1 00:00:05,080 --> 00:00:09,320 Speaker 1: On this episode of Newsworld. On September twenty first, Russia 2 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:12,480 Speaker 1: announced it will draft three hundred thousand reservists to support 3 00:00:12,520 --> 00:00:16,239 Speaker 1: its military campaign in Ukraine. The announcement was made by 4 00:00:16,360 --> 00:00:21,120 Speaker 1: Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoiku. Shoigu also said that Russia 5 00:00:21,160 --> 00:00:23,720 Speaker 1: had lost five thousand, nine hundred and thirty seven Russian 6 00:00:23,720 --> 00:00:27,400 Speaker 1: soldiers since the beginning of their invasion of Ukraine. Then 7 00:00:27,680 --> 00:00:31,080 Speaker 1: President Vladimir Putin, in addition to calling for the first 8 00:00:31,160 --> 00:00:34,440 Speaker 1: mobilization of troops since World War Two, he should availed 9 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:39,239 Speaker 1: threat quote, if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, 10 00:00:39,840 --> 00:00:43,560 Speaker 1: we will, without doubt use all available means to protect 11 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:47,880 Speaker 1: Russia and our people. This is not a bluff, Putin 12 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 1: said to televised addressed to the nation. So we're entering 13 00:00:51,400 --> 00:00:55,040 Speaker 1: a very dangerous period, and I really am delighted because 14 00:00:55,040 --> 00:00:57,960 Speaker 1: to help us understand where we are in the war 15 00:00:58,040 --> 00:01:02,040 Speaker 1: between Russia and Ukraine. Pleased to welcome my guest, George Beebe, 16 00:01:02,560 --> 00:01:06,320 Speaker 1: former director of the CIA's Russia Program, former advisor to 17 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:11,119 Speaker 1: Vice President Cheney, currently the Director of Grand Strategy at 18 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:28,520 Speaker 1: the Quincy Institute. On the ongoing Russia Ukraine War. George, 19 00:01:28,720 --> 00:01:32,200 Speaker 1: welcome and thank you for joining me on News World. Great, 20 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: thank you for inviting me. Let me start with something 21 00:01:35,640 --> 00:01:39,039 Speaker 1: I've been surprised by. Do you think that Putin anticipated 22 00:01:39,120 --> 00:01:43,039 Speaker 1: how difficult the invasion of Ukraine would be? No. I 23 00:01:43,040 --> 00:01:45,560 Speaker 1: think it's quite clear that he did not anticipate how 24 00:01:45,600 --> 00:01:49,400 Speaker 1: difficult this has become. And we know that for a 25 00:01:49,520 --> 00:01:54,360 Speaker 1: very simple reason. Shortly after this invasion began and Russia 26 00:01:54,560 --> 00:02:00,919 Speaker 1: set forces, airborne troops, armored forces toward the Ukrainian capital Kiev, 27 00:02:01,840 --> 00:02:06,400 Speaker 1: many of them were armed with riot control gear. They 28 00:02:06,440 --> 00:02:12,880 Speaker 1: weren't prepared for meeting a stiff Ukrainian defensive resistance. They 29 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,919 Speaker 1: thought their biggest challenge was going to be maintaining civic 30 00:02:17,120 --> 00:02:21,639 Speaker 1: order inside the cities after they controlled them, and that 31 00:02:21,760 --> 00:02:24,960 Speaker 1: I think is an indication of just how badly Putin 32 00:02:25,040 --> 00:02:28,880 Speaker 1: and his intelligence services misread the kind of war that 33 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:32,600 Speaker 1: they were getting into. As you've watched it unfold, has 34 00:02:32,639 --> 00:02:37,799 Speaker 1: it surprised you how relatively effective the Ukrainians have been 35 00:02:38,280 --> 00:02:41,840 Speaker 1: and how rapidly they've adapted to new weapons systems. Yes, 36 00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:46,000 Speaker 1: to some degree it has. I expected that the Russians 37 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,320 Speaker 1: would win this war decisively and fairly quickly. And the 38 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:54,520 Speaker 1: reason why is just a simple numerical comparison between the 39 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:58,560 Speaker 1: size of the Ukrainian military and the weapons that it has, 40 00:02:58,639 --> 00:03:02,800 Speaker 1: the military age personnel that it can draw on to fight, 41 00:03:03,320 --> 00:03:07,480 Speaker 1: and those of Russia. Russia simply is overwhelmingly larger and 42 00:03:07,560 --> 00:03:12,480 Speaker 1: its military and its population. Russia had years of experience 43 00:03:12,520 --> 00:03:18,320 Speaker 1: militarily fighting in Syria, fighting in Chechnyah, fighting in Georgia 44 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:20,919 Speaker 1: in two thousand and eight, so I didn't expect this 45 00:03:21,000 --> 00:03:23,640 Speaker 1: was going to be a close contest. One of the 46 00:03:23,680 --> 00:03:27,360 Speaker 1: things I did not count on was just how far 47 00:03:27,520 --> 00:03:31,919 Speaker 1: the United States military was willing to go to support 48 00:03:31,960 --> 00:03:34,440 Speaker 1: the Ukrainians and all of this. I think that's been 49 00:03:34,520 --> 00:03:37,640 Speaker 1: quite a decisive factor and how this has played out. 50 00:03:38,160 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 1: The United States has not only been sending weaponry to Ukraine, 51 00:03:43,320 --> 00:03:47,880 Speaker 1: it's provided the training necessary, the logistics support necessary to 52 00:03:47,960 --> 00:03:52,640 Speaker 1: keep all this up. It has ex US military fighting 53 00:03:52,720 --> 00:03:56,800 Speaker 1: on the ground alongside the Ukrainians. These are volunteers, not 54 00:03:56,960 --> 00:04:00,360 Speaker 1: official representatives of the US government, but these are quite 55 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:05,440 Speaker 1: experienced and effective fighters. Nonetheless, and from what I understand, 56 00:04:05,480 --> 00:04:08,640 Speaker 1: the United States has had a wax aircraft that have 57 00:04:08,760 --> 00:04:14,920 Speaker 1: been patrolling off of Ukrainian airspace and providing what I 58 00:04:14,960 --> 00:04:20,359 Speaker 1: think has been quite effective intelligence support that has neutralized 59 00:04:20,480 --> 00:04:24,880 Speaker 1: what would otherwise be Russian air superiority. And without that 60 00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:27,960 Speaker 1: air superiority, the Russians have not been able to make 61 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:31,200 Speaker 1: very fast advances at all in all of this. So, 62 00:04:31,680 --> 00:04:36,599 Speaker 1: I think really the combination of Ukraine's courage in fighting 63 00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 1: back and American technology and intelligence and military advice has 64 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:45,479 Speaker 1: really turned this into a battle that is not what 65 00:04:45,600 --> 00:04:47,800 Speaker 1: I had expected. I don't think at the beginning of 66 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:51,440 Speaker 1: this war. Yeah, I'm reminded of two different campaigns. One 67 00:04:51,600 --> 00:04:54,960 Speaker 1: was the Winter War in Finland, where the Russians came 68 00:04:55,040 --> 00:05:00,800 Speaker 1: in under prepared, undertrained, got beaten very badly, but then regrouped, 69 00:05:01,200 --> 00:05:04,280 Speaker 1: sent in massively more people and eventually wore the Fens down. 70 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:07,159 Speaker 1: And the other was the British going into the Falklands, 71 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:11,920 Speaker 1: where I suspect without our intelligence capabilities they literally would 72 00:05:11,960 --> 00:05:15,240 Speaker 1: have been blind and not capable of winning that victory 73 00:05:15,279 --> 00:05:18,480 Speaker 1: against the Argentinians. Well, we haven't seen yet, and maybe 74 00:05:18,480 --> 00:05:22,039 Speaker 1: we're about to with the mobilization that's been announced, but 75 00:05:22,160 --> 00:05:25,360 Speaker 1: we haven't seen the sort of regrouping for an all 76 00:05:25,400 --> 00:05:28,560 Speaker 1: out effort on the part of Russia. We've seen sort 77 00:05:28,600 --> 00:05:32,400 Speaker 1: of a grinding in effectiveness. To me, the biggest surprise 78 00:05:32,680 --> 00:05:36,360 Speaker 1: was the collapse of the Russian logistics system. I mean, 79 00:05:36,560 --> 00:05:39,960 Speaker 1: they were at one time a very formidable force. And 80 00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:41,880 Speaker 1: I don't know whether it's the total corruption of the 81 00:05:41,960 --> 00:05:45,600 Speaker 1: society or what's happened, but were you a little surprised 82 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:50,040 Speaker 1: by how badly their logistics system operated? Yes, I have been, 83 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:52,919 Speaker 1: and I think Putin was too, and I think that 84 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:57,120 Speaker 1: accounts for why he chose to replace the Ministry of 85 00:05:57,160 --> 00:06:01,520 Speaker 1: Defense official, the general who was in charge of logistics. Supply, 86 00:06:02,279 --> 00:06:05,240 Speaker 1: clearly this has not gone well, and Putin believes he's 87 00:06:05,279 --> 00:06:07,560 Speaker 1: going to have to make a change. So we'll see 88 00:06:07,920 --> 00:06:11,479 Speaker 1: if new leadership will result in better performance. Now that 89 00:06:11,520 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: he's started calling up people into military service. Ye have 90 00:06:15,960 --> 00:06:19,799 Speaker 1: mile long traffic jams at the Russian border crossings. Apparently 91 00:06:19,800 --> 00:06:23,039 Speaker 1: on the border with Georgia, lines of Russian cars stretch 92 00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:26,160 Speaker 1: back more than eighteen miles. I think Finland has now 93 00:06:26,200 --> 00:06:29,560 Speaker 1: closed the border because of the sheer flood, and apparently 94 00:06:29,600 --> 00:06:33,120 Speaker 1: every plane that is leaving Russia is fully booked. I mean, 95 00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:34,839 Speaker 1: it seems to me that a lot of Russians are 96 00:06:34,920 --> 00:06:37,720 Speaker 1: voting with their feet and trying to get out rather 97 00:06:37,760 --> 00:06:42,240 Speaker 1: than get drafted. Do you think that the dissatisfaction with 98 00:06:42,320 --> 00:06:45,800 Speaker 1: the campaign is significantly deep or do you think it's 99 00:06:45,839 --> 00:06:49,720 Speaker 1: only a small minority of the Russians. Well, I think 100 00:06:49,720 --> 00:06:52,680 Speaker 1: it's very hard to say at this point. My impression 101 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:55,360 Speaker 1: over the past several years has been that by far 102 00:06:55,440 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: the most dynamic force in Russia politically has been the 103 00:07:00,560 --> 00:07:05,200 Speaker 1: far right nationalists. These are people that believe that Putin 104 00:07:05,279 --> 00:07:08,040 Speaker 1: has been far too soft in dealing with the West 105 00:07:08,080 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 1: and in dealing with Ukraine. They've criticized him for being 106 00:07:11,640 --> 00:07:15,600 Speaker 1: too willing to try to seek compromise deals with Germany 107 00:07:15,600 --> 00:07:18,840 Speaker 1: and the United States, for example. They think that he 108 00:07:18,880 --> 00:07:21,600 Speaker 1: should have taken the gloves off, so to speak, with 109 00:07:21,760 --> 00:07:25,920 Speaker 1: Ukraine long ago. They believe that he should have recognized 110 00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:30,760 Speaker 1: the independence of the so called people's republics in Ukraine 111 00:07:30,800 --> 00:07:34,760 Speaker 1: way back in twenty fourteen when they first declared independence. 112 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 1: So this, I think is the largest and most influential 113 00:07:39,680 --> 00:07:44,080 Speaker 1: faction on the Russian political spectrum right now. Now clearly 114 00:07:44,400 --> 00:07:48,120 Speaker 1: there are what the United States might call pro Western liberals. 115 00:07:48,720 --> 00:07:50,960 Speaker 1: My strong oppression has been there had not been a 116 00:07:51,040 --> 00:07:54,160 Speaker 1: lot of them. Many of them have voted with their 117 00:07:54,200 --> 00:07:58,720 Speaker 1: feet already and left Russia for the West. There are 118 00:07:58,800 --> 00:08:02,640 Speaker 1: ordinary citizens don't understand the war, don't believe that they 119 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:05,240 Speaker 1: ought to be fighting and dying for a cause that 120 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:08,840 Speaker 1: they don't understand. I don't think they have strong political 121 00:08:08,920 --> 00:08:11,640 Speaker 1: views one way or the other, but they do have 122 00:08:11,800 --> 00:08:16,760 Speaker 1: strong self preservation instincts, and I think they are concerned 123 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:19,880 Speaker 1: about the situation that they find themselves in right now. 124 00:08:20,480 --> 00:08:24,000 Speaker 1: Putin has been reluctant to mobilize, in part because he 125 00:08:24,200 --> 00:08:30,000 Speaker 1: feared that ordinary Russians that are not particularly politically engaged 126 00:08:30,320 --> 00:08:33,640 Speaker 1: would become alarmed and start to oppose the Kremlin as 127 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:36,199 Speaker 1: a result of this. So I do think that this 128 00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:38,840 Speaker 1: is a sign to some degree of the kind of 129 00:08:38,880 --> 00:08:42,200 Speaker 1: pressure he feels he's under right now that he believed 130 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:45,920 Speaker 1: he had to take this step. How this plays out 131 00:08:45,920 --> 00:08:48,680 Speaker 1: over time is anybody's guess. It's very hard to predict 132 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:52,600 Speaker 1: at this point. So one of the things that yes 133 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:55,440 Speaker 1: concerns me because I think it's a logical strategy but 134 00:08:55,880 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 1: with pretty frightening results, is this whole phony referenda process. 135 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:03,800 Speaker 1: I mean, I understand that it's stuffing ballots. When you're 136 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:06,640 Speaker 1: stuff ballots with rifles, it's sort of a pretty open 137 00:09:06,679 --> 00:09:10,200 Speaker 1: and blatant violation, and both we and the rest of 138 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:13,280 Speaker 1: the G seven have condemned it. But it strikes me 139 00:09:13,360 --> 00:09:17,000 Speaker 1: that in his own mind, Putin is setting up first 140 00:09:17,040 --> 00:09:19,599 Speaker 1: that they will vote to join Russia, then that he 141 00:09:19,720 --> 00:09:23,800 Speaker 1: will declare that the Russian border now is these new areas, 142 00:09:24,320 --> 00:09:27,720 Speaker 1: and that Russian military doctrine does say that they would 143 00:09:27,800 --> 00:09:31,120 Speaker 1: use nuclear weapons to defend an attack on Russia itself, 144 00:09:31,679 --> 00:09:36,080 Speaker 1: and so he is potentially setting up a scene in 145 00:09:36,160 --> 00:09:40,679 Speaker 1: which if Ukraine were to aggressively attack those areas, he 146 00:09:40,720 --> 00:09:43,400 Speaker 1: could claim that it was an attack on Russia. I mean, 147 00:09:43,600 --> 00:09:46,160 Speaker 1: is that too far fetched? How do you read this 148 00:09:46,160 --> 00:09:50,160 Speaker 1: whole gambit on his part? Well, I think this is 149 00:09:50,160 --> 00:09:53,040 Speaker 1: a dangerous situation. I think at this point there's no 150 00:09:53,160 --> 00:09:57,199 Speaker 1: question that the Russians are going to recognize the results 151 00:09:57,240 --> 00:10:00,920 Speaker 1: of these referenda. The rest of the world, with vanishing 152 00:10:01,040 --> 00:10:04,360 Speaker 1: a few exceptions, will not. That is not going to 153 00:10:04,440 --> 00:10:07,840 Speaker 1: hold pouting back on all of this. I don't know 154 00:10:07,920 --> 00:10:10,720 Speaker 1: how quickly the Russians are going to recognize the results 155 00:10:10,720 --> 00:10:14,479 Speaker 1: of these referenda. There may be a window of opportunity 156 00:10:14,679 --> 00:10:20,360 Speaker 1: between the holding of these votes and actual annexation by 157 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:24,120 Speaker 1: the Russian Duma. We will have to see that. Said, 158 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:28,280 Speaker 1: I'm not sure that Russian nuclear doctrine is quite as 159 00:10:28,480 --> 00:10:33,840 Speaker 1: clear as you're describing. Certainly, the Russians provide for the 160 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:37,840 Speaker 1: use of nuclear weapons if Russia is attacked with nuclear weapons. 