

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Speaker 1: blew up when it was reported by the Beijing News. Um, yeah,

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Speaker 1: number of years ago. So this just been going on

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Speaker 1: for a while. Just be careful, you know what. I

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Speaker 1: feel like we can we can end it on that.

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Speaker 1: Like if a package shows up at your door and

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Speaker 1: it doesn't have your name on it and it's not

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Speaker 1: an ipsy, so like it definitely is not in some

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Speaker 1: kind of pink bubble wrap. It looks all pretty. What

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Speaker 1: is an ipsy? I don't know something my wife subscribes

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Speaker 1: to Okay, well, if it is not an ipsy, you

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Speaker 1: know what what, No matter what it is, if it

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Speaker 1: doesn't have your name on it, it's a sign from

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Speaker 1: the universe that you should not open this. And even

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Speaker 1: if it does have your name on it, it's a

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Speaker 1: sign from the universe. Just don't open any packages anymore,

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Speaker 1: never open mail, get an assistant, have them open all

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Speaker 1: your mail. But fascinating, true and ongoing. If you have

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Speaker 1: had an experience with this, please write to us. Let

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Speaker 1: us know. You can find us on our usual internet haunts,

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Speaker 1: or of course you can call us one more time.

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Speaker 1: One eight three three st d w y d k

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Speaker 1: T e K. So what's next an AD break? All right,

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Speaker 1: we're back. Should we listen to another message? Oh? Yes,

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Speaker 1: let's this one comes from another anonymous source. Hi, Ben,

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Speaker 1: Matt and Noll. I'm calling to tell you a little

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Speaker 1: bit about my job and UM, kind of a weird

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Speaker 1: thing that I've noticed so um. Currently I live in

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Speaker 1: the European Union, UM, and the EU has over the

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Speaker 1: last year gotten new legal EU data protection policies. Now,

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Speaker 1: I work for a company called i d G that's

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Speaker 1: International Data Group. And basically what we do is we

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Speaker 1: call compacts off of our massive database and tell them

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Speaker 1: about our It's basically UM the market research and lead generation.

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Speaker 1: So like if we have a like, Dell will call

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Speaker 1: a bunch of I T people and say, hey, Bob,

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Speaker 1: you know, here's some stuff from Dell. You want to

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Speaker 1: answer A couple of really creepy. I promise they're not

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Speaker 1: like probing questions and you know, so we that's what

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Speaker 1: I do basically. Um. The reason for my call is

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Speaker 1: that the other day I realized that there's a little

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Speaker 1: loophole um within our company that basically, because of data protection,

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Speaker 1: we're not allowed to enter anyone onto our database unless

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Speaker 1: we've actually spoken to them on their permission, except for

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Speaker 1: in the case that if we can find that information

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Speaker 1: online then mechanetics for database. So we actually add a

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Speaker 1: lot of people to our database who have never spoken

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Speaker 1: to us, who don't know who we are, and you know,

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Speaker 1: you could not want to be there, but we will

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Speaker 1: go out and find you. Um, And it's actually kind

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00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:06,520
Speaker 1: of great being shady. But I was just wondering you

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Speaker 1: guys could do an episode on the new you um

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Speaker 1: the Protection Moss because honestly, like everybody thinks that they're

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Speaker 1: really you know, iron clads, but they're actually not, and

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Speaker 1: you can your data is still not as safe as

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Speaker 1: people think it is. But that's all. I love the

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Speaker 1: show and thanks for listening. Bye, guys. Okay, well, that's unsettling,

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Speaker 1: So perhaps the call you just heard sounded a little

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Speaker 1: odd of that's uh, that was Paul's fault. That was

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Speaker 1: all Paul. Thank you Paul, by the way, and thank

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Speaker 1: you Paul. So this is this is a huge concern.

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Speaker 1: We know that in the years leading up to this

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Speaker 1: new data privacy law that a lot of people were

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Speaker 1: very bully on this. You know, they thought this was

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Speaker 1: the next natural step to protect individuals against the huge

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Speaker 1: vacuum cleaner approach the businesses and government's use when it

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Speaker 1: comes to your personal information. Right, So it is distressing

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Speaker 1: to hear that maybe this is not this new law

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Speaker 1: is not all it's cracked up to be. But honestly,

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Speaker 1: is anyone surprised, you know? Yeah? Not I um a

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Speaker 1: surprise and outrage or different things, though, right, yes, I

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Speaker 1: guess we can all be um upset that these practices

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Speaker 1: continue to happen. We knew, we've known that this kind

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Speaker 1: of thing, this vacuum approach to data mining, to literally

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Speaker 1: just pulling anything and everything that is available from varying sources.

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Speaker 1: It's been happening for years. And we know that some

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Speaker 1: companies who collect a bunch of data just through the

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Speaker 1: use of some platform that they have, some app, some website,

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Speaker 1: um a search perhaps a large search browser or something

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Speaker 1: that let's use an omnibox. Yeah, we're free with the Uh.

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Speaker 1: The only thing, the only catch being that they keep

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Speaker 1: every key strokey type yeah, something like that. Um. We

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Speaker 1: we know that they've been collecting and sometimes selling that

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Speaker 1: data to third parties, and who knows what that third

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Speaker 1: party is going to do with it. Um, And even

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Speaker 1: through lawsuits and everything does take a lot of time.

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Speaker 1: So our information really isn't safe anywhere. And that is

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Speaker 1: illustrated by something that happened recently. Yeah, I mean, I

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Speaker 1: you know, it's sort of what happens when a big

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Speaker 1: giant company that's used to doing business as usual is

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Speaker 1: met with a new set of regulations and then they

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Speaker 1: kind of have to do a bit of a U turn. Um.

