WEBVTT - SkyBridge Anthony Scaramucci: Masters in Business (Audio) 0:00:03.240 --> 0:00:08.640 This is Master's in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. Hi, 0:00:08.760 --> 0:00:11.280 this is Barry Ridholts and you're listening to Masters in 0:00:11.400 --> 0:00:17.000 Business on Bloomberg Radio. The podcast portion a little background. 0:00:17.000 --> 0:00:20.680 I know Scaramucci, or as he's widely known, the Mooch, 0:00:21.440 --> 0:00:24.439 for a good couple of years. Um, we've done a 0:00:24.520 --> 0:00:27.800 number of shows together, We've been at various conferences together. 0:00:28.640 --> 0:00:31.160 But the way I kind of first got to know 0:00:31.240 --> 0:00:35.159 who he was, I've called him the man who rescued 0:00:35.240 --> 0:00:39.040 Dell and as well here in the conversation. He's very 0:00:39.080 --> 0:00:42.800 self effacing and he's all about we the team. When 0:00:42.840 --> 0:00:45.159 he was at Goman Sacks, it was the team. And 0:00:45.280 --> 0:00:49.000 when he was at UM other places like new Berger 0:00:49.040 --> 0:00:52.240 and Berman or Lehman Brothers, it was all about the team. 0:00:52.280 --> 0:00:55.160 But I'm gonna share a little bit of info that 0:00:55.480 --> 0:00:58.200 he was too monest to talk about. You know, when 0:00:58.280 --> 0:01:02.000 when Dell ran into some trull in the early nineteen nineties, 0:01:02.840 --> 0:01:05.600 he was a young kid. He was a hotshot CEO, 0:01:05.840 --> 0:01:08.920 one of the youngest CEOs of an SMP company ever, 0:01:09.840 --> 0:01:12.120 and they ran into a bunch of trouble. You know, 0:01:12.360 --> 0:01:15.880 HP kind of retooled and went after them. Ibm UM 0:01:15.920 --> 0:01:20.200 became a better competitor, and at the same time their 0:01:20.319 --> 0:01:24.400 CFO began dabbling in the currency markets something as it 0:01:24.440 --> 0:01:29.160 turned out that he was wholly unqualified to two and 0:01:29.560 --> 0:01:33.200 del The company lost hundreds of millions, if not billions 0:01:33.240 --> 0:01:36.600 of dollars that they simply didn't have to lose, and 0:01:36.640 --> 0:01:40.520 they really needed a cash infusion. And my understanding, and 0:01:40.600 --> 0:01:42.959 this is second and third hand and based on some 0:01:43.040 --> 0:01:47.240 old research and some old conversations, was nobody was especially 0:01:47.360 --> 0:01:51.080 enthusiastic about getting this deal done. Um Anthony said. If 0:01:51.120 --> 0:01:53.320 he wasn't there, it would have happened. Somebody else would 0:01:53.360 --> 0:01:56.120 have picked up the ball. I'm less convinced of it. 0:01:56.480 --> 0:01:59.200 I think that he was a guy who was sort 0:01:59.240 --> 0:02:01.920 of an odd fit at Harvard Law to Goldman Sachs 0:02:02.560 --> 0:02:06.880 investment banking, not exactly the usual candidate. And I think 0:02:06.960 --> 0:02:11.519 that he was looking around for something that he understood 0:02:11.520 --> 0:02:13.480 and he could pick up and run with that nobody 0:02:13.520 --> 0:02:17.359 else really did. And he had was impressed with Michael 0:02:17.400 --> 0:02:21.040 Dell as a person, and he understood the situation as 0:02:21.080 --> 0:02:24.880 to the trouble the CFO had created by engaging in 0:02:24.919 --> 0:02:28.760 these currency hedges that all went bad, and so he 0:02:28.960 --> 0:02:32.320 decided to pick up the ball, and with a great 0:02:32.400 --> 0:02:36.120 Rolodex and a great network and a very personable way 0:02:36.160 --> 0:02:42.680 about him, essentially rescued Dell as a company, managed to 0:02:42.680 --> 0:02:45.480 get a lead, managed to raise money, managed to get 0:02:45.520 --> 0:02:51.000 the deal done. But what's fascinating about the discussion with 0:02:51.080 --> 0:02:54.920 Scaramucci is that he for a guy who is as 0:02:55.560 --> 0:02:59.280 wildly successful as he is on pretty much every level. 