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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 2: Jonathan Strickland.

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Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio and how the tech

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Speaker 1: are you? It is time for another tech Stuff classic

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Speaker 1: and we actually have a part two.

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Speaker 2: So last week, last Friday.

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Speaker 1: We had The Worst Hacking Scenes from Hollywood Part one

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Speaker 1: with Shannon Morse, and Shannon is back for this other

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Speaker 1: classic episode, The Worst Hacking Scenes from Hollywood Part two.

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Speaker 1: It originally published on September fourteenth, twenty sixteen. Enjoy Today

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Speaker 1: we're going to talk more about some of the embarrassing

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Speaker 1: examples out there in entertainment as well as some of

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Speaker 1: the really good ones.

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Speaker 2: And we're going to.

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Speaker 1: Start off with a conversation about a pair of movies

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Speaker 1: that not only did a disservice to hackers, but also

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Speaker 1: virtual reality.

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Speaker 2: We joined the conver station already in progress.

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Speaker 1: Lawnmower Man and lawnmower Man Too, inspired by the work

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Speaker 1: of Stephen King. So these movies are terrible, it could

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Speaker 1: be a lot of fun to watch with a group

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Speaker 1: of people who just want to see, like a really

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Speaker 1: bad movie and make fun of it, you know. Mst

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Speaker 1: three K style. I included a couple of eclips and

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Speaker 1: I showed them to Shannon. One of them was a

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Speaker 1: demonstration that hacking a system in this world isn't just

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Speaker 1: graphical but immersive. So you're wearing like a head mounted display,

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Speaker 1: and you're wearing gloves that allow you to interact with

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Speaker 1: the virtual world.

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Speaker 2: And so they're.

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Speaker 1: Showing a character getting backdoor access to a system by

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Speaker 1: slapping at hexagons inside the virtual space. So these hexagons

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Speaker 1: are popping up in front of them, and he's slapping

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Speaker 1: at them and eventually gets you know, access granted. Mostly

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Speaker 1: it's getting access denied, but eventually access granted pops up

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Speaker 1: and it looks like the only thing that he did

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Speaker 1: differently was just that he hit it a little faster

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Speaker 1: that time. So, in other words, it'd be equivalent to

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Speaker 1: that NCIS scene we talked about earlier, where if you

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Speaker 1: just tiede fast enough, you either hack in or you

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Speaker 1: prevent a hack from happening. Obviously, this is not at

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Speaker 1: all remotely realistic, but it is one of those where

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Speaker 1: you look at and you you could tell the screenwriter

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Speaker 1: was saying, well, I want to show that this character

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Speaker 1: who has has found that he's very powerful in the

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Speaker 1: virtual space, can access a system.

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Speaker 2: How can I do that in a way that's not just.

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Speaker 1: You know, it's over in a blink of an eye,

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Speaker 1: and there's no way to show it visually, So they

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Speaker 1: created this sort of three D display. This isn't one

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Speaker 1: of those things we see in a lot of Hollywood

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Speaker 1: movies where they try and visualize the navigating a secure

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Speaker 1: system as like going through a maze.

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Speaker 2: It happens a ton.

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Speaker 3: And again, actually going through that maze of information that's

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Speaker 3: located on a network is actually quite boring looking on camera.

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Speaker 3: So they created this out by terrible virtual reality scene

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Speaker 3: to actually give some kind of implementation, some kind of

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Speaker 3: visual implementation to the people that are watching this movie.

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Speaker 3: And it's pretty terrible. It's definitely not how gaining access

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Speaker 3: to a network would work, but I thought it was hilarious. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Lawnmower Man two also has a scene that's similar to that.

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Speaker 1: The characters are looking at what is just an equation

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Speaker 1: on a computer screen. So they're looking at this equation

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Speaker 1: and trying to figure out how to get access and

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Speaker 1: one of the character says that she can't get past

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Speaker 1: the memory lock to access the chain so the smarmy

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Speaker 1: computer expert who's next to her says, well, all you

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Speaker 1: have to do is just enhance the memory index, which

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Speaker 1: already none of that makes any real sense. It's kind

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Speaker 1: of like Star Trek technobabble where they talk about reversing

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Speaker 1: the polarity it really, it's just there to say something

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Speaker 1: technical is happening.

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Speaker 2: And you don't need to understand what it is. It's

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Speaker 2: kind of shorthand.

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Speaker 4: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So then a little yellow ball appears on the screen

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Speaker 1: and the equation they're looking at it starts to rotate

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Speaker 1: and starts to turn on its side and become a

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Speaker 1: three dimensional maze again, so we get another example of

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Speaker 1: accessing a system involves navigating through an actual three dimensional maze.

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Speaker 1: He uses gesture controls to move this little yellow ball

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Speaker 1: around until finally getting to where the data is. The

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Speaker 1: whole time he's just using meaningless computer jargon incorrectly. And

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Speaker 1: then the very the cherry on top of the Sunday

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Speaker 1: is that he says to da, so uh, if you

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Speaker 1: really want a good time, watch the hacking scene from

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Speaker 1: lawnmower Man too. Both of those, obviously, are are in

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Speaker 1: that same category of trying to visualize what this process

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Speaker 1: would be like in a way that is interesting. I

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Speaker 1: said that the worst a movie can do is not

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Speaker 1: only be incorrect, but also fail to be entertaining, and

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Speaker 1: then I would.

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Speaker 2: Argue both of these fall into that category.

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Speaker 3: I feel like if hacking was as entertaining as it

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Speaker 3: is in lawnmower Man, I would have gotten into it

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Speaker 3: at a much, much younger age.

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Speaker 2: It's I remember lawnmower Man's one of them movies.

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Speaker 1: I would often cite as being a real reason why

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Speaker 1: virtual reality died in the mid nineties.

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Speaker 4: So sad, yeah.

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Speaker 1: Because the stuff that was around in the mid nineties

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Speaker 1: was very, very primitive, right. You had like Dactyl Nightmare,

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Speaker 1: these games that were just polygons, and they were very primitive.

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Speaker 1: The gameplay was limited, the headsets you wore had to

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Speaker 1: be supported on cables because they were so heavy they

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Speaker 1: would really hurt your neck otherwise. And so when people

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Speaker 1: saw what the actual state of the art of virtual

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Speaker 1: reality was at the time compared to what they were

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Speaker 1: seeing in films, that gap ended up making people say, well,

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Speaker 1: this isn't good at all. I don't see any reason

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Speaker 1: in putting any money toward this, and virtual reality died

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Speaker 1: for about ten years, and now we're starting to see

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Speaker 1: it get back into the consumer space with the success

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Speaker 1: of Oculus Rift in HTCVI mean you can get your

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Speaker 1: hands on one. We're starting to see it come back,

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Speaker 1: but it took almost twenty years for it to recover.

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Speaker 1: So thanks lawnmower Man. Not only were you a bad movie,

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Speaker 1: but you killed v Are.

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Speaker 4: It's all your fault.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm not bitter or anything.

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Speaker 1: There's a movie that we have to mention everyone that

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Speaker 1: I when I posted on Twitter that I was going

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Speaker 1: to do this, I had a lot of people say

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Speaker 1: the entire movie of Hackers should be considered as part

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Speaker 1: of this as a bad hacking scene.

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Speaker 2: And Hackers is a great example.

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Speaker 1: It's another one of those where it's a movie that

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Speaker 1: was posing as an anti authoritarian kind of film, but

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Speaker 1: in the safest way possible, like there was nothing.

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Speaker 2: Really daring about it.

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Speaker 1: And the opening sequence has a couple of characters trying

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Speaker 1: to battle it out over one another, and one of

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Speaker 1: them is it trying to create an intrusion into a system.

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Speaker 1: The other one exit and then shuts everything down. So Shannon,

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Speaker 1: typically when you're talking about things like a hacker intruding

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Speaker 1: into a system, detecting that there's been an intrusion. We're

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Speaker 1: not normally seeing this happen on a one versus one

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Speaker 1: kind of basis in real time typically are we.