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Speaker 1: Whether it means finding some of the loopholes like our

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Speaker 1: caller was talking about, or whether it means that they've

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Speaker 1: kind they kind of keep going the normal course until

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Speaker 1: someone flags them and they kind of figure things out

427
00:24:58,720 --> 00:25:01,080
Speaker 1: as they go. Uh. Seems to kind of be the

428
00:25:01,119 --> 00:25:04,080
Speaker 1: case with a certain company called Google, who were fined

429
00:25:04,240 --> 00:25:09,959
Speaker 1: fifty seven million dollars under the new European Data Privacy Law, which,

430
00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:15,640
Speaker 1: among other things, is supposed to require companies to get consent,

431
00:25:15,920 --> 00:25:18,840
Speaker 1: as the callers said her company is technically required to do,

432
00:25:19,359 --> 00:25:24,119
Speaker 1: and also provide individuals with copies of their personal data,

433
00:25:24,200 --> 00:25:26,840
Speaker 1: which does seem revolutionary given what we know about the

434
00:25:26,840 --> 00:25:29,840
Speaker 1: way Facebook has kept these files on people and all

435
00:25:29,880 --> 00:25:31,719
Speaker 1: of that and the whole stink that came up around

436
00:25:31,960 --> 00:25:34,600
Speaker 1: that practice. And they're supposed to be able to report

437
00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:39,440
Speaker 1: any breaches of data within seventy two hours. But Google

438
00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:42,879
Speaker 1: apparently did not meet this obligation for this transparency, and

439
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:47,120
Speaker 1: they did not present this information in a transparent fashion

440
00:25:47,240 --> 00:25:50,359
Speaker 1: that fell in line with these new standards. Apparently it

441
00:25:50,400 --> 00:25:54,080
Speaker 1: required users to use five or six clicks to get

442
00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:56,719
Speaker 1: the information, so going through a different page and end

443
00:25:56,840 --> 00:25:59,560
Speaker 1: user agreement or what have you. And the whole point

444
00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:03,200
Speaker 1: of this UM legislation is to make it more transparent.

445
00:26:03,359 --> 00:26:05,640
Speaker 1: But as you know, anytime there's new legislation, that's going

446
00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:07,800
Speaker 1: to be new loopholes in our caller seems to have

447
00:26:07,880 --> 00:26:10,160
Speaker 1: hipped us to one. And just to clarify, I think

448
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:14,359
Speaker 1: what she's saying is, um, if it's out there, whether

449
00:26:14,400 --> 00:26:18,760
Speaker 1: it's on an easily accessible, non private Facebook page or whatever,

450
00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:21,880
Speaker 1: or if maybe you have an old Google business account

451
00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:24,560
Speaker 1: or something like that with your phone number and name

452
00:26:24,720 --> 00:26:26,840
Speaker 1: or an address or something like that, then they can

453
00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:30,280
Speaker 1: use that if they This only really governs kind of

454
00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:34,400
Speaker 1: cookie type, the data mining, right, so like the way

455
00:26:34,560 --> 00:26:36,720
Speaker 1: it would monitor your browsing habits. But if it's out

456
00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:39,879
Speaker 1: there on the Worldwide Web, able to be accessed by anybody,

457
00:26:39,920 --> 00:26:41,760
Speaker 1: then it's fair game. I think that's what she's saying.

458
00:26:41,880 --> 00:26:44,600
Speaker 1: Yan who knows how much of that information has been

459
00:26:44,640 --> 00:26:49,040
Speaker 1: placed online somewhere, even if it's in a dark a

460
00:26:49,119 --> 00:26:51,760
Speaker 1: dark web corner, not necessarily dark web, the deep web,

461
00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:55,440
Speaker 1: just sitting there somewhere and it gets accessed in one

462
00:26:55,440 --> 00:27:00,320
Speaker 1: way or another. Three things, three huge, crazy disturbing things,

463
00:27:00,440 --> 00:27:04,240
Speaker 1: in reverse order and no particular order of importance ascending

464
00:27:04,320 --> 00:27:09,439
Speaker 1: or descending. But first, the problem with calling some stuff

465
00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 1: public and some stuff private is that those are goalposts

466
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:16,720
Speaker 1: that can move. They are mutable. So it doesn't take

467
00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:20,439
Speaker 1: uh too much to decide that in the interest of

468
00:27:20,480 --> 00:27:24,560
Speaker 1: a public good, information that our generation would consider private

469
00:27:24,760 --> 00:27:28,640
Speaker 1: should in the future be considered public. So this this

470
00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:31,720
Speaker 1: is there's a little bit more leeway than it might

471
00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:36,400
Speaker 1: sound initially. Uh. Secondly, I think I think it hit

472
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:39,240
Speaker 1: on the the exact point. Nell It's something that I

473
00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:45,399
Speaker 1: have always ardently believed in. Technology outpaces legislation every single time,

474
00:27:45,640 --> 00:27:48,680
Speaker 1: from the days of ancient civilizations to the civilizations that

475
00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:51,560
Speaker 1: will be here thousands of years after. We are all

476
00:27:51,760 --> 00:27:56,000
Speaker 1: you know, stardust and weird myths based loosely on our lives.

477
00:27:56,640 --> 00:28:00,879
Speaker 1: There's there's not a bureaucracy or a government meant agency

478
00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:04,440
Speaker 1: yet that is able to, at least for the good

479
00:28:04,480 --> 00:28:08,080
Speaker 1: of consumers, keep up with technology. Right. There are a

480
00:28:08,119 --> 00:28:11,879
Speaker 1: lot of intelligence agencies that are cutting edge, and they're

481
00:28:11,960 --> 00:28:15,720
Speaker 1: not operating they're operating in the interests of the state,

482
00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:18,000
Speaker 1: which is maybe not always the interests of the people

483
00:28:18,080 --> 00:28:23,320
Speaker 1: living within the state. The last thing that I think

484
00:28:23,480 --> 00:28:27,120
Speaker 1: is crucial here is that Google also got in trouble

485
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:30,919
Speaker 1: because they didn't say why they were taking this data.

486
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:36,439
Speaker 1: They were too vague. According to the the French National

487
00:28:36,520 --> 00:28:39,520
Speaker 1: Data Protection Commission, they were too vague about what they

488
00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,240
Speaker 1: were actually doing with it. And there's a thing this

489
00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:45,880
Speaker 1: reminds me of the thing that happens with smartphones. So

490
00:28:45,960 --> 00:28:48,440
Speaker 1: let's say you get an app, right, a really cool

491
00:28:48,520 --> 00:28:51,600
Speaker 1: app and um and for sticking with lint rollers, it

492
00:28:51,640 --> 00:28:53,880
Speaker 1: just tells you where the closest limp roller is whatever,

493
00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:56,680
Speaker 1: and to do that it needs access to your GPS,

494
00:28:56,720 --> 00:28:58,880
Speaker 1: and then it also requires you to make a profile.

495
00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:02,040
Speaker 1: It also has require is you'd have to continual uh

496
00:29:02,080 --> 00:29:06,720
Speaker 1: internet connection, right, the data connection of some sort. That

497
00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:10,040
Speaker 1: app when you when you agree to the terms of service,

498
00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:13,600
Speaker 1: it may ask you for those things or those requirements

499
00:29:13,760 --> 00:29:17,160
Speaker 1: and then say we promise we will never use your information.

500
00:29:17,200 --> 00:29:20,840
Speaker 1: But then also this agreement can change at any time

501
00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:23,320
Speaker 1: without notice, you know what I mean. And then all

502
00:29:23,360 --> 00:29:26,720
Speaker 1: it takes is for some other company to purchase that app.