161 00:10:39,120 --> 00:10:42,559 Speaker 1: The other scenario has been that if Russia is attacked 162 00:10:42,600 --> 00:10:47,120 Speaker 1: with conventional weapons and looks as if its existence as 163 00:10:47,160 --> 00:10:51,600 Speaker 1: a state is in jeopardy as a result, they also 164 00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:55,520 Speaker 1: provide for the use of nuclear weapons. My understanding is 165 00:10:55,559 --> 00:10:58,760 Speaker 1: that doctrinally they have never said that if you simply 166 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:02,960 Speaker 1: attack Russia in any way that they could respond with 167 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:07,040 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, So this is a little bit of an ambiguity. 168 00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:10,360 Speaker 1: While it is possible that they may respond to an 169 00:11:10,360 --> 00:11:16,080 Speaker 1: attack on these newly annexed territories with nuclear weapons, I 170 00:11:16,120 --> 00:11:20,320 Speaker 1: don't think that's a very likely scenario yet. I think 171 00:11:20,360 --> 00:11:24,439 Speaker 1: Putin would have to believe that Russia was in danger 172 00:11:24,480 --> 00:11:28,160 Speaker 1: of losing this war altogether before he would resort to 173 00:11:28,240 --> 00:11:32,880 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, and they're not there yet. One can imagine 174 00:11:32,920 --> 00:11:36,080 Speaker 1: that possibility off in the distant future, but it's not 175 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:38,679 Speaker 1: an imminent One. One of the things it was interesting 176 00:11:38,720 --> 00:11:41,400 Speaker 1: to me was on September fifteenth when they met in 177 00:11:41,480 --> 00:11:46,880 Speaker 1: Central Asia, President g was not exactly strongly supportive and 178 00:11:47,280 --> 00:11:49,199 Speaker 1: whatever Putent hoped to get out of it, and then 179 00:11:49,520 --> 00:11:53,319 Speaker 1: apparently Moti from India was aggressively negative about what they 180 00:11:53,320 --> 00:11:56,600 Speaker 1: were doing. Do you think in that sense that the 181 00:11:56,720 --> 00:12:02,200 Speaker 1: Russian military failure has weakened Putin's relative value as seen 182 00:12:02,240 --> 00:12:06,560 Speaker 1: by Boji and by Modi, Well, yeah, I think that's 183 00:12:06,640 --> 00:12:10,840 Speaker 1: almost inevitable. As you know, political power in the world 184 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:16,160 Speaker 1: has both absolute and perceptual components to it. Part of 185 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:19,480 Speaker 1: it is what actually can you use that power to do. 186 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:23,080 Speaker 1: Part of it is how you're perceived, the image that 187 00:12:23,120 --> 00:12:27,400 Speaker 1: you have of being powerful. And there's no question that 188 00:12:27,480 --> 00:12:31,640 Speaker 1: Russia's image of being powerful and influential in the world 189 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:36,240 Speaker 1: has taken enormous hits. That's inevitably going to happen when 190 00:12:36,559 --> 00:12:41,440 Speaker 1: a military campaign of this size and ambition sputters, and 191 00:12:41,559 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: it has. The Russians have impressed no one with how 192 00:12:46,040 --> 00:12:50,400 Speaker 1: effective they've been on the battlefield, and so that inevitably 193 00:12:50,440 --> 00:12:54,520 Speaker 1: means that Russia is not quite as valuable a partner 194 00:12:54,840 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 1: or an ally as it was prior to this war 195 00:12:58,440 --> 00:13:02,280 Speaker 1: for places like China and India. You know, the Indians 196 00:13:02,320 --> 00:13:07,400 Speaker 1: have purchased an enormous amount of Soviet and Russian military 197 00:13:07,440 --> 00:13:10,160 Speaker 1: weaponry over the years, and they've got to be wondering, 198 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:14,880 Speaker 1: you know, does that look particularly effective relative to that 199 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,520 Speaker 1: equipment of the West right now? I'm careious. Do you 200 00:13:17,559 --> 00:13:21,400 Speaker 1: think a g thinks about Taiwan that he has to 201 00:13:21,400 --> 00:13:25,400 Speaker 1: be a little bit skeptical about whether his peacetime military 202 00:13:25,440 --> 00:13:28,880 Speaker 1: can in fact operate the way that they would like 203 00:13:28,960 --> 00:13:31,360 Speaker 1: to claim they could, just given what he's seen of 204 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:35,640 Speaker 1: the gap between Russian pretension and Russian behavior. Well, I 205 00:13:35,640 --> 00:13:38,160 Speaker 1: don't know. This is a question that a lot of 206 00:13:38,240 --> 00:13:40,760 Speaker 1: analysts are asking right now, and I'm not sure anyone 207 00:13:40,840 --> 00:13:45,880 Speaker 1: has a very good answer to this. Besides speculating, Chinese 208 00:13:45,880 --> 00:13:51,120 Speaker 1: soldiers are not Russian soldiers, so that comparison depends to 209 00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:57,360 Speaker 1: a great degree on she's assessment of how effective the 210 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:01,760 Speaker 1: average Chinese soldier is relative to that of Russia. Part 211 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:05,640 Speaker 1: of it is, though, that this war, I think underscores 212 00:14:06,240 --> 00:14:10,800 Speaker 1: how difficult it is to go on offense against a 213 00:14:10,960 --> 00:14:18,040 Speaker 1: prepared and courageous and informed defense, particularly one that is 214 00:14:18,200 --> 00:14:24,360 Speaker 1: armed with American high tech weapons. My personal belief is 215 00:14:24,400 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: that of all the military operations one can undertake, and 216 00:14:29,600 --> 00:14:33,960 Speaker 1: amphibious invasion is among the most difficult. We learned that 217 00:14:34,320 --> 00:14:37,360 Speaker 1: in the US during World War Two. It took us 218 00:14:37,400 --> 00:14:41,640 Speaker 1: a while to master amphibious invasions and get good at it. 219 00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:45,720 Speaker 1: And even at that, it's an extremely difficult thing to 220 00:14:45,760 --> 00:14:49,800 Speaker 1: pull off. So I wouldn't imagine that the Chinese are 221 00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:53,640 Speaker 1: at all complacent about how things might go should they 222 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:57,160 Speaker 1: attempt to invade Taiwan. I always remind people that the 223 00:14:57,160 --> 00:15:00,040 Speaker 1: German army couldn't figure out how to get a I 224 00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 1: was twenty one miles of English Channel, and I want 225 00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:06,480 Speaker 1: Straits is about one hundred and forty miles. It is 226 00:15:06,520 --> 00:15:10,200 Speaker 1: a big problem, not a small problem. I'm curious, you know, 227 00:15:10,280 --> 00:15:13,000 Speaker 1: we keep getting more and more reports of burial sites 228 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:16,680 Speaker 1: of people who are tortured to death of various atrocities. 