WEBVTT - Fake News is Solvable 0:00:15.076 --> 0:00:22.676 Pushkin, I'm may have Higgins, and this is Solvable Interviews 0:00:22.716 --> 0:00:25.796 with the world's most innovative thinkers who are working to 0:00:25.916 --> 0:00:31.516 solve the world's biggest problems. In this episode, Anne Applebaum 0:00:31.596 --> 0:00:35.476 is in conversation with researcher and data analyst Renee Deresta 0:00:35.636 --> 0:00:39.756 about her solvable, which is the growing spread of dangerous 0:00:39.836 --> 0:00:45.796 misinformation online, especially on social media. For the most solvable, 0:00:45.836 --> 0:00:50.036 I think we need increasing awareness, increasing cooperations, helping algorithms 0:00:50.036 --> 0:00:55.956 make better decisions, recognizing that recommendation engines are not functioning 0:00:55.996 --> 0:00:58.076 as they should, and that we should be taking tangible 0:00:58.116 --> 0:01:02.116 steps to think about ways in which algorithm curation serves 0:01:02.156 --> 0:01:07.676 information to people. In late twenty sixteen, Oxford Dictionaries selected 0:01:07.796 --> 0:01:11.396 post truth as their word of the year, defining it 0:01:11.436 --> 0:01:15.916 as relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts 0:01:16.036 --> 0:01:21.036 are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to 0:01:21.236 --> 0:01:25.116 emotion and personal belief. It's like, I want to believe 0:01:25.156 --> 0:01:29.356 that nachos are the ideal balanced nutritional snack that appeals 0:01:29.396 --> 0:01:32.276 to my emotional and personal belief system, because God, I 0:01:32.356 --> 0:01:36.276 love nattos. So I'll go and I'll find some vague 0:01:36.436 --> 0:01:40.156 chitchat online that tells me, you know, something melted cheese 0:01:40.196 --> 0:01:42.836 is totally full of calcium that is good for your bones, 0:01:43.236 --> 0:01:45.516 and it's important for you, as an immigrant to the US, 0:01:45.556 --> 0:01:50.396 to assimilate by eating their national dish of natos. So 0:01:50.796 --> 0:01:54.156 I'll convince myself of that, and I'll maybe even eat 0:01:54.196 --> 0:01:59.156 myself into a delicious early grave. The age we live in, 0:01:59.276 --> 0:02:03.036 the digital age, affects every narrative we see and absorb, 0:02:03.236 --> 0:02:06.436 and that can be news based, or cultural or artistic. 0:02:07.116 --> 0:02:09.916 We have always had an instinct to find information that 0:02:09.996 --> 0:02:13.476 sinks with our perspective, and now a host of new 0:02:13.556 --> 0:02:17.356 platforms are only too happy to oblige that part of us. 0:02:18.156 --> 0:02:21.996 Pew reports that an analysis of almost four hundred million 0:02:22.116 --> 0:02:26.916 Facebook users interactions with over nine hundred news outlets found 0:02:26.916 --> 0:02:31.396 that people tend to seek information that aligns with their views. 0:02:31.436 --> 0:02:34.556 That makes many of us vulnerable to accepting and acting 0:02:34.636 --> 0:02:39.316 on misinformation. Social media firms are under pressure to halt 0:02:39.396 --> 0:02:43.116 the spread of fake contents on their platforms, and we 0:02:43.196 --> 0:02:46.836 know that the problem has both human and technical side, 0:02:47.116 --> 0:02:51.876 and so too does any potential solution. Reneed Arresta is 0:02:51.876 --> 0:02:55.196 the director of research at New Knowledge and a Mozilla 0:02:55.236 --> 0:02:59.356 Fellow in Media Misinformation and Trust. She investigates the spread 0:02:59.396 --> 0:03:03.796 of malign narratives across social networks and helps policymakers to 0:03:03.916 --> 0:03:08.116 understand and respond to the problem. Renee has advised Congress 0:03:08.116 --> 0:03:11.636 and the State Department, and she studies some fascinating areas 0:03:11.676 --> 0:03:18.756 of disinformation in contexts like pseudoscience, conspiracies, terrorism, and state 0:03:18.836 --> 0:03:23.556 sponsored information warfare, all that spooky stuff. I'm so glad 0:03:23.596 --> 0:03:26.476 she is scouting ahead and sending us back the best 0:03:26.476 --> 0:03:29.476 ways to deal with this. Let's take a listen and 0:03:29.636 --> 0:03:33.076 I'll speak to you after. So, Renee, you're one of 0:03:33.076 --> 0:03:38.836 the few people who identified the problem