WEBVTT - Illusory Truth Effect, Part 1: The Big Lie

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<v Speaker 1>My welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff Works dot com. Hey you welcome to Stuff to

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<v Speaker 1>Blow your Mind. My name is Robert Lamb and I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Joe McCormick. In. Today, we're gonna be talking about one

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<v