1 00:00:03,600 --> 00:00:07,120 Speaker 1: You're listening to Math and Magic, a production. I heart radio, 2 00:00:10,400 --> 00:00:13,560 Speaker 1: giving the audience the power over the programming and not 3 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:16,560 Speaker 1: the advertisers. For us, that's what we were saying with 4 00:00:16,600 --> 00:00:21,400 Speaker 1: our campaign, It's not TV, it's HBO. We were saying 5 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:25,919 Speaker 1: that we're different, We're not like every other network. I 6 00:00:26,000 --> 00:00:29,160 Speaker 1: am Bob Pittman. Welcome to this episode of Math and Magic, 7 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:31,880 Speaker 1: where we explore the entire range of business from the 8 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:35,120 Speaker 1: analytics to the creative. Today we have as our guests 9 00:00:35,159 --> 00:00:38,800 Speaker 1: someone who really does embody both. He was the last 10 00:00:39,000 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: CEO of Time Warner and was CEO of HBO before that, 11 00:00:42,479 --> 00:00:45,800 Speaker 1: in what could be argued was HBO's greatest decade of 12 00:00:45,880 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 1: growth and innovation. It's Jeff Bucas. He checks all the boxes, 13 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:53,400 Speaker 1: by the way, dear Phil for prep school Yale, for 14 00:00:53,479 --> 00:00:56,800 Speaker 1: undergrad Stanford, for his m b A. Even started his 15 00:00:56,920 --> 00:01:02,120 Speaker 1: career as that background, Mike suggests, at a prestigious financial institution, 16 00:01:02,400 --> 00:01:06,280 Speaker 1: City Bank, But in nineteen seventy nine he made a 17 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:10,240 Speaker 1: faithful decision to give up that traditional and joined this 18 00:01:10,360 --> 00:01:14,920 Speaker 1: new media upstart that was trying to reimagine TV HBO, 19 00:01:15,440 --> 00:01:17,640 Speaker 1: and that path eventually took him to the head of 20 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:21,400 Speaker 1: Time Warner, and of course, before that, the head of HBO. 21 00:01:21,959 --> 00:01:24,680 Speaker 1: Jeff and I have had forty years of intertwined careers 22 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:27,760 Speaker 1: and friendship. He's not only a great business leader and 23 00:01:27,800 --> 00:01:31,440 Speaker 1: a brilliant strategist, but he's a great guy with a 24 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:36,920 Speaker 1: terrific sense of humor. Jeff, Welcome. We're gonna dig into 25 00:01:37,000 --> 00:01:39,720 Speaker 1: the real meat. But first I want us to warm 26 00:01:39,800 --> 00:01:44,160 Speaker 1: up by doing you in sixty seconds. Do you prefer 27 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:49,840 Speaker 1: cats or dogs? Dog call or text herb your enthusiasm 28 00:01:49,960 --> 00:01:54,720 Speaker 1: or sex in the city Larry Sanders Show, Early Riser 29 00:01:54,800 --> 00:01:58,720 Speaker 1: or night Owl, Night Slow and steady or pedal to 30 00:01:58,760 --> 00:02:03,240 Speaker 1: the Metal Slow. Instead, it's about to get harder. Smartest 31 00:02:03,240 --> 00:02:09,720 Speaker 1: person you know. Jimmy Buffett, Childhood Hero, The Swamp, Fox Technology, 32 00:02:09,880 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 1: you can't live without Television, Favorite ever movie, The Godfather, 33 00:02:15,760 --> 00:02:20,480 Speaker 1: First Job, Bill, Collecting in Paris. Oh, that's pretty exotic. 34 00:02:20,800 --> 00:02:26,680 Speaker 1: Favorite ever TV show, Sopranos, Favorite Sopranos character. It's a 35 00:02:26,680 --> 00:02:31,160 Speaker 1: tough one, man, but I'm going with Tony. And finally, 36 00:02:31,760 --> 00:02:33,760 Speaker 1: what did you want to be when you were growing up? 37 00:02:34,600 --> 00:02:41,280 Speaker 1: A singer? Songwriter? Okay, let's really get serious. Now. Let's 38 00:02:41,320 --> 00:02:45,800 Speaker 1: get started by going back in time by all outward measures. 39 00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:50,080 Speaker 1: You had made every right decision in building towards a 40 00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:53,720 Speaker 1: great life in finance in the nineteen nine is and 41 00:02:53,800 --> 00:02:56,360 Speaker 1: mentioned in the intro, you gave that up to go 42 00:02:56,440 --> 00:03:00,359 Speaker 1: to this new upstart HBO. And for those thing who 43 00:03:00,360 --> 00:03:02,840 Speaker 1: weren't around then, HBO back then was only on in 44 00:03:02,880 --> 00:03:06,400 Speaker 1: prime time. It ran some Hollywood movies and some pretty 45 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:10,600 Speaker 1: cheesy original shows, not at all what it became. So 46 00:03:10,639 --> 00:03:13,440 Speaker 1: it took a lot of imagination and courage to make 47 00:03:13,480 --> 00:03:16,440 Speaker 1: that jump. What made you make the job? How did 48 00:03:16,440 --> 00:03:19,919 Speaker 1: that happen? I always wanted to work in TV, and 49 00:03:20,000 --> 00:03:24,840 Speaker 1: when I was in college, we had nightly movies, International movies, 50 00:03:24,880 --> 00:03:27,920 Speaker 1: foreign movies. I was watching them every night. I wanted 51 00:03:27,919 --> 00:03:31,280 Speaker 1: to work in Hollywood or in TV, and I got 52 00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:33,720 Speaker 1: a job in the summer of seventy three of my 53 00:03:33,800 --> 00:03:35,840 Speaker 1: junior year in college out in l A. I was 54 00:03:35,880 --> 00:03:40,200 Speaker 1: a go for for a TV show that nobody remembers, 55 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:45,280 Speaker 1: The Diana Rigg Show, and it was a sitcom. Occasionally 56 00:03:45,320 --> 00:03:49,320 Speaker 1: they tent me around to get scripts or pick up extras, 57 00:03:49,360 --> 00:03:52,880 Speaker 1: and once they told me to drive Diana rig from 58 00:03:52,920 --> 00:03:55,920 Speaker 1: one place in LA to the other place. I didn't 59 00:03:55,920 --> 00:03:58,280 Speaker 1: make it into TV. I got out of college. I 60 00:03:58,320 --> 00:04:00,640 Speaker 1: tried to get into networks I could to get a job. 61 00:04:01,560 --> 00:04:04,800 Speaker 1: I ended up working at NBC News. The year after 62 00:04:04,800 --> 00:04:06,360 Speaker 1: I got out of college, I was working on a 63 00:04:06,400 --> 00:04:11,160 Speaker 1: gun documentary for Lucy Jarvis that actually got very well reviewed. 64 00:04:11,840 --> 00:04:15,080 Speaker 1: After that thing ended, I got laid off, and you know, 65 00:04:15,120 --> 00:04:17,240 Speaker 1: if you're out of college and you don't have a job, 66 00:04:18,400 --> 00:04:21,200 Speaker 1: I started thinking what am I gonna do? I basically 67 00:04:21,240 --> 00:04:23,200 Speaker 1: failed to get a job like a lot of other 68 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:26,359 Speaker 1: people in that seventy four seventy five were sessions. So 69 00:04:26,400 --> 00:04:28,839 Speaker 1: I ended up going to business school, which had not 70 00:04:29,000 --> 00:04:32,159 Speaker 1: been any plan I ever had, and I worked in 71 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:35,640 Speaker 1: the summer at a wine ring, and I was actually 72 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:38,600 Speaker 1: going to keep working at the winery after, but then 73 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:42,080 Speaker 1: in an argument with my father, who was telling me, 74 00:04:42,200 --> 00:04:44,320 Speaker 1: you know, you're working for a privately on wine or 75 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 1: you're never going to get anywhere. You went to a 76 00:04:46,360 --> 00:04:49,720 Speaker 1: business school so you could sell wine. So I took 77 00:04:49,760 --> 00:04:52,560 Speaker 1: a holding job. Not I wasn't trying to go into finance. 78 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:55,680 Speaker 1: I basically took a job at City Bank because I 79 00:04:55,680 --> 00:04:58,640 Speaker 1: couldn't figure out what else to do and started trying 80 00:04:58,640 --> 00:05:02,960 Speaker 1: to find another place, and I was looking at CBS, ABC, NBC, 81 00:05:03,080 --> 00:05:06,279 Speaker 1: but they just wouldn't hire. So I found out about 82 00:05:06,279 --> 00:05:10,000 Speaker 1: this HBO. I went over there, and remember the guy 83 00:05:10,080 --> 00:05:13,640 Speaker 1: who hired me, it was the president, Jim Hayward said 84 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:15,400 Speaker 1: to me, well, what do you want to do here? 85 00:05:15,520 --> 00:05:18,520 Speaker 1: And I said sales, as though I knew what I 86 00:05:18,560 --> 00:05:22,000 Speaker 1: was talking about. And he said, but you're a finance guy, 87 00:05:22,160 --> 00:05:23,960 Speaker 1: and I said, well, well no, I'm twenty three. I 88 00:05:23,960 --> 00:05:26,800 Speaker 1: haven't done anything. I'm nothing. I just I figured that's 89 00:05:26,800 --> 00:05:29,479 Speaker 1: your main business. He said, yeah, it is, but we 90 00:05:29,480 --> 00:05:32,400 Speaker 1: don't have any jobs. So I'll tell you what. We 91 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:34,840 Speaker 1: got a job for you if you want to go 92 00:05:35,839 --> 00:05:37,839 Speaker 1: kind of not on the roster, but we're trying to 93 00:05:37,880 --> 00:05:41,359 Speaker 1: sell motels to put HBO out on the marquee, you know, 94 