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Speaker 3: Not necessarily a lot of times, what you'll see with

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Speaker 3: a hack intrusion into a system, like you said, is

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Speaker 3: that they will sit and watch and they will do

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Speaker 3: a lot of recons so they'll try to figure out

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Speaker 3: what's available for them, what can they see, and they'll

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Speaker 3: wait for something to happen that'll give them even more access.

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Speaker 3: And then if you have somebody that's working inside of

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Speaker 3: that company that's being intruded upon, usually the first action

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Speaker 3: that you will see is them trying to also collect

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Speaker 3: information so they can find where this opening is, where

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Speaker 3: this vulnerability is, and then they'll shut it down.

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Speaker 4: And then after that they'll do.

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Speaker 3: A whole whole research report on it and try to

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Speaker 3: figure out like who actually did it, and probably take

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Speaker 3: two enforcement agencies so that they can get the capture

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Speaker 3: of the person and hopefully get them charged, because that's

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Speaker 3: not a very good thing to do. Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 3: you don't necessarily see people like duking it out like

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Speaker 3: they do in package.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's usually you know, like, your first indication that

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Speaker 1: something is wrong can often just be that you notice

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Speaker 1: there's unusual amounts of data traffic across your network, and

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Speaker 1: you might say, well, why why are we getting these spikes.

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Speaker 1: If you're a savvy hacker, you're trying to mask your activity.

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Speaker 1: You're kind of like trying to sneak in when a

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Speaker 1: big crowd is going into a room. It's kind of

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Speaker 1: the same thing, right, Like you're waiting for large transfers

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Speaker 1: of data so that it masks what you are doing.

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Speaker 1: In a lot of cases, if you're really really good

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Speaker 1: at what you're doing, you're trying to kind of go

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Speaker 1: in that route because it means you can stay hidden

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Speaker 1: for longer and get more information.

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Speaker 2: Information is valuable.

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Speaker 1: Therefore, you don't want to just you know, you don't

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Speaker 1: want to just break into a system and then immediately

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Speaker 1: get booted out.

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Speaker 2: Then what was the point of that other than to say.

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Speaker 1: Hey, I figured out you have a vulnerability, And if

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Speaker 1: that's your job, that's awesome. If you're a white hat

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Speaker 1: hacker and your job is to hey, we've got this system,

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Speaker 1: we think it's pretty secure, but we would like you

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Speaker 1: to really put it to the test, and if you

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Speaker 1: find any vulnerabilities, let us know, and then we can

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Speaker 1: go and we can address that and fix them so

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Speaker 1: that the bad guys don't have a chance to do

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Speaker 1: it later.

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Speaker 2: That's a legitimate job. But in the movies, that's not

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Speaker 2: what you see.

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Speaker 1: You see a person going like I've got access, and

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Speaker 1: then almost immediately everything is gone pear shaped, right, like

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Speaker 1: there's alarms going off, And that's just not how it works,

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Speaker 1: not if you're doing it correctly anyway, exactly. Yeah, So

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Speaker 1: these movies, I mean, I appreciate it. Again, try to

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Speaker 1: create dramatic tension, but not terribly accurate.

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Speaker 3: One thing that I did like about hackers is the

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Speaker 3: fact that he uses social engineering to first gain access

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Speaker 3: to this network, which is something that's very very common

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Speaker 3: with hackers in general, because humans are the first, the first.

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Speaker 4: Failure in any network.

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Speaker 3: They're the people, they're the ones that you can generally

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Speaker 3: go to and find some kind of vulnerability because people

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Speaker 3: inherently trust each other. And that's just a thing that

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Speaker 3: humans need to understand is if somebody is asking you

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Speaker 3: questions that you shouldn't necessarily give out, don't give them

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Speaker 3: out because they might be social engineering you into giving

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Speaker 3: out those answers. Hackers also does a good job of

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Speaker 3: pinpointing people towards real life hacker culture. For example, there

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Speaker 3: is one scene in Hackers where they read off the

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Speaker 3: Hacker Manifesto, which was originally found in a hacker magazine,

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Speaker 3: which you can only find if you were a part

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Speaker 3: of that culture. And then later on in the movie

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Speaker 3: they also show a real life booklet, a documentation book

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Speaker 3: that shows that was actually used by phone operations to

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Speaker 3: you know, put up new towers and things like that

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Speaker 3: back in the nineteen eighties and nineties. So it has

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Speaker 3: these real life parts of culture, but in reality the

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Speaker 3: movie still has that terrible Hollywood hacking parts of it

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Speaker 3: as well.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm glad you brought up the social engineering. I'm

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Speaker 1: actually going to do an episode about specifically about social

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Speaker 1: engineering live at Dragon Con with our mutual friend Brian Brushwood.

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Speaker 1: So Brushwood's going to come on the show. There's no

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Speaker 1: one like a magician to tell you how to fool

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Speaker 1: people right, how to lie to.

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Speaker 2: People and get them to do the things you want

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Speaker 2: them to do.

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Speaker 1: So we're gonna we're going to go into social engineering

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Speaker 1: big time on that episode. And I'm also glad you

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Speaker 1: mentioned that things like the manuals that definitely is a

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Speaker 1: big part of hacker culture, going all the way back

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Speaker 1: to those phone freak days, where again the hackers were

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Speaker 1: not necessarily trying to take advantage of a system. They

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Speaker 1: just wanted to know how it worked. They were fascinated

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Speaker 1: by the way it actually performed, and so when you

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Speaker 1: got a manual, suddenly you had an insight into it.

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Speaker 1: Even if the manual didn't go into deep detail about

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Speaker 1: how the system as a whole operates on the back end,

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Speaker 1: it could give you enough insight and then they start

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Speaker 1: understanding like, oh wow, that's really cool that they have

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Speaker 1: this system set up in such a way where they

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Speaker 1: can route calls like this and they can dynamically change

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Speaker 1: things over. And I'm glad you brought that up, because

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Speaker 1: once again, being a hacker doesn't necessarily mean you're a

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Speaker 1: terrible person at all. It may mean that you just

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Speaker 1: have a deep curiosity that is only satisfied by learning

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Speaker 1: how this stuff works. And it's not always easy to

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Speaker 1: do that. Information is not always publicly available at all times.

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Speaker 1: There have been times where it accidentally got publicly available.

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Speaker 2: That's again going.

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Speaker 1: Back to the phone freaks, there were some phone manuals

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Speaker 1: that kind of were released to the public, not intentionally.

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Speaker 1: It also wasn't considered to be a huge problem until

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Speaker 1: the phone freakers got hold of it and suddenly you

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Speaker 1: had all these people making weird calls long distance all

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Speaker 1: over the place.

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Speaker 4: So funny.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, our next one is another case of people just

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Speaker 1: throwing out terms without really having any meaning to them.

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Speaker 1: I mean, the terms themselves have meaning, but not in

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Speaker 1: the context of the lines. And it was from a

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Speaker 1: CSI New York episode in which a character says, and

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Speaker 1: this is a quote, I'll create a gooey interface using

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Speaker 1: visual basics, see if I can track an IP address. So, Shannon,

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Speaker 1: you want to track an IP address? Do you go

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Speaker 1: to the trouble of developing a graphical user interface?

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Speaker 3: No, what I would do is open up probably netcat

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Speaker 3: in my terminals so that I can gain access and

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Speaker 3: see what the heck's going on on that IP address. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: Or if it was wireless and I was on a

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Speaker 3: nearby network, I would I would probably use wireshark and

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Speaker 3: WiFi Pinapple Like. It's not you don't have to create

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Speaker 3: an entirely new graphical user interface table to be able

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Speaker 3: to access an IP address and see what kind of

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Speaker 3: traffic is happening to and from them.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it doesn't.

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Speaker 1: Creating a graphical user interface literally makes no sense. I mean,

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Speaker 1: it has nothing to do with your ability to track

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Speaker 1: an IP address, to identify an IP address. It has

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Speaker 1: nothing to do with a graphical user interface is an

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Speaker 1: interface in itself. Isn't a thing that performs these functions.

