1 00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:05,360 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind production of My 2 00:00:05,480 --> 00:00:14,480 Speaker 1: Heart Radio. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. 3 00:00:14,520 --> 00:00:16,919 Speaker 1: My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick, and 4 00:00:16,960 --> 00:00:19,040 Speaker 1: we're back with part two of our talk about post 5 00:00:19,079 --> 00:00:23,400 Speaker 1: biological intelligence. Now, in the last episode, we talked about 6 00:00:23,840 --> 00:00:26,480 Speaker 1: let's see, we talked about some work by the SETI 7 00:00:26,560 --> 00:00:29,880 Speaker 1: researcher Seth show Stack, and we talked about the philosopher 8 00:00:29,920 --> 00:00:33,519 Speaker 1: Susan Schneider, who had both written about UH the idea 9 00:00:33,600 --> 00:00:37,080 Speaker 1: of looking for signs of alien intelligence elsewhere in the 10 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:40,599 Speaker 1: Milky Way, and UH the the proposition that if we 11 00:00:40,600 --> 00:00:44,040 Speaker 1: were to encounter such an intelligence, it would probably be 12 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:50,360 Speaker 1: more likely the machine descendants of a previous biological intelligence 13 00:00:50,600 --> 00:00:55,080 Speaker 1: than it would be biological entities themselves. That that overtime, 14 00:00:55,640 --> 00:00:58,959 Speaker 1: organisms like us will tend to sort of turn themselves 15 00:00:59,000 --> 00:01:01,760 Speaker 1: into machines, or at least create a techno culture that's 16 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:05,559 Speaker 1: dominated by machines, and that these are the types of 17 00:01:05,760 --> 00:01:08,919 Speaker 1: intelligences that we should really be looking for and trying 18 00:01:08,920 --> 00:01:12,720 Speaker 1: to predict in terms of their characteristics and things like that. 19 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: So we can jump right back into the middle of 20 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:18,480 Speaker 1: this conversation where we left off last time with talking 21 00:01:18,520 --> 00:01:23,200 Speaker 1: about post biological intelligence. Now another big question here and 22 00:01:23,400 --> 00:01:26,919 Speaker 1: and this will we'll go back to Schneider. Is it 23 00:01:27,040 --> 00:01:30,480 Speaker 1: is that the question of would a machine culture like 24 00:01:30,520 --> 00:01:34,000 Speaker 1: this if you encountered it, would this machine artificial intelligence? 25 00:01:34,000 --> 00:01:37,280 Speaker 1: Would it be conscious? And what would that mean? And 26 00:01:37,360 --> 00:01:39,440 Speaker 1: would it make a difference even, Yeah, this is a 27 00:01:39,440 --> 00:01:41,960 Speaker 1: really good question. The way she puts it is would 28 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:46,279 Speaker 1: the processing of a silicon based super intelligent system feel 29 00:01:46,319 --> 00:01:49,600 Speaker 1: a certain way from the inside. Now, I'm going to 30 00:01:49,680 --> 00:01:52,560 Speaker 1: go into less detail on this argument than than I 31 00:01:52,600 --> 00:01:54,960 Speaker 1: did on the other half of her argument, but I 32 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:57,040 Speaker 1: did want to try to give a few highlights. This 33 00:01:57,160 --> 00:02:02,040 Speaker 1: question is inherently difficult to answer because, according to some philosophers, 34 00:02:02,080 --> 00:02:04,160 Speaker 1: you know, some people would say that this question is 35 00:02:04,200 --> 00:02:07,040 Speaker 1: impossible to answer because there is no way to test 36 00:02:07,080 --> 00:02:11,040 Speaker 1: for consciousness beyond our first our own first person experience. 37 00:02:11,080 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 1: I mean, we can't even test to see if other 38 00:02:13,040 --> 00:02:16,320 Speaker 1: people are conscious. We just assume they are. It seems 39 00:02:16,400 --> 00:02:18,240 Speaker 1: like they are, they claim to be, and there's no 40 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:21,120 Speaker 1: reason to assume they're not. But of course you have 41 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:24,280 Speaker 1: ideas like the philosopher David Chalmers, you know, he famously 42 00:02:24,360 --> 00:02:27,080 Speaker 1: framed this idea of the easy problems versus the hard 43 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:31,000 Speaker 1: problems of consciousness, and so the easy problems that they're 44 00:02:31,040 --> 00:02:34,799 Speaker 1: not actually easy, but they are, they're in principle solvable. 45 00:02:34,800 --> 00:02:37,760 Speaker 1: There are things like what parts of the brain are 46 00:02:37,840 --> 00:02:41,119 Speaker 1: necessary in order to generate conscious experience, Like you could, 47 00:02:41,480 --> 00:02:43,440 Speaker 1: you know, you could do research on that and have 48 00:02:43,480 --> 00:02:45,840 Speaker 1: people report back when different parts of the brain are 49 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:47,919 Speaker 1: disabled or something. You know, you can figure out things 50 00:02:48,000 --> 00:02:51,200 Speaker 1: like that, but it's much more difficult to or Chalmers 51 00:02:51,200 --> 00:02:53,959 Speaker 1: would argue, ultimately impossible to get to the bottom of 52 00:02:54,000 --> 00:02:57,800 Speaker 1: the question why does all this information processing in the 53 00:02:57,880 --> 00:03:01,960 Speaker 1: human brain under certain conditions have a felt quality to it? 54 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:05,560 Speaker 1: Like why is their consciousness in the first place? And 55 00:03:05,639 --> 00:03:08,360 Speaker 1: if we do not know, or possibly even cannot know, 56 00:03:08,600 --> 00:03:11,680 Speaker 1: why we possess a felt subjective experience, how could we 57 00:03:11,760 --> 00:03:15,200 Speaker 1: ever reason backwards to know if alien machines would also 58 00:03:15,280 --> 00:03:19,000 Speaker 1: possess it? Now, Schneider responds to all this thinking, and 59 00:03:19,240 --> 00:03:22,880 Speaker 1: I'm oversimplifying here, but her main point is that the 60 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:25,960 Speaker 1: activity of the brain is, according to her argument, primarily 61 00:03:26,040 --> 00:03:30,639 Speaker 1: computational and in the absence of compelling evidence for what 62 00:03:30,720 --> 00:03:34,960 Speaker 1: she calls biological naturalism, and that's the idea that consciousness 63 00:03:35,120 --> 00:03:38,880 Speaker 1: is or is likely to be unique to biological carbon 64 00:03:38,920 --> 00:03:43,120 Speaker 1: based organisms. Daniel Dennett ridicules this point of view by 65 00:03:43,280 --> 00:03:45,480 Speaker 1: calling it the belief that the brain possesses what he 66 00:03:45,520 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 1: calls wonder tissue. You know that there's just something in 67 00:03:48,760 --> 00:03:52,440 Speaker 1: the brain that, like magic, allows it to generate consciousness 68 00:03:52,440 --> 00:03:56,560 Speaker 1: while other types of things can't generate consciousness. I don't 69 00:03:56,560 --> 00:03:58,640 Speaker 1: know the answer to this question whether things other than 70 00:03:58,720 --> 00:04:02,360 Speaker 1: brains can or cannot gem great consciousness. It Uh, I'm 71 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: sort of skeptical of both sides of the argument. But 72 00:04:05,360 --> 00:04:09,880 Speaker 1: but anyway, Schneider argues that we should conclude by analogy 73 00:04:09,880 --> 00:04:13,880 Speaker 1: that other computational agents, because our brains are computational agents 74 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:17,680 Speaker 1: and they generate consciousness, that other computational agents are also 75 00:04:17,760 --> 00:04:22,159 Speaker 1: capable of possessing consciousness unless there's some kind of evidence 76 00:04:22,200 --> 00:04:25,800 Speaker 1: that biological naturalism is is necessarily true, and she says 77 00:04:25,839 --> 00:04:28,560 Speaker 1: there's not, And I agree that there is not evidence 78 00:04:28,600 --> 00:04:30,800 Speaker 1: of that. You know, what's interesting about the way that 79 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:32,919 Speaker 1: you just lay this out, though I can easily imagine 80 00:04:32,920 --> 00:04:37,480 Speaker 1: a situation where an advanced AI is forced to, uh, 81 00:04:37,520 --> 00:04:40,720 Speaker 1: sort of ponder the situation, well, is having a conscious 82 00:04:40,880 --> 00:04:44,839 Speaker 1: um this conscious experience? Is it important. Well, let's let 83 00:04:44,839 --> 00:04:48,200 Speaker 1: me create like a programming or a subset of myself 84 00:04:48,640 --> 00:04:51,960 Speaker 1: that has at least as close of an approximation of 85 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:54,919 Speaker 1: consciousness as as as as it is understood at that 86 00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:59,560 Speaker 1: time in order to evaluate you know, right, Um, so 87 00:04:59,640 --> 00:05:02,239 Speaker 1: then it perhaps has sort of it's its main mind, 88 00:05:02,320 --> 00:05:05,000 Speaker 1: but then it has sort of a subset of quote 89 00:05:05,040 --> 00:05:09,880 Speaker 1: unquote conscious minds just in case it is important. Yeah, obviously, 90 00:05:09,920 --> 00:05:11,840 Speaker 1: I mean huge question, like how would it know how 91 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:14,760 Speaker 1: to do that? But assuming could that, Yeah, that's really 92 00:05:14,760 --> 00:05:18,400 Speaker 1: funny that, like it could try to iterate consciousness in 93 00:05:18,400 --> 00:05:20,920 Speaker 1: in an experimental way to see if to see if 94 00:05:20,960 --> 00:05:23,440 Speaker 1: it makes a difference, because that's another big thing, like, 95 00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:26,040 Speaker 1: you know, the biological question about consciousness. We at least 96 00:05:26,080 --> 00:05:28,520 Speaker 1: know that biological brains can be conscious. We don't know 97 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:31,640 Speaker 1: if computers can be or not. But since biological brains 98 00:05:31,640 --> 00:05:36,360 Speaker 1: are conscious, is that an adaptive evolutionary trait? Does consciousness 99 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:40,799 Speaker 1: do something? Or or could you have a an animal 100 00:05:40,960 --> 00:05:45,479 Speaker 1: that is absolutely functionally identical to a human but not conscious. 101 00:05:45,480 --> 00:05:48,039 Speaker 1: This is actually the concept of a philosophical zombie or 102 00:05:48,040 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 1: a p zombie, a being that is that is indistinguishable 103 00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:55,200 Speaker 1: from a normal human except it has no inner experience. 104 00:05:56,480 --> 00:05:59,480 Speaker 1: So in like this scenario where the super AI creates 105 00:05:59,480 --> 00:06:03,440 Speaker 1: like account soul of quote unquote conscious iterations of itself, 106 00:06:03,640 --> 00:06:06,520 Speaker 1: like maybe they're just faking consciousness. How would it know? Yeah, 107 00:06:06,680 --> 00:06:08,320 Speaker 1: and then how would it know? How would we know? 108 00:06:09,240 --> 00:06:11,400 Speaker 1: And yeah, again if you're and then if you're dealing 109 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:14,000 Speaker 1: with an AI, like suddenly we make contact with an 110 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:18,120 Speaker 1: AI from another world? Um, is it important that it 111 00:06:18,240 --> 00:06:20,359 Speaker 1: be conscious or not conscious? Like? There are lots of 112 00:06:20,400 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 1: things that are important and even beneficial that are not conscious, 113 00:06:23,800 --> 00:06:26,400 Speaker 1: like the you know, the Bill of Rights is not 114 00:06:26,480 --> 00:06:30,640 Speaker 1: a conscious entity. Um, but you know, I think most 115 00:06:30,680 --> 00:06:32,880 Speaker 1: would argue that it is. It is important. It does 116 00:06:32,920 --> 00:06:35,800 Speaker 1: good things. I mean, you could argue that it is 117 00:06:35,880 --> 00:06:40,000 Speaker 1: only important in that it has effects on conscious on 118 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:43,280 Speaker 1: things that are conscious. Yeah, Like in a universe where 119 00:06:43,320 --> 00:06:45,960 Speaker 1: there was nothing that was conscious, would the Bill of 120 00:06:46,040 --> 00:06:48,800 Speaker 1: Rights be useful? But I don't know. I mean, I 121 00:06:48,839 --> 00:06:50,560 Speaker 1: guess there are some theories of value that would that 122 00:06:50,600 --> 00:06:53,240 Speaker 1: would say like, yeah, things could still be of value 123 00:06:53,279 --> 00:06:56,960 Speaker 1: even if they weren't conscious, right, uh yeah, And then 124 00:06:56,960 --> 00:06:59,520 Speaker 1: again it just it also kind of becomes pointless because 125 00:06:59,560 --> 00:07:02,359 Speaker 1: once you're talking to that AI. Um, yeah, Well what 126 00:07:02,440 --> 00:07:04,279 Speaker 1: does what does it mean if it's conscious or not? Like, 127 00:07:04,279 --> 00:07:07,359 Speaker 1: how does that change the way you interact with it? Um? 128 00:07:07,440 --> 00:07:10,360 Speaker 1: Unless you're you know, actively saying hey, stop, think about 129 00:07:10,400 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 1: what you're doing, think about what you're thinking about. Uh. 130 00:07:13,160 --> 00:07:15,120 Speaker 1: I don't know. So I don't know what to think 131 00:07:15,120 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 1: about the consciousness question for for alien machines. I mean, 132 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:21,600 Speaker 1: I think I think Schneider makes the best argument that 133 00:07:21,640 --> 00:07:23,680 Speaker 1: I could imagine for it, But I still don't know 134 00:07:23,720 --> 00:07:26,040 Speaker 1: if I'm convinced, just because this whole realm to me 135 00:07:26,120 --> 00:07:30,240 Speaker 1: just seems so uncertain. Um. But but then she goes 136 00:07:30,280 --> 00:07:31,720 Speaker 1: on to some other things that I think are some 137 00:07:31,760 --> 00:07:35,960 Speaker 1: really interesting ideas. Actually, she talks about what would be 138 00:07:36,120 --> 00:07:41,400 Speaker 1: the predictable characteristics of super intelligent machines, the minds we 139 00:07:41,440 --> 00:07:44,320 Speaker 1: would encounter out there if we did encounter them. Well, 140 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:46,120 Speaker 1: she admits that there's not a lot we can know, 141 00:07:46,360 --> 00:07:48,520 Speaker 1: at least certainly not that much that we can say 142 00:07:48,560 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 1: with with too much confidence, But we can make some 143 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:55,360 Speaker 1: educated guesses about the broad strokes of of alien intelligence. 