503
00:29:26,720 --> 00:29:28,960
Speaker 1: And when they purchase that app, they get all the

504
00:29:29,040 --> 00:29:32,760
Speaker 1: data and they can change the permissions to whatever they wish.

505
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:35,640
Speaker 1: This explains a lot. Have you guys heard of the

506
00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:38,960
Speaker 1: concept of the right to be forgotten? Yes, that was

507
00:29:39,040 --> 00:29:42,840
Speaker 1: the one of the EU changes, right. Well, I think

508
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:45,440
Speaker 1: it's I think it's been bandied around for some time

509
00:29:45,520 --> 00:29:48,840
Speaker 1: now that it is definitely codified in the legislation known

510
00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:52,160
Speaker 1: as g d p R or General Data Protection Regulation,

511
00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:54,440
Speaker 1: And it's just the notion that you should be able

512
00:29:54,520 --> 00:29:57,480
Speaker 1: to request that any information about you on the Internet.

513
00:29:57,640 --> 00:29:59,120
Speaker 1: I I might be simplifying it a little bit. I

514
00:29:59,160 --> 00:30:03,560
Speaker 1: think it also UM determines how long companies are supposed

515
00:30:03,600 --> 00:30:06,840
Speaker 1: to hold onto your data. Once they've achieved their goal

516
00:30:06,920 --> 00:30:08,480
Speaker 1: of what they had it for in the first place,

517
00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:10,320
Speaker 1: based on the terms of service that you agree to,

518
00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:16,040
Speaker 1: then they should automatically scrub it. But again, technology outpacing legislation.

519
00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:18,720
Speaker 1: Can you imagine a world where you could you would

520
00:30:18,880 --> 00:30:20,960
Speaker 1: take the time to go to every place your data

521
00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:23,680
Speaker 1: might be and send a nice email and say, please, sir,

522
00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:26,120
Speaker 1: will you erase my stuff? Like? How does that you know?

523
00:30:26,120 --> 00:30:27,880
Speaker 1: I mean, I know there are companies that that will

524
00:30:27,920 --> 00:30:31,680
Speaker 1: supposedly do this for you and erase stuff, embarrassing stuff

525
00:30:31,680 --> 00:30:33,200
Speaker 1: off the internet. But even then, it's like a game

526
00:30:33,240 --> 00:30:35,720
Speaker 1: of whac a mole, right, Yeah, it's Pandora's jar Man.

527
00:30:35,800 --> 00:30:38,120
Speaker 1: You can't put the lid back on. The right to

528
00:30:38,120 --> 00:30:41,400
Speaker 1: be forgotten is in practice in the EU and in

529
00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:45,040
Speaker 1: Argentina now, but I think those are the only places

530
00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:48,200
Speaker 1: that are trying to make a go of it. I'm

531
00:30:48,240 --> 00:30:51,240
Speaker 1: I'm in favor of the right to be forgotten. I

532
00:30:51,320 --> 00:30:57,080
Speaker 1: don't think that's especially surprising, right, But it's tricky. It

533
00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:01,480
Speaker 1: touches on some some very important things, like people who

534
00:31:01,480 --> 00:31:06,080
Speaker 1: are victims of revenge pornography. You know, the right to

535
00:31:06,120 --> 00:31:10,200
Speaker 1: be forgotten is crucial to people who are victims of that. Right.

536
00:31:10,920 --> 00:31:14,720
Speaker 1: And then there's there's the idea that some of this

537
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:19,280
Speaker 1: information could unduly influence your future job prospects, right. Or

538
00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:21,280
Speaker 1: the more dangerous thing that if you were in an

539
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:24,960
Speaker 1: autocratic regime. Let's say we all get a wild hair

540
00:31:25,400 --> 00:31:28,480
Speaker 1: and uh, the five of us, you know, us and

541
00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:31,960
Speaker 1: Paul and you listening, we all say, hey, let's just

542
00:31:32,440 --> 00:31:36,000
Speaker 1: let's let's go to uh North Korea. Uh, let's go

543
00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:38,920
Speaker 1: to uh, let's go to Tehronto, or let's go to Turkmenistan.

544
00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:41,720
Speaker 1: But before we do, years before we do, let's talk

545
00:31:41,760 --> 00:31:44,640
Speaker 1: a lot of trash about them, like specifically, you know

546
00:31:44,680 --> 00:31:47,200
Speaker 1: what I mean. And then all they have to do

547
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:50,040
Speaker 1: is Google search your name or run your passport through

548
00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:53,120
Speaker 1: something right when you're at the border, and you might

549
00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:57,000
Speaker 1: be detained. Uh. This isn't just something for the typical

550
00:31:57,640 --> 00:32:02,040
Speaker 1: boogeyman countries that are trotted out in Western propaganda. This

551
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:06,200
Speaker 1: also could occur in places like Thailand, which has very

552
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:09,760
Speaker 1: strict laws about how you are allowed to talk about

553
00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:13,480
Speaker 1: the monarchy, what you can and cannot say about them. Yes,

554
00:32:13,680 --> 00:32:16,760
Speaker 1: that's a not a fun thing. I I know, I

555
00:32:16,800 --> 00:32:20,240
Speaker 1: think the right to be forgotten is um. First off,

556
00:32:20,240 --> 00:32:24,200
Speaker 1: it's it's a net positive for people who are just

557
00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:28,520
Speaker 1: regular Internet users. But it's also very difficult to convince

558
00:32:28,600 --> 00:32:32,360
Speaker 1: companies and especially governments to to do that sort of stuff.

559
00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:34,920
Speaker 1: And where does it stop? You know, if you're convicted

560
00:32:34,920 --> 00:32:38,280
Speaker 1: of murder five years ago, should people not be able

561
00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:41,880
Speaker 1: to know that you killed someone? I've got something for you, though,

562
00:32:41,920 --> 00:32:45,560
Speaker 1: what's that? Imagine this guy, Um, let's just say he's

563
00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:52,280
Speaker 1: a probably a billionaire. He's probably he loves massages, and um,

564
00:32:53,480 --> 00:32:56,239
Speaker 1: one day it's you know, he gets in trouble with

565
00:32:56,320 --> 00:33:01,000
Speaker 1: the law because he was getting these massages from underage

566
00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:04,479
Speaker 1: women and uh ends up getting in a little bit

567
00:33:04,520 --> 00:33:08,200
Speaker 1: of trouble for it, and then he wants to have

568
00:33:08,320 --> 00:33:12,680
Speaker 1: all that information expunged after he, let's say, does his

569
00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:14,880
Speaker 1: time or at least gets away with a slap on

570
00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:17,040
Speaker 1: the wrist, and then he wants all that information to

571
00:33:17,080 --> 00:33:19,480
Speaker 1: be forgotten because he has the right to be forgotten.

