WEBVTT - Matt Stoller Explains Monopolies

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<v Speaker 1>All Zone Media.

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<v Speaker 2>Hello and welcome to Better Offline. I'm your host ed Zetron.

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<v Speaker 2>Today we're talking monopolies, and I'm joined by Matt Stoler,

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<v Speaker 2>who covers market power and antitrust for The Big Newsletter

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<v Speaker 2>and is the director of research at the American Economic

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<v Speaker 2>Liberties Project. Matt, thank you for joining me.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, thanks for having me.

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<v Speaker 2>So this is a very dumb place to start, but

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<v Speaker 2>I think it's necessary. What exactly is a monopoly.

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<v Speaker 1>Not a dumb place to start at all. There are

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<v Speaker 1>different definitions, but generally speaking, it is the control of

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<v Speaker 1>a recognized branch of trade or service, a unified control

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<v Speaker 1>of recognized trade or service. And that's a definition I'm

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<v Speaker 1>giving you from Lewis Brandeis, who was a Supreme Court justice,

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<v Speaker 1>but it's the same. I think Milton Friedman had a

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<v Speaker 1>kind of a similar definition. The essence of a monopoly

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<v Speaker 1>is control of a market or a recognized trade.

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<v Speaker 2>And what the most people not actually understand about them what.

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<v Speaker 1>I think most people characterize monopoly as kind of an

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<v Speaker 1>economic thing or you know, just a commercial thing, but

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<v Speaker 1>really a monopoly is a political institution. So when we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about monopolies, we're talking about what is effectively a

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<v Speaker 1>private government over a market, over an industry. If you're

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<v Speaker 1>in that trade right, or that service, if you ply

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<v Speaker 1>your trade there. If you're operating in a market which

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<v Speaker 1>is monopolized, then you have a political boss who sets

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<v Speaker 1>the prices, the terms of trade, who can buy, who

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<v Speaker 1>can sell, and you're under their thumb and yeah, it's

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<v Speaker 1>your trade right. So it looks like the quote unquote economy,

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<v Speaker 1>but in fact it's really a person has or that

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<v Speaker 1>firm has political power over you. And if you have

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<v Speaker 1>enough monopolies in an economy, then at least in the

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<v Speaker 1>commercial sector, which is a big part of our lives,

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<v Speaker 1>we're not living in a democratic society. We're living in

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<v Speaker 1>a society of a of a bunch of of private governments,

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<v Speaker 1>authoritarian governments over markets.

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<v Speaker 2>So Son Dapashi of Google would be like the president

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<v Speaker 2>of his private monopoly, his little private I think that.

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<v Speaker 1>I think that's right if you if you think about

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<v Speaker 1>how people you know, there was a there's a good

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<v Speaker 1>quote that from a plumber actually in the in the

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street Journal who said that, you know, the government

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<v Speaker 1>can find me, but Google can put me out of business, right,

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<v Speaker 1>because Google could take his business off Google Maps. They

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<v Speaker 1>could they could change his ranking in Google Search, and

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<v Speaker 1>so he was way more afraid of Google than than

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<v Speaker 1>the government. And that's that's because Google has governing power

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<v Speaker 1>over you know, over the Internet. You can see this,

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<v Speaker 1>like every publisher can tell you that the change in

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<v Speaker 1>Google's algorithm can be catastrophic or can be you know,

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<v Speaker 1>hugely important and pactful in some ways. So yeah, very much. So.

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<v Speaker 1>Google is the private government of the Internet, or at

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<v Speaker 1>least the gatekeeper of the Internet. And it is exactly

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<v Speaker 1>it's exactly what you're talking about. They also have political

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<v Speaker 1>power because they're a big company and they lobby and whatnot.

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<v Speaker 1>But just as infrastructure, they are governing that infrastructure.

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<v Speaker 2>Almost feels like Yelp is like a borough of the

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<v Speaker 2>larger Google country than Yelp controlling the reviews, and Yelp

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<v Speaker 2>has a weird little mob like thing they do where

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<v Speaker 2>you have to pay them to get rid of bad reviews. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>it's very never really thought about the governmental comparison.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, I mean, so what you have with something like

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<v Speaker 1>Yelp is because Yelp is under the control of Google, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And Google is doing all sorts of things to sort

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<v Speaker 1>of try to kill Yelp yelp, and Google has monopolized

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<v Speaker 1>to advertising, right, a company like it kind of has

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<v Speaker 1>no choice but to move towards a kind of sleazier

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<v Speaker 1>business model where they're extractive, because all of the other

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<v Speaker 1>areas where they could legit make more legitimate money have

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<v Speaker 1>been monopolized by Google or have been taken by Google. So,

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<v Speaker 1>in one sense, what happens when you have monopolies, you

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<v Speaker 1>have you know, higher prices and all the rest of it.

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<v Speaker 1>But another thing that happens is that businesses that are

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<v Speaker 1>operating often have a choice of continuing in existence or not.

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<v Speaker 1>And the choice of whether to continue in existence is

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<v Speaker 1>often to go down through a business model that can

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<v Speaker 1>look sleazier, can be problematic, or can be coercive. And

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<v Speaker 1>so it's like that's that's the choice. Do you go

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<v Speaker 1>out of business or do you this do this thing

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<v Speaker 1>that you know you don't like. Is there's a law,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a rule of thumb called Gresham's law about counterfeit money,

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<v Speaker 1>which is, you know, when somebody starts using counterfeit money,

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<v Speaker 1>then nobody wants to use real money. Because even if

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<v Speaker 1>you want to use real money, you know, you're like,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to put real money out there if

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<v Speaker 1>it's all counterfeit.

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<v Speaker 2>So yeah, the drive with the counterfeit has the advantage,

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<v Speaker 2>right rules.

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<v Speaker 1>Good money drives out the bad. And so this is

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<v Speaker 1>one of the things you see. For example, when you

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<v Speaker 1>go to like a like a expeedyer or something like that,

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<v Speaker 1>and you're hotels dot com. You're looking for, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>to book something, they don't show the you know, resort fees,

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<v Speaker 1>the junk fees until you know, you get to the

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<v Speaker 1>last page where you're going to check out, or sometimes

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<v Speaker 1>even when you get to the hotel. And it's not

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<v Speaker 1>that every hotel wants to rip you off, but they

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<v Speaker 1>all know that you're going to be looking at the

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<v Speaker 1>price and comparing the sticker price that you see on

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<v Speaker 1>the on the results page, and if their rival is

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<v Speaker 1>not is not showing you that junk fee, then they're

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<v Speaker 1>at a competitive disadvantage if they don't lie.

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<v Speaker 3>So yeah, yeah, well so well it's it's it's just

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<v Speaker 3>that a market where you have rules that enable that

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<v Speaker 3>allow fraud is just a different market than one where

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<v Speaker 3>we don't allow fraud.

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<v Speaker 1>It's just there. You know, there's discussions about capitalism or

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<v Speaker 1>free markets or whatever. But the fact that you use

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<v Speaker 1>the term market doesn't mean anything because markets are politically structured,

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<v Speaker 1>like a farmer's market, a derivatives market, a slave market.

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<v Speaker 1>They all use the term market. They're very different institutions,

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<v Speaker 1>very different moral elements underpinning them, very different arrangements of power.

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<v Speaker 2>So you've said something you wrote and deep, well it's

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<v Speaker 2>also on your main page. Is America's in a monopoly crisis, right?

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<v Speaker 2>What you mean?

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<v Speaker 1>So what you haven't in a lot of areas and

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<v Speaker 1>in most I think monopoly or oligopoly, which is just

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<v Speaker 1>a small number of companies controlling a market is now

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<v Speaker 1>a systemic feature of the American economy, and it didn't

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<v Speaker 1>used to be. So there are different ways to measure it.

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<v Speaker 1>But you know, about seventy five percent of industries in

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<v Speaker 1>the last twenty five years have gotten more consolidated, and

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<v Speaker 1>so you see, you know, and this is largely through mergers.

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<v Speaker 1>So another statistic would be, you know, there's something called

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<v Speaker 1>the Wilshire Wilshire five thousand, which is an index of

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<v Speaker 1>public companies, and we don't have enough public companies for

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<v Speaker 1>the Wilshire five thousand. They're only about thirty four hundred

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<v Speaker 1>public companies. Now there used to be around nine thousand

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<v Speaker 1>in the nineties. Now we have around thirty five hundred.

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<v Speaker 1>It's largely because of mergers. Even the country per capitis,

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<v Speaker 1>you know that the decline is even more significant. So

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<v Speaker 1>just the number of big companies is smaller because companies

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<v Speaker 1>have gotten you know, they've merged and gotten much much bigger,

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<v Speaker 1>and this has a lot of consequences. What you see

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<v Speaker 1>is wages are much lower than they otherwise would be.

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<v Speaker 1>So the amount spent on employees with either increased wages

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<v Speaker 1>or healthcare or training is probably between fourteen and twenty

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<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars per American in the non in the non

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<v Speaker 1>financial corporate sectors eighty million Americans. You see things like

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<v Speaker 1>the cost of healthcare, which is largely driven by market power,

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<v Speaker 1>consolidation in hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, insurers. The price of an

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<v Speaker 1>insured family of four has gone from about ten to

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<v Speaker 1>fifteen thousand dollars a year in two thousand and eight

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<v Speaker 1>to about thirty thousand dollars a year today. So that's

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<v Speaker 1>you know, a lot of the you know, lack of

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<v Speaker 1>increase of compensation and wages. If you just take those

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<v Speaker 1>two facts of just how much lack of ability to

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<v Speaker 1>move to a new job because of consolidation. That's fifteen

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<v Speaker 1>to twenty thousand dollars plus the increase that we're paying

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<v Speaker 1>in healthcare. That's a lot of money. And that's you know,

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<v Speaker 1>every single year, it's basically almost a new car every

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<v Speaker 1>single year. That's just extracted from every family by this

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<v Speaker 1>increased amount of concentration.

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<v Speaker 2>And do you have less ability to move because there

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<v Speaker 2>are just less places to work?

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's I mean, that's right. There's just like if

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<v Speaker 1>you it used to be that you had, say you

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<v Speaker 1>were in a town, you had ten stores, the you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of dry goods stores and grocery stores, butcher

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<v Speaker 1>you know, like your you know, your standard main street,

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<v Speaker 1>and then that all got put under one roof Walmart,

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<v Speaker 1>and so you have one place to work and all

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<v Speaker 1>the stuff is sold there, and now you don't have

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<v Speaker 1>any place to bargain as if you're a worker or

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<v Speaker 1>if you want to set up a store, you can't

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<v Speaker 1>do that either because for you know, other reasons, because

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<v Speaker 1>that Walmart has more bargaining power with suppliers, and so

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<v Speaker 1>you can't compete. Even if you had a you could

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<v Speaker 1>do it more efficiently, you still couldn't compete because you

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<v Speaker 1>couldn't get the supplies that you needed, or you couldn't

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<v Speaker 1>get them at the best at the same price.

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<v Speaker 2>And that sounds like another manifestation of the political nature

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<v Speaker 2>of these companies because they just set the terms that

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<v Speaker 2>customers will expect and businesses have to operate with.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean Walmart in the nineteen nineties and two

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<v Speaker 1>thousands as it was growing, and there are political reasons

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<v Speaker 1>that were there were just changes in pricing law and

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<v Speaker 1>anti trust laws. But Walmart would literally just go to

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<v Speaker 1>their suppliers and they would say, okay, you Levi Strauss,

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<v Speaker 1>you're not making your genes in China. We want you

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<v Speaker 1>to move production to China. That's if you want to

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<v Speaker 1>get into Walmart, and you need to get into Walmart

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<v Speaker 1>because we are eight nine percent of the retail dollar

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<v Speaker 1>and you need it, You're going to do this. And

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<v Speaker 1>they just did this across the board, and they literally

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<v Speaker 1>restructured how American production happens because.

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<v Speaker 2>Was that to lower prices? Was that too? Why did

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<v Speaker 2>they want them to move to China.

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<v Speaker 1>Lower prices usually? But also you know, they had they

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<v Speaker 1>had specific ways that they wanted to see their their

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<v Speaker 1>their business operate, so they just want control. I mean

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<v Speaker 1>there are other things that they did that are actually

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<v Speaker 1>really interesting to restructure how retail works. But yeah, it

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<v Speaker 1>was largely a price. It was a price element.

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<v Speaker 2>And is the crisis that these there were just so

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<v Speaker 2>many of these little moving within America.