229 00:15:17,080 --> 00:15:19,320 Speaker 1: To what extent do you think once this is over, 230 00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:22,280 Speaker 1: the world will actually pursue that in the way that 231 00:15:22,320 --> 00:15:24,720 Speaker 1: we did in the Balkans, And to what extent do 232 00:15:24,720 --> 00:15:26,640 Speaker 1: you think it will just be sort of brushed over? 233 00:15:26,840 --> 00:15:29,520 Speaker 1: Is one of the costs of a war as people 234 00:15:29,520 --> 00:15:33,280 Speaker 1: try to get back to a more peaceful relationship. Well, 235 00:15:33,320 --> 00:15:35,480 Speaker 1: I think that depends to a great degree on how 236 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:39,160 Speaker 1: this war ends, and anybody that can tell you that 237 00:15:39,200 --> 00:15:41,240 Speaker 1: they know how this war is going to end is 238 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:45,800 Speaker 1: either fooling you or fooling themselves. But pursuing that kind 239 00:15:45,840 --> 00:15:52,040 Speaker 1: of investigation and punishment presupposes more or less an unconditional 240 00:15:52,120 --> 00:15:55,720 Speaker 1: military victory on the part of Ukraine and its Western allies, 241 00:15:56,600 --> 00:15:59,800 Speaker 1: And frankly, I don't think that's a very likely outcome. 242 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:03,240 Speaker 1: In part for the reason that you alluded to earlier, 243 00:16:03,320 --> 00:16:07,360 Speaker 1: the Russians have nuclear weapons and they're quite frantically signaling 244 00:16:07,360 --> 00:16:10,680 Speaker 1: that they're willing to use them. Had Hitler or Japan 245 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:13,840 Speaker 1: had nuclear weapons in World War Two, I think it's 246 00:16:13,920 --> 00:16:18,920 Speaker 1: highly unlikely that those wars would have ended in unconditional surrender. 247 00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:23,000 Speaker 1: So I don't think that that outcome is very likely, 248 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:26,960 Speaker 1: And as a result, I don't think that pursuing the 249 00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:30,480 Speaker 1: kinds of investigations and punishments that you're alluding to is 250 00:16:30,480 --> 00:16:44,080 Speaker 1: a very likely outcome. 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It's interesting to 265 00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:46,200 Speaker 1: me you sort of began working as an analyst civil 266 00:17:46,320 --> 00:17:50,760 Speaker 1: Union at exactly the point when it was just changing dramatically. 267 00:17:51,119 --> 00:17:52,679 Speaker 1: Let me go all the way back. How did you 268 00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:55,520 Speaker 1: get intrigued with the Soviet Union and what was the 269 00:17:55,560 --> 00:17:59,040 Speaker 1: base of your studies? Well, it's funny. My dad worked 270 00:17:59,040 --> 00:18:03,520 Speaker 1: for a role research laboratory MIT Lincoln Laboratory when I 271 00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:06,480 Speaker 1: was a kid, and when I was a teenager we 272 00:18:06,560 --> 00:18:10,560 Speaker 1: moved to quadrilin Atoll in the Marshall Islands, which is 273 00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:14,000 Speaker 1: the site of some of those amphibious invasions that we 274 00:18:14,040 --> 00:18:17,879 Speaker 1: had talked about during World War Two. And that's a 275 00:18:17,920 --> 00:18:21,040 Speaker 1: place that the United States Air Force uses as a 276 00:18:21,080 --> 00:18:26,760 Speaker 1: missile testing range. So we fire missiles ICBMs from Vandenberg 277 00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:29,959 Speaker 1: Air Force Base in California. They land in the lagoon 278 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:33,480 Speaker 1: on Quadulin Atoll. And one of the things that was 279 00:18:33,520 --> 00:18:36,200 Speaker 1: interesting when I was a kid, the Soviet Union had 280 00:18:36,240 --> 00:18:40,639 Speaker 1: an intelligence collectionship that would patrol off the shores of 281 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:44,320 Speaker 1: the island where I was living to collect telemetry data 282 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:47,520 Speaker 1: on these missiles that were coming in. This was one 283 00:18:47,520 --> 00:18:50,720 Speaker 1: of the provisions of some of the arms control treaties 284 00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:53,760 Speaker 1: that we had with the Soviet Union. And I would 285 00:18:53,800 --> 00:18:57,320 Speaker 1: go off fishing and scuba diving and things offshore with 286 00:18:57,440 --> 00:19:01,400 Speaker 1: my friends and we would wave to the Oviet collectionship 287 00:19:01,720 --> 00:19:04,320 Speaker 1: off in the distance and they would wave back. And 288 00:19:04,520 --> 00:19:07,280 Speaker 1: I got interested, and you know, what is this whole 289 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:10,960 Speaker 1: arms race and Cold War and what is the Soviet 290 00:19:11,080 --> 00:19:14,480 Speaker 1: Union all about? So I took some classes in college 291 00:19:14,560 --> 00:19:18,320 Speaker 1: just out of interest because this was a very real 292 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:22,760 Speaker 1: thing in my life as a teenager, and I sort 293 00:19:22,760 --> 00:19:27,640 Speaker 1: of eventually accumulated enough classes that I thought, gee, let's 294 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:30,560 Speaker 1: pursue it. In graduate school. And in grad school I 295 00:19:30,680 --> 00:19:34,520 Speaker 1: bumped accidentally into a guy who used to work at CIA, 296 00:19:34,600 --> 00:19:37,160 Speaker 1: who said, hey, you ought to look into this. Having 297 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:40,520 Speaker 1: no particular idea what else to do with this degree 298 00:19:41,040 --> 00:19:43,719 Speaker 1: rather than going to academia, I thought, Gee, that might 299 00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:45,800 Speaker 1: be an interesting thing to look into. And it all 300 00:19:45,840 --> 00:19:50,280 Speaker 1: sort of unfolded without any particular plan on my part. 301 00:19:50,840 --> 00:19:54,080 Speaker 1: So you end up studying the Silvia Union just at 302 00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:55,760 Speaker 1: the point where I was about to cease being the 303 00:19:55,760 --> 00:19:57,840 Speaker 1: Silvia Union. I mean in a way that must have 304 00:19:57,880 --> 00:20:02,119 Speaker 1: been a very exhilarating waking up every day wondering what 305 00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:06,560 Speaker 1: was going to happen next. Well, it was, quite honestly 306 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,199 Speaker 1: what happened over the course of my career. I started 307 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:12,680 Speaker 1: at the CIA in nineteen eighty six when there was 308 00:20:12,720 --> 00:20:15,879 Speaker 1: a great deal of debate about whether Gorbatov was really 309 00:20:15,920 --> 00:20:19,240 Speaker 1: a reformer or not and what direction he intended to 310 00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:24,080 Speaker 1: go inside the Soviet Union. And over the next twenty 311 00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 1: years a lot of things changed in a very big way, 312 