of online anti 0:03:38.916 --> 0:03:42.476 vax disinformation very early on. How did you first come 0:03:42.476 --> 0:03:43.996 into contact with the problem? How did you know it 0:03:44.076 --> 0:03:46.396 was a problem at all. I started working on a 0:03:46.476 --> 0:03:49.236 law in California called SP two seventy seven, and it 0:03:49.276 --> 0:03:51.636 was a law to eliminate vaccine opt outs. And I 0:03:51.676 --> 0:03:54.236 was a parent at a new baby, and I wanted, 0:03:54.316 --> 0:03:56.596 as a mom, just to volunteer to help get this 0:03:56.676 --> 0:03:59.476 law passed. So I am a data analyst, and I 0:03:59.556 --> 0:04:03.476 offered to do some analysis into things like the social 0:04:03.516 --> 0:04:06.436 media conversation around the law. And I was really surprised 0:04:06.476 --> 0:04:09.236 because the legislators, there are a number of legislators on 0:04:09.756 --> 0:04:11.876 both parties who were supporting the law. They were saying 0:04:11.876 --> 0:04:14.356 that their constituents were polling at around eighty five percent 0:04:14.396 --> 0:04:17.196 in favor, but the social media conversation was almost one 0:04:17.236 --> 0:04:19.996 hundred percent negative, and that was on Facebook and Twitter. 0:04:20.396 --> 0:04:23.316 So I started working with another data scientist named Glad 0:04:23.356 --> 0:04:26.596 Latan to look at the conversation on Twitter, to look 0:04:26.596 --> 0:04:29.756 at the different distinct groups, how they were evolving their messages, 0:04:30.036 --> 0:04:33.316 how they were connecting with other activists outside of California, 0:04:33.436 --> 0:04:36.516 how sometimes activists outside of California. It turned out we're 0:04:36.716 --> 0:04:40.236 pretending to be Californians, bunches of new accounts that had 0:04:40.236 --> 0:04:42.556 been created, and we were really looking at the idea 0:04:42.596 --> 0:04:44.596 of what had no name then but kind of came 0:04:44.636 --> 0:04:48.276 to be called manufactured consensus, the idea that the conversation 0:04:48.356 --> 0:04:51.676 online was really being driven by a relatively small number 0:04:51.676 --> 0:04:54.396 of people who were using things like tools to be 0:04:54.476 --> 0:04:58.396 always on, constantly being in the hashtag Facebook groups and 0:04:58.436 --> 0:05:01.436 ads to amplify their message, and then the way that 0:05:01.476 --> 0:05:04.516 the algorithm was amplifying the message. In addition to that, 0:05:04.636 --> 0:05:07.116 so ways in which I, as a parent who had 0:05:07.156 --> 0:05:09.796 just gotten involved in the conversation, had just demonstrated an 0:05:09.876 --> 0:05:12.596 interest in vaccine policy, was all of a sudden getting 0:05:12.596 --> 0:05:15.916 pushed tons of anti vaccine content on Facebook. It was 0:05:15.996 --> 0:05:18.556 recommending groups to me, it was recommending pages to me. 0:05:19.036 --> 0:05:23.116 And the realization that what was really not a very 0:05:23.236 --> 0:05:27.636 large number of people was actually having an extreme disproportionate 0:05:27.676 --> 0:05:31.956 amount of a share of voice in the conversation, and 0:05:32.036 --> 0:05:34.396 did you have to create tools in order to begin 0:05:34.476 --> 0:05:37.676 identifying who the people were who was being pushed. They 0:05:37.676 --> 0:05:39.996 were actually not very quiet about that. There was a 0:05:40.036 --> 0:05:42.596 page called tweet for Vaccine Freedom, and it was actually 0:05:42.916 --> 0:05:45.076 you know, when out of state activists were asking how 0:05:45.116 --> 0:05:47.516 can we help because the entire anti vaccine movement across 0:05:47.516 --> 0:05:50.676 the entire United States decided to fight this battle. They 0:05:50.676 --> 0:05:53.036 would say like, oh, you should just create an account 0:05:53.076 --> 0:05:55.636 and say or from California. So it was actually really transparent. 