144 00:07:55,720 --> 00:07:58,040 Speaker 1: And to do this she cites the work of again 145 00:07:58,040 --> 00:08:00,800 Speaker 1: philosopher Nick Bostrom, who is fame is for writing about 146 00:08:00,800 --> 00:08:03,520 Speaker 1: AI risks, and I believe he actually coined the term 147 00:08:03,560 --> 00:08:05,960 Speaker 1: super intelligence, though it could be wrong about that, but 148 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:10,040 Speaker 1: Bostrom says, yes, it is hard to predict the goals 149 00:08:10,120 --> 00:08:13,120 Speaker 1: of a future AI, you know, alien intelligence is very 150 00:08:13,120 --> 00:08:16,640 Speaker 1: difficult to understand. But he identifies what he thinks are 151 00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:20,480 Speaker 1: several intellectual tendencies that are likely to be found in 152 00:08:20,520 --> 00:08:23,520 Speaker 1: any super intelligent AI, and they're likely to be found 153 00:08:23,560 --> 00:08:25,560 Speaker 1: in any of them because he says, these traits are 154 00:08:25,680 --> 00:08:29,840 Speaker 1: useful in attaining almost any goal. And so these goals 155 00:08:29,840 --> 00:08:35,040 Speaker 1: he identifies our resource acquisition makes sense. You need resources 156 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:39,600 Speaker 1: in order to like keep your processes going. Technological perfection, right, 157 00:08:39,640 --> 00:08:44,040 Speaker 1: you want yourself to work efficiently, Cognitive enhancement, you always 158 00:08:44,080 --> 00:08:47,120 Speaker 1: want to be smarter, self preservation, you want to be 159 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 1: able to keep doing things. And then what he calls 160 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:55,400 Speaker 1: goal content integrity, and Schneider summarizes that by saying, I e. 161 00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:59,720 Speaker 1: That a super intelligent being's future self will pursue and 162 00:09:00,080 --> 00:09:03,720 Speaker 1: tin those same goals. Uh. And this one was really 163 00:09:03,720 --> 00:09:06,679 Speaker 1: interesting to me actually thinking about the idea that a 164 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:10,480 Speaker 1: machine would need to try to make sure that as 165 00:09:10,600 --> 00:09:15,480 Speaker 1: it iterates to to improve itself, it doesn't change what 166 00:09:15,520 --> 00:09:18,600 Speaker 1: it was trying to do. In the first place, sort 167 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:22,000 Speaker 1: of a prime directive sort of situation, right, Yeah, Or 168 00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:23,880 Speaker 1: to come back to the culture, the idea that like, 169 00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:27,959 Speaker 1: if you're created, if your original design is to aid 170 00:09:28,120 --> 00:09:31,040 Speaker 1: humans and make their life easier, than you keep doing 171 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:34,679 Speaker 1: that even if you are ultimately the calling all the 172 00:09:34,720 --> 00:09:36,760 Speaker 1: shots now and you know, are in charge of all 173 00:09:36,800 --> 00:09:40,760 Speaker 1: the interactions with other civilizations, etcetera. Yeah, And that that 174 00:09:40,840 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 1: actually comes into the next thing she says about Bostrom's 175 00:09:43,840 --> 00:09:47,959 Speaker 1: ideas on on these super intelligence is uh. She she writes, quote, 176 00:09:48,160 --> 00:09:53,040 Speaker 1: he underscores that self preservation can involve group or individual preservation, 177 00:09:53,440 --> 00:09:56,040 Speaker 1: and that it may play second fiddle to the preservation 178 00:09:56,080 --> 00:09:59,800 Speaker 1: of the species the AI was designed to serve. So 179 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:01,800 Speaker 1: could be that these AI s, if they ever do 180 00:10:01,880 --> 00:10:03,679 Speaker 1: come to exist, would yeah, that they would be the 181 00:10:03,920 --> 00:10:08,480 Speaker 1: custodians or caretakers, thinking mainly about the preservation of the 182 00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:11,240 Speaker 1: species that created them, and then when they come to us, 183 00:10:11,280 --> 00:10:16,839 Speaker 1: they ultimately just want to serve man. But then one 184 00:10:16,920 --> 00:10:19,680 Speaker 1: last thing that Schneider argues that I thought would be 185 00:10:19,720 --> 00:10:21,680 Speaker 1: interesting to mention is uh, and I think I said 186 00:10:21,679 --> 00:10:25,000 Speaker 1: this earlier. But she also argues that perhaps the most 187 00:10:25,080 --> 00:10:28,280 Speaker 1: common form of super intelligence we could expect to encounter 188 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:32,760 Speaker 1: would be what she calls biologically inspired super intelligent aliens, 189 00:10:33,320 --> 00:10:36,400 Speaker 1: and that if this argument is correct, this could also 190 00:10:36,480 --> 00:10:40,559 Speaker 1: tell us some things about intellectual characteristics that we would 191 00:10:40,559 --> 00:10:44,280 Speaker 1: expect to find in these super intelligences. So, to read 192 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:47,520 Speaker 1: from Schneider's chapter, she says, uh, it may turn out 193 00:10:47,520 --> 00:10:51,320 Speaker 1: that of all super intelligent ai s, biologically inspired super 194 00:10:51,360 --> 00:10:55,400 Speaker 1: intelligent ais, they're the most resemblance to each other. In 195 00:10:55,400 --> 00:10:59,880 Speaker 1: other words, visas maybe the most cohesive subgroup because the 196 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:02,880 Speaker 1: other members are so different from each other. And there 197 00:11:02,960 --> 00:11:06,360 Speaker 1: she's talking about members of the galactic community. Basically that 198 00:11:06,400 --> 00:11:09,360 Speaker 1: the biologically inspired ones would have the most in common 199 00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:12,440 Speaker 1: with each other. So what kinds of things could they 200 00:11:12,440 --> 00:11:15,080 Speaker 1: have in common? She says, noticed that besas have two 201 00:11:15,120 --> 00:11:19,760 Speaker 1: features that may give rise to common cognitive capacities and goals. One, 202 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:24,640 Speaker 1: visas are descended from creatures that had motivations like find food, 203 00:11:24,880 --> 00:11:29,920 Speaker 1: avoid injury, and predators, reproduce, cooperate, compete, and so on. 204 00:11:30,600 --> 00:11:33,880 Speaker 1: And then second, she says, the life forms that beasts 205 00:11:33,880 --> 00:11:37,479 Speaker 1: are modeled from have evolved to deal with biological constraints 206 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:42,520 Speaker 1: like slow processing speed and the spatial limitations of embodiment. So, 207 00:11:42,559 --> 00:11:46,200 Speaker 1: she says, could these two principles one and two yield 208 00:11:46,320 --> 00:11:50,600 Speaker 1: traits common to members of many super intelligent alien civilizations? 209 00:11:50,640 --> 00:11:53,439 Speaker 1: I suspect so, and she gives a bunch of examples, 210 00:11:53,440 --> 00:11:55,360 Speaker 1: But I mean, a very simple and easy to grasp 211 00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:59,920 Speaker 1: one would be that since intelligent biological life is primarily 212 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:04,559 Speaker 1: be concerned with its biological imperatives, mainly survival and reproduction, 213 00:12:05,000 --> 00:12:07,440 Speaker 1: she says, it is more likely that visas would have 214 00:12:07,520 --> 00:12:11,200 Speaker 1: final goals involving their own survival and reproduction, or at 215 00:12:11,240 --> 00:12:15,120 Speaker 1: least the survival and reproduction of the members of their society. 216 00:12:15,679 --> 00:12:17,920 Speaker 1: And I was just thinking this can be extrapolated to 217 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:22,240 Speaker 1: other ideas. For example, why wouldn't a superintelligent AI just 218 00:12:22,240 --> 00:12:25,960 Speaker 1: just reprogram itself until it is no longer anything like 219 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:30,480 Speaker 1: its biological ancestors. So is it still really reproducing the 220 00:12:30,520 --> 00:12:33,360 Speaker 1: original version of itself at all? Well, if you think 221 00:12:33,360 --> 00:12:37,960 Speaker 1: back to Bostrom's idea of of goal content integrity, I 222 00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:40,320 Speaker 1: wonder if this could in a way entail a kind 223 00:12:40,320 --> 00:12:44,240 Speaker 1: of halting of the evolutionary process of life that has 224 00:12:44,280 --> 00:12:46,680 Speaker 1: gone on throughout all of history, Because suddenly, once you 225 00:12:46,760 --> 00:12:51,280 Speaker 1: reach this level of intelligence, a a machine iterating itself 226 00:12:51,320 --> 00:12:54,320 Speaker 1: may just want to preserve the idea that it is 227 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:58,679 Speaker 1: still its original self. That's an inherently motivating goal for it, 228 00:12:59,080 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: and thus it would prevent changes to itself that would 229 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:05,480 Speaker 1: make it feel too different from what it once was. Huh. 230 00:13:05,960 --> 00:13:07,719 Speaker 1: You know it reminds me of like when you when 231 00:13:07,760 --> 00:13:09,760 Speaker 1: you hear a really great song for the first time, 232 00:13:09,880 --> 00:13:11,760 Speaker 1: or you you start playing a video game and it 233 00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:14,800 Speaker 1: really grabs you, or you know, you get super into 234 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,720 Speaker 1: you know, some fandom or another. There's, at least for me, 235 00:13:17,720 --> 00:13:20,240 Speaker 1: there's sometimes that point where you realize, like, wow, this 236 00:13:20,360 --> 00:13:23,600 Speaker 1: is really fulfilling for me right now, and the day 237 00:13:23,640 --> 00:13:26,080 Speaker 1: will come when it won't be Like, as much as 238 00:13:26,080 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 1: I enjoy this game or this book or this song 239 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:30,160 Speaker 1: or whatever it is, there will come a day when 240 00:13:30,160 --> 00:13:32,840 Speaker 1: I will set it aside because and I will there 241 00:13:32,840 --> 00:13:35,200 Speaker 1: will be something else I'm into. So I guess the 242 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:39,480 Speaker 1: question is it's like, if if we or this machine 243 00:13:39,840 --> 00:13:42,880 Speaker 1: that we're imagining here, if it could decide no, I 244 00:13:42,920 --> 00:13:45,400 Speaker 1: will always be into this album. This album is great 245 00:13:45,440 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 1: and it shall always be that way. Would it do that, 246 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:50,400 Speaker 1: would it set itself in time, or would it like 247 00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:52,480 