00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:31,879 Speaker 1: and a lot of the conventional wisdom, the things that 313 00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:36,320 Speaker 1: people thought they knew about the world and how it operated, 314 00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:41,360 Speaker 1: what was possible and what wasn't actually proved erroneous. And 315 00:20:41,440 --> 00:20:45,800 Speaker 1: so what this taught me as an analyst was how 316 00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:51,359 Speaker 1: important it is to think about the ways things could 317 00:20:51,480 --> 00:20:56,960 Speaker 1: unfold that aren't what people expect, and to be sensitive 318 00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:04,200 Speaker 1: to how little things can turn into big changes. That's 319 00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:06,600 Speaker 1: happened over and over again over the course of my 320 00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:10,040 Speaker 1: career on a lot of different issues, and it has 321 00:21:10,080 --> 00:21:14,520 Speaker 1: made me quite sensitive to the importance of thinking about 322 00:21:14,560 --> 00:21:18,879 Speaker 1: alternatives to conventional wisdom. Did you have any notion in 323 00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:23,400 Speaker 1: eighty six that the whole system could collapse by ninety one? 324 00:21:24,119 --> 00:21:28,240 Speaker 1: Absolutely not, And almost no one that I knew in 325 00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:31,919 Speaker 1: or out of government had that kind of belief either. 326 00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 1: It took it awful lot of people by surprise. And 327 00:21:34,880 --> 00:21:37,440 Speaker 1: looking backwards, how much of it do you think was 328 00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:40,760 Speaker 1: Gorbuschoff and how much of it was just that the 329 00:21:40,840 --> 00:21:45,360 Speaker 1: system was decaying beyond the ability to sustain itself. Well, 330 00:21:45,400 --> 00:21:48,480 Speaker 1: I think it was a combination of both. Gorbuchoff, I think, 331 00:21:48,720 --> 00:21:53,679 Speaker 1: obviously proved to be a genuine reformer. That early debate 332 00:21:53,720 --> 00:21:58,120 Speaker 1: that we had over that resolved itself pretty quickly. But Gorbuschoff, 333 00:21:58,119 --> 00:22:03,480 Speaker 1: I think underestimated the forces of nationalism inside the Soviet 334 00:22:03,560 --> 00:22:08,480 Speaker 1: Union and what kind of effect they could have, And 335 00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:14,120 Speaker 1: I think he made some fundamental errors in understanding his 336 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:18,879 Speaker 1: own power base inside the country, how effective he could 337 00:22:18,880 --> 00:22:24,520 Speaker 1: be in trying to outmaneuver the Communist Party. Over time. 338 00:22:24,520 --> 00:22:29,000 Speaker 1: He felt that the anti reform elements in the Communist 339 00:22:29,000 --> 00:22:32,480 Speaker 1: Party could be outflanked in that he could build up 340 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:38,560 Speaker 1: the Russian state, the non Communist government, parts of that system, 341 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:43,240 Speaker 1: and use that as his base for ruling and overcome 342 00:22:43,400 --> 00:22:47,320 Speaker 1: opposition to reform in the party. What he didn't understand 343 00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:51,680 Speaker 1: was that there really was nothing there inside that apparatus 344 00:22:51,680 --> 00:22:55,760 Speaker 1: outside the party. So he put his chips on something 345 00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:59,760 Speaker 1: that was really not substantial, and he paid a new 346 00:22:59,760 --> 00:23:02,320 Speaker 1: normal price for that. I was really struck that the 347 00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:05,840 Speaker 1: system had become so endlessly corrupt that if you led 348 00:23:05,880 --> 00:23:09,400 Speaker 1: an anti corruption campaign, the whole system just froze up. 349 00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:12,120 Speaker 1: It didn't know what to do anymore. It was an 350 00:23:12,119 --> 00:23:16,400 Speaker 1: extraordinarily period, and I agree with you, was virtually unpredictable, 351 00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: how fast it occurred, and how many different pieces of 352 00:23:19,840 --> 00:23:23,320 Speaker 1: it occurred, that no one of which could have been predicted, which, 353 00:23:23,320 --> 00:23:26,360 Speaker 1: in a sense as a useful reminder when you think 354 00:23:26,359 --> 00:23:28,879 Speaker 1: about the future that if we weren't all that clever 355 00:23:29,000 --> 00:23:31,359 Speaker 1: in the late eighties. Maybe we're not all that clever 356 00:23:31,560 --> 00:23:33,440 Speaker 1: right now. And I know you've written a book back 357 00:23:33,480 --> 00:23:37,560 Speaker 1: in twenty nineteen, The Russia Trap, how our shadow war 358 00:23:37,640 --> 00:23:41,239 Speaker 1: with Russia could spiral into nuclear catastrophe, which is one 359 00:23:41,240 --> 00:23:42,919 Speaker 1: of the things, frankly, I worry about a lot, and 360 00:23:43,080 --> 00:23:45,680 Speaker 1: one reason I really wanted you to come and spend 361 00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:48,440 Speaker 1: some time with us. And you basically warned that if 362 00:23:48,440 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: we're going to avoid a catastrophic and mutually destructive war, 363 00:23:56,200 --> 00:24:01,440 Speaker 1: that we've got to find some method to compromise. Talk 364 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:05,120 Speaker 1: diesital governments about the notion that what could happen, much 365 00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:09,040 Speaker 1: like what happened in nineteen fourteen in particular, and to 366 00:24:09,080 --> 00:24:11,600 Speaker 1: a lesser extent in thirty nine to forty one, the 367 00:24:11,720 --> 00:24:15,320 Speaker 1: system just gets tighter and tighter and tighter and more 368 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:19,680 Speaker 1: and more hostile, and there are fewer and fewer options, 369 00:24:20,440 --> 00:24:23,600 Speaker 1: and then suddenly one morning you find yourself, by the 370 00:24:23,640 --> 00:24:27,520 Speaker 1: force of logic, doing something which is totally irrational. That's 371 00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:30,080 Speaker 1: essentially what happened in the run up to World War One. 372 00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:34,320 Speaker 1: There were a variety of factors that came together and 373 00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:39,679 Speaker 1: reinforce one another and put Europe on a path toward 374 00:24:39,760 --> 00:24:44,000 Speaker 1: a catastrophic collision that toward the end it no longer 375 00:24:44,040 --> 00:24:47,400 Speaker 1: had real options to get out of, and I frankly 376 00:24:47,480 --> 00:24:50,280 Speaker 1: worry that that's the situation that we're in right now 377 00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:55,879 Speaker 1: with Russia, and Putin's options are narrowing. He is increasingly 378 00:24:56,000 --> 00:25:00,879 Speaker 1: forced to escalate. He's got a choice between doubling down, 379 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:07,119 Speaker 1: mobilizing Russia for all out war and humiliation conceding that 380 00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:10,879 Speaker 1: this was all a giant mistake and that NATO is 381 00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:17,760 Speaker 1: going to expand into Ukraine and Russia from his perspective, 382 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:21,879 Speaker 1: is then on a path toward not just irrelevancy, but 383 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:25,920 Speaker 1: perhaps even