1 00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:07,280 Speaker 1: It's the big take from Bloomberg News and I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:07,600 --> 00:00:12,160 Speaker 1: I'm West Cosova today. Who should Ticketmaster be more afraid 3 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: of thousands of angry Taylor Swift fans or the US government? 4 00:00:26,000 --> 00:00:29,040 Speaker 1: A group of Taylor Swift fans is suing Ticketmaster, the 5 00:00:29,040 --> 00:00:32,760 Speaker 1: big live events ticket provider. They say the company kept 6 00:00:32,800 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 1: them from buying tickets to the pop Stars concerts for 7 00:00:35,840 --> 00:00:40,519 Speaker 1: her Eras tour, while allowing computerized bots and scalpers to 8 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:44,199 Speaker 1: snap them up instead. The botched ticket sale provoked the 9 00:00:44,240 --> 00:00:48,000 Speaker 1: fury of swift ease all over the US. It's also 10 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 1: drawn the attention of the US Justice Department. The government 11 00:00:52,120 --> 00:00:56,280 Speaker 1: is now investigating whether Ticketmaster uses its dominance and ticket 12 00:00:56,320 --> 00:01:01,279 Speaker 1: sales to drive out competitors and drive up prices. And 13 00:01:01,360 --> 00:01:03,960 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster isn't the only big company in the government sites. 14 00:01:04,280 --> 00:01:07,640 Speaker 1: The Biden administration has taken an activist stand against the 15 00:01:07,680 --> 00:01:13,800 Speaker 1: consolidation of corporate power among tech companies, manufacturers, even book publishers. 16 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:17,040 Speaker 1: To sort all this out, I'm joined by Sarah Ford 17 00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:20,759 Speaker 1: and she leads Bloomberg's coverage of corporate influence in Washington 18 00:01:21,200 --> 00:01:25,119 Speaker 1: and reporter Leah Niland. She's also in Washington and writes 19 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:31,520 Speaker 1: about anti trust Sarah Fordon and Lea and Island. Thanks 20 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:33,680 Speaker 1: so much for being here, Thanks for having us. So 21 00:01:33,720 --> 00:01:37,440 Speaker 1: once again we're hearing about Ticketmaster. Um, in all my 22 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:41,000 Speaker 1: years of buying tickets, I have never met anyone who said, oh, 23 00:01:41,000 --> 00:01:43,200 Speaker 1: I'm so glad I got to buy that ticket. Ticketmaster. 24 00:01:43,360 --> 00:01:46,720 Speaker 1: They seemed to be the company everybody forever has loved 25 00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:49,720 Speaker 1: to complain about, and recently they've once again been in 26 00:01:49,720 --> 00:01:52,480 Speaker 1: the news involving like the biggest star of all time, 27 00:01:52,600 --> 00:01:55,040 Speaker 1: Taylor Swift. Leah, can you just remind us exactly what 28 00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:57,920 Speaker 1: got them in the hot water this time? So ticket 29 00:01:57,960 --> 00:02:02,600 Speaker 1: Master was doing the pre sale for Taylor Swift's new tour. 30 00:02:02,880 --> 00:02:05,040 Speaker 1: You know, this is on her new album which just 31 00:02:05,120 --> 00:02:07,080 Speaker 1: came out, which is at the top of the charts. 32 00:02:07,120 --> 00:02:10,280 Speaker 1: Everyone was super excited, you know, post pandemic, this is 33 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:14,040 Speaker 1: going to be a huge tour, and Ticketmaster completely botched 34 00:02:14,200 --> 00:02:17,320 Speaker 1: the sale. The real problem for Teller Swift fans today, 35 00:02:17,560 --> 00:02:21,200 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster has canceled sales to the general public for the 36 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:25,079 Speaker 1: pop stars upcoming concert tour after pre sale tickets were 37 00:02:25,120 --> 00:02:29,960 Speaker 1: in such high demand. Tuesday, a crash this site. They 38 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:33,239 Speaker 1: were using this program that they have called the Ticketmaster 39 00:02:33,400 --> 00:02:36,400 Speaker 1: Verified Fan program that means you had to be a person. 40 00:02:36,440 --> 00:02:38,440 Speaker 1: They were trying to get rid of bots, so they 41 00:02:38,440 --> 00:02:41,760 Speaker 1: sent out these pre sale codes for people to get tickets, 42 00:02:42,000 --> 00:02:43,880 Speaker 1: these kind of robots that go in and steal all 43 00:02:43,919 --> 00:02:46,680 Speaker 1: the tickets before actual humans can dial fast enough. Yeah, 44 00:02:46,840 --> 00:02:49,080 Speaker 1: people set up computer programs that go and buy all 45 00:02:49,120 --> 00:02:50,960 Speaker 1: of the tickets so then they can resell them for 46 00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:53,440 Speaker 1: even more money. But to try and get around that, 47 00:02:53,560 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster had this pre sale code, but it completely didn't work. 48 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:00,360 Speaker 1: People were waiting in line for hours and hours and 49 00:03:00,400 --> 00:03:03,440 Speaker 1: hours before it even asked them for their pre sale code, 50 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:06,480 Speaker 1: and lots of people could never get through to get tickets, 51 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:10,639 Speaker 1: so thousands of fans were really frustrated. They ended up 52 00:03:10,680 --> 00:03:12,799 Speaker 1: selling out all of the tickets before it even open 53 00:03:12,880 --> 00:03:14,480 Speaker 1: to the public, So if you weren't part of this 54 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:17,960 Speaker 1: pre sale process, you had no luck getting a ticket whatsoever. 55 00:03:18,440 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 1: And it's not even clear that they were able to 56 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: actually stop bots because now there are tons of tickets 57 00:03:22,480 --> 00:03:25,840 Speaker 1: for resale for like absurd prices like dollars a ticket. 