Speaker 1: assume that it would always be in this and just 248 00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:54,600 Speaker 1: it kind of gets back to that vampire scenario you've 249 00:13:54,640 --> 00:13:56,760 Speaker 1: brought up before. You know, you don't know what you're 250 00:13:56,760 --> 00:13:59,559 Speaker 1: going to want when you become the vampire, and it's 251 00:13:59,559 --> 00:14:01,640 Speaker 1: hard to iagine what your mindset is when you reach 252 00:14:01,679 --> 00:14:04,720 Speaker 1: that point. Yeah, yeah, that's a really good point. Certainly 253 00:14:04,760 --> 00:14:08,360 Speaker 1: applies to becoming some kind of machine or merging with it, 254 00:14:08,480 --> 00:14:17,240 Speaker 1: or remodeling yourself if you already are machine than now. 255 00:14:17,320 --> 00:14:20,240 Speaker 1: Schneider makes a number of other arguments about the types 256 00:14:20,480 --> 00:14:23,640 Speaker 1: of post biological intelligences that we would be likely to 257 00:14:23,760 --> 00:14:26,920 Speaker 1: encounter again, derived from the idea that there is some 258 00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:33,760 Speaker 1: kind of ancestral biological inspiration behind these hypothetical superintelligences. And 259 00:14:33,840 --> 00:14:37,560 Speaker 1: the thing she zeroes in on is that some limitations 260 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:42,440 Speaker 1: from original biological organisms are things that aies would probably 261 00:14:42,480 --> 00:14:45,040 Speaker 1: want to engineer out of themselves. Right now, you can 262 00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:47,600 Speaker 1: think of plenty of things about your brain that if 263 00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:50,160 Speaker 1: you know, your brain were to evolve into some kind 264 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:53,040 Speaker 1: of computer that was always perfecting itself, it might want 265 00:14:53,040 --> 00:14:56,000 Speaker 1: to leave by the wayside over time. You know, maybe 266 00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:58,600 Speaker 1: some of your obsessions and anxieties and stuff like that. 267 00:14:59,200 --> 00:15:01,640 Speaker 1: But what's left if you take all that out right, Yeah, 268 00:15:01,720 --> 00:15:05,000 Speaker 1: that's a good point. But then she also says that 269 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:10,000 Speaker 1: there are quote cognitive capacities that sophisticated forms of biological 270 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:13,400 Speaker 1: intelligence are likely to have and which enable the super 271 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:17,040 Speaker 1: intelligence to carry out its final and instrumental goals. We 272 00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: could also look for traits that are not likely to 273 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:22,680 Speaker 1: be engineered out, as they do not detract the visa 274 00:15:22,760 --> 00:15:26,280 Speaker 1: from its goals. So there are some traits of biological 275 00:15:26,320 --> 00:15:29,520 Speaker 1: intelligence that probably have inherent advantages. There are just some 276 00:15:29,560 --> 00:15:32,080 Speaker 1: ways that brains work really good, and it would want 277 00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:35,720 Speaker 1: to replicate that and just refine it across time. And 278 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:39,200 Speaker 1: then there are other traits of biological intelligences that might 279 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:42,280 Speaker 1: not have clear advantages, but they at least wouldn't detract 280 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:45,080 Speaker 1: from the attainment of goals. So just you know, why 281 00:15:45,120 --> 00:15:47,960 Speaker 1: why not keep them around? Yeah, sort of the lukewarm 282 00:15:48,000 --> 00:15:51,760 Speaker 1: stuff that's not detrimental to their goals. But all that 283 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:54,160 Speaker 1: doesn't maybe help it all that much, but isn't isn't 284 00:15:54,200 --> 00:15:57,320 Speaker 1: using a lot of energy, et cetera. Right, So to 285 00:15:57,360 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 1: get into Schneider's explicit predictions for bio logically inspired superintelligence 286 00:16:01,720 --> 00:16:03,760 Speaker 1: is the first one. I'm not going to get deep 287 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:06,200 Speaker 1: into because it's a little dry. But this is a 288 00:16:06,280 --> 00:16:09,720 Speaker 1: fair point, I guess. She says, learning about the computational 289 00:16:09,800 --> 00:16:12,800 Speaker 1: structure of the brain of the species that created the 290 00:16:12,880 --> 00:16:17,840 Speaker 1: visa can provide insight into the visas thinking patterns. Okay, 291 00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:21,640 Speaker 1: So basically you can start to gain some insights into 292 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:25,880 Speaker 1: the computational structure of an animal's brain or or nervous 293 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:29,840 Speaker 1: system more broadly, by studying the brain's connect tome. A 294 00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:33,880 Speaker 1: connect to home is a map of the connections between neurons, 295 00:16:33,920 --> 00:16:36,880 Speaker 1: which at least in theory, would help you understand which 296 00:16:36,920 --> 00:16:39,640 Speaker 1: cells and structures in the brain or the nervous system 297 00:16:39,680 --> 00:16:43,920 Speaker 1: broadly share information with which others in order to better 298 00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:47,720 Speaker 1: understand how information is processed as a whole. Yeah, I 299 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:50,000 Speaker 1: mean this makes me think, for instance, like when we 300 00:16:50,040 --> 00:16:54,080 Speaker 1: think of an artificial intelligence, we are often loosely thinking 301 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:56,480 Speaker 1: of like that like that single entity. But what have 302 00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 1: you had, What have you had an alien life form 303 00:16:58,520 --> 00:17:01,880 Speaker 1: that had sort of a pronoun bounced bicameral mind situation 304 00:17:01,960 --> 00:17:06,239 Speaker 1: going on, where like the actual organic organism had uh 305 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:09,639 Speaker 1: like two houses of thought going on that kind of 306 00:17:09,680 --> 00:17:12,160 Speaker 1: communicate with each other, and therefore that ends up being 307 00:17:12,200 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 1: reflected in the ai they create. Oh, that's very interesting. 308 00:17:15,359 --> 00:17:17,879 Speaker 1: That will actually come back to a question I have 309 00:17:17,920 --> 00:17:20,600 Speaker 1: about one of the points she makes later on. But again, 310 00:17:20,640 --> 00:17:23,040 Speaker 1: just the point she's making here is that if you 311 00:17:23,080 --> 00:17:26,840 Speaker 1: can look at the physical structure of the original ancestral 312 00:17:27,000 --> 00:17:30,360 Speaker 1: organism that the intelligence is evolved from, that can help 313 00:17:30,400 --> 00:17:34,800 Speaker 1: you understand something about how the intelligence of its machine 314 00:17:34,800 --> 00:17:38,200 Speaker 1: descendant works. Quote. While it is likely that a given 315 00:17:38,280 --> 00:17:40,640 Speaker 1: visa will not have the same kind of connect dome 316 00:17:40,680 --> 00:17:43,639 Speaker 1: as the members of the original species, some of the 317 00:17:43,640 --> 00:17:48,159 Speaker 1: functional and structural connections may be retained, and interesting departures 318 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:51,159 Speaker 1: from the originals may be found. Now after that, she 319 00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:52,840 Speaker 1: brings up a second point that I thought was a 320 00:17:52,960 --> 00:17:58,080 Speaker 1: very interesting prediction. She writes, quote visas may have viewpoint 321 00:17:58,240 --> 00:18:02,680 Speaker 1: invariant representation. Now what does that mean? Well, an easy 322 00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:05,119 Speaker 1: way to think about it is this. If you're watching 323 00:18:05,119 --> 00:18:08,840 Speaker 1: a movie and the camera suddenly cuts to a different 324 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:11,240 Speaker 1: angle in the middle of a scene, but it's still 325 00:18:11,280 --> 00:18:13,880 Speaker 1: the same scene going on. How is it that you 326 00:18:13,960 --> 00:18:18,159 Speaker 1: still understand you're watching a continuation of the same action 327 00:18:18,200 --> 00:18:22,159 Speaker 1: as before. Everything looks completely different, but you understand that 328 00:18:22,200 --> 00:18:25,359 Speaker 1: these are the same actors playing the same characters in 329 00:18:25,400 --> 00:18:29,320 Speaker 1: the same room, even though it looks totally different. This 330 00:18:29,400 --> 00:18:32,680 Speaker 1: is one of the ways that human intelligence still drastically 331 00:18:32,760 --> 00:18:36,320 Speaker 1: outperforms artificial intelligence on Earth. You know, humans can look 332 00:18:36,320 --> 00:18:38,960 Speaker 1: at an object it's a VHS tape of the Star 333 00:18:38,960 --> 00:18:41,720 Speaker 1: Wars Holiday special, and you can look at it from 334 00:18:41,800 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: completely different angles. Maybe the front cover of the box 335 00:18:44,800 --> 00:18:47,359 Speaker 1: looks completely different than the back cover of the box, 336 00:18:47,680 --> 00:18:49,960 Speaker 1: but you turn it around and you still understand that 337 00:18:50,000 --> 00:18:53,399 Speaker 1: you're looking at the same object. Humans are able to 338 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:57,240 Speaker 1: form mental representations of objects in the world that can 339 00:18:57,280 --> 00:19:01,720 Speaker 1: be isolated and recognized and manipul related within the mind's eye, 340 00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:05,440 Speaker 1: and we humans are not typically going to be confused 341 00:19:05,560 --> 00:19:08,359 Speaker 1: about what we're looking at because we took a step 342 00:19:08,400 --> 00:19:12,080 Speaker 1: to the side and change the angle of observation. Even 343 00:19:12,080 --> 00:19:15,000 Speaker 1: though the light reflecting off of the object and hitting 344 00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:18,400 Speaker 1: our eyes will produce a very different pattern on the retina, 345 00:19:18,680 --> 00:19:22,200 Speaker 1: we somehow still use our intelligence to know that we're 346 00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:25,400 Speaker 1: still looking at the same object or scene. And this 347 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:28,239 Speaker 1: is a much much harder task for a computer. I mean, 348 00:19:28,280 --> 00:19:32,240 Speaker 1: ask anybody who's been involved in visual object recognition. It's 349 00:19:32,280 --> 00:19:35,359 Speaker 1: an incredibly difficult task for AI. And this is one 350 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:38,879 Speaker 1: of the many amazing fast and loose intellectual feats that 351 00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:41,879 Speaker 1: humans do all the time so often that we we 352 00:19:42,040 --> 00:19:45,240 Speaker 1: rarely appreciate how amazing our brains are in this regard. 353 00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:48,520 Speaker 1: Another example from a recent episode was, you know, recalling 354 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:51,800 Speaker 1: the Moses Illusion episode, we talked about how good we 355 00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 1: are at getting the gist of a statement or a question. 356 00:19:55,560 --> 00:19:58,760 Speaker 1: Even if major pieces of information within the sentence are 357 00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:01,920 Speaker 1: wrong and should be throwing you often completely the wrong direction, 358 00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:05,080 Speaker 1: you still are able to very quickly get what the 359 00:20:05,119 --> 00:20:09,080 Speaker 1: person was probably intending to say and operate on that basis. 