572
00:33:20,160 --> 00:33:22,120
Speaker 1: How do you feel about that? It can't extend to

573
00:33:22,240 --> 00:33:28,280
Speaker 1: serious crimes. It surely cannot. It surely cannot. Like what Okay,

574
00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:31,800
Speaker 1: so what if someone let's say this person again hypothetically

575
00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:36,560
Speaker 1: will call him Jepstein is let's say that person, uh,

576
00:33:36,600 --> 00:33:41,720
Speaker 1: instead of getting a cartoonishly legal non prosecution agreement, let's

577
00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:44,840
Speaker 1: say they actually do get convicted of the crimes, which,

578
00:33:44,920 --> 00:33:49,080
Speaker 1: if we're being honest, they totally committed, then they they

579
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:52,400
Speaker 1: shouldn't have that right to be forgotten like they would

580
00:33:52,400 --> 00:33:54,560
Speaker 1: be on the sex offender register. That's different than if

581
00:33:54,560 --> 00:33:56,960
Speaker 1: they were going around the internet, right right, right right.

582
00:33:57,440 --> 00:33:59,720
Speaker 1: It is stored on the internet. People are supposed to

583
00:33:59,760 --> 00:34:02,520
Speaker 1: be a check the sex offender Register's probably a paper

584
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:05,360
Speaker 1: copy of it somewhere. Yeah, yeah, exactly. But that guy,

585
00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:08,000
Speaker 1: that guy should not be able to First off, he

586
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:11,520
Speaker 1: shouldn't have ever been out of jail. But that a guy,

587
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:16,840
Speaker 1: hypothetically again should not be able to erase that sex

588
00:34:16,840 --> 00:34:19,000
Speaker 1: offender status. You know what I mean, And I know

589
00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:22,080
Speaker 1: sex offender status. This is probably a different episode, but

590
00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:24,680
Speaker 1: I know, uh, here in the US, that can get

591
00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 1: really tricky if it's an action between teenagers. Have you

592
00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 1: guys heard the horror stories about kids like texting each

593
00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:36,160
Speaker 1: other nudes and getting arrested. I actually, when I worked

594
00:34:36,160 --> 00:34:38,200
Speaker 1: for public radio years ago, did a piece about a

595
00:34:38,200 --> 00:34:42,360
Speaker 1: girl here from Georgia, UM who was with an underage

596
00:34:42,440 --> 00:34:46,200
Speaker 1: boy by a year's time and did an act that

597
00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:50,360
Speaker 1: is very bizarrely referred to as sodomy um. It was

598
00:34:50,440 --> 00:34:54,160
Speaker 1: moral sex and it was on school grounds, which is

599
00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:56,279
Speaker 1: neither here nor there for the actual crime she got

600
00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:57,759
Speaker 1: convicted of, but she got she got on the sex

601
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:00,640
Speaker 1: offenders list, and she was like six teen and he

602
00:35:00,719 --> 00:35:03,279
Speaker 1: was fifteen or fourteen or something like that. I think

603
00:35:03,320 --> 00:35:04,640
Speaker 1: at the time that was the age of Now it

604
00:35:04,680 --> 00:35:06,279
Speaker 1: was must have been seventeen. Isn't that the age of

605
00:35:06,280 --> 00:35:10,440
Speaker 1: consent in Georgia? Seventeen? You know, I have never been

606
00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:12,279
Speaker 1: in a situation where I had to worry about it.

607
00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:14,040
Speaker 1: I haven't either, and that's why I always get confused

608
00:35:14,080 --> 00:35:16,080
Speaker 1: because this did. I actually was talking about about this

609
00:35:16,120 --> 00:35:19,320
Speaker 1: to my girlfriend. And in some states it's much higher,

610
00:35:19,320 --> 00:35:21,000
Speaker 1: and in some states it's much lower. And I believe

611
00:35:21,040 --> 00:35:23,920
Speaker 1: in Georgia it's seventeen. But then a relationship between a

612
00:35:23,920 --> 00:35:26,239
Speaker 1: fifteen year old and a seventeen year old certainly isn't

613
00:35:26,280 --> 00:35:28,000
Speaker 1: the same as a relationship between the seven two year

614
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:30,160
Speaker 1: old and a thirty five year old exactly. Yeah, I

615
00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:33,520
Speaker 1: completely agree. Also side note for anyone listening outside of

616
00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:37,080
Speaker 1: the States. In many in many states, here in the US. Uh,

617
00:35:37,120 --> 00:35:39,880
Speaker 1: the age of consent is several years lower if the

618
00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:45,399
Speaker 1: people get married. Okay, well, that's at least it's good

619
00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:48,080
Speaker 1: because do we here in the States, and not that

620
00:35:48,080 --> 00:35:49,600
Speaker 1: we were going off the rails a little bit, but

621
00:35:49,600 --> 00:35:51,960
Speaker 1: do we have a minimum age for marriage? I bet

622
00:35:51,960 --> 00:35:56,120
Speaker 1: it's sixteen? In some states you can get married at fourteen,

623
00:35:57,800 --> 00:36:00,840
Speaker 1: which I think is egregious. In virgin you know, marriages,

624
00:36:01,640 --> 00:36:05,080
Speaker 1: it's unlawful. Did you guys know that it's illegal to

625
00:36:05,080 --> 00:36:10,200
Speaker 1: get married in Virginia. I'm just kidding, Okay, I just

626
00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:12,920
Speaker 1: giving you this straightest look. It's just so backwards in

627
00:36:12,960 --> 00:36:17,560
Speaker 1: Virginia right now. It's it's rough. Yeah, it seems to

628
00:36:17,640 --> 00:36:21,640
Speaker 1: be sixteen pretty pretty much across the board. Some there's

629
00:36:21,680 --> 00:36:25,880
Speaker 1: one in Massachusetts apparently it's fourteen for a male and

630
00:36:25,960 --> 00:36:30,360
Speaker 1: twelve for a female. Yeah. New Hampshire it's fourteen for

631
00:36:30,440 --> 00:36:34,160
Speaker 1: a male versus thirteen for female. We should say before

632
00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:37,480
Speaker 1: this sounds like a total dystopian Mad Max nightmare. Uh,

633
00:36:37,520 --> 00:36:43,359
Speaker 1: those those underage marriages are allowed with parental consent, that's right,

634
00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:45,920
Speaker 1: So the parents have to at least say, you know what,