58 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:29,960 Speaker 1: So this caused all sorts of tunnel, lots of unhappy fans, 59 00:03:30,160 --> 00:03:35,120 Speaker 1: and prompts recalls from Washington to investigate Ticketmaster for being 60 00:03:35,160 --> 00:03:38,320 Speaker 1: in a monopoly, for cornering the market on tickets where 61 00:03:38,360 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 1: if you can't buy it from them, you can't buy 62 00:03:39,960 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 1: them anywhere unless you're willing to go to a scalper 63 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:45,640 Speaker 1: and Sarah, a lot of politicians in d C have 64 00:03:45,760 --> 00:03:48,400 Speaker 1: kind of lashed onto this fight. Now, well, this has 65 00:03:48,440 --> 00:03:51,000 Speaker 1: been simmering for a long time actually, ever since the 66 00:03:51,080 --> 00:03:54,640 Speaker 1: DJ approved this merger back in o J. Of course, 67 00:03:54,680 --> 00:03:57,640 Speaker 1: the Department of Justice, the Department of Justice let this 68 00:03:57,720 --> 00:04:00,600 Speaker 1: deal through with the settlement that was supposed to resolve 69 00:04:00,600 --> 00:04:04,400 Speaker 1: all concerns about competition and not playing fair with the 70 00:04:04,440 --> 00:04:08,000 Speaker 1: smaller people, and that just wasn't happening. So, in fact, 71 00:04:08,560 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster Live Nation has already been under investigation by the 72 00:04:12,320 --> 00:04:15,480 Speaker 1: DJ before the Taylor Swift blow up, but that really 73 00:04:15,560 --> 00:04:18,880 Speaker 1: just thrusted onto the stage for all to see. And 74 00:04:18,880 --> 00:04:21,120 Speaker 1: what they claim is that they only represent what is 75 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:24,960 Speaker 1: all ticket sales, but when it comes to buying the 76 00:04:25,080 --> 00:04:29,520 Speaker 1: premium tickets, often times you're coming up against Ticketmaster. Yeah, 77 00:04:29,560 --> 00:04:33,880 Speaker 1: and you also have the largest live entertainment events promoter 78 00:04:34,080 --> 00:04:36,960 Speaker 1: combined with the largest ticket seller, and so they've been 79 00:04:37,000 --> 00:04:40,480 Speaker 1: able to also sort of work the markets, so that 80 00:04:40,680 --> 00:04:43,719 Speaker 1: new stars would have incentives to go with them and 81 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:46,240 Speaker 1: not go with other ticket sellers. So they've been able 82 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:48,839 Speaker 1: to really exert power over the market. And so we 83 00:04:48,880 --> 00:04:51,960 Speaker 1: have calls from Congress to investigate, and people are calling 84 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:57,200 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster of monopoly and trying to invoke anti trust laws 85 00:04:57,360 --> 00:05:01,360 Speaker 1: either to discipline them, to to break them up, all 86 00:05:01,480 --> 00:05:04,240 Speaker 1: kinds of things. Sarah, can you just dust off our 87 00:05:04,320 --> 00:05:08,080 Speaker 1: econ one O one textbook and walk us through exactly 88 00:05:08,160 --> 00:05:11,360 Speaker 1: what a monopoly is, what antitrust laws? All these terms 89 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:16,680 Speaker 1: that are kind of flying around this issue. Yeah, so 90 00:05:16,839 --> 00:05:19,320 Speaker 1: our antitrust laws are rooted in the kind of pre 91 00:05:19,520 --> 00:05:22,440 Speaker 1: trust busting era. I mean, the first one started and 92 00:05:22,680 --> 00:05:26,560 Speaker 1: was passed in. It's really rooted in the idea that 93 00:05:26,720 --> 00:05:29,800 Speaker 1: the more competitive markets are, the better it is for consumers. 94 00:05:29,839 --> 00:05:32,479 Speaker 1: So the more companies that are competing with each other 95 00:05:32,560 --> 00:05:35,039 Speaker 1: to get your dollars, to get your eyeballs, to get 96 00:05:35,120 --> 00:05:37,520 Speaker 1: you know, what you want, the better it's going to be, 97 00:05:37,560 --> 00:05:40,960 Speaker 1: both in terms of pricing and in terms of quality 98 00:05:40,960 --> 00:05:44,719 Speaker 1: of products and innovation. So that's kind of the core idea. 99 00:05:45,240 --> 00:05:47,839 Speaker 1: In terms of what is a monopoly, there's no clear 100 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:51,960 Speaker 1: definition of what exactly is a monopoly, but it's a 101 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:56,159 Speaker 1: dominant company that has some sort of exclusive power over 102 00:05:56,200 --> 00:05:59,560 Speaker 1: a market. There have been examples um set by the 103 00:05:59,600 --> 00:06:02,800 Speaker 1: court of companies that are you know, have six of 104 00:06:02,800 --> 00:06:05,479 Speaker 1: the market, but there are also been examples of companies 105 00:06:05,480 --> 00:06:08,200 Speaker 1: that have a lower percent. So there's no magic number 106 00:06:08,360 --> 00:06:11,039 Speaker 1: for a monopoly. And the other really important thing to 107 00:06:11,400 --> 00:06:14,520 Speaker 1: understand remembers that it's not actually illegal to be a 108 00:06:14,560 --> 00:06:18,359 Speaker 1: monopoly in the United States. So we love our big corporations. 109 00:06:18,720 --> 00:06:22,120 Speaker 1: BIGA is not necessarily bad. The problem is when they 110 00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:26,839 Speaker 1: start to exert illegal behavior to keep that monopoly. So 111 00:06:26,960 --> 00:06:31,520 Speaker 1: if they are pushing out competitors, if they are using 112 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:35,320 Speaker 1: predatory pricing, if they are using exclusive contracts. But the 113 00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:38,039 Speaker 1: way our process is set up, those cases have to 114 00:06:38,040 --> 00:06:41,320 Speaker 1: actually be investigated and filed by orn i trust enforcers, 115 00:06:41,360 --> 00:06:43,280 Speaker 1: and they have to be one in a court of law, 116 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 1: So the government has to persuade a judge that a 117 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:49,480 Speaker 1: company has been competing illegally. So it's not an easy 118 00:06:49,520 --> 00:06:56,240 Speaker 1: slam dunk by any means. And LEAs here points out, 119 00:06:56,279 --> 00:06:58,760 Speaker 1: you know a lot of these laws were written for 120 00:06:58,880 --> 00:07:02,479 Speaker 1: a much early your time, and as so often happens, 121 00:07:02,520 --> 00:07:05,000 Speaker 1: like federal government is kind of slow to keep up. 122 00:07:05,160 --> 00:07:07,520 Speaker 1: And is that what we're seeing here that the you know, 123 00:07:07,640 --> 00:07:10,280 Speaker 1: the idea of monopoly in the twenty one century is 124 00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:14,360 Speaker 1: a whole lot different than a monopoly when we're