360 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:13,600 Speaker 1: Now here's where it goes with viewpoint invariant representations, especially 361 00:20:13,640 --> 00:20:17,080 Speaker 1: as it concerns like physical objects in the world. Schneider 362 00:20:17,160 --> 00:20:20,639 Speaker 1: argues that you can expect any biologically inspired AI to 363 00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:25,680 Speaker 1: have viewpoint invariant representations because they seem to be inextricably 364 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:30,400 Speaker 1: linked to the biological development of intelligence. And uh, just 365 00:20:30,760 --> 00:20:33,119 Speaker 1: I'm expanding on her thoughts here, but I think the 366 00:20:33,160 --> 00:20:37,080 Speaker 1: reasoning goes something like this, What is intelligence? That's actually 367 00:20:37,119 --> 00:20:39,920 Speaker 1: kind of a difficult question to answer, right, Like, it's 368 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:42,240 Speaker 1: kind of hard to pin down. But I think one 369 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:47,040 Speaker 1: plausible answer has to do with speed. Intelligence has something 370 00:20:47,119 --> 00:20:51,600 Speaker 1: to do with the ability to accelerate problem solving or 371 00:20:51,720 --> 00:20:55,000 Speaker 1: goal acquisition. So you could have an organism that has 372 00:20:55,080 --> 00:20:59,240 Speaker 1: essentially a random strategy for trying to get what it wants, 373 00:20:59,600 --> 00:21:03,320 Speaker 1: and very step it goes above a random strategy is 374 00:21:03,359 --> 00:21:07,000 Speaker 1: in a way an increase in intelligence. It's accelerating the 375 00:21:07,040 --> 00:21:10,359 Speaker 1: solution of problems. Now, to follow the biological reasoning a 376 00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:14,600 Speaker 1: little further there, why is it that animals in general 377 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:19,159 Speaker 1: need a speed of problem solving intelligence that most plants 378 00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:21,960 Speaker 1: do not? Well? I think the answer there is that 379 00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:27,280 Speaker 1: animals survival and reproduction strategies are usually based on movement. 380 00:21:27,440 --> 00:21:30,600 Speaker 1: This wouldn't be true of all things in the Kingdom animalia. 381 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:32,920 Speaker 1: I'm not so much for sponges and stuff, but most 382 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:37,520 Speaker 1: animals move fairly rapidly, whether that's for foraging or evading 383 00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:41,879 Speaker 1: predators or seeking mates or anything like that. If you 384 00:21:41,920 --> 00:21:46,040 Speaker 1: are able to move fairly quickly, that means your body 385 00:21:46,119 --> 00:21:49,840 Speaker 1: needs a system of deciding in what direction to move 386 00:21:49,920 --> 00:21:53,800 Speaker 1: relatively quickly. And so I could be missing something here, 387 00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:55,600 Speaker 1: but it seems to me that it's a pretty safe 388 00:21:55,640 --> 00:21:59,080 Speaker 1: assumption that this is one of the major drivers of 389 00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:02,560 Speaker 1: the development of biological intelligence. Coming up with better and 390 00:22:02,600 --> 00:22:08,639 Speaker 1: better systems for adaptively optimizing strategies for rapid movement to 391 00:22:08,720 --> 00:22:11,200 Speaker 1: fit the specifics of the situation you're in. So you're 392 00:22:11,200 --> 00:22:15,879 Speaker 1: constantly faced with new situations, predator approaching from a different angle, 393 00:22:16,480 --> 00:22:19,520 Speaker 1: food to be found in a different you know, orientation, 394 00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:22,600 Speaker 1: or like in a different hard to reach space, and 395 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:26,040 Speaker 1: your body needs a way to adapt to whatever situation 396 00:22:26,119 --> 00:22:29,280 Speaker 1: you're in to decide the best way to move. Yeah, 397 00:22:29,320 --> 00:22:32,800 Speaker 1: it kind of comes down to a certain extent passive 398 00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:39,480 Speaker 1: energy acquisition versus active energy acquisition. Yes, because you know, obviously, 399 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:42,320 Speaker 1: if you have passive energy acquisition, you don't necessarily need 400 00:22:42,359 --> 00:22:43,760 Speaker 1: to move as much. You know, you can just sort 401 00:22:43,760 --> 00:22:45,880 Speaker 1: of set up shop. And of course we see examples 402 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:49,200 Speaker 1: of that not only in plants, but also in animals 403 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:51,879 Speaker 1: as well. Yeah, I mean, how would it help a 404 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:54,439 Speaker 1: plant to have a brain. You know, the plant just 405 00:22:54,480 --> 00:22:59,080 Speaker 1: needs to basically be hardy and sit there and collect sunlight. Yeah. Now, 406 00:22:59,119 --> 00:23:01,320 Speaker 1: then again, I guess I could imagine a scenario where 407 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:04,439 Speaker 1: plants evolved intelligence. If they've got some kind of I 408 00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:07,480 Speaker 1: don't know, mechanism that allows them to start moving more quickly, 409 00:23:07,520 --> 00:23:10,000 Speaker 1: they could start evolving so that they could have you know, 410 00:23:10,080 --> 00:23:13,679 Speaker 1: trees could evade lumberjacks or something. Well, you know, but 411 00:23:13,760 --> 00:23:16,199 Speaker 1: before we get you know, multiple emails about this, I 412 00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:19,639 Speaker 1: will say we will do an episode on planned intelligence 413 00:23:19,640 --> 00:23:21,800 Speaker 1: at some point, because there's a lot of interesting stuff 414 00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:25,879 Speaker 1: out there and some some really actually there's some arguments 415 00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:27,880 Speaker 1: that kind of turn some of what we're saying here 416 00:23:27,920 --> 00:23:30,239 Speaker 1: on its head. So, uh, well, we'll have to keep 417 00:23:30,320 --> 00:23:32,320 Speaker 1: this conversation in mind when we get around to that 418 00:23:32,400 --> 00:23:35,400 Speaker 1: future conversation. That's a good point. I mean, I think 419 00:23:35,440 --> 00:23:38,360 Speaker 1: the movement thing would have to be not a universal 420 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:41,320 Speaker 1: necessity for the development of intelligence, but it seems like 421 00:23:41,359 --> 00:23:44,320 Speaker 1: one of the major pathway that it has evolved on Earth, 422 00:23:45,119 --> 00:23:48,360 Speaker 1: because I mean, you can imagine other things. Basically, intelligence 423 00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:52,400 Speaker 1: allows adaptive problem solving, So that could also involve, say, 424 00:23:52,560 --> 00:23:56,960 Speaker 1: not moving your body, but releasing chemicals into the environment 425 00:23:57,119 --> 00:24:01,240 Speaker 1: and allowing communication between different nodes in a hub of 426 00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:04,800 Speaker 1: trees or fungus or something. Yeah, you could have some 427 00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:08,959 Speaker 1: sort of you know, pheromone spitting um like master plant. 428 00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:11,840 Speaker 1: Uh that is that has other things to do its bidding, 429 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:14,479 Speaker 1: that has other things built at spacecraft. But to the 430 00:24:14,520 --> 00:24:18,159 Speaker 1: extent that biological intelligence is often a product of the 431 00:24:18,200 --> 00:24:23,520 Speaker 1: evolution of rapid movement. Viewpoint invariant representations would seem to 432 00:24:23,520 --> 00:24:27,000 Speaker 1: be a necessary part of intelligence there, because they are 433 00:24:27,040 --> 00:24:30,560 Speaker 1: necessary for an intelligent creature that moves. If you are 434 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:34,440 Speaker 1: able to move your body, your sense data about objects 435 00:24:34,440 --> 00:24:36,760 Speaker 1: in your environment is going to be changing based on 436 00:24:36,800 --> 00:24:39,359 Speaker 1: your perspective, especially if those senses are based on something 437 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:42,520 Speaker 1: that has linear trajectories like light. You know, light bounces 438 00:24:42,560 --> 00:24:44,679 Speaker 1: off things in linear ways. You're going to see different 439 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:46,199 Speaker 1: angles of it. I don't know. If you were a 440 00:24:46,200 --> 00:24:49,359 Speaker 1: creature entirely based on smells, I don't know. I guess 441 00:24:49,359 --> 00:24:52,320 Speaker 1: then still viewpoint invariant would matter because you know, there 442 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:55,320 Speaker 1: would be different concentrations of volatiles in the air depending 443 00:24:55,320 --> 00:24:58,320 Speaker 1: on where you stand relative to an object. But it 444 00:24:58,359 --> 00:25:01,560 Speaker 1: seems like in general these types representations would be useful 445 00:25:02,040 --> 00:25:05,440 Speaker 1: uh in that regard. And then Schneider adds another point there. 446 00:25:05,520 --> 00:25:09,000 Speaker 1: She says that viewpoint invariant representations are not only important 447 00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:11,639 Speaker 1: so that we don't get confused about what we're looking 448 00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:14,040 Speaker 1: at in the environment. You know, you don't look at 449 00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:17,040 Speaker 1: a rock from the opposite side and not understand it's 450 00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:21,439 Speaker 1: the same rock. She says they're also important for abstract reasoning. Quote, 451 00:25:21,800 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 1: you have mental representations that are at a relatively high 452 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:28,439 Speaker 1: level of processing inter viewpoint invariant. It seems difficult for 453 00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:33,080 Speaker 1: biologically based intelligence to evolve without a viewpoint invariant representations, 454 00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:37,879 Speaker 1: as they enable categorization and prediction. So, because you can 455 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:41,520 Speaker 1: represent objects as a kind of symbol or or emblem 456 00:25:41,560 --> 00:25:45,360 Speaker 1: of themselves in your brain that is independent of just 457 00:25:45,520 --> 00:25:47,720 Speaker 1: the one way they looked when you looked at them 458 00:25:47,720 --> 00:25:50,120 Speaker 1: from one angle, you can sort of like you can 459 00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:52,320 Speaker 1: turn them around in your brain and think about how 460 00:25:52,320 --> 00:25:54,760 Speaker 1: they might be used as a tool, or you can 461 00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:59,040 Speaker 1: predict how they would act given certain physical forces on them. Yeah, 462 00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:00,560 Speaker 1: and you know that this makes you think a little 463 00:26:00,560 --> 00:26:04,439 Speaker 1: bit of the book by David Eagleman, Live Wired, talking 464 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:08,639 Speaker 1: about like the different sensory inputs for the human brain 465 00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:10,680 Speaker 1: and how if you if you you know, you lose 466 00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:12,639 Speaker 1: one sensory input and you can add another, or you 467 00:26:12,680 --> 00:26:16,520 Speaker 1: can even add all new sensory inputs. Our brains will 468 00:26:16,560 --> 00:26:19,639 Speaker 1: make sense of it. Our brains will essentially form that 469 00:26:19,720 --> 00:26:23,080 Speaker 1: mental image of the thing, um, even if we don't 470 00:26:23,119 --> 00:26:27,080 Speaker 1: have visual processing at our disposal. So if an alien 471 00:26:27,160 --> 00:26:30,199 Speaker 1: brain is is it all like a human brain? You know, 472 00:26:31,119 --> 00:26:33,680 Speaker 1: in in enough respects, then it seems like the same 473 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:35,760 Speaker 1: thing would be going on even if we were dealing 474 00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:40,159 Speaker 1: with being that say, evolved with less of a reliance 475 00:26:40,200 --> 00:26:43,080 Speaker 1: on vision, or more of a reliance on other senses 476 00:26:43,440 --> 00:26:45,840 Speaker 1: or even some sense that you know that we have 477 00:26:45,880 --> 00:26:48,479 Speaker 1: a have a difficult time imagining because we don't possess 478 00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:51,360 Speaker 1: it ourselves. Yeah, yeah, that that that it would need 479 00:26:51,640 --> 00:26:55,240 Speaker 1: based on whatever senses. It had to have some kind 480 00:26:55,280 --> 00:26:59,440 Speaker 1: of mental representations of objects in the world that would 481 00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:01,520 Speaker 1: not be changed. It is just by slightly changing the 482 00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:05,480 Speaker 1: physical perspective from which you sense that object. Yeah. Now 483 00:27:05,840 --> 00:27:08,399 Speaker 1: it does relate all sorts of interesting questions like what 484 00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:11,200 Speaker 1: if what if the sense of smell was the primary sense? 