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Speaker 1: It's just a way to visualize data and allow you

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Speaker 1: to interact with it in some way. So Windows is

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Speaker 1: a graphical user interface. It's a gooey. Any any program

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Speaker 1: that has a graphical representation of information that allows you

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Speaker 1: to move things around, that's a guy. Has nothing to

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Speaker 1: do with the actual function. It is separate from the function.

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Speaker 1: It is just a way of manifesting what that data

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Speaker 1: actually means. Now, you might go through the trouble of

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Speaker 1: creating some sort of visual data if you wanted to

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Speaker 1: explain it to someone else who wouldn't understand if you

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Speaker 1: just handed them lines of code or whatever. But that's

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Speaker 1: not what That doesn't even work in this case because

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Speaker 1: we're talking about an IP address. We're an IP address.

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Speaker 1: You don't need like a pie chart or you know,

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Speaker 1: you don't need a graphical representation of what an IP

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Speaker 1: address is.

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Speaker 2: It's an IP address exactly.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, this one, this one kind of broke my brain

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Speaker 1: for about twenty minutes when I when I watched it.

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Speaker 1: We'll be back with more terrible hacking scenes from Hollywood

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Speaker 1: after this quick break. The next one I had on

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Speaker 1: the list was another example of hackers battling it out

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Speaker 1: in real time and seeing who could type the fastest.

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Speaker 2: This happens all the time.

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Speaker 1: There was also an episode of Chuck that did this

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Speaker 1: where the best part of that episode of Chuck was

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Speaker 1: that the guy that Chuck was facing against was played

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Speaker 1: by Freddy Wong and his character was named Freddie. So

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Speaker 1: I was like, oh my gosh, it's Freddy Wong, a

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Speaker 1: YouTube star.

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Speaker 2: Done good.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's fantastic, It's I think it's it's I can't remember.

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Speaker 1: It's like Chuck versus the Hackathon or something like that.

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Speaker 1: It's along those lines, and Freddy Wong plays the elite

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Speaker 1: hacker that he goes up against. But in this case,

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Speaker 1: I'm talking about criminal minds, which, as Nicholas Brendan in It,

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Speaker 1: who I will always and forever think of as Xander

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Speaker 1: from Buffy the vampire slayer.

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Speaker 2: Yep.

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Speaker 1: And he's brought in to try and access another i

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Speaker 1: think another employees system, but the employees kind of on

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Speaker 1: the lamb and she's working with other folks who are

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Speaker 1: trying to do this quietly without the rest of the

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Speaker 1: organization taking any notice of them. And so he ends

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Speaker 1: up getting into her system and trying to snoop around

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Speaker 1: a bit. She notices, and then they have this duel.

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Speaker 1: And as Shannon has already said, this is not really

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Speaker 1: how we see things play out, but it does have

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Speaker 1: the best line I think out of all the examples

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Speaker 1: we have here, which is her gooey is mind blowing.

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Speaker 3: And what you would actually see a hacker say is, well,

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Speaker 3: check out this code.

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Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, instead of all these little uh these little

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Speaker 1: windows pop up. Also, it's funny because in the sequence

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Speaker 1: as they're typing uh, there's like one point where the

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Speaker 1: Xander I'll always call him Xander, is saying, well, here,

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Speaker 1: see what you think about this, And all that you

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Speaker 1: see on the screen is that one of the windows

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Speaker 1: on the screen is dragged down to like the lower

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Speaker 1: right corner.

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Speaker 2: Yes, and you're the wow, you have a.

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Speaker 1: Mouse so bad, But they're actually not even using computer mice,

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Speaker 1: they're just typing on the keyboard and so so really

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Speaker 1: all you're seeing are all these little windows being dragged

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Speaker 1: around the screen and no real way of doing that easily.

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Speaker 1: If you're just if you're using a keyboard, you're making

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Speaker 1: it too hard on yourself, honestly.

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Speaker 3: One thing is about hackers that I have noticed. I

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Speaker 3: am not as good as a lot of my friends are,

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Speaker 3: but keyboard shortcuts are huge in the hacker culture.

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Speaker 4: Huge.

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Speaker 1: Well yeah, I mean, especially if you're doing the same

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Speaker 1: sort of code over and over, if you're going to

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Speaker 1: be using the same sort of strings repeatedly, having like

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Speaker 1: various shortcuts and macro set up saves you so much time.

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Speaker 1: It's way more efficient. And you know, I totally get that.

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Speaker 1: I've worked on documents where that sort of thing made

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Speaker 1: a lot of sense. And I don't even do coding

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Speaker 1: right I'm doing I'm talking about working mostly in the

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Speaker 1: legal world. I don't like to talk about it. It

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Speaker 1: was a long time ago, and I really like to

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Speaker 1: leave that chapter behind. I was working four lawyers. I

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Speaker 1: wasn't being pursued by them. Another great example weird science.

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Speaker 1: This one sort of gets a pass from me too.

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Speaker 1: Because it's such a goofy movie. It's one of those

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Speaker 1: films from the eighties where you kind of the basic

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Speaker 1: premise is kind of squiky, well more than kind of squiky,

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Speaker 1: because you've got two high school males who decide to

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Speaker 1: try and create a girl so that they can do

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Speaker 1: various sexual things with her, which is pretty awful. But

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Speaker 1: it turns out that she ends up having a way

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Speaker 1: more intelligence than either of them and a lot more

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Speaker 1: agency than either of them. So it's okay because it

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Speaker 1: could have gone way worse than that. I know, because

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Speaker 1: I've watched a movie recently that took the other path

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Speaker 1: and it was terrible. I was for a different podcast,

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Speaker 1: So this one also has another depiction of characters trying

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Speaker 1: to navigate through a three dimensional virtual environment in order

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Speaker 1: to access a secure system. In this case, they're trying

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Speaker 1: to create a simulated brain for their created female, but

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Speaker 1: the computer that Wyatt has is only capable of getting

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Speaker 1: her intelligence up to fifth grade level, and they need

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Speaker 1: more than that, so they tap into some as far

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Speaker 1: as I can tell, unidentified government agency to get more

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Speaker 1: computing power, which in this film is equated to electricity.

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Speaker 1: I guess because if you watch the sequence when they

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Speaker 1: get access to the computers, everything at the government center

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Speaker 1: is going crazy. You're seeing these real to real tapes

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Speaker 1: that are spinning super fast. You see lights flashing, and

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Speaker 1: then a power surge ends up blasting all of the

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Speaker 1: electronics at Wyatt's home, like the microwave, and there's like

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Speaker 1: a smoke detector. I think that explodes, and so that's

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Speaker 1: what zooms in enough power to not only boost the

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Speaker 1: intelligence of the character up to superhuman levels, but also

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Speaker 1: somehow magically brings to life this woman. I'd say ninety

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Speaker 1: seven percent accurate. Let's take a quick break to thank

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Speaker 3: Oh, so this is a great example the Weird Science series.

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Speaker 3: Her segment is a great example of what you can

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Speaker 3: actually do with more computing power. So in the real life,

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Speaker 3: we have quantum computing, which people are currently working on

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Speaker 3: to be able to decrypt encryption that is not currently vulnerable,

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Speaker 3: but that requires more computing power. That's what quantum computing

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Speaker 3: is all about, not necessarily more electricity.

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Speaker 1: Right, Yeah, quantum computing, you know, using cubits where you

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Speaker 1: have quantum bits that represent not just a zero, not

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Speaker 1: just a one, but both and technically all values in

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Speaker 1: between mean that you can complete calculations in parallel. And

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Speaker 1: this is great for certain types of computing problems. Where

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Speaker 1: you can have those parallel computing problems that are easily

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Speaker 1: solved this way, other computing problems are not parallel, and

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Speaker 1: in those cases, a quantum computer is not necessarily going

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Speaker 1: to be any better than a classical computer. In fact,

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Speaker 1: it may be worse depending upon how many cubits the

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Speaker 1: quantum computer has.

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Speaker 2: If it has enough, then it'll chug along.