talking 125 00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:17,560 Speaker 1: about big oil bearings or steel companies. Yeah. I think 126 00:07:17,560 --> 00:07:19,680 Speaker 1: that's definitely a part of it. I mean, a lot 127 00:07:19,720 --> 00:07:21,840 Speaker 1: of the monopolies that people are talking about today have 128 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:25,040 Speaker 1: to deal with digital companies or online companies, and the 129 00:07:25,080 --> 00:07:28,200 Speaker 1: situation there is a little bit different. Not necessarily a ticketmaster, 130 00:07:28,360 --> 00:07:31,120 Speaker 1: but some of the other companies that have come into 131 00:07:31,120 --> 00:07:34,160 Speaker 1: the any trust cross hairs, like Google um often offer 132 00:07:34,280 --> 00:07:36,680 Speaker 1: products for free, and that has had a lot of 133 00:07:36,680 --> 00:07:40,239 Speaker 1: difficulty for any trust enforcers because one of the hallmarks 134 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:42,760 Speaker 1: over the past thirty to forty years for any trust 135 00:07:42,840 --> 00:07:45,640 Speaker 1: enforces has been how does this business conduct or merger 136 00:07:46,120 --> 00:07:49,160 Speaker 1: impact price? And when you have a company that is 137 00:07:49,200 --> 00:07:52,000 Speaker 1: offering a free product, they haven't quite known what to 138 00:07:52,040 --> 00:07:54,480 Speaker 1: do with that. Sarah. When we look at what politicians 139 00:07:54,480 --> 00:07:56,640 Speaker 1: and Capitol Hill are asking for, what is it that 140 00:07:56,680 --> 00:07:58,720 Speaker 1: they're saying about take master and what they want to 141 00:07:58,880 --> 00:08:03,760 Speaker 1: do using the laws to clamp down on monopoly power 142 00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:08,800 Speaker 1: and di competitive practices, they can reinvestigate that original merger, 143 00:08:08,840 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 1: and if they find that the company is behaving in 144 00:08:11,480 --> 00:08:13,960 Speaker 1: an anti competitive way, they can file a lawsuit and 145 00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:15,920 Speaker 1: try to break it up. Well, let's talk about that 146 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:18,559 Speaker 1: for a second. So we're talking about the Ticketmaster Live 147 00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:23,160 Speaker 1: Nation merger, which, as you say, combined two big companies, 148 00:08:23,200 --> 00:08:25,360 Speaker 1: one that sales tickets, the only one that puts on shows. 149 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:28,480 Speaker 1: And they had to agree to all kinds of things 150 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,440 Speaker 1: to prove that they weren't going to be pushing everybody 151 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 1: out of the space. So what did they have to 152 00:08:33,600 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 1: agree to? Yea, So the Ticketmaster Live Nations settlement was 153 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:39,920 Speaker 1: unentered into by a court in two thousand and ten, 154 00:08:40,120 --> 00:08:44,080 Speaker 1: and essentially they agreed that they wouldn't try and force 155 00:08:44,200 --> 00:08:46,720 Speaker 1: companies to do business with their partner just because they 156 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:50,640 Speaker 1: were doing business with one. So Live Nations said, okay, venues, 157 00:08:50,679 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: we're putting on the shows, but if we're acting as 158 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:56,199 Speaker 1: your event promoter, you don't have to use Ticketmaster. You 159 00:08:56,240 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 1: can use another ticketing company. And ticket Master is that 160 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:01,880 Speaker 1: if we're ticketing your show, you don't have to use 161 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:05,280 Speaker 1: Live Nation as the promoter. You can use a different one. 162 00:09:05,720 --> 00:09:08,160 Speaker 1: But over time, there have been a lot of complaints 163 00:09:08,160 --> 00:09:11,040 Speaker 1: about this. I mean, it's essentially asking the companies to 164 00:09:11,160 --> 00:09:14,360 Speaker 1: not compete as vigorously as they might. So there have been, 165 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:17,320 Speaker 1: you know, just tons and tons of complaints about this 166 00:09:17,480 --> 00:09:21,000 Speaker 1: settlement almost from the beginning. So the Justice Department has 167 00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:24,600 Speaker 1: actually already done one investigation into Ticketmaster in Live Nation 168 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:27,839 Speaker 1: found that they weren't abiding by this agreement, and then 169 00:09:27,880 --> 00:09:30,880 Speaker 1: they change the consent decree in twenty nineteen to extend 170 00:09:30,880 --> 00:09:34,040 Speaker 1: it for another five years, and they imposed a monitor 171 00:09:34,120 --> 00:09:36,320 Speaker 1: on them. So there is literally a guy whose job 172 00:09:36,360 --> 00:09:40,240 Speaker 1: it is to investigate complaints about Ticketmaster in Live Nation 173 00:09:40,559 --> 00:09:42,560 Speaker 1: and tell the Justice Department if he finds any of 174 00:09:42,559 --> 00:09:45,760 Speaker 1: these complaints you know, are merited. And from there, the 175 00:09:45,800 --> 00:09:50,520 Speaker 1: Justice Department could impose a fine on Ticketmaster for again 176 00:09:50,600 --> 00:09:53,800 Speaker 1: violating the consent decree, or could potentially try and bring 177 00:09:53,800 --> 00:09:57,480 Speaker 1: another case. Sarah and Leah stagram for just a second. 178 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:08,000 Speaker 1: Our conversation will continue after the break. Yeah, is this 179 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:11,280 Speaker 1: incestuous relationship and the lack of any national competition for 180 00:10:11,320 --> 00:10:14,040 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster that has created the situation we're dealing with today. 