0:05:55.676 --> 0:05:57.316 It wasn't that hard to figure out that there were 0:05:57.316 --> 0:06:00.676 people pretending to be from California. There were also Twitter 0:06:00.716 --> 0:06:02.996 accounts that all of a sudden had a vested interest 0:06:03.036 --> 0:06:05.636 in California politics. But if you read their past material, 0:06:05.676 --> 0:06:07.716 which again is also public it was really right out 0:06:07.716 --> 0:06:09.516 there that that's not where they were actually from. Kind 0:06:09.556 --> 0:06:12.996 of a very interesting because it was extremely small, local 0:06:13.076 --> 0:06:15.636 and niche we you know, we thought in California. But 0:06:15.756 --> 0:06:18.156 as the law began to get more press coverage and 0:06:18.196 --> 0:06:21.356 things or would actually be like comments section battles, you know, 0:06:21.396 --> 0:06:23.396 the same kinds of stuff that we saw later with 0:06:23.556 --> 0:06:26.836 you know, entities that go and are like almost incentivized 0:06:26.876 --> 0:06:29.916 to leave comments on news articles to shape a perception 0:06:30.076 --> 0:06:33.116 about the topic. And actually we on the provac side thought, 0:06:33.116 --> 0:06:34.916 oh boy, I guess we're gonna you know, we need 0:06:34.956 --> 0:06:38.076 to do this too. Are we really engaging in Okay? 0:06:38.076 --> 0:06:39.636 They commented over here, so you know, we have to 0:06:39.636 --> 0:06:42.476 go comment over here. They have bots that are on 0:06:42.516 --> 0:06:44.436 twenty four to seven? Do we need bots that are 0:06:44.436 --> 0:06:47.196 on twenty four seven? Just became this this interesting firsthand 0:06:47.196 --> 0:06:48.716 experience of what it was going to be like to 0:06:48.836 --> 0:06:51.716 try to run any kind of influence or policy campaign 0:06:51.756 --> 0:06:54.036 in the future. I found it really troubling, especially when 0:06:54.036 --> 0:06:58.076 the algorithms just began recommending anti vaccine content to me constantly. 0:06:58.396 --> 0:07:01.956 And how did the Facebook and Twitter and other algorithms work. 0:07:02.036 --> 0:07:04.556 Were they affected by this campaign? The where the search 0:07:04.596 --> 0:07:06.836 engines affected by it. I don't think the search engines 0:07:06.876 --> 0:07:09.276 as much because it was you know, the Google is 0:07:09.276 --> 0:07:11.596 a little bit more sophisticated about this stuff than the 0:07:11.636 --> 0:07:14.716 social platforms. Social platforms the number one signal that they're 0:07:14.796 --> 0:07:17.596 using as popularity, and so you either if you have 0:07:17.676 --> 0:07:20.756 real popularity or if you can feign popularity. The number 0:07:20.796 --> 0:07:23.836 of likes and engagements and comments and things is what decides, 0:07:24.076 --> 0:07:26.436 you know, whether this is how Facebook was deciding what 0:07:26.476 --> 0:07:30.036 gets pushed into your feed. Instagram is like that too. 0:07:30.196 --> 0:07:33.476 Google has a framework now it has a proper name. 0:07:33.476 --> 0:07:35.636 It's called Your Money or Your Life, and it says 0:07:35.676 --> 0:07:39.716 that on topics related to health issues and financial issues 0:07:39.756 --> 0:07:41.516 they have to have a higher standard of care to 0:07:41.556 --> 0:07:44.396 make sure that it isn't just what's popular that's rising 0:07:44.396 --> 0:07:47.236 to the top. But even with that policy, one of 0:07:47.236 --> 0:07:50.796 the things that we consistently see is anti vaccine activists 0:07:50.836 --> 0:07:54.316 producing content at a higher rate and also candidly more 0:07:54.356 --> 0:07:57.556 engaging content, you know, a much more emotionally resonant versus 0:07:57.956 --> 0:08:02.356 more authoritative medical quote unquote establishment doctors, the CDC, the 0:08:02.436 --> 0:08:05.676 National Instituites for Health, their contents not as emotionally resonant. 0:08:05.716 --> 0:08:08.116 It doesn't get as much engagement, and so the search 0:08:08.156 --> 0:08:12.996 engines and the algorithm aren't amplifying the more factual, reality 0:08:13.036 --> 0:08:16.076 based content, and instead what we're getting is this conspiratorial stuff. 0:08:16.356 --> 0:08:19.596 Walk me through what it means to be emotionally resonant online. 0:08:19.796 --> 0:08:21.796 Is this something that's being done deliberately to the people 0:08:21.796 --> 0:08:23.996 who are creating it understand that that's what it is? 0:08:24.516 --> 0:08:26.836 Or is it that the human brain is just tuned 0:08:26.836 --> 0:08:30.756 to conspiracies and prefers them. Some of it is platform culturism, 0:08:30.796 --> 0:08:34.276 of it is the way that the algorithm understands engagement. 