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Speaker 1: Topics featured in this episode may be disturbing to some listeners.

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Speaker 1: Please take care while listening.

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Speaker 2: This is a crime that thrives in the shadows, and

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Speaker 2: people needed to hear what was actually going on.

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Speaker 3: One of the biggest problems reporting on this is nobody

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Speaker 3: wants to hear about the problem because of how awful

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Speaker 3: it is.

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Speaker 1: I'm Andrea Gunning and this is a betrayal bonus episode.

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Speaker 1: In episode four, you heard from New York Times reporters

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Speaker 1: Michael Keller and Gabriel Dance as they spoke to their

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Speaker 1: twenty nineteen investigative piece on child sexual abuse material. It's

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Speaker 1: called the Internet is overrun with images of child sexual abuse?

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Speaker 1: What went wrong? If you have a chance to read it,

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Speaker 1: look it up because it's superb investigative reporting. There's a

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Speaker 1: link in our show notes to the article. We wanted

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Speaker 1: to dive a little deeper. How are crimes being reported,

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Speaker 1: what role our technology company's playing, and how is the

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Speaker 1: government responding. Here's Michael Keller.

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Speaker 2: This is a crime that thrives in the shadows, and

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Speaker 2: people needed to hear what was actually going on.

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Speaker 1: Reporter Gabriel Dance.

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Speaker 3: One of the biggest problems reporting on this is nobody

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Speaker 3: wants to hear about the problem because of how awful it.

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Speaker 1: Is, and to be honest, we were nervous. We know

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Speaker 1: from season one of Betrayal that our audience is genuinely

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Speaker 1: interested in letting the light in on dark stories. One

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Speaker 1: of Michael and Gabriel's most important revelations was that our

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Speaker 1: legislators don't really want to hear about it. State lawmakers, judges,

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Speaker 1: and members of Congress have avoided attending meetings and hearings

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Speaker 1: when it was on the agenda. They just aren't showing up.

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Speaker 2: One of the big things was the failures of the

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Speaker 2: federal govern to live up to its own promises that

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Speaker 2: it made around two thousand and eight to develop a

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Speaker 2: strong national response. The government had not really followed through

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Speaker 2: on its grand plans. The high role position at DOJ

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Speaker 2: was never fully created. The strategy reports that we're supposed

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Speaker 2: to come out on a regular basis, there's only been

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Speaker 2: two of them over the last decade. You know, these

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Speaker 2: reports have risen, but federal funding to these special task

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Speaker 2: forces has largely remained flat.

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Speaker 3: I mean, there's so much of these offenses going on,

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Speaker 3: there's so many reports, there's not enough police in the

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Speaker 3: United States seemingly to solved this problem.

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Speaker 1: I CAACK, or the Internet Crimes Against Children's Task Force,

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Speaker 1: is working on the front lines every day. There's at

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Speaker 1: least one eye CACK in every state hearing what they

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Speaker 1: go through through daily. It's truly harrowing.

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Speaker 3: What I will say is speaking with members of these

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Speaker 3: ICAC task forces, I was always in such admiration and

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Speaker 3: awe of their work dealing with this kind of content

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Speaker 3: and this kind of horrible crime, and really the survivors

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Speaker 3: and how hurt some of them are for sometimes the

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Speaker 3: rest of their lives. We spoke with an Ikaq guy

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Speaker 3: in Kansas who had served in the Iraq War, and

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Speaker 3: he said he would almost rather go back and serve

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Speaker 3: another tour than continue in his position dealing with these

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Speaker 3: types of crimes.

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Speaker 2: He had said that he worked in Ikaq and then

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Speaker 2: to take a break, he did a tour in Iraq

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Speaker 2: and then came back and felt like, all right, now

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Speaker 2: I can go back and keep doing this work.

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Speaker 1: I'm in awe of the law enforcement officers. They choose

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Speaker 1: this work because they want to save children, but it

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Speaker 1: really is a kin to war in an emotional sense.

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Speaker 3: Some people like viscerally cannot deal with this issue because

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Speaker 3: it is truly one of the most awful crimes that

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Speaker 3: we commit against one another and the descriptions. Michael and

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Speaker 3: I probably read hundreds and hundreds of search warrants and

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Speaker 3: legal documents that would describe videos and photos and the

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Speaker 3: acts in them.