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Speaker 1: But for those parallel problems, including encryption, quantum computers will

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Speaker 1: transform our world. The encryption that we rely upon today

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Speaker 1: will be trivial if you have a significantly powerful quantum computer,

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Speaker 1: because it will be able to go through all the

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00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:57,639
Speaker 1: possible answers that are the basis for your encryption. Typically

442
00:24:57,720 --> 00:25:04,080
Speaker 1: we're talking about very large hash numbers and assign probabilities

443
00:25:04,080 --> 00:25:06,600
Speaker 1: to them and figure out things like your encryption keys

444
00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:10,640
Speaker 1: very very quickly. So that is interesting, But as you say,

445
00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:15,119
Speaker 1: not just by It's not something that's done by pumping

446
00:25:15,119 --> 00:25:19,480
Speaker 1: more electricity through a power line exactly. That would be

447
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:22,760
Speaker 1: a little little simplistic. Our next example is of course

448
00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:25,200
Speaker 1: the most famous one in my mind. It's the one

449
00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:28,840
Speaker 1: that I spent an episode ranting about previously on tex stuff.

450
00:25:28,840 --> 00:25:30,800
Speaker 1: So I won't go into too much detail. It is

451
00:25:30,920 --> 00:25:37,800
Speaker 1: Independence Day. It's like Kickbook movie. Yeah, I gotta tell you,

452
00:25:38,320 --> 00:25:41,520
Speaker 1: if an alien race ever attacks us, I want Jeff

453
00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:44,600
Speaker 1: Goldbloom to develop the computer virus that we're going to

454
00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:47,320
Speaker 1: put on their on their ships so that they can't

455
00:25:47,320 --> 00:25:49,720
Speaker 1: attack us.

456
00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:52,439
Speaker 3: So this is a great example because he was was

457
00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:55,840
Speaker 3: out of any prior knowledge, he was able to get

458
00:25:55,880 --> 00:25:59,040
Speaker 3: a computer virus from his Mac laptop onto an alien

459
00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:01,760
Speaker 3: spacecraft and be able to basically take them over and.

460
00:26:01,760 --> 00:26:02,439
Speaker 4: Shut them down.

461
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:07,960
Speaker 1: Yeah, so there's so many things wrong with this one.

462
00:26:08,119 --> 00:26:12,919
Speaker 1: We cannot be certain that any alien, intelligent alien civilization

463
00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:17,520
Speaker 1: out there uses computers that remotely resemble the way our

464
00:26:17,560 --> 00:26:22,199
Speaker 1: computers work. That's problem one. Problem two, we can't be

465
00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:25,680
Speaker 1: certain that a virus that we would create for Earth

466
00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:29,240
Speaker 1: based computers would ever be transferable onto an alien craft.

467
00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:31,320
Speaker 2: Problem three, we don't even know how.

468
00:26:31,160 --> 00:26:34,040
Speaker 1: We would do that, right, Like, it's do they have

469
00:26:34,280 --> 00:26:38,960
Speaker 1: universal serial ports or something? What's how do you get

470
00:26:39,840 --> 00:26:45,280
Speaker 1: your stuff, your your program into alien technology, even if

471
00:26:45,320 --> 00:26:50,680
Speaker 1: it's wireless, the wireless protocols, those are things. We don't

472
00:26:50,760 --> 00:26:56,240
Speaker 1: just have computers shooting off random radio waves. They have

473
00:26:56,280 --> 00:26:59,639
Speaker 1: to follow very specific rules for computers to communicate with

474
00:26:59,680 --> 00:27:00,000
Speaker 1: each other.

475
00:27:00,680 --> 00:27:02,320
Speaker 2: Everything about this is wrong.

476
00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:06,320
Speaker 3: And given the premise of this movie, I highly doubt

477
00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:10,719
Speaker 3: that their alien technology would even remotely compare to ours.

478
00:27:11,480 --> 00:27:12,560
Speaker 4: I'm sure that they would be.

479
00:27:12,560 --> 00:27:16,959
Speaker 3: Much much stronger and much more, much more advanced than

480
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:17,440
Speaker 3: our own.

481
00:27:17,840 --> 00:27:20,680
Speaker 1: Yeah, and some of the arguments are that, oh, but see,

482
00:27:20,720 --> 00:27:23,560
Speaker 1: the whole point of the movie is that the United

483
00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,119
Speaker 1: States took technology from the Aliens and use that to

484
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:30,320
Speaker 1: boost our own technology so that we would advance faster.

485
00:27:30,480 --> 00:27:36,119
Speaker 1: And my thought to that is how that considering that

486
00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:39,080
Speaker 1: all the technology that we rely upon today is based

487
00:27:39,119 --> 00:27:44,480
Speaker 1: off of very very very well documented advances in engineering,

488
00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:48,360
Speaker 1: none of which are so dramatic as to say, oh,

489
00:27:48,440 --> 00:27:50,360
Speaker 1: that's when the Aliens arrived.

490
00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:52,920
Speaker 4: This is so great. I love that one.

491
00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:53,360
Speaker 2: Now.

492
00:27:53,560 --> 00:27:56,359
Speaker 1: I included this next one just for you, Shannon, because

493
00:27:56,600 --> 00:27:59,760
Speaker 1: I know that you are a lover of Japanese culture,

494
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:06,560
Speaker 1: and so I found a great anime scene from tangin

495
00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:12,680
Speaker 1: Tapa gurin Lagan gurn Hen and it involves a character

496
00:28:13,320 --> 00:28:17,439
Speaker 1: going into a virtual world as a virtual avatar.

497
00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:19,360
Speaker 2: Runs through a maze as we've.

498
00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:23,720
Speaker 1: Seen before, finds a lock box that apparently has the

499
00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:27,159
Speaker 1: data he wants to get At takes out a green

500
00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:30,399
Speaker 1: glowing key, puts it in the lock box, tries to unlock.

501
00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:34,639
Speaker 1: It doesn't work, so as he do, his virtual avatar

502
00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:38,080
Speaker 1: head butts the box repeatedly till it breaks open.

503
00:28:38,520 --> 00:28:40,880
Speaker 2: He grabs hold of a red sphere, which.

504
00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:44,040
Speaker 1: Represents the data he wants, and then his character eats

505
00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:46,400
Speaker 1: the data and that's how they analyze it.

506
00:28:46,720 --> 00:28:48,959
Speaker 2: And boy do I wish that's the way it worked.

507
00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:53,440
Speaker 4: Oh that's hilarious. I just I hope that it tasted good.

508
00:28:53,720 --> 00:28:56,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, I mean it is a virtual character,

509
00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:59,600
Speaker 1: so I guess you could technically assume it tastes any

510
00:28:59,640 --> 00:29:03,080
Speaker 1: way you like it to taste. I watched this and

511
00:29:03,120 --> 00:29:07,360
Speaker 1: I thought, well, this is delightful, but it's it's also

512
00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:09,440
Speaker 1: again not trying to play this as this is how

513
00:29:09,520 --> 00:29:12,800
Speaker 1: real hackers are. This is obviously a fantasy sci fi

514
00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:16,880
Speaker 1: world that we're looking at, but one of the most

515
00:29:17,000 --> 00:29:20,560
Speaker 1: entertaining versions of that meme that I've ever seen.

516
00:29:21,520 --> 00:29:24,160
Speaker 3: I just love it, and like, just watching that scene

517
00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:26,360
Speaker 3: makes me want to watch the entire.

518
00:29:26,880 --> 00:29:29,560
Speaker 4: Anime because it's just so ridiculous.

519
00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:30,560
Speaker 2: Yeah.

520
00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:33,080
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's like somebody trying.

521
00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:37,720
Speaker 3: To brute force, but their implementation of brute forcing is headbutts.

522
00:29:37,840 --> 00:29:42,680
Speaker 1: Yeah, literal brute force, like not not putting password after

523
00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:47,920
Speaker 1: password attempt through a password manager, nothing like that. It's

524
00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:54,080
Speaker 1: literally attacking a virtual box with a virtual headbutt. It's wonderful.

525
00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:56,560
Speaker 1: The last little bit I have on here, this one.

526
00:29:56,640 --> 00:29:58,880
Speaker 1: This one doesn't really count because it was done on purpose.