0:08:34.316 --> 0:08:36.596 So there's the human element which gets kind of the 0:08:36.636 --> 0:08:39.276 initial signal shows that there's a lot of people who 0:08:39.276 --> 0:08:41.476 are watching this, and the algorithm recognizes that a lot 0:08:41.476 --> 0:08:44.556 of people are watching it and then begins the amplification process. 0:08:44.796 --> 0:08:46.796 But the first step is actually the content, of course, 0:08:47.076 --> 0:08:50.596 and in that particular area, it's usually a first person, 0:08:50.916 --> 0:08:53.676 you know, looking directly at a camera, speaking about a 0:08:53.676 --> 0:08:57.556 personal experience they've had, recounting a narrative or an interesting story. 0:08:57.996 --> 0:08:59.956 So a lot of times with the anti vaccine movement, 0:08:59.996 --> 0:09:02.836 that's a person claiming that their child has autism and 0:09:03.036 --> 0:09:05.756 telling a story, you know, usually very sad story about 0:09:05.796 --> 0:09:09.356 their child's health, and so it is engaging. It is 0:09:09.436 --> 0:09:13.596 much more resonant versus seeing kind of infomercial about how 0:09:13.676 --> 0:09:16.956 vaccines don't cause autism because thousands and thousands and thousands 0:09:16.996 --> 0:09:18.796 of studies have said that they do not. I know 0:09:18.876 --> 0:09:21.516 that you were part of the Senate commission that looked 0:09:21.556 --> 0:09:24.796 through material that we knew that Facebook handed over to 0:09:24.836 --> 0:09:28.076 Congress which was originally created by the IRA, the Russian 0:09:28.436 --> 0:09:31.716 Internet Agency, in order to influence the US elections. When 0:09:31.716 --> 0:09:34.076 you looked over that material, did it seem to use 0:09:34.116 --> 0:09:36.596 those same tactics? Can you see a relationship between the 0:09:36.636 --> 0:09:40.116 way the Russian influence campaign worked and the anti vax campaigns? 0:09:40.276 --> 0:09:43.516 The Russian content was distinct, and that this was a 0:09:43.556 --> 0:09:46.556 foreign intelligent service of a foreign entity that was trying 0:09:46.556 --> 0:09:49.236 to pretend to be American. So it was far more 0:09:49.316 --> 0:09:53.556 duplicitous than anything that we've seen related to domestic activists 0:09:53.636 --> 0:09:56.036 pushing for a cause. Really, but what was happening there 0:09:56.156 --> 0:10:00.076 was again they were taking these extremely big topics things 0:10:00.116 --> 0:10:02.436 like who is America for? What does it mean to 0:10:02.436 --> 0:10:04.676 be an American? How do we feel about immigration? How 0:10:04.676 --> 0:10:06.436 do we feel about gay rights? How do we feel 0:10:06.436 --> 0:10:10.676 about police brutality? They were creating these pages, and each 0:10:10.716 --> 0:10:14.436 page was designed for a very particular type of person, 0:10:14.716 --> 0:10:17.236 So they were really creating these tribes, again relying on 0:10:17.276 --> 0:10:21.116 the sort of first person experience, first person concerns and fears, 0:10:21.436 --> 0:10:24.116 and putting out content that was again very much focused 0:10:24.156 --> 0:10:27.476 on achieving an emotional response. So for the black community, 0:10:27.516 --> 0:10:31.276 the content took the form of constant references to police 0:10:31.356 --> 0:10:34.796 violence mixed in with narratives of pride, and so it 0:10:34.836 --> 0:10:38.276 was really very much designed to evoke cultural pride and 0:10:38.316 --> 0:10:41.396 then also a sense of deep harm. And on the 0:10:41.996 --> 0:10:44.956 right leaning pages, it was really concerned about what America 0:10:45.076 --> 0:10:47.036 is and who it's for, and so a lot of 0:10:47.236 --> 0:10:51.236 photos of things like homeless veterans. This is a very 0:10:51.236 --> 0:10:52.876 real problem that we have in this country, and they 0:10:52.876 --> 0:10:55.796 were using the images of homeless veterans to say, why 0:10:55.836 --> 0:10:57.676 are we allowing in all of these outsiders when we 0:10:57.716 --> 0:10:59.836 can't take care of our own. This is how propaganda 0:10:59.916 --> 0:11:01.836 is most effective. It's when it has some degree of 0:11:01.876 --> 0:11:05.036 truth to it, and it spins it just enough that 0:11:05.156 --> 0:11:08.316 it doesn't necessarily trigger the part of the brain that says, hey, 0:11:08.316 --> 0:11:11.676 this is false. Instead it the person relies on the 0:11:11.716 --> 0:11:14.676 emotional reaction to it, and that's how they begin to 0:11:15.476 --> 0:11:18.276 develop a sustained relationship with the page and sustained engagement 0:11:18.276 --> 0:11:20.276 with that type of content. You know, as I'm listening 0:11:20.316 --> 0:11:23.116 to you, I'm wondering whether different kinds of propagandists they 0:11:23.196 --> 0:11:26.756 understand now that they need to tailor messages to particular audiences. 