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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey therein

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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm

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Speaker 1: an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the tech

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Speaker 1: are you. It's time for the tech news for the

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Speaker 1: week ending on Friday, April nineteenth, twenty twenty four, and

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Speaker 1: let's get to it now. If you've been listening to

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff for just a bit, you know I've talked

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Speaker 1: about the issue of Chinese hackers having infiltrated various American networks,

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Speaker 1: and those include networks that belong to critical infrastructure. So

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Speaker 1: this first news item, I would argue, is not really

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Speaker 1: new news, but it is important. In fact, I've even

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Speaker 1: talked specifically about Christopher Ray, the director of the Federal

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Speaker 1: Bureau of Investigation, warning us about Chinese infiltration of these systems.

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Speaker 1: I talked about that earlier this year, but Ray and

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Speaker 1: his warnings are back in the news because he gave

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Speaker 1: a speech this week at Vanderbilt University. In that speech,

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Speaker 1: among other things, he said, Chinese agents have breached systems

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Speaker 1: ranging from telecommunications networks to power grid networks and tons

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Speaker 1: of other stuff as well, and that China is essentially

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Speaker 1: just biting its time, and eventually it will use this

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Speaker 1: presence in these networks to wreak havoc on the United States.

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Speaker 1: Ray called this initiative volt Typhoon. He said, that's the

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Speaker 1: name of this whole project of infiltration, and it said

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Speaker 1: it was the product of the Chinese government. Now, China's

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Speaker 1: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for what it's worth, has said no, no, no,

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Speaker 1: no no, that's a criminal hacker group and it has

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Speaker 1: no connection to the government. Now what is the truth?

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Speaker 1: Beats me? But a vault Typhoon is, as the government

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Speaker 1: spokesperson had said, the efforts of a ransomware group. It

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Speaker 1: does seem odd to me that the group hasn't, you know,

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Speaker 1: demanded a ransom. Ransomware only makes sense if you alert

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Speaker 1: your victim to the fact that they've been breached and

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Speaker 1: then demand a ransom. If not, then it's not ransomware.

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Speaker 1: So if in fact it's a result of a criminal

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Speaker 1: ransomware group, why has this group not done that? What

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Speaker 1: is it waiting for now? It could be that it's

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Speaker 1: waiting for the time to cause the maximum amount of

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Speaker 1: chaos by striking all these various targets simultaneously, because maybe

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Speaker 1: that way, they'll net a much larger payoff. If everything

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Speaker 1: looks like it's going haywire, then maybe that would create

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Speaker 1: the situation where you get paid millions of dollars in

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Speaker 1: order to stop. But whether that's the truth or whether

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Speaker 1: China itself is actually behind the attacks, it's seriously bad

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Speaker 1: news for America. It could mean that America has some

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Speaker 1: really rough times to look forward to. And the thing is,

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Speaker 1: we don't know when that will happen, only that because

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Speaker 1: it can happen, it will eventually happening. Of China. We

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Speaker 1: have more news in the story of how the US

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Speaker 1: government is going after TikTok. When last we left this tale,

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Speaker 1: the US House of Representatives had voted in favor of

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Speaker 1: either forcing Byte Dance, which is TikTok's Chinese parent company,

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Speaker 1: to sell TikTok off to someone else, notably someone not

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Speaker 1: considered a quote unquote for an adversary by the good

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Speaker 1: old US of A, or they would face a nationwide

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Speaker 1: ban on the app. And I said it seemed less

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Speaker 1: likely that the US Senate would actually push this bill

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Speaker 1: through into being signed into law. Then we had one.

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Speaker 1: US Senator, Maria Cantwell, suggests a change to the House

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Speaker 1: bill to extend the deadline for byteedance to comply from

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Speaker 1: six months to a year, and that helped move the

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Speaker 1: needle a little bit. Some other Senators started to be

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Speaker 1: perhaps a little more comfortable expressing support for such a

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Speaker 1: possible bill in the Senate, and that might be because

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Speaker 1: that timeline also pushes the actual sale date to after

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Speaker 1: the US elections this year. And now things are getting

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Speaker 1: even murkier because the House of Representatives, after making that

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Speaker 1: alteration to the bill and extending the deadline, have lumped

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Speaker 1: the TikTok stuff in with a larger package of bills

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Speaker 1: relating to foreign aid to Ukraine and Israel, which is

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Speaker 1: kind of sneaky, but it's very much typical in US

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Speaker 1: politics anyway. There are main questions as to whether such

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Speaker 1: a law would even be constitutional, and there is no

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Speaker 1: question at all that TikTok would immediately challenge such a

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Speaker 1: law in court in an effort to force an official

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Speaker 1: decision as to whether the law is valid or not.