635
00:36:46,360 --> 00:36:50,840
Speaker 1: you're fourteen, but you've got a great head on your shoulders,

636
00:36:50,840 --> 00:36:53,160
Speaker 1: and I'm sure this decision will work out for the

637
00:36:53,200 --> 00:36:56,120
Speaker 1: rest of your life. And without parental consent, it seems

638
00:36:56,120 --> 00:36:59,279
Speaker 1: to actually be eighteen. Pretty well. Now there's one that's

639
00:36:59,719 --> 00:37:04,239
Speaker 1: Mrs Hippie seventeen male fifteen female without parental consent, then

640
00:37:04,239 --> 00:37:07,600
Speaker 1: it's largely eighteen nineteen eighteen. Yeah, I'm looking down the

641
00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:11,839
Speaker 1: list pretty much eighteen. So this we I think we did,

642
00:37:12,040 --> 00:37:17,960
Speaker 1: uh fear into some different corners. But this is an

643
00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:23,400
Speaker 1: incredibly and profoundly important call. And if you are hearing

644
00:37:23,600 --> 00:37:27,160
Speaker 1: about this sort of stuff for the first time and

645
00:37:27,280 --> 00:37:30,280
Speaker 1: you live in the US, really, if you live outside

646
00:37:30,280 --> 00:37:33,840
Speaker 1: of the EU, you need to be very much aware,

647
00:37:33,840 --> 00:37:36,040
Speaker 1: and I'm sure everybody has a little bit of an

648
00:37:36,040 --> 00:37:38,920
Speaker 1: inkling of this already, need to be very much aware

649
00:37:39,360 --> 00:37:43,799
Speaker 1: that you do not have control over the information that

650
00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:49,279
Speaker 1: you put online. Every everything you do. You should consider that,

651
00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:55,879
Speaker 1: uh something that later people will know about you. Very

652
00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:59,880
Speaker 1: good point, pen uh last thing before we escape this one,

653
00:37:59,880 --> 00:38:01,560
Speaker 1: by the way, if you have if you deal with

654
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:04,400
Speaker 1: data mining at your job, feel free to call and

655
00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:06,160
Speaker 1: leave a message. We will treat your voice the same

656
00:38:06,160 --> 00:38:09,279
Speaker 1: way we did this caller and protect your identity. UM

657
00:38:09,320 --> 00:38:11,879
Speaker 1: if you feel like it's something important for the rest

658
00:38:11,920 --> 00:38:15,720
Speaker 1: of us to hear, including everybody listening right now. Um,

659
00:38:15,760 --> 00:38:18,000
Speaker 1: just an update, guys. We we got this on our

660
00:38:18,040 --> 00:38:20,080
Speaker 1: Twitter and I think on our Here's where it gets

661
00:38:20,080 --> 00:38:26,799
Speaker 1: crazy page the Efrey Jepstein case. It is currently as

662
00:38:26,840 --> 00:38:30,520
Speaker 1: of last week when we're recording this, there's a new

663
00:38:30,600 --> 00:38:36,200
Speaker 1: investigation into the plea deal that was that was went

664
00:38:36,239 --> 00:38:38,840
Speaker 1: into or that he got into thousand seven right, non

665
00:38:38,880 --> 00:38:43,680
Speaker 1: prosecution agreement, not even a plea deal. Okay, yes, that

666
00:38:43,680 --> 00:38:46,280
Speaker 1: that's exactly what it is. That basically mean we agree

667
00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:49,960
Speaker 1: to not prosecute you pretty much. Yeah, I mean it is.

668
00:38:50,040 --> 00:38:53,640
Speaker 1: It is a plea deal. I just keep using the phrase, uh,

669
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:59,279
Speaker 1: non prosecution agreement because that sounds just so far out

670
00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:02,960
Speaker 1: of bounce. Apparently it came from, let's see this, this

671
00:39:03,000 --> 00:39:05,359
Speaker 1: inquiry that's happening right now into the plea deal came

672
00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:09,759
Speaker 1: from UH Senator Ben Sass of Nebraska who posted this

673
00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:14,000
Speaker 1: letter on his website that just discussed it like what

674
00:39:14,040 --> 00:39:15,640
Speaker 1: it is, and hey, we're gonna we're gonna be looking

675
00:39:15,680 --> 00:39:18,000
Speaker 1: into this. Oh I thought you he posted it on

676
00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:21,840
Speaker 1: our community page. No, I wish Ben Sass, if you're listening.

677
00:39:22,320 --> 00:39:25,600
Speaker 1: That's pretty cool. A way to bring the sassa Ben

678
00:39:25,680 --> 00:39:29,920
Speaker 1: Sass and sass. He paid for that name. He earned it.

679
00:39:29,960 --> 00:39:32,560
Speaker 1: He lived through elementary school with that name. He did,

680
00:39:32,680 --> 00:39:37,640
Speaker 1: he really did in sass. All right, well, uh, let's

681
00:39:37,680 --> 00:39:47,760
Speaker 1: get to one of these ads. Let's do it. Hello.

682
00:39:47,840 --> 00:39:51,400
Speaker 1: My name is Anthony in Philadelphia, and I have something

683
00:39:51,400 --> 00:39:54,319
Speaker 1: I don't want anyone to know. I failed to lift

684
00:39:54,320 --> 00:39:57,400
Speaker 1: the toilet last night. Wind No, actually that's not what

685
00:39:57,400 --> 00:40:00,839
Speaker 1: I'm talking about. I believe. All right, guys, I'm gonna

686
00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:04,000
Speaker 1: come clean. I put two and two together. I believe.

687
00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:09,720
Speaker 1: All right, Here it comes David Blaine. He's a magician.

688
00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:14,879
Speaker 1: He's fantastic. I love that man. Besides that, he's able

689
00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:17,080
Speaker 1: to hold his breath for more than eighteen minutes. It

690
00:40:17,200 --> 00:40:21,759
Speaker 1: is physically impossible to do that. Your body matter will

691
00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:25,560
Speaker 1: begin to do very bad things. I believe that he

692
00:40:25,600 --> 00:40:29,080
Speaker 1: has attained this world record from using some type of

693
00:40:29,640 --> 00:40:33,239
Speaker 1: serum from the Naked Mole Rack. The Naked mole rat

694
00:40:33,320 --> 00:40:35,880
Speaker 1: is able to hold his breath for up to nineteen

695
00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:42,799
Speaker 1: minutes underground during a collapse. Fascinating creature, completely naked. Anyway,

696
00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:45,600
Speaker 1: I think there's something to this, but I don't want

697
00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:50,960
Speaker 1: it to affect Mr Blaine's career, but I think he

698
00:40:51,080 --> 00:40:54,239
Speaker 1: does not want us to know this. Please look into this.