0:11:26.956 --> 0:11:28.956 Is it the case that some of the solutions to 0:11:29.036 --> 0:11:32.676 this they're also going to involve thinking differently about different 0:11:32.676 --> 0:11:35.996 audiences or offering different kinds of counter messaging or counter 0:11:36.036 --> 0:11:39.196 strategies to different audiences. Yeah. Absolutely, And this is something 0:11:39.236 --> 0:11:41.356 that you know. A third area I worked in was 0:11:41.476 --> 0:11:44.156 countering violent extremism. Briefly was Isis. The idea that we 0:11:44.156 --> 0:11:46.396 would kick Isis off the platforms was sort of a 0:11:46.476 --> 0:11:49.156 stretch at the time. There were a lot of people 0:11:49.196 --> 0:11:51.036 who were very concerned at the idea that we would 0:11:51.116 --> 0:11:53.756 delete terrorists accounts, and so a lot of the focus 0:11:53.756 --> 0:11:56.116 instead was on counter messaging. How do we reach these 0:11:56.116 --> 0:11:59.476 audiences that are receptive to ISIS propaganda and present counter 0:11:59.596 --> 0:12:02.436 narratives to them. Who is the authentic voice for the 0:12:02.436 --> 0:12:05.276 counter narrative. It's definitely not the United States State department, 0:12:05.676 --> 0:12:07.436 So who is it and what are the ways in 0:12:07.476 --> 0:12:10.236 which we can come together to think about ways to 0:12:10.676 --> 0:12:14.196 counter message to try to present people with it an alternate, 0:12:14.556 --> 0:12:17.876 also emotionally resonant narrative instead of just saying it's a 0:12:17.916 --> 0:12:19.876 bad idea to be a terrorist because you're going to 0:12:19.916 --> 0:12:21.636 go to jail or you're going to die. A lot 0:12:21.676 --> 0:12:24.836 of the tribal deep affinity ties is what is my 0:12:24.956 --> 0:12:27.156 place in society? This is something that comes up with 0:12:27.196 --> 0:12:30.996 conspiracy theorists also, they're looking for answers, they're looking for 0:12:31.036 --> 0:12:34.516 an explanation. What you get hooked into oftentimes is what 0:12:34.676 --> 0:12:37.716 is most visible to you, what's most prevalent in your 0:12:38.076 --> 0:12:41.036 space at that moment. Now that we're spending so much 0:12:41.036 --> 0:12:45.236 more of our time online, things like ad targeting and 0:12:45.876 --> 0:12:49.116 participation in Facebook groups where you're kind of declaring a 0:12:49.156 --> 0:12:53.276 particular alignment mean that bad actors who want to target 0:12:53.316 --> 0:12:55.836 you with certain types of propaganda can find you very easily. 0:12:56.276 --> 0:12:59.876 And can we reapply some of that thinking back, for example, 0:13:00.516 --> 0:13:03.476 to the anti vax problem. Can we think about counter 0:13:03.516 --> 0:13:06.116 messaging there? Can we think about how to reach people 0:13:06.796 --> 0:13:10.716 using counter emotional stories? Yes, absolutely, that is That's something 0:13:10.756 --> 0:13:13.716 that our groups like Voices for Vaccines are trying to 0:13:13.756 --> 0:13:15.916 work on that. The group that was formerly called every 0:13:15.956 --> 0:13:17.956 child by two, it now goes by vaccinate your family 0:13:18.036 --> 0:13:20.076 is trying to do that. We have to get out 0:13:20.076 --> 0:13:23.516 of statistics and get into storytelling. That's the one of 0:13:23.516 --> 0:13:27.196 the key takeaways of how the information ecosystem has evolved. 0:13:27.676 --> 0:13:29.716 If you look at even just from a design perspective, 0:13:29.756 --> 0:13:31.476 one of the things I always get at is the 0:13:31.916 --> 0:13:35.116 the subject of the narrative is interesting when you're thinking 0:13:35.156 --> 0:13:37.916 about how to counter message to a particular group of people. 