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:43,080 Speaker 1: so if you check into a hotel, you can get 95 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:46,400 Speaker 1: free HBO. So my first months at HBO, I was 96 00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:49,320 Speaker 1: driving around in rented cars in the Midwest and the 97 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:52,919 Speaker 1: Florida band Handle, going up to motel owners and saying, 98 00:05:52,920 --> 00:05:55,920 Speaker 1: you know, you out of court HBO in this hotel 99 00:05:56,440 --> 00:06:00,240 Speaker 1: and they'd say, well, why so, Well, because if you 100 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:03,800 Speaker 1: put free HBO out there, when people are driving in 101 00:06:03,960 --> 00:06:06,120 Speaker 1: and they're trying to decide to go to your hotel 102 00:06:06,320 --> 00:06:07,919 Speaker 1: or the one across the street. They're gonna go to 103 00:06:07,960 --> 00:06:11,960 Speaker 1: EU hotel. Slowly we got a few sales, and then 104 00:06:11,960 --> 00:06:15,080 Speaker 1: of course as soon as one hotel motel would put 105 00:06:15,120 --> 00:06:18,400 Speaker 1: up h the other one across the street would do it. 106 00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:21,960 Speaker 1: By the end of it, nobody had an advantage. What 107 00:06:22,120 --> 00:06:25,560 Speaker 1: did you go from there? At HBO? So in HBO 108 00:06:25,600 --> 00:06:27,839 Speaker 1: in those days, this is seventy nine, we had less 109 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:30,279 Speaker 1: than a fewer than a million cubs. At this point, 110 00:06:30,360 --> 00:06:32,679 Speaker 1: there was not that much cable in America. You remember 111 00:06:32,680 --> 00:06:36,279 Speaker 1: this from MTV. I started the cable business in nineteen 112 00:06:36,360 --> 00:06:38,880 Speaker 1: seventy nine as well. I remember, yes, So in those 113 00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 1: days people got cable not to get a new programming serve. 114 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:45,680 Speaker 1: They just got it so they could watch CBS, ABC, NBC, 115 00:06:46,120 --> 00:06:51,120 Speaker 1: maybe an independent or something with clear reception. And so 116 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 1: it was HBO that came along, and then MTV right 117 00:06:54,400 --> 00:07:00,640 Speaker 1: after one TIMTV h So, so we had been a 118 00:07:00,640 --> 00:07:04,000 Speaker 1: few years before. So we're going around saying to people 119 00:07:04,320 --> 00:07:07,719 Speaker 1: cable operators, well, you could get more people to sign 120 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:09,720 Speaker 1: up or pay you a little more if you offered 121 00:07:09,760 --> 00:07:13,680 Speaker 1: uncut movies in your home. And in those days you 122 00:07:13,720 --> 00:07:17,760 Speaker 1: could get basic cable, which is like five channels for six, 123 00:07:17,800 --> 00:07:20,880 Speaker 1: seven eight dollars a month, and you could pay seven 124 00:07:20,960 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 1: or eight blucks for HBO. We'd get three dollars and 125 00:07:24,040 --> 00:07:28,640 Speaker 1: they'd keep the rest. What everybody forgets you you know it, 126 00:07:28,760 --> 00:07:31,960 Speaker 1: and I know it is that back in the seventies 127 00:07:31,960 --> 00:07:35,120 Speaker 1: and eighties, in order for people to get on TV 128 00:07:35,360 --> 00:07:38,880 Speaker 1: or HBO, they had to build cable system, string wire 129 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,800 Speaker 1: down all the streets, and they had to put satellite 130 00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:45,040 Speaker 1: dishes in and this was costing the cable operator a 131 00:07:45,040 --> 00:07:50,640 Speaker 1: fair amount. So HBO was a product that drove cable 132 00:07:50,680 --> 00:07:55,520 Speaker 1: builds and cable companies to expand. But in order to 133 00:07:55,560 --> 00:08:00,000 Speaker 1: get franchises from the city politicians think of St. Louis, Indianapolis, 134 00:08:00,280 --> 00:08:03,200 Speaker 1: they wanted to be able to tell the government officials 135 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:06,000 Speaker 1: that they had a product for people. It wasn't so 136 00:08:06,040 --> 00:08:10,120 Speaker 1: expensive as HBO, So it wasn't seven eight bucks a month, 137 00:08:10,120 --> 00:08:12,920 Speaker 1: it was three or four, and it didn't have all 138 00:08:12,960 --> 00:08:15,560 Speaker 1: the dirty stuff on it. So we had a kind 139 00:08:15,600 --> 00:08:20,200 Speaker 1: of a MINIAGEBO called TAKEE two. I'd forgotten about that. 140 00:08:20,440 --> 00:08:23,080 Speaker 1: There was a thing called Home Theater Network. So Time 141 00:08:23,160 --> 00:08:25,680 Speaker 1: had their mini channel, we had ours. They were both 142 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:31,160 Speaker 1: really franchise offerings that no consumers wanted. Eventually we figured 143 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:33,079 Speaker 1: out that on three or four dollars a month, he 144 00:08:33,120 --> 00:08:35,800 Speaker 1: couldn't make money. Had to be seven or eight. So 145 00:08:35,880 --> 00:08:38,679 Speaker 1: we invented a thing and there was a task for us. 146 00:08:38,760 --> 00:08:44,440 Speaker 1: Michael Fuchs, Frank beyond the wed Bore, John Billick, and 147 00:08:44,559 --> 00:08:47,040 Speaker 1: I were on this thing. It was called the Max 148 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:49,559 Speaker 1: task for us. We needed to have a channel that 149 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:52,640 Speaker 1: had enough stuff on it you could charge eight bucks 150 00:08:52,720 --> 00:08:56,719 Speaker 1: for it, and offered alongside HBO, and it became Cinemax. 151 00:08:57,360 --> 00:09:00,120 Speaker 1: I remember it well because actually my first job is 152 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:03,160 Speaker 1: running the Movie Channel, which was the first twenty four 153 00:09:03,160 --> 00:09:06,520 Speaker 1: hour movie service, which did really, really well until you 154 00:09:06,600 --> 00:09:09,360 Speaker 1: launched Cinemax, and then it knocked the legs out from 155 00:09:09,400 --> 00:09:12,079 Speaker 1: under the Movie Channel, and we eventually merged it with Showtime. 156 00:09:12,880 --> 00:09:14,800 Speaker 1: A little bit of trivia by the way, just to 157 00:09:14,840 --> 00:09:17,520 Speaker 1: put this in context for the folks listening in this 158 00:09:17,559 --> 00:09:21,120 Speaker 1: period of time, there was no home video yet and 159 00:09:21,120 --> 00:09:24,120 Speaker 1: there was no pay per view, so you had no 160 00:09:24,280 --> 00:09:27,240 Speaker 1: way to get a movie unless the broadcast networks ran 161 00:09:27,280 --> 00:09:29,480 Speaker 1: it on their movie of the week or something with 162 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:32,480 Speaker 1: commercials in it, or seeing it at the theater. So 163 00:09:32,840 --> 00:09:36,000 Speaker 1: HBO was really the service that opened up this idea 164 00:09:36,040 --> 00:09:39,560 Speaker 1: of movies on TV all the time to the American public. 165 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 1: You were the first mission driven TV business. How did 166 00:09:43,920 --> 00:09:47,960 Speaker 1: you describe that mission back then? HBO was always an idea. 167 00:09:48,000 --> 00:09:51,160 Speaker 1: It's like America right back in the early days of 168 00:09:51,160 --> 00:09:54,600 Speaker 1: pay TV, and really continued past the year two thousand. 169 00:09:55,400 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 1: The main draw for people to sign up for Movie 170 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,760 Speaker 1: Channel or HBO, which they wanted uncut Hollywood movies in 171 00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:05,920 Speaker 1: their house. And there's two things about it. It's not 172 00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:10,800 Speaker 1: only that they didn't have commercials interruptions, which really screws 173 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: up the movie if you think about, but they were 174 00:10:13,240 --> 00:10:16,280 Speaker 1: uncut because everybody forgets I mean, you thought you were 175 00:10:16,280 --> 00:10:19,000 Speaker 1: watching up till then you thought you were watching you know, 176 00:10:19,120 --> 00:10:22,640 Speaker 1: The gods Father, whatever the movie was on ABC really 177 00:10:22,679 --> 00:10:24,760 Speaker 1: the wait, but you weren't really getting the movie. They 178 00:10:24,760 --> 00:10:28,560 Speaker 1: were cutting it for Procter and Gamble and Ford Motor 179 00:10:28,679 --> 00:10:32,160 Speaker 1: because they didn't want to have racy stuff in there, 180 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:34,800 Speaker 1: if it was sexual, if it was language, if it 181 00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:39,440 Speaker 1: was violence, if it was political. So there was a 182 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:43,440 Speaker 1: huge draw that everybody forgets about. When we moved away 183 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:47,680 Speaker 1: from that supported movies into your subscribe or supported movies, 184 00:10:48,120 --> 00:10:51,240 Speaker 1: so people were not signing up for HBO so they 185 00:10:51,280 --> 