181 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:16,800 Speaker 1: As a result, our band, which is concerned about keeping 182 00:10:16,840 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 1: the price of its tickets low, will almost always be 183 00:10:18,920 --> 00:10:22,800 Speaker 1: in conflict with Ticketmaster. They go from five to six 184 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:27,960 Speaker 1: to seven to eight. Pretty soon it's all over there, 185 00:10:29,040 --> 00:10:32,440 Speaker 1: what with the Ticketmaster charge, and it's gotten out of 186 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:35,199 Speaker 1: hand price of concerts, the price of entertainment period and 187 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 1: what with Live Nation. I said, how can we just 188 00:10:37,280 --> 00:10:39,920 Speaker 1: go in take everything, put it in a pot, split 189 00:10:39,960 --> 00:10:41,960 Speaker 1: it up fairly based on a number of people that come. 190 00:10:42,640 --> 00:10:45,400 Speaker 1: And they're like, you're gonna take a pay cut, No problem, 191 00:10:45,400 --> 00:10:46,959 Speaker 1: I'll make a lot of money. I can take a 192 00:10:47,000 --> 00:10:52,040 Speaker 1: pay cut. That was Pearl Jams, Stone Gossard back in 193 00:10:53,800 --> 00:10:57,959 Speaker 1: Dave grow of Nirvana and kid Rock. So lots of 194 00:10:58,000 --> 00:11:01,480 Speaker 1: people upset about Ticketmaster, both customers who couldn't get their 195 00:11:01,520 --> 00:11:04,440 Speaker 1: Taylor Swift tickets and members of Congress are seeing an 196 00:11:04,480 --> 00:11:09,600 Speaker 1: opportunity to maybe take another look at Ticketmaster and it's practices. 197 00:11:10,040 --> 00:11:13,760 Speaker 1: But aside from really messing up a giant ticket sale, 198 00:11:14,440 --> 00:11:18,200 Speaker 1: did Ticketmaster do anything wrong? Did they do anything that 199 00:11:18,320 --> 00:11:21,160 Speaker 1: would point to them being a monopoly that needs to 200 00:11:21,280 --> 00:11:27,280 Speaker 1: have heavy regulation on them. So there's um a lot 201 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:30,160 Speaker 1: of debate over whether Ticketmaster did anything bad. Harry, you know, 202 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:32,840 Speaker 1: they say, you know, there are just we're so many 203 00:11:32,880 --> 00:11:35,960 Speaker 1: people who wanted Taylor swift tickets that they couldn't have 204 00:11:36,000 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 1: anticipated that level of demand. The Grammy winner finally addressing 205 00:11:39,640 --> 00:11:43,880 Speaker 1: this week's Ticketmaster disaster on her Instagram, writing in part, 206 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:46,880 Speaker 1: I'm not going to make excuses for anyone because we 207 00:11:46,960 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 1: asked them multiple times if they could handle this kind 208 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:53,360 Speaker 1: of demand, and we were assured they could. One of 209 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:57,160 Speaker 1: the hallmarks of a monopoly is a company that sort 210 00:11:57,200 --> 00:12:00,240 Speaker 1: of rests on its laurels and doesn't improve its product. 211 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:02,480 Speaker 1: And so one of the things that folks who are 212 00:12:02,559 --> 00:12:05,920 Speaker 1: critical of Ticketmasters say is, you know, if it had 213 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:08,880 Speaker 1: had competition, if it actually had to try and compete 214 00:12:09,160 --> 00:12:13,480 Speaker 1: for the opportunity to provide these ticketing services, they probably 215 00:12:13,559 --> 00:12:16,560 Speaker 1: would have improved their servers so that they could have 216 00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:19,199 Speaker 1: handled this level of demand. They probably would have come 217 00:12:19,280 --> 00:12:22,559 Speaker 1: up with a better system than just emailing out these 218 00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:25,479 Speaker 1: pre codes, some of which may have gone to bots. 219 00:12:25,480 --> 00:12:27,920 Speaker 1: So it's hard to know, you know, just looking on 220 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 1: the outside, whether it was sort of Ticketmaster doing something 221 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:34,040 Speaker 1: wrong here or whether it really was demand. And what 222 00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:36,839 Speaker 1: does Ticketmaster actually say in their defense about this. They 223 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:39,600 Speaker 1: do say that this is the system that they have 224 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:42,480 Speaker 1: used to do verified pre sales in the past, and 225 00:12:42,520 --> 00:12:45,200 Speaker 1: it has worked. They're not even the promoter for this one. 226 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:48,000 Speaker 1: So they alleged that all of these allegations about them 227 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:52,199 Speaker 1: trying to tie services between Live Nation and Ticketmaster is 228 00:12:52,240 --> 00:12:56,080 Speaker 1: flawed because it's the other major promotion company that's actually 229 00:12:56,120 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: the promoter for Taylor Swift tour well you know. West. 230 00:13:01,880 --> 00:13:05,120 Speaker 1: Ticketmaster said that only verified fans were allowed to buy 231 00:13:05,160 --> 00:13:08,040 Speaker 1: tickets um but the problem was at the demand far 232 00:13:08,160 --> 00:13:11,320 Speaker 1: exceeded their expectations and so they had to slow down 233 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:14,800 Speaker 1: their systems and slow down the access to stabilize everything. 234 00:13:15,440 --> 00:13:17,800 Speaker 1: They also know that less than five percent of the 235 00:13:17,840 --> 00:13:21,280 Speaker 1: tickets were later posted for resale, which showed that they 236 00:13:21,320 --> 00:13:25,840 Speaker 1: weren't purchased by bots. Ticketmaster also says it doesn't engage 237 00:13:25,840 --> 00:13:29,280 Speaker 1: in ammic competitive practices even though it is the largest 238 00:13:29,320 --> 00:13:32,840 Speaker 1: primary seller of tickets. One other big part about this controversy, 239 00:13:32,840 --> 00:13:34,640 Speaker 1: and one of the things that gets people really riled 240 00:13:34,760 --> 00:13:40,440 Speaker 1: up about Ticketmaster, is this dynamic pricing policy that they have. 241 00:13:41,200 --> 00:13:44,000 Speaker 1: Can you just explain what exactly that is and how 242 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:48,679 Speaker 1: it works. So, dynamic pricing is where the computers are 243 00:13:48,720 --> 00:13:52,520 Speaker 1: algorithms try and create an individualized price for you based 244 00:13:52,520 --> 00:13:55,079 Speaker 1: on what they think that you'd be willing to pay. 245 00:13:55,160 --> 00:13:58,480 Speaker 1: So whenever you're using a computer, obviously it knows a 246 00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:01,280 Speaker 1: lot about your brows in history. It might know of 247 00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:04,920 Speaker 1: your previous purchases, so the computer algorithm is going to 248 00:14:05,040 --> 00:14:08,360 Speaker 1: try and predict how much you might be willing to pay. 249 00:14:08,480 --> 00:14:10,839 Speaker 1: So you know, Sarah might only be like a little 250 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:13,560 Speaker 1: bit of a tailor Swift fan. She might only really 251 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:16,080 Speaker 1: be willing to pay like a hundred dollars for a ticket. 