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<v Speaker 1>You mean that there's so many mononoply crisis, Yeah, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean the crisis is that we have you know, as

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<v Speaker 1>people get used to being bossed around, they lose their

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<v Speaker 1>respect for democracy itself, right, I mean, that's that's the ultimately,

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<v Speaker 1>like you see a ton of cynicism. And I think

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<v Speaker 1>the reason that there's all of the cynicism about the

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<v Speaker 1>rule of law, about the idea of living in a

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<v Speaker 1>society is because most people experience living in an authoritarian

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<v Speaker 1>part of their lives. I don't want to overstate it.

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<v Speaker 1>We're not living in a dictatorship or anything. This is

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<v Speaker 1>still a democracy. But you know, you get bossed around

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<v Speaker 1>and you get told you can't mean, the amount of

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<v Speaker 1>fear in commerce is overwhelming at this point. When you

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<v Speaker 1>when you talk to people in lots of different areas,

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<v Speaker 1>they're afraid to talk about what's going on in their industry.

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<v Speaker 1>Because the monopolists can can retaliate against them. And so

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<v Speaker 1>if you're living in fear, then you're not living, You're

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<v Speaker 1>you're not free, right. You may not be living in

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<v Speaker 1>a dictatorship, but you're not free.

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<v Speaker 2>That's interesting as well, because so much of what I've

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<v Speaker 2>talked about with the Valley is this without really framing

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<v Speaker 2>it like you are, which is people fear. Samultman of

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<v Speaker 2>Open Ai, he's grown big because people fear his existence,

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<v Speaker 2>what he may say about them read Hoffmann right, same deal,

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<v Speaker 2>And just the political nature of these institutions. I never

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<v Speaker 2>really considered is this how it got so bad that

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<v Speaker 2>the corporation's kind of got this level of power.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's interesting the story of why this happened is

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<v Speaker 1>actually not a story of big corporations seizing power, because

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<v Speaker 1>we didn't actually have this problem in the nineteen seventies

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<v Speaker 1>and before that. I mean, you know, there's always like

0:12:41.679 --> 0:12:44.599
<v Speaker 1>some big companies, and there's always some problems here but

0:12:44.880 --> 0:12:46.920
<v Speaker 1>here and there. But largely this is a story of

0:12:47.000 --> 0:12:53.320
<v Speaker 1>bad ideas taking over. So what happened in the we

0:12:53.440 --> 0:12:58.000
<v Speaker 1>had this populist tradition in America, right, which you can

0:12:58.120 --> 0:13:01.400
<v Speaker 1>you can find this you know, really the the original

0:13:01.480 --> 0:13:03.520
<v Speaker 1>Populace was a political party in the eighteen eighties and

0:13:03.559 --> 0:13:06.400
<v Speaker 1>eighteen nineties. They were farmers from the South and the Midwest.

0:13:06.559 --> 0:13:09.559
<v Speaker 1>They were upset about a number of different changes in

0:13:09.600 --> 0:13:13.280
<v Speaker 1>the economy, the dominance of railroads, dominance of large banks. Basically,

0:13:13.360 --> 0:13:17.240
<v Speaker 1>they were mad about Eastern capital controlling their business and

0:13:17.679 --> 0:13:21.600
<v Speaker 1>making it hard to make a living selling farm products.

0:13:22.080 --> 0:13:26.160
<v Speaker 1>And you control by processors, controlled by railroads. This is

0:13:26.280 --> 0:13:29.679
<v Speaker 1>very similar stuff that we're seeing today. So standard oil.

0:13:29.679 --> 0:13:32.000
<v Speaker 1>I didn't like that, But you could go back, you

0:13:32.000 --> 0:13:33.480
<v Speaker 1>could find this, you know, you go back in the

0:13:33.520 --> 0:13:37.079
<v Speaker 1>sixteen hundreds and find antecedents in England and so on

0:13:37.120 --> 0:13:40.480
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. There has always been this tradition of

0:13:40.960 --> 0:13:42.960
<v Speaker 1>let's not have too much. No one should have too

0:13:43.040 --> 0:13:46.559
<v Speaker 1>much power in America, right, that's the checks and balances things,

0:13:46.600 --> 0:13:50.240
<v Speaker 1>the federalist papers and whatnot. Also, no one should have

0:13:50.360 --> 0:13:52.600
<v Speaker 1>there we should try to avoid conflicts of interest. I mean,

0:13:52.640 --> 0:13:55.160
<v Speaker 1>that's in the Bible. No man may serve two masters. Right,

0:13:55.400 --> 0:13:57.679
<v Speaker 1>So you have this these two sort of basic themes,

0:13:58.240 --> 0:14:01.760
<v Speaker 1>checks and balances, no conflicts of interest. And we've we've

0:14:01.800 --> 0:14:04.800
<v Speaker 1>always kind of understood that that's the way that we

0:14:05.080 --> 0:14:09.079
<v Speaker 1>should arrange our society. Very bitter fights in the nineteenth

0:14:09.120 --> 0:14:13.240
<v Speaker 1>century over corporate chartering. We regulated our corporusiness idea that

0:14:13.280 --> 0:14:15.360
<v Speaker 1>we used to be less a fair and that's always nonsense.

0:14:17.000 --> 0:14:18.760
<v Speaker 2>Just corporate chaltering. What do you mean that?

0:14:19.480 --> 0:14:21.960
<v Speaker 1>So just the idea of being able to charter a

0:14:21.960 --> 0:14:25.320
<v Speaker 1>corporation create a pupka idea, you can form one, yeah,

0:14:25.360 --> 0:14:28.080
<v Speaker 1>being able to form one limited liability corporation where I,

0:14:28.280 --> 0:14:32.200
<v Speaker 1>if my corporation does something, it's liable, but me as

0:14:32.200 --> 0:14:35.280
<v Speaker 1>a human being that runs it is not right. An

0:14:35.320 --> 0:14:40.760
<v Speaker 1>eternal entity that like you, doesn't die, is not a

0:14:40.840 --> 0:14:43.160
<v Speaker 1>natural person, but can conduct business as if it is

0:14:43.200 --> 0:14:46.080
<v Speaker 1>a natural person. That wasn't That was an innovation in

0:14:46.120 --> 0:14:48.920
<v Speaker 1>the nineteenth century. It's not something that ever anybody could get.

0:14:49.120 --> 0:14:51.200
<v Speaker 1>There were all sorts of fights over who could charter

0:14:51.280 --> 0:14:55.560
<v Speaker 1>it for what reason. Originally it was academic institutions, municipalities.

0:14:55.760 --> 0:14:59.400
<v Speaker 1>They didn't allow anyone to just charter a corporation. And

0:14:59.480 --> 0:15:02.280
<v Speaker 1>because they were like this can be really dangerous. Corporations

0:15:02.280 --> 0:15:06.200
<v Speaker 1>were originally chartered to allow the pooling. You know, eventually

0:15:06.200 --> 0:15:08.520
<v Speaker 1>they started to charter them in business and they said

0:15:08.520 --> 0:15:12.240
<v Speaker 1>you can pool capital and men to build things of

0:15:12.280 --> 0:15:14.360
<v Speaker 1>public works and make a little profit, and we're going

0:15:14.440 --> 0:15:16.800
<v Speaker 1>to put very restrictive confidence in there. And it was

0:15:16.920 --> 0:15:19.920
<v Speaker 1>very restrictive until the eighteen eighties and eighteen nineties, and

0:15:19.960 --> 0:15:23.600
<v Speaker 1>that's when you started to see federal antitrust laws because

0:15:23.720 --> 0:15:26.120
<v Speaker 1>the state chartering didn't work as well, and so we

0:15:26.160 --> 0:15:28.720
<v Speaker 1>needed a new regulatory regime, and that was the that's

0:15:28.720 --> 0:15:33.320
<v Speaker 1>when we got into the federalization of it. But that's

0:15:33.400 --> 0:15:36.320
<v Speaker 1>the story. The story is we've always kept a tight

0:15:36.440 --> 0:15:41.120
<v Speaker 1>rain on commercial concentrations of power. In the nineteen seventies,

0:15:41.160 --> 0:15:44.360
<v Speaker 1>there were sort of two different political and intellectual movements

0:15:44.360 --> 0:15:47.720
<v Speaker 1>that came that won the debate. Each one within the

0:15:47.720 --> 0:15:52.080
<v Speaker 1>Republican Party, one within the Democratic Party, the Republican the debate.

0:15:52.320 --> 0:15:54.640
<v Speaker 1>The one on the right was the Chicago School. These

0:15:54.680 --> 0:15:58.640
<v Speaker 1>were the Libertarians, and their argument was power doesn't matter,

0:15:58.680 --> 0:16:01.360
<v Speaker 1>Concentrations of power doesn't matter, conflicts of interest don't matter.

0:16:01.520 --> 0:16:05.680
<v Speaker 1>Traditional things like usery caps, all that stuff is very silly.

0:16:05.800 --> 0:16:08.360
<v Speaker 1>The only thing that matters is efficiency. We need to

0:16:08.440 --> 0:16:12.680
<v Speaker 1>just think about what is most efficient. And to understand efficiency,

0:16:12.760 --> 0:16:16.360
<v Speaker 1>let's think. Let's ask economists. They are the scientists, right,

0:16:16.360 --> 0:16:18.840
<v Speaker 1>We're going to move this political question out of the

0:16:18.880 --> 0:16:22.040
<v Speaker 1>realm of the public and the citizen and move it

0:16:22.080 --> 0:16:25.040
<v Speaker 1>to the expert, the scientists, the economist. That's why these

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:28.400
<v Speaker 1>political things become the economy. That's why we start using

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:33.160
<v Speaker 1>terms like human capital instead of people, or infrastructure instead

0:16:33.160 --> 0:16:36.280
<v Speaker 1>of bridges. Like it's just a very you know, the

0:16:36.400 --> 0:16:40.840
<v Speaker 1>language got gets weird and sort of flat distant, yeah,

0:16:41.320 --> 0:16:43.840
<v Speaker 1>exactly distant alien right. I noticed this in the in

0:16:43.880 --> 0:16:45.280
<v Speaker 1>some of the documents that I was looking at the

0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:47.800
<v Speaker 1>government doctor in the seventy eight seventy nine, that like,

0:16:47.800 --> 0:16:52.960
<v Speaker 1>the language started getting weird and very technocratic, wonky. So

0:16:53.040 --> 0:16:55.000
<v Speaker 1>that was on the right. On the left, it was

0:16:55.040 --> 0:16:58.840
<v Speaker 1>sort of like some quasi socialists who made a similar argument.

0:16:59.120 --> 0:17:02.760
<v Speaker 1>And they they you know, they they were not they

0:17:02.800 --> 0:17:05.199
<v Speaker 1>didn't like small business right because they thought that like

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:09.959
<v Speaker 1>small business people were like uh racist and and Rubby

0:17:10.119 --> 0:17:13.359
<v Speaker 1>and Andy. They preferred working with you know, the big

0:17:13.440 --> 0:17:16.240
<v Speaker 1>the big banks and the and the big chain stores.

0:17:16.280 --> 0:17:18.680
<v Speaker 1>And they thought, oh, they're cosmopolitans regardless.

0:17:19.240 --> 0:17:22.400
<v Speaker 2>Who knows how big corporations feel about race. Jesus.

0:17:23.200 --> 0:17:24.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I'm not I'm just telling.

0:17:24.400 --> 0:17:26.400
<v Speaker 2>You no, no, no, no, I'm not saying you're the one. He's

0:17:26.440 --> 0:17:27.440
<v Speaker 2>just like, oh god.

0:17:27.960 --> 0:17:31.040
<v Speaker 1>Right, I mean so so. So they didn't like car dealers, right,

0:17:31.040 --> 0:17:32.919
<v Speaker 1>That was they were like, car dealers are sleazy, we

0:17:32.920 --> 0:17:35.080
<v Speaker 1>don't like them. They were kind of more socialists, and

0:17:35.080 --> 0:17:36.720
<v Speaker 1>they said, you know what we should we should have

0:17:37.280 --> 0:17:40.679
<v Speaker 1>big planning, right, work with IBM, work with like the

0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:45.480
<v Speaker 1>big fancy companies to sort of plan things, and and

0:17:45.480 --> 0:17:47.800
<v Speaker 1>and that. They were like, we need experts to kind

0:17:47.800 --> 0:17:50.679
<v Speaker 1>of be planners in the economy. And that's actually not

0:17:51.119 --> 0:17:54.439
<v Speaker 1>very different than saying, let's just allow the economists to

0:17:54.520 --> 0:17:58.320
<v Speaker 1>run things, right, It's actually very similar. Both the right

0:17:58.359 --> 0:18:00.199
<v Speaker 1>and the left they kind of hated each other, but

0:18:00.240 --> 0:18:04.320
<v Speaker 1>they agreed that populism was bad, that small business was

0:18:04.320 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 1>sort of foolish and silly, and that what we really

0:18:06.760 --> 0:18:10.600
<v Speaker 1>should do is is have big institutions running things. And

0:18:11.000 --> 0:18:14.000
<v Speaker 1>those big institutions, you know, maybe the right thought, well,

0:18:14.000 --> 0:18:16.320
<v Speaker 1>they should just generate cash because that's more efficient, and

0:18:16.359 --> 0:18:19.720
<v Speaker 1>the left maybe thought, let's have them be more socialist

0:18:19.840 --> 0:18:21.960
<v Speaker 1>and look out for the public interest. But that was

0:18:22.000 --> 0:18:25.600
<v Speaker 1>the sort of the gist of what both and they won.