699
00:40:55,000 --> 00:40:59,759
Speaker 1: Excuse me. First of all, shame on you for your

700
00:41:00,000 --> 00:41:05,399
Speaker 1: toilet habits, any female or male. Okay, I'm gonna come clean.

701
00:41:05,440 --> 00:41:07,000
Speaker 1: I have something I don't want you to know. I

702
00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:10,120
Speaker 1: I piece it in down every time. You know, occasionally

703
00:41:10,280 --> 00:41:12,080
Speaker 1: sometimes I just want to take a minute, read an

704
00:41:12,160 --> 00:41:15,480
Speaker 1: article on your phone. Maybe I only have to pee, understood,

705
00:41:15,560 --> 00:41:17,480
Speaker 1: You know you have you had your break today. Sometimes

706
00:41:17,520 --> 00:41:20,799
Speaker 1: my break is is taking a piece. But at night

707
00:41:21,040 --> 00:41:24,359
Speaker 1: with the lights off, I would fall in. I'd fall

708
00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:26,000
Speaker 1: in like in that curb your enthusiasm. You don't have

709
00:41:26,000 --> 00:41:31,040
Speaker 1: a toilet light. We'm about to change your world, SERI. Yeah,

710
00:41:31,120 --> 00:41:33,480
Speaker 1: I've got a really cool it's like a light that

711
00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:36,520
Speaker 1: clips in. I go for electric blue because I think

712
00:41:36,520 --> 00:41:39,920
Speaker 1: it's a classy. Look. Uh, it fits inside your toilet

713
00:41:39,960 --> 00:41:42,520
Speaker 1: bowl like ground effects for your toilet, kind of at

714
00:41:42,520 --> 00:41:44,800
Speaker 1: the bottom of those bird scooters. I got a static

715
00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:48,640
Speaker 1: one because you know, when when I am I in

716
00:41:48,680 --> 00:41:50,920
Speaker 1: a late night scenario, I don't want to get spooted.

717
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:54,280
Speaker 1: I don't want to introduce new variables into the equation.

718
00:41:55,040 --> 00:41:57,640
Speaker 1: So I've got you know what. I know what you

719
00:41:57,640 --> 00:42:00,080
Speaker 1: guys are getting for stocking stuffers, and I bet you

720
00:42:00,120 --> 00:42:02,920
Speaker 1: will forget by the time this year draws to a close.

721
00:42:03,080 --> 00:42:06,239
Speaker 1: That sounds pricey bend, but I'll take it. Nothing like

722
00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:10,960
Speaker 1: potty Swag. Yes, Potty Swag the new sponsor of stuff.

723
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:15,640
Speaker 1: They don't want you to go so first, you are correct,

724
00:42:15,680 --> 00:42:20,320
Speaker 1: Sir David Blaine, and as of at least two thousand

725
00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:23,080
Speaker 1: and eight, does have the world record for longest time

726
00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:26,480
Speaker 1: spent holding his breath was seventeen minutes and four seconds

727
00:42:26,640 --> 00:42:30,080
Speaker 1: allegedly holding his breath allegedly. We don't know if he

728
00:42:30,239 --> 00:42:33,480
Speaker 1: was doping with that. Naked mole rats serum. Naked mole

729
00:42:33,560 --> 00:42:38,600
Speaker 1: rats are a real creature. They can survive eighteen minutes

730
00:42:38,680 --> 00:42:44,480
Speaker 1: without oxygen. They're also very, very different in comparison to

731
00:42:44,880 --> 00:42:48,080
Speaker 1: most mammals. Yeah, it's true. There's an article on NPR

732
00:42:48,160 --> 00:42:51,600
Speaker 1: researchers find yet another reason why naked mole rats are

733
00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:54,560
Speaker 1: just weird, and a researcher by the name of Thomas

734
00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:58,040
Speaker 1: park Is, a neuroscientist at the University of Illinois in Chicago,

735
00:42:58,480 --> 00:43:01,040
Speaker 1: says that they've evolved under such to a different environment

736
00:43:01,080 --> 00:43:03,879
Speaker 1: that it's like studying an animal from another planet. Um,

737
00:43:03,960 --> 00:43:08,640
Speaker 1: that environment being deep underground, I imagine. Yeah, they live

738
00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:12,839
Speaker 1: in ant like social structures. They have they have a

739
00:43:12,880 --> 00:43:17,759
Speaker 1: dominant breeder. Uh. They also have very slow metabolism, so

740
00:43:17,800 --> 00:43:21,560
Speaker 1: they live for a very very long time. And uh

741
00:43:21,760 --> 00:43:26,040
Speaker 1: they are no slouch when it comes to fighting cancer. So, sir,

742
00:43:26,440 --> 00:43:30,560
Speaker 1: if your supposition is correct, if David Blaine is doping

743
00:43:30,600 --> 00:43:34,080
Speaker 1: with naked mole rat derived serum to hold his breath

744
00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:38,680
Speaker 1: for frankly superhuman amounts of time, what else has he

745
00:43:39,280 --> 00:43:42,520
Speaker 1: what else has he gained from the mole rats? So

746
00:43:42,640 --> 00:43:47,400
Speaker 1: what if David Blaine was in fact bitten by a

747
00:43:47,800 --> 00:43:53,920
Speaker 1: naked a radioactive from fallout? Exactly? Those are Those are

748
00:43:53,920 --> 00:43:56,440
Speaker 1: the pesky critters. They're quite large and they come at

749
00:43:56,560 --> 00:43:59,240
Speaker 1: you and you can usually just stomp on them. Um,

750
00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:03,200
Speaker 1: but some of them are irradiated ones will mess you up. Um.

751
00:44:03,320 --> 00:44:08,440
Speaker 1: I will further postulate, has anyone seen Mr David Blaine

752
00:44:08,640 --> 00:44:14,480
Speaker 1: pierced his own arm with a metal poker? Was that

753
00:44:14,520 --> 00:44:16,799
Speaker 1: on one of the specials? It was where he's doing

754
00:44:16,840 --> 00:44:20,160
Speaker 1: it for Will Smith and his family and Kanye West

755
00:44:20,200 --> 00:44:22,120
Speaker 1: and all these people, like putting it through his hand

756
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:24,719
Speaker 1: or his arm or something, and then he pulls it

757
00:44:24,719 --> 00:44:27,480
Speaker 1: out and there's no wound there. It's just gone. I

758
00:44:27,520 --> 00:44:32,399
Speaker 1: think perhaps he's taken an octopus serum can regenerate. It's

759
00:44:32,440 --> 00:44:35,560
Speaker 1: like an evil doctor Doolttle mainly mainly gets his magic

760
00:44:35,600 --> 00:44:41,200
Speaker 1: abilities from animal juice, which potions potions. But then potions

761
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:45,000
Speaker 1: have a limited uh a limited durations. Some of them

762
00:44:45,040 --> 00:44:48,280
Speaker 1: do some of them will infect your entire character sheet.