252 00:14:16,120 --> 00:14:18,840 Speaker 1: But because I'm like a die hard, it might try 253 00:14:19,040 --> 00:14:22,320 Speaker 1: and raise by price because it knows that I really 254 00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:24,760 Speaker 1: really want this ticket. And you know, this is something 255 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:27,440 Speaker 1: that you hear all the time with like airline pricing, 256 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:29,800 Speaker 1: Like that's why you're always supposed to hear your cookies 257 00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:32,760 Speaker 1: and buy on a Tuesday night so that you know 258 00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:36,000 Speaker 1: you can get a cheaper price on airlines. But Ticketmaster, 259 00:14:36,200 --> 00:14:38,680 Speaker 1: you know, especially because it's the only place that you 260 00:14:38,680 --> 00:14:41,520 Speaker 1: can buy these tickets, it really has people over a barrel. 261 00:14:41,640 --> 00:14:43,720 Speaker 1: I'll just jump in here and say this whole concept 262 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:47,000 Speaker 1: of dynamic pricing is really a terrible thing for consumers. 263 00:14:47,240 --> 00:14:51,040 Speaker 1: And it really means that companies are able to assess 264 00:14:51,120 --> 00:14:53,440 Speaker 1: what a person is likely to pay or able to pay. 265 00:14:53,480 --> 00:14:56,720 Speaker 1: But it doesn't necessarily drive prices lower. It actually, as 266 00:14:56,720 --> 00:14:59,400 Speaker 1: we saw in this case, it drives prices higher. Well, 267 00:14:59,400 --> 00:15:01,680 Speaker 1: it's an intra sam point to Leah. You had said 268 00:15:01,680 --> 00:15:03,440 Speaker 1: earlier that one of the problems with the monopoly is 269 00:15:03,440 --> 00:15:04,960 Speaker 1: they can rest on the laurels and not have to 270 00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:06,960 Speaker 1: improve their product. And here's the case where they were 271 00:15:06,960 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 1: actually innovating their product, but it was to their own 272 00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:11,920 Speaker 1: benefit and not to the benefit of the people who 273 00:15:12,040 --> 00:15:14,640 Speaker 1: are using their service. Yeah. I mean, if there was 274 00:15:14,680 --> 00:15:17,720 Speaker 1: another ticketing company that competed, or if there were more 275 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:19,400 Speaker 1: than one going at the same time, you know, you 276 00:15:19,440 --> 00:15:22,800 Speaker 1: could check the prices on Ticketmaster versus the other company 277 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:24,960 Speaker 1: and maybe buy the cheaper one. But because it's the 278 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:26,720 Speaker 1: only option, you know, you really have to go with 279 00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:29,560 Speaker 1: what they're offering you. So, Sarah, this question of price 280 00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:31,560 Speaker 1: is kind of an interesting one when it comes to 281 00:15:32,080 --> 00:15:36,000 Speaker 1: the public push against monopoly power, and especially politicians, who 282 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:40,360 Speaker 1: of course want to look responsive to angry voters. If 283 00:15:40,680 --> 00:15:44,480 Speaker 1: tickets weren't so expensive, like let's say, you know, you 284 00:15:44,560 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 1: had more like Amazon pricing where they were driving prices down, um, 285 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:50,200 Speaker 1: putting other companies out of business, but doing it in 286 00:15:50,240 --> 00:15:52,480 Speaker 1: a way by driving prices down. Do you think people 287 00:15:52,520 --> 00:15:55,040 Speaker 1: would be so upset or complaining that ticket Master was 288 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:57,760 Speaker 1: a monopoly? Well, I mean, I think this example has 289 00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:00,400 Speaker 1: really put a spotlight on a lot of shoes that 290 00:16:00,440 --> 00:16:02,240 Speaker 1: are getting a lot of attention right now and have 291 00:16:02,320 --> 00:16:05,520 Speaker 1: become hot button sort of front page issues. And we're 292 00:16:05,520 --> 00:16:08,920 Speaker 1: seeing a time of persistent inflation, and there's been a 293 00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:11,000 Speaker 1: lot of reports about how, you know, the bigger the 294 00:16:11,040 --> 00:16:15,640 Speaker 1: companies are, the stickier price increases get and the slower 295 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:19,200 Speaker 1: they come down, even as you know, inflation subsides. So 296 00:16:19,480 --> 00:16:22,320 Speaker 1: these are issues that are just going to people's pocketbooks 297 00:16:22,400 --> 00:16:25,560 Speaker 1: and dinner tables. So I think the reason that people 298 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:28,200 Speaker 1: have become so passionate about this is because it's really 299 00:16:28,280 --> 00:16:32,680 Speaker 1: hurting people at home. So what can be done about this? 300 00:16:32,760 --> 00:16:35,440 Speaker 1: What is going to be done about this? We'll try 301 00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:47,160 Speaker 1: to answer that question after the break lee And now 302 00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:51,400 Speaker 1: we know what the complaint against Ticketmaster is. What do 303 00:16:51,480 --> 00:16:54,200 Speaker 1: you think Washington will do about this? How will this 304 00:16:54,440 --> 00:16:57,840 