0:02:59.360 --> 0:03:02.960 The company, he's running, the conference, he's running, the resurrection 0:03:03.240 --> 0:03:06.520 of Lewis ruck Kaiser's Wall Street Week. By just about 0:03:06.520 --> 0:03:11.400 any measure, he's a tremendously successful guy. The conversation we 0:03:11.480 --> 0:03:15.280 have is all about failure. He discusses how he was 0:03:15.360 --> 0:03:18.359 fired by it from Goldman Sachs. He discusses how when 0:03:18.400 --> 0:03:22.400 he first launched Skybridge, it was pretty much a disaster. 0:03:22.520 --> 0:03:25.600 It wasn't happening the way they had hoped, and then 0:03:25.600 --> 0:03:29.880 the financial crisis had come along. But the the thing 0:03:29.960 --> 0:03:32.240 that we hear over and over again in all the 0:03:32.280 --> 0:03:38.160 stories that he tells is that each subsequent failure is greeted, 0:03:38.320 --> 0:03:41.040 if that's the right word, as an opportunity, as a 0:03:41.120 --> 0:03:45.240 learning expense, as a learning situation, as as as a 0:03:45.320 --> 0:03:50.560 chance to pivot and try and do something new and different, 0:03:51.240 --> 0:03:54.960 to rise from the ashes, so to speak, and Skybridge 0:03:55.040 --> 0:03:57.160 is a perfect example. He tells the story of how 0:03:57.480 --> 0:04:02.280 originally they started out as a hedge fund seating company 0:04:02.320 --> 0:04:05.680 and that really wasn't going especially well when the financial 0:04:05.720 --> 0:04:09.560 crisis hit, and in the attempt to raise some seed 0:04:09.600 --> 0:04:14.000 capital from City Group, ended up essentially recognizing that they 0:04:14.040 --> 0:04:16.719 had to get rid of their hedge fund practice. It 0:04:16.760 --> 0:04:20.280 was a liability and they were really retooling dramatically, and 0:04:20.320 --> 0:04:24.479 so Mooch as he's known, ended up picking up a 0:04:24.560 --> 0:04:29.400 couple of billion dollars in assets, really very inexpensively, and 0:04:29.560 --> 0:04:33.640 parlayed that into their nearly uh ten billion dollar fund 0:04:33.640 --> 0:04:39.040 of funds now and runs a very straightforward approach. Hey, 0:04:39.080 --> 0:04:40.800 if you're looking for us to beat the market, if 0:04:40.800 --> 0:04:43.000 you want to generate alpha, if you're looking for all 0:04:43.000 --> 0:04:45.400 those sort of things, that's not what we're gonna do. 0:04:45.600 --> 0:04:48.520 That's not what we're capable of doing. He's pretty straightforward 0:04:49.040 --> 0:04:53.120 in not over promising, and therefore he doesn't under deliver. 0:04:53.839 --> 0:04:55.800 So I babbled on long enough. I think you'll find 0:04:55.800 --> 0:04:59.320 this to be a really really interesting conversation. My interview 0:04:59.560 --> 0:05:06.640 with guy Bridge Capitals Anthony Scaramucci. This is Masters in 0:05:06.680 --> 0:05:11.760 Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. My guest today 0:05:11.960 --> 0:05:15.400 is Anthony Scaramucci. You may know him as the Mooch. 0:05:15.560 --> 0:05:19.279 He is the founder of Skybridge Capital and the Impress 0:05:19.320 --> 0:05:23.520 Sario behind the Big Salt Conference, which takes place every 0:05:23.560 --> 0:05:28.000 year in Las Vegas. Anthony, Welcome to Bloomberg Barry. It's 0:05:28.000 --> 0:05:29.920 a pleasure to be here. Thank you for having me. 0:05:30.000 --> 0:05:32.680 So you're at Goldman Sachs in the nineties, coming out 0:05:32.680 --> 0:05:36.960 of Harvard Law. You are summarily dismissed from Goldman What 0:05:37.000 --> 0:05:39.000 do you do with your career then? So, now it's 0:05:39.040 --> 0:05:42.680 a Friday afternoon. I go home very rejected, and I 0:05:42.760 --> 0:05:45.960 wake up on Monday dust myself off. I have a 0:05:46.120 --> 0:05:49.599 roll of quarters because we didn't have cell phones back then. 0:05:49.760 --> 0:05:52.360 I took a train back into the city. I started 0:05:52.360 --> 0:05:55.080 pumping quarters into stay phones and I was calling my 0:05:55.120 --> 0:05:59.000 buddies asking for help, and finally I reached the fellow 0:05:59.080 --> 0:06:00.839 was a great friend of mine. He said, hey, listen, 0:06:01.200 --> 0:06:06.000 there's a job offer and an opening at Goldman Sacks. 