527
00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:01,680
Speaker 1: But there was a segment on the Late Show with

528
00:30:01,680 --> 00:30:04,960
Speaker 1: Stephen Colbert who had Michael Ian Black on Michael Ian

529
00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:09,480
Speaker 1: Black who was in the state and tons of other stuff,

530
00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:15,240
Speaker 1: and Michael Ian Black explained that he had dramatic acting

531
00:30:15,400 --> 00:30:17,920
Speaker 1: chops that he felt he never got a chance to

532
00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:21,200
Speaker 1: really exercise. He's known as a comedic actor, and that

533
00:30:21,280 --> 00:30:24,800
Speaker 1: he always wanted his dream role is that of a

534
00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:29,480
Speaker 1: hacker on a police procedural show, because it meant that

535
00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:33,160
Speaker 1: he could dress in nice clothes, sit down behind a desk,

536
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:36,600
Speaker 1: and everything he would do would seem really important. He says,

537
00:30:36,600 --> 00:30:39,880
Speaker 1: it's a dream job. And so then they do a

538
00:30:39,920 --> 00:30:43,560
Speaker 1: segment where Stephen Colbert's show gets hacked and Michael Ian

539
00:30:43,600 --> 00:30:46,960
Speaker 1: Black comes back out to fight off against the hack.

540
00:30:47,440 --> 00:30:50,480
Speaker 1: It is a send up of all the tropes we've

541
00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:53,200
Speaker 1: been mentioning so far in this episode, and if you

542
00:30:53,280 --> 00:30:55,920
Speaker 1: have not seen it. I recommend going out and watching

543
00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:57,200
Speaker 1: it because it's hilarious.

544
00:30:58,360 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 3: My favorite part is the fact that he comes out

545
00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:04,880
Speaker 3: with black lipstick on and he's like biker gloves, which

546
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:08,360
Speaker 3: first off, would be incredibly hard to type in yep,

547
00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:12,000
Speaker 3: wearing those gloves. And second off, like the hackers, I know,

548
00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:16,640
Speaker 3: do you not wear black lipstick, especially if they're male. Yeah.

549
00:31:16,880 --> 00:31:19,160
Speaker 1: The first one of the first things he says is

550
00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:21,280
Speaker 1: talking about how he's gonna be typing, and then his

551
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:24,960
Speaker 1: typing will in no way be hampered by the fact

552
00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:28,240
Speaker 1: he's wearing fingerless biker gloves, so he's actually he actually

553
00:31:28,280 --> 00:31:31,240
Speaker 1: brings attention to that, and there is a funny there's

554
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:33,800
Speaker 1: a funny moment he's bent over Stephen Colbert's desk and

555
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:37,120
Speaker 1: he's typing furiously, not really typing, he's just slapping at

556
00:31:37,160 --> 00:31:40,160
Speaker 1: the keyboard furiously. And then it becomes clear that his

557
00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:45,320
Speaker 1: lines are on the screen and he scrolled past them,

558
00:31:45,600 --> 00:31:48,120
Speaker 1: and so he's like, I'm trying to find my line.

559
00:31:50,080 --> 00:31:52,400
Speaker 1: So there's the But it's great because they just roll

560
00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:56,160
Speaker 1: with it, they just keep on going. So it's fantastic

561
00:31:56,240 --> 00:32:01,280
Speaker 1: to see that kind of self aware take on the

562
00:32:01,280 --> 00:32:05,040
Speaker 1: way hackers and hacking culture has been portrayed in the

563
00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:08,800
Speaker 1: popular media. We're going to take another quick break and

564
00:32:08,840 --> 00:32:10,880
Speaker 1: we'll be right back with more of the worst hacking

565
00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:22,840
Speaker 1: scenes from Hollywood. We've harped on a lot of different

566
00:32:22,840 --> 00:32:27,400
Speaker 1: shows in movies about being terrible or being inaccurate, but

567
00:32:27,440 --> 00:32:30,560
Speaker 1: there are some examples out there that are trying really

568
00:32:30,680 --> 00:32:35,280
Speaker 1: hard to be respectful and realistic when it comes to

569
00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:38,720
Speaker 1: hacker culture. One of the ones that leaps to mind

570
00:32:39,720 --> 00:32:44,760
Speaker 1: is Mister Robot, a series where hacking plays a very

571
00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:48,080
Speaker 1: important part. It's not like it's all about hacking, but

572
00:32:48,160 --> 00:32:50,760
Speaker 1: that's an important plot device in several episodes.

573
00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:52,960
Speaker 2: And they name.

574
00:32:53,320 --> 00:32:59,040
Speaker 1: Real security firms, they name real penetration teams that actually

575
00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:01,640
Speaker 1: go and do the sort of testing. They name real

576
00:33:01,720 --> 00:33:07,960
Speaker 1: software packages that are meant to either help someone commit

577
00:33:08,080 --> 00:33:10,120
Speaker 1: one of these attacks or defend against them.

578
00:33:10,520 --> 00:33:11,880
Speaker 2: They use real products.

579
00:33:11,920 --> 00:33:14,400
Speaker 1: They're so it's clear that people who are working on

580
00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:16,560
Speaker 1: the show do their research.

581
00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:20,600
Speaker 3: Yes, it's very clear, and in fact, I have a

582
00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:24,320
Speaker 3: very close working relationship with the team over at Mister

583
00:33:24,400 --> 00:33:27,640
Speaker 3: Robot to make sure that they get our products right,

584
00:33:27,680 --> 00:33:31,560
Speaker 3: because they have shown very recently one of hack Five's

585
00:33:31,600 --> 00:33:33,320
Speaker 3: products called the USB robber Ducky.

586
00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:34,360
Speaker 2: They have a.

587
00:33:34,320 --> 00:33:38,560
Speaker 3: Team over there that includes somebody who used to work

588
00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:41,840
Speaker 3: for the FBI, so they have actual people who have

589
00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:45,640
Speaker 3: worked with security and with privacy and they have a

590
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:48,560
Speaker 3: general understanding, but they still like to talk to real

591
00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:50,800
Speaker 3: life hackers to make sure that everything that they show

592
00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:54,120
Speaker 3: on the show is legit and is an actual hack.

593
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:57,640
Speaker 3: Mister Robot is such a great example because it gives

594
00:33:57,640 --> 00:34:02,480
Speaker 3: it perfect real life scenario where you have people that

595
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:03,360
Speaker 3: are fighting back.

596
00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:04,320
Speaker 4: You have people that are.

597
00:34:04,240 --> 00:34:06,800
Speaker 3: Fighting back against you know, the big corpse and trying

598
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:10,120
Speaker 3: to do something that's right for the little guy, which

599
00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:14,400
Speaker 3: you do see a lot in real life hacking cases.

600
00:34:15,160 --> 00:34:17,719
Speaker 3: A lot of times people will go after large corporations

601
00:34:17,760 --> 00:34:20,239
Speaker 3: because they don't necessarily agree with their tactics, or they

602
00:34:20,280 --> 00:34:22,759
Speaker 3: don't agree with how much they're paying their employees or

603
00:34:22,760 --> 00:34:26,160
Speaker 3: something like that. So I just I love watching Mister

604
00:34:26,239 --> 00:34:28,279
Speaker 3: Robot because it gives me the chance to look at

605
00:34:28,280 --> 00:34:30,839
Speaker 3: it and be like, like, oh, what they're showing right

606
00:34:30,880 --> 00:34:32,800
Speaker 3: now is a real it's a real hack.

607
00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:36,240
Speaker 4: Like they're actually showing this too. A huge fan.

608
00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:40,840
Speaker 3: Base of people who wouldn't necessarily be interested in this

609
00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:44,600
Speaker 3: kind of stuff unless they were watching a show. So

610
00:34:45,560 --> 00:34:48,919
Speaker 3: I just love that they're bringing such a huge fan

611
00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:53,480
Speaker 3: base into what we do on a day to day basis.