763
00:44:49,960 --> 00:44:53,320
Speaker 1: Have you seen the one where he pukes up frogs? Oh? Yeah,

764
00:44:53,360 --> 00:44:56,400
Speaker 1: that was pretty cool. I think he's just managed to

765
00:44:56,480 --> 00:44:59,600
Speaker 1: kind of like train his body in weird ways. But

766
00:45:00,040 --> 00:45:02,600
Speaker 1: think too. I guess with the World Record they check

767
00:45:02,600 --> 00:45:05,120
Speaker 1: and make sure you're not wearing some kind of device.

768
00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:07,759
Speaker 1: I mean, but then again, how strict do you think

769
00:45:07,800 --> 00:45:10,880
Speaker 1: the the oversight for the Guinness World Records actually is?

770
00:45:10,920 --> 00:45:13,800
Speaker 1: They would at least need to measure the oxygen levels

771
00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:17,080
Speaker 1: in his blood. One would assume um and then make

772
00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:20,759
Speaker 1: sure that the seals on whatever device is keeping him

773
00:45:20,840 --> 00:45:25,120
Speaker 1: from unconsciously breathing work. But if you enter a meditative state,

774
00:45:25,480 --> 00:45:28,719
Speaker 1: you can go quite a long time appearing not to

775
00:45:28,760 --> 00:45:31,400
Speaker 1: breathe at all, like those people who freeze very quickly

776
00:45:31,719 --> 00:45:34,200
Speaker 1: and appear to be dead and then just can kind

777
00:45:34,200 --> 00:45:37,320
Speaker 1: of get jumped like a car battery a White Walkers.

778
00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:42,320
Speaker 1: So so I think this is fascinating. I can't believe

779
00:45:42,360 --> 00:45:45,239
Speaker 1: we did two episodes on real life superpowers. We didn't

780
00:45:45,280 --> 00:45:49,560
Speaker 1: mention David Blaine. We also didn't mention Harry Houdini, who

781
00:45:49,600 --> 00:45:53,359
Speaker 1: we could consider sort of a predecessor of blame absolutely

782
00:45:53,560 --> 00:45:58,279
Speaker 1: or the the David Blaine two point Oh, Chris Angel,

783
00:45:59,680 --> 00:46:04,759
Speaker 1: he's he's more like a poor man David Blaine with

784
00:46:04,960 --> 00:46:08,200
Speaker 1: like is he strad letting? You know from Molly Crue.

785
00:46:08,600 --> 00:46:11,319
Speaker 1: Our next episode is going to have a h an

786
00:46:11,320 --> 00:46:16,000
Speaker 1: incredibly furious call from Chris Angel. All I know is

787
00:46:16,040 --> 00:46:19,360
Speaker 1: I stepped into somewhere when I was in I was

788
00:46:19,400 --> 00:46:21,880
Speaker 1: in Las Vegas one time when I was much younger.

789
00:46:22,160 --> 00:46:25,440
Speaker 1: I just walked into some theater somehow and it happened

790
00:46:25,480 --> 00:46:27,400
Speaker 1: to be a Chris Angel show that was at like

791
00:46:27,440 --> 00:46:30,200
Speaker 1: a bar setting, and it was fantastic. How old do

792
00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:35,800
Speaker 1: you think he is? Oh, he's welled into his two hundreds,

793
00:46:35,640 --> 00:46:39,440
Speaker 1: his human ages fifty one. You can't be that good

794
00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:43,040
Speaker 1: at illusions, Michael, if you know you're a young person,

795
00:46:43,239 --> 00:46:45,399
Speaker 1: if you're less than a hundred and fifty right, that's

796
00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:49,280
Speaker 1: the entry. And in a Time magazine article, Dr Ralph

797
00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:53,920
Speaker 1: Potkin does say the body can be trained to do

798
00:46:54,280 --> 00:46:56,480
Speaker 1: this kind of thing, and that you can train your

799
00:46:56,480 --> 00:47:00,600
Speaker 1: body to um ignore some of the spas that it

800
00:47:00,600 --> 00:47:04,279
Speaker 1: would naturally do to get you to gasp for breath. Uh,

801
00:47:04,320 --> 00:47:06,839
Speaker 1: and that, like you're saying, Ben, you could probably train

802
00:47:06,920 --> 00:47:09,400
Speaker 1: your mind to go into a meditative state. But to

803
00:47:09,440 --> 00:47:11,279
Speaker 1: the College point, I mean, I can't imagine there there

804
00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:14,200
Speaker 1: must be a limit to that physically where your body

805
00:47:14,239 --> 00:47:17,560
Speaker 1: would just start to like convulse in on itself or something.

806
00:47:17,600 --> 00:47:21,320
Speaker 1: You know, there's it's it is fascinating if you haven't

807
00:47:21,360 --> 00:47:24,320
Speaker 1: checked out our real life superpowers up, so please to

808
00:47:25,080 --> 00:47:29,760
Speaker 1: We should also do an episode on meditation in general.

809
00:47:30,320 --> 00:47:33,720
Speaker 1: This Uh, this is a related point if you haven't

810
00:47:33,719 --> 00:47:37,120
Speaker 1: heard it before, this is a baffling fact. Due to

811
00:47:37,400 --> 00:47:40,719
Speaker 1: a study of London cab drivers. Of all things, we

812
00:47:40,840 --> 00:47:44,160
Speaker 1: do know that mind over matter is real in that

813
00:47:44,680 --> 00:47:49,239
Speaker 1: the type of thinking and cognition you practice will affect

814
00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:52,719
Speaker 1: the growth of your brain. Uh. There's a test that

815
00:47:52,760 --> 00:47:56,239
Speaker 1: all black cab drivers in London had to take for

816
00:47:56,280 --> 00:47:58,960
Speaker 1: a long time was called the knowledge with the capital K,

817
00:47:59,560 --> 00:48:03,120
Speaker 1: and at we say, black cabs, I mean the traditional

818
00:48:03,280 --> 00:48:06,520
Speaker 1: black cabs in London, kind of like the yellow taxis

819
00:48:06,560 --> 00:48:09,120
Speaker 1: you'll see in big cities here in the States. The

820
00:48:09,160 --> 00:48:11,960
Speaker 1: problem with taking the knowledge is that you couldn't use

