Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio.
Speaker 1: Jury selection is scheduled to begin next Monday in the
Speaker 1: trial of the former Minneapolis police officer accused of killing
Speaker 1: George Floyd. At the same time, the Biden administration is
Speaker 1: backing a police reform bill in the House that would,
Speaker 1: among other things, banned show coles and no knock warrants.
Speaker 1: Its name the George Floyd Justice and Policing Act. Joining
Speaker 1: me is Jeffrey Fagan, a professor at Columbia Law School,
Speaker 1: tell us a little bit about the Act. Well, the
Speaker 1: Act is about several things UM. One in particular is
Speaker 1: racial profiling and UM. It specifies measures to eliminate racially policing,
Speaker 1: particularly racially racial profiling UM and sets forth the standard
Speaker 1: of UH disparate impact on particular populations minority populations UM
Speaker 1: as the measure of looking in to see whether jurisdiction
Speaker 1: is violating the prohibition on profiling UM. I think, though,
Speaker 1: the most important things to me are the police misconduct
Speaker 1: measures UM. Profiling is a form of misconduct with the
Speaker 1: but the measures to try and UM identify officers who
Speaker 1: are repeat offenders. With respect to who misconduct or excessive
Speaker 1: force or perhaps lethal force, the creation of a registry
Speaker 1: to monitor misconduct across the country, the de certification procedures,
Speaker 1: which I think are extremely important to stop officers from
Speaker 1: pinging around from one department to the other after they
Speaker 1: get in trouble. Um data collections really is built in,
Speaker 1: and it's quite important. We have very little in the
Speaker 1: way of national data on the kinds of issues that
Speaker 1: are the target of the George Floyd Act again, excessive force,
Speaker 1: racial profiling, repeat this conduct, and z on. So I
Speaker 1: think it's a very wide ranging act. I think it
Speaker 1: at least at the federal level, it should have some impacts.
Speaker 1: Now most of the issues that that they try and
Speaker 1: get at are actually state in the city level issues
Speaker 1: are local municipalities. So um, at the very least, it
Speaker 1: sets this this lights of path I think for a
Speaker 1: fairly uniform response across the US with respect to improving
Speaker 1: policing and reducing UH policing equities and the police misconduct
Speaker 1: and ensure your accountability of police to both citizens into
Speaker 1: their local governments. How does the Act handle racial profiling?
Speaker 1: Because isn't sometimes racial profiling something that goes on in
Speaker 1: the officer's head well, you know, it's at the individual level.
Speaker 1: It's you could say that, yeah, it doesn't go on
Speaker 1: in the officer's head. He could perceive where she could
Speaker 1: perceive that a particularly individual is dangerous or up to
Speaker 1: some kind of criminal activity. That's based on perception, and
Speaker 1: those perceptions can be biased, and I think that's one
Speaker 1: of the issues that they try and get at UM.
Speaker 1: I think though, when you think about UM, the way
Speaker 1: the language is set forth in UM Section three one
Speaker 1: two of the Act, they talk about really a pattern,
Speaker 1: and they talk about activities of law enforcement agents and
Speaker 1: a jurisdiction that have had a disparate impact on individuals
Speaker 1: with a particular characteristic, and the characteristic is a racial
Speaker 1: razor gender, but particularly recent ethnicity. So implicitly they're arguing
Speaker 1: for a pattern and practice model, which means some kind
Speaker 1: of statistical analysis overall of the actions of police officers
Speaker 1: with respect to the citizens. Now I've done that. I
Speaker 1: was participately in the David Floyd trial in New York
Speaker 1: on stopping frisk um, and I've been involved in other
Speaker 1: UM racial selective we call selective enforcement cases. And it's
Speaker 1: hard to prove. There's two issues here. One is disparate impact,
Speaker 1: which is a different standard than for example, selective enforcement
Speaker 1: or disparate treatment. And I think there'll be a little
Speaker 1: bit of m conscientiousness in when there are efforts to
Speaker 1: prove disparate impact. It's proven to be in the empirical
Speaker 1: literature by police scholars to be kind of hard to
Speaker 1: pin down. It's one of those things where I think
Speaker 1: everybody knows it's there, but to to say it and
Speaker 1: to find that race UH, net of all other factors
Speaker 1: is driving the patterns that are observed, that's tricky. We
Speaker 1: all may be may sense it. It may be the
Speaker 1: only logical explanation. I think that was one of the
Speaker 1: conclusions we reached in New York. Apart from the statistical conclusion.