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Speaker 1: And behind all of this is a teeny tiny but

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Speaker 1: lingering problem that the United States doesn't actually have evidence

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Speaker 1: that TikTok has been acting as a kind of like

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Speaker 1: surveillance tool for the Chinese government. Now, that is an

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Speaker 1: issue because the whole crux of the bill argues that

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Speaker 1: there are these dangers of having a data howard app

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Speaker 1: owned by a foreign adversary. That's the reason the bill

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Speaker 1: has been written, at least according to the language of

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Speaker 1: the bill. Now, of course, there are some leaders who

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Speaker 1: have plenty of different objections to TikTok that have very

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Speaker 1: little to do with whether or not Chinese officials have

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Speaker 1: access to the data. For the record, I don't like TikTok,

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Speaker 1: and it is very true that China does have laws that,

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Speaker 1: if those laws are enforced, compel citizens and Chinese companies

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Speaker 1: to gather intelligence on behalf of the Chinese government. However,

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Speaker 1: I'm also a stickler for proof and evidence, So just

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Speaker 1: saying that something could happen is different than saying something

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Speaker 1: has happened, And you can't, in my mind, punish people

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Speaker 1: for something that could happen, Like that's ridiculous, right. I mean,

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Speaker 1: everyone could potentially commit a crime, but we don't just

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Speaker 1: go and arrest everyone ahead of time. In order to

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Speaker 1: avoid that, we wait till someone has committed a crime.

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Speaker 1: Then there's the legal system gets in so This whole

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Speaker 1: thing doesn't sit very well with me. Even though I

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Speaker 1: am no fan of TikTok, I'm also not a fan

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Speaker 1: of the government taking action against a perceived threat that

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Speaker 1: has not been proven to actually be a threat. So yeah,

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Speaker 1: still a complicated, big old mess, and we still don't

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Speaker 1: really know where it's going to go. It just seems

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Speaker 1: now that it is more likely to get passed into

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Speaker 1: law than it would have been, say, a month ago.

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Speaker 1: So maybe it turns out that by the end of

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Speaker 1: this month we're going to see a law that's going

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Speaker 1: to either compel byt Dance to sell off TikTok or

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Speaker 1: to face a national ban, and then that'll precipitate all

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Speaker 1: these other legal actions. I'm sure. Now I've got a

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Speaker 1: few AI stories today. First up is a pretty concerning one.

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Speaker 1: The US Air Force, in partnership with DARPA, which is

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Speaker 1: the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have announced that an

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Speaker 1: AI powered X six ' too a Vista air araft,

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Speaker 1: has engaged in simulated dog fights against actual human pilots. Now,

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Speaker 1: to be clear, the Vista is a real aircraft. It

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Speaker 1: is derived from the F sixteen D fighting Falcon aircraft,

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Speaker 1: and last year Lockheed Martin issued a press release saying

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Speaker 1: that an AI piloted Vista aircraft had been flying under

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Speaker 1: AI control for more than seventeen hours. Now, we're talking

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Speaker 1: about simulating air to air combat with actual human pilots,

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Speaker 1: and during the dogfights, human pilots were also on the

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Speaker 1: Vista aircraft, so it wasn't like it was just robot

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Speaker 1: controlled and there were no other people. There were humans

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Speaker 1: in the cockpit as well. They were there to intervene

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Speaker 1: if it were necessary, but it turned out not to be,

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Speaker 1: so the AI piloted the Vista within human safety norms.