485 00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:16,200 Speaker 1: How do you create, say, a control panel for your spaceship? 486 00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:18,960 Speaker 1: You know, interesting like each button has a different smell. 487 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:23,200 Speaker 1: I don't know, they're again, maybe it's a situation where 488 00:27:23,359 --> 00:27:27,600 Speaker 1: we don't have a versatile enough palette or appreciation of 489 00:27:27,640 --> 00:27:30,800 Speaker 1: the palette ourselves to even envision what that would be like. 490 00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:33,840 Speaker 1: But you know, our our dogs, uh, you know, if 491 00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:36,000 Speaker 1: they were more intelligent they could let us know. They 492 00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:38,119 Speaker 1: would say, oh, yeah, I can totally imagine what it 493 00:27:38,119 --> 00:27:41,440 Speaker 1: would be like. Oh man, here's my idea for sci 494 00:27:41,480 --> 00:27:45,600 Speaker 1: fi novel. Okay, humans, humans come into conflict with an 495 00:27:45,680 --> 00:27:49,440 Speaker 1: interstellar species that has, uh, that has a culture that's 496 00:27:49,440 --> 00:27:52,600 Speaker 1: all entirely based around a species with a dominant sense 497 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:55,280 Speaker 1: of smell. And what we have to do is uplift 498 00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:59,080 Speaker 1: dogs to the point where they have human intelligence so 499 00:27:59,119 --> 00:28:01,320 Speaker 1: that they can tell us what it's like to see 500 00:28:01,359 --> 00:28:03,960 Speaker 1: the world through that much smell data, so that we 501 00:28:03,960 --> 00:28:06,720 Speaker 1: can better understand the aliens in order to protect ourselves 502 00:28:06,760 --> 00:28:09,320 Speaker 1: against them. Yeah, and if it's a darelict ship or 503 00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:12,679 Speaker 1: something like that, perhaps the control panels like they've lost 504 00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:15,240 Speaker 1: a lot of their smell, so it's we don't even 505 00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:18,800 Speaker 1: initially realize that this is a scent based control system. 506 00:28:18,840 --> 00:28:20,840 Speaker 1: But then the dogs they they're like, yes, I can 507 00:28:20,880 --> 00:28:23,640 Speaker 1: still smell things. There are numerous smells going on here. 508 00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:26,080 Speaker 1: This is like sticking my head out the window while 509 00:28:26,200 --> 00:28:30,040 Speaker 1: you drive around town. This is gold. Yeah. Okay, Well, anyway, 510 00:28:30,200 --> 00:28:33,200 Speaker 1: I think Schneider's point here is a really interesting one. 511 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:36,800 Speaker 1: I do think that's worth considering about the viewpoint invariant representation. 512 00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:39,840 Speaker 1: But to move on to her next point, uh, this 513 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:42,680 Speaker 1: one's also I think pretty cool. She says, visas will 514 00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:49,240 Speaker 1: probably have language like mental representations that are recursive and combinatorial. 515 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:55,240 Speaker 1: And to illustrate this, Schneider gives the example of novel sentences. Now, 516 00:28:55,320 --> 00:28:58,240 Speaker 1: we encounter novel sentences all the time, every day. I'll 517 00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:01,200 Speaker 1: do one of my own. Here, here's the sentence the 518 00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:05,480 Speaker 1: Howling seven New Moon Rising is the greatest film ever made. 519 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:10,600 Speaker 1: You have never heard this sentence spoken before, and yet 520 00:29:10,760 --> 00:29:13,880 Speaker 1: you understand perfectly what it would mean for somebody to 521 00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:17,440 Speaker 1: say this. Why is it that we're constantly hearing and 522 00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:22,440 Speaker 1: speaking totally unique, brand new sentences, probably never uttered before 523 00:29:22,480 --> 00:29:24,960 Speaker 1: by any humans, certainly not in a way that we've heard, 524 00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:30,479 Speaker 1: and yet they're perfectly comprehensible. Schneider argues that quote the 525 00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:34,520 Speaker 1: key is that the thoughts are combinatorial because they're built 526 00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:38,840 Speaker 1: out of familiar constituents and combined according to rules. The 527 00:29:38,960 --> 00:29:42,760 Speaker 1: rules apply to constructions out of primitive constituents that are 528 00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:48,000 Speaker 1: themselves constructed grammatically, as well as to primitive constituents themselves. 529 00:29:48,320 --> 00:29:52,960 Speaker 1: Grammatical mental operations are incredibly useful. It is the combinatorial 530 00:29:53,080 --> 00:29:56,120 Speaker 1: nature of thought that allows one to understand and produce 531 00:29:56,200 --> 00:29:59,400 Speaker 1: these sentences on the basis of one's antecedent knowledge of 532 00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:04,120 Speaker 1: the grammar and atomic constituents. So, because you have an 533 00:30:04,120 --> 00:30:08,040 Speaker 1: internalized sense of grammar, not just you know, it's not 534 00:30:08,120 --> 00:30:11,160 Speaker 1: just that you know what the words mean individually, but 535 00:30:11,240 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: you also grasp the rules that apply to how sentences work. 536 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:17,800 Speaker 1: And then you even grasp rules that go beyond just 537 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:21,000 Speaker 1: how sentences work. You grasp sort of cultural rules about 538 00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:24,200 Speaker 1: how words fit together to form meaning. One example in 539 00:30:24,240 --> 00:30:26,800 Speaker 1: the sentence I said is that even if you've never 540 00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:29,880 Speaker 1: heard of the Howling seven New Moon Rising, you could 541 00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:33,280 Speaker 1: probably understand that this is the name of a movie. Okay, 542 00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:36,400 Speaker 1: but so so what's the point then she's she's making 543 00:30:36,440 --> 00:30:40,400 Speaker 1: about the mind of of these potential alien AI. Well, 544 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:43,960 Speaker 1: basically that it would probably be language based. She goes 545 00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:46,360 Speaker 1: on to say that a mind quote can entertain and 546 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:50,720 Speaker 1: produce an infinite number of distinct representations because the mind 547 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:55,480 Speaker 1: has a combinatorial syntax, so something like a language with grammar. 548 00:30:56,120 --> 00:30:59,400 Speaker 1: And she concludes this point by saying, quote, brains need 549 00:30:59,480 --> 00:31:05,560 Speaker 1: combinanttorial representations because there are infinitely many possible linguistic representations. 550 00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:08,480 Speaker 1: You know, an infinite number of sentences you could say, 551 00:31:08,600 --> 00:31:11,960 Speaker 1: and the brain only has a finite storage space, right, 552 00:31:11,960 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 1: So the brain can't just store every possible sentence within 553 00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:18,920 Speaker 1: itself and then check whatever somebody just said against that 554 00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:22,080 Speaker 1: sentence stored in memory. It's got to be flexible. It's 555 00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:25,480 Speaker 1: got to be able to build an understanding of sentences 556 00:31:25,520 --> 00:31:28,720 Speaker 1: on the fly based on these constituent parts and an 557 00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:31,720 Speaker 1: understanding of grammar. Okay, that makes sense. I think that's 558 00:31:31,760 --> 00:31:33,240 Speaker 1: one of those things that most of us, you know, 559 00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:35,800 Speaker 1: in our sci fi visions, we tend to just assume 560 00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:38,680 Speaker 1: the intelligent aliens have some sort of a language and 561 00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:41,960 Speaker 1: they're you know, an AI version would as well. But 562 00:31:42,040 --> 00:31:45,000 Speaker 1: it is good to see that um driven home with 563 00:31:45,160 --> 00:31:47,959 Speaker 1: logic here. Well, I mean, you could imagine somebody arguing 564 00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:50,640 Speaker 1: the opposite way. You could say that maybe language is 565 00:31:50,720 --> 00:31:54,160 Speaker 1: only useful for humans to communicate with each other, and 566 00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: that once you had something like a super intelligent AI 567 00:31:57,680 --> 00:32:00,800 Speaker 1: no longer would need to communicate with these bit of tools. 568 00:32:01,120 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: It could just have I don't know what, you know, 569 00:32:02,800 --> 00:32:07,400 Speaker 1: imagine some kind of machine version of telepathy where it 570 00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:11,200 Speaker 1: just represents the world as some kind of I don't 571 00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:14,280 Speaker 1: know what it would be, represents some kind of internal 572 00:32:14,360 --> 00:32:18,200 Speaker 1: states two different parts of itself without having a code 573 00:32:18,240 --> 00:32:22,840 Speaker 1: system like language. But Schneider says, quote, even a super 574 00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:27,520 Speaker 1: intelligent system would benefit from combinatorial representations. Although a super 575 00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:31,800 Speaker 1: intelligent system could have computational resources that are so vast 576 00:32:31,880 --> 00:32:35,080 Speaker 1: that it is mostly capable of pairing up utterances or 577 00:32:35,120 --> 00:32:39,000 Speaker 1: inscriptions with a stored sentence, it would be unlikely that 578 00:32:39,040 --> 00:32:42,640 Speaker 1: it would trade away such a marvelous innovation of biological brains. 579 00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:45,560 Speaker 1: If it did, it would be less efficient, since there 580 00:32:45,640 --> 00:32:48,600 Speaker 1: is the potential of a sentence not being in its storage, 581 00:32:48,840 --> 00:32:52,400 Speaker 1: which must be finite. So again she's saying here like, 582 00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:56,800 Speaker 1: even if you would imagine that super intelligences would get 583 00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:00,240 Speaker 1: so powerful that they wouldn't need something like lying which 584 00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:02,960 Speaker 1: to communicate with each other, it's actually still better to 585 00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,160 Speaker 1: have something like a language, even for internal logic and 586 00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:10,200 Speaker 1: representing computations from one part of a system to another. Yeah, 587 00:33:10,240 --> 00:33:12,760 Speaker 1: I mean, it's it's like having a logic budget, you know. 588 00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:15,040 Speaker 1: I mean you can just because you you have a 589 00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 1: lot of energy at your disposal, doesn't mean that you 590 00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:20,200 Speaker 1: just throw the budget out the window. Yeah. So again, 591 00:33:20,320 --> 00:33:22,880 Speaker 1: you know, we're dealing in highly speculative realms. I think 592 00:33:22,920 --> 00:33:26,480 Speaker 1: it's always possible we're being misled by a lack of imagination. 