Speaker 1: play out both politically and you know, in terms of 305 00:16:57,880 --> 00:17:01,440 Speaker 1: government regulation, possible regulations of company. Well, the Senate has 306 00:17:01,440 --> 00:17:04,200 Speaker 1: already said that they want to hold a hearing on Ticketmaster, 307 00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:06,800 Speaker 1: so this will be the opportunity for them to rate 308 00:17:06,880 --> 00:17:09,800 Speaker 1: the CEOs and everybody to have like a a nice 309 00:17:09,920 --> 00:17:14,160 Speaker 1: cathartic experience. And then the Justice Department has an investigation 310 00:17:14,200 --> 00:17:16,800 Speaker 1: now into ticket Master and Live Nation that is not 311 00:17:16,840 --> 00:17:18,760 Speaker 1: going to be resolved in the near term. These types 312 00:17:18,800 --> 00:17:22,320 Speaker 1: of investigations can take several years or so, but we 313 00:17:22,400 --> 00:17:25,600 Speaker 1: might see out of that either some kind of change 314 00:17:25,600 --> 00:17:27,919 Speaker 1: to the consent to create has right now, or we 315 00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:30,600 Speaker 1: could seem a move by the Justice Department to break 316 00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:33,159 Speaker 1: it up. The individual right now who is in charge 317 00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:36,160 Speaker 1: of the Justice Departments in a trust division is Jonathan Cantor. 318 00:17:36,560 --> 00:17:40,720 Speaker 1: He has spoken pretty aggressively about the need to bring 319 00:17:40,760 --> 00:17:44,720 Speaker 1: more cases focused on monopolies like ticket Master, and he's 320 00:17:44,760 --> 00:17:48,760 Speaker 1: been a big proponent of cases against the tech giants 321 00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:51,840 Speaker 1: like Google and Apple, and so it wouldn't be surprising 322 00:17:51,880 --> 00:17:54,440 Speaker 1: if he wanted to take on a breakup of Ticketmaster 323 00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:57,360 Speaker 1: and Live Nation. Let's talk about that for a second, Sarah. 324 00:17:57,520 --> 00:18:00,480 Speaker 1: Breaking up a company is pretty much the most extreme 325 00:18:00,560 --> 00:18:03,159 Speaker 1: thing the government can do, and taking action against a 326 00:18:03,240 --> 00:18:07,160 Speaker 1: company day labelism, monopoly, how likely do you think that 327 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:12,479 Speaker 1: is in this case? Well, that's a really interesting question. 328 00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:14,960 Speaker 1: I think you have two different kinds of mergers. One 329 00:18:15,240 --> 00:18:17,960 Speaker 1: kind of mergers where a company has pretty much the 330 00:18:18,040 --> 00:18:20,840 Speaker 1: same kind of business, like let's say a supermarket chain 331 00:18:21,000 --> 00:18:23,239 Speaker 1: or a drug store chain, and they merge, and you know, 332 00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:26,359 Speaker 1: they all become the new you know, cel right label, 333 00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:29,120 Speaker 1: And it's harder to break up a company a few 334 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:32,199 Speaker 1: years after it's merge if it's completely integrated. You know, 335 00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:34,840 Speaker 1: they talk about how difficult is it to unscramble an 336 00:18:34,840 --> 00:18:39,760 Speaker 1: omelet In the Live Nation Ticketmaster example, you actually have 337 00:18:39,840 --> 00:18:43,200 Speaker 1: two companies that do different things and they have different names, 338 00:18:43,400 --> 00:18:46,640 Speaker 1: and so they can only integrate so much because they're 339 00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:49,560 Speaker 1: different operations. So it would be easier, you know, they 340 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:52,280 Speaker 1: may have consolidated and integrated some of the sort of 341 00:18:52,359 --> 00:18:55,560 Speaker 1: executive functions and the service functions and the I T functions, 342 00:18:55,600 --> 00:18:57,800 Speaker 1: but all in all, it would be easier to separate 343 00:18:57,840 --> 00:19:03,320 Speaker 1: out a company like that. And one thing that you're 344 00:19:03,359 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 1: both pointing up to here is that even though we're 345 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:09,399 Speaker 1: talking about Ticketmaster, it's really just an example of a 346 00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:15,000 Speaker 1: larger activist justice departmenting the Biden administration. What other deals 347 00:19:15,320 --> 00:19:21,000 Speaker 1: mergers companies? Is the Biden administration looking at for possible 348 00:19:21,080 --> 00:19:24,760 Speaker 1: action in this anti trust sverre well the first one 349 00:19:24,840 --> 00:19:27,399 Speaker 1: is obviously Google. This is actually a case that started 350 00:19:27,480 --> 00:19:30,760 Speaker 1: during the Trump administration. The Justice Department and a bunch 351 00:19:30,760 --> 00:19:35,159 Speaker 1: of state attorneys general sued Google over the exclusive contracts 352 00:19:35,240 --> 00:19:38,040 Speaker 1: it has on cell phones to ensure that it is 353 00:19:38,160 --> 00:19:41,240 Speaker 1: the default search engine on every cell phone sold in 354 00:19:41,280 --> 00:19:43,119 Speaker 1: the United States and that it is also has a 355 00:19:43,160 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 1: default search engine on most web browsers. The Justice Department 356 00:19:46,600 --> 00:19:50,160 Speaker 1: said that that is really unfair because it means most 357 00:19:50,160 --> 00:19:52,920 Speaker 1: of the traffic goes to Google, and they have filed 358 00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:56,400 Speaker 1: a complaint in that's supposed to go to trial next year. 359 00:19:56,800 --> 00:19:59,960 Speaker 1: The Justice Department also has a separate investigation into Google's 360 00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:03,600 Speaker 1: power over the advertising technology market. This is all of 361 00:20:03,640 --> 00:20:07,840 Speaker 1: the invisible businesses that are used to buy, sell, and 362 00:20:07,920 --> 00:20:12,439 Speaker 1: serve advertising online. They also have another investigation into Apple 363 00:20:12,640 --> 00:20:15,760 Speaker 1: over its dominance in the Apple App Store, So you know, 364 00:20:15,840 --> 00:20:18,920 Speaker 1: they've really even taking a hard look at a lot 365 00:20:18,960 --> 00:20:21,640 Speaker 1: of the tech giants. That's just at the Justice Department. 