0:13:38.076 --> 0:13:40.636 But when you think about this as a problem written large, 0:13:40.756 --> 0:13:42.956 a lot of it comes down to the algorithms and 0:13:42.956 --> 0:13:46.596 the design. And so memes in particular are getting more 0:13:46.636 --> 0:13:49.076 and more important in our lives. And that's because the 0:13:49.116 --> 0:13:52.996 design of the platform itself is privileging this large you know, 0:13:53.036 --> 0:13:55.676 this large square image or this piece of video, this 0:13:55.956 --> 0:13:59.236 short video clip. So what can you convey in the 0:14:00.076 --> 0:14:03.476 construct of that design. As people are scrolling by, they 0:14:03.516 --> 0:14:06.276 see your message in it immediately sticks. The fact that 0:14:06.356 --> 0:14:09.076 the algorithm will continue to serve up types of content 0:14:09.236 --> 0:14:11.636 that you've engaged within the past means that if you 0:14:11.676 --> 0:14:14.556 do engage with anti vaccine content, you're likely to see 0:14:14.596 --> 0:14:19.036 more of it. The challenge of algorithms that don't know 0:14:19.076 --> 0:14:21.436 what they're pushing because they have no actual awareness of 0:14:21.436 --> 0:14:24.276 what the underlying content is. So they treat something that's 0:14:24.276 --> 0:14:28.636 potentially radical, they treat something that's potentially blatantly false the 0:14:28.676 --> 0:14:31.316 exact same way that they would treat something that's accurate 0:14:31.436 --> 0:14:34.316 or uplifting. They don't actually know. They just know that 0:14:34.356 --> 0:14:37.636 this content drives engagement, and so they continue to show 0:14:37.676 --> 0:14:40.716 it to people. We see all this disinformation online. We 0:14:41.156 --> 0:14:42.876 you know, we hear about it. You know, we can 0:14:42.916 --> 0:14:45.956 sometimes see it in our Google searches. But doesn't really matter. 0:14:46.076 --> 0:14:48.716 I mean, for example, in the anti vax campaign, has 0:14:48.756 --> 0:14:50.836 this really affected anything, Does it make any difference? Or 0:14:51.036 --> 0:14:52.996 is this just stuff that exists somewhere in the ether 0:14:53.116 --> 0:14:55.396 and if we ignore it will go away. Let me 0:14:55.956 --> 0:14:57.836 give you two quick examples on that. First of all, 0:14:57.836 --> 0:15:00.556 with the anti vaccine movement, Yes, it absolutely has an impact. 0:15:00.676 --> 0:15:03.196 It really creates a lot of fear and hesitancy, and 0:15:03.276 --> 0:15:07.556 that translates very directly into vaccination rates declining in the 0:15:07.596 --> 0:15:10.236 communities that are that are seeing it. And so this 0:15:10.316 --> 0:15:13.276 is something that in California. The reason I started looking 0:15:13.316 --> 0:15:17.276 at it was because immunization rates in California communities had declined, 0:15:17.316 --> 0:15:19.116 and when I was trying to find a preschool for 0:15:19.236 --> 0:15:22.076 my son, I was actually looking at these rates, and 0:15:22.316 --> 0:15:25.676 there are certain schools in California with thirty percent immunization rates, 0:15:26.036 --> 0:15:29.716 which is terrifying. That's like South Sudan. The reason that 0:15:29.716 --> 0:15:31.756 we passed the lawn California was because we wound up 0:15:31.756 --> 0:15:34.876 with the Disneyland measles outbreak, where two hundred and something 0:15:34.876 --> 0:15:36.836 people got sick and I believe a quarter had to 0:15:36.836 --> 0:15:40.756 be hospitalized. So this was a very real outcome of 0:15:41.116 --> 0:15:45.316 that kind of misinformation becoming so pervasive to people, creating 0:15:45.316 --> 0:15:48.516 that very real fear and then leading to an outbreak 0:15:48.956 --> 0:15:50.796 in the case of Russia. Just because a lot of 0:15:50.796 --> 0:15:53.396 people think about this is just related to the election. No, 0:15:53.516 --> 0:15:55.476 what they were doing was they were also creating real 0:15:55.516 --> 0:15:59.316 world events. So they were sponsoring protests, and one of 0:15:59.356 --> 0:16:01.876 the things that they sponsored was an incident in Texas 0:16:01.956 --> 0:16:04.636 where they had two competing protests on the same day 0:16:04.676 --> 0:16:08.676 at the same time. So