Speaker 1: We said, well, if it's not race, what else could
Speaker 1: it be? And I think that the access to the
Speaker 1: standard that UH will lead to some contentious um fights
Speaker 1: once we get to litigation and allegations of violation to
Speaker 1: the Act. Having said all that, I think that the
Speaker 1: acts of a baseline that would lead to I think
Speaker 1: rigorous and and and sweeping empirical research to show and
Speaker 1: identify the patterns and local jurisdictions as well as across
Speaker 1: the federal agencies mentioned sort of tracking police officers to
Speaker 1: see if they repeat conduct. I don't think they they
Speaker 1: I don't think they Act specifies tracking particular officers. I
Speaker 1: think the Act specifies recording incidents of misconduct by officers,
Speaker 1: and then jurisdictions can identify within the data which officers
Speaker 1: are engaging in misconduct repeatedly and which officers may only
Speaker 1: be doing it incidentally, and then ideally the data collection system,
Speaker 1: the archive, would be able to look at the responses
Speaker 1: to those by particular departments to see if they're being
Speaker 1: held accountable. I don't think it's a system to register
Speaker 1: all police and follow their their uh their behavior over
Speaker 1: time and record their misconduct. I think it's an incident
Speaker 1: based system to look at particular incidents to see if
Speaker 1: there are patterns in there. So my question is don't
Speaker 1: police departments across the country already keep track of those officers.
Speaker 1: It's wildly uneven um and for for several reasons. One
Speaker 1: is just simply the preference of the police departments to
Speaker 1: invest their resources in keeping track of officer misconduct to
Speaker 1: a lot of misconduct depends on reporting by civilians to
Speaker 1: either directly that the police are to a civilian oversight board,
Speaker 1: and um uh, some civilians may not want to report.
Speaker 1: I think there's a legitimate fear of retaliation by police
Speaker 1: officers if somebody reports an officer for having engaged in
Speaker 1: excessive forests or or abusive language, or false arrested and
Speaker 1: things like that. So, um, there's a good interesting example
Speaker 1: in Chicago. The police department in Chicago does receive complaints.
Speaker 1: They record a fairly large volume of complaints. But there's
Speaker 1: also a private organization called the Invisible Institute, and they
Speaker 1: received complaints as well. And the private organization Invisible Institute,
Speaker 1: they received nearly twice as many complaints by civilians about
Speaker 1: misconduct by the Chicago Police as do the Chicago Police.
Speaker 1: So I think that tells us something about the sensitivity
Speaker 1: of these archives to willingness of citizens to report to
Speaker 1: an agency that they may have some distrust towards. When
Speaker 1: you look at news articles on this act, the first
Speaker 1: thing you see is that it bans all chokeholds. Are
Speaker 1: there still police stations around the country where choke holds
Speaker 1: are allowed. There's a few they allow chokeholds under particular
Speaker 1: circumstances what they call exiting circumstances, but for the most
Speaker 1: part they're banned. Now the bands um are of question
Speaker 1: will affectiveness and UM. If an officer violated the ban
Speaker 1: in a particular department, whether that officer is sanctioned for
Speaker 1: violating the band depends very much on the discipline systems
Speaker 1: in place in that department, and often the departments will
Speaker 1: look at the particular circumstances in which the officer used
Speaker 1: the chokehold and decide, well, perhaps that officer really didn't
Speaker 1: have a choice. Now, that's hard to prove one more
Speaker 1: or the other, um, but in general I think officers
Speaker 1: do have a choice. There are many ways to simping
Speaker 1: with aspect other than risking their life by cutting off
Speaker 1: their oxygen supply. So um, it's it's a The ban
Speaker 1: is is well stated. I think it has strong expressive
Speaker 1: value to condemn a particular police tactic. Um. Its enforceability
Speaker 1: will vary from place to place, depending on the the
Speaker 1: urgency that police leadership feels towards this and their willingness
Speaker 1: to make their officers angry by curtailing their activities. So
Speaker 1: there's again, many of these provisions are complicated by the
Speaker 1: realities of policing, but they're all pointing in the right
Speaker 1: direction to increase accountability. Does the Act just stop all
Speaker 1: no knock warrants? I believe the intent is to ban