0:18:26.119 --> 0:18:29.720
<v Speaker 1>And then they changed antitrust laws in the nineteen seventies

0:18:29.760 --> 0:18:33.399
<v Speaker 1>and a whole bunch of regulatory laws in the nineteen eighties, like,

0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:37.840
<v Speaker 1>for example, deregulation of airlines, which happened in nineteen eighty.

0:18:37.920 --> 0:18:44.359
<v Speaker 1>The most aggressive proponent of deregulation of airlines was Ralph Nader. Okay,

0:18:44.960 --> 0:18:47.959
<v Speaker 1>wasn't a right wing thing. The airlines themselves didn't want it.

0:18:47.960 --> 0:18:50.800
<v Speaker 1>It was Ralph Nader pushing it very aggressively. He was

0:18:50.840 --> 0:18:55.000
<v Speaker 1>also very aggressive about pushing for deregulation in banking. You know,

0:18:55.160 --> 0:18:56.840
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's a weird history here.

0:19:07.680 --> 0:19:10.960
<v Speaker 2>It's weird. How will like the two very different sides

0:19:11.040 --> 0:19:13.960
<v Speaker 2>both seem to kind of turn against workers almost.

0:19:14.760 --> 0:19:17.359
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So Nata realized he made a mistake. But what

0:19:17.480 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 1>the basic idea there was, Oh, this is it's bad

0:19:22.080 --> 0:19:24.679
<v Speaker 1>for consumers that we have this regulatory scheme of for

0:19:24.760 --> 0:19:28.800
<v Speaker 1>banks or for or for or for truckers or for airlines.

0:19:28.920 --> 0:19:32.479
<v Speaker 1>It increases prices, it's not as efficient as it could be.

0:19:32.680 --> 0:19:36.800
<v Speaker 1>If we consolidate power, that's more efficient. Right, all these

0:19:36.840 --> 0:19:37.480
<v Speaker 1>grubby you.

0:19:37.480 --> 0:19:39.359
<v Speaker 2>Know, because scale, you'll be able to do.

0:19:39.920 --> 0:19:43.639
<v Speaker 1>Right. And so the Chicago schoolers or the right wingers

0:19:43.680 --> 0:19:46.240
<v Speaker 1>were like, absolutely, this is completely right. I mean they're

0:19:46.320 --> 0:19:49.119
<v Speaker 1>hippies and communists and we hate them, but they're not

0:19:49.160 --> 0:19:52.080
<v Speaker 1>wrong about the need to bring the experts in to

0:19:52.200 --> 0:19:55.159
<v Speaker 1>run things and move away from these you know, grubby,

0:19:55.240 --> 0:19:58.600
<v Speaker 1>dumb small business people. And you know, the there's a

0:19:58.640 --> 0:20:00.560
<v Speaker 1>lot of it is the consumer rights move movement was

0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:04.840
<v Speaker 1>part was the people on the left who got this

0:20:04.920 --> 0:20:07.080
<v Speaker 1>to happen. And you know, even if today if you

0:20:07.160 --> 0:20:11.119
<v Speaker 1>read like the biographies autobiographies of people who worked in

0:20:11.160 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 1>the Carter administration, though like invective, the anger they have

0:20:14.920 --> 0:20:18.520
<v Speaker 1>towards the teamsters is really weird. Like I've read like

0:20:18.680 --> 0:20:22.840
<v Speaker 1>multiple people from was his name, Alfred Kahn was kind

0:20:22.840 --> 0:20:24.840
<v Speaker 1>of the big one. He was like diregular, but he

0:20:24.920 --> 0:20:26.840
<v Speaker 1>used to talk about like how the goal of a

0:20:26.880 --> 0:20:30.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of the policies was to just destroy the teamsters

0:20:30.000 --> 0:20:32.360
<v Speaker 1>and reduce wages like for workers, and.

0:20:32.320 --> 0:20:35.600
<v Speaker 2>Did they did. Why was there such bipartisan descent for

0:20:35.640 --> 0:20:38.399
<v Speaker 2>small business? It just doesn't Maybe it makes sense just

0:20:38.520 --> 0:20:41.119
<v Speaker 2>looking back, like Hinslight's twenty twenty, but it just feels

0:20:41.119 --> 0:20:45.200
<v Speaker 2>so illogical almost on the left.

0:20:46.000 --> 0:20:48.720
<v Speaker 1>There's an elitism to it. Right, So you had this

0:20:48.760 --> 0:20:51.720
<v Speaker 1>is the first generation like in this it's the sixties

0:20:51.760 --> 0:20:55.240
<v Speaker 1>and seventies, and now you have finally like tens of

0:20:55.240 --> 0:20:57.800
<v Speaker 1>millions of people who are college educated. Right, it's right

0:20:57.840 --> 0:21:01.160
<v Speaker 1>after the GI Bill and this the World War two,

0:21:01.640 --> 0:21:05.439
<v Speaker 1>and they're they're trying to understand the economy and the

0:21:05.480 --> 0:21:07.840
<v Speaker 1>New Deal. The New Deal exists, right, the New Deal

0:21:07.880 --> 0:21:11.960
<v Speaker 1>framework is there. Things aren't basically prosperous, and they stop

0:21:12.119 --> 0:21:16.280
<v Speaker 1>caring about questions of political economy and concentrations of power

0:21:16.359 --> 0:21:18.840
<v Speaker 1>and inequality because there just isn't that much of it.

0:21:19.000 --> 0:21:22.159
<v Speaker 1>I mean, yeah, there's like there's some like rich people.

0:21:22.200 --> 0:21:23.920
<v Speaker 1>There are rich people, but they're seen as kind of

0:21:23.960 --> 0:21:27.240
<v Speaker 1>like borish and tacky. They're not like considered powerful. Wall

0:21:27.240 --> 0:21:31.080
<v Speaker 1>Street doesn't really matter, you know, in the seventies, it's

0:21:31.160 --> 0:21:34.440
<v Speaker 1>just like a place with coupon clippings of like bonds.

0:21:34.480 --> 0:21:37.240
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't it's not you know, it's not a big deal.

0:21:37.840 --> 0:21:42.000
<v Speaker 1>And that's kind of the vibe that that most people have.

0:21:42.560 --> 0:21:44.480
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's in nineteen seventy nine, you could like

0:21:44.760 --> 0:21:47.719
<v Speaker 1>you could leave high school and you could just get it,

0:21:47.800 --> 0:21:50.520
<v Speaker 1>get a job making fifty bucks an hour in a factory.

0:21:51.200 --> 0:21:54.399
<v Speaker 1>Right that it was just a very different society. So

0:21:54.440 --> 0:21:58.200
<v Speaker 1>there just wasn't the concern over being able to make it.

0:21:58.320 --> 0:22:00.560
<v Speaker 2>In and not fifty dollars an hour. Job was not

0:22:00.720 --> 0:22:03.000
<v Speaker 2>I'm going to guess from mega corporation.

0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:05.480
<v Speaker 1>Or it was I mean, but it could be. It

0:22:05.520 --> 0:22:07.800
<v Speaker 1>could be but like it could be for Ford, or

0:22:07.800 --> 0:22:10.360
<v Speaker 1>it could be for a supplier of Ford or whatever.

0:22:10.440 --> 0:22:13.400
<v Speaker 1>But like it wasn't you know, there was a lot

0:22:13.400 --> 0:22:17.000
<v Speaker 1>of light manufacturing by smaller companies. But the point is

0:22:17.000 --> 0:22:18.080
<v Speaker 1>is that you had a lot There were a lot

0:22:18.119 --> 0:22:20.840
<v Speaker 1>of options, and it wasn't you know, it wasn't considered

0:22:21.760 --> 0:22:25.240
<v Speaker 1>weird or a bad thing, and inequality was fairly low,

0:22:25.560 --> 0:22:27.440
<v Speaker 1>and you could also start your own business. It wasn't

0:22:27.480 --> 0:22:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that hard to do that, right, But the political infrastructure

0:22:31.080 --> 0:22:33.840
<v Speaker 1>for that had kind of fallen apart. And when inflation

0:22:34.000 --> 0:22:36.760
<v Speaker 1>hit in the nineteen seventies, and inflation hit for a

0:22:36.800 --> 0:22:41.360
<v Speaker 1>variety of reasons, mostly having to do with changes in banking,

0:22:41.920 --> 0:22:47.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, some some oil shocks, those two movements spent

0:22:47.280 --> 0:22:52.119
<v Speaker 1>a lot of time convincing people that the American economy

0:22:52.200 --> 0:22:57.800
<v Speaker 1>was misshapen because there wasn't enough expertise running things. And

0:22:57.880 --> 0:23:00.920
<v Speaker 1>so in the nineteen seventies, when you started, when there

0:23:00.960 --> 0:23:03.880
<v Speaker 1>was inflation, when there were these when there were financial shocks,

0:23:05.520 --> 0:23:09.040
<v Speaker 1>the argument was we gotta we got to get rid

0:23:09.160 --> 0:23:12.960
<v Speaker 1>of these new deal rules. Now, there were legitimate reasons

0:23:13.000 --> 0:23:15.800
<v Speaker 1>to update those rules, like the train system was a mess,

0:23:16.280 --> 0:23:19.399
<v Speaker 1>and because you couldn't close down unprofitable routes. You know,

0:23:19.480 --> 0:23:21.679
<v Speaker 1>there was there were there was a lot of like

0:23:21.760 --> 0:23:24.560
<v Speaker 1>real problems with our with our transportation system. You know,

0:23:24.880 --> 0:23:27.560
<v Speaker 1>it was hard to update trucking rules. There were things

0:23:27.560 --> 0:23:29.359
<v Speaker 1>that needed to be updated. But they just said, you

0:23:29.440 --> 0:23:32.560
<v Speaker 1>know what, all of this stuff, just throw it out

0:23:32.640 --> 0:23:36.439
<v Speaker 1>and give freedom to capital, to to unionize, to do

0:23:36.480 --> 0:23:38.960
<v Speaker 1>whatever capital wants, because that's how to bring down costs.

0:23:38.960 --> 0:23:41.040
<v Speaker 1>You got to make things more efficient and that will

0:23:41.040 --> 0:23:41.880
<v Speaker 1>address pricing.

0:23:42.160 --> 0:23:44.840
<v Speaker 2>So was there a succession of legislation or was it

0:23:44.880 --> 0:23:45.840
<v Speaker 2>one big moment.

0:23:46.160 --> 0:23:47.919
<v Speaker 1>It was a bunch of different it was. It was

0:23:47.960 --> 0:23:50.240
<v Speaker 1>some legislation. A lot of it was through the courts,

0:23:50.480 --> 0:23:52.400
<v Speaker 1>so it wasn't you know, it's not like we ever

0:23:52.440 --> 0:23:54.439
<v Speaker 1>repealed any of these anti trust laws. It's just that

0:23:54.560 --> 0:23:59.119
<v Speaker 1>interpretations by enforcers and the courts changed. Oh yeah, and

0:23:59.119 --> 0:24:02.960
<v Speaker 1>that's actually the Reagan administration. You know. There's this document

0:24:03.000 --> 0:24:07.439
<v Speaker 1>that a colleague uncovered in nineteen eighty, the Transition, a

0:24:07.480 --> 0:24:12.320
<v Speaker 1>transition document from two important economists who said we're not

0:24:12.320 --> 0:24:14.240
<v Speaker 1>going to be able to convince Congress to get rid

0:24:14.320 --> 0:24:16.439
<v Speaker 1>of anti trust laws. So we're just going to have

0:24:16.440 --> 0:24:19.720
<v Speaker 1>to change it administratively by not enforcing the laws that

0:24:19.760 --> 0:24:22.560
<v Speaker 1>we don't like. So that's what Reagan did with mergers.