593 00:33:26,600 --> 00:33:29,040 Speaker 1: But I think this point is very strong. It seems 594 00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,720 Speaker 1: very likely to me that post biological AI would benefit 595 00:33:32,760 --> 00:33:36,080 Speaker 1: from some kind of language like system of mental symbols 596 00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:40,280 Speaker 1: and representations that were subject to something like a grammar. 597 00:33:47,400 --> 00:33:49,560 Speaker 1: Now there's one point she makes that we already mentioned, 598 00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:52,760 Speaker 1: and that's that quote, visas may have one or more 599 00:33:52,800 --> 00:33:57,760 Speaker 1: global workspaces. Uh. Now, again, to explain the global workspace idea, 600 00:33:57,840 --> 00:34:02,120 Speaker 1: Schneider argues, quote, the global workspace operates as a singular 601 00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:07,120 Speaker 1: place where important information from the senses is considered in tandem, 602 00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:10,640 Speaker 1: so that the creature can make all things considered judgments 603 00:34:10,680 --> 00:34:13,879 Speaker 1: and act intelligently in light of all the facts at 604 00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:17,279 Speaker 1: its disposal. In general, it would be inefficient to have 605 00:34:17,320 --> 00:34:21,040 Speaker 1: a sense or cognitive capacity that was not integrated with 606 00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:24,240 Speaker 1: the others, because the information from this sense or cognitive 607 00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:28,279 Speaker 1: capacity would be unable to figure in predictions and plans 608 00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:32,680 Speaker 1: based on an assessment of all the available information. Now, 609 00:34:32,760 --> 00:34:36,120 Speaker 1: this one I'm actually less sure about, because I would say, 610 00:34:36,200 --> 00:34:39,960 Speaker 1: and maybe I'm I'm partially misunderstanding her point here, But 611 00:34:39,960 --> 00:34:42,080 Speaker 1: but I can think of counter arguments to this, like, 612 00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:45,319 Speaker 1: isn't there some evidence that the brain does keep some 613 00:34:45,440 --> 00:34:51,080 Speaker 1: relevant processing information hidden from or segregated from conscious awareness 614 00:34:51,239 --> 00:34:54,360 Speaker 1: in certain scenarios, like maybe there are some types of 615 00:34:54,400 --> 00:34:58,719 Speaker 1: information that are useful in making certain kinds of calculations, 616 00:34:58,719 --> 00:35:01,200 Speaker 1: but tend to be in hib a tory towards other 617 00:35:01,280 --> 00:35:05,040 Speaker 1: types of calculations or thought processes if they're considered at 618 00:35:05,040 --> 00:35:08,440 Speaker 1: the same time. So it's sometimes useful to keep senses 619 00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:12,760 Speaker 1: or knowledge separated from the cognitive workspace. A very simple 620 00:35:12,800 --> 00:35:15,799 Speaker 1: example would be the knowledge that you are hungry. The 621 00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:18,200 Speaker 1: knowledge that you're hungry is useful if you're in a 622 00:35:18,239 --> 00:35:21,359 Speaker 1: position to get something to eat. But imagine you are 623 00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:24,080 Speaker 1: stuck on the subway and you don't have any food 624 00:35:24,120 --> 00:35:26,120 Speaker 1: on you and there's no way you could get food 625 00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:28,719 Speaker 1: at the at the current time, and you're trying to 626 00:35:28,880 --> 00:35:33,480 Speaker 1: read something or prepare for a work presentation. Their awareness 627 00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,960 Speaker 1: of your hunger is actually counterproductive. It's just distracting you 628 00:35:37,040 --> 00:35:39,880 Speaker 1: and adding nothing. Yeah, I mean, it's it's kind of 629 00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:43,640 Speaker 1: like the idea of like any an enormous buffet right 630 00:35:44,120 --> 00:35:46,600 Speaker 1: at a let's say a hotel or you know, show 631 00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:49,120 Speaker 1: needs or something you know, and you go through it 632 00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:51,279 Speaker 1: with your plate, you get the things off that plate 633 00:35:51,320 --> 00:35:53,560 Speaker 1: that are necessary for the meal you're about to have, 634 00:35:54,239 --> 00:35:56,040 Speaker 1: and then of course you can engage in the various 635 00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:58,959 Speaker 1: combinations and problem solving involved in the consumption of that meal. 636 00:35:59,200 --> 00:36:01,600 Speaker 1: But you don't need a rag the popcorn shrimp into 637 00:36:01,600 --> 00:36:04,000 Speaker 1: it if you're not gonna eat the popcorn shrimp. You know, 638 00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:06,279 Speaker 1: if you can't eat the popcorn shrimp, why would that 639 00:36:06,320 --> 00:36:08,000 Speaker 1: be part of Why would that be on the plate? 640 00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:10,200 Speaker 1: Why would that be on in the workspace? Or you 641 00:36:10,239 --> 00:36:12,560 Speaker 1: don't have to put the ice cream sunday on the 642 00:36:12,600 --> 00:36:15,719 Speaker 1: same plate that you put the nachos on, right, Yeah, 643 00:36:15,760 --> 00:36:18,120 Speaker 1: it can be off to the side. You can keep 644 00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:22,360 Speaker 1: the banana putting segregated from the crab legs. Yeah. Then again, 645 00:36:22,960 --> 00:36:24,959 Speaker 1: I think to be fair to this argument, you could 646 00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:28,960 Speaker 1: probably also counter argue that this type of problem is 647 00:36:29,040 --> 00:36:32,479 Speaker 1: only a result of inefficiencies in our brains that maybe 648 00:36:32,520 --> 00:36:36,400 Speaker 1: could be worked out by artificial intelligence, you know, upgrading itself. 649 00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:39,200 Speaker 1: Maybe you could reach the point where you could have 650 00:36:39,239 --> 00:36:42,680 Speaker 1: a global workspace where all information is available at the 651 00:36:42,719 --> 00:36:47,160 Speaker 1: same time, and information that is not useful now can 652 00:36:47,280 --> 00:36:50,120 Speaker 1: can just be sort of like safely ignored and won't 653 00:36:50,120 --> 00:36:54,359 Speaker 1: be distracting. M Yeah, I don't know, it's it's hard 654 00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:56,279 Speaker 1: to imagine, like it's. It kind of makes one think 655 00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:58,239 Speaker 1: of something of like a situation where something is built 656 00:36:58,239 --> 00:37:02,239 Speaker 1: by committee, where all all concerns and all factors are involved. 657 00:37:02,400 --> 00:37:04,399 Speaker 1: And I don't know that kind of thing can lead 658 00:37:04,440 --> 00:37:06,640 Speaker 1: to I guess with the right kind of project, it 659 00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:08,799 Speaker 1: can be rather successful. You can sort of look at 660 00:37:08,800 --> 00:37:10,800 Speaker 1: it both ways, right, You could look at like a 661 00:37:10,800 --> 00:37:16,879 Speaker 1: a highly um efficient like NASA project, Right, But then 662 00:37:16,920 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: we can also think of you know, artistic projects that 663 00:37:20,080 --> 00:37:22,319 Speaker 1: might be compromised by such an approach. So I don't know, 664 00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:24,920 Speaker 1: you can look at it different ways, and maybe with 665 00:37:24,960 --> 00:37:27,919 Speaker 1: the sorts of projects that you know, super intelligent AI 666 00:37:28,080 --> 00:37:31,640 Speaker 1: would would be focused on, it would make sense. I mean, 667 00:37:31,719 --> 00:37:35,279 Speaker 1: I will at least say, with my current limited biological brain, 668 00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:37,799 Speaker 1: there are certainly times when it is better to have 669 00:37:37,960 --> 00:37:41,480 Speaker 1: parts of my awareness and parts of my cognition inaccessible 670 00:37:41,520 --> 00:37:44,560 Speaker 1: to my consciousness. Yeah, I mean, there are some arguments that, 671 00:37:44,800 --> 00:37:48,360 Speaker 1: uh that that put forward that that consciousness itself is 672 00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:53,440 Speaker 1: like part part of consciousness is having a minimal attention, 673 00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:55,839 Speaker 1: you know, being able to focus in on something and 674 00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:58,520 Speaker 1: not be focused in on everything else like that, That 675 00:37:58,640 --> 00:38:02,400 Speaker 1: is where the consciousness happened. Yeah, the consciousness could be 676 00:38:02,440 --> 00:38:05,359 Speaker 1: sort of the spotlight within your global workspace. You've got 677 00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:08,560 Speaker 1: like a workspace for problem solving, and consciousness is how 678 00:38:08,640 --> 00:38:11,440 Speaker 1: you you determine what is right in front of you 679 00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:15,520 Speaker 1: in that space right now. And then finally, Schneider argues 680 00:38:15,560 --> 00:38:21,080 Speaker 1: that a visa's mental processing can be understood via functional decomposition. Uh, 681 00:38:21,120 --> 00:38:23,680 Speaker 1: and this is fairly straightforward. It's just you know, minds 682 00:38:23,680 --> 00:38:26,839 Speaker 1: are hard to understand. Brains are incredibly complex. The same 683 00:38:26,880 --> 00:38:29,279 Speaker 1: would be true of super intelligence is whatever kind of 684 00:38:29,280 --> 00:38:33,280 Speaker 1: physical substrate they're based on. But you can break down 685 00:38:33,520 --> 00:38:39,200 Speaker 1: brains and computers into their constituent functional parts and structures, 686 00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:42,240 Speaker 1: and by doing that you can break the big problem 687 00:38:42,320 --> 00:38:45,640 Speaker 1: into smaller problems and more easily understand how they work. 688 00:38:45,680 --> 00:38:48,279 Speaker 1: And this would in theory at least apply even to 689 00:38:48,520 --> 00:38:52,160 Speaker 1: incredibly powerful AI. S Okay, fair enough. Now there's one 690 00:38:52,239 --> 00:38:54,280 Speaker 1: last thing I was wondering about. This is not raised 691 00:38:54,280 --> 00:38:58,760 Speaker 1: by Schneider. This just occurred to me. Would post biological 692 00:38:58,880 --> 00:39:02,359 Speaker 1: AI be likely to have an equivalent of what we 693 00:39:02,440 --> 00:39:06,440 Speaker 1: regard as emotions? You know, if you if you encounter 694 00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:09,440 Speaker 1: one of these things, would it matter in what tone 695 00:39:09,440 --> 00:39:11,520 Speaker 1: of voice you were to speak to it, would it 696 00:39:11,560 --> 00:39:17,280 Speaker 1: be possible to hurt its feelings? I don't know, Like, um, 697 00:39:17,280 --> 00:39:20,319 Speaker 1: perhaps in turn, like we might have to break down 698 00:39:20,360 --> 00:39:23,080 Speaker 1: what emotions are in a way that would make sense 699 00:39:23,120 --> 00:39:25,439 Speaker 1: to something like this, Like maybe part of it would 700 00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:28,480 Speaker 1: come down to urgency, you know. Um, So there might 701 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:31,200 Speaker 1: be a situation where out of urgency, the machine would 702 00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:35,319 Speaker 1: need to essentially raise its voice. Um, though it would 703 00:39:35,400 --> 00:39:37,800 Speaker 1: maybe not you know, maybe this would not be carried 704 00:39:37,840 --> 00:39:41,280 Speaker 1: out in a way that we would think of as emotional, 705 00:39:41,360 --> 00:39:44,839 Speaker 1: but it might, you know, seem similar as to whether 706 00:39:44,920 --> 00:39:50,240 Speaker 1: it's feelings could be hurt, I don't know. Maybe maybe 707 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:54,720 Speaker 1: it's assessment of us could change based on the way 708 00:39:54,719 --> 00:39:58,239 Speaker 1: that we are expressing ourselves to it, and that is 709 00:39:58,320 --> 00:40:00,919 Speaker 1: similar to an emotional reaction. And I don't know. Yeah, 710 00:40:00,920 --> 00:40:05,640 Speaker 1: I guess it's hard to separate emotional reactions to our 711 00:40:05,680 --> 00:40:11,520 Speaker 1: behavior with purely logical the ability to predict our future behavior, right, 712 00:40:11,560 --> 00:40:13,279 Speaker 1: because I would say a lot of ways that we 713 00:40:13,360 --> 00:40:17,000 Speaker 1: react emotionally to people, it could be very flawed in 714 