from Saint Petersburg, Troll created 0:16:08.676 --> 0:16:11.916 a Facebook event saying that people with Texas Pride had 0:16:11.916 --> 0:16:14.156 to come and protest outside of an Islamic center to 0:16:14.196 --> 0:16:17.756 defend their way of life. They also posted an event 0:16:18.116 --> 0:16:20.516 calling on members of the Islamic Center to come out 0:16:20.516 --> 0:16:24.156 and defend the Islamic faith. So they sponsored two protests 0:16:24.196 --> 0:16:26.196 on the same day at the same time, across the 0:16:26.236 --> 0:16:28.316 street from each other. And you can go on YouTube 0:16:28.356 --> 0:16:30.196 and you can see the video footage from that day 0:16:30.396 --> 0:16:34.276 of people showing up with kind of anti Islamic material 0:16:34.356 --> 0:16:35.836 on one side of the street and then people on 0:16:35.876 --> 0:16:37.596 the other side of the streets screaming back at them, 0:16:37.596 --> 0:16:41.396 and police getting involved in breaking up altercations. So this 0:16:41.476 --> 0:16:45.956 is an example of very real world tension erupting as 0:16:45.956 --> 0:16:49.196 a result of online disinformation. When you first started looking 0:16:49.236 --> 0:16:52.796 at this problem, did people believe it was a problem. 0:16:52.876 --> 0:16:55.756 Opinion polls all showed people were in favor of vaccinations. 0:16:56.116 --> 0:16:58.876 You saw something quite different online. How did you convince 0:16:58.916 --> 0:17:00.876 people that this was something they need to take seriously. 0:17:01.156 --> 0:17:04.796 In the California case in particular, I sent what I 0:17:04.876 --> 0:17:08.356 was seeing, you know, kind of quantifiable evidence to the 0:17:08.476 --> 0:17:12.316 legislators and said, I don't think that people are screaming 0:17:12.316 --> 0:17:15.356 at you online, they're threatening you online, You're seeing all 0:17:15.396 --> 0:17:18.036 of this anger and rage in the hashtags, I don't 0:17:18.156 --> 0:17:21.036 think that these are not your constituents, where it's pretty 0:17:21.076 --> 0:17:25.196 pretty clear that these are not all even Californians. So 0:17:25.436 --> 0:17:29.236 when you make your decision, I would lean into the 0:17:29.316 --> 0:17:31.956 polling numbers and the communications with your actual constituents. I 0:17:31.956 --> 0:17:34.236 don't think that we can treat the online conversation as 0:17:34.316 --> 0:17:38.476 representative of the reality of the population of California. So 0:17:38.556 --> 0:17:41.876 in that particular case, it was just really kind of 0:17:41.916 --> 0:17:45.156 appealing directly to the legislators with the evidence the challenges 0:17:45.276 --> 0:17:47.716 it really does bump up against things like freedom of 0:17:47.756 --> 0:17:49.996 expression right. So you have a right to have an 0:17:49.996 --> 0:17:52.636 anti vaccine opinion. Of course you have a right to 0:17:52.636 --> 0:17:56.156 put the content online. The challenge was at the time, 0:17:56.596 --> 0:18:00.796 the recommendation engine, the trending algorithm, the ways in which 0:18:01.356 --> 0:18:06.996 Twitter and Facebook were amplifying information was very different, far 0:18:07.036 --> 0:18:09.316 more primitive then than it is even now two and 0:18:09.356 --> 0:18:11.596 a half years later. After those of us who work 0:18:11.596 --> 0:18:13.676 on this challenge have kind of been constantly beating the 0:18:13.756 --> 0:18:17.396 drum with example after example of example of how this 0:18:17.516 --> 0:18:20.596 is manifesting in the real world. How do we preserve 0:18:20.676 --> 0:18:23.316 freedom of expression while at the same time recognizing that 0:18:23.916 --> 0:18:27.356 the platform is pushing this point of view at people 0:18:27.556 --> 0:18:30.116 people aren't even know me. In particular, I'm not going 0:18:30.116 --> 0:18:33.676 out there typing in anti vaccine search terms. The recommendation 0:18:33.716 --> 0:18:36.076 engine is just pushing it to me because it's seeing 0:18:36.076 --> 0:18:39.596 that I've expressed an interest in vaccines in general. As 0:18:39.676 --> 0:18:42.036 part of working on this law, I suppose there's also 0:18:42.076 --> 0:18:44.596 a question of Okay, you have a right to write something, 0:18:44.636 --> 0:18:47.756 but then do you have a right to artificially amplify 0:18:47.836 --> 0:18:52.156 it using bots and search engine optimization? So everyone has 0:18:52.156 --> 0:18:56.596 the right to freedom of expression online. The secondary piece 0:18:56.596 --> 0:18:58.156 of that, though, is do you have a right to 0:18:58.236 --> 0:19:02.876 free reach your right to algorithmic amplification. Nobody has that right. 