Speaker 1: all no knock warrants. Are there certain instances where no
Speaker 1: knock warrant is needed? You know, it's an interesting question,
Speaker 1: and I think, well, let's put it this way. It
Speaker 1: does band no knock warrants. I would guess that that
Speaker 1: somewhere uh north of se perhaps closer to eight of
Speaker 1: warrants can be served without a no knock provision. Um,
Speaker 1: it's possible that it could be as high as as
Speaker 1: as ninety five or ninety eight or UM. We don't
Speaker 1: have enough research on this question to answer um your
Speaker 1: question and the criticisms of police that you do need
Speaker 1: to keep that possibility. And again it's one of the
Speaker 1: things that that has strong expressive value. But UM, I
Speaker 1: think we need This is an area where we really
Speaker 1: need some research to say to say just how far
Speaker 1: should the band go so qualified immunity just explain what
Speaker 1: qualified immunity is and what this bill would provide. According
Speaker 1: to the Act, very little of it will survive as
Speaker 1: any qualified immunity essentially is UM relieves officers of liability
Speaker 1: for having engaged in um misconduct as simple as that,
Speaker 1: if they engage in excessive force, if they engage in
Speaker 1: false arrest, if they engage in some kind of racial
Speaker 1: profiling for example, that leads to some harm when an
Speaker 1: officer is found, When an officer is found who have
Speaker 1: violated the law, whether civil or criminal, they are quality
Speaker 1: the qualified and meanoring and provisions reliefs of any responsibility
Speaker 1: for the acts that they took, that they engaged in,
Speaker 1: and that includes relief of monetary damages and in some
Speaker 1: instances relief from criminal prosecution. So this would eliminate qualified immunity,
Speaker 1: that's right, It would hold officers feet to the fire.
Speaker 1: This is a federal federal bill, so I mean, how
Speaker 1: much of this will be enforceable at the state level. Well,
Speaker 1: this is an interesting question because some states have their
Speaker 1: own statutes and qualified immunity and there didn't UM. Not surprisingly,
Speaker 1: a number of court cases on qualified immunity in the
Speaker 1: last couple of years, and there's a very very strong,
Speaker 1: well thought out appellate court opinions on this with respect
Speaker 1: to the actions of individual officers. But but there most
Speaker 1: of those cases involve allegations of violations of federal law.
Speaker 1: If there's a case which involves violation of state law,
Speaker 1: that's going to lead to a different um possibly different
Speaker 1: uh standard in the courts to determine where they're qualified
Speaker 1: immunity applies. It depends on how the state statutes wriated.
Speaker 1: But there is federal case law that that's that sustains
Speaker 1: qualified immunity depending on the depending on the statute in
Speaker 1: the circumstances. To give an example, you know, we don't
Speaker 1: we don't really know the parameter that the courts haven't
Speaker 1: really settled on the parameters of it. There was just
Speaker 1: a case in um I believe was in Texas of
Speaker 1: a negligent correctional officer who allowed a person to suffer
Speaker 1: illness um and um some beatings at the hands of
Speaker 1: garden inmates um in well confined, and the courts, the
Speaker 1: lower courts there's um found um the officer gave the
Speaker 1: officer to qualified immunity for any damages. The appellate court
Speaker 1: didn't and um uh they were going to They essentially
Speaker 1: they said there are limits to qualified immunity. And it
Speaker 1: was an interesting opinion in the courts, but it did
Speaker 1: say that you know, there are boundaries on it. The
Speaker 1: boundaries are a little bit porous, and the boundaries are
Speaker 1: really hard to see as a clear um categorical line,
Speaker 1: but there are boundaries on it. But for the most part,
Speaker 1: I think this is going to make it much more
Speaker 1: difficult for officers to claim qualified immunity for the courts
Speaker 1: they granted to them and as far as the rest
Speaker 1: of the act. So if it passes, it would be
Speaker 1: against federal law to let's say, use a choke cold,
Speaker 1: so the officer would have to be charged in the
Speaker 1: federal court. That would put the federal government in in
Speaker 1: the position of doing a lot of policing of the police.
Speaker 1: Well I do would now, I mean the Department of
Speaker 1: Justice has mechanisms by which they can order police departments, um,
Speaker 1: following a civil rights investigation to undertake particular activities to
Speaker 1: remedy acts of civil rights violations. Music call consent degrees.