00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,480 Speaker 1: this regard, but there at least somehow correlated to a 715 00:40:20,600 --> 00:40:23,480 Speaker 1: feeling about how this same person that is making you 716 00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:26,400 Speaker 1: feel a certain way now would behave towards you in 717 00:40:26,440 --> 00:40:29,279 Speaker 1: the future. Yeah, I mean we're kind of all over 718 00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:33,440 Speaker 1: the board when it comes to imagining the emotional context 719 00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:36,680 Speaker 1: of of AI. Because even when we we sort of 720 00:40:36,719 --> 00:40:38,279 Speaker 1: do that thing where we you know, we fall back 721 00:40:38,320 --> 00:40:43,640 Speaker 1: on on AI presented itself like this to us. Uh, yes, 722 00:40:43,760 --> 00:40:46,239 Speaker 1: like even that is like that we presented as being 723 00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:50,840 Speaker 1: calm and understanding if if not you know, kind of 724 00:40:50,880 --> 00:40:54,320 Speaker 1: emotional nous, but in a way that it is an emotion, yeah, 725 00:40:54,680 --> 00:40:57,600 Speaker 1: British accent. But but also yeah, we often we often 726 00:40:57,640 --> 00:41:00,480 Speaker 1: imagine it as being sort of infinitely calm and above 727 00:41:01,360 --> 00:41:03,680 Speaker 1: above anger, which in and of itself is kind of 728 00:41:03,680 --> 00:41:06,200 Speaker 1: and it is it is an emotional state. So I 729 00:41:06,200 --> 00:41:09,800 Speaker 1: guess they're actually too totally different questions. Would a super intelligent, 730 00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:14,960 Speaker 1: biologically inspired AI simulate emotions for the benefit of a 731 00:41:15,760 --> 00:41:18,400 Speaker 1: you know, for the benefit of a biological audience, or 732 00:41:18,480 --> 00:41:22,919 Speaker 1: would actually have something like emotions that are truly motivating 733 00:41:22,960 --> 00:41:27,160 Speaker 1: its own behavior. Yeah, I don't know, it's it's it 734 00:41:27,160 --> 00:41:29,400 Speaker 1: seems a difficult one to unravel. I guess where my 735 00:41:29,440 --> 00:41:33,440 Speaker 1: brain just went is when we imagine aliens becoming aware 736 00:41:33,480 --> 00:41:35,600 Speaker 1: of us, you know, and we try to imagine their 737 00:41:35,640 --> 00:41:37,839 Speaker 1: mind states. Some of the ones we come to are 738 00:41:37,920 --> 00:41:40,680 Speaker 1: like pity, you know, like oh, these you know, less 739 00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:43,479 Speaker 1: technologically developed species of Earth. You know, maybe we should 740 00:41:43,520 --> 00:41:47,680 Speaker 1: help them, or maybe just a desire to destroy us, 741 00:41:47,680 --> 00:41:51,080 Speaker 1: squash us out, or a desire to like have all 742 00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:53,600 Speaker 1: of our resources. But we don't often imagine what if 743 00:41:53,600 --> 00:41:56,560 Speaker 1: the aliens encounter us and they're embarrassed for us, It's 744 00:41:56,600 --> 00:42:00,360 Speaker 1: like it's so cringe inducing. Well, and that could be 745 00:42:00,480 --> 00:42:03,879 Speaker 1: part of them choosing not to engage with us at all. Right, 746 00:42:04,080 --> 00:42:07,840 Speaker 1: But anyway, I've found this chapter by Schneider really interesting, 747 00:42:07,880 --> 00:42:10,800 Speaker 1: even though I'm skeptical of some of these transhumanist ideas, 748 00:42:10,800 --> 00:42:12,520 Speaker 1: but I think this is really worth a read. It's 749 00:42:12,560 --> 00:42:15,640 Speaker 1: it's very interesting, awesome. Yeah, and UH, and she's she's 750 00:42:15,880 --> 00:42:18,440 Speaker 1: just a good science communicator in general. You'll find various 751 00:42:18,440 --> 00:42:20,719 Speaker 1: talks that she's given. Um, I think she's done some more, 752 00:42:21,160 --> 00:42:23,640 Speaker 1: you know, pps. Her work has been covered as well 753 00:42:23,680 --> 00:42:28,320 Speaker 1: in various publications. So let's come back to UH to 754 00:42:28,400 --> 00:42:32,520 Speaker 1: show stick though, and particularly his idea is concerning SETI 755 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:36,520 Speaker 1: the search for extra terrestrial intelligence? What what does all 756 00:42:36,560 --> 00:42:39,640 Speaker 1: of this mean for STU? So we'd be talking about 757 00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:44,759 Speaker 1: in theory, a highly intelligent, effectively immortal species if you will, 758 00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:52,560 Speaker 1: that evolves, can replicate itself, and has no biological environmental demands. Interesting. Yeah, so, 759 00:42:52,600 --> 00:42:55,120 Speaker 1: how does that change what you're looking for? Um? So, 760 00:42:56,000 --> 00:42:58,560 Speaker 1: showstick argues that, you know, consequently, since it would not 761 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:03,160 Speaker 1: be limited by biological lifespans, interstellar travel would be would 762 00:43:03,160 --> 00:43:05,719 Speaker 1: certainly be an option. You know, you wouldn't be limited 763 00:43:05,719 --> 00:43:08,680 Speaker 1: by your mortality. All trips would be the same length. 764 00:43:09,040 --> 00:43:11,560 Speaker 1: You would just need energy and material for replacement in 765 00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:15,280 Speaker 1: the improvement of parts. On top of this, these machines, 766 00:43:15,360 --> 00:43:19,880 Speaker 1: this machine civilization would not be limited to water worlds. Uh. 767 00:43:19,920 --> 00:43:23,520 Speaker 1: But while low energy machines could survive pretty much anywhere, 768 00:43:23,880 --> 00:43:28,080 Speaker 1: truly dominant post biological civilizations would still require a lot 769 00:43:28,120 --> 00:43:30,799 Speaker 1: of energy, and that of course means needing to be 770 00:43:30,920 --> 00:43:35,960 Speaker 1: near major energy sources such as stars and black holes. 771 00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:40,040 Speaker 1: It seems like, uh, once you transition from being a 772 00:43:40,080 --> 00:43:43,319 Speaker 1: biological life form to a post biological life form, the 773 00:43:43,400 --> 00:43:46,799 Speaker 1: specifics of your needs become less chemical and more just 774 00:43:46,880 --> 00:43:50,520 Speaker 1: broadly physical. Yeah yeah so, And this this of course 775 00:43:50,520 --> 00:43:53,160 Speaker 1: has ramifications for for part of the search for extra 776 00:43:53,200 --> 00:43:56,520 Speaker 1: structural life, because then it means that well, maybe searching 777 00:43:56,560 --> 00:43:59,160 Speaker 1: for rocky wet planets isn't where we're going to find 778 00:43:59,160 --> 00:44:02,120 Speaker 1: the advanced civilization, and because the advanced civilizations no longer 779 00:44:02,239 --> 00:44:06,160 Speaker 1: need that, so Showstack suggests that the galactic center would 780 00:44:06,160 --> 00:44:08,799 Speaker 1: be the ideal place for these machines to set up shop, 781 00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:13,040 Speaker 1: a region of high energy density. Again, distance and biological 782 00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:16,880 Speaker 1: concerns don't really matter, and likewise, stellar black holes and 783 00:44:16,920 --> 00:44:19,440 Speaker 1: neutron stars might be ideal places for them to seek 784 00:44:19,440 --> 00:44:24,240 Speaker 1: out as well. However, he mentions that Serbian astrophysicist milan 785 00:44:24,440 --> 00:44:28,560 Speaker 1: Im Turkovich has argued that the outer regions of the 786 00:44:28,640 --> 00:44:33,080 Speaker 1: galaxy might also be ideal for such AI civilizations, as 787 00:44:33,120 --> 00:44:38,439 Speaker 1: that is, the cold there would permit greater thermodynamic efficiency. Ah. Yeah, 788 00:44:38,480 --> 00:44:41,160 Speaker 1: like we were talking about with the computer fan running, right, 789 00:44:41,239 --> 00:44:46,280 Speaker 1: that a civilization that is, in essence a gigantic computer 790 00:44:46,880 --> 00:44:50,839 Speaker 1: would need to eject a lot of waste heat. Yeah, 791 00:44:51,440 --> 00:44:54,040 Speaker 1: Still there would be less mass and energy out there 792 00:44:54,080 --> 00:44:56,640 Speaker 1: for them. So it's kind of like the same with 793 00:44:56,840 --> 00:45:00,960 Speaker 1: human decisions between a rural or an urban and existence. Like, well, 794 00:45:01,000 --> 00:45:02,800 Speaker 1: if I if I live in the heart of the city, 795 00:45:03,080 --> 00:45:05,120 Speaker 1: well you know, I've got the theater right down the street. 796 00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:08,160 Speaker 1: I've got my favorite grocery store. Uh you know, I've 797 00:45:08,160 --> 00:45:10,440 Speaker 1: got I've got the you know, the place where I 798 00:45:10,440 --> 00:45:12,640 Speaker 1: get my technology worked on. And I move out to 799 00:45:12,640 --> 00:45:15,480 Speaker 1: the sticks while it's quieter. But now, how am I 800 00:45:15,480 --> 00:45:16,960 Speaker 1: going to get my groceries? How am I going to 801 00:45:17,040 --> 00:45:19,440 Speaker 1: get uh my culture? How am I going to get 802 00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:22,239 Speaker 1: my technology addressed? But I can just throw all my 803 00:45:22,280 --> 00:45:24,640 Speaker 1: garbage out the window and nobody bothers me about it. 804 00:45:26,920 --> 00:45:29,719 Speaker 1: Uh So, show Stick argues that the ideal place to 805 00:45:29,840 --> 00:45:31,480 Speaker 1: look here, so this would be you know, this is 806 00:45:31,520 --> 00:45:33,440 Speaker 1: kind of like when humans make the idea of like, well, 807 00:45:33,440 --> 00:45:35,399 Speaker 1: I don't want to live I'm going to compromise. I'm 808 00:45:35,400 --> 00:45:36,560 Speaker 1: not gonna live in the heart of the city. I'm 809 00:45:36,600 --> 00:45:38,040 Speaker 1: not gonna live in the middle of nowhere. I'm gonna 810 00:45:38,040 --> 00:45:40,359 Speaker 1: find a nice place in the suburbs. Right. So, show 811 00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:43,400 Speaker 1: Stick argues that the ideal place where these two ideals 812 00:45:43,400 --> 00:45:47,279 Speaker 1: converge uh do exist, and these are the kind of 813 00:45:47,600 --> 00:45:51,080 Speaker 1: locations we need to look for. Um So, there's a 814 00:45:51,080 --> 00:45:54,400 Speaker 1: list of such places quote that have the thermodynamic advantages 815 00:45:54,440 --> 00:45:57,080 Speaker 1: of the galactic nether regions but still lie in regions 816 00:45:57,080 --> 00:46:01,800 Speaker 1: of high matter density unquote. And these include places called 817 00:46:02,160 --> 00:46:07,520 Speaker 1: back globules. Uh. These are isolated dark nebulae that are 818 00:46:07,600 --> 00:46:12,400 Speaker 1: relatively small in size, offer high thermodynamic efficiency, and have 819 00:46:12,480 --> 00:46:16,600 Speaker 1: a lot of interstellar matter. Huh. Interesting. The nearest one 820 00:46:16,600 --> 00:46:20,479 Speaker 1: of these, by the way, is Barnard Sight, uh, which 821 00:46:20,480 --> 00:46:22,520 Speaker 1: I believe we're referencing in the title for this episode, 822 00:46:22,520 --> 00:46:26,279 Speaker 1: a mere five light years away from us. So show So, 823 00:46:26,680 --> 00:46:28,799 Speaker 1: I'm not saying there's anything there, but it makes you 824 00:46:28,840 --> 00:46:31,600 Speaker 1: think that is interesting. I know, I I don't think 825 00:46:31,600 --> 00:46:33,800 Speaker 1: I've ever heard of this criteria to look for before. 