612
00:34:53,800 --> 00:34:55,640
Speaker 1: And I like that not only are they taking these

613
00:34:55,640 --> 00:34:59,560
Speaker 1: steps to make sure that the stuff they portray is accurate,

614
00:35:00,400 --> 00:35:04,040
Speaker 1: but they are even going so far as certain aspects

615
00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:06,520
Speaker 1: that we do see reflected in the news. You were

616
00:35:06,600 --> 00:35:09,359
Speaker 1: mentioning this shan and things like someone being on the

617
00:35:09,400 --> 00:35:12,880
Speaker 1: inside of a company and for one reason or another,

618
00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:18,400
Speaker 1: they decide to aid someone who wants to access that

619
00:35:18,560 --> 00:35:21,239
Speaker 1: company's information, and they're doing so knowingly. It's not that

620
00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:25,080
Speaker 1: they've been tricked into it. We see this where we

621
00:35:25,160 --> 00:35:28,839
Speaker 1: have their hackers who one of the best things, one

622
00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:30,880
Speaker 1: of the best tools you can have is making friends

623
00:35:30,880 --> 00:35:34,000
Speaker 1: with someone who works for the company that you want

624
00:35:34,040 --> 00:35:36,799
Speaker 1: to try and access, like you want to get into

625
00:35:36,840 --> 00:35:40,680
Speaker 1: their system. And if it's someone who's disgruntled for whatever reason,

626
00:35:41,120 --> 00:35:44,480
Speaker 1: maybe they were looked over for promotion, maybe they don't

627
00:35:44,560 --> 00:35:47,600
Speaker 1: like what the company is doing, maybe what the company's

628
00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:51,200
Speaker 1: purpose is conflicts with their own ethical code. They might

629
00:35:51,320 --> 00:35:55,680
Speaker 1: feel like helping someone out is the right choice. And

630
00:35:55,760 --> 00:35:59,000
Speaker 1: even if they themselves are not the ones doing the

631
00:35:59,040 --> 00:36:02,319
Speaker 1: programming or or whatever. When it comes to it they

632
00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:04,880
Speaker 1: might be the ones who allow the access in the

633
00:36:04,880 --> 00:36:08,040
Speaker 1: first place. We do see that in real life, and

634
00:36:08,080 --> 00:36:10,480
Speaker 1: there are sometimes where we have to ask the question

635
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:13,279
Speaker 1: like was this someone from the inside or was this

636
00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:16,680
Speaker 1: someone who attacked from an external site.

637
00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:19,160
Speaker 2: Again, going back to Sony.

638
00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:24,600
Speaker 1: There's still a lot of argument about who ultimately was

639
00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:28,160
Speaker 1: responsible for that. At the time, the two big arguments

640
00:36:28,160 --> 00:36:30,800
Speaker 1: that were coming out was that it was either someone

641
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:34,640
Speaker 1: in North Korea who had done this, or someone who

642
00:36:34,719 --> 00:36:38,400
Speaker 1: was in the pay of North Korea, like a state

643
00:36:38,520 --> 00:36:41,600
Speaker 1: agent in other words, or it was someone who used

644
00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:44,000
Speaker 1: to work for Sony or was currently working for Sony

645
00:36:44,520 --> 00:36:48,000
Speaker 1: and they did not like something that happened, and so

646
00:36:48,120 --> 00:36:51,200
Speaker 1: as a result ended up stealing a ton of information

647
00:36:51,320 --> 00:36:53,840
Speaker 1: and dumping it online for public review.

648
00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:56,319
Speaker 2: And then the.

649
00:36:56,760 --> 00:36:59,560
Speaker 1: North Korea part just became a great smoke screen for

650
00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:03,840
Speaker 1: that burst. I saw that a lot of security experts,

651
00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:07,320
Speaker 1: at least at the time, felt more inclined to believe

652
00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:10,120
Speaker 1: it was the second possibility, that it was someone from

653
00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:15,520
Speaker 1: the inside and not necessarily a state sponsored attack. I

654
00:37:15,560 --> 00:37:19,280
Speaker 1: don't know if that opinion ultimately changed. I've honestly lost

655
00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:21,840
Speaker 1: track of the Sony story at this point because it

656
00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:27,239
Speaker 1: kind of died down after that initial flare of controversy

657
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:29,080
Speaker 1: around all the different elements. Yeah.

658
00:37:29,120 --> 00:37:32,239
Speaker 3: The interesting thing that I found about that is a

659
00:37:32,280 --> 00:37:35,800
Speaker 3: lot of the friends that I have in hacker culture

660
00:37:37,040 --> 00:37:39,759
Speaker 3: just move on because there are so many different hacks

661
00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:42,480
Speaker 3: that you see in our day and age that they

662
00:37:42,480 --> 00:37:44,080
Speaker 3: don't have time to go back and.

663
00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:45,960
Speaker 4: Discuss the Sony hack.

664
00:37:46,680 --> 00:37:48,840
Speaker 3: And disclaimer, I did do a bunch of videos for

665
00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:54,719
Speaker 3: Signal by Sony, which was a different, different core company

666
00:37:54,760 --> 00:37:57,480
Speaker 3: inside of Sony that was doing these shows that I

667
00:37:57,560 --> 00:37:58,080
Speaker 3: was working with.

668
00:37:58,120 --> 00:38:00,000
Speaker 4: It wasn't the entertainment one that got hacked.

669
00:38:00,320 --> 00:38:02,839
Speaker 3: Yeah, but I definitely went to them when I got

670
00:38:02,840 --> 00:38:04,879
Speaker 3: that job, and I was like, you sure you want

671
00:38:04,880 --> 00:38:07,880
Speaker 3: to hire me because that thing happened to you guys,

672
00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:09,759
Speaker 3: and I'm kind of a hacker, so.

673
00:38:10,600 --> 00:38:11,960
Speaker 2: Yeah, you heard.

674
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:17,520
Speaker 1: Yeah, So I'm pleased that mister Robot is out there.

675
00:38:17,920 --> 00:38:21,440
Speaker 1: You were mentioning before we went on on the recording,

676
00:38:21,480 --> 00:38:25,200
Speaker 1: before we started recording that that Silicon Valley also typically

677
00:38:25,480 --> 00:38:28,680
Speaker 1: does a pretty good job of portraying hacking in a

678
00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:30,120
Speaker 1: in a realistic way.

679
00:38:30,760 --> 00:38:33,960
Speaker 3: They do so Silicon Valley. I actually hired one of

680
00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:36,120
Speaker 3: my friends, Rob Fuller, who you can see in the

681
00:38:36,160 --> 00:38:39,640
Speaker 3: credits of several of their episodes to give them a

682
00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:43,520
Speaker 3: good overview, a good synopsis of what they should be

683
00:38:43,600 --> 00:38:46,960
Speaker 3: showing on their show and what would be fake, what

684
00:38:46,960 --> 00:38:49,960
Speaker 3: would be called out. So he helped, and he's actually

685
00:38:49,960 --> 00:38:52,600
Speaker 3: a penetration tester. He does this as his day job,

686
00:38:52,640 --> 00:38:55,080
Speaker 3: and he's been doing it for you know, a couple

687
00:38:55,080 --> 00:38:58,400
Speaker 3: of decades, I believe, so he was the perfect person

688
00:38:58,480 --> 00:39:01,400
Speaker 3: for them to go to to say, you know, is

689
00:39:01,760 --> 00:39:02,200
Speaker 3: this right?

690
00:39:02,360 --> 00:39:02,960
Speaker 4: Is this correct?

691
00:39:03,560 --> 00:39:05,680
Speaker 3: Can you can you actually build a script for us

692
00:39:05,719 --> 00:39:09,359
Speaker 3: to show on on camera so that we don't get

693
00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:11,399
Speaker 3: called out by our fan base, a lot of which

694
00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:14,360
Speaker 3: is going to be the Silicon Valley, you know, gurus

695
00:39:14,400 --> 00:39:17,120
Speaker 3: that actually do coding on a day day and day

696
00:39:17,120 --> 00:39:21,719
Speaker 3: out basis. So Mister Robot and Siliconbat Valley both have

697
00:39:21,920 --> 00:39:26,040
Speaker 3: hired on several people who have worked in security and

698
00:39:26,080 --> 00:39:29,880
Speaker 3: penetration testing, information technology, things of that nature so that

699
00:39:29,920 --> 00:39:32,239
Speaker 3: they can get it right on camera. And I think

700
00:39:32,239 --> 00:39:36,560
Speaker 3: that's very important because what we're finding in this in

701
00:39:36,600 --> 00:39:39,760
Speaker 3: this genre, in this career career path is that.