Speaker 1: In there, they were dormant for the most part unto
Speaker 1: the Trunk administration. They were fairly common um under the
Speaker 1: Obama administration. Um less so under the Bush administration, but
Speaker 1: but probably more so than any other administration during the
Speaker 1: Obama years. And I'm quite sure that given the nominees
Speaker 1: for UM Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, this this
Speaker 1: activity will be revived. So I think there is a
Speaker 1: mechanism that is going to be reinvigorated, strengthened in the
Speaker 1: Justice Department to pursue these kinds of investigations. So, yes,
Speaker 1: there is some elements, there's some aspects of of federal
Speaker 1: oversecon police departments, and they will be I think expanded
Speaker 1: somewhat under these They would be expanded with or without
Speaker 1: the George Floyd Act, make me clear about that. But
Speaker 1: the George Flight Act gives kind of a foundation and
Speaker 1: a sort of a normative or political political rationale to
Speaker 1: more aggressively overseeing the police activity. A version of the
Speaker 1: bill passed the House last year along partisan lines, but
Speaker 1: it went nowhere in the Senate, which was then controlled
Speaker 1: by Republicans. What do you think it's chances are in
Speaker 1: the Senate this time around. Well, I think we can
Speaker 1: probably count noses in this case, and I my guess
Speaker 1: is that for the most part, there may be some
Speaker 1: tinkering with the act in the Senate version of the Act,
Speaker 1: and that tinkering would be around the margins of police accountability,
Speaker 1: and it might lead to some concessions by some Democratic senators.
Speaker 1: I can imagine Senator Mansion, for example, coming from a
Speaker 1: more conservative state, perhaps Senator Cinema from from Arizona me
Speaker 1: from a more conservative state, having a few qualms about
Speaker 1: certain provisions of the bill. So there might be some
Speaker 1: figuring around the markets. But I think the main thrust
Speaker 1: of the legislation will pass. Now that's a prediction, and
Speaker 1: I'm very bad. I'm a very bad gambler. We appreciate
Speaker 1: the prediction anyway, Thanks so much for being on the show.
Speaker 1: That's Professor Jeffrey Fagan of Columbia Law School. A federal
Speaker 1: judge in Texas extended in order blocking President Joe Biden's
Speaker 1: plan to hall deportations of undocumented immigrants for one hundred days.
Speaker 1: Federal Judge Drew Tipton, a Trump appointee, granted Texas's motion
Speaker 1: for an injunction blocking the plan freeze on removals until
Speaker 1: the case is resolved, which could take months or even years.
Speaker 1: Joining me is Leon Fresco, a partner at Hollandon Knight.
Speaker 1: Leon the judge road a one five page order. What
Speaker 1: was his reasoning here? Well, in the end, what this
Speaker 1: judge was saying, is that, just like other programmatic changes
Speaker 1: that have occurred that have been enjoyed by the courts,
Speaker 1: that here this memo that was then by the Biden
Speaker 1: administration that was specifically instructing I not to engage in
Speaker 1: certain removal operations in order to remove people from the
Speaker 1: United States was a programmatic change that needed to occur
Speaker 1: to the notice and comment process, and so violated the
Speaker 1: I and A. And also that it violated different agreements
Speaker 1: that have been in place with different states about how
Speaker 1: the enforcement of immigration law could occur, and also violated
Speaker 1: the requirements that the president actually enforced the laws. And
Speaker 1: so with all of those results, the court enjoined this memorandum,
Speaker 1: which actually has some cookie results, but in the end
Speaker 1: just says that this memorandum itself can actually be enforced.
Speaker 1: So not going through the comment procedures is something that
Speaker 1: was often used against the Trump administration. So is this
Speaker 1: judge using the same kind of reasoning here? The doctor
Speaker 1: in itself upon which the decision was based upon is
Speaker 1: the typical doctor that you would use to overturn one
Speaker 1: of these prigot edge of the memorandum. The key here, however,
Speaker 1: is that in the end, this is a memorandum about
Speaker 1: how the president is going to enforce immigration law. And
Speaker 1: so even if this particular memo is stricken, it doesn't
Speaker 1: really change the fact that on a case by case basis,
Speaker 1: ICE can't be forced to deport specific people. There's no
Speaker 1: lawsuits that anybody is going to be able to file.