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Speaker 1: One strategy ICAQ uses to write reports is to turn

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Speaker 1: the video off when documenting the audio and turn the

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Speaker 1: sound off when documenting the video because it's too much

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Speaker 1: to handle. At the same time, these KAC Task Force

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Speaker 1: members can only do so much with what they are given.

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Speaker 1: They triage the cases, often prioritizing the youngest victims, but

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Speaker 1: they can only investigate about a third of all the

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Speaker 1: tips because the caseload so overwhelming. Of course, predators are

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Speaker 1: the biggest problem and bear the most responsibility, but we

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Speaker 1: need to acknowledge there's another culpable participant when it comes

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Speaker 1: to the explosion of seesam material technology companies. Before the Internet,

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Speaker 1: the US Postal Service was the leading reporter of CESAM

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Speaker 1: and was stopping the dissemination of material via the mail. However,

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Speaker 1: with millions of images plaguing the Internet, is it time

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Speaker 1: we started holding technology companies responsible? For their lack of action.

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Speaker 3: What I do think they're certainly responsible for is allowing

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Speaker 3: this problem to get very serious before they started to

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Speaker 3: take responsibility for their role in it. As early as

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Speaker 3: two thousand, tech companies knew this was a very serious problem,

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Speaker 3: and we're doing nothing to solve it. So I would

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Speaker 3: say that tech companies are certainly responsible for allowing the

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Speaker 3: problem to spiral out of control in the early part

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Speaker 3: of this century, and I'm encouraged that from what we've seen,

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Speaker 3: several of them have begun to take the problem much

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Speaker 3: more seriously.

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Speaker 1: The technology exists to root out criminal behavior, why aren't

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Speaker 1: tech companies deploying it?

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Speaker 2: Microsoft, along with professor Hani Farred, came up with the

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Speaker 2: technology called photo DNA. This takes a database of image

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Speaker 2: fingerprints and whenever a photograph gets uploaded to an Internet platform,

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Speaker 2: that company can scan it to see if it's in

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Speaker 2: the database of verified illegal imagery. And so that's the

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Speaker 2: main tool that tech companies use, which is great because

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Speaker 2: it's largely automated and easy to use. It's been around

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Speaker 2: for a long time, so a company like Facebook or

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Speaker 2: others that are doing automated scanning, they can generate a

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Speaker 2: large number of reports just through this software. They also

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Speaker 2: generally have a team of human moderators that review it,

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Speaker 2: and that serves an.

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Speaker 1: Important role of.

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Speaker 2: Verifying what was found and also escalating it if there's

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Speaker 2: evidence of actual hands on abuse.

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Speaker 3: Of a child.

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Speaker 2: If you talk with most technology policy people, one perspective

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Speaker 2: that you hear a lot. Technology companies don't have that

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Speaker 2: much pressure to get rid of harmful content on their

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Speaker 2: platform because they don't face any legal liability for it.

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Speaker 2: You know, technology companies, of course would say, we have

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Speaker 2: every reason to get rid of this harmful content. We

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Speaker 2: don't want to be a place for exploitation. What the

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Speaker 2: legislative solutions that have been proposed so far try to

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Speaker 2: go after Section two thirty of the Communications Decency Act,

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Speaker 2: which shields technology companies from any liability for content that

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Speaker 2: users post. There have been a few proposals to try

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Speaker 2: and change that, both from Democrats and Republicans. It's been

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Speaker 2: one of the few areas of bipartisan support. Those proposals

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Speaker 2: have not gone through, but over the last few years

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Speaker 2: you do see people trying to find ways to increase

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Speaker 2: the incentives for tech companies to clamp down on this more.

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Speaker 1: Let's take Facebook's parent company Meta. As an example, Meta

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Speaker 1: is the leading reporter of child sexual abuse material to

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Speaker 1: the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Almost all

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Speaker 1: of the illegal content gets transmitted through their Messenger app.

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Speaker 1: That isn't necessarily because it has the most CSAM because

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Speaker 1: they're using photo DNA and finding offenders. Currently, Messenger does

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Speaker 1: not encrypt their messages. However, Meta has announced that this

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Speaker 1: year it will make end to end and encryption the default.