0:19:02.996 --> 0:19:04.876 That is not part of the First Amendment, That is 0:19:04.916 --> 0:19:07.956 not part of our cultural experience of what it means 0:19:07.956 --> 0:19:10.116 to have a right to express, or you have never 0:19:10.196 --> 0:19:14.396 had the right to free mass dissemination as well. That's 0:19:14.436 --> 0:19:17.476 the piece where as people begin to talk about how 0:19:17.476 --> 0:19:19.596 the platform should think about these things. One of the 0:19:19.636 --> 0:19:22.796 ways that we can continue to maximize freedom of expression 0:19:23.236 --> 0:19:25.556 is to allow people to speak, but also for the 0:19:25.556 --> 0:19:29.876 algorithm to perhaps not begin to take that kind of 0:19:30.436 --> 0:19:37.676 sensationalist content and proactively broadcast it out to massive quantities 0:19:37.716 --> 0:19:41.596 of people because it checks the boxes of being sensational 0:19:41.636 --> 0:19:44.436 and emotional. And do you think that it's going to 0:19:44.476 --> 0:19:47.316 be enough to discuss this with the platforms, for people 0:19:47.356 --> 0:19:50.236 like you who have you, who are respected on these issues, 0:19:50.276 --> 0:19:52.796 to talk about it with people at Facebook and Google, 0:19:53.236 --> 0:19:54.836 or is this something that we're going to need to 0:19:54.876 --> 0:19:58.076 regulate or have Congress step in on. I don't think 0:19:58.076 --> 0:20:02.076 you can have Congress regulate what algorithms amplify. I think 0:20:02.076 --> 0:20:03.956 that that would probably be a little bit too close 0:20:04.076 --> 0:20:08.116 to Congress making decisions on speech. A lot of the 0:20:08.156 --> 0:20:12.716 dissemination that come about through inauthentic amplification through things like 0:20:12.756 --> 0:20:15.236 bots and stuff, can be addressed without even knowing what 0:20:15.276 --> 0:20:17.796 the narrative is actually about. So you're not looking for 0:20:17.996 --> 0:20:21.156 content related to a particular topic. You're looking for particular 0:20:21.236 --> 0:20:24.916 dissemination patterns. So you're looking at the authenticity of the accounts. 0:20:24.916 --> 0:20:28.236 Are these real accounts where they all created yesterday? Are 0:20:28.236 --> 0:20:31.556 they bots? Are they majority automated? Are they Twitter does 0:20:31.636 --> 0:20:34.116 have now a designation of something that considers a low 0:20:34.196 --> 0:20:38.476 quality account ways in which it surfaces top tweets, as 0:20:38.476 --> 0:20:42.316 opposed to just the straight up reverse chronological order where 0:20:42.356 --> 0:20:45.396 you see every single tweet about a particular hashtag, giving 0:20:45.436 --> 0:20:47.916 the user some control. So people who do want to 0:20:47.956 --> 0:20:50.756 go see that kind of fire hose of every single 0:20:51.116 --> 0:20:53.476 tweet coming through about a topic can go and do that. 0:20:53.636 --> 0:20:56.116 But the majority of people who just want to get 0:20:56.156 --> 0:20:59.356 the kind of quick takeaways are seeing more kind of 0:20:59.436 --> 0:21:02.716 higher caliber content. And that sounds like you do believe 0:21:02.836 --> 0:21:08.796 algorithms could eventually identify quality content that they could encompass 0:21:08.956 --> 0:21:13.556 a notion of better or more comprehensive or more fact based. 0:21:14.156 --> 0:21:17.276 Remember the olden days of the Internet where you had 0:21:17.276 --> 0:21:20.756 email spam, right, we did build classifiers, We did build 0:21:20.956 --> 0:21:24.876 tools to think about how to ensure that crap wasn't 0:21:24.876 --> 0:21:29.316 flooding people's inboxes, that there wasn't this mass cognitive load 0:21:29.436 --> 0:21:31.876 every time you opened your inbox of having to sift 0:21:31.916 --> 0:21:34.716 through all of the garbage to find the communications from 0:21:34.756 --> 0:21:37.196