00:10:54,840 Speaker 1: could tune into a specific show that Sunday night. They 186 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:58,080 Speaker 1: wanted the range of shows, but they were hearing everybody 187 00:10:58,160 --> 00:11:02,360 Speaker 1: raving about. So that fact that we didn't have advertising 188 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:06,640 Speaker 1: is what shaped our original programming breakthroughs and it led 189 00:11:06,679 --> 00:11:10,880 Speaker 1: to what we modestly called the Golden Age of television 190 00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:14,520 Speaker 1: because we were the only network with movie channel that 191 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:18,080 Speaker 1: didn't make shows for the advertisers. We made shows for 192 00:11:18,120 --> 00:11:21,280 Speaker 1: the audience. And so that's what we were saying with 193 00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:26,200 Speaker 1: our campaign, it's not TV, it's HBO. We were saying 194 00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:29,040 Speaker 1: that we're different, We're not like every other network. And 195 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:33,080 Speaker 1: that reminds me another big line from cable networks, I 196 00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:38,080 Speaker 1: want my MTV a huge breakthrough campaign, and I think 197 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:42,920 Speaker 1: you were saying to your audience, you're in control. You 198 00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:46,680 Speaker 1: want your MTV, you get your MTV. And giving the 199 00:11:46,720 --> 00:11:50,719 Speaker 1: audience the power over the programming and not the advertisers 200 00:11:50,760 --> 00:11:54,240 Speaker 1: for us, was the key to it's not TV, It's HBO. 201 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:57,520 Speaker 1: So the you know, the math of it is we 202 00:11:57,559 --> 00:12:00,720 Speaker 1: didn't have advertising. That's the structural thing. And the magic 203 00:12:01,040 --> 00:12:05,199 Speaker 1: was it's not TV, it's HBO. So we're gonna come 204 00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:08,400 Speaker 1: back to some of these lessons you learned there. But 205 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:11,160 Speaker 1: I want to go back further in time. You were 206 00:12:11,200 --> 00:12:13,720 Speaker 1: born in New Jersey, started off life in New Jersey, 207 00:12:13,840 --> 00:12:16,679 Speaker 1: then moved to Connecticut. Can you paint a picture of 208 00:12:16,720 --> 00:12:20,600 Speaker 1: your childhood. We moved around because my dad wasn't taken 209 00:12:20,600 --> 00:12:22,839 Speaker 1: off as he was a lawyer. He tried to be 210 00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:25,720 Speaker 1: a lawyer, but he didn't practice very low. I moved 211 00:12:25,760 --> 00:12:28,560 Speaker 1: about five times, so we were always the new kids 212 00:12:28,559 --> 00:12:32,679 Speaker 1: in some suburban New Jersey. With the continuity for us 213 00:12:33,200 --> 00:12:37,800 Speaker 1: was that my grandfather, my father's dad, was a college 214 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:41,400 Speaker 1: professor up in New York State in the farm country, 215 00:12:41,640 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 1: and so we spend every summer on a farm. We 216 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:48,520 Speaker 1: were basically country kids in the summer and then we 217 00:12:48,600 --> 00:12:52,280 Speaker 1: go back to the suburbs in the wintertime. So for me, 218 00:12:52,679 --> 00:12:56,040 Speaker 1: I love my childhood because I spent all day with 219 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:59,880 Speaker 1: no She's out in our little lake or running around 220 00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:02,320 Speaker 1: the words. I love that I was there with my 221 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 1: two brothers and my cousins. What kind of lasting impact 222 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:08,280 Speaker 1: do you think that had on you in terms of 223 00:13:08,280 --> 00:13:12,400 Speaker 1: shaping who you are. You just had a feeling of peace, 224 00:13:12,679 --> 00:13:14,800 Speaker 1: you know, if you're used to be an app by 225 00:13:14,840 --> 00:13:18,360 Speaker 1: yourself in the fields of the forest with nobody else around. 226 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:22,199 Speaker 1: The next farm was half a mile away. It's just 227 00:13:22,520 --> 00:13:25,640 Speaker 1: beautiful and peaceful. Well, by the way, I would say 228 00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:28,600 Speaker 1: I've known you forty years, I would say that actually 229 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:30,960 Speaker 1: most people would describe you that way. Of all the 230 00:13:31,040 --> 00:13:34,359 Speaker 1: people I know who have risen to the topping companies, 231 00:13:34,720 --> 00:13:39,319 Speaker 1: you're so calm, so collected, good humor, and so now 232 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:42,360 Speaker 1: we know why. Well, thank you for saying that. Let's 233 00:13:42,480 --> 00:13:45,520 Speaker 1: jump a little bit. You go to boarding school for 234 00:13:45,640 --> 00:13:48,679 Speaker 1: high school. Was that a positive experience for you? I 235 00:13:48,679 --> 00:13:51,600 Speaker 1: mean it sounds like you're talking about the suburban life, 236 00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:54,000 Speaker 1: the farm and now you're off at one of the 237 00:13:54,040 --> 00:13:57,719 Speaker 1: most prestigious prep schools in America. And also, by the way, 238 00:13:57,720 --> 00:14:00,719 Speaker 1: you got to be hard as hell too. How did 239 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:03,080 Speaker 1: that work out? And what it impact did that have 240 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:05,760 Speaker 1: on you? You know, it was a big thing for me. 241 00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:08,800 Speaker 1: If I hadn't done that, we wouldn't be talking probably 242 00:14:08,880 --> 00:14:12,240 Speaker 1: right now, because for me, when you come out of 243 00:14:12,280 --> 00:14:15,559 Speaker 1: the other side, if you look at all of us graduands, 244 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:19,160 Speaker 1: you can't really tell the difference three years after at 245 00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 1: the end between a public school kid from the suburbs 246 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:25,400 Speaker 1: that goes in there, which is what half the class was. 247 00:14:25,560 --> 00:14:28,200 Speaker 1: I was one of those or the other half of 248 00:14:28,240 --> 00:14:31,040 Speaker 1: the class, which were private school kids, and they all 249 00:14:31,120 --> 00:14:34,200 Speaker 1: had all these uh you know houses in the Hampton's 250 00:14:34,360 --> 00:14:37,080 Speaker 1: or the Brooks Brothers stuff. I've never heard of it. 251 00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: I got there, some guy came down the hall and 252 00:14:40,480 --> 00:14:43,600 Speaker 1: kind of flashed hit my Lopel's to find out what 253 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:45,680 Speaker 1: kind of a jacket I was wearing. I had a 254 00:14:45,720 --> 00:14:50,520 Speaker 1: factory store polyester from Norhawalk. I wanted to fit in 255 00:14:50,560 --> 00:14:53,560 Speaker 1: with this whole thing. We went to Yale at that 256 00:14:53,600 --> 00:14:57,320 Speaker 1: point of very progressive school, especially in the area you 257 00:14:57,360 --> 00:15:02,600 Speaker 1: went like sixties early. It hadn't been before Yield, you know. 258 00:15:02,600 --> 00:15:06,280 Speaker 1: It was a pretty traditional establishment play. And then every 259 00:15:06,320 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: all the alumni got piste off because Yale was getting 260 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:13,760 Speaker 1: so radicals, remember Dad, the Bobby Seal demonstrations going in there. 261 00:15:14,120 --> 00:15:17,560 Speaker 1: There was a pretty controversial time. And did they go 262 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:20,120 Speaker 1: co ed in your time at Yale? Yeah, they went 263 00:15:20,240 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 1: coed a year before I got there. And just to 264 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:26,320 Speaker 1: give you the sad fact about it, because it went 265 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:32,960 Speaker 1: slowly unfortunately, there were a thousand males in the entering classes, 266 00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:36,800 Speaker 1: let's say, and there were two hundred women in my 267 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:39,520 Speaker 1: class entering and there were two hundred women in the class. 268 00:15:39,520 --> 00:15:43,640 Speaker 1: Before months there were four hundred undergraduate women at Yale 269 00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:48,960 Speaker 1: and four thousand male undergraduates and another five thousand Mayle 270 00:15:49,040 --> 00:15:59,440 Speaker 1: graduate students. More mathemagic. Right after this quick break, welcome 271 00:15:59,520 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 1: back to at the Magic Let's you're more from my 272 00:16:01,720 --> 00:16:06,160 Speaker 1: conversation with Jeff Buchas. If you could go back in 273 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:08,920 Speaker 1: time and you could give your twenty one year old 274 00:16:08,920 --> 00:16:12,960 Speaker 1: self some advice, what would that advice be. Just be honest. 