0:06:06.120 --> 0:06:07.599 I said, are you kidding me? He said, in the 0:06:07.640 --> 0:06:10.479 sales area. I said, okay, that's probably better suited for 0:06:10.560 --> 0:06:14.000 my skill set. So I called my old boss who 0:06:14.000 --> 0:06:17.039 had just fired me. His name is Michael Facetel. He 0:06:17.080 --> 0:06:19.000 built the building that we're in. He was the CEO 0:06:19.040 --> 0:06:22.440 of Vernado Realty, went on to become CEO Vernado Realty Trust. 0:06:22.800 --> 0:06:25.119 I said, Michael, you gotta help me get this job 0:06:25.160 --> 0:06:27.919 in sales at Goldman. Uh and so he put a 0:06:27.960 --> 0:06:30.520 call in for me. I got interviewed. There were many 0:06:30.600 --> 0:06:34.839 interviews later, they offered me a job on March. So 0:06:34.960 --> 0:06:39.239 I was out of Goldman from February one to March. 0:06:40.800 --> 0:06:43.559 But I got rehired two months about two months. So 0:06:43.560 --> 0:06:45.560 so there's an ironic thing. I got to keep the 0:06:45.600 --> 0:06:49.880 eleven thousand dollars seven check, thank god, grand months and 0:06:50.279 --> 0:06:52.799 I got and I got myself a new job at Goldman, 0:06:52.960 --> 0:06:55.000 which is better suited for me. So so the lesson 0:06:55.000 --> 0:06:58.120 for younger viewers out there is, try to go for 0:06:58.200 --> 0:07:01.080 the jobs that you think you're well suited for, not 0:07:01.160 --> 0:07:05.080 the ones that you think are the sexy job. Don't 0:07:05.120 --> 0:07:07.279 breed in security in your own personality. Go for the 0:07:07.279 --> 0:07:09.440 stuff you think so you stay at Goldman for a 0:07:09.480 --> 0:07:12.840 couple more years. But eventually, and I think it's ninety six, 0:07:13.280 --> 0:07:16.800 you end up leaving to launch Oscar Capital. That's correct. 0:07:17.160 --> 0:07:20.400 What was Oscar Capital like? So it was Andrew Bozart, 0:07:20.440 --> 0:07:23.120 So his name was bo s. My first name, I 0:07:23.200 --> 0:07:25.760 make last name is S. C. A. R. We dropped 0:07:25.800 --> 0:07:29.160 the be called it Oscar Capital, worst name in financial 0:07:29.160 --> 0:07:32.120 services history. Every time we had a meeting people for 0:07:32.200 --> 0:07:34.800 our year affiliated with Oscar Meyer the hot dog company. 0:07:35.280 --> 0:07:37.880 You know, Oscar the grouch. But we built a one 0:07:37.960 --> 0:07:41.520 billion dollar registered investment advisor that had a small hedge fund. 0:07:42.120 --> 0:07:44.560 We had a very good relationship with Fidelity. We were 0:07:44.600 --> 0:07:47.960 part of the advisor referral program. I think New Burger 0:07:48.000 --> 0:07:50.400 wanted to be in that business with Fidelity, so that's 0:07:50.440 --> 0:07:53.120 why they They contacted Greg Fleming, who was the M 0:07:53.120 --> 0:07:55.400 and a banker at Mary Lynch. He's now the president 0:07:55.480 --> 0:07:59.320 of Morgan Stanley. Greg was our merger banker and we 0:07:59.400 --> 0:08:02.400 did the d all six weeks after the nine eleven 0:08:02.520 --> 0:08:04.840 terrorist attack, really in two thousand one. So you have 0:08:04.880 --> 0:08:07.600 gone for five years. Now you get bought by New 0:08:07.680 --> 0:08:10.960 Burger and I think it's too and I'm assuming for 0:08:11.080 --> 0:08:14.200 a billion dollars in a U M there's a number 0:08:14.200 --> 0:08:19.040 of ways of calculating that um multiple of sales or 0:08:19.080 --> 0:08:23.640 how how did they figure out I'm perfectly understand if 0:08:23.640 --> 0:08:26.160 you want to blurt out the number, but what was 0:08:26.200 --> 0:08:29.800 the formula that we're playing with? It was at times sales. Yeah, 0:08:29.840 --> 0:08:31.680 you know, I'm a I'm an open guy, but I 0:08:31.720 --> 0:08:36.040 did sign a confidentiality. It was a reasonable multiple. I mean, 0:08:36.080 --> 0:08:38.680 I think of earnings of of revenue, how do they 0:08:38.840 --> 0:08:40.439 they do? Yeah, it was multiple of revenues. But I 0:08:40.480 --> 0:08:42.560 think I think the interesting thing about it is, I mean, 0:08:42.559 --> 0:08:44.520 none of us were crying when we when we did 0:08:44.559 --> 0:08:47.080 the deal, But I think the interesting thing about it 0:08:47.120 --> 0:08:48.520 is you have to make sure if you're ever going 0:08:48.559 --> 0:08:50.320 to do a deal like that on your own company 0:08:50.960 --> 0:08:52.640 and you're gonna sell it, you gotta make sure you 0:08:52.640 --> 0:08:56.199 sell it to people that are similarly situated personality wise. 0:08:56.440 --> 0:08:59.160 Thank god that was the case for us. I sold 0:08:59.240 --> 0:09:01.360 the business to a guy named Bob nats Up and 0:09:01.440 --> 0:09:04.120 Jeffrey Lane. They were the two senior guys at New Burger, 0:09:04.520 --> 0:09:06.960 and they lived up to their promises. They were great people. 