internal breakup. And one of the things that Americans, 384 00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:29,520 Speaker 1: I think, don't appreciate when we hear that the Russians 385 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:33,360 Speaker 1: are concerned that the United States is out for Russia's demise, 386 00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:36,000 Speaker 1: that we're trying to break up the country and circle 387 00:25:36,040 --> 00:25:39,119 Speaker 1: it militarily, we think, Oh, this is just all a 388 00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:43,800 Speaker 1: bunch of nonsense. They're paranoid. Well, they actually went through 389 00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:48,800 Speaker 1: the breakup of their country, many of them a generation 390 00:25:49,119 --> 00:25:53,200 Speaker 1: or less ago, in the Soviet Union, so they are 391 00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:57,359 Speaker 1: not at all complacent about how stable that situation is. 392 00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:02,119 Speaker 1: In the United States obviously celebrated the Soviet Union's break up. 393 00:26:02,200 --> 00:26:06,280 Speaker 1: We regarded this as a great triumph, and many Americans 394 00:26:06,320 --> 00:26:10,840 Speaker 1: today think that Russia itself is a country that should 395 00:26:10,960 --> 00:26:13,840 Speaker 1: be defeated and should be broken up. There was an 396 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:17,520 Speaker 1: article in the Atlantic not too long ago calling for 397 00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:23,040 Speaker 1: Russia's internal decolonization, as they put it. And the Russians 398 00:26:23,119 --> 00:26:26,480 Speaker 1: look at things like this and think that in fact, 399 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:31,199 Speaker 1: this is indicative of American intentions, that we are attempting 400 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:36,960 Speaker 1: to eliminate Russia as a great power. And the Russians, 401 00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:40,320 Speaker 1: of course, think of themselves not just as a country 402 00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:44,040 Speaker 1: that should be a great power. They think that Russia 403 00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:48,040 Speaker 1: can't survive unless it is, which again is something that 404 00:26:48,080 --> 00:26:51,720 Speaker 1: Americans have a hard time understanding. But the Russians don't 405 00:26:51,760 --> 00:26:55,159 Speaker 1: think they have the option of being a Sweden, a 406 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,840 Speaker 1: country that was once a great military power and decided 407 00:26:58,880 --> 00:27:02,080 Speaker 1: it was going to become a country that provided a 408 00:27:02,119 --> 00:27:05,880 Speaker 1: great standard of living for its people. Instead, the Russians 409 00:27:05,920 --> 00:27:10,840 Speaker 1: think they're just too vast a country, too geographically vulnerable 410 00:27:10,880 --> 00:27:18,120 Speaker 1: to invasion, too surrounded by hostile countries, that they have 411 00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:22,800 Speaker 1: to be a great power to protect themselves against the 412 00:27:22,880 --> 00:27:26,560 Speaker 1: intentions of others. So this is a mentality that is 413 00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:30,240 Speaker 1: hard for Americans to understand, we have a much different 414 00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:34,520 Speaker 1: geographic situation, a much different history than the Russians do. 415 00:27:35,359 --> 00:27:39,400 Speaker 1: But for them, these are very real fears. And I 416 00:27:39,440 --> 00:27:44,240 Speaker 1: think we're in a situation right now where the Russians 417 00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:48,240 Speaker 1: believe that they fight or they die, that this is 418 00:27:48,280 --> 00:27:54,120 Speaker 1: an existential battle for them, not so much focused against Ukraine, 419 00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:58,440 Speaker 1: but being played out in Ukraine between the United States 420 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:02,240 Speaker 1: and Russia. This is a war of Russia fighting against 421 00:28:02,280 --> 00:28:05,280 Speaker 1: what they called the Collective West. They have a much 422 00:28:05,320 --> 00:28:24,480 Speaker 1: different perspective on this than most Americans do. You talk 423 00:28:24,560 --> 00:28:27,600 Speaker 1: a little bit about the notion that we've been involved 424 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:30,600 Speaker 1: in a shadow war. I have an intrigued because, frankly, 425 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:33,680 Speaker 1: I would have guessed that Biden would have been more 426 00:28:34,240 --> 00:28:39,600 Speaker 1: cautious and more disinclined to use power than he has. 427 00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 1: You have to say in the Ukraine that Biden has 428 00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:44,920 Speaker 1: pretty well stepped up to the plate in a way 429 00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:47,440 Speaker 1: that I would not have predicted frankly. But I think 430 00:28:47,440 --> 00:28:50,240 Speaker 1: it's part of sort of where we are as a 431 00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:54,360 Speaker 1: bureaucratic national security system in dealing with Russia right now. 432 00:28:54,720 --> 00:28:57,000 Speaker 1: But described just briefly, because I think it's a very 433 00:28:57,120 --> 00:29:00,720 Speaker 1: useful distinction between a hot war war like we had 434 00:29:00,760 --> 00:29:03,520 Speaker 1: with Japan of Germany, and a cold war like we 435 00:29:03,560 --> 00:29:06,600 Speaker 1: had with the Soviet Union. And it actually fits the 436 00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:09,680 Speaker 1: Russian model of hybrid warfare, so that we're fighting sort 437 00:29:09,680 --> 00:29:14,280 Speaker 1: of a shadow conflict where we're dancing with each other 438 00:29:14,360 --> 00:29:17,120 Speaker 1: in ways that are dangerous. Can you describe how you 439 00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:19,880 Speaker 1: got to the concept of shadow war and what it 440 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:22,160 Speaker 1: means to you? Well, I was trying to come up 441 00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:25,080 Speaker 1: with a term that describes something in between what was 442 00:29:25,120 --> 00:29:28,040 Speaker 1: going on in the Cold War and an actual traditional 443 00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:31,600 Speaker 1: hot war with Nazi Germany or Japan in World War Two. 444 00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:34,600 Speaker 1: You know, the Russian concept of hybrid war really is 445 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:37,040 Speaker 1: a derivative of what they think the United States has 446 00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:40,200 Speaker 1: been doing to Russia. It didn't originate with the Russians. 447 00:29:40,200 --> 00:29:44,400 Speaker 1: The Russians actually adopted it based on what they saw 448 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:48,000 Speaker 1: or thought they saw us doing. So it's a combination 449 00:29:48,040 --> 00:29:50,560 Speaker 1: of high technology. There's a lot going on in the 450 00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:57,520 Speaker 1: cyber world, sabotage and subterfuge and efforts to try to 451 00:29:57,680 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 1: influence internal politics through the Internet and digital communications. So 452 00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:06,720 Speaker 1: that's been going on land at a very high level 453 00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:10,200 Speaker 1: for many years now. Part of this is economic warfare 454 00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:13,120 Speaker 1: and the United States is quite good at that we 455 00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:19,200 Speaker 1: have enormous resources to draw on in financial state craft. 