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Speaker 1: Meta executives have admitted that encryption will decrease its ability

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Speaker 1: to report SESAM, saying if it's content we cannot see,

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Speaker 1: then it's content we cannot report. The Virtual Global Task Force,

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Speaker 1: a consortium of fifteen law enforcement agencies, is practically begging

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Speaker 1: Meta not to do it. Meta CEO Mark Sockerberg stated

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Speaker 1: encryption is a powerful tool for privacy, but that includes

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Speaker 1: the privacy of people doing bad things. When billions of

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Speaker 1: people use a service to connect, some of them are

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Speaker 1: going to misuse it for truly terrible things like child exploitation, terrorism,

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Speaker 1: and extortion.

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Speaker 3: The more communications are encrypted, the less capable tech companies

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Speaker 3: are of using these automated scanning tools to find and

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Speaker 3: report se SAM. That's a much broader conversation that should

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Speaker 3: be had, and oftentimes it gets shorthanded to everything should

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Speaker 3: be encrypted or nothing should be encrypted. The encryption conversation

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Speaker 3: is often complicated by this particular issue and held out

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Speaker 3: by both sides, both by law enforcement and by tech

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Speaker 3: companies and people who believe that all communications should be

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Speaker 3: encrypted as a wedge issue. I think there can be

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Speaker 3: more nuanced to that conversation, particularly when you come to

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Speaker 3: platforms and social media networks where adults can engage with children.

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Speaker 3: Just by definition, children are at such a disadvantage. Something

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Speaker 3: that's important to note as well is that many of

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Speaker 3: these social networks also give predators is an opportunity to

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Speaker 3: engage with children in a way that was never before possible.

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Speaker 3: You have documented cases of grown men going on Facebook

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Speaker 3: pretending to be children and then sexually extorting other children

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Speaker 3: into sending images of themselves, after which they continue to

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Speaker 3: force them to produce more and more imagery.

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Speaker 1: Gabe is referring to what is commonly known as sextortion,

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Speaker 1: tricking a young person into sending an image and then

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Speaker 1: essentially blackmailing the child into scending more with threats of

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Speaker 1: exposure or harm. The encryption debate won't be solved anytime soon,

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Speaker 1: but it's clear that protecting children from abuse is not

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Speaker 1: enough of a reason to compel for profit tech companies

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Speaker 1: to consider changing their approach. Social media websites and messaging

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Speaker 1: platforms are ground zero for the production and sharing of

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Speaker 1: ce sam material through the dark web and encrypted groups.

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Speaker 1: Appalling communities have developed. Take the site welcome to Video.

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Speaker 1: This darknet site, hosted in South Korea, a mass more

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Speaker 1: than two hundred and fifty thousand child exploitation videos in

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Speaker 1: only two years. Welcome to Video created a community of

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Speaker 1: users who bought and traded appalling content. Videos were sold

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Speaker 1: for bitcoin. According to an April twenty twenty two article

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Speaker 1: in Wired magazine, the site's upload page instructed do not

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Speaker 1: upload adult porn, the last two words highlighted and read

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Speaker 1: for emphasis. The page also warned that uploaded videos would

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Speaker 1: be checked for uniqueness, meaning only new material would be accepted.

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Speaker 2: In a lot of online groups, these images are like

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Speaker 2: a currency. In order to gain access to people's collections,

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Speaker 2: it's required that you produce knew, never before seen images.

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Speaker 2: So you also have that dynamic where people that want

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Speaker 2: to get images are pushed into abusing children and documenting

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Speaker 2: that abuse and sharing it online.

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Speaker 1: Welcome to Video was brought down by a joint effort

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Speaker 1: between the FBI and the South Korean government. It was

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Speaker 1: the result of dogged detective work and internet sleuthing, and

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Speaker 1: while it was hosted in South Korea, many of its

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Speaker 1: users were United States citizens. There are so many people

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Speaker 1: who don't realize just how big this problem is and

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Speaker 1: how close to home it actually hits. So with all

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Speaker 1: of this information we have what can we do to

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Speaker 1: make the public more aware of this problem.

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Speaker 3: What I came away with as the clearest call to

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Speaker 3: action from our reporting is spreading awareness and educing parents

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Speaker 3: and encouraging them to educate their children. This is not

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Speaker 3: necessarily a problem that tech companies and solve, and certainly

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Speaker 3: don't seem determined to solve.