0:24:22.560 --> 0:24:24.760
<v Speaker 1>He said, we're no longer going to enforce merger anti

0:24:24.800 --> 0:24:27.920
<v Speaker 1>merger law. And so that's why, you know, you saw

0:24:27.920 --> 0:24:32.280
<v Speaker 1>a huge consolidation wave in the nineteen eighties. You know

0:24:32.359 --> 0:24:35.040
<v Speaker 1>the movie Wall Street, the nineteen eighty seven Oliver Spill. Yeah,

0:24:35.080 --> 0:24:38.919
<v Speaker 1>so that's about a merger, right, that is the moment, Like,

0:24:39.280 --> 0:24:42.440
<v Speaker 1>that's what happens, is that that change. You also saw

0:24:42.960 --> 0:24:45.879
<v Speaker 1>in terms of legislation. Yes, there was a tremendous amount

0:24:45.920 --> 0:24:50.000
<v Speaker 1>of deregulation of particularly of finance, but also of trade,

0:24:50.440 --> 0:24:54.679
<v Speaker 1>also of shipping, also of you know, railroads and trucking,

0:24:54.760 --> 0:24:58.800
<v Speaker 1>and there were a lot of legislative changes that fostered

0:24:58.800 --> 0:25:03.119
<v Speaker 1>the consolidation of economic power in the name of efficiency. So,

0:25:03.760 --> 0:25:06.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, one of the first laws that changed was

0:25:06.720 --> 0:25:09.960
<v Speaker 1>one that it was called the Consumer Pricing Goods Act

0:25:10.000 --> 0:25:13.000
<v Speaker 1>of nineteen seventy five. They said, we are going to

0:25:14.359 --> 0:25:19.760
<v Speaker 1>allow discounters to basically charge much less than an item

0:25:19.880 --> 0:25:23.679
<v Speaker 1>costs in order to kill their rivals. So you know

0:25:23.760 --> 0:25:26.520
<v Speaker 1>that the idea used to be that if I sold,

0:25:26.560 --> 0:25:29.320
<v Speaker 1>if I was a producer and I and I sold,

0:25:29.440 --> 0:25:33.879
<v Speaker 1>say Ingersol watches or something, I could tell the retailer

0:25:33.920 --> 0:25:38.040
<v Speaker 1>what price minimum price they could set, and that way

0:25:38.240 --> 0:25:42.000
<v Speaker 1>that retailer couldn't price below cost to draw people in

0:25:42.119 --> 0:25:44.240
<v Speaker 1>and kill their rivals. Let's say, like, you know, they

0:25:44.280 --> 0:25:45.840
<v Speaker 1>don't do that with Ingosole watches, but they did that

0:25:45.840 --> 0:25:48.239
<v Speaker 1>with milk, right, you know, price below cost to kill

0:25:48.280 --> 0:25:51.119
<v Speaker 1>your rivals. If you can price below cost, this is

0:25:51.160 --> 0:25:53.680
<v Speaker 1>what Amazon does, right, Like. The reason Amazon was able

0:25:53.680 --> 0:25:56.120
<v Speaker 1>to kill its rivals is because it could borrow from

0:25:56.119 --> 0:25:59.040
<v Speaker 1>Wall Street for as long as it took, whereas its

0:25:59.119 --> 0:26:04.040
<v Speaker 1>rivals couldn't. That's called predatory pricing. Uber did something similar

0:26:04.240 --> 0:26:06.800
<v Speaker 1>that used to be illegal, and one of the laws

0:26:06.800 --> 0:26:09.160
<v Speaker 1>that made it possible was the Consumer Pricing Goods Act

0:26:09.160 --> 0:26:11.240
<v Speaker 1>of nineteen seventy five that was put in place by

0:26:11.240 --> 0:26:14.879
<v Speaker 1>the Democrats who had just gotten elected reacting in a

0:26:14.920 --> 0:26:17.560
<v Speaker 1>reaction to Nixon, and they didn't know what to do

0:26:17.600 --> 0:26:20.200
<v Speaker 1>about inflation. So this is something that the Natorites told

0:26:20.240 --> 0:26:24.000
<v Speaker 1>them to do. They did it, and Walmart exploded as

0:26:24.000 --> 0:26:27.359
<v Speaker 1>a result, nineteen seventy, Walmart was about had about, I

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:29.960
<v Speaker 1>don't know, twenty thirty million dollars in sales. By nineteen

0:26:30.000 --> 0:26:32.000
<v Speaker 1>eighty it had a billion dollars in sales by nineteen

0:26:32.040 --> 0:26:36.280
<v Speaker 1>eighty five. Sam Walton richest guy in the country. But

0:26:36.520 --> 0:26:38.400
<v Speaker 1>so a bunch of stuff, like a bunch of legal

0:26:38.480 --> 0:26:42.280
<v Speaker 1>changes happened, deregulation of finance, deregulation of all of these

0:26:42.320 --> 0:26:46.719
<v Speaker 1>different areas, and now so the relaxation, dramatic relaxation of

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:51.720
<v Speaker 1>antitrust laws. And so when you make when you legalize monopoly,

0:26:51.760 --> 0:26:55.880
<v Speaker 1>which is effectively what happened, then you get a bunch

0:26:55.920 --> 0:26:58.600
<v Speaker 1>of monopolies. And this is to our earlier point. If

0:26:58.640 --> 0:27:02.239
<v Speaker 1>you don't monopolize, then you get eaten, right, and you

0:27:02.280 --> 0:27:04.960
<v Speaker 1>get destroyed. So you could say Mark Zuckerberg did what

0:27:05.040 --> 0:27:07.199
<v Speaker 1>he did, and that's bad by rolling up, you know,

0:27:07.240 --> 0:27:09.520
<v Speaker 1>the social media space. But if it hadn't been him,

0:27:09.520 --> 0:27:12.160
<v Speaker 1>it would have been somebody else, right, And same thing

0:27:12.160 --> 0:27:13.840
<v Speaker 1>with Google, same thing with all of these guys like

0:27:13.880 --> 0:27:16.760
<v Speaker 1>it was gonna When you create a legal environment like that,

0:27:16.760 --> 0:27:20.280
<v Speaker 1>that's what happens. So these big companies now they're big,

0:27:20.320 --> 0:27:23.119
<v Speaker 1>Now they're powerful, and they use lobbying, they use infrastructure,

0:27:23.119 --> 0:27:26.680
<v Speaker 1>and they're governing. But it didn't start out that way.

0:27:27.000 --> 0:27:31.120
<v Speaker 1>Now we have a political economy problem, but the ideas

0:27:31.160 --> 0:27:34.480
<v Speaker 1>have changed. So the intellectual framework they were operating on

0:27:35.119 --> 0:27:38.480
<v Speaker 1>of Google, we don't do evil, right, which is a

0:27:38.720 --> 0:27:42.240
<v Speaker 1>fundamentally a statement about governing. I think there's like a

0:27:42.359 --> 0:27:46.760
<v Speaker 1>general view that whatever you think about Google's business model,

0:27:46.960 --> 0:27:50.760
<v Speaker 1>it is inappropriate for a private entity to be used

0:27:50.800 --> 0:27:53.760
<v Speaker 1>to be wielding sovereign power. That's not it shouldn't be

0:27:53.920 --> 0:27:55.520
<v Speaker 1>up to them, right.

0:27:55.840 --> 0:27:58.680
<v Speaker 2>So what does it actually mean that the government said

0:27:58.800 --> 0:28:01.320
<v Speaker 2>they had a monopoly of search? What? What does that

0:28:01.520 --> 0:28:02.880
<v Speaker 2>actually the ramifications?

0:28:03.359 --> 0:28:06.440
<v Speaker 1>So this is getting to the search trial. We can

0:28:06.640 --> 0:28:08.960
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about that, but but a monopoly

0:28:09.040 --> 0:28:11.760
<v Speaker 1>means you know what the what? So they were just

0:28:12.080 --> 0:28:15.960
<v Speaker 1>deemed a monopolist by a judge judgment meta in in

0:28:16.080 --> 0:28:18.240
<v Speaker 1>DC District Court. It's actually their second loss. They were

0:28:18.440 --> 0:28:22.880
<v Speaker 1>also dubbed a monopolist in uh the Android app store.

0:28:23.040 --> 0:28:25.440
<v Speaker 2>Controls with the case with that pig.

0:28:25.880 --> 0:28:28.080
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so this is their second and there's a third

0:28:28.119 --> 0:28:31.200
<v Speaker 1>case that's starting where it's about their control of software

0:28:31.720 --> 0:28:37.560
<v Speaker 1>that underpins advertise online advertising markets. That starts in a

0:28:37.600 --> 0:28:38.320
<v Speaker 1>couple of weeks.

0:28:38.560 --> 0:28:38.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

0:28:38.920 --> 0:28:43.160
<v Speaker 1>Anyway, what what Metta said is that Google is a

0:28:43.200 --> 0:28:48.080
<v Speaker 1>monopolist because they control uh search right, general search services,

0:28:48.120 --> 0:28:51.560
<v Speaker 1>and then they control search advertising. And what they were

0:28:51.600 --> 0:28:55.400
<v Speaker 1>doing that was illegal is they were preventing rivals from

0:28:55.480 --> 0:28:59.240
<v Speaker 1>getting into the search market using contracts, and so it's

0:28:59.240 --> 0:29:02.240
<v Speaker 1>not just that they were monopolizing, it's that they were

0:29:02.280 --> 0:29:07.160
<v Speaker 1>thwarting rivals from challenging them, and then they were raising

0:29:07.280 --> 0:29:11.320
<v Speaker 1>ad prices as a result of their control of this market.

0:29:11.840 --> 0:29:15.560
<v Speaker 1>So the that's like the in anti trust law. It

0:29:15.560 --> 0:29:18.320
<v Speaker 1>didn't always used to be this way, but we interpret

0:29:18.360 --> 0:29:23.080
<v Speaker 1>it to really since the sixties to the eighties, depending

0:29:23.080 --> 0:29:25.440
<v Speaker 1>on what case you look at. If you are if

0:29:25.480 --> 0:29:29.920
<v Speaker 1>you are a monopoly and you and then you do

0:29:30.080 --> 0:29:33.720
<v Speaker 1>something to maintain that monopoly or to extend your monopoly,

0:29:35.560 --> 0:29:38.040
<v Speaker 1>that's what makes it illegal. Right, Like if I just

0:29:38.080 --> 0:29:40.880
<v Speaker 1>create a new product category, some widget that no one's

0:29:40.880 --> 0:29:43.360
<v Speaker 1>ever heard of before, and I start making it and

0:29:43.400 --> 0:29:46.280
<v Speaker 1>it's popular, I'm by definition going to have one hundred

0:29:46.280 --> 0:29:49.880
<v Speaker 1>percent of the market. That doesn't that's not illegal, right.

0:29:49.960 --> 0:29:51.640
<v Speaker 1>What it would be illegal as if I had one

0:29:51.680 --> 0:29:54.720
<v Speaker 1>hundred percent of the market and then I said to

0:29:54.760 --> 0:29:58.920
<v Speaker 1>my distributors. Hey, if you want my thing that everybody wants,

0:29:58.960 --> 0:30:02.520
<v Speaker 1>you can't distribute my rivals. Think that's what makes it.

0:30:03.120 --> 0:30:06.720
<v Speaker 1>That's what turns it into an illegal conspiracy, and that's

0:30:06.760 --> 0:30:10.120
<v Speaker 1>effective the argument about what Google was doing with search.

0:30:10.720 --> 0:30:11.960
<v Speaker 2>So, how do you feel it's going to go?

0:30:13.920 --> 0:30:19.680
<v Speaker 1>Why do you think, I mean the they're starting. So

0:30:20.280 --> 0:30:23.560
<v Speaker 1>the case started in twenty twenty. It was originally brought

0:30:23.560 --> 0:30:26.400
<v Speaker 1>by the Trump administration. The Biden administration has brought it forward,

0:30:27.000 --> 0:30:29.239
<v Speaker 1>and it took until twenty twenty four when it went

0:30:29.280 --> 0:30:32.240
<v Speaker 1>to trial and finally the judge ruled that Google's a monopolist.