456 00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:22,680 Speaker 1: And the Russians believe this has been going on for 457 00:30:22,800 --> 00:30:25,960 Speaker 1: quite some time and that the ultimate aim of this 458 00:30:26,080 --> 00:30:29,360 Speaker 1: is not to change Russian behavior, but to change Russia itself, 459 00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:33,600 Speaker 1: which they find quite alarming. And there's also an awful 460 00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:37,960 Speaker 1: lot of sparring that has been going on between US 461 00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:42,640 Speaker 1: and Russian military forces in a number of domains. Part 462 00:30:42,640 --> 00:30:44,680 Speaker 1: of this is going on in space, which is an 463 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:48,680 Speaker 1: increasingly important domain in warfare. Part of it's going on 464 00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:55,200 Speaker 1: at sea and in the air with intelligence collection flights 465 00:30:55,280 --> 00:30:59,680 Speaker 1: that have been going on, testing of sea and air 466 00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:03,320 Speaker 1: de fences that both sides have been engaged in. So 467 00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:09,280 Speaker 1: the Russians see the purpose of this as war by 468 00:31:09,320 --> 00:31:15,280 Speaker 1: other means, that these are coercive efforts carried out in 469 00:31:15,320 --> 00:31:22,239 Speaker 1: these unconventional ways that have an aim of changing Russia's 470 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:27,720 Speaker 1: internal politics in some way, bringing about regime change, weakening 471 00:31:27,800 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 1: Russia to the point where it can't function effectively in 472 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: the world. So I summarized all that with the term 473 00:31:34,520 --> 00:31:38,719 Speaker 1: shadow warfare. Right now we're moving past shadow warfare into 474 00:31:39,320 --> 00:31:43,000 Speaker 1: proxy warfare. We're nudging right up to the edge of 475 00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:47,200 Speaker 1: an openly declared hot war between the United States and Russia. 476 00:31:47,400 --> 00:31:49,360 Speaker 1: Let me ask one question that you sort of triggered. 477 00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:54,760 Speaker 1: Do you think that from a Russian perspective, the notion 478 00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:59,400 Speaker 1: of Russia evolving into a relatively open liberal democracy with 479 00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: the rule of would actually be a defeat because it 480 00:32:02,760 --> 00:32:06,800 Speaker 1: would have ended Russia as the historic authoritarian culture had 481 00:32:06,840 --> 00:32:11,200 Speaker 1: always been a defeat for Russia. Yes, that what we 482 00:32:11,280 --> 00:32:14,160 Speaker 1: think of as the natural outcome of evolution, they would 483 00:32:14,200 --> 00:32:18,960 Speaker 1: regard as a replacement of their culture and their system. Well, 484 00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:22,640 Speaker 1: I think some Russians would far from all. I think 485 00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:26,760 Speaker 1: a lot of Russians would embrace that kind of outcome. 486 00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:31,320 Speaker 1: The difficulty with that is how do you get there? 487 00:32:32,240 --> 00:32:35,880 Speaker 1: And that's the difficulty that we encountered quite directly in 488 00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:40,400 Speaker 1: the nineteen nineties, when I think both the United States 489 00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:44,800 Speaker 1: and a lot of Russian liberal reformers had very good intentions. 490 00:32:44,840 --> 00:32:47,840 Speaker 1: There was a great deal of hope that Russia could 491 00:32:47,880 --> 00:32:54,800 Speaker 1: transform relatively quickly into a liberal, Western style, market oriented democracy. 492 00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:58,440 Speaker 1: And obviously, in retrospect, it didn't work out that way. 493 00:32:58,640 --> 00:33:01,920 Speaker 1: But I think what did on the part of a 494 00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:05,120 Speaker 1: lot of Russians was to believe that the United States 495 00:33:05,480 --> 00:33:11,560 Speaker 1: didn't actually want to see Russia succeed and thrive, that 496 00:33:11,600 --> 00:33:14,479 Speaker 1: this was all a plot on our part to weaken 497 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:17,960 Speaker 1: and break up Russia. After all, we're the world's most 498 00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:22,520 Speaker 1: powerful country. If we were up to our eyes in 499 00:33:22,520 --> 00:33:27,160 Speaker 1: involvement in Russia's internal politics during that period and it 500 00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:30,520 Speaker 1: turned out to be such a mess, then obviously that's 501 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:33,280 Speaker 1: because we wanted it to turn into such a mess. 502 00:33:33,320 --> 00:33:36,280 Speaker 1: And the notion that the United States didn't actually know 503 00:33:36,320 --> 00:33:39,800 Speaker 1: what it was doing, It didn't actually know how you 504 00:33:40,680 --> 00:33:44,280 Speaker 1: orchestrate the transformation of a country like that into a 505 00:33:44,480 --> 00:33:48,480 Speaker 1: capitalist democracy didn't occur to a lot of people in Russia. 506 00:33:48,640 --> 00:33:52,080 Speaker 1: And unfortunately, I think that's the most likely explanation that 507 00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:57,160 Speaker 1: transforming a country like that is an extremely difficult thing 508 00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:01,480 Speaker 1: to do, particularly from the outside side, particularly by people 509 00:34:01,480 --> 00:34:04,520 Speaker 1: that don't understand the culture and the history and all 510 00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:08,520 Speaker 1: the connections that are there. And this is something that 511 00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:11,240 Speaker 1: I think a lot of conservatives in the United States 512 00:34:11,640 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 1: have a strange position on. We tend to believe that 513 00:34:15,360 --> 00:34:21,680 Speaker 1: social engineering by the federal government tends to result in disaster, 514 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:25,000 Speaker 1: and I think there's good reason for believing that. But 515 00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:28,720 Speaker 1: suddenly we're going to go overseas and engage in massive 516 00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:33,000 Speaker 1: social engineering efforts in countries that we don't understand nearly 517 00:34:33,040 --> 00:34:34,920 Speaker 1: as well as our own, and we somehow think they're 518 00:34:34,960 --> 00:34:37,080 Speaker 1: going to succeed. And I think we have good reason 519 00:34:37,200 --> 00:34:40,319 Speaker 1: for being far more humble about that than we have been. 520 00:34:40,600 --> 00:34:44,680 Speaker 1: As the grinding war with Ukraine continues. How concerned are 521 00:34:44,719 --> 00:34:48,400 Speaker 1: you though we could drift into sort of tactical engagement 522 00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:53,719 Speaker 1: between Russian and American forces? Well, I'm quite concerned. I 523 00:34:53,760 --> 00:34:57,640 Speaker 1: think