702
00:39:39,680 --> 00:39:42,520
Speaker 4: Where there's a lot of people who lose.

703
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:45,040
Speaker 3: Interest very very quickly in it because it is hard,

704
00:39:45,080 --> 00:39:48,839
Speaker 3: it is ever changing, and it's complicated, and you have

705
00:39:48,880 --> 00:39:50,279
Speaker 3: to go to school for it, and you have to

706
00:39:50,280 --> 00:39:54,600
Speaker 3: get certificates that increased your knowledge, and you have to

707
00:39:54,760 --> 00:39:57,479
Speaker 3: renew those certificates day in and day out every year.

708
00:39:57,960 --> 00:40:00,719
Speaker 4: So it's expensive to stay in this career too.

709
00:40:00,800 --> 00:40:02,799
Speaker 3: Hopefully you get a company or get a job with

710
00:40:02,840 --> 00:40:05,239
Speaker 3: a company that you know will pay for those certificates

711
00:40:05,239 --> 00:40:09,680
Speaker 3: for you. Yeah, So the fact that they're showing these

712
00:40:09,760 --> 00:40:14,279
Speaker 3: real life scenarios on camera, I'm hoping that it will

713
00:40:14,320 --> 00:40:18,240
Speaker 3: increase more interest in this in this genre of work,

714
00:40:18,320 --> 00:40:21,280
Speaker 3: because we really need more people to be interested in

715
00:40:21,440 --> 00:40:23,879
Speaker 3: it in the long term, because it is so so

716
00:40:23,960 --> 00:40:27,600
Speaker 3: important for companies as a whole, especially if they're holding

717
00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:30,359
Speaker 3: user data, to be secure and to be private and

718
00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:33,319
Speaker 3: to be very conscious of what they're doing behind the

719
00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:36,000
Speaker 3: scenes as opposed to just making a website pretty.

720
00:40:36,800 --> 00:40:38,400
Speaker 4: The things that are most important.

721
00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,359
Speaker 3: To me are security and privacy, and it's it's very

722
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:44,440
Speaker 3: important to me that more and more companies get involved

723
00:40:44,440 --> 00:40:48,640
Speaker 3: with this information and get a much broader understanding of

724
00:40:48,680 --> 00:40:51,680
Speaker 3: how important it is to actually pay money to make

725
00:40:51,719 --> 00:40:53,200
Speaker 3: sure that you have good security.

726
00:40:54,000 --> 00:40:56,600
Speaker 1: And to that end, I mean, there's a there's a

727
00:40:56,640 --> 00:40:59,440
Speaker 1: movie that's coming out later on this year, I believe

728
00:40:59,520 --> 00:41:03,120
Speaker 1: called I. It's got Pierce brosen in in it, uh.

729
00:41:03,160 --> 00:41:07,880
Speaker 1: And in that film, there's this idea of privacy and

730
00:41:07,880 --> 00:41:10,319
Speaker 1: security plays a huge part of it, as well as

731
00:41:10,320 --> 00:41:13,320
Speaker 1: the Internet of Things, which again is a great illustration

732
00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:16,279
Speaker 1: of why security is so important. We have more and

733
00:41:16,320 --> 00:41:21,160
Speaker 1: more devices that are are opening up opportunities to be

734
00:41:21,320 --> 00:41:24,160
Speaker 1: a point of entry for a hacker, right like if

735
00:41:24,160 --> 00:41:28,120
Speaker 1: you have not if you haven't designed your IoT device

736
00:41:28,320 --> 00:41:32,040
Speaker 1: to also be secure and encrypted, that's a potential in

737
00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:37,200
Speaker 1: depending upon how it communicates with the rest of your devices.

738
00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:41,600
Speaker 1: So this movie I that's coming out, there's a Pierce

739
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:45,839
Speaker 1: Brosnan's playing like a a Tony Stark like business guy

740
00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:49,839
Speaker 1: who ends up having a an IT guy come in

741
00:41:49,880 --> 00:41:51,759
Speaker 1: and help him out when he's giving a presentation and

742
00:41:51,880 --> 00:41:56,120
Speaker 1: the technology is failing. The IT guy gets it turned around,

743
00:41:56,360 --> 00:41:59,280
Speaker 1: and so Pierce Brosidan says, Hey, come back to my house.

744
00:41:59,480 --> 00:42:01,240
Speaker 1: I'd like you to help me out with some stuff.

745
00:42:01,239 --> 00:42:03,480
Speaker 1: And the guy's like, okay, sure, and he comes by

746
00:42:03,600 --> 00:42:06,360
Speaker 1: and the guy's house has got all this high tech equipment,

747
00:42:06,440 --> 00:42:10,000
Speaker 1: most of which is not really working up to the.

748
00:42:09,840 --> 00:42:10,920
Speaker 2: Possibility that could.

749
00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:14,840
Speaker 1: But he also has a young like a teenage daughter

750
00:42:15,640 --> 00:42:18,279
Speaker 1: that the IT guy ends up becoming fixated with. So

751
00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:21,680
Speaker 1: then it becomes a psychological thriller where the IT guy

752
00:42:21,880 --> 00:42:24,359
Speaker 1: who was upgrading all the systems is really using them

753
00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:28,640
Speaker 1: to spy on people, and when he's rebuffed, he uses

754
00:42:28,719 --> 00:42:31,759
Speaker 1: them to terrorize people. So it becomes kind of a

755
00:42:31,760 --> 00:42:36,200
Speaker 1: psychological thriller slash horror movie that's IT based and Internet

756
00:42:36,200 --> 00:42:38,560
Speaker 1: of Things based. And while that is going to be

757
00:42:39,480 --> 00:42:44,479
Speaker 1: pushed to the limit for drama for dramatic purposes, there's

758
00:42:44,520 --> 00:42:45,800
Speaker 1: a lot there.

759
00:42:45,880 --> 00:42:48,840
Speaker 2: That you could say, like, you know, yeah.

760
00:42:48,719 --> 00:42:51,000
Speaker 1: It went to extremes for the purposes of this movie,

761
00:42:51,040 --> 00:42:54,400
Speaker 1: but it does drive home certain things you should be

762
00:42:54,400 --> 00:42:57,160
Speaker 1: aware of, like how many devices do you own that

763
00:42:57,239 --> 00:42:59,520
Speaker 1: have microphones in them? How many do you own that

764
00:42:59,600 --> 00:43:03,680
Speaker 1: have cameras in them? What are they connected to? And

765
00:43:03,920 --> 00:43:07,640
Speaker 1: is it secure? Is your router secure? Did you buy

766
00:43:07,640 --> 00:43:13,640
Speaker 1: any chance not change the default identifier and password to

767
00:43:13,680 --> 00:43:16,880
Speaker 1: your router because you might want to do that that

768
00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 1: kind of stuff.

769
00:43:18,000 --> 00:43:22,439
Speaker 4: So I'm so grateful that I got into this early, so.

770
00:43:22,760 --> 00:43:26,080
Speaker 3: Like before Internet of Things became a thing, because now

771
00:43:26,120 --> 00:43:28,879
Speaker 3: I can go home, like right at this minute, pull

772
00:43:28,960 --> 00:43:31,239
Speaker 3: up a program on my computer, sit down on the

773
00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:34,439
Speaker 3: same networks as my camera, and make sure that it's

774
00:43:34,560 --> 00:43:37,719
Speaker 3: not open to the World Wide Web, because it's it's

775
00:43:37,880 --> 00:43:40,200
Speaker 3: entirely possible that those things can happen.

776
00:43:40,320 --> 00:43:42,440
Speaker 4: They have happened, and.