366 00:20:21,680 --> 00:20:24,840 Speaker 1: Over at the FTC, they have a case against Facebook 367 00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:28,639 Speaker 1: and which they're trying to unwind the company's acquisitions of 368 00:20:28,680 --> 00:20:32,119 Speaker 1: Instagram and What's App, which happened years ago, but the 369 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:37,040 Speaker 1: FTC is now arguing we're intended to cement Facebook's monopoly 370 00:20:37,119 --> 00:20:40,440 Speaker 1: position in the social networking market, and the FTC has 371 00:20:40,520 --> 00:20:44,840 Speaker 1: also since been investigating Amazon over a host of issues 372 00:20:44,880 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: related to its marketplace, cloud computing, and whether it's prime 373 00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:52,199 Speaker 1: subscription service is too difficult for consumers to cancel. And 374 00:20:52,240 --> 00:20:55,280 Speaker 1: the FTC, of course, is the Federal Trade Commission also 375 00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:58,480 Speaker 1: has a hand in all these issues. Sarah, And we're 376 00:20:58,520 --> 00:21:00,600 Speaker 1: talking about a lot of tech and he's back in 377 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:03,639 Speaker 1: their previous life. I think you reported on the government's 378 00:21:03,720 --> 00:21:07,119 Speaker 1: attempt to take action against Microsoft. Well, that was really 379 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:10,280 Speaker 1: kind of the mother of all the untitrust investigations against 380 00:21:10,359 --> 00:21:14,240 Speaker 1: big tech, and it's still being referred to decades later, 381 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:17,760 Speaker 1: and it was considered by many to be the reason 382 00:21:17,880 --> 00:21:20,720 Speaker 1: that actually the market opened up and allowed companies like 383 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:24,439 Speaker 1: Google and Facebook and Apple to thrive, to grow and thrive. 384 00:21:24,840 --> 00:21:27,240 Speaker 1: And the reason is interesting too, and I know this 385 00:21:27,320 --> 00:21:29,919 Speaker 1: because I've spoken this year about this before. The government 386 00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:34,439 Speaker 1: actually didn't ultimately prevail. They came to a settlement, correct, 387 00:21:34,480 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: but it had a big effect on the way Microsoft operated. 388 00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:40,320 Speaker 1: Can you describe that, Yeah, I mean think of it 389 00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:43,040 Speaker 1: sort of like Gulliver, you know, being tied down by 390 00:21:43,119 --> 00:21:45,280 Speaker 1: all the Liliputians. I mean it really it was sort 391 00:21:45,280 --> 00:21:48,240 Speaker 1: of death by a thousand cuts, and they all constantly 392 00:21:48,240 --> 00:21:50,320 Speaker 1: had to go into court. They were under like a 393 00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:54,159 Speaker 1: ten year court supervision protocol where they had to go 394 00:21:54,200 --> 00:21:56,600 Speaker 1: in and address all the complaints that could come up 395 00:21:56,640 --> 00:21:59,040 Speaker 1: about them, and it really slowed them down. It was 396 00:21:59,080 --> 00:22:02,760 Speaker 1: sort of like they became I'm a lethargic giant. And meanwhile, 397 00:22:03,119 --> 00:22:06,600 Speaker 1: these little competitors like Google, which are now the giant 398 00:22:06,600 --> 00:22:10,320 Speaker 1: Glass saw the opportunity to move in on Microsoft at 399 00:22:10,320 --> 00:22:14,879 Speaker 1: the time when they were so distracted. This is actually 400 00:22:14,920 --> 00:22:17,920 Speaker 1: an entire theory of any trust law that was proposed 401 00:22:17,960 --> 00:22:20,639 Speaker 1: by Tim Woo, who is one of the President Biden's 402 00:22:20,640 --> 00:22:24,000 Speaker 1: competition advisors. The idea is that when the government goes 403 00:22:24,040 --> 00:22:26,600 Speaker 1: after these big companies, that distracts them with the litigation, 404 00:22:26,640 --> 00:22:29,159 Speaker 1: and then they sort of tend to miss like important 405 00:22:29,640 --> 00:22:31,760 Speaker 1: moves and technology. So if you think about it, when 406 00:22:31,800 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: IBM was the subject of a twenty year government antitrust case, 407 00:22:36,880 --> 00:22:40,600 Speaker 1: it sort of missed the move to personal computers. When 408 00:22:40,640 --> 00:22:43,160 Speaker 1: A T and T was the subject of a government 409 00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:46,439 Speaker 1: antitrust litigation that led to their breakup, they missed the 410 00:22:46,600 --> 00:22:50,360 Speaker 1: move to long distance and ultimately wireless technology. And then, 411 00:22:50,359 --> 00:22:53,720 Speaker 1: as Sarah mentioned, Microsoft really missed the move to the Internet. 412 00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:57,359 Speaker 1: So there's this argument that by attacking a lot of 413 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:00,879 Speaker 1: the monopolis now the Justice Department is making space for 414 00:23:01,000 --> 00:23:03,240 Speaker 1: some of these new innovations that might be the next 415 00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:05,680 Speaker 1: wave of technology. And is the idea that they're doing 416 00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:08,400 Speaker 1: this explicitly or this is a side effect of these 417 00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:11,480 Speaker 1: investigations a little bit of both. You know, it tends 418 00:23:11,480 --> 00:23:13,800 Speaker 1: to be a side effect. But even if they aren't 419 00:23:13,800 --> 00:23:16,040 Speaker 1: going to prevail, you know, these cases tend to take 420 00:23:16,080 --> 00:23:19,760 Speaker 1: a really long time. The average anti trust litigation is 421 00:23:19,800 --> 00:23:22,639 Speaker 1: like five to ten years, especially depending if there are 422 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:25,240 Speaker 1: a lot of appeals. So none of these cases are 423 00:23:25,280 --> 00:23:28,120 Speaker 1: going to be resolved in the near future. And we're 424 00:23:28,119 --> 00:23:30,639 Speaker 1: talking about all these tech companies. But this administration has 425 00:23:30,680 --> 00:23:33,480 Speaker 1: also taking a look at like, say, the most