0:30:32.920 --> 0:30:35.280
<v Speaker 1>Now is the second part of the trial, which is

0:30:35.280 --> 0:30:38.400
<v Speaker 1>called the remedy phase, where the government comes and says,

0:30:38.400 --> 0:30:42.200
<v Speaker 1>here's what we want to cure the monopoly, and Google

0:30:42.320 --> 0:30:44.280
<v Speaker 1>will say, no, I don't think that's right. This is

0:30:44.280 --> 0:30:46.440
<v Speaker 1>what you need to cure the monopoly. And there will

0:30:46.440 --> 0:30:49.600
<v Speaker 1>be another, effectively a trial, and then the judge will

0:30:49.680 --> 0:30:52.160
<v Speaker 1>rule and make a decision, and then it will go

0:30:52.440 --> 0:30:56.680
<v Speaker 1>on appeal, probably the Supreme Court, or depending on who

0:30:56.720 --> 0:31:01.719
<v Speaker 1>wins in you know, this election, they could settle it

0:31:01.840 --> 0:31:05.000
<v Speaker 1>as the Bush administration did with the Microsoft suit in

0:31:05.040 --> 0:31:08.120
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and one. So all of that being said,

0:31:08.600 --> 0:31:10.600
<v Speaker 1>we don't even know what the Justice Department is going

0:31:10.640 --> 0:31:13.760
<v Speaker 1>to ask for. So the Justice Department could ask for

0:31:13.840 --> 0:31:17.160
<v Speaker 1>something very small, in which case that's the most you're

0:31:17.160 --> 0:31:18.720
<v Speaker 1>going to get, or they could ask the end of it,

0:31:19.040 --> 0:31:20.680
<v Speaker 1>right well, I mean it's not the end. There's going

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:23.160
<v Speaker 1>to be you know, yeah, that's the most you're going

0:31:23.240 --> 0:31:26.440
<v Speaker 1>to get. Or they could ask for you know, breaking

0:31:26.560 --> 0:31:29.280
<v Speaker 1>up the company and you know, opening up the data

0:31:29.320 --> 0:31:33.000
<v Speaker 1>vaults to let anybody use the data that that Google collected,

0:31:33.560 --> 0:31:36.360
<v Speaker 1>or you know, opening up their IP vaults and saying

0:31:36.400 --> 0:31:39.160
<v Speaker 1>anybody gets to use that, or you know, there's a

0:31:39.200 --> 0:31:40.960
<v Speaker 1>ton that the DJ could ask for. We're going to

0:31:41.000 --> 0:31:43.400
<v Speaker 1>sort of find out more about that in the next

0:31:43.520 --> 0:31:49.360
<v Speaker 1>month or two. The Remedy phase conference the have they're

0:31:49.440 --> 0:31:51.200
<v Speaker 1>they're just going to talk about the scheduling of the

0:31:51.240 --> 0:31:54.480
<v Speaker 1>remedy phase in I think September like sixth the ninth

0:31:54.560 --> 0:31:56.520
<v Speaker 1>or something like that. So, well, you know what we're

0:31:56.520 --> 0:31:58.320
<v Speaker 1>gonna be covering, mys be covering that. You're going to

0:31:58.400 --> 0:32:00.080
<v Speaker 1>hear about that if you if you want to see it.

0:32:00.120 --> 0:32:05.000
<v Speaker 1>But it's I know, it's very exciting. I mean, this

0:32:05.040 --> 0:32:09.000
<v Speaker 1>is the first big tech company that's been deemed to

0:32:09.000 --> 0:32:13.000
<v Speaker 1>be a monopolist and the anti trust law, you know,

0:32:13.080 --> 0:32:16.719
<v Speaker 1>a lot of anti trusts law is is just not

0:32:17.400 --> 0:32:20.120
<v Speaker 1>so much what the law says, but whether you use

0:32:20.240 --> 0:32:23.040
<v Speaker 1>the law. You know, the Department of Justice didn't bring

0:32:23.080 --> 0:32:28.400
<v Speaker 1>a monopolization case pretty much for twenty years since Microsoft,

0:32:28.440 --> 0:32:31.040
<v Speaker 1>like the Google case was the first one first, certainly

0:32:31.120 --> 0:32:33.960
<v Speaker 1>first big one. FDC brought a few. There have been

0:32:33.960 --> 0:32:36.200
<v Speaker 1>some private cases, but this is really the first big

0:32:36.240 --> 0:32:41.000
<v Speaker 1>one since since Microsoft. And what's gonna happen and what

0:32:41.080 --> 0:32:44.719
<v Speaker 1>is already happening is, you know, every big company is

0:32:45.640 --> 0:32:47.920
<v Speaker 1>we're you know, every CEO in a company that has

0:32:48.000 --> 0:32:52.920
<v Speaker 1>market power has to ask their general counselor could this

0:32:53.280 --> 0:32:55.560
<v Speaker 1>are we doing something that could get us into hot water?

0:32:56.640 --> 0:32:58.520
<v Speaker 1>They didn't have to ask that a few years ago,

0:32:58.840 --> 0:33:01.440
<v Speaker 1>because you could just the general counsel or their anti

0:33:01.480 --> 0:33:04.200
<v Speaker 1>trust council could say, eh, don't worry.

0:33:04.040 --> 0:33:06.880
<v Speaker 2>That dude gives a shit, it won't do anything.

0:33:06.880 --> 0:33:08.760
<v Speaker 1>No one would ever bring a case. Right But now

0:33:08.880 --> 0:33:10.959
<v Speaker 1>not only did the government bring a case, but they

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:14.360
<v Speaker 1>won the case. So it's like, oh, okay, now we

0:33:14.400 --> 0:33:17.240
<v Speaker 1>got to be careful.

0:33:16.760 --> 0:33:19.200
<v Speaker 2>And just so you when you say they won the case.

0:33:19.240 --> 0:33:22.880
<v Speaker 2>So it was the government versus Google with a no.

0:33:23.000 --> 0:33:26.440
<v Speaker 2>This is very simple with the judge, Judge Meta saying

0:33:26.560 --> 0:33:28.600
<v Speaker 2>I agree with the government, right, Yeah.

0:33:28.440 --> 0:33:29.840
<v Speaker 1>It was the government, and then there were a bunch

0:33:29.840 --> 0:33:33.760
<v Speaker 1>of states as well, and the Meta didn't. He didn't

0:33:33.760 --> 0:33:36.320
<v Speaker 1>agree with everything the government said. So there were certain

0:33:36.360 --> 0:33:40.240
<v Speaker 1>things with like Google's advertising platform that he said that's

0:33:40.280 --> 0:33:44.520
<v Speaker 1>not a monopoly. But on the big stuff, the search stuff, yeah,

0:33:44.560 --> 0:33:46.840
<v Speaker 1>he agreed with the government.

0:33:47.160 --> 0:33:49.240
<v Speaker 2>How do you break up a company like Google?

0:33:49.280 --> 0:33:52.680
<v Speaker 1>Though Wall Street does it all the time. I mean,

0:33:52.720 --> 0:33:56.440
<v Speaker 1>you just saw what I think. DuPont just broke itself

0:33:56.520 --> 0:33:59.800
<v Speaker 1>up into multiple division. You know, Google is not just

0:34:00.240 --> 0:34:02.720
<v Speaker 1>it's not like one jumbled together thing. You know, Google

0:34:02.760 --> 0:34:05.400
<v Speaker 1>has different divisions, and so, you know, and they buy

0:34:05.400 --> 0:34:07.680
<v Speaker 1>companies and they sell companies, and you just you've got

0:34:07.760 --> 0:34:10.600
<v Speaker 1>put an investment banker in there to sell the company,

0:34:10.600 --> 0:34:11.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, sell parts of the company.

0:34:11.640 --> 0:34:14.279
<v Speaker 2>It's not it would be selling off bits of the

0:34:14.320 --> 0:34:14.960
<v Speaker 2>company though.

0:34:15.239 --> 0:34:17.080
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you could just I mean, depending on what they

0:34:17.480 --> 0:34:19.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, you could do it in lots of different ways.

0:34:19.280 --> 0:34:22.279
<v Speaker 1>But this is something that Wall Street knows how to do,

0:34:22.480 --> 0:34:24.680
<v Speaker 1>so you could just It's not it's not rocket science.

0:34:24.680 --> 0:34:28.680
<v Speaker 1>You know Google. You just go to Google has a

0:34:28.719 --> 0:34:31.080
<v Speaker 1>bunch of people who work in the YouTube you know,

0:34:31.160 --> 0:34:34.600
<v Speaker 1>at YouTube, and they have someone who's a CEO of YouTube.

0:34:35.040 --> 0:34:37.840
<v Speaker 1>You just say, okay, if you have a share of Google,

0:34:37.920 --> 0:34:39.560
<v Speaker 1>you now have a share of Google and you have

0:34:39.600 --> 0:34:40.520
<v Speaker 1>a share of YouTube.

0:34:40.600 --> 0:34:42.160
<v Speaker 2>Of a separate institution for.

0:34:42.239 --> 0:34:45.120
<v Speaker 1>Companies, right, I mean there are difficult things to break up.

0:34:45.160 --> 0:34:47.160
<v Speaker 1>Like let's say you want it to have a different

0:34:47.320 --> 0:34:50.799
<v Speaker 1>a separate search engine, right right, okay? There do you

0:34:50.840 --> 0:34:53.319
<v Speaker 1>clone it? Who gets the Google domain? Like who gets

0:34:53.360 --> 0:34:55.520
<v Speaker 1>the brand? You know? There are also questions all right,

0:34:55.560 --> 0:34:57.480
<v Speaker 1>like let's say you open up the data vault and

0:34:57.480 --> 0:35:00.000
<v Speaker 1>you say other entities can come in and use the data.

0:35:01.160 --> 0:35:03.919
<v Speaker 1>That's those are technical questions and you could you could.

0:35:04.160 --> 0:35:05.880
<v Speaker 1>Basically the way you would deal with that is you

0:35:05.920 --> 0:35:09.800
<v Speaker 1>would have Google pay for a like a special master

0:35:10.120 --> 0:35:13.160
<v Speaker 1>who would kind of like run who would run a

0:35:14.520 --> 0:35:17.239
<v Speaker 1>like a technical committee that would make a lot of decisions.

0:35:17.360 --> 0:35:20.279
<v Speaker 1>That's what Microsoft had to do after they lost There

0:35:20.320 --> 0:35:22.640
<v Speaker 1>was a technical committee that came in and basically was

0:35:22.680 --> 0:35:26.160
<v Speaker 1>a regulator for Microsoft's a couple hundred people something one

0:35:26.239 --> 0:35:29.439
<v Speaker 1>hundred to two hundred people who were just making sure

0:35:29.440 --> 0:35:34.640
<v Speaker 1>that Microsoft's software was compatible with other entity software, and

0:35:34.680 --> 0:35:38.040
<v Speaker 1>they had certain legal authority over Microsoft. You do that

0:35:38.120 --> 0:35:41.759
<v Speaker 1>for for parts of Google where you can't actually do

0:35:41.880 --> 0:35:45.239
<v Speaker 1>a breakup, and there you know, there you go. This

0:35:45.320 --> 0:35:49.680
<v Speaker 1>is a remedy is not that hard depending on what

0:35:49.719 --> 0:35:50.160
<v Speaker 1>you want to do.

0:35:50.200 --> 0:35:53.120
<v Speaker 2>It almost feels like they kind of want us to

0:35:53.160 --> 0:35:55.600
<v Speaker 2>think it's harder than it is because that benefits them.

0:35:56.200 --> 0:35:58.960
<v Speaker 2>It makes oh, it's impossible to do this. We couldn't possibly,

0:35:59.440 --> 0:36:01.279
<v Speaker 2>but I imagine and that that's the argument in the

0:36:01.280 --> 0:36:02.000
<v Speaker 2>remedies face.

0:36:02.280 --> 0:36:04.440
<v Speaker 1>Well, I mean I think that yes, they they in

0:36:04.480 --> 0:36:06.799
<v Speaker 1>the in the epic. We've seen the remedy argument in

0:36:06.840 --> 0:36:09.480
<v Speaker 1>the epic the Apple. And what Google has been saying is, oh,

0:36:09.520 --> 0:36:11.680
<v Speaker 1>all of this stuff is so hard, it's so expensive.

0:36:11.760 --> 0:36:14.640
<v Speaker 1>It's how could we do this? And also it's not fair.

0:36:15.160 --> 0:36:17.000
<v Speaker 1>And the judge is basically like, come on, your Google.

0:36:17.040 --> 0:36:18.960
<v Speaker 1>You've been saying how awesome you are for a long time.

0:36:19.040 --> 0:36:20.680
<v Speaker 1>You can do this. This is not that hard and

0:36:20.719 --> 0:36:22.719
<v Speaker 1>it's not going to take you ten years and eight

0:36:22.800 --> 0:36:23.800
<v Speaker 1>gazillion dollars.

0:36:35.239 --> 0:36:38.040
<v Speaker 2>So do you see any other monopolies within the tech industry?