0:09:07.640 --> 0:09:11.040 New Burger then went on to sell New Burger Berman 0:09:11.559 --> 0:09:14.040 to Lehman Brothers and so That was an interesting point 0:09:14.040 --> 0:09:16.280 in my career because I had worked at Goldman Sachs 0:09:16.679 --> 0:09:19.120 and now we were all migrating over to Lehman Brothers. 0:09:19.120 --> 0:09:23.120 And I became a managing director of Lehman Brothers in 0:09:23.160 --> 0:09:26.000 October of two thousand and three. You know, we we 0:09:26.120 --> 0:09:29.720 had Jack Rivkin on the show some months ago. He 0:09:29.840 --> 0:09:33.600 was at Lehman, left more or less, got fired, joined 0:09:33.640 --> 0:09:36.480 New Burger, joined New Burger, and ends up coming back 0:09:36.559 --> 0:09:40.439 to UH Actually his time at Lehman the first time 0:09:40.840 --> 0:09:46.160 became a Harvard Business School. He took them from last 0:09:46.160 --> 0:09:49.560 to first place the research similar situation ends up at 0:09:49.559 --> 0:09:52.640 New Burger along with your friends. Gary Kaminsky was a 0:09:52.720 --> 0:09:56.480 New Burger for and his dad, Gary and his dad 0:09:56.520 --> 0:09:59.480 and his brother Michael and Gary Kamitsky, and I go 0:09:59.559 --> 0:10:04.080 back to two where one of his best friends from 0:10:05.040 --> 0:10:06.959 the town Ulit that he grew up in was one 0:10:06.960 --> 0:10:09.560 of my roommates in college at Tufts. So I've known 0:10:09.600 --> 0:10:12.440 Gary forever um and it was really a lot of 0:10:12.440 --> 0:10:15.319 fun to work with Gary at Newburger. So in the 0:10:15.400 --> 0:10:19.520 last thirty seconds we have how can you compare the 0:10:19.559 --> 0:10:22.680 culture at Lehman with the culture of Goldman Sachs very 0:10:22.800 --> 0:10:26.360 very different places. Uh these things he evolved differently over time. 0:10:26.400 --> 0:10:28.280 So I'll just talk about the culture. I remember at 0:10:28.320 --> 0:10:33.560 Goldman inclusive, team oriented. The pronoun use was we, the 0:10:33.559 --> 0:10:36.480 pronoun use was our, uh, and you had to pass 0:10:36.559 --> 0:10:39.520 the ball. You did way better Lehman. They had one 0:10:39.559 --> 0:10:42.600 eye on the outside world and they had one They 0:10:42.600 --> 0:10:44.800 had one gun trained to the outside world, and they 0:10:44.840 --> 0:10:47.640 had one gun trained on each other. You see that. 0:10:47.640 --> 0:10:50.640 That's a little bit more divisive. You kill to play 0:10:50.760 --> 0:10:52.920 sort of. And the other problem they had, and I 0:10:52.960 --> 0:10:55.400 do respect them, and I'm sorry that they're gone, but 0:10:55.480 --> 0:10:58.160 the other problem that they had they had Goldman Sachs envy. 0:10:58.520 --> 0:11:01.120 Well so did everybody else. They'd sit at the conference 0:11:01.160 --> 0:11:02.880 table and say, well, we're just as good as Goldman 0:11:02.920 --> 0:11:04.560 as this, We're just as good as Goldman at dad, 0:11:04.559 --> 0:11:06.800 And I remember thinking, hey, who cares what you're just 0:11:06.840 --> 0:11:10.280 as good at. Focus on yourselves and let's not have 0:11:10.360 --> 0:11:12.560 this relative comparison. I think it's a good message for 0:11:12.600 --> 0:11:14.800 younger people about their own lives. Right If if you're 0:11:14.800 --> 0:11:16.920 at a conference table when someone is saying that over 0:11:16.920 --> 0:11:20.080 and over again, the potential client is thinking themselves, maybe 0:11:20.080 --> 0:11:22.920 I should check out Goldman. My days were numbered. When 0:11:22.920 --> 0:11:25.480 I raised my hand at an m D meeting, I said, guys, 0:11:25.520 --> 0:11:27.679 why are we so focused on Goldman? I can guarantee 0:11:27.920 --> 0:11:30.680 that they're not that focused on you. And that was 0:11:31.800 --> 0:11:35.040 that was not a politically astute thing to say at 0:11:35.080 --> 0:11:37.520 that moment, but it was honest that it was true. Yeah, 0:11:37.559 --> 0:11:39.040 but you know, that was another reason why I had 0:11:39.040 --> 0:11:41.439 to look on and see if I could start another company. 