analog 426 00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:36,520 Speaker 1: thing you can do, book publishers and lacking the merger 427 00:23:36,520 --> 00:23:39,840 Speaker 1: of two big book publishers. Yeah, the Justice Department this 428 00:23:39,920 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 1: year has challenged a record number of mergers, ten which 429 00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:46,359 Speaker 1: might not sound like a lot, but oftentimes back in 430 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:48,639 Speaker 1: the day you would get like maybe one merger challenge 431 00:23:48,640 --> 00:23:51,640 Speaker 1: in a year, So ton is quite the number, and 432 00:23:51,920 --> 00:23:54,640 Speaker 1: while they haven't succeeded in all of them, in four 433 00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:57,040 Speaker 1: of those deals, the companies walked away as soon as 434 00:23:57,080 --> 00:23:59,920 Speaker 1: the suits were filed. In the book publishers deal, the 435 00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:02,639 Speaker 1: was between Penguin, Random House and Simon and Schusta. They 436 00:24:02,680 --> 00:24:05,560 Speaker 1: lost at trial and they have ultimately walked away. So 437 00:24:05,880 --> 00:24:08,600 Speaker 1: they have a pretty good record so far with being 438 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,760 Speaker 1: much more aggressive on this type of case. So, Sarah, 439 00:24:11,880 --> 00:24:14,439 Speaker 1: what Lie is describing is sometimes just the threat of 440 00:24:14,480 --> 00:24:17,600 Speaker 1: this investigation and the idea that they're gonna spend years 441 00:24:17,880 --> 00:24:19,680 Speaker 1: or enough to make them say, yeah, it's not worth 442 00:24:19,680 --> 00:24:21,920 Speaker 1: it and walk away. Well, it's interesting to see how 443 00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:24,760 Speaker 1: this is actually proven to have a deterrent effect. You 444 00:24:24,840 --> 00:24:28,240 Speaker 1: haven't typically thought about or seeing deterrent effects in the 445 00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:31,080 Speaker 1: antitrust enforcement. And in fact what we're seeing is this 446 00:24:31,200 --> 00:24:35,040 Speaker 1: see change in the approach to antitrust enforcement. Whereas you know, 447 00:24:35,080 --> 00:24:38,160 Speaker 1: before the DJ and the FDC might have been afraid 448 00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 1: to challenge a case because they're afraid of losing and 449 00:24:40,960 --> 00:24:43,680 Speaker 1: they were afraid of setting a negative precedent, and this 450 00:24:43,720 --> 00:24:45,960 Speaker 1: crew is saying, no, we have to challenge even the 451 00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:48,399 Speaker 1: hard cases, even if we lose, because we have to 452 00:24:48,520 --> 00:24:50,239 Speaker 1: let companies know we are going to fight and they 453 00:24:50,240 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 1: are going to have to tackle us. And the other 454 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:53,879 Speaker 1: thing they say is even if we lose, you know, 455 00:24:53,920 --> 00:24:55,680 Speaker 1: if we lose enough of these cases, maybe it will 456 00:24:55,680 --> 00:24:59,320 Speaker 1: finally convince Congress to change the law. So, circling back 457 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:03,000 Speaker 1: to ticket Master, keeping that in mind, what are you 458 00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:06,119 Speaker 1: watching for as this story unfolds and how do you 459 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:10,160 Speaker 1: get might impact other companies, other industries and this kind 460 00:25:10,160 --> 00:25:15,000 Speaker 1: of press for anti monopoly laws or investigations. Well, as 461 00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:16,680 Speaker 1: I mentioned, the Senate is going to have a big 462 00:25:16,720 --> 00:25:19,320 Speaker 1: hearing on this sometime next year, so that'll be like 463 00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:21,720 Speaker 1: one big thing to watch out for. And then as 464 00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: this case moves along, there may be some updates. It'll 465 00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:27,800 Speaker 1: be pretty interesting whether the Justice Department sort of goes 466 00:25:27,840 --> 00:25:31,160 Speaker 1: with the minor revisions to the consent to create already 467 00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:33,880 Speaker 1: has with Ticketmaster, or if they do move for a breakup. 468 00:25:34,240 --> 00:25:37,040 Speaker 1: I mean, given the progressive folks who have been in 469 00:25:37,119 --> 00:25:40,119 Speaker 1: charge so far, you know my odds are more on 470 00:25:40,160 --> 00:25:42,640 Speaker 1: a breakup than like minor changes, but you never know. 471 00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:45,879 Speaker 1: Sarah Fordon and Leean Island, thanks so much for joining 472 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 1: me today. Thanks for having us, Thanks for having us. 473 00:25:50,840 --> 00:25:53,000 Speaker 1: You can read more from Sarah Fordon and Lee and 474 00:25:53,040 --> 00:25:57,639 Speaker 1: Eileen at Bloomberg dot com. Thanks for listening to us 475 00:25:57,640 --> 00:26:00,400 Speaker 1: here at The Big Take, the daily podcast us from 476 00:26:00,400 --> 00:26:04,040 Speaker 1: Bloomberg and I Heart Radio. For more shows from my 477 00:26:04,160 --> 00:26:08,280 Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcast, 478 00:26:08,359 --> 00:26:12,240 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen. Read Today's story and subscribe to 479 00:26:12,240 --> 00:26:16,320 Speaker 1: our daily newsletter at Bloomberg dot com slash Big Take, 480 00:26:16,880 --> 00:26:19,719 Speaker 1: and we'd love to hear from you. Email us with 481 00:26:19,840 --> 00:26:23,840 Speaker 1: questions or comments to Big Take at Bloomberg dot net. 482 00:26:25,119 --> 00:26:28,080 Speaker 1: The supervising producer of The Big Take is Vicky Burgalina. 483 00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:32,239 Speaker 1: Our senior producer is Katherine Fink. Our producers are Moe 484 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:37,480 Speaker 1: Barrow and Michael Falero. Hilda Garcia is our engineer. Original 485 00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:41,320 Speaker 1: music by Leo Sidrin. I'm West Kasova. We'll be back 486 00:26:41,359 --> 00:26:43,320 Speaker 1: tomorrow with another Big Take.