0:36:38.640 --> 0:36:40.040
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean I think there's a lot of there's

0:36:40.040 --> 0:36:44.360
<v Speaker 1>a lot of market power in all over the economy,

0:36:44.400 --> 0:36:48.200
<v Speaker 1>and you see it in you know, I mean the

0:36:48.520 --> 0:36:52.000
<v Speaker 1>probably the most obvious monopoly is VeriSign's control of the

0:36:52.040 --> 0:36:55.799
<v Speaker 1>dot com domain. Like I know, it's like a small Yeah,

0:36:55.840 --> 0:36:58.520
<v Speaker 1>it's just so obviously if you want to register a

0:36:58.600 --> 0:37:01.520
<v Speaker 1>domain name and you want a dot com or you

0:37:01.560 --> 0:37:04.319
<v Speaker 1>own a dot com and you need to reregister, you know,

0:37:04.360 --> 0:37:07.400
<v Speaker 1>you need to renew it, you're going to pay a

0:37:07.760 --> 0:37:10.959
<v Speaker 1>you know, you're gonna pay registration company and they're gonna

0:37:11.000 --> 0:37:15.200
<v Speaker 1>have to remit whatever whatever they charge. I think they

0:37:15.320 --> 0:37:18.680
<v Speaker 1>charge like nine dollars and fifty cents and it's it's

0:37:18.680 --> 0:37:23.600
<v Speaker 1>like seventy percent operating margins. And because they manage the

0:37:23.640 --> 0:37:26.239
<v Speaker 1>dot com domain name, because the government charters them told them,

0:37:26.280 --> 0:37:28.240
<v Speaker 1>you can you get to manage this. They have contract

0:37:28.280 --> 0:37:31.040
<v Speaker 1>government that lets them do it. Just a very clear

0:37:31.080 --> 0:37:33.600
<v Speaker 1>one hundred percent of the market for you know, renewing

0:37:33.719 --> 0:37:36.880
<v Speaker 1>dot com domain names, and just everybody that owns a

0:37:36.920 --> 0:37:40.839
<v Speaker 1>dot com domain gives them nine dollars and fifty cents

0:37:40.880 --> 0:37:44.879
<v Speaker 1>a year. They should give them probably ninety cents a year.

0:37:45.960 --> 0:37:49.520
<v Speaker 2>Right, So are you suggesting that'd be other chances or chanters?

0:37:50.160 --> 0:37:52.239
<v Speaker 1>Well, what they should do is either just put a

0:37:52.239 --> 0:37:53.959
<v Speaker 1>price cap on it and say you get to charge

0:37:54.000 --> 0:37:57.560
<v Speaker 1>two bucks and that's it, like a utility, or say

0:37:57.719 --> 0:38:00.280
<v Speaker 1>every three years just bid it out and say, Okay,

0:38:00.960 --> 0:38:03.920
<v Speaker 1>whoever gives, you know, the best price gets to manage

0:38:04.040 --> 0:38:06.839
<v Speaker 1>the you know, the dot com domains. They've done that

0:38:06.880 --> 0:38:10.399
<v Speaker 1>for other you know, for other domains, and it tends

0:38:10.480 --> 0:38:12.000
<v Speaker 1>to drop the price. Pretty dramatic.

0:38:12.080 --> 0:38:14.279
<v Speaker 2>This is a personal one. I'm going to ask, how

0:38:14.320 --> 0:38:17.359
<v Speaker 2>do you feel about the Madden franchise with electronic arts?

0:38:17.360 --> 0:38:20.080
<v Speaker 4>So the reason the house this is because it sucks.

0:38:20.239 --> 0:38:22.880
<v Speaker 1>It's something that I, you know, people have been telling

0:38:22.920 --> 0:38:25.000
<v Speaker 1>me about for a long time. So monopolies is not

0:38:25.239 --> 0:38:30.760
<v Speaker 1>It's not like always obvious. The moral arguments aren't always obvious.

0:38:30.760 --> 0:38:33.319
<v Speaker 1>Mad's a really good example where and I don't know

0:38:33.320 --> 0:38:34.800
<v Speaker 1>that much about this, but you used to have a

0:38:34.840 --> 0:38:37.640
<v Speaker 1>lot of different NFL sort of football games. You had

0:38:37.640 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>at least two, Yeah, and they were and they were innovative,

0:38:40.560 --> 0:38:43.320
<v Speaker 1>so you like, they had to innovate around like different features.

0:38:43.360 --> 0:38:45.879
<v Speaker 1>I don't play video games. I don't believe in fun.

0:38:46.080 --> 0:38:49.319
<v Speaker 1>I don't like, you know, I don't think there should

0:38:49.320 --> 0:38:54.440
<v Speaker 1>be any joy. But I lost that, so, uh, but

0:38:54.480 --> 0:38:56.880
<v Speaker 1>as long as you're not going outside, that's my main concern,

0:38:57.239 --> 0:39:02.120
<v Speaker 1>not a problem. Okay, good. So you know, the these

0:39:02.239 --> 0:39:08.279
<v Speaker 1>long term monopoly arrangements are like are I think there's

0:39:08.280 --> 0:39:12.440
<v Speaker 1>something really problematic about it, But I don't exactly know

0:39:12.480 --> 0:39:15.680
<v Speaker 1>what to do about the But but the you know

0:39:15.840 --> 0:39:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Madden has gotten is it's not that it's gotten worse,

0:39:18.520 --> 0:39:21.839
<v Speaker 1>it just hasn't improved, right, And and they're there there's

0:39:21.880 --> 0:39:24.080
<v Speaker 1>also some of the other sports games they're like extracting

0:39:24.080 --> 0:39:26.600
<v Speaker 1>more and more money. But did you see this with

0:39:26.680 --> 0:39:33.239
<v Speaker 1>fanatics too? They've made the experience in sports worse. So

0:39:33.320 --> 0:39:35.799
<v Speaker 1>it's what we need to look at is these kind

0:39:35.840 --> 0:39:42.920
<v Speaker 1>of long term exclusive contracts. And there are some there

0:39:42.960 --> 0:39:46.120
<v Speaker 1>are some questions like should the NFL be able to

0:39:47.440 --> 0:39:54.080
<v Speaker 1>leverage its brands to create you know, obviously they have

0:39:55.200 --> 0:39:58.360
<v Speaker 1>obviously they have a right to profit from their brand,

0:39:58.800 --> 0:40:02.239
<v Speaker 1>right and obviously the players and they all have right

0:40:02.280 --> 0:40:05.400
<v Speaker 1>to profit from their brand, just as movie company. You know,

0:40:05.400 --> 0:40:08.759
<v Speaker 1>they get a copyright of the movies they make. But

0:40:09.560 --> 0:40:12.520
<v Speaker 1>the question is should you able should you be allowed

0:40:12.560 --> 0:40:17.400
<v Speaker 1>to take that brand that is a government granted monopoly,

0:40:17.440 --> 0:40:19.920
<v Speaker 1>which is fair because you are generating you know, you're

0:40:19.960 --> 0:40:23.920
<v Speaker 1>making the product, right, but should you be able to

0:40:23.920 --> 0:40:26.360
<v Speaker 1>turn that into another monopoly? Should be you able to

0:40:26.560 --> 0:40:31.200
<v Speaker 1>leverage that you know, or should you have to say, okay,

0:40:31.200 --> 0:40:33.600
<v Speaker 1>well we will. I'm in a profit from it. Anybody

0:40:33.600 --> 0:40:36.040
<v Speaker 1>that uses the NFL in a game has to pay me.

0:40:36.400 --> 0:40:39.600
<v Speaker 1>But I can't restrict who gets to use that in

0:40:39.680 --> 0:40:43.200
<v Speaker 1>a game, right. That was a little bit like there

0:40:43.239 --> 0:40:45.600
<v Speaker 1>have been anti trust cases on that. There was one

0:40:45.760 --> 0:40:50.239
<v Speaker 1>in the forties that restructured Hollywood. So there were a

0:40:50.280 --> 0:40:54.680
<v Speaker 1>bunch of movie studios and they owned or they controlled

0:40:55.040 --> 0:40:59.800
<v Speaker 1>theater chains, and they wouldn't let rival movies into the theaters.

0:41:00.280 --> 0:41:02.719
<v Speaker 1>So it'd be like, if you want to get you know,

0:41:02.840 --> 0:41:05.359
<v Speaker 1>like Gone with the Wind, which everyone wants to see,

0:41:05.360 --> 0:41:07.120
<v Speaker 1>then you have to take our other movies and you

0:41:07.200 --> 0:41:09.279
<v Speaker 1>have to keep rivals out of your theater. And it

0:41:09.320 --> 0:41:11.960
<v Speaker 1>was just a way of controlling the commons. It was

0:41:11.960 --> 0:41:17.360
<v Speaker 1>a way of tran of turning their monopoly over legitimate

0:41:17.600 --> 0:41:20.239
<v Speaker 1>copyright monopoly over Gone with the Win, which they had made,

0:41:20.400 --> 0:41:24.080
<v Speaker 1>into a monopoly over distribution of movies in general. And

0:41:24.560 --> 0:41:26.880
<v Speaker 1>this feels the Madden thing feels a little bit like

0:41:27.440 --> 0:41:33.880
<v Speaker 1>it's turning their brand into control over over, just like

0:41:33.960 --> 0:41:37.880
<v Speaker 1>football related video games, and that that doesn't feel it's

0:41:37.960 --> 0:41:41.520
<v Speaker 1>had the consequences that we don't like higher prices worse quality.

0:41:42.480 --> 0:41:45.160
<v Speaker 2>And you're right about Madden. I think it's a great

0:41:45.200 --> 0:41:47.840
<v Speaker 2>example of how of a problem of this kind of

0:41:47.840 --> 0:41:52.600
<v Speaker 2>long term licensing agreement because it's it is. I would

0:41:52.760 --> 0:41:54.759
<v Speaker 2>argue with people about whether it's good or bad. I

0:41:54.800 --> 0:41:57.600
<v Speaker 2>think it's a certain kind of mediocre. But you're right,

0:41:57.760 --> 0:42:00.440
<v Speaker 2>is it keeps things kind of trapped in amba it

0:42:00.480 --> 0:42:02.840
<v Speaker 2>only gets as good as the monopolist decides.

0:42:03.600 --> 0:42:07.759
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's right. And EA Sports will overpay, right, like,

0:42:08.640 --> 0:42:11.839
<v Speaker 1>they will pay more just to just to be the monopolist. Right,

0:42:11.880 --> 0:42:14.840
<v Speaker 1>They're not paying for the license, they're paying for the

0:42:14.920 --> 0:42:18.920
<v Speaker 1>license and to exclude someone else from getting into.

0:42:18.760 --> 0:42:21.480
<v Speaker 2>The space, kind of like Apple with Google.

0:42:22.120 --> 0:42:24.000
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's right. I mean, that's the thing is you

0:42:24.040 --> 0:42:26.960
<v Speaker 1>don't want so the original the Sherman At Anti Trust

0:42:27.040 --> 0:42:31.239
<v Speaker 1>acts bars monopolization and restraints of trade. So if you

0:42:31.320 --> 0:42:34.560
<v Speaker 1>think about the term restraints of trade, it is about

0:42:34.680 --> 0:42:39.920
<v Speaker 1>saying someone shouldn't be able to restrain trade to to

0:42:40.160 --> 0:42:43.480
<v Speaker 1>It's not a critique of big business. It's a critique

0:42:43.800 --> 0:42:47.480
<v Speaker 1>of not allowing business to get big right, And this

0:42:47.680 --> 0:42:51.640
<v Speaker 1>is a case where they are preventing more business from

0:42:51.640 --> 0:42:55.279
<v Speaker 1>being done by paying explicitly so others won't get that

0:42:56.320 --> 0:42:58.680
<v Speaker 1>that NFL licensing brand.

0:42:59.080 --> 0:43:02.720
<v Speaker 2>It almost feels like monopolies are just like distinctly on American.

0:43:03.040 --> 0:43:05.839
<v Speaker 1>Well, you know they they you know, let me get

0:43:05.840 --> 0:43:09.040
<v Speaker 1>this quote from Woodrow Wilson because it's it's a really

0:43:09.040 --> 0:43:12.080
<v Speaker 1>good quote. I know he's you know, it was virulently

0:43:12.160 --> 0:43:14.719
<v Speaker 1>racist and everything, but you know, take the good with

0:43:14.760 --> 0:43:18.560
<v Speaker 1>the bad. So America was created to break every kind

0:43:18.560 --> 0:43:21.160
<v Speaker 1>of monopoly and to set men free upon a footing

0:43:21.200 --> 0:43:23.799
<v Speaker 1>of equality, upon a footing of opportunity, to match their

0:43:23.840 --> 0:43:29.600
<v Speaker 1>brains and their energies. So he actually appointed Lewis Brandeis

0:43:29.640 --> 0:43:33.600
<v Speaker 1>to the Supreme Court. And you know there is a

0:43:33.960 --> 0:43:36.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, Thomas Jefferson wanted to put an antime monopoly

0:43:36.280 --> 0:43:39.239
<v Speaker 1>plank in the Constitution. That was his one of his critiques.