Speaker 1: It's going to say you must import every single person
Speaker 1: you encounter. That's the president's discretion. That's literally in the
Speaker 1: statutes that nobody can do to take away that discretion.
Speaker 1: And so all this does is just eliminate the memo
Speaker 1: as a basis for governing how this ICE discretionary process works,
Speaker 1: which is why the Biden administrations of siquickly issued another
Speaker 1: memo had said if you're going to engage in operations
Speaker 1: against people other than serious criminals, you have to get
Speaker 1: many layers of approval, which basically procedurally accomplishes the same
Speaker 1: objective as saying don't remove people. The Texas A g
Speaker 1: was tweeting victory, etcetera. So the victory maybe the legal victory,
Speaker 1: but on the ground it doesn't make that much difference. Correct,
Speaker 1: It's a victory in paper only, but not in substance.
Speaker 1: Because the paper itself, the memo itself is gone, so
Speaker 1: that no one can site to that memo as a
Speaker 1: basis for why a removal shouldn't occur. But if an
Speaker 1: ICE agent has to go through many layers of review
Speaker 1: in order to engage in an ICE operation, what will
Speaker 1: inevitably occur is that those context that the memo does
Speaker 1: permit or doesn't permit for removal will be inculcated in
Speaker 1: the agency such that whatever somebody tries to go through
Speaker 1: those layers of review, they will be told this is
Speaker 1: not an acceptable operation for a removal and that goal
Speaker 1: will have been accomplished in the same manner. So that
Speaker 1: may be the reason why the Biden administration hasn't said
Speaker 1: that they're going to appeal this decision to the Fifth Circuit.
Speaker 1: Right in the end, it's really much to do about nothing,
Speaker 1: because if you are organizing a prosecutorial discretion regime, that
Speaker 1: regime can be done without needing a memo like this.
Speaker 1: The point of what memo was because on day one
Speaker 1: of the Biden administration, you needed a very broad memo
Speaker 1: like that which essentially said don't support anyone because there
Speaker 1: was no one there at these agencies. Yet he inculcate
Speaker 1: the officers about what the new enforcement priorities were. Now,
Speaker 1: people are slowly being installed. Alle Majorchis has been confirmed
Speaker 1: as the DHS secretary. There are political appointments that are
Speaker 1: moving into these agencies that do not require cetic conformation,
Speaker 1: and those individuals can begin to say to the people,
Speaker 1: and I here are our priorities, and so you should
Speaker 1: not approve a removal as this or this or this,
Speaker 1: and that doesn't need a memo that says don't enforce
Speaker 1: the immigration law, which was sort of the day one
Speaker 1: memo just to stop any removals that were imminent at
Speaker 1: that time. And the judges opinion didn't touch on the
Speaker 1: agreement that the Trump administration made with Texas and some
Speaker 1: other states. Well, in the end, the agreements were not
Speaker 1: necessary to invalidate this decision because what was ultimately necessary
Speaker 1: was just this issue that this was a programmatic change
Speaker 1: that needed to go through the formal rulemaking process, that
Speaker 1: it was going to be implemented. And they don't in
Speaker 1: the end half standings to say that the federal government
Speaker 1: should deport at person that just is not a thing
Speaker 1: in the US law. And so from that perspective, that
Speaker 1: wasn't something that was going to be able to survive
Speaker 1: the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court review. And so that's
Speaker 1: why I think you don't see the imphasis there. Lean
Speaker 1: you said that the judge's action will have some cookie results.
Speaker 1: Tell us about them. There results in some very unique consequences,
Speaker 1: which is just that this memo itself can't be imforced.
Speaker 1: So you can't say to people, don't deport anyone they
Speaker 1: on the basis of this memo. But there's nothing about
Speaker 1: this case being victorious for the State of Texas that
Speaker 1: is likely to lead to even a single additional person
Speaker 1: being removed or maintained, because the processes that the agency
Speaker 1: has put in place now have made it clear that
Speaker 1: here are the kinds of approval you need in order
Speaker 1: to begin a removal action or to finalize the removal action,
Speaker 1: and when those approve sources are procured, you're not going
Speaker 1: to get that approval unless it's a serious criminal or
Speaker 1: national security case. Let's turn to what's happening now. Because
Speaker 1: there are ports that there have been thousands of unaccompanied
Speaker 1: miners coming through the border. Border patrol agents are apprehending
Speaker 1: an average of more than two hundred children crossing the
Speaker 1: border without a parent every day, but nearly all beds
Speaker 1: for immigrant children maintained by the Department of Health and
Speaker 1: Human Services are full. So what's happening at the border.