0:11:41.640 --> 0:11:44.240 I'm Barry Ridhult. You're listening to Masters in Business on 0:11:44.280 --> 0:11:48.400 Bloomberg Radio. My guest today is Anthony Scaramucci of Skybridge Capital. 0:11:48.960 --> 0:11:52.040 Let's talk a little bit about your early days at Goldman, 0:11:52.240 --> 0:11:55.880 and I recall way back. You're telling a story that 0:11:55.960 --> 0:11:59.880 I found absolutely fascinating about when you were rotating through 0:12:00.000 --> 0:12:03.240 of the different departments and you found a sort of, 0:12:03.440 --> 0:12:06.959 if I memory serves correctly, a kind of orphaned deal 0:12:07.120 --> 0:12:11.200 that people really kind of were neglecting with some startup 0:12:11.200 --> 0:12:14.880 company called Dell Computer. Well, Dell at that time wasn't 0:12:14.880 --> 0:12:17.160 a startup, you know. Michael started the business and eight 0:12:17.360 --> 0:12:20.800 four uh he in college, he went public and eighty 0:12:20.880 --> 0:12:27.880 eight through Goldman Sachs. In the summer of three, Michael 0:12:28.040 --> 0:12:29.920 had gotten into a little bit of trouble with his 0:12:30.000 --> 0:12:34.600 laptops the introduction of his laptops. The batteries weren't working well. Uh, 0:12:34.640 --> 0:12:36.920 they were actually catching fire, and he had to stop 0:12:36.960 --> 0:12:39.240 the production and he had a little bit of a 0:12:39.320 --> 0:12:41.920 cash bleed and a little bit of a spin out. There. 0:12:42.600 --> 0:12:45.160 One thing Michael Dell said to me, in order to 0:12:45.160 --> 0:12:48.480 become Michael Dell and Dell Computer Corporation, there were about 0:12:48.480 --> 0:12:50.840 eight thousand decisions that he had to make and he 0:12:50.880 --> 0:12:53.839 had to get about seven thousand, nine hundred of them right. 0:12:54.000 --> 0:12:56.360 And it's an interesting thing. And so he was in 0:12:56.400 --> 0:12:59.599 a tailspin. And one of his best skills, he's incredibly 0:12:59.640 --> 0:13:02.160 commercial guy, was that he needed a little bit of help. 0:13:02.160 --> 0:13:04.560 He need a little bit of financing and so and 0:13:04.640 --> 0:13:07.840 this isn't so long after they had the currency issue 0:13:07.880 --> 0:13:12.400 that the currency hedge, and basically that was a commodation 0:13:12.559 --> 0:13:15.959 to dead bet and it wasn't what Michael did. But 0:13:16.000 --> 0:13:18.319 what can we call it? I can't call him Michael, 0:13:18.360 --> 0:13:21.280 but you you know, listen, I I call him Michael, 0:13:21.320 --> 0:13:22.880 but you know he is Mr Dell. I mean, the 0:13:22.920 --> 0:13:25.280 guy is a masterful guy. He should be on your 0:13:25.280 --> 0:13:28.800 show way more than me. But but to tell you 0:13:28.840 --> 0:13:31.000 this story, it's twenty two years ago, but I remember 0:13:31.040 --> 0:13:34.160 it very well. It was mid August, most of Wall 0:13:34.160 --> 0:13:39.440 Street was on vacation. Michael came into the conference room. 0:13:39.520 --> 0:13:41.320 I got called into a meeting by one of the 0:13:41.360 --> 0:13:44.760 capital markets people. I was on the institutional sales desk 0:13:44.800 --> 0:13:49.400 at the time, looking over the deal UH. And then 0:13:49.440 --> 0:13:52.400 they asked me, look, we're gonna put a convertible bond together. 