0:43:40.120 --> 0:43:44.120
<v Speaker 1>You know. You see, like historically, the anti monopoly lens

0:43:44.719 --> 0:43:49.320
<v Speaker 1>is kind of a critical way to understand American history.

0:43:50.560 --> 0:43:52.919
<v Speaker 1>And you can see this like over and over and over.

0:43:53.360 --> 0:43:58.840
<v Speaker 1>There is this fear of monopoly power and it comes

0:43:58.880 --> 0:44:04.879
<v Speaker 1>from the the the recognition that we do not want

0:44:04.880 --> 0:44:08.880
<v Speaker 1>to be run by a king. Right, So John Sherman,

0:44:08.920 --> 0:44:12.920
<v Speaker 1>Sherman Anti Trust Act, said that, you know, if we

0:44:12.920 --> 0:44:14.840
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be will not be ruled by a monarch, we

0:44:14.840 --> 0:44:17.960
<v Speaker 1>should not be ruled by an autocratic trade. Right, very

0:44:17.960 --> 0:44:25.239
<v Speaker 1>explicit about the link between monarchy and authoritarianism and monopoly.

0:44:25.280 --> 0:44:29.360
<v Speaker 1>And they were using the term monarchy because fascism hadn't

0:44:29.400 --> 0:44:33.120
<v Speaker 1>happened yet, right, so, but monarchy did exist, right then

0:44:33.160 --> 0:44:35.439
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteenth century, Americans were looking across the ocean

0:44:35.480 --> 0:44:37.239
<v Speaker 1>and they were seeing a bunch of kingdoms. There was

0:44:37.239 --> 0:44:38.839
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of democracy, but that's what they were

0:44:38.840 --> 0:44:40.879
<v Speaker 1>really looking at, and they were like, we don't want that.

0:44:41.440 --> 0:44:45.799
<v Speaker 1>And today we would just say fascism, right, but like you,

0:44:45.800 --> 0:44:49.759
<v Speaker 1>you know that we did analogize monopoly to fascism in

0:44:49.760 --> 0:44:52.960
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen twenties, thirties, forties. But it has always been

0:44:53.080 --> 0:44:59.400
<v Speaker 1>foundational in America that concentrations of power are what we

0:45:00.080 --> 0:45:02.600
<v Speaker 1>escaped and they are not what we want here. And

0:45:02.640 --> 0:45:06.880
<v Speaker 1>there's always been this tension because you do need to

0:45:07.000 --> 0:45:11.279
<v Speaker 1>consolidate capital and effort to do great public works and

0:45:11.320 --> 0:45:13.239
<v Speaker 1>to do great works in general, like you often do

0:45:13.320 --> 0:45:16.319
<v Speaker 1>need to do that, But how do you control the

0:45:16.400 --> 0:45:19.600
<v Speaker 1>power of that. How do you control the power of industry?

0:45:19.719 --> 0:45:21.960
<v Speaker 1>If you're going to put a billion dollars together to

0:45:22.000 --> 0:45:26.120
<v Speaker 1>build a railroad across the country, you know, that's awesome.

0:45:26.160 --> 0:45:30.680
<v Speaker 1>Now you have a transcontinental railroad, but who runs that

0:45:30.840 --> 0:45:34.920
<v Speaker 1>railroad and the prices they charge, the ability for them

0:45:34.960 --> 0:45:38.240
<v Speaker 1>to charge different prices to different classes of people based

0:45:38.280 --> 0:45:42.000
<v Speaker 1>on who they want to succeed. Now, all of a sudden,

0:45:42.000 --> 0:45:44.600
<v Speaker 1>you're talking about a political problem. Well, of course you

0:45:44.600 --> 0:45:47.120
<v Speaker 1>don't want to say you can't have a railroad, but

0:45:47.640 --> 0:45:50.480
<v Speaker 1>you do have to deal with the political power that's concentrated.

0:45:50.520 --> 0:45:52.160
<v Speaker 1>And it's true with telegraphs, it's true, you know, the

0:45:52.200 --> 0:45:54.640
<v Speaker 1>Internet going all of these things. So this has always

0:45:54.680 --> 0:45:59.440
<v Speaker 1>been a problem, a political problem that we've tried to address.

0:45:59.520 --> 0:46:01.840
<v Speaker 1>And I think what happened in the seventies and eighties,

0:46:01.880 --> 0:46:04.359
<v Speaker 1>and this has happened the last forty years, is we

0:46:04.440 --> 0:46:06.319
<v Speaker 1>just kind of forgot about it, and then all this

0:46:06.400 --> 0:46:09.200
<v Speaker 1>consolidation happened, and now we're trying to get a handle

0:46:09.200 --> 0:46:09.719
<v Speaker 1>on it again.

0:46:10.320 --> 0:46:12.640
<v Speaker 2>And is this what you were referring to you mentioned

0:46:13.080 --> 0:46:16.160
<v Speaker 2>previous previous quote of your authoritarianism is coming for the

0:46:16.200 --> 0:46:18.879
<v Speaker 2>private from the private sector. Is this what you mean?

0:46:19.480 --> 0:46:19.920
<v Speaker 1>That's right?

0:46:20.520 --> 0:46:24.160
<v Speaker 2>These It's It's fascinating as well because I've been running

0:46:24.160 --> 0:46:27.880
<v Speaker 2>business fifteen years and felt pretty well learned about this stuff,

0:46:28.080 --> 0:46:30.960
<v Speaker 2>but never really thought about these companies as political entities.

0:46:31.280 --> 0:46:35.600
<v Speaker 2>Which leads me to a cloud compute question. So do

0:46:35.680 --> 0:46:38.319
<v Speaker 2>all police basically have the same problem because right now

0:46:38.400 --> 0:46:42.239
<v Speaker 2>in tech you have basically three or four, maybe five

0:46:42.280 --> 0:46:46.920
<v Speaker 2>companies that control all cloud compute? Is that something we

0:46:46.960 --> 0:46:49.359
<v Speaker 2>should let stand it? Like do we need to see

0:46:49.400 --> 0:46:51.760
<v Speaker 2>signs of price fixing? What are the bad signs?

0:46:53.200 --> 0:46:59.480
<v Speaker 1>So really good question. Every market is its own special snowflake. Right.

0:46:59.560 --> 0:47:03.319
<v Speaker 1>You can't. You can't make you know, some markets, right,

0:47:03.840 --> 0:47:07.520
<v Speaker 1>you can? You could. You could structure a market to

0:47:07.520 --> 0:47:10.319
<v Speaker 1>have a lot of a lot of different entrants like farming. Right,

0:47:11.320 --> 0:47:14.360
<v Speaker 1>you can have a lot of people growing corn depending

0:47:14.360 --> 0:47:17.440
<v Speaker 1>on how you split up the land. You can have

0:47:17.480 --> 0:47:21.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot of banks, right. Not totally clear to me

0:47:21.200 --> 0:47:25.239
<v Speaker 1>that you could have a lot of say, auto producers, right,

0:47:25.440 --> 0:47:28.040
<v Speaker 1>not going to have a family, you know, artisanal auto

0:47:28.120 --> 0:47:35.919
<v Speaker 1>producer that makes a lot of cars, right, So same

0:47:35.960 --> 0:47:37.680
<v Speaker 1>with chemicals, same with lots of different I mean you

0:47:37.760 --> 0:47:41.160
<v Speaker 1>can like there's there's just there are some industries where

0:47:41.320 --> 0:47:45.200
<v Speaker 1>you're going to have a small number of producers semiconductors,

0:47:45.200 --> 0:47:47.400
<v Speaker 1>there's you know, they're not going to have like so

0:47:49.120 --> 0:47:52.759
<v Speaker 1>cloud computing. When I look at it, to me, it's

0:47:52.800 --> 0:47:55.880
<v Speaker 1>just a it's a capital story, right, Who has the

0:47:55.920 --> 0:48:00.160
<v Speaker 1>capital to put to build out the data centers to

0:48:00.200 --> 0:48:03.520
<v Speaker 1>get the power that you need to design the compute

0:48:03.600 --> 0:48:07.440
<v Speaker 1>that you need. And it might be the case that

0:48:07.480 --> 0:48:10.319
<v Speaker 1>you really can only have three or four of them,

0:48:10.400 --> 0:48:13.440
<v Speaker 1>maybe have some specialty cloud computing. I don't know. This

0:48:13.480 --> 0:48:17.640
<v Speaker 1>isn't an area I've studied extensionly. But typically when you

0:48:17.680 --> 0:48:20.759
<v Speaker 1>do have an entity where entity is where you have

0:48:20.920 --> 0:48:26.319
<v Speaker 1>like a huge capital investment and you can't have you

0:48:26.360 --> 0:48:29.680
<v Speaker 1>have their natural limits on the number of competitors, you

0:48:29.719 --> 0:48:34.280
<v Speaker 1>have some form of public utility regulation, which usually takes

0:48:34.360 --> 0:48:40.359
<v Speaker 1>the form of saying you can't engage in price discrimination,

0:48:40.640 --> 0:48:43.440
<v Speaker 1>like you can raise your prices, but you can't charge

0:48:43.480 --> 0:48:46.440
<v Speaker 1>more to that entity for the same service than you

0:48:46.560 --> 0:48:49.480
<v Speaker 1>charge to this other entity. And you can't you know,

0:48:49.560 --> 0:48:54.480
<v Speaker 1>and you can't say, engage in like surveillance of your

0:48:54.480 --> 0:48:58.200
<v Speaker 1>clients to give yourself an advantage that would be or

0:48:58.280 --> 0:49:01.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, there's certain like you can't pick winners and losers.

0:49:01.600 --> 0:49:04.520
<v Speaker 1>You have to you have to be a public utility.

0:49:04.520 --> 0:49:06.880
<v Speaker 1>It's a little bit like it was a little bit

0:49:06.920 --> 0:49:09.359
<v Speaker 1>like a railroad or a granary or something which is

0:49:09.680 --> 0:49:15.960
<v Speaker 1>clothed with public interest but is owned by a private entity. There.

0:49:16.360 --> 0:49:18.440
<v Speaker 1>You know, it gets a little tricky with things, you know,

0:49:18.480 --> 0:49:23.719
<v Speaker 1>with companies that make open source tools on top of

0:49:23.719 --> 0:49:27.520
<v Speaker 1>of uh you know, for cloud computing entities, do those

0:49:27.600 --> 0:49:30.920
<v Speaker 1>cloud computing anties just like absorb those tools make their

0:49:30.920 --> 0:49:33.880
<v Speaker 1>own version of it like there are you know, I

0:49:33.920 --> 0:49:37.000
<v Speaker 1>don't have an answer to all of the questions about

0:49:37.040 --> 0:49:43.040
<v Speaker 1>how to run a cloud computing infrastructure, but generally what

0:49:43.080 --> 0:49:45.160
<v Speaker 1>you want to do is you you want to say,

0:49:45.239 --> 0:49:49.000
<v Speaker 1>all right, we're gonna we're going to try to pull

0:49:49.040 --> 0:49:52.880
<v Speaker 1>the power out of we want the economies of scale,

0:49:53.200 --> 0:49:55.319
<v Speaker 1>but we're going to try to pull the ability to

0:49:55.400 --> 0:49:59.279
<v Speaker 1>be arbitrary and coercive out of the business model through

0:50:00.000 --> 0:50:05.319
<v Speaker 1>antitrust law or regulations or whatever we can do, or

0:50:05.440 --> 0:50:09.520
<v Speaker 1>just you know, transparency of pricing. You know, I know

0:50:09.560 --> 0:50:12.560
<v Speaker 1>there's some egress pricing. I mean that's you know, being

0:50:12.560 --> 0:50:16.280
<v Speaker 1>able allowing people to get out of the cloud computing

0:50:16.480 --> 0:50:19.880
<v Speaker 1>pull their data out if they want so. There are

0:50:19.960 --> 0:50:24.040
<v Speaker 1>different techniques, but the basic idea is to recognize that

0:50:24.640 --> 0:50:28.600
<v Speaker 1>there is a there is a public interest in this

0:50:28.800 --> 0:50:33.520
<v Speaker 1>private in these in these these in this private infrastructure,

0:50:34.239 --> 0:50:37.600
<v Speaker 1>and so the public has some right, not total right,

0:50:37.680 --> 0:50:41.800
<v Speaker 1>but some right to control how these entities are are operating.