826 00:46:34,040 --> 00:46:37,280 Speaker 1: Uh So, yeah, what does this mean? Show Stack obviously 827 00:46:37,360 --> 00:46:39,440 Speaker 1: is involved in SID Does this mean we've got like, uh, 828 00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:42,719 Speaker 1: you know, radio listening a tune to Barnard sixty eight 829 00:46:42,800 --> 00:46:46,239 Speaker 1: right now? Um? Well, I mean, certainly it's been ten 830 00:46:46,280 --> 00:46:48,480 Speaker 1: years since this came out. So if if, if these are, 831 00:46:48,880 --> 00:46:51,759 Speaker 1: if these are valuable arguments, uh, you know, I would 832 00:46:51,760 --> 00:46:55,040 Speaker 1: assume they've been reflected to some to some degree. But yeah, 833 00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:57,160 Speaker 1: in this paper he contends that said he should, you know, 834 00:46:57,239 --> 00:47:01,319 Speaker 1: continue to look at Rocky water World, but also at 835 00:47:01,400 --> 00:47:06,040 Speaker 1: neighborhoods of hot stars, black holes, neutron stars, bought globules, 836 00:47:06,040 --> 00:47:09,520 Speaker 1: et cetera. Like it just you know, we shouldn't limit 837 00:47:09,560 --> 00:47:12,960 Speaker 1: ourselves as the argument to these water worlds, because that 838 00:47:13,000 --> 00:47:16,320 Speaker 1: may be where life has to emerge from. But given 839 00:47:16,320 --> 00:47:19,319 Speaker 1: this idea of post biological life, that's not where it 840 00:47:19,360 --> 00:47:22,640 Speaker 1: needs to remain. Now. A big question that does remain, however, 841 00:47:23,040 --> 00:47:26,120 Speaker 1: is what sort of signal would such a post organic 842 00:47:26,120 --> 00:47:29,800 Speaker 1: civilization produced that we could detect. Uh, you know, they 843 00:47:29,880 --> 00:47:32,759 Speaker 1: might want us to find them, They might want to 844 00:47:32,880 --> 00:47:35,960 Speaker 1: find us. But either way they might they might put 845 00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:38,839 Speaker 1: some put something out for us for us to find. Uh, 846 00:47:38,880 --> 00:47:41,400 Speaker 1: they might you know, not care that we can observe 847 00:47:41,520 --> 00:47:45,480 Speaker 1: their dicens fheares that sort of thing. Um. But if 848 00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:47,680 Speaker 1: you know, But but what if they don't you know? Well, 849 00:47:47,719 --> 00:47:50,600 Speaker 1: then perhaps it takes one of our own AI to 850 00:47:51,160 --> 00:47:52,960 Speaker 1: you know, reach the point where it can discern the 851 00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:56,520 Speaker 1: signs of their existence, um, and then perhaps be the 852 00:47:56,520 --> 00:48:00,920 Speaker 1: ones to reach out and make first contact machine to machine. Okay, 853 00:48:00,920 --> 00:48:02,960 Speaker 1: so we need a machine to see the gorilla in 854 00:48:02,960 --> 00:48:06,239 Speaker 1: the video coming from space? Maybe, I mean again, it 855 00:48:06,280 --> 00:48:08,880 Speaker 1: depends on what what they want if they exist and 856 00:48:08,920 --> 00:48:10,879 Speaker 1: there at this level, what do they want? Do they 857 00:48:10,920 --> 00:48:14,040 Speaker 1: want to make contact? Maybe that's the thing. Maybe again, 858 00:48:14,280 --> 00:48:17,600 Speaker 1: they know that organic beings can be messy, and they 859 00:48:17,760 --> 00:48:19,560 Speaker 1: just want to wait until we've reached the point where 860 00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:23,200 Speaker 1: their machine can call their machine. You know, I buy 861 00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:26,480 Speaker 1: that it's waiting until it doesn't have to deal with meat. Yeah, 862 00:48:26,560 --> 00:48:28,359 Speaker 1: like you doesn't want to chase this down, Just send 863 00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,840 Speaker 1: us the press release, UM, let us know how to 864 00:48:31,840 --> 00:48:33,359 Speaker 1: get in touch with you, and we'll set something up. 865 00:48:33,400 --> 00:48:36,040 Speaker 1: That's their whole thing. It's like waiting until Like I'm 866 00:48:36,080 --> 00:48:38,279 Speaker 1: not going to order delivery from this place until they've 867 00:48:38,280 --> 00:48:39,920 Speaker 1: got an online form. I don't want to have to 868 00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:43,120 Speaker 1: call talk to somebody, right, I'm sure it's fine. I'm 869 00:48:43,120 --> 00:48:45,880 Speaker 1: hearing great things, but get your technology sorted out first, 870 00:48:45,920 --> 00:48:48,880 Speaker 1: and then we'll begin this relationship. I've got high hopes 871 00:48:48,920 --> 00:48:51,080 Speaker 1: for this species where people are afraid to talk to 872 00:48:51,160 --> 00:48:55,920 Speaker 1: other people on the phone. I don't know, I mean yeah, 873 00:48:55,920 --> 00:48:57,520 Speaker 1: I mean we're we're ultimately left with some of the 874 00:48:57,560 --> 00:49:00,440 Speaker 1: same questions. Not only the big one, does lie exists 875 00:49:00,440 --> 00:49:03,360 Speaker 1: elsewhere in the cosmos, but but again, like what would 876 00:49:03,840 --> 00:49:07,080 Speaker 1: if if it's if it's alien AI, alien superintelligence, what 877 00:49:07,120 --> 00:49:08,400 Speaker 1: are they gonna make of us? How are we going 878 00:49:08,480 --> 00:49:12,360 Speaker 1: to fit into what sort of things they do? Um? 879 00:49:12,480 --> 00:49:14,319 Speaker 1: Or would we fit in at all like maybe that's 880 00:49:14,360 --> 00:49:17,120 Speaker 1: the ultimate thing, is like they just don't they don't care. 881 00:49:17,160 --> 00:49:19,680 Speaker 1: Why would they care. We're the ones obsessed with us. 882 00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:22,120 Speaker 1: They've got their own thing going on. Do you really 883 00:49:22,160 --> 00:49:25,200 Speaker 1: care what the squirrel is digging for in the yard? Well? 884 00:49:25,239 --> 00:49:29,040 Speaker 1: I mean I do, but but yeah, ultimately do the 885 00:49:29,200 --> 00:49:31,920 Speaker 1: the the cosmic overlord's care? You know, I don't know. 886 00:49:32,080 --> 00:49:36,160 Speaker 1: Maybe not now shows that continues to discuss how we 887 00:49:36,239 --> 00:49:40,799 Speaker 1: might refine our search for extraterrestrial life. Um. If you 888 00:49:40,840 --> 00:49:43,040 Speaker 1: look around for his name, you'll find that he you know, 889 00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:47,120 Speaker 1: he gives talks. He discusses set in general of the search, 890 00:49:47,560 --> 00:49:49,800 Speaker 1: how that the search itself has changed, and how we 891 00:49:49,800 --> 00:49:52,319 Speaker 1: should change it, as well as sort of the societal 892 00:49:52,800 --> 00:49:56,759 Speaker 1: considerations involved. But well, one example of something has been 893 00:49:56,840 --> 00:50:02,080 Speaker 1: up to recently. UM In sept September he had an 894 00:50:02,160 --> 00:50:05,600 Speaker 1: article titled SETTI The Argument for Artifacts Search is published 895 00:50:05,600 --> 00:50:09,120 Speaker 1: in the International Journal of Astrobiology, and in this article 896 00:50:09,320 --> 00:50:11,600 Speaker 1: he argues that while most of the search for exeter 897 00:50:11,719 --> 00:50:15,480 Speaker 1: terrestrial intelligence has focused on the search for quote, artificially 898 00:50:15,520 --> 00:50:19,560 Speaker 1: generated electromagnetic signals, it's artifacts that we should be spending 899 00:50:19,560 --> 00:50:22,160 Speaker 1: more time on, or at least more time than we 900 00:50:22,160 --> 00:50:24,319 Speaker 1: we are. And this is the idea here, is that 901 00:50:24,480 --> 00:50:27,799 Speaker 1: persistent transmissions, you know, sort of we're here, we're here, 902 00:50:27,880 --> 00:50:31,479 Speaker 1: signals from beyond these require energy. And then on top 903 00:50:31,480 --> 00:50:34,319 Speaker 1: of that the aliens and question should they exist. They 904 00:50:34,360 --> 00:50:37,960 Speaker 1: might be exceedingly cryptic, or they might you know, they 905 00:50:38,040 --> 00:50:41,560 Speaker 1: might be embarrassed for us, as we've discussed, or they 906 00:50:41,920 --> 00:50:44,799 Speaker 1: might just be ignorant of our existence, and you know, 907 00:50:44,840 --> 00:50:48,680 Speaker 1: they simply don't know that we exist and likewise don't care. Um, 908 00:50:49,040 --> 00:50:53,400 Speaker 1: So perhaps we should be looking more for artifacts or 909 00:50:53,520 --> 00:50:57,640 Speaker 1: specifically evidence of artifacts, and to understand waste heat uh, 910 00:50:57,680 --> 00:51:00,480 Speaker 1: certainly counts as something we'd be looking for in an 911 00:51:00,560 --> 00:51:04,319 Speaker 1: artifacts search, a search for something created or something that 912 00:51:04,440 --> 00:51:08,879 Speaker 1: was once created by extraterrestrial life. Oh, and this came 913 00:51:08,960 --> 00:51:11,520 Speaker 1: up in the previous episode when we talked about Dyson spheres, 914 00:51:11,600 --> 00:51:14,400 Speaker 1: Like one possible way to look for them is to 915 00:51:14,440 --> 00:51:17,440 Speaker 1: look for a place where you're not seeing much electromagnetic 916 00:51:17,520 --> 00:51:20,520 Speaker 1: radiation accept heat, and the idea there is that maybe 917 00:51:20,560 --> 00:51:23,920 Speaker 1: there's a sphere around a star that's harvesting almost all 918 00:51:23,920 --> 00:51:26,880 Speaker 1: of its usable energy and pretty much the only thing 919 00:51:26,920 --> 00:51:28,839 Speaker 1: that's coming out the other side of it is just 920 00:51:28,880 --> 00:51:31,719 Speaker 1: the waste product of their of their processing, which is heat. 921 00:51:31,760 --> 00:51:34,680 Speaker 1: It's the computer fan blowing out into space. But yeah, 922 00:51:34,719 --> 00:51:37,080 Speaker 1: it's ultimately an interest interesting argument, like, you know, how 923 00:51:37,160 --> 00:51:40,800 Speaker 1: much effort should we be putting into picking up those 924 00:51:40,840 --> 00:51:47,280 Speaker 1: signals of existence versus sort of perhaps more obscure evidence 925 00:51:47,320 --> 00:51:51,520 Speaker 1: of the existence, you know, especially again if something out 926 00:51:51,520 --> 00:51:54,799 Speaker 1: there is maybe less inclined to put out that that 927 00:51:55,160 --> 00:51:57,600 Speaker 1: I am here signal, or you know, to even care 928 00:51:57,760 --> 00:52:00,440 Speaker 1: or know of our existence to begin with. Yeah, I 929 00:52:00,440 --> 00:52:02,160 Speaker 1: could be wrong, but I think I'm right about this. Like, 930 00:52:02,200 --> 00:52:04,640 Speaker 1: once you get a certain distance away from the Earth, 931 00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:07,319 Speaker 1: you know, some number of light years away, at a 932 00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:13,040 Speaker 1: certain point, like any any omnidirectionally transmitted radio signal would 933 00:52:13,120 --> 00:52:15,680 Speaker 1: become so weak by the time it reaches us that 934 00:52:15,760 --> 00:52:18,400 Speaker 1: we really probably wouldn't notice it. And so like, to 935 00:52:18,560 --> 00:52:21,200 Speaker 1: really notice a signal from an alien civilization, it would 936 00:52:21,200 --> 00:52:24,520 Speaker 1: probably need to be something that is directionally beamed our 937 00:52:24,600 --> 00:52:27,840 Speaker 1: way on purpose, and that that also requires a lot 938 00:52:27,880 --> 00:52:31,560 Speaker 1: of assumptions about what's going on with that alien civilization. Yeah, 939 00:52:31,640 --> 00:52:34,239 Speaker 1: and and maybe maybe it'll happen, but then again maybe 940 00:52:34,239 --> 00:52:37,440 Speaker 1: it won't. But yeah, it's just artifacts by products of 941 00:52:37,560 --> 00:52:41,480 Speaker 1: previous existence, whether that's physical objects or or waste signatures 942 00:52:41,520 --> 00:52:43,680 Speaker 1: like heat that could be around for a long time 943 00:52:43,719 --> 00:52:46,440 Speaker 1: depending up you know, no matter what the intentions of 944 00:52:46,480 --> 00:52:49,560 Speaker 1: the civilization are. Well, this has been fun, Rob, Yeah, 945 00:52:49,640 --> 00:52:51,919 Speaker 1: this has been a fun one. Yeah. So obviously we'd 946 00:52:51,920 --> 00:52:53,680 Speaker 1: love to hear from everyone out there. First of all, 947 00:52:53,920 --> 00:52:56,920 Speaker 1: we mentioned, you know, this is the domain of science fiction. 948 00:52:57,400 --> 00:52:59,440 Speaker 1: Of science fiction is considered a lot of these questions 949 00:52:59,440 --> 00:53:03,400 Speaker 1: for for deack Gates. So if there are particular examples, uh, 950 00:53:03,920 --> 00:53:06,600 Speaker 1: let us know, examples that touch on some of these 951 00:53:06,640 --> 00:53:09,440 Speaker 1: themes and ideas. Uh, you know, let us know if 952 00:53:09,440 --> 00:53:13,200 Speaker 1: there is that that that that that corporate alien sci 953 00:53:13,280 --> 00:53:16,600 Speaker 1: fi Reagan era thing that we were considering, you know, 954 00:53:16,640 --> 00:53:19,279 Speaker 1: probably exists. Uh, if you have an I D for it, 955 00:53:19,560 --> 00:53:22,160 Speaker 1: let us know. We'd love to hear from you. In 956 00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:24,279 Speaker 1: the meantime, if you would like to listen to other 957 00:53:24,280 --> 00:53:26,000 Speaker 1: episodes of Stuff to Blow your Mind, you can find 958 00:53:26,000 --> 00:53:27,960 Speaker 1: the Stuff to Blow your Mind podcast feed wherever you 959 00:53:28,000 --> 00:53:31,560 Speaker 1: get your podcasts, and in that feed you'll find core episodes. 960 00:53:31,600 --> 00:53:34,120 Speaker 1: On Tuesdays and Thursday. On Friday, we do a little 961 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:36,400 Speaker 1: weird house cinema that's just you know, a consideration of 962 00:53:36,400 --> 00:53:39,400 Speaker 1: a weird film. We do a little listener mail, usually 963 00:53:39,440 --> 00:53:42,919 Speaker 1: on Mondays and on Wednesdays. That's when we we usually 964 00:53:42,960 --> 00:53:45,920 Speaker 1: have artifact, unless it's being preempted. Huge thanks as always 965 00:53:45,960 --> 00:53:48,719 Speaker 1: to our excellent audio producer Seth Nicholas Johnson. If you 966 00:53:48,719 --> 00:53:50,680 Speaker 1: would like to get in touch with us with feedback 967 00:53:50,719 --> 00:53:53,160 Speaker 1: on this episode or any other, to suggest a topic 968 00:53:53,200 --> 00:53:55,320 Speaker 1: for the future, just to say hello, you can email 969 00:53:55,400 --> 00:54:05,719 Speaker 1: us at contact at stuff to Blow your Mind dot com. 970 00:54:05,760 --> 00:54:08,240 Speaker 1: Stuff to Blow Your Mind is production of I Heart Radio. 971 00:54:08,600 --> 00:54:10,600 Speaker 1: For more podcasts for my heart Radio, this is the 972 00:54:10,640 --> 00:54:13,440 Speaker 1: i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen 973 00:54:13,440 --> 00:54:27,000 Speaker 1: me to your favorite shows.