821
00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:14,879
Speaker 1: a GPS, and you had to build a mental map

822
00:48:14,920 --> 00:48:17,360
Speaker 1: of London. You had to know all the fastest roots,

823
00:48:17,480 --> 00:48:20,080
Speaker 1: and you had to know how to modify those roots

824
00:48:20,120 --> 00:48:23,960
Speaker 1: according to traffic in different you know, public events and

825
00:48:24,000 --> 00:48:28,400
Speaker 1: so on. And people generally don't pass this test, especially

826
00:48:28,400 --> 00:48:30,719
Speaker 1: now the first time. But they've found in these studies

827
00:48:30,760 --> 00:48:35,360
Speaker 1: that drivers who had put in decades after passing the knowledge,

828
00:48:35,880 --> 00:48:38,719
Speaker 1: they have been practicing the knowledge as cab drivers. The

829
00:48:38,760 --> 00:48:43,040
Speaker 1: parts of their brain that involve spatial awareness and that

830
00:48:43,160 --> 00:48:49,520
Speaker 1: sort of cognition were physically larger than normal brains. So

831
00:48:49,520 --> 00:48:53,880
Speaker 1: so you can meditate your way into superpowers. It just

832
00:48:53,920 --> 00:48:56,319
Speaker 1: takes a long long time. It's not a not a

833
00:48:56,360 --> 00:48:59,520
Speaker 1: fifteen minute or afternoon profession. But I would love to

834
00:48:59,520 --> 00:49:01,640
Speaker 1: do it. Well what you guys do if you could,

835
00:49:01,680 --> 00:49:04,120
Speaker 1: If you could learn one meditative power, would you learn

836
00:49:04,160 --> 00:49:08,640
Speaker 1: this sort of super hibernation to slow your nervous system.

837
00:49:08,719 --> 00:49:10,440
Speaker 1: I just want to be able to control things with

838
00:49:10,480 --> 00:49:13,600
Speaker 1: my mind. Man, tell the kinesis. Yeah, dig it. Yeah,

839
00:49:14,080 --> 00:49:16,680
Speaker 1: I think I keep going back to it. I've said

840
00:49:16,680 --> 00:49:19,200
Speaker 1: it before and I'll say it again. I want to

841
00:49:19,200 --> 00:49:23,279
Speaker 1: have the iceman's powers and then the trauma guy. Yeah.

842
00:49:23,440 --> 00:49:27,880
Speaker 1: I want to be able to withstand like seriously freezing

843
00:49:27,920 --> 00:49:31,440
Speaker 1: temperatures and just be just be cool about it. I actually,

844
00:49:31,480 --> 00:49:35,759
Speaker 1: in desperation, resorted to trying to do that last week. Yeah. Yeah,

845
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:39,759
Speaker 1: I was very very cold. I was Circumstances led me

846
00:49:39,800 --> 00:49:41,840
Speaker 1: to be locked out of a place for a few hours,

847
00:49:42,680 --> 00:49:45,480
Speaker 1: wandering in a town where I didn't know anyone, I

848
00:49:45,520 --> 00:49:48,960
Speaker 1: didn't speak the language, and everything was closed, and I

849
00:49:49,080 --> 00:49:51,080
Speaker 1: was like, I'm gonna try to breathe the way that

850
00:49:51,200 --> 00:49:58,080
Speaker 1: guy did. Limited success, have you had some, though? I

851
00:49:58,160 --> 00:50:01,719
Speaker 1: don't know, Matt, I I would need to practice a

852
00:50:01,800 --> 00:50:05,400
Speaker 1: lot more. But I also didn't have naked mulerat serum

853
00:50:05,440 --> 00:50:10,360
Speaker 1: to bring us back around. Right, Okay, I got I

854
00:50:10,440 --> 00:50:13,040
Speaker 1: don't think we have time for anymore. We have plenty

855
00:50:13,360 --> 00:50:17,279
Speaker 1: of voicemails, uh, hundreds in facts. What do you say

856
00:50:17,320 --> 00:50:20,480
Speaker 1: we do another one of these? Maybe not sequentially, but

857
00:50:20,560 --> 00:50:23,719
Speaker 1: we like scound the road, down the road, down the road. Yeah,

858
00:50:23,760 --> 00:50:26,280
Speaker 1: because these are really good conversations and like, we always

859
00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:27,680
Speaker 1: kind of go into these thinking they're gonna be a

860
00:50:27,680 --> 00:50:30,160
Speaker 1: little clip shows, but they're really not. Like I mean,

861
00:50:30,200 --> 00:50:32,239
Speaker 1: there's so much good stuff here. Maybe not worth an

862
00:50:32,360 --> 00:50:35,360
Speaker 1: entire episode, but definitely worth a cool, you know, twenty

863
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:38,319
Speaker 1: minute conversation sometime before the end of the year. And

864
00:50:38,400 --> 00:50:41,720
Speaker 1: we we may not be able to air every phone

865
00:50:41,760 --> 00:50:44,279
Speaker 1: call we get, but we do listen to all of

866
00:50:44,320 --> 00:50:48,160
Speaker 1: them eventually. That's the part of the asterisk. So please

867
00:50:48,320 --> 00:50:51,920
Speaker 1: let us, and more importantly, your fellow listeners know the

868
00:50:52,080 --> 00:50:55,839
Speaker 1: strange stories that you have found in your personal life

869
00:50:55,960 --> 00:50:58,480
Speaker 1: or in your neck of the global woods. You can

870
00:50:58,520 --> 00:51:01,000
Speaker 1: do that immediately by going to our Facebook page. Here's

871
00:51:01,000 --> 00:51:04,560
Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. You can find us on m Amazon.

872
00:51:04,640 --> 00:51:07,759
Speaker 1: You can find us on Amazon, but you can find

873
00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:11,479
Speaker 1: us and talk to us on Instagram and Twitter as well.

874
00:51:12,080 --> 00:51:13,600
Speaker 1: If you don't want to do any of that stuff,

875
00:51:13,600 --> 00:51:16,000
Speaker 1: you just like, you know, doing things that're not fully

876
00:51:16,000 --> 00:51:17,839
Speaker 1: old fashioned way, you could write us a snail mail

877
00:51:17,880 --> 00:51:19,480
Speaker 1: if you want, you can go to our website and

878
00:51:19,520 --> 00:51:21,520
Speaker 1: find that address. But if you want to just do

879
00:51:21,800 --> 00:51:24,080
Speaker 1: this sort of medium old fashioned way, send us an email.

880
00:51:24,440 --> 00:51:47,440
Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at how stuff Works dot com.