275 00:16:13,040 --> 00:16:16,120 Speaker 1: Don't try to pretend that you know what you want 276 00:16:16,120 --> 00:16:18,600 Speaker 1: to do or that you know, let's say you're on 277 00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:22,360 Speaker 1: a Jeff, that you know something when you don't. Like 278 00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:24,640 Speaker 1: you mentioned, I had to go to these schools where 279 00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:27,400 Speaker 1: everybody's trying to get in. People are always trying to 280 00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:31,720 Speaker 1: build themselves into some kind of resume of the perfect 281 00:16:31,760 --> 00:16:35,520 Speaker 1: person or something for whatever job they think they want 282 00:16:35,520 --> 00:16:36,800 Speaker 1: to do. Well, none of us know what you want 283 00:16:36,800 --> 00:16:40,200 Speaker 1: to do because we haven't done it yet. So if 284 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:43,480 Speaker 1: you get in that habit, which unfortunately now young people, 285 00:16:43,720 --> 00:16:47,240 Speaker 1: you get in the habit of pretulating yourself into something 286 00:16:48,200 --> 00:16:50,360 Speaker 1: which may or may not do what you ought to do, 287 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:53,400 Speaker 1: you don't know, so you don't have the habit of 288 00:16:53,520 --> 00:16:56,320 Speaker 1: trying to find out what you want to do, and 289 00:16:56,360 --> 00:17:01,360 Speaker 1: you don't have the habit of expressing your actual impulses 290 00:17:01,400 --> 00:17:06,680 Speaker 1: are natural inclinations. You're always looking for what do they want? 291 00:17:07,040 --> 00:17:10,119 Speaker 1: What am I trying to present myself as? Try to 292 00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:13,280 Speaker 1: keep that as minimum as you can, because you want 293 00:17:13,280 --> 00:17:17,000 Speaker 1: to get kicked that of places, they're where you don't belong. 294 00:17:17,080 --> 00:17:19,639 Speaker 1: Everybody's afraid. Well, they're gonna tell me they don't belong. 295 00:17:20,440 --> 00:17:23,800 Speaker 1: That's not bad, that's good. This is not where you 296 00:17:23,880 --> 00:17:28,280 Speaker 1: should be. Get oppy. Take five. Okay, good, I'll go 297 00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:31,439 Speaker 1: somewhere and see if I've fit over there. You were 298 00:17:31,480 --> 00:17:34,520 Speaker 1: a rising star at HBO in the eighties. You end 299 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:39,960 Speaker 1: up being CFO. Along comes Steve Ross and Time Inc. 300 00:17:40,240 --> 00:17:42,520 Speaker 1: And by this time HBO is a major part of 301 00:17:42,560 --> 00:17:47,840 Speaker 1: Time Inc. And Warner Communications merge, the first of the 302 00:17:47,880 --> 00:17:51,879 Speaker 1: big media mega mergers. I was on the Warner side, 303 00:17:52,040 --> 00:17:53,680 Speaker 1: and you and I really got to know each other. 304 00:17:53,720 --> 00:17:56,200 Speaker 1: I guess from that merger, how did that deal look 305 00:17:56,640 --> 00:18:00,480 Speaker 1: from your side of the street? There so Time macause 306 00:18:00,560 --> 00:18:04,360 Speaker 1: the parent company of HBO, this little, you know, guerrilla 307 00:18:04,480 --> 00:18:11,200 Speaker 1: operation that was very scrappy because HBO was always threatened 308 00:18:11,240 --> 00:18:14,200 Speaker 1: with extinction from either the movie companies that wouldn't sell 309 00:18:14,240 --> 00:18:17,040 Speaker 1: us the movies, or the cable companies that didn't want 310 00:18:17,080 --> 00:18:19,760 Speaker 1: us to have high share of subscribers that we had, 311 00:18:20,320 --> 00:18:23,879 Speaker 1: and we were the leader, so we weren't running scared exactly. 312 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:27,440 Speaker 1: We were well aware that we were chased by a 313 00:18:27,480 --> 00:18:30,720 Speaker 1: pack of dogs. So we were always trying to move. 314 00:18:30,840 --> 00:18:34,280 Speaker 1: We were always trying to stay ahead of what we 315 00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:37,320 Speaker 1: thought would be that the cable people or the movie 316 00:18:37,320 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 1: people were wiping us out. They both tried. There's some 317 00:18:40,880 --> 00:18:45,280 Speaker 1: famous cases. The movies companies got together and tried to 318 00:18:45,320 --> 00:18:47,840 Speaker 1: stop selling HBO movies and we sued him for an 319 00:18:47,920 --> 00:18:51,680 Speaker 1: of trust in one and it was very chaotic because 320 00:18:51,680 --> 00:18:53,800 Speaker 1: we were growing fan and we got a lot of 321 00:18:54,480 --> 00:18:59,119 Speaker 1: leadership changes. We survived at Michael Fuchs, who was a 322 00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:02,119 Speaker 1: vital part of us. He was the guy with the 323 00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:05,159 Speaker 1: vision in the hoods, but to weigh the foundations for 324 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:08,640 Speaker 1: our original programming, which he saw more than any of us, 325 00:19:09,240 --> 00:19:13,919 Speaker 1: would become well the central thing at HBO, and he 326 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:18,680 Speaker 1: had the ability to do that. He attracted a brilliant team. 327 00:19:18,840 --> 00:19:21,560 Speaker 1: These people are famous now in that world. They probably 328 00:19:21,560 --> 00:19:25,600 Speaker 1: have more oscars and peabodies and enemies than anyone in 329 00:19:25,600 --> 00:19:29,760 Speaker 1: that category. And then the thing everybody now knows because 330 00:19:29,800 --> 00:19:34,439 Speaker 1: they're thinking of Sopranos or lately Game of Thrones, Bridget Potter, 331 00:19:34,600 --> 00:19:39,680 Speaker 1: Chris Albret kallen Strauss creating really our original programming series 332 00:19:39,720 --> 00:19:42,240 Speaker 1: business out of nothing. And this is when the big 333 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:45,960 Speaker 1: networks had thirty plus series each a week. That's a 334 00:19:46,040 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 1: hundred series on USTv with big stars, big budgets, big 335 00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 1: schedules to premiere new shows, audience flow, all the things 336 00:19:54,480 --> 00:19:57,399 Speaker 1: you're supposed to have to have for series. And we 337 00:19:57,440 --> 00:20:00,480 Speaker 1: had enough money for maybe two or three series. And 338 00:20:00,560 --> 00:20:03,320 Speaker 1: we know that the network series failed four out of 339 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:07,040 Speaker 1: five times. Our competitors have a hundred of them. They've 340 00:20:07,119 --> 00:20:11,199 Speaker 1: launched four hundred pilots. We've got enough, but three What 341 00:20:11,280 --> 00:20:14,199 Speaker 1: are we going to do? And so we happened to 342 00:20:14,240 --> 00:20:17,439 Speaker 1: get somewhat lucky. We decided we got to be very different. 343 00:20:17,720 --> 00:20:20,640 Speaker 1: Michael deserves the credit for them. You know this show 344 00:20:20,920 --> 00:20:24,159 Speaker 1: and I mentioned alright, Larry Sanders show, I think was 345 00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:27,200 Speaker 1: what put us on the map as a network that 346 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:32,520 Speaker 1: could really do something that changed the genre that Larry 347 00:20:32,520 --> 00:20:35,520 Speaker 1: Sanders was in. He basically put a new layer on 348 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:38,920 Speaker 1: what Johnny Carson and let him in We're doing I mean, 349 00:20:38,960 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 1: would you agree with that? Absolutely? It was fantastic, kind 350 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:45,280 Speaker 1: of showed us what we could do. The problem was, 351 00:20:45,359 --> 00:20:47,320 Speaker 1: you know, we had a marketing thing. This is under 352 00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:50,480 Speaker 1: Michael's top. We had a marketing thing for that big 353 00:20:50,520 --> 00:20:54,320 Speaker 1: success for us. We called it the best hour on TV, 354 00:20:55,440 --> 00:20:56,960 Speaker 1: and in fact, I think it was on What the 355 00:20:57,040 --> 00:21:01,000 Speaker 1: joke was? It was only in that because so Sanders 356 00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 1: was a half hour show and we had ten episodes 357 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:09,480 Speaker 1: a year, and we paired it on the schedule with 358 00:21:09,520 --> 00:21:14,800 Speaker 1: another sitcom, very good show dream On, which starred Brian 359 00:21:14,840 --> 00:21:19,960 Speaker 1: ben Ben along with Wendy Malick and Dorian Wilson. We 360 00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:23,600 Speaker 1: called those two half hours. So let's say it's an 361 00:21:23,600 --> 00:21:26,840 Speaker 