777
00:43:42,560 --> 00:43:46,839
Speaker 3: It's oh, man, consumers, just I wish more consumers were

778
00:43:46,840 --> 00:43:48,799
Speaker 3: interested in this kind of thing because it would make

779
00:43:48,840 --> 00:43:49,880
Speaker 3: them so much safer.

780
00:43:50,320 --> 00:43:50,600
Speaker 2: Yeah.

781
00:43:50,800 --> 00:43:52,719
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's the sort of stuff no one wants to

782
00:43:52,719 --> 00:43:56,319
Speaker 1: really think about. The convenience of the technology is so

783
00:43:56,480 --> 00:44:02,520
Speaker 1: great that it people don't feel feel comfortable thinking about

784
00:44:02,560 --> 00:44:05,279
Speaker 1: the other side of it because the technology they rely

785
00:44:05,440 --> 00:44:08,040
Speaker 1: so heavily on it it does so many useful things

786
00:44:08,040 --> 00:44:11,200
Speaker 1: for them that I think that ends up making them

787
00:44:11,680 --> 00:44:15,399
Speaker 1: kind of ignore the possible security problems, because if they

788
00:44:15,560 --> 00:44:18,080
Speaker 1: paid attention to it, they would feel that they would

789
00:44:18,080 --> 00:44:20,240
Speaker 1: either need to take a lot of effort to fix

790
00:44:20,280 --> 00:44:23,520
Speaker 1: those security issues, at least the ones they can fix

791
00:44:23,560 --> 00:44:26,080
Speaker 1: from a consumer side of things, or they would have

792
00:44:26,080 --> 00:44:29,759
Speaker 1: to abandon the technology, which is so incredibly useful and convenient,

793
00:44:30,040 --> 00:44:31,160
Speaker 1: and neither of those.

794
00:44:30,960 --> 00:44:35,160
Speaker 2: Seem particularly interesting. It's way better to just, you know,

795
00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:36,279
Speaker 2: just pretend like.

796
00:44:36,239 --> 00:44:40,080
Speaker 1: It doesn't happen and keep using your unsecured Wi Fi

797
00:44:40,360 --> 00:44:42,960
Speaker 1: and yeah, absolutely.

798
00:44:42,520 --> 00:44:45,400
Speaker 3: I mean there, I've made some sacrifices in my life

799
00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:48,000
Speaker 3: to be more secure. For example, I don't use Facebook

800
00:44:48,040 --> 00:44:50,560
Speaker 3: Messenger on my phone, Yeah, because I don't I don't

801
00:44:50,600 --> 00:44:53,120
Speaker 3: trust that feature. I don't even use the Facebook app

802
00:44:53,200 --> 00:44:55,200
Speaker 3: on my phone because I don't trust the app.

803
00:44:55,520 --> 00:44:55,719
Speaker 4: Yeah.

804
00:44:56,280 --> 00:44:58,920
Speaker 1: I noticed that when I abandoned the Facebook app. You

805
00:44:58,960 --> 00:45:00,719
Speaker 1: gave me a big thumbs up on that day.

806
00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:02,160
Speaker 4: Oh, yes, I did.

807
00:45:03,000 --> 00:45:06,960
Speaker 3: And there's other things that I've chosen convenience over security,

808
00:45:07,239 --> 00:45:11,799
Speaker 3: even though I understand what what I might what might

809
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:14,640
Speaker 3: happen to me if I because I chose that convenience.

810
00:45:14,960 --> 00:45:17,480
Speaker 3: For example, I use a thumbprint to unlock my phone,

811
00:45:17,600 --> 00:45:20,840
Speaker 3: even though you are basically forced to give away a

812
00:45:20,880 --> 00:45:23,520
Speaker 3: thumb print if you are ever if there is a

813
00:45:23,560 --> 00:45:26,040
Speaker 3: warrant on your phone, as opposed to if you have

814
00:45:26,080 --> 00:45:27,880
Speaker 3: a pin code or a password, you don't have to

815
00:45:27,920 --> 00:45:31,160
Speaker 3: give those away. So that's like those kind of things

816
00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:34,759
Speaker 3: you really have to think about, especially if you know

817
00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:38,360
Speaker 3: you're going into this with the with the thought you know,

818
00:45:38,440 --> 00:45:40,560
Speaker 3: I have to better my security and privacy.

819
00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:41,160
Speaker 2: Yeah.

820
00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:44,839
Speaker 1: And see it's different for you too, Shannon, because you're

821
00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:48,120
Speaker 1: you are aware of all the potential or at least

822
00:45:48,280 --> 00:45:52,080
Speaker 1: a large majority of the potential bad things that can happen,

823
00:45:52,120 --> 00:45:54,880
Speaker 1: so you can make an informed decision, and you can

824
00:45:55,040 --> 00:45:58,960
Speaker 1: you can measure that risk versus the reward you get

825
00:45:59,440 --> 00:46:01,399
Speaker 1: based upon whatever choice you make.

826
00:46:01,800 --> 00:46:04,280
Speaker 2: A lot of people out there they aren't.

827
00:46:05,440 --> 00:46:07,759
Speaker 1: I think the problem is so scary they don't even

828
00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:10,799
Speaker 1: want to look at it, and that means that they're

829
00:46:10,840 --> 00:46:16,840
Speaker 1: making uninformed, uneducated decisions. And I know the problem is scary, guys,

830
00:46:16,880 --> 00:46:19,759
Speaker 1: but that's why you gotta look at it. You can't.

831
00:46:19,800 --> 00:46:22,520
Speaker 3: That's why we're here so that we can inform everybody

832
00:46:22,560 --> 00:46:25,480
Speaker 3: and we can educate everyone right on the proper uses

833
00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:26,640
Speaker 3: of the security and privacy.

834
00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:30,160
Speaker 1: So if you guys out there, take anything at all

835
00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:33,440
Speaker 1: away from this episode, I want you to take a well, really, there's.

836
00:46:33,320 --> 00:46:34,640
Speaker 2: Two things I want you to take away.

837
00:46:34,960 --> 00:46:38,239
Speaker 1: One is, really give it some serious thought if you

838
00:46:38,320 --> 00:46:41,640
Speaker 1: have it before, because it's something that could save you

839
00:46:41,960 --> 00:46:45,440
Speaker 1: tons of heartache down the line, and it can protect

840
00:46:45,480 --> 00:46:49,080
Speaker 1: you and those who are close to you from attacks.

841
00:46:49,080 --> 00:46:50,840
Speaker 1: And the second thing I want you to remember is

842
00:46:51,360 --> 00:46:54,719
Speaker 1: if aliens attack, get Jeff goldblooma mac because that guy

843
00:46:54,760 --> 00:46:59,200
Speaker 1: can do anything. And that's it for that classic episode

844
00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:02,600
Speaker 1: that originally published September fourteenth, twenty sixteen, The Worst Hacking

845
00:47:02,640 --> 00:47:06,440
Speaker 1: Scenes from Hollywood, Part two. Big thanks to Shannon Morse,

846
00:47:06,719 --> 00:47:11,960
Speaker 1: even seven years later. She has always been a great

847
00:47:12,000 --> 00:47:15,760
Speaker 1: friend and a phenomenal guest, and also is a great

848
00:47:15,760 --> 00:47:19,000
Speaker 1: host all on her own. You should definitely go seek

849
00:47:19,040 --> 00:47:22,880
Speaker 1: out her work. She has done tons of cool stuff

850
00:47:23,320 --> 00:47:29,480
Speaker 1: and is wicked smart and experienced with things like hacking

851
00:47:30,320 --> 00:47:32,920
Speaker 1: and understand that on a much deeper level than I do.

852
00:47:33,120 --> 00:47:36,920
Speaker 1: So check out her stuff. It's great and I hope

853
00:47:37,080 --> 00:47:39,160
Speaker 1: all of you are well, and I'll talk to you

854
00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:49,759
Speaker 1: again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For

855
00:47:49,880 --> 00:47:54,719
Speaker 1: more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

856
00:47:54,840 --> 00:47:58,520
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

857
00:48:00,080 --> 00:48:00,319
Speaker 3: Zo