Speaker 1: So there are multiple issues that are happening at the
Speaker 1: southern border. One is with regard to asylum speakers, and
Speaker 1: one is with regard to unaccompanied children. So for unaccompanied children,
Speaker 1: the Trump administration, at the final days of the Trump
Speaker 1: administration have actually won a decision that said that what's
Speaker 1: called Title forty two of the Code, which is the
Speaker 1: code having to do with the CDC and disease exclusion,
Speaker 1: permitted the Trump administration to exclude young people on a
Speaker 1: companied miners from the United States because of COVID and
Speaker 1: the COVID crisis. The Biden administration decided that it would
Speaker 1: not use this COVID authority to exclude on a company
Speaker 1: miners and would instead process on accompany miners the way
Speaker 1: they had traditionally been processed under the Flora Settlement Agreement,
Speaker 1: which is that an unaccompanied minor gets to come into
Speaker 1: the United States and make a claim for either asylum
Speaker 1: relief or trafficking relief or what is called special immigrants
Speaker 1: juvenile static. The complication is that when on a company
Speaker 1: miner comes into the United States, they need to be
Speaker 1: housed in a shelter that is run by the Office
Speaker 1: of Refugee Resettlement until the Office of Refugee Resettlement can
Speaker 1: determine that the adult that something to pick up that
Speaker 1: minor isn't some human trafficker or smuggler or terrible individual,
Speaker 1: but it is instead a committed scare stags. And so
Speaker 1: the facilities that are usually over expended for this purpose
Speaker 1: here not only are overexpended, but haves to be out
Speaker 1: about capacity due to the COVID prices. And so this
Speaker 1: is why you're seeing all of these new facilities opening up,
Speaker 1: including this one in Carrizo Springs, Texas, is because they're
Speaker 1: gonna need to be increased capacity if the unaccompanied miners
Speaker 1: are actually going to be allowed into the United States
Speaker 1: as opposed to be excluded using the CDC COVID Exclusion Authority.
Speaker 1: So are more people coming in since since Biden has
Speaker 1: been president, So the numbers are on an uptick. They're
Speaker 1: not yet at the crisis levels that we've seen in
Speaker 1: the past, but there is some concerns that the Department
Speaker 1: of home brand security of citing that those numbers by
Speaker 1: May or June could get up to those levels. And
Speaker 1: the question is, if they get up to those levels,
Speaker 1: will the Biden administration change course and use this title
Speaker 1: forty to afford ready again to exclude people from the
Speaker 1: United States. That's going to be very interesting to see.
Speaker 1: And the other change that was made was ending what
Speaker 1: is known as the Remain in Mexico or the Migrant
Speaker 1: Protection Protocol program, which was a program that required anybody
Speaker 1: seeking asylum too entertain their claims from Mexico and not
Speaker 1: from inside the United States. The Biden administration has said
Speaker 1: that people, not new people, but people who were previously
Speaker 1: waiting in line, can come in on a controlled basis
Speaker 1: of a few hundred people per day to come in
Speaker 1: and make their claims from inside the United States. And
Speaker 1: so the worry is that if enough people misinterpret that action,
Speaker 1: meaning they think it does apply to the people or
Speaker 1: it will apply to new people, that more people will
Speaker 1: try to come in through the border. Are people coming
Speaker 1: in now? Are they going through an immigration hearing and
Speaker 1: then released until what you know used to be called
Speaker 1: catch and release and then released until a court day.
Speaker 1: How is it being done. Well. What's happening is the
Speaker 1: queue that had been created for this migration Protection Protocol
Speaker 1: of several thousand individuals waiting for hearings inside of Mexico
Speaker 1: instead of inside the United States. They're going through that
Speaker 1: queue and they're assessing who has serious, legitimate claims, and
Speaker 1: a few hundreds of those individuals are being led into
Speaker 1: the United States. They're being quarantined for a specific period
Speaker 1: of time and facility that are being implemented for this quarantine,
Speaker 1: and then yes, they are being released into the United
Speaker 1: States to make their claim. And so this is why
Speaker 1: you see the protestations from former President Trump about this,
Speaker 1: because he did not want them to occur. And the
Speaker 1: Biden administration said, but the humanitarian nightmare that was happening
Speaker 1: on the Mexican border cannot be justified under asylum law principles.