1: hour block ten times in a year, we called the 362 00:21:26,840 --> 00:21:29,879 Speaker 1: best hour on TV. But we had ten hours in 363 00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 1: a whole year. And here we have a three day 364 00:21:34,880 --> 00:21:37,800 Speaker 1: program network. That's one twenty four hours a day. I mean, 365 00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:41,680 Speaker 1: you know, we had literally nothing, so we had to 366 00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:44,440 Speaker 1: when the blockbuster came in and all of a sudden, 367 00:21:44,480 --> 00:21:47,440 Speaker 1: movies that you could watch on DVD in your house 368 00:21:47,440 --> 00:21:52,199 Speaker 1: whenever you wanted to was wiping out or previous selling 369 00:21:52,280 --> 00:21:55,160 Speaker 1: point which was a big movie from Hollywood on Saturday 370 00:21:55,280 --> 00:21:57,840 Speaker 1: nights or Sunday night, but you had to watch it 371 00:21:57,880 --> 00:22:00,720 Speaker 1: at nine o'clock. But let me interject, because I was 372 00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:06,400 Speaker 1: around the business. Then the movie companies actually invented home 373 00:22:06,520 --> 00:22:09,840 Speaker 1: video rental to try and get some leverage on HBO. 374 00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:13,040 Speaker 1: HBO is that powerful and that important to them. And 375 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:16,080 Speaker 1: HBO used to play a strategy called odd man out 376 00:22:16,520 --> 00:22:19,679 Speaker 1: where you'd leave one studio out of your by so 377 00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:22,800 Speaker 1: their movies wouldn't get any pay TV money, and it's 378 00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:24,800 Speaker 1: so infuriated. Actually think it was m c A that 379 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: started it, that said, well, we can't have that kind 380 00:22:28,359 --> 00:22:31,880 Speaker 1: of instability, so we're gonna start home video and sell 381 00:22:31,960 --> 00:22:34,680 Speaker 1: the movies. And of course people start running them and 382 00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:38,360 Speaker 1: doing whatever. But just as an aside, that's how powerful 383 00:22:38,480 --> 00:22:41,520 Speaker 1: HBO was in the movie business. And it's so powerful 384 00:22:41,560 --> 00:22:45,160 Speaker 1: that it actually started its own competitor. Yeah, that's true. 385 00:22:45,200 --> 00:22:48,360 Speaker 1: And also there was another competitor all of us inside 386 00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:50,760 Speaker 1: used to fight about because when we had the one 387 00:22:50,800 --> 00:22:54,520 Speaker 1: man out movie studio and we left Universal like a 388 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:57,679 Speaker 1: loaded gun on the table, I think it was six 389 00:22:57,840 --> 00:23:00,280 Speaker 1: or seven, they weren't going to go nowhere. So it 390 00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:04,520 Speaker 1: ended up feeding the start of John Malin's Encore Stars 391 00:23:04,760 --> 00:23:08,040 Speaker 1: competitor if you had Showtime Movie Channel together, we had 392 00:23:08,040 --> 00:23:10,959 Speaker 1: an HBO. We thought out nowhere for them to go 393 00:23:11,640 --> 00:23:16,679 Speaker 1: and they created stocks, which not a great development for 394 00:23:16,880 --> 00:23:19,320 Speaker 1: us because it raised all the movie costs and it 395 00:23:19,720 --> 00:23:23,160 Speaker 1: creates leverage for the cable operators. Again our cable deal. 396 00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:26,760 Speaker 1: So let's go to the Warner deal. You clearly are 397 00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:30,040 Speaker 1: vulnerable to the movie companies. And suddenly here comes a 398 00:23:30,080 --> 00:23:35,600 Speaker 1: movie company, Warner Communications, and this merger happens. Yeah. Well, 399 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:39,320 Speaker 1: so one problem with the merger was an undervalued Time 400 00:23:39,320 --> 00:23:43,440 Speaker 1: anchor and overvalued the Warners. Nobody outside cares inside he 401 00:23:43,520 --> 00:23:47,080 Speaker 1: created a problem because the Warner side, everybody got wealthy, 402 00:23:47,119 --> 00:23:50,399 Speaker 1: and the Time side, everybody got wiped out. Then what 403 00:23:50,560 --> 00:23:58,040 Speaker 1: happened was that because Steve was so powerful in his momentum, force, skills, etcetera, 404 00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:03,120 Speaker 1: that he was really roll over as everyone expected that 405 00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:05,280 Speaker 1: he would do. Now, this is Steve Ross, who was 406 00:24:05,320 --> 00:24:08,680 Speaker 1: the CEO of Warning Communications. Yeah, and he was a 407 00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:12,600 Speaker 1: unique guy with a huge and loyal following on the 408 00:24:12,640 --> 00:24:15,720 Speaker 1: street and inside Warners. And he was quite talented, and 409 00:24:15,760 --> 00:24:20,000 Speaker 1: he was real entertainment god, which the Timing people were not. 410 00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:23,840 Speaker 1: They were magazine and so he was on the way 411 00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:30,040 Speaker 1: to completing pretty much domination, and I think possibly all 412 00:24:30,080 --> 00:24:33,480 Speaker 1: of what was all of us the little brother HBO, 413 00:24:34,040 --> 00:24:36,960 Speaker 1: We're gonna get wiped out. And then, as you know, 414 00:24:37,240 --> 00:24:42,440 Speaker 1: because you were there, Steve died and their time in 415 00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:48,480 Speaker 1: people really HBO people ended up integrating and coming back. 416 00:24:48,600 --> 00:24:53,200 Speaker 1: Jerry Levin took over a CEO. You've gone now from 417 00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:58,920 Speaker 1: a sales guy at HBO, CFO CEO and then CEO 418 00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:02,720 Speaker 1: of HB oh and so you saw this whole rise 419 00:25:02,800 --> 00:25:06,679 Speaker 1: of cable reinventing the television business, and just as the 420 00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:10,280 Speaker 1: Internet was emerging for the mass market, you turned down 421 00:25:10,320 --> 00:25:13,239 Speaker 1: the job to be CEO of American Online. I know 422 00:25:13,320 --> 00:25:15,840 Speaker 1: because I was on that board and was part of 423 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,520 Speaker 1: the recruitment effort. Why didn't you want to go for 424 00:25:18,640 --> 00:25:23,600 Speaker 1: something new again? Was HBO now in your blood? Yeah? 425 00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:27,040 Speaker 1: It was mostly that. Secondly, I didn't know anything about 426 00:25:27,040 --> 00:25:31,240 Speaker 1: it well online. I mean I could study it and everything, 427 00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:35,280 Speaker 1: but I didn't know really well how it worked. I 428 00:25:35,320 --> 00:25:37,680 Speaker 1: thought all of you guys were much better to run 429 00:25:37,680 --> 00:25:41,560 Speaker 1: it than I would be. And the other reason, as 430 00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:43,600 Speaker 1: I had a twelve year old son, I wasn't about 431 00:25:43,640 --> 00:25:48,479 Speaker 1: to move to California, when he was in Connecticut. I 432 00:25:48,520 --> 00:25:50,200 Speaker 1: wasn't trying to do anything. I was trying to stay 433 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:54,840 Speaker 1: I loved during HBO. We weren't finished with the transformation 434 00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:57,160 Speaker 1: we were making at HBO. We wanted to have vr 435 00:25:57,200 --> 00:26:00,840 Speaker 1: D get going. We wanted to fill out the original program. 436 00:26:00,920 --> 00:26:03,200 Speaker 1: We were just started with soprano sex in the city. 437 00:26:03,359 --> 00:26:06,520 Speaker 1: We came behind to Brothers and all the things after that, 438 00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:10,320 Speaker 1: and we were moving international. I just thought, well, I 439 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:12,640 Speaker 1: know how to do that. I like doing it. Let's 440 00:26:12,680 --> 00:26:15,520 Speaker 1: do that. As I said before, I never had a 441 00:26:15,560 --> 00:26:19,480 Speaker 1: plan to go to the next job. Well, I will 442 00:26:19,520 --> 00:26:22,720 Speaker 1: tell you that when I left Time Warner two thousand 443 00:26:22,720 --> 00:26:25,520 Speaker 1: and two and a O l Time Warner at the 444 00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:30,240 Speaker 1: moment and you and Don Logan, we're going to replace 445 00:26:30,359 --> 00:26:32,359 Speaker 1: me in that job. And you said to me, you know, 446 00:26:33,080 --> 00:26:35,040 Speaker 1: I really love my job at HBO, but I think 447 00:26:35,080 --> 00:26:37,600 Speaker 1: I got to take this job to protect myself against 448 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:40,440 Speaker 1: could be an asshole that gets in this job. So 449 00:26:40,640 --> 00:26:42,600 Speaker 1: I will attest to the fact that you were never 450 00:26:42,920 --> 00:26:46,040 Speaker 1: plotting or planning your next move, that they just sort 451 00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:48,439 Speaker 1: of always happened to you. Can I ask you this? 452 00:26:48,640 --> 00:26:50,800 Speaker 1: So there were one time you were the boss, you 453 00:26:50,840 --> 00:26:52,480 Speaker 1: were the head of it I was reported to do, 454 00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:55,840 Speaker 1: and we always got along, and you were saying to 455 00:26:55,920 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 1: me something in one minuting and I was saying, look, 456 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:02,480 Speaker 1: HBO is fine. Can you guys stop screwing with it? 457 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:04,479 Speaker 1: And I think when you and I learn in your 458 00:27:04,520 --> 00:27:06,399 Speaker 1: office and you said to me, as a kind of 459 00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:09,959 Speaker 1: a friendly test, he said, do you think that you 460 00:27:10,000 --> 00:27:13,119 Speaker 1: could do this job? I mean you want you And 461 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:16,080 Speaker 1: I said to you, see if you remember that, look, 462 00:27:16,320 --> 00:27:18,960 Speaker 1: I want you to be doing this job. There's nobody 463 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:22,119 Speaker 1: in this whole building that wants you to succeed in 464 00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:26,520 Speaker 1: this job more than I do, because I'm afraid if 465 00:27:26,560 --> 00:27:30,479 Speaker 1: you're not doing it, I'm gonna ben have to do it. 466 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:33,400 Speaker 1: I thought it was kind of an impossible job. It 467 00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:36,040 Speaker 1: sort of was an impossible job. What can I say? 468 00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:43,040 Speaker 1: On your behalf and my that was a terrible job. Look, 469 00:27:43,080 --> 00:27:45,040 Speaker 1: inherently it's not awful. It's a lot of fun. You 470 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:48,639 Speaker 1: got the music company and the movie companies in the 471 00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:52,240 Speaker 1: Turner networks, and you know, there's a lot of fascinating 472 00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:55,960 Speaker 1: business as we have. But with the challenge at a well, 473 00:27:56,440 --> 00:27:58,639 Speaker 1: they think it was all you tell me, was it 474 00:27:58,680 --> 00:28:01,480 Speaker 1: a culture clash? It's interesting. I do think it was 475 00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:04,520 Speaker 1: a terrible culture clash. I mean, the reality was two 476 00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:07,560 Speaker 1: thousand and one. Actually the financial performance of AO L 477 00:28:07,600 --> 00:28:11,200 Speaker 1: Time Warner was substantially better than any of the other 478 00:28:11,359 --> 00:28:14,320 Speaker 1: entertainment and media companies. But what I think it was was, 479 00:28:14,359 --> 00:28:16,960 Speaker 1: remember A O L was about fort of the free 480 00:28:16,960 --> 00:28:21,040 Speaker 1: cash flow of the combined company, and the decision was 481 00:28:21,119 --> 00:28:25,200 Speaker 1: made instead of taking that free cash flow and using 482 00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:28,320 Speaker 1: it to continue to grow and evolve. You know, you 483 00:28:28,320 --> 00:28:31,800 Speaker 1: could argue that with AOL, instant Messenger, all the services 484 00:28:32,119 --> 00:28:35,160 Speaker 1: that what Twitter did, what Facebook did, what Google did, 485 00:28:35,720 --> 00:28:40,920 Speaker 1: should have been a O l's future, And instead they 486 00:28:41,000 --> 00:28:43,440 Speaker 1: took that free cash flow and gave it to the 487 00:28:43,480 --> 00:28:47,200 Speaker 1: cable company. And I think it was that voracious appetite 488 00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:50,720 Speaker 1: that the cable company had for capital and starving a 489 00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:53,680 Speaker 1: O L when it was the growth engine. You know, 490 00:28:53,720 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 1: people sometimes say, wow, it was a great merger for 491 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:57,480 Speaker 1: a O L. And I said, actually, it was a 492 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,880 Speaker 1: horrible merger of AO well, because if we had stayed 493 00:29:00,920 --> 00:29:03,440 Speaker 1: an independent company, we would have continued to use that 494 00:29:03,600 --> 00:29:07,200 Speaker 1: enormous cash flow and that huge leadership position we had 495 00:29:07,560 --> 00:29:10,760 Speaker 1: and continue to uh, you know, grow and evolve and 496 00:29:10,800 --> 00:29:13,840 Speaker 1: buy new companies, add companies, As a matter of fact, 497 00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:16,520 Speaker 1: right before the merging with Time Warner, we had a 498 00:29:16,560 --> 00:29:21,200 Speaker 1: handshake with the eBay people to buy eBay, and so 499 00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:24,000 Speaker 1: we were just gobbling up these companies and adding it 500 00:29:24,080 --> 00:29:26,640 Speaker 1: to the to o L. So I think it was 501 00:29:26,680 --> 00:29:29,360 Speaker 1: probably that more than anything else. I think once it 502 00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:31,840 Speaker 1: became part of a big company and was no longer 503 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:36,840 Speaker 1: the priority it suffered, that is interesting. Now you also 504 00:29:37,160 --> 00:29:40,320 Speaker 1: owned a big, a big slice of Google. Right. Well, 505 00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:43,960 Speaker 1: the last deal I did, the board asked me Dick 506 00:29:44,000 --> 00:29:47,680 Speaker 1: Parsons to make the decision. Is we decided we were 507 00:29:47,760 --> 00:29:51,880 Speaker 1: going to let a search engine take the traffic from 508 00:29:52,640 --> 00:29:55,120 Speaker 1: a o L, which at that time I think fifty 509 00:29:55,560 --> 00:29:58,480 Speaker 1: of the traffic Internet traffic of the U S went 510 00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:00,880 Speaker 1: through a o L at that time, and we were 511 00:30:00,880 --> 00:30:04,080 Speaker 1: going to sell it and Google did a deal. We 512 00:30:04,120 --> 00:30:07,280 Speaker 1: actually had another bidder we had between two. We decided 513 00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:10,240 Speaker 1: to go with Google and we gave them the search 514 00:30:10,280 --> 00:30:13,280 Speaker 1: traffic for at that time an enormous amount of money, 515 00:30:13,480 --> 00:30:16,040 Speaker 1: and they gave us I can't remember it was five 516 00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:20,240 Speaker 1: or of Google. Now, someone after my time, Jeff, I'm 517 00:30:20,240 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 1: not going to say it was. You sold that stake 518 00:30:22,560 --> 00:30:25,680 Speaker 1: in Google for billions of dollars, not hundreds of billions. 519 00:30:25,960 --> 00:30:28,960 Speaker 1: It was billions. That was when Time Warner was shedding 520 00:30:29,040 --> 00:30:31,360 Speaker 1: debt because we had a debt problem. I just think 521 00:30:31,400 --> 00:30:34,640 Speaker 1: we should sell it, but we did, and there you go. 522 00:30:34,960 --> 00:30:36,960 Speaker 1: I mean the irony is that would probably worth a 523 00:30:36,960 --> 00:30:40,400 Speaker 1: couple of hundred billion today when you look at stuff 524 00:30:40,440 --> 00:30:44,480 Speaker 1: in hindsights, it's really interesting. So let me jump to 525 00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:48,480 Speaker 1: you built. HBO is one of the core team shaped 526 00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:53,880 Speaker 1: Time Warner, what roll this corporate culture play and something 527 00:30:53,960 --> 00:30:57,680 Speaker 1: like that significant amount, But it depends on which company. 528 00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:00,440 Speaker 1: The Time Warner company, as we've been saying, it came 529 00:31:00,480 --> 00:31:04,120 Speaker 1: about by a series of mergers. So the Time merger 530 00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:08,200 Speaker 1: with Warner that was the biggest merger in media when 531 00:31:08,240 --> 00:31:12,200 Speaker 1: it happened, and it was not like to like merge. 532 00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:18,000 Speaker 1: It was industry leaders in studio production of film, studio 533 00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:24,840 Speaker 1: production of TV series, music, Warner Brothers merging with a 534 00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:28,760 Speaker 1: big magazine company, an HBO, and a cable company. Those 535 00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:31,600 Speaker 1: are six different industries. That's a little different than when 536 00:31:31,600 --> 00:31:35,640 Speaker 1: people merge things that are in a shared industry. Then 537 00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 1: after that you had the Turner merger, which added a 538 00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:40,200 Speaker 1: lot more scale to the network side, but it tied 539 00:31:40,320 --> 00:31:45,280 Speaker 1: the whole company more to the basic cable bundle, which 540 00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:47,800 Speaker 1: is having a hell of a time right now coming 541 00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:51,400 Speaker 1: out in the internet streaming world, because it's hard to 542 00:31:51,440 --> 00:31:55,360 Speaker 1: shrink four or five basic channels like t NT, TBS, 543 00:31:55,440 --> 00:32:00,840 Speaker 1: Cartoon Network, CNN into a singular or one or two 544 00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:06,960 Speaker 1: streaming services. So that set of mergers then a o 545 00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:13,000 Speaker 1: L the biggest Internet at that point, and a portal company. 546 00:32:13,480 --> 00:32:17,080 Speaker 1: If you think about that, that's an unwieldy group of 547 00:32:17,360 --> 00:32:22,520 Speaker 1: conglomerated industries put together. And if you then say, well, 548 00:32:22,520 --> 00:32:26,000 Speaker 1: what's the right carbon culture for that? And it's a 549 00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:29,360 Speaker 1: different answer than if you're the Disney company and you 550 00:32:29,400 --> 00:32:36,240 Speaker 1: can bolt on Pixar, Lucasfilm, Marvel into the Disney flywheel 551 00:32:36,440 --> 00:32:41,200 Speaker 1: of Family I P. That's been going on for fifty years. 552 00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:45,160 Speaker 1: So for us, and you know this from all the 553 00:32:45,280 --> 00:32:49,400 Speaker 1: culture and the core capabilities of the warners, we're very 554 00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:53,160 Speaker 1: different than the network people at HBO on pay TV, 555 00:32:53,440 --> 00:32:57,800 Speaker 1: which has no ad support versus the little closer to 556 00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:02,400 Speaker 1: the cable cousins that turn had down in Atlanta, and 557 00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:05,920 Speaker 1: then the magazine PEP, which are different yet again and 558 00:33:06,040 --> 00:33:08,920 Speaker 1: a whole different trajectory. So you're saying, what to do 559 00:33:09,080 --> 00:33:11,120 Speaker 1: with those corporate cultures. How much do you mail them? 560 00:33:11,160 --> 00:33:13,360 Speaker 1: What kind of culture do you have? You need a 561 00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:17,840 Speaker 1: certain amount of decentralization if you're an Unlike businesses, they 562 00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:21,600 Speaker 1: need to be separated at some point, not integrated in 563 00:33:21,680 --> 00:33:25,200 Speaker 1: a top down thing. So you really looked at corporate 564 00:33:25,240 --> 00:33:28,440 Speaker 1: culture by sort of operating group and looked at it 565 00:33:28,520 --> 00:33:32,080 Speaker 1: more of handling a portfolio of companies. Then you did 566 00:33:32,200 --> 00:33:37,960 Speaker 1: one overarching corporate culture which affected all of these operating businesses. Well, 567 00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:42,960 Speaker 1: there were some core businesses Turner Warner, HBO. They clearly 568 00:33:43,160 --> 00:33:47,600 Speaker 1: could and should be operated together strategically. That's why we 569 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:50,760 Speaker 1: made them the core of the company. You couldn't keep 570 00:33:50,800 --> 00:33:54,080 Speaker 1: the cable company in that because the cable company was 571 00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:57,160 Speaker 1: too small and we needed to double the size of 572 00:33:57,200 --> 00:33:59,240 Speaker 1: it for its own efficiency. But you couldn't get that 573 00:33:59,280 --> 00:34:01,400 Speaker 1: through any trub them, So we had to spin it 574 00:34:01,400 --> 00:34:04,320 Speaker 1: off so it could merge and become charter. The result 575 00:34:04,480 --> 00:34:08,400 Speaker 1: was it became ten times more valuable. The magazine company 576 00:34:08,520 --> 00:34:11,560 Speaker 1: was irrelevant to any of this and needed to be 577 00:34:11,960 --> 00:34:16,160 Speaker 1: separated and merged for scale with another magazine company. You 578 00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:20,000 Speaker 1: could make an argument that the music company could stay 579 00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:24,480 Speaker 1: in the gena Warner HBO thing. I am not saying 580 00:34:24,520 --> 00:34:26,920 Speaker 1: that you don't have a unified corporate culture. I'm just 581 00:34:26,960 --> 00:34:30,080 Speaker 1: saying you have to do it carefully when you have 582 00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:33,120 Speaker 1: so many pieces of the giant numprodre that we had 583 00:34:33,160 --> 00:34:37,400 Speaker 1: to spin off. And you know, if you asked, you 584 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:40,240 Speaker 1: didn't not to say it because what other thinking about, 585 00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:45,600 Speaker 1: and that's what our saolders were pressing about. We had 586 00:34:45,680 --> 00:34:48,520 Speaker 1: to streamline the thing where there was no way we're 587 00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:52,680 Speaker 1: going to be able to stay together. And people sometimes say, well, 588 00:34:52,719 --> 00:34:54,960 Speaker 1: you could have invested in this or that or defied 589 00:34:55,000 --> 00:34:59,239 Speaker 1: the shareholders to a point. We couldn't because it would 590 00:34:59,239 --> 00:35:02,480 Speaker 1: be easy to break it up. I can't. Tried to 591 00:35:02,520 --> 00:35:04,799 Speaker 1: do it in oh five, we beat him out of it. 592 00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:08,279 Speaker 1: Murdoch tried to do it in fourteen. We beat him 593 00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:12,040 Speaker 1: out of it. It was a pretty easy pitch for 594 00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:15,120 Speaker 1: the owners to say, hey, I'll take it and break 595 00:35:15,160 --> 00:35:17,680 Speaker 1: it up and we can get all this unlock value 596 00:35:17,719 --> 00:35:22,080 Speaker 1: when merge of the magazines are publishing, or the music 597 00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:24,840 Speaker 1: with a like thing and make it a scale play. 598 00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:29,600 Speaker 1: So those are just inevitable facts that time. Warner, let's say, 599 00:35:29,880 --> 00:35:34,160 Speaker 1: was there when you inherited it in two thousand. That 600 00:35:34,320 --> 00:35:39,600 Speaker 1: was not a sustainable collection of assets over time. The 601 00:35:39,760 --> 00:35:42,680 Speaker 1: lesson you had a like a blocking shareholder who could 602 00:35:43,360 --> 00:35:46,279 Speaker 1: turn down hostile offers because it's too easy to make 603 00:35:46,320 --> 00:35:50,680 Speaker 1: more money separating them. And the proof of it is frankly, 604 00:35:50,760 --> 00:35:54,320 Speaker 1: when I got it in a eight it was worth 605 00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:59,560 Speaker 1: in equity terms, Time Warner about but if you had 606 00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:02,319 Speaker 1: to share, oh wait, we had nine or ten times 607 00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:07,120 Speaker 1: your money through all of these spins and the increase 608 00:36:07,280 --> 00:36:12,160 Speaker 1: in the Time Warner core value at HBO Warner and Turner. 609 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:14,960 Speaker 1: I think you did, and I think everyone would agree, 610 00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:19,440 Speaker 1: a spectacular job creating value for shareholders at Time Warner. 611 00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:22,719 Speaker 1: And I think even the eventual sale to A T 612 00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,040 Speaker 1: and T made an enormous amount of sense at the 613 00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:29,479 Speaker 1: time too, and for the shareholders was a spectacular deal. Well, 614 00:36:29,480 --> 00:36:32,600 Speaker 1: thank you for saying that all of us thought, not 615 00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:36,040 Speaker 1: just me alone, that we knew we couldn't stay turn 616 00:36:36,080 --> 00:36:40,560 Speaker 1: our HBO Warner with Netflix coming. It was just impossible. 617 00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:44,399 Speaker 1: So we needed more scale to invest in the streaming thing. 618 00:36:44,560 --> 00:36:46,960 Speaker 1: Because if we took it, the Time Warner earnings from 619 00:36:46,960 --> 00:36:50,120 Speaker 1: the BILLI into four, which would have still left us 620 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:54,440 Speaker 1: at a quarter of the Netflix program. But that's just 621 00:36:54,480 --> 00:36:56,680 Speaker 1: not gonna work. We'd have been bought by you know, 622 00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:00,960 Speaker 1: hostile offers, and A would have been sliced. So when 623 00:37:01,040 --> 00:37:05,000 Speaker 1: we found a T and T. One thing is yet 624 00:37:05,080 --> 00:37:07,520 Speaker 1: they can write the check and they've got a big 625 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:11,520 Speaker 1: enough scale with a three billion dollar company, they can 626 00:37:11,560 --> 00:37:14,520 Speaker 1: take those losses and not have a suffering of the 627 00:37:14,560 --> 00:37:16,359 Speaker 1: stock rush. They could finance it. They had a lot 628 00:37:16,400 --> 00:37:19,920 Speaker 1: of cash dollars, a lot of free cash. Though. We 629 00:37:20,040 --> 00:37:24,840 Speaker 1: never thought that they would go and try to replace 630 00:37:25,160 --> 00:37:29,120 Speaker 1: the management at Warner Turner and HBO. I don't mean 631 00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:31,400 Speaker 1: just the top people. You can know that, you'd always 632 00:37:31,400 --> 00:37:35,640 Speaker 1: see that, But they went down and really lost a 633 00:37:35,719 --> 00:37:40,600 Speaker 1: great deal of expertise in the top fifty ranks. And 634 00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:44,240 Speaker 1: each of those Warner, HBO, Turners and all those people 635 00:37:44,320 --> 00:37:47,799 Speaker 1: were highly capable. They knew how to pivot into the 636 00:37:47,840 --> 00:37:51,600 Speaker 1: new streaming world, and they knew how to keep the 637 00:37:51,640 --> 00:37:55,360 Speaker 1: maximization of the old cable wholesale world that you know 638 00:37:55,520 --> 00:37:58,879 Speaker 1: and I know. And it's not one versus the other. 639 00:37:59,160 --> 00:38:04,400 Speaker 1: It's basically, how did you do this smoothly and maintain 640 00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:08,080 Speaker 1: maximum resources all the way along? And you're seeing it 641 00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:11,759 Speaker 1: now because I was just out of sun Valley talking everybody. 642 00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:14,680 Speaker 1: The streamers are five. People always ask who's gonna win 643 00:38:14,680 --> 00:38:19,560 Speaker 1: the streaming war, probably Netflix, Disney, Amazon, and HBO. But 644 00:38:20,560 --> 00:38:24,879 Speaker 1: when they win, what are they gonna what's their economics 645 00:38:24,920 --> 00:38:27,120 Speaker 1: going to be? It may not be anything close to 646 00:38:27,160 --> 00:38:31,160 Speaker 1: what it was. You sat at the top of the 647 00:38:31,239 --> 00:38:35,840 Speaker 1: pyramid for a long time HBO, then eventually Time Warner. 648 00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:40,480 Speaker 1: What is surprised you most after leaving the CEO role? 649 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:44,239 Speaker 1: It's really gonna sound crusty, and it reminds me of 650 00:38:44,320 --> 00:38:48,880 Speaker 1: something Walter Riston said. He was the famous head of 651 00:38:48,960 --> 00:38:53,680 Speaker 1: City Bank back in the seventies. When I was recruited 652 00:38:53,719 --> 00:38:57,040 Speaker 1: there for my short time, he said to the train 653 00:38:57,160 --> 00:39:02,080 Speaker 1: and look, you think that all your fancy analysis and 654 00:39:02,280 --> 00:39:06,880 Speaker 1: all the modern skills, that those are the things that 655 00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:09,560 Speaker 1: are going to protect and lead to the most success 656 00:39:09,640 --> 00:39:14,640 Speaker 1: for this massive worldwide institution. But no, it's actually the 657 00:39:14,719 --> 00:39:19,680 Speaker 1: character of whoever you're dealing with, whoever is leading the institution. 658 00:39:20,000 --> 00:39:22,560 Speaker 1: If you make a tightly structured we will be able 659 00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:26,080 Speaker 1: to bad person, You're gonna have a bad outcome. If 660 00:39:26,120 --> 00:39:29,720 Speaker 1: you make a loosely structured, sloppy deal with a good person, 661 00:39:29,800 --> 00:39:32,520 Speaker 1: you're gonna have a good outcome. You need to know 662 00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:35,040 Speaker 1: the character of the person. And that's what surprised me 663 00:39:35,080 --> 00:39:39,520 Speaker 1: the most is it really makes a difference who's doing it. 664 00:39:39,560 --> 00:39:43,640 Speaker 1: And I don't mean by that just the quote CEO. 665 00:39:44,239 --> 00:39:48,759 Speaker 1: It's the people and the culture that are dominant in 666 00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:51,920 Speaker 1: the company. I mean, if you ask me, what's the 667 00:39:51,920 --> 00:39:56,160 Speaker 1: one thing I remember about HBO, the singular thing is 668 00:39:56,320 --> 00:39:58,520 Speaker 1: people could trust us. If we said we're going to 669 00:39:58,600 --> 00:40:00,920 Speaker 1: do this, we would do it. Didn't really matter it 670 00:40:01,040 --> 00:40:04,840 Speaker 1: was informal. We owe that to Jerry Levine, Michael Fuchs, 671 00:40:05,680 --> 00:40:09,200 Speaker 1: Nick Nicholas Tony Cox. People stood by their work. It 672 00:40:09,280 --> 00:40:12,319 Speaker 1: was the most important thing and I still think it's 673 00:40:12,320 --> 00:40:16,440 Speaker 1: the most important thing. So this leads us to how 674 00:40:16,480 --> 00:40:19,400 Speaker 1: we end each episode. We give a shout out to 675 00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:22,040 Speaker 1: the stars of the math side of the business, those 676 00:40:22,120 --> 00:40:25,960 Speaker 1: analytics folks who sort of run businesses through the numbers, 677 00:40:26,440 --> 00:40:29,600 Speaker 1: and those from the magic side, the promoters, the people 678 00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:34,839 Speaker 1: who see and feel and touch and have these incredible ideas. 679 00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:38,120 Speaker 1: Can you give us your nod, your shout out? Want 680 00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:40,880 Speaker 1: you to pick the best mathematician, the best magician, so 681 00:40:40,920 --> 00:40:43,680 Speaker 1: to speak, Well, these days I'm worried about the country, 682 00:40:44,120 --> 00:40:48,759 Speaker 1: So for me in math Alexander Hamilton's in Magic, I 683 00:40:48,800 --> 00:40:51,840 Speaker 1: gotta go with the Ministry of Magic, Joe rolland runner 684 00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:57,160 Speaker 1: up Michael Fix. That's very nice, Jeff, you have an 685 00:40:57,160 --> 00:41:00,360 Speaker 1: amazing legacy. As you built your career, are you have 686 00:41:00,440 --> 00:41:02,879 Speaker 1: lifted so many others up with you. You talked about 687 00:41:02,880 --> 00:41:05,239 Speaker 1: your days at HBO. There was that great sense of 688 00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:09,040 Speaker 1: camaraderie and collaboration. You also developed and executed some of 689 00:41:09,120 --> 00:41:13,359 Speaker 1: the most impressive strategies and media and entertainment. Congrats and 690 00:41:13,400 --> 00:41:16,799 Speaker 1: thanks for sharing with us today on Mathew Magic. Hey Rob, 691 00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:21,440 Speaker 1: thanks for having me. Here are a few things I've 692 00:41:21,480 --> 00:41:25,080 Speaker 1: picked up in my conversation with Jeff. One retire the 693 00:41:25,120 --> 00:41:28,080 Speaker 1: advice fake it till you make it. For young people 694 00:41:28,160 --> 00:41:31,279 Speaker 1: starting their careers, Jeff says, you'll have an easier time 695 00:41:31,320 --> 00:41:33,840 Speaker 1: finding the right gig if you're honest about what you 696 00:41:33,880 --> 00:41:38,040 Speaker 1: know and what you don't to Character matters when making 697 00:41:38,040 --> 00:41:40,799 Speaker 1: a deal, As Jeff says, good deals are made by 698 00:41:40,840 --> 00:41:43,719 Speaker 1: good people, So the first step and every budding deal 699 00:41:43,800 --> 00:41:46,080 Speaker 1: should be getting to know the people you're doing business with. 700 00:41:46,600 --> 00:41:52,080 Speaker 1: And three decentralization Foster's specialization. During the time Inc and 701 00:41:52,200 --> 00:41:55,400 Speaker 1: Warner merger, Jeff learned that while you need some elements 702 00:41:55,400 --> 00:41:59,720 Speaker 1: of overarching culture, specialized team should maintain the operating systems 703 00:41:59,760 --> 00:42:03,200 Speaker 1: they've fine tune for success. Parent companies need to play 704 00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:06,040 Speaker 1: by the golden rule. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. 705 00:42:07,400 --> 00:42:11,720 Speaker 1: I'm Bob Pittman. Thanks for listening. That's it for today's episode. 706 00:42:11,880 --> 00:42:13,880 Speaker 1: Thanks so much for listening to Math and Magic, a 707 00:42:13,960 --> 00:42:16,359 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. The show is hosted by 708 00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:19,160 Speaker 1: Bob Pittman. Special thanks to Susan Ward for booking and 709 00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:21,920 Speaker 1: wrangling our wonderful talent, which is no small feat Marissa 710 00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:25,239 Speaker 1: Brown for pulling research, our editors Derek Clements, Mary Dow 711 00:42:25,400 --> 00:42:28,720 Speaker 1: and Ryan Murdoch, our producer Morgan Levoy, our executive producer 712 00:42:28,840 --> 00:42:32,400 Speaker 1: Nikki Eator, and of course Gayle Roel, Eric Angel Noel, 713 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:34,920 Speaker 1: and everyone who helped bring this show to your ears. 714 00:42:35,239 --> 00:42:36,120 Speaker 1: Until next time,