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Speaker 2: We spoke with a few online child safety experts who

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Speaker 2: had a few pieces of advice. One brought up the

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Speaker 2: idea that the industry is not about the business of

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Speaker 2: promoting safety, and she said that she would love to

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Speaker 2: see whenever she buys a cell phone a pamphlet that

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Speaker 2: comes along with it that says how to keep your

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Speaker 2: children safe with this device. The key thing is to

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Speaker 2: not keep abuse secret. The less we talk about this,

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Speaker 2: the more the offenders have an advantage. They thrive on

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Speaker 2: the feelings of guilt and blame that a child may

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Speaker 2: have if they were tricked into sending a nude photograph.

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Speaker 2: That shame is really what gives them more.

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Speaker 1: If you or someone you know has been a victim

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Speaker 1: of sextortion, you can get help email the National Center

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Speaker 1: for Missing and Exploited Children or call one eight hundred

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Speaker 1: The Lost Many Thanks to Michael Keller and Gabriel Dance

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Speaker 1: from The New York Times, see our show notes for

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Speaker 1: a link to their article, The Internet is overrun with

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Speaker 1: images of child sexual abuse? What went wrong? Since we

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Speaker 1: spoke with Michael and Gabriel, Meta has been caught up

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Speaker 1: in controversy again. A recent investigation by The Wall Street

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Speaker 1: Journal and researchers at Stanford University and the University of

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Speaker 1: Massachusetts Amherst found that Instagram was helping to link predators

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Speaker 1: and people selling child sexual abuse material. Its algorithm connected

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Speaker 1: accounts offering to sell illicit sex material with people seeking it.

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Speaker 1: According to The Wall Street Journal, Instagram allowed users to

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Speaker 1: search for terms that its own algorithms no may be

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Speaker 1: associated with illegal material. And it's not like they were

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Speaker 1: hiding in. Instagram enabled people to search hashtags like hashtag

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Speaker 1: pewdo horror and hashtag preteen sex, then connected them to

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Speaker 1: accounts advertising CSAM for sale. If that wasn't troubling enough,

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Speaker 1: a pop up screen for the users warned these results

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Speaker 1: may contain images of child sexual abuse, and then offered users' options.

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Speaker 1: One of them was see results anyway. Meta has set

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Speaker 1: up an internal task force to address the problem. If

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Speaker 1: you would like to reach out to the Betrayal team,

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Speaker 1: email us at Betrayal Pod at gmail dot com. That's

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Speaker 1: Betrayal Pod at gmail dot com. To report a case

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Speaker 1: of child sexual exploitation, called the National Center for Missing

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Speaker 1: and Exploited Children's cyber tipline at one eight hundred the Lost.

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Speaker 1: If you or someone you know is worried about their

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Speaker 1: sexual thoughts and feelings towards children, reach out to Stop

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Speaker 1: It Now dot org. In the United Kingdom go to

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Speaker 1: Stop it Now dot org dot UK. These organizations can help.

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Speaker 1: We're grateful for your support, and one way to show

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Speaker 1: support is by subscribing to our show on Apple Podcasts

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Speaker 1: and Don't Forget to rate and review Betrayal five star reviews,

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Speaker 1: go a Long Way, A big thank you to all

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Speaker 1: of our listeners. The Trail is a production of Glass Podcasts,

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Speaker 1: a division of Glass Entertainment Group and partnership with iHeart Podcasts.

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Speaker 1: The show was executive produced by Nancy Glass and Jennifer Fason,

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Speaker 1: hosted and produced by me Andrea Gunning, written and produced

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Speaker 1: by Kerry Hartman, also produced by Ben Fetterman, Associate producer

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Speaker 1: Kristin Melcurrie. Our iHeart team is Ali Perry and Jessica Krincheck.

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Speaker 1: Special thanks to our talent Ashley Litton and production assistant

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Speaker 1: Tessa Shields. Audio editing and mixing by Matt Alvecchio. A

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Speaker 1: Trail's theme composed by Oliver Bains. Music library provided by

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Speaker 1: my Music and For more podcast from iHeart, visit the

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Speaker 1: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

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Speaker 3: M