0:50:41.480 --> 0:50:43.640
<v Speaker 2>And that they could that they must be free trade

0:50:43.680 --> 0:50:45.480
<v Speaker 2>in the sense that someone can easily leave and go

0:50:45.560 --> 0:50:48.560
<v Speaker 2>to a competitor right within reason.

0:50:48.719 --> 0:50:49.799
<v Speaker 1>In reason, Yeah, that's right.

0:50:50.719 --> 0:50:52.759
<v Speaker 2>Another question I think we can wrap up with this

0:50:52.800 --> 0:50:56.479
<v Speaker 2>one is Meta a monopoly? Because Meta is the only

0:50:56.560 --> 0:51:01.040
<v Speaker 2>provider of advertising on metas products and they have there

0:51:01.120 --> 0:51:04.920
<v Speaker 2>is no way that someone realistically compete with Facebook. It

0:51:05.000 --> 0:51:07.200
<v Speaker 2>is too big at this point, and same with Instagram

0:51:07.520 --> 0:51:11.440
<v Speaker 2>kind of is it a monopoly? I'm trying to understand

0:51:11.440 --> 0:51:12.759
<v Speaker 2>these concepts in real time.

0:51:13.440 --> 0:51:15.319
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean I think you you know there are

0:51:15.320 --> 0:51:18.200
<v Speaker 1>different markets, right, So I think an easier way to

0:51:18.200 --> 0:51:21.400
<v Speaker 1>conceptualize this would be to look at Apple, right, Apple

0:51:21.400 --> 0:51:24.560
<v Speaker 1>and Google, and you would say, well, Apple's not a monopoly.

0:51:24.600 --> 0:51:27.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I can I can buy an Android phone, right, right,

0:51:27.960 --> 0:51:30.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't need to buy an Apple an iPhone, right?

0:51:30.520 --> 0:51:32.200
<v Speaker 1>And that's true if you're looking at it from a

0:51:32.239 --> 0:51:35.160
<v Speaker 1>perspective of somebody who's buying a phone. It's a duopoly.

0:51:35.239 --> 0:51:36.920
<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of market power there, but it's not

0:51:36.960 --> 0:51:40.759
<v Speaker 1>a monopoly. However, what if you've bought the phone now,

0:51:40.800 --> 0:51:43.319
<v Speaker 1>all of a sudden, you you know, you can't it's

0:51:43.360 --> 0:51:47.040
<v Speaker 1>not easy to switch, right, so you're kind of locked in.

0:51:48.080 --> 0:51:51.719
<v Speaker 1>Is Apple a monopoly? Kind of kind of? Okay, Well,

0:51:51.719 --> 0:51:53.879
<v Speaker 1>you can look at it from a different point of view,

0:51:53.880 --> 0:51:58.320
<v Speaker 1>which is what if you're an app developer right now,

0:51:58.400 --> 0:52:01.480
<v Speaker 1>you have to get on the I phone because some

0:52:01.520 --> 0:52:04.640
<v Speaker 1>of your customers are there and you can't not be

0:52:04.840 --> 0:52:09.480
<v Speaker 1>on the iPhone. So getting into the app store for Apple,

0:52:09.920 --> 0:52:12.040
<v Speaker 1>that's a monopoly question. And the same thing is true

0:52:12.080 --> 0:52:15.800
<v Speaker 1>for Getting So it's a little bit like you're you know, sure,

0:52:16.280 --> 0:52:19.160
<v Speaker 1>maybe you can. There's a lot of railroad options, but

0:52:19.200 --> 0:52:22.680
<v Speaker 1>there's only one railroad that goes from one town to another.

0:52:22.880 --> 0:52:25.279
<v Speaker 1>So there might be a bunch of different railroads, but

0:52:25.880 --> 0:52:28.240
<v Speaker 1>for what you need, there's only one option.

0:52:28.600 --> 0:52:30.120
<v Speaker 2>So it's access to the customer.

0:52:30.440 --> 0:52:32.879
<v Speaker 1>Well, right, just there's lots of different markets, there's lots

0:52:32.880 --> 0:52:36.600
<v Speaker 1>of ways to understand, you know, what what market power means.

0:52:36.880 --> 0:52:39.120
<v Speaker 1>So if you take that back to Facebook, which is

0:52:39.160 --> 0:52:44.879
<v Speaker 1>really like a conglomerate of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. Do

0:52:44.920 --> 0:52:46.920
<v Speaker 1>they have market power and where do they have market

0:52:46.960 --> 0:52:52.120
<v Speaker 1>power over? I think you'd look at the ability to

0:52:52.160 --> 0:52:56.120
<v Speaker 1>buy certain kinds of advertising, right if do you need

0:52:56.200 --> 0:52:59.320
<v Speaker 1>if you're running advertising campaigns, do you need to buy

0:52:59.600 --> 0:53:03.880
<v Speaker 1>on Facebook? Or can you just avoid Facebook entirely? This

0:53:04.040 --> 0:53:07.200
<v Speaker 1>is one of the questions in the Google case, and

0:53:07.200 --> 0:53:10.040
<v Speaker 1>this is the question in actually multiple Google cases, And

0:53:10.080 --> 0:53:14.279
<v Speaker 1>it's been a question in a different case involving medical advertising,

0:53:14.280 --> 0:53:17.040
<v Speaker 1>which had to involve a company called IQBA, and the

0:53:17.080 --> 0:53:20.800
<v Speaker 1>court found that in fact, yes, if you are doing

0:53:20.840 --> 0:53:28.080
<v Speaker 1>specifically pharmaceutical marketing, IQB is is there is market power

0:53:28.160 --> 0:53:32.120
<v Speaker 1>involved in these very narrow places where you have to buy.

0:53:32.160 --> 0:53:34.880
<v Speaker 1>It's kind of like that smaller railroad, that one place

0:53:34.920 --> 0:53:36.480
<v Speaker 1>you put at the one the only one that goes

0:53:36.480 --> 0:53:38.359
<v Speaker 1>to the place that you need to go, the jack

0:53:38.440 --> 0:53:42.399
<v Speaker 1>up prices and control who gets to use it. So

0:53:42.520 --> 0:53:44.880
<v Speaker 1>the question, I think the question I would ask is,

0:53:45.280 --> 0:53:47.759
<v Speaker 1>if you're an advertiser, do you have to buy on

0:53:48.400 --> 0:53:53.400
<v Speaker 1>Facebook's products? If you are, you know, a company, do

0:53:53.480 --> 0:53:56.960
<v Speaker 1>you have to communicate through Facebook's tools? Right? I know

0:53:57.000 --> 0:54:01.160
<v Speaker 1>WhatsApp is really embedded in a lot of different business

0:54:01.239 --> 0:54:04.719
<v Speaker 1>arrangements at this point. So that's where that's kind of

0:54:04.760 --> 0:54:07.040
<v Speaker 1>how I would I would look at it, and I

0:54:07.080 --> 0:54:11.640
<v Speaker 1>think you could make a pretty good argument that Facebook

0:54:11.719 --> 0:54:16.040
<v Speaker 1>has immense market power in social networking in general. You

0:54:16.080 --> 0:54:19.600
<v Speaker 1>know the definition. There's different ways to test for monopoly.

0:54:19.640 --> 0:54:21.840
<v Speaker 1>You could just say, well, can they raise prices without

0:54:22.239 --> 0:54:26.440
<v Speaker 1>really losing very much? It's been, which they have been,

0:54:26.480 --> 0:54:28.719
<v Speaker 1>and I think it's pretty clear that they can. And

0:54:29.640 --> 0:54:33.640
<v Speaker 1>if there were another option, right, you could you probably would.

0:54:33.680 --> 0:54:38.000
<v Speaker 1>They would they would see loss of customers bleeding going

0:54:38.080 --> 0:54:40.759
<v Speaker 1>somewhere else, and they don't see that. Another way to

0:54:40.880 --> 0:54:45.360
<v Speaker 1>understand it is, after some of the scandals that they've had,

0:54:45.680 --> 0:54:48.279
<v Speaker 1>do they lose customers because of it? Do they lose

0:54:48.360 --> 0:54:50.839
<v Speaker 1>users because of it? And the answer is no. Right,

0:54:51.080 --> 0:54:54.400
<v Speaker 1>So there doesn't really seem to be an effect of

0:54:54.960 --> 0:54:58.400
<v Speaker 1>the quality of the product. It doesn't seem to affect

0:54:59.160 --> 0:55:00.560
<v Speaker 1>whether people you it or not.

0:55:00.920 --> 0:55:03.799
<v Speaker 2>Oh, actually, I might push back at that a little bit,

0:55:03.800 --> 0:55:07.320
<v Speaker 2>and perhaps I'm misunderstanding your point. But Facebook's advertising product

0:55:07.360 --> 0:55:10.359
<v Speaker 2>is decaying to the point that it's actually unreliable how

0:55:10.440 --> 0:55:13.839
<v Speaker 2>much comes out of it, And also they approve there's

0:55:13.880 --> 0:55:16.439
<v Speaker 2>a big thing where they approve fake ads for fake

0:55:16.880 --> 0:55:21.960
<v Speaker 2>for other companies. So it's interesting as well because it

0:55:22.080 --> 0:55:26.320
<v Speaker 2>almost feels as if we need a full consumer awakening

0:55:26.400 --> 0:55:28.719
<v Speaker 2>just to the concept of monopolies writ large, so that

0:55:28.760 --> 0:55:31.600
<v Speaker 2>people can start looking at these companies and acting and

0:55:31.680 --> 0:55:33.240
<v Speaker 2>even just discussing them differently.

0:55:34.040 --> 0:55:38.040
<v Speaker 1>Right, So, to Facebook, the product quality is decaying, the

0:55:38.120 --> 0:55:42.400
<v Speaker 1>advertising quality is decaying. Are they losing business because of it.

0:55:42.800 --> 0:55:45.560
<v Speaker 2>As in they being meta or they be right?

0:55:46.239 --> 0:55:50.560
<v Speaker 1>Because if they're not, then what that's proof of monopoly power?

0:55:50.640 --> 0:55:53.360
<v Speaker 1>Because what's right gowing is the quality is declining, but

0:55:53.400 --> 0:55:56.319
<v Speaker 1>they're not getting Like if it were if there were

0:55:56.320 --> 0:55:59.640
<v Speaker 1>a competitive market and the quality of a product went down,

0:56:00.000 --> 0:56:01.960
<v Speaker 1>people would say, I'm not going to buy that product anymore,

0:56:02.200 --> 0:56:04.719
<v Speaker 1>the shirts fall apart, I'll go buy somewhere else. But

0:56:04.920 --> 0:56:06.839
<v Speaker 1>because but it's like, if that's the only place where

0:56:06.880 --> 0:56:09.320
<v Speaker 1>you can get the product, you can't. You have no choice.

0:56:09.360 --> 0:56:10.880
<v Speaker 1>You have to keep buying from them.

0:56:10.960 --> 0:56:16.400
<v Speaker 2>Right right, that makes sense? So Matt, Yeah, this has

0:56:16.440 --> 0:56:18.560
<v Speaker 2>been such a pleasure. Thank you so much for joining

0:56:18.600 --> 0:56:19.840
<v Speaker 2>me today. Where can people find you?

0:56:20.480 --> 0:56:24.560
<v Speaker 1>So? I write a newsletter called The Big Newsletter dot com,

0:56:24.560 --> 0:56:29.320
<v Speaker 1>which is about monopoly, power and finance. And I also

0:56:29.800 --> 0:56:32.760
<v Speaker 1>am the research director of a nonprofit called the American

0:56:32.760 --> 0:56:36.919
<v Speaker 1>Economic Liberties Project. And then I rant on Twitter way

0:56:36.920 --> 0:56:41.040
<v Speaker 1>too often. That's my you know, that's my madden post.

0:56:41.040 --> 0:56:44.080
<v Speaker 2>This mindset, it's the greatest. You've all been listening to

0:56:44.120 --> 0:56:46.560
<v Speaker 2>Better Offline. Thank you for listening so much, and of

0:56:46.560 --> 0:56:49.200
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0:56:49.280 --> 0:56:50.040
<v Speaker 2>follow after this.

0:56:59.160 --> 0:57:00.880
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0:57:01.000 --> 0:57:03.399
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0:57:03.480 --> 0:57:06.160
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0:57:06.160 --> 0:57:09.799
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0:57:09.800 --> 0:57:14.279
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0:57:14.280 --> 0:57:16.800
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