Speaker 1: And so this is why this needed to be accomplished.
Speaker 1: And so you just have two completely different philosophies on
Speaker 1: this issue of processing a sylum speakers on the border.
Speaker 1: The immigration bill that's been proposed in the House is
Speaker 1: that Biden's immigration bill. Does that have what Biden wants
Speaker 1: in it? Correct? That was the bill that by then
Speaker 1: actually wrote with the administration and consultation with Senator Menendez
Speaker 1: and and congress Women Linda Fanja in the Senator in
Speaker 1: the House, respectively, and that bill is what I would say.
Speaker 1: There are two parts to the usual comprehensive bill. There's
Speaker 1: the bill that fixes the legal immigration system and provides
Speaker 1: benefits for people here without status, and that's usually coupled
Speaker 1: with significant increases in enforcement to prevent future waves of
Speaker 1: illegal immigration. And so this package only has the first
Speaker 1: part of it. It doesn't have the second part of it.
Speaker 1: Because the idea is, well, if Republicans want to negotiate,
Speaker 1: then they can. They can say what they want the
Speaker 1: second part of this bill to be, but that strategically
Speaker 1: wouldn't make sense for Democrats to insert whatever language they
Speaker 1: think is good on it, for given that whatever they
Speaker 1: do may not be deemed acceptable to Republicans anyway. So
Speaker 1: the idea is, you get what the Democrats want in
Speaker 1: the bill out there, and you see if there are
Speaker 1: Republicans who are willing to engage and say I will
Speaker 1: accept this and you give me these changes. The focus
Speaker 1: has been on the dreamers, what's their path under this
Speaker 1: immigration bill? Well, I think you'll see in the middle
Speaker 1: of mark the House vote on a number of provisions.
Speaker 1: They'll see if they can vote on this bigger bill,
Speaker 1: but the laws of vote on a bill for Dreamers,
Speaker 1: on a bill for people who have been here for
Speaker 1: decades with temporary prospective status to give them lawful permanent residents,
Speaker 1: and a bill to help farm workers who have been
Speaker 1: here for several years with our documented status to give
Speaker 1: them legal status as well. And then that will shift
Speaker 1: over to that is going to lead a process to
Speaker 1: determine are their ten Republicans who will agree to any
Speaker 1: immigration changes for anybody for any reason. And that's gonna
Speaker 1: be where the action really is is what can you
Speaker 1: get Republican senators to vote for an immigration if there's anything.
Speaker 1: Trump had several immigration cases before the court. Have all
Speaker 1: those cases been taken off the track by Biden's administration
Speaker 1: or not? Yes, Almost the vast majority of those cases
Speaker 1: have either been staved or have been dismissed, such as
Speaker 1: the border wall case and the public charge case, because
Speaker 1: those cases are you know, the Trump of the Biden
Speaker 1: administration is saying they're taking a different direction than the
Speaker 1: one that the people in the lawsuit were suing about.
Speaker 1: For that, there would be no need for the Supreme
Speaker 1: Courts to come in. There is one case of very
Speaker 1: interesting about whether people on temporary protective status can actually
Speaker 1: get green cards, where it looks like that case will
Speaker 1: go forward and the Biden administrator may adopt these same
Speaker 1: decision that the Trump administrations have adopted that people on
Speaker 1: semporary protective status shouldn't be able to get green cards.
Speaker 1: But we'll wait and we'll see on that one. Thanks
Speaker 1: for being on the show. Leon, that's Leon Fresco, a
Speaker 1: partner at Hollanden Night And that's it for the edition
Speaker 1: of the Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get
Speaker 1: the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Lawn podcast. You
Speaker 1: can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or at www
Speaker 1: dot bloomberg dot com slash podcast Slash Law. I'm Judent Grosso.
Speaker 1: Thanks so much for listening, and please tune into The
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm Eastern right
Speaker 1: here on Bloomberg Radio.