the Biden administration has been to this point quite 524 00:34:57,680 --> 00:35:01,080 Speaker 1: cautious about not wanting to get erectly involved in all 525 00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:04,080 Speaker 1: of this. Biden has repeatedly said that he does not 526 00:35:04,280 --> 00:35:08,279 Speaker 1: want World War three, and rightly so. But when you're 527 00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:11,600 Speaker 1: in an escalation spiral, which I think we are in 528 00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:15,640 Speaker 1: with the Russians, there's a temptation on the part of 529 00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:19,359 Speaker 1: both sides to believe that this next step up the 530 00:35:19,480 --> 00:35:23,279 Speaker 1: escalatory ladder will cause the other side to sober up. 531 00:35:23,840 --> 00:35:27,719 Speaker 1: They'll realize they can't win, they'll realize that it's just 532 00:35:27,760 --> 00:35:32,480 Speaker 1: getting too dangerous, and they'll sue for peace, essentially, And 533 00:35:32,560 --> 00:35:35,120 Speaker 1: that has happened on both sides at every stage, and 534 00:35:35,160 --> 00:35:38,560 Speaker 1: this word so far, the Biden administrations started out early 535 00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:41,640 Speaker 1: this year by saying to the Russians, Hey, if you 536 00:35:41,719 --> 00:35:45,160 Speaker 1: follow through and you actually invade Ukraine, you're going to 537 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:48,320 Speaker 1: get sanctions like you've never imagined, and we're going to 538 00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:52,040 Speaker 1: make countermoves in the West that will bring about a 539 00:35:52,080 --> 00:35:55,480 Speaker 1: situation that you want to avoid, So don't do it. Well, 540 00:35:55,520 --> 00:35:59,440 Speaker 1: what happened. Putin actually followed through on the invasion, then 541 00:35:59,520 --> 00:36:03,200 Speaker 1: we scald then he escalated again, then we had the 542 00:36:03,320 --> 00:36:08,120 Speaker 1: Ukrainian counter offensive. And what happened Putin is escalating right now, 543 00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:10,680 Speaker 1: and I think what's going to come next is we're 544 00:36:10,719 --> 00:36:19,279 Speaker 1: going to see much more serious, widespread and destructive Russian bombing, missile, artillery, 545 00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 1: rocket attacks that are going to go after Ukrainian infrastructure, 546 00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:28,080 Speaker 1: that go after cities what the Russians called decision making 547 00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:32,120 Speaker 1: centers in Ukraine, and that's going to cause a great 548 00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:36,960 Speaker 1: deal of outrage in the West, justifiably. So Washington is 549 00:36:37,000 --> 00:36:41,320 Speaker 1: going to look at this, and the typical Washington response 550 00:36:41,360 --> 00:36:44,239 Speaker 1: to these sorts of things is to do something. We 551 00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:47,719 Speaker 1: can't just sit there and tolerate this. We have to 552 00:36:47,760 --> 00:36:50,200 Speaker 1: do something. So I think the pressure is going to 553 00:36:50,280 --> 00:36:53,759 Speaker 1: build in Washington to provide the Ukrainians with the wherewithal 554 00:36:54,320 --> 00:36:59,040 Speaker 1: to respond to retaliate in kind on Russian infrastructure, on 555 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:03,280 Speaker 1: Russian decision making centers, and then what's going to happen. 556 00:37:03,480 --> 00:37:05,759 Speaker 1: The Russians are going to sober up and back off, 557 00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:08,560 Speaker 1: I don't think so. I think they're going to escalate again. 558 00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:12,560 Speaker 1: So the only way you get out of these kinds 559 00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:18,760 Speaker 1: of spirals is to talk, to find a compromise way 560 00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:22,840 Speaker 1: out of this. But I don't see any appetite right now. 561 00:37:23,520 --> 00:37:28,120 Speaker 1: First in Ukraine, which Zelinsky is being quite clear that 562 00:37:28,160 --> 00:37:30,239 Speaker 1: he believes the only way out of this war is 563 00:37:30,320 --> 00:37:35,320 Speaker 1: Russia's complete defeat. But Washington doesn't seem to be pursuing 564 00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:39,400 Speaker 1: any kind of talks at this point. And the Russians, 565 00:37:39,440 --> 00:37:42,440 Speaker 1: I think, although they are saying they're open to talks, 566 00:37:43,480 --> 00:37:47,160 Speaker 1: have almost given up hope that anybody on the other 567 00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:51,040 Speaker 1: side wants to engage. So we're on a I think, 568 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:54,720 Speaker 1: a very dangerous course right now. I think that's probably 569 00:37:54,760 --> 00:37:59,040 Speaker 1: an accurate description of what's happening. I've always been concerned 570 00:37:59,680 --> 00:38:02,560 Speaker 1: from the time we added Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to 571 00:38:02,640 --> 00:38:08,480 Speaker 1: NATO because Estonia is basically an ex Arab of Saint Petersburg, 572 00:38:09,520 --> 00:38:12,080 Speaker 1: and of course now adding Finland and Sweden will increase 573 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,400 Speaker 1: the Russian sense of encirclement. I think this is a 574 00:38:15,520 --> 00:38:18,359 Speaker 1: very very dangerous period. George. I want to thank you 575 00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:21,560 Speaker 1: for joining me and helping us understand more about what 576 00:38:21,719 --> 00:38:24,920 Speaker 1: is happening with Putin's Russia and the conflict with Ukraine 577 00:38:24,960 --> 00:38:27,520 Speaker 1: and the dangers we all face. And I want to 578 00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:30,000 Speaker 1: let our listeners know. We'll have a link to your 579 00:38:30,040 --> 00:38:33,720 Speaker 1: book The Russia Trap, How our shadow war with Russia 580 00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:37,239 Speaker 1: could spiral into nuclear catastrophe on our show page at 581 00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:40,839 Speaker 1: newtsworld dot com. Thank you very very much, thank you, 582 00:38:44,320 --> 00:38:46,919 Speaker 1: Thank you to my guest George Biebe. You can learn 583 00:38:46,960 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: more about Russia's invasion of Ukraine at newtsworld dot com. 584 00:38:51,120 --> 00:38:54,480 Speaker 1: Newts World is produced by Gewich three sixty and iHeartMedia. 585 00:38:54,920 --> 00:38:59,160 Speaker 1: Our executive producers Garnsey Slung, our producers Rebecca Howe, and 586 00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:02,920 Speaker 1: our research is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show 587 00:39:03,400 --> 00:39:06,560 Speaker 1: was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team 588 00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:10,120 Speaker 1: at Gingwishtree sixty. If you've been enjoying newts World, I 589 00:39:10,160 --> 00:39:13,120 Speaker 1: hope you'll go to Apple Podcasts and both rate us 590 00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:16,240 Speaker 1: with five stars and give us a review so others 591 00:39:16,239 --> 00:39:19,360 Speaker 1: can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of 592 00:39:19,440 --> 00:39:23,640 Speaker 1: newts World consigned for my three free weekly columns at 593 00:39:23,640 --> 00:39:28,200 Speaker 1: gingwistreet sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gangwich. This 594 00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:29,080 Speaker 1: is Newtsworld