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Speaker 1: Now that is interesting to point out because if you

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Speaker 1: think about it, a jet being controlled by AI would

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Speaker 1: not necessarily have to obey the safety norms because you

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Speaker 1: don't have a human pilot who's going to black out

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Speaker 1: if the aircraft engages in maneuvers that would put too

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Speaker 1: much force upon the humans inside. So it's possible for

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Speaker 1: an AI aircraft to do stuff that human piloted aircraft

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Speaker 1: just can't do. It's also possible for an AI powered

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Speaker 1: aircraft to rip a plane apart by trying to make

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Speaker 1: it do something that it just physically cannot do. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: we're still quite a ways out from aircraft that will

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Speaker 1: fly and engage in actual combat all by themselves. But

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Speaker 1: this is a big step closer to that, and that's

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Speaker 1: something that concerns a lot of people, not just in

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Speaker 1: the tech field, well beyond that, including me. I mean,

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Speaker 1: I really worry about how quickly a nation might enter

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Speaker 1: into armed conflict if they can do so just by

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Speaker 1: sending in the robots. I worry that would lead to

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Speaker 1: a future that would be more violent, with more civilian casualties.

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Speaker 1: But then I also read a lot of science fiction

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Speaker 1: where this kind of stuff has been talked about ad nauseum,

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Speaker 1: moving to a less violent but arguably equally as scary

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Speaker 1: AI story. Meta recently released an early version of its

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Speaker 1: latest large language model, which is dubbed Lama three. It

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Speaker 1: also released an AI image generator that, according to Reuter's quote,

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Speaker 1: updates pictures in real time while users type prompts end quote. Now,

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Speaker 1: that last bit is quite impressive. I've used image generators

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Speaker 1: just to kind of test them out, and they take

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Speaker 1: a prompt typically and usually it calculates a response that

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Speaker 1: takes between thirty seconds to a minute before showing you

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Speaker 1: an image. So to have a model capable of making

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Speaker 1: dynamic changes as you type in new edits tier prompt.

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Speaker 1: That's really impressive, and you could also see how someone

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Speaker 1: could use a tool like that to create an image

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Speaker 1: and then refine it or alter it until they got

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Speaker 1: something close to what they wanted, and that you could

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Speaker 1: see as being an enormous concern to you know, actual

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Speaker 1: human artists. There are also still massive questions about how

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Speaker 1: companies like Meta are actually training these AI tools to

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Speaker 1: begin with, including potentially the use of other people work

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Speaker 1: without their consent. Meta's messaging around AI is similar to

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Speaker 1: what you would see with companies like Microsoft or open ai,

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Speaker 1: and to be clear, open ai is heavily funded by Microsoft,

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Speaker 1: namely that AI tools are there to help take certain

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Speaker 1: tasks off your hands and that future versions of this

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Speaker 1: tool will allow for things like making detailed, multi step

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Speaker 1: plans that actually make sense. So I guess it all

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Speaker 1: depends on where you come down on generative AI as

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Speaker 1: to whether you see this as a positive step toward

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Speaker 1: greater productivity or a more concerning step toward copyright infringement

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Speaker 1: and displacement of people that kind of thing. Okay, we're

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Speaker 1: going to take a quick break to thank our sponsors.

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Speaker 1: When we come back. I've got some more news stories

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Speaker 1: to talk about. Okay, we're back. I still have another

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Speaker 1: AI story here. So Microsoft also introduced new AI tool

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Speaker 1: this week and it's getting a lot of buzz. It's

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Speaker 1: called Vasa one Vasa one, and this is an AI

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Speaker 1: image to video tool, which means you can feed it

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Speaker 1: a still image like a photograph in other words, and

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Speaker 1: you can give it an audio clip, and then Vasa

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Speaker 1: one will create a fully animated video incorporating those two things.

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Speaker 1: So if you took a selfie, let's say, just you

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Speaker 1: take a selfie and then you upload audio from some

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Speaker 1: other source, like maybe it's Alec Baldwin's monologue in Glengarry

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Speaker 1: Glenn Ross, well, Vasa one would manipulate your selfie image

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Speaker 1: so it looked like video of you explaining that second

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Speaker 1: place is a set of steak knives and third blazes,

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Speaker 1: you're fired. Or as Daniel John of creative block dot

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Speaker 1: Com puts it, quote, it's capable of creating deep fake

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Speaker 1: videos based on a single image end quote. That being said,

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Speaker 1: Microsoft has said that the Vasa one is an internal

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Speaker 1: tool and it's being used for research purposes and the

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Speaker 1: company has no intention of releasing it as a product,

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Speaker 1: so folks like you and me wouldn't be able to

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Speaker 1: get our grubby little hands on it unless you happen

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Speaker 1: to work for Microsoft in their AI research department. That is,

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Speaker 1: I've seen some short animations of this thing in action.