0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:55.640 Do you think some of your clients would have an 0:13:55.640 --> 0:13:59.280 interest in this convertible bond? And I went out and 0:13:59.720 --> 0:14:03.080 call several white guys who were on vacation. I said, listen, 0:14:03.120 --> 0:14:06.280 this thing has a very low premium meanings will convert 0:14:06.320 --> 0:14:10.040 into a lot of equity. It has a high coupon UH, 0:14:10.080 --> 0:14:12.800 and I really think this is a good deal. And 0:14:12.960 --> 0:14:14.880 people looked at the financials and said, well, you know, 0:14:14.920 --> 0:14:17.559 the financials a little shaky. I said, they are a 0:14:17.640 --> 0:14:21.080 little shaky, but this guy is not shaky. This is 0:14:21.120 --> 0:14:24.920 a betting. Michael is a steward of this business. All 0:14:24.960 --> 0:14:28.840 businesses go through some hiccups. This is an opportune time. 0:14:28.880 --> 0:14:31.760 When he gets this cash onto his balance sheet, He's 0:14:31.760 --> 0:14:34.800 gonna retool the product cycle. He's gonna freshen up and 0:14:34.840 --> 0:14:39.040 strengthen his balance sheet, and I think you guys gotta 0:14:39.080 --> 0:14:42.520 make this investment. And so long story short, and listen, 0:14:42.560 --> 0:14:45.000 this is a team approach. I'm out here running the 0:14:45.040 --> 0:14:48.360 flag up for myself, but Goldman Sachs went out and 0:14:48.440 --> 0:14:51.040 raised him. Uh. I don't know. It had to be 0:14:51.040 --> 0:14:53.680 about two and fifty million dollars a lot of money 0:14:53.680 --> 0:14:56.680 at that time. UH, and Dell went off to the races. 0:14:56.720 --> 0:14:58.840 If you look at that short, one of the great 0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:03.800 stocks of the ninete andies from the apple of its death, no, 0:15:03.960 --> 0:15:07.000 no question. And one of my institutional investors who I'm 0:15:07.040 --> 0:15:10.520 still very very close to, just retired from the Alfred P. 0:15:10.720 --> 0:15:14.480 Sloan Foundation. His name is Bill Peterson. UH remembers that 0:15:14.560 --> 0:15:17.920 deal fondly because he said it was the top performing 0:15:18.200 --> 0:15:21.240 name for him over a five year period of time 0:15:21.280 --> 0:15:23.480 that he held the stock. And so a combination, like 0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:25.760 I said earlier in our conversation, a little bit of 0:15:25.800 --> 0:15:29.720 providential luck, good timing, But that helped me build a 0:15:29.760 --> 0:15:32.760 relationship with Michael, and I just have an enormous respect 0:15:32.840 --> 0:15:36.320 for him. Was speaking with Anthony Scaramucci of Skybridge Capital, 0:15:36.520 --> 0:15:41.960 talking about the time Goldman Sachs essentially rescued Dell Computers. 0:15:42.000 --> 0:15:45.200 So let's talk a little bit about Michael Dell. He's 0:15:45.280 --> 0:15:50.000 been fairly active. Um, not so much him, but MSK 0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:53.360 Ventures is MST ms D m s K is the 0:15:53.400 --> 0:15:57.720 whole something else. MSD Michael S. Dell UM is a 0:15:57.880 --> 0:16:01.880 fairly substantial venture cap role operation. Are you still in 0:16:01.960 --> 0:16:03.880 touch with him much? Do you? How often do you 0:16:03.960 --> 0:16:07.240 bump into it? I'm actually in touch with him less. Uh. 0:16:07.280 --> 0:16:09.240 I see him once in a while at the World 0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:13.520 Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. He's obviously super busy raising 0:16:13.560 --> 0:16:15.640 his family as m I, and he's got deaf and 0:16:15.640 --> 0:16:18.200 he's also taken del He's got a private company that 0:16:18.240 --> 0:16:21.480 he's dealing with now, which I predicted some point we'll 0:16:21.520 --> 0:16:24.760 probably go public again. But MSD Capital is I think 0:16:24.760 --> 0:16:30.000 a very diversified UH portfolio. In addition to venture private equity, 0:16:30.040 --> 0:16:34.160 they've got long portfolio, fixed income portfolio, and him and 0:16:34.160 --> 0:16:36.720 his team there have done a masterful job of managing 0:16:36.800 --> 0:16:39.720 his money. And I'm pretty sure they've taken into outside 0:16:39.720 --> 0:16:42.040 money at this point. Are we gonna see Michael Dell 0:16:42.080 --> 0:16:45.160 at a SAULT conference anytime? So you know, we haven't 0:16:45.200 --> 0:16:47.760 gone in the CEO direction, but you know he's a 0:16:47.880 --> 0:16:51.640 terrific guy to have it an event like that. So 0:16:51.840 --> 0:16:55.080 let's talk a little bit about Skybridge Capital because we 0:16:55.120 --> 0:17:00.840 really haven't touched on that. UM. That was post Lehman 0:17:00.920 --> 0:17:03.040 when you decided, all right, I've had enough of this, 0:17:03.200 --> 0:17:06.280 I've offended all the right people. It's time to make 0:17:06.400 --> 0:17:10.240 head for the exit. You launched Skybridge Capital in what 0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:13.200 year was that? It was March March of two thousand 0:17:13.200 --> 0:17:15.919 and five five, and so I had worked at Lehman 0:17:16.000 --> 0:17:18.639 from October of two thousand three to March of two 0:17:18.720 --> 0:17:22.360 thousand five. UM, a lot of guys were departing from 0:17:22.359 --> 0:17:25.520 the Lehman senior management team. I went to the guy 0:17:25.600 --> 0:17:28.359 that I was working for. I said, listen, I didn't 0:17:28.359 --> 0:17:30.800 grow up here in this organization. Guys that are in 0:17:30.920 --> 0:17:33.640 I was forty one at the time, and I said, 0:17:34.000 --> 0:17:35.879 you guys that have grown up here twenty years that 0:17:35.880 --> 0:17:38.600 are now in your forties are super tight with each other. 0:17:39.359 --> 0:17:43.240 I'm not in yourr an outsider within. I'm an outsider. 0:17:43.400 --> 0:17:45.520 These guys had a strong culture and it was a 0:17:45.520 --> 0:17:48.000 good culture, different from Goldman and but you have a 0:17:48.040 --> 0:17:51.040 little bit of an immune system because I'm transplanted in 0:17:51.080 --> 0:17:54.119 from new Berger Berman so and I'm doing renunal rejection. 0:17:54.800 --> 0:17:58.000 Rejected tissue. Is that I was rejected tissue and no problem. 0:17:58.040 --> 0:18:00.600 It could have been personality issues too. But but but 0:18:00.600 --> 0:18:02.560 but in fairness of them, well, but you know, I 0:18:02.600 --> 0:18:06.159 know you long enough that I know you're kinda you 0:18:06.200 --> 0:18:09.160 get along with pretty much everybody. You know, you're really 0:18:09.240 --> 0:18:13.840 rubbed that many people when you're when you're opinionated in 0:18:13.880 --> 0:18:19.480 a politically correct or politically neutral organization. Uh that's uh, well, 0:18:19.560 --> 0:18:22.000 you know what your your elbows for somebody like you 0:18:22.080 --> 0:18:24.600 or me or elbows may not be that sharp given 0:18:24.600 --> 0:18:26.920 the neighborhoods that we both grew up here. But when 0:18:26.960 --> 0:18:29.640 you're in that sort of corporate environment where everybody's wearing 0:18:29.640 --> 0:18:32.840 a white shirt, Uh, you know, and you have an opinion, 0:18:32.960 --> 0:18:35.560 it may not be something that people super like about you. 0:18:35.640 --> 0:18:38.600 And so I think the more successful guys, and God 0:18:38.640 --> 0:18:41.679 blessed them, they have a way of talking and a 0:18:41.720 --> 0:18:46.200 way of navigating those situations that you know, I wasn't 0:18:46.200 --> 0:18:50.359 super successful at. Having said that, Uh, Richard s Fold 0:18:50.440 --> 0:18:53.760 Dick Fold do have an enormous amount of respect for Uh. 0:18:53.840 --> 0:18:56.440 He gave me ten million dollars a balance sheet capital 0:18:56.640 --> 0:18:59.359 put it into our fund. A gentleman by the name 0:18:59.400 --> 0:19:01.000 of Jared Way he helped me get that done. He 0:19:01.040 --> 0:19:04.520 was on the senior relationship management team there at Lehman, 0:19:04.680 --> 0:19:08.320 so they see you very much. Day Goldman's seeds outgoing 0:19:08.720 --> 0:19:12.000 traders as well. They did. They put ten million dollars 0:19:12.000 --> 0:19:14.960 of their balance sheet into our fund, which helped me 0:19:15.160 --> 0:19:18.840 get the catalyzation. If you will have that fund started. 0:19:18.880 --> 0:19:21.920 And I'm Barry Ridhults. You're listening to Masters in Business 0:19:21.920 --> 0:19:25.840 on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Anthony Scaramucci 0:19:26.200 --> 0:19:31.320 of Skybridge Capital. Anthony is the gentleman behind the resurrection 0:19:31.480 --> 0:19:36.240 of an iconic television show, Lewis Rukaiser. Wall Street Week 0:19:36.240 --> 0:19:42.240 with Louis Rukaiser was on for twentysomething years, thirty years. 0:19:42.320 --> 0:19:46.160 It's how a lot of people today of our generation, 0:19:46.280 --> 0:19:49.840 or maybe a few years younger, first discovered investing Wall 0:19:49.840 --> 0:19:53.119 Street stocks back in the day. What made you think 0:19:53.160 --> 0:19:57.199 of bringing the show back. It's an amazing show and 0:19:57.240 --> 0:20:00.359 I've seen almost all of the film library a half 0:20:00.359 --> 0:20:05.000 hour show over thirty five years. Lewis Rukaiser, classic guy. 0:20:05.640 --> 0:20:10.280 I think He was a master at explaining complex things 0:20:10.320 --> 0:20:14.480 in a way that regular people outside of our industry 0:20:14.520 --> 0:20:17.640 battery can understand. And I don't want to say simplify them, 0:20:17.680 --> 0:20:20.359 because these are very complex things, and sometimes when you 0:20:20.600 --> 0:20:23.439 try to simplify something complex, you really don't get it 0:20:23.440 --> 0:20:26.040 at all. He never dumbed it down. He just gave 0:20:26.160 --> 0:20:30.080 He gave it rust in the viewer to but Button 0:20:30.080 --> 0:20:33.359 made it understandable. Liz Ane Sanders was on our show 0:20:33.560 --> 0:20:36.840 this past week. Had a great story where she was 0:20:37.000 --> 0:20:39.080 very nervous the first time she met lu She was 0:20:39.080 --> 0:20:41.679 sitting in the chair. He said, are your parents in 0:20:41.720 --> 0:20:44.360 our business? And she said no. He says, I'll tell 0:20:44.359 --> 0:20:45.679 you what we're gonna go on the air in a 0:20:45.720 --> 0:20:48.760 few minutes, but I want you to talk to your parents. 0:20:48.840 --> 0:20:51.359 I want you to explain the concepts that we're discussing 0:20:51.960 --> 0:20:53.800 to your mom and dad. If you do that, we're 0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:56.800 gonna have a terrific show. And that's the spirit of 0:20:56.840 --> 0:20:59.280 what we're trying to capture with the return of Wall Street. 0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:02.439 So Wall Street Week, that's so, that's funny you mentioned 0:21:02.480 --> 0:21:05.280 that because my wife's an our teacher. My mother was 0:21:05.280 --> 0:21:07.880 a real estate agent, and that was always the goal. Hey, 0:21:07.920 --> 0:21:09.879 if you can make a real estate agent and an 0:21:09.960 --> 0:21:12.919 art teacher, if you can remove the jargon and speak 0:21:12.960 --> 0:21:16.080 in ways that they can understand it well, then anybody 0:21:16.080 --> 0:21:18.200 can understand it. And and and this is a good 0:21:18.240 --> 0:21:21.080 segue because I do think that some of the punditry 0:21:21.119 --> 0:21:25.840 on business television is intimidating, and some of the punditry 0:21:25.880 --> 0:21:29.320 on business telligence is for the impression of other pundits. 0:21:29.320 --> 0:21:31.199 They want to impress each other while they're talking to 0:21:31.200 --> 0:21:35.280 each other. And so what Louis Rukeyser did was he 0:21:35.320 --> 0:21:37.640 waxed away all of that stuff barr and he really 0:21:37.680 --> 0:21:41.640 just tried to deliver high, thoughtful content. And so that 0:21:41.760 --> 0:21:45.240 show laid dormant for about ten years. UH. Gentleman by 0:21:45.320 --> 0:21:47.639 name of Jeff Salkin had actually bought the rights to 0:21:47.680 --> 0:21:50.600 the show. He had a website up called Wall Street 0:21:50.640 --> 0:21:53.800 Week um, and but he had not really figured out 0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:56.359 how to bring the show back on the year and 0:21:56.400 --> 0:21:59.639 to transform the brand. UH. And so he came to 0:21:59.680 --> 0:22:03.159 see eight. I had a conversation with him, UH and 0:22:03.280 --> 0:22:06.920 Maryland Public Television, and I acquired the brand from him 0:22:06.920 --> 0:22:10.160