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Speaker 1: I do find it unsettling, but then again, I'm easily unsettled.

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Speaker 1: Now let us turn to the matter of bots. Those

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Speaker 1: little automated critters that typically rank lower on our robo

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Speaker 1: terror meters than AI powered fighter jets. Are generative AI

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Speaker 1: determined to turn creativity into an algorithm. There's still something

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Speaker 1: we got to deal with. So Sean Mitchell wrote a

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Speaker 1: piece that I saw in Security Brief, which is a

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Speaker 1: New Zealand publication, and it's titled half of online traffic

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Speaker 1: in twenty twenty four generated by Bots report fines. So

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Speaker 1: that report comes from a cybersecurity company called Thales, and

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Speaker 1: it said that forty nine point six percent of all

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Speaker 1: Internet traffic is from bots forty nine point six and

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Speaker 1: that this is a continuation of a trend, and it's

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Speaker 1: been going on for years. So like each year we've

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Speaker 1: seen that trend higher. That means that perhaps next year

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Speaker 1: we could see more traffic generated by bots on the

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Speaker 1: Internet than by actual human beings. You know, bots will

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Speaker 1: be making content for other bots. Eventually the rest of

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Speaker 1: us will just disconnect and go for a walk or something,

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Speaker 1: or maybe read some poetry, or probably probably just stay

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Speaker 1: online and complain about how ding Dan cluttered everything is.

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Speaker 1: So the piece really has much more of a cybersecurity focus,

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Speaker 1: which is legit. I mean, that's understandable both for the

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Speaker 1: publication and for the actual issues. Because a significant amount

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Speaker 1: of bot traffic does relate to malicious intent, whether that

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Speaker 1: is to spread misinformation or perpetuate malware across networks. That

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Speaker 1: is a big thing to be worried about. But I'm

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Speaker 1: also generally worried that we're rapidly reaching a point where

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Speaker 1: the stuff that is actually generating content is going to

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Speaker 1: be making that not for people, but actually for other bots.

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Speaker 1: If bots are making up the majority of the traffic,

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Speaker 1: then they're going to be a feedback loop of bots

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Speaker 1: making stuff for bots, and that can mean that over

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Speaker 1: time we start to encounter content that's deviating significantly from

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Speaker 1: what you know, human beings would care to consume. It's

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Speaker 1: a weird thought, right that you could go on and

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Speaker 1: be like none of this makes sense or is at

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Speaker 1: all compelling or interesting, But it's because it wasn't made

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Speaker 1: for you. It was made for where all the traffic's

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Speaker 1: coming from, which is from other bots. That's a weird

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Speaker 1: thing to think about. But here's the crazy thing is

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Speaker 1: that we may not have to wait too much longer

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Speaker 1: to actually see that start to unfold. So if you

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Speaker 1: think AI generative hallucinations are weird, now we're just getting started.

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Speaker 1: Next up, the great halving of bitcoin is upon us having,

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Speaker 1: as in cut in half. So the way bitcoin works

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Speaker 1: is that the bitcoin network creates what is essentially a

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Speaker 1: very hard math problem, and all the computers that are

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Speaker 1: connected to the network that are trying to mine bitcoins,

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Speaker 1: what they're really doing is they're trying to solve this

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Speaker 1: very hard math problem. You could argue that really this

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Speaker 1: just comes down to guessing a very very very large number.

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Speaker 1: So upon solving the math problem, a couple of things happen. First,

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Speaker 1: that solution verifies the current block of transactions on the blockchain,

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Speaker 1: the one that's just being finished up, and then that

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Speaker 1: block becomes the newest link in the blockchain. The computer

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Speaker 1: or system of computers that's responsible for solving the problem

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Speaker 1: receives some bitcoin as a reward. It's like your fee

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Speaker 1: for solving this issue. And there is a finite number

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Speaker 1: of bitcoin that will ever be issued, and so to

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Speaker 1: control circulation and distribution, the system periodically has the number

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Speaker 1: of bitcoins that are rewarded upon solving the math problem.

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Speaker 1: For the last few years, if you were the one

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Speaker 1: who solved the math problem, you would get six point

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Speaker 1: two five bitcoins for each time you did that. Currently,

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Speaker 1: bitcoin is trading it around sixty five thousand dollars per bitcoin,

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Speaker 1: so that means if you solve it, you get around

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Speaker 1: four hundred and six thousand dollars worth of bitcoin for

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Speaker 1: solve that problem. And there's a new problem every ten minutes.

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Speaker 1: So that's what drives bitcoin minors to do stuff like

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Speaker 1: takeover old power plants in order to use their their

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Speaker 1: sources to have these massive computer networks tackling these problems,

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Speaker 1: which interestingly makes the problems even more difficult. Because the

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Speaker 1: system is dynamic, it detects if people are solving problems

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Speaker 1: too quickly, it makes the problems harder. So if you

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Speaker 1: can make four hundred grand every ten minutes, then it's

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Speaker 1: worth the expense to have this massive computer network running

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Speaker 1: off incredible amounts of electricity. Well, soon that number of

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Speaker 1: bitcoins awarded is going to go down to three point

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Speaker 1: one two five per solution. So, assuming that the value

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Speaker 1: of bitcoin remains in the general neighborhood of sixty five grand,

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Speaker 1: which by the way, is not a sure thing, but

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Speaker 1: we'll get to that, that would mean that now a

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Speaker 1: solution would net you two hundred three thousand dollars, which

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Speaker 1: is obvious, right. You just cut in half the amount

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Speaker 1: that you would have made previously. So this raises some questions.

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Speaker 1: Does this mean that the really huge mining operations will

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Speaker 1: start to shut down? Because if you're making half as

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Speaker 1: much per solution, you could reach a point where it

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Speaker 1: costs too much to operate your mining operation compared to

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Speaker 1: how much you make in solving these problems. And then

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Speaker 1: there are other questions like what if the value of

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Speaker 1: bitcoin itself changes? Well, if the value of bitcoin goes up,

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Speaker 1: then it might very well mean that it's still worth

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Speaker 1: it to use as much electricity as some countries do

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Speaker 1: in a full year. We've seen the value of bitcoin

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Speaker 1: fluctuate quite a bit this week, like even more than

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Speaker 1: it usually fluctuates, which is already a lot, but it's

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Speaker 1: still hard to say where things ultimately are going to go.

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Speaker 1: I will say that bitcoin's value has grown way more

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Speaker 1: than I thought it would back when it was still

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Speaker 1: trading at around twenty thousand dollars per crypto coin. After

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Speaker 1: it had its kind of crash, I was like, well,

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Speaker 1: I don't know if we're ever going to see it

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Speaker 1: go up as high again, but we did. It got

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Speaker 1: higher than it had ever been before. However, it's also

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Speaker 1: not as valuable as what some evangelists were predicting last

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Speaker 1: year when they said it was going to hit one

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Speaker 1: hundred thousand dollars per bitcoin before twenty twenty three was over.

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Speaker 1: That did not happen. So I guess what I'm saying

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Speaker 1: is that no one really knows where it's going to

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Speaker 1: go from here. No one knows if it's going to

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Speaker 1: keep going to the moon and continue to feed this

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Speaker 1: cycle of crazy bitcoin mining operations, or if it's going

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Speaker 1: to level out or even start to dip and thus

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Speaker 1: change that nature. Nobody knows. If someone tells you otherwise

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Speaker 1: that they definitively know where it's going to go, they're

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Speaker 1: probably heavily invested in cryptocurrency. They're probably trying to get

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Speaker 1: other people to buy in to cryptocurrency because that protects

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Speaker 1: their investment, right, Like, if more people are interested in it,

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Speaker 1: and more people are investing in it, it drives the

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Speaker 1: value up and their own investment increases by comparison, I

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Speaker 1: put this for like all of the crypto community. By

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Speaker 1: the way, if you run into someone who is extremely

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Speaker 1: passionate about the crypto community, it's not a hard and

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Speaker 1: fast rule, but chances are they're in pretty deep. Like

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Speaker 1: they've invested in that, and so their investment only pays

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Speaker 1: off if the value increases, and the value increases only

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Speaker 1: if enough people share that same belief that the value

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Speaker 1: is greater. If people lose confidence in it, then the

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Speaker 1: value goes down and then you start losing money on

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Speaker 1: your investment. So I always view anyone who is really

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Speaker 1: a hardcore cheerleader of the crypto community with some skepticism. Okay,

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Speaker 1: we're going to take another quick break. When we come back,

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Speaker 1: I do have a couple more news items I want

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Speaker 1: to talk about, but first let's take another break to

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Speaker 1: thank our sponsors. Okay, We've got a few more news

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Speaker 1: stories to cover before we close out today. Google is

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Speaker 1: making an interesting or organizational change within the company. They

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Speaker 1: are combining departments focused on Android and Google Chrome. So

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Speaker 1: these are software focused departments in other words, with Google's

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Speaker 1: hardware division, so they're integrating the two, and the purpose

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Speaker 1: of making this change is to create tighter integrations with AI.

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Speaker 1: Of course I could have put this with the AI stories.

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Speaker 1: I didn't think about that. So this does continue a

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Speaker 1: trend in which Google has leaned on its Pixel series

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Speaker 1: of Android phones to feature the company's various AI implementations.

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Speaker 1: So I think we're going to see that continue and

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Speaker 1: become more apparent with future Pixel releases, probably not this year's,

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Speaker 1: but maybe like a couple of years down the line. Now,

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Speaker 1: what I'm really curious about is how this is going

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Speaker 1: to affect Google's relationship with other hardware companies like Samsung.

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Speaker 1: For example, Samsung makes some very popular Android phones, and

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Speaker 1: by tying the Android department with the Google hardware departments

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Speaker 1: so closely together, it makes me wonder if that's going

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Speaker 1: to put other companies at a disadvantage when it comes

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Speaker 1: to using Android. Right, Like, the idea of your purpose

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Speaker 1: built hardware was made with this specific version of Android

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Speaker 1: in mind. That's different than say, oh, here's a hardware platform,

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Speaker 1: let's put Android on top of it. So I'm very

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Speaker 1: curious to see how this affects those relationships. I'm wondering

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Speaker 1: if it's going to cause some friction. Samsung is kind

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Speaker 1: of going through its own crisis right now. I didn't

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Speaker 1: really put this in the lineup, but right now that

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Speaker 1: company has mandated a six day workweek, not for their

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Speaker 1: regular staff, but for their executives executives. It's kind of

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Speaker 1: a little bit of shot in freuda for those of

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Speaker 1: us who are used to the rank and file having

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Speaker 1: to work super duper hard while executives are off on

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Speaker 1: their yachts or whatever or golf courses. In this case,

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Speaker 1: Samsung executives will have to work either Saturday or Sunday

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Speaker 1: in addition to their normal work week, because that company

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Speaker 1: is currently going through a pretty rough time. But that

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Speaker 1: has more to do with their semiconductor business, not their

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Speaker 1: mobile hardware business. Anyway, I guess Google's decision really is

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Speaker 1: understandable if you want to push the envelope of AI features,

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Speaker 1: because then you really do need a tight integration between

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Speaker 1: the software side and the hardware side to make sure

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Speaker 1: that you can actually support the stuff you want to do,

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Speaker 1: you need to have a lot more control over all

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Speaker 1: the elements involved. And it doesn't really work for you

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Speaker 1: to just build a solution that will hopefully work on

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Speaker 1: whatever platform it ends up on. It's not going to

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Speaker 1: be as good of a product as you could do

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Speaker 1: if you had everything under your control. I'm just not

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Speaker 1: sure how it's going to impact other companies that use

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Speaker 1: Android operating systems. Maybe we'll see a branching Android where

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Speaker 1: one version is what you would find on Google made

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Speaker 1: hardware and one version is on everything else. That's possible.

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Speaker 1: I haven't read anything about it, so it don't there's

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Speaker 1: no guarantee that that's what's going to happen. Just thinking

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Speaker 1: kind of off the cuff here and now to segue

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Speaker 1: into our cut the cable segment. To be clear, this

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Speaker 1: isn't about cord cutters getting rid of cable TV. All

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Speaker 1: of that continues to be a big thing. Instead, this

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Speaker 1: is about literal instances of physical cables being cut and

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Speaker 1: the problems that arise because of it. So, first up,

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Speaker 1: earlier this week here in America, four states Nevada, Nebraska,

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Speaker 1: South Dakota, and Texas experienced nine one one outages. So

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Speaker 1: For those of y'all not from the United States, nine

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Speaker 1: to one one is our number for emergencies phone number,

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Speaker 1: So as you can imagine, a nine to one one

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Speaker 1: disruption is a really big deal because suddenly folks who

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Speaker 1: are in need of help have a reliable line disrupted,

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Speaker 1: they cannot reach the emergency services that they need. So

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Speaker 1: what actually happened, Well, a telecommunications company called Lumen Technology

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Speaker 1: is explained for at least some of these cases that

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Speaker 1: a third party company quote physically cut our fiber d quote,

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Speaker 1: and that this happened while that third party company was

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Speaker 1: trying to install a light pole, so they were just

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Speaker 1: trying to install this thing and in the process they

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Speaker 1: cut through a telecommunications cable that caused this nine to

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Speaker 1: one one outage, which is a powerful reminder of how

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Speaker 1: our communications capability is still really dependent upon a lot

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Speaker 1: of physical hardware. Right. It's easy to forget that because

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Speaker 1: we've gone so cordless over the years, like it seems

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Speaker 1: like everything just works by magic. But no, there's like

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Speaker 1: physical equipment that's making all this work, and if that

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Speaker 1: physical equipment is damaged or destroyed, we lose that connectivity. Now,

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Speaker 1: I should also add that according to a representative from

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Speaker 1: Lumen that particular cable would not have been responsible for

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Speaker 1: any service in Texas. So the outage in Texas appears

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Speaker 1: to be, at least based on what I could read,

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Speaker 1: unrelated to the loss of service in those other states.

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Speaker 1: So that's odd. It's a weird coincidence that it would

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Speaker 1: happen in Texas as well. According to one thing I read,

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Speaker 1: people in Texas were saying that it appeared to be

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Speaker 1: a T mobile disruption and that you could still reach

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Speaker 1: nine one one if you were using a landline or

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00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:12,560
Speaker 1: some other mobile company. So yeah, it's just odd that

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00:25:12,640 --> 00:25:15,320
Speaker 1: it seemed to coincide with this other outage that was

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Speaker 1: due to a physical cable being cut. And the other

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00:25:19,480 --> 00:25:22,120
Speaker 1: story I wanted to talk about with cables getting cut

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00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:25,520
Speaker 1: happened in Sacramento, California. Someone cut an AT and T

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00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:29,679
Speaker 1: cable and disrupted internet service for the Sacramento Airport for

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00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:33,200
Speaker 1: a whole bunch of airlines, And as you might imagine,

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00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:36,680
Speaker 1: the disruption meant that tons of passengers and crew experienced

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00:25:36,800 --> 00:25:39,560
Speaker 1: very long delays as the various companies tried to find

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00:25:39,560 --> 00:25:42,840
Speaker 1: a solution. In the meantime, now, amazingly, no flights were

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00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:45,400
Speaker 1: actually canceled, but things did move at a much more

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00:25:45,600 --> 00:25:48,280
Speaker 1: deliberate pace, as airlines had to go back to some

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00:25:48,280 --> 00:25:52,520
Speaker 1: pretty old methods like handwriting out boarding passes and such.

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00:25:52,800 --> 00:25:55,399
Speaker 1: And according to sources who spoke with The New York Times,

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00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:57,240
Speaker 1: the damage to the cable happened about two and a

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Speaker 1: half miles from the airport itself, and they based upon

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00:26:00,840 --> 00:26:02,960
Speaker 1: the nature of that damage, it looks like it was

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00:26:03,000 --> 00:26:06,480
Speaker 1: an intentional act of sabotage, though at the time I'm

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00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:09,480
Speaker 1: recording this, I don't have any information on any suspects

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00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:12,520
Speaker 1: or motive behind it. That was it. But now time

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00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:16,679
Speaker 1: for some recommended reading. So first up Mara vistaal and

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00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:19,720
Speaker 1: I apologize Mara for butchering her name, but of the

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00:26:19,720 --> 00:26:22,200
Speaker 1: New York Times, she has a piece titled A Trove

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00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:26,080
Speaker 1: of Byte Dance Records Mistakenly went public. Here's what they say.

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00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:28,800
Speaker 1: So her piece details and error made by a court

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00:26:28,920 --> 00:26:31,439
Speaker 1: that led to a bunch of files going public. And

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00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:34,000
Speaker 1: these files give a lot more information about the origins

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00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:36,040
Speaker 1: of Byte Dance and how they connect to an investment

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00:26:36,080 --> 00:26:39,919
Speaker 1: company headed by a conservative political donor named Jeff Yas

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00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:42,800
Speaker 1: I imagine Yaes is very much opposed to legislation that

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00:26:42,840 --> 00:26:45,560
Speaker 1: would either force byte Dance to divest itself of TikTok

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00:26:45,880 --> 00:26:49,240
Speaker 1: or to have the app outright band. Next up, John

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00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:51,960
Speaker 1: Broadkin at Ours Technica has a piece titled cops can

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00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:55,840
Speaker 1: force suspect to unlock phone with thumbprint US court rules.

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00:26:56,240 --> 00:27:00,240
Speaker 1: The question about how authorities are allowed to access things

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00:27:00,320 --> 00:27:04,320
Speaker 1: like locked phones or locked computers has come up several times,

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00:27:04,520 --> 00:27:08,000
Speaker 1: and it is a very tricky and sticky legal subject,

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00:27:08,160 --> 00:27:11,440
Speaker 1: not just a technical subject. So Broadkin's article explains how

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00:27:11,640 --> 00:27:15,159
Speaker 1: a particular set of circumstances could be seen as being legal,

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00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:18,439
Speaker 1: like the law would be well within its rights to

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00:27:18,520 --> 00:27:22,320
Speaker 1: compel you to unlock your phone, but under other circumstances

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00:27:22,359 --> 00:27:26,359
Speaker 1: it could be viewed as unconstitutional. Sometimes it almost feels

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00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:29,080
Speaker 1: like it's down to semantics. You need to read the

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00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:31,560
Speaker 1: article to get a full appreciation for it, because it

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00:27:31,600 --> 00:27:35,720
Speaker 1: does show exactly how tricky the situation is. Finally, Kate

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00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:39,440
Speaker 1: NIBBs at Wired has an article that's titled how one

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00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:42,840
Speaker 1: author pushed the limits of AI copyright. Now, you might

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00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:45,639
Speaker 1: remember previous news stories in which a judge ruled that

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00:27:45,760 --> 00:27:48,320
Speaker 1: in order for a work to be eligible for copyright

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00:27:48,359 --> 00:27:51,080
Speaker 1: at all, it has to be of human origin. This

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00:27:51,160 --> 00:27:54,440
Speaker 1: Wired article covers the story of an author named Elisa

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00:27:54,600 --> 00:27:56,960
Speaker 1: Shoop who wrote a novel with the assistance of chat

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00:27:57,000 --> 00:28:00,879
Speaker 1: GPT and Shoop's efforts to secure a copyright for that work.

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00:28:01,119 --> 00:28:03,479
Speaker 1: And it's pretty interesting stuff, and it does raise more

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00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:07,919
Speaker 1: questions about where's the line. At what point can you

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00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:12,320
Speaker 1: say a work is eligible for copyright protection? And in

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00:28:12,359 --> 00:28:15,639
Speaker 1: which case would you say no, that's too much, Like

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00:28:15,720 --> 00:28:17,560
Speaker 1: do you actually have a hard and fast rule of

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00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:21,320
Speaker 1: how much material can be generated by AI versus a

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00:28:21,440 --> 00:28:23,920
Speaker 1: human before you get to a point where you say

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00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:28,720
Speaker 1: copyright is or isn't you know? Valid? Really fascinating kind

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00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:31,240
Speaker 1: of problem to think about, and it is going to

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00:28:31,280 --> 00:28:33,320
Speaker 1: be a problem, like it's a problem now, but it's

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00:28:33,320 --> 00:28:36,480
Speaker 1: going to be a bigger problem the more advanced this

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00:28:36,600 --> 00:28:40,000
Speaker 1: AI gets. So yes, those are some articles that are

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00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:42,960
Speaker 1: well worth your time if you're looking into reading some

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00:28:43,280 --> 00:28:47,360
Speaker 1: other tech news or tech opinions, I recommend those And

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00:28:47,800 --> 00:28:50,360
Speaker 1: I hope you are all well and I will talk

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00:28:50,360 --> 00:29:00,000
Speaker 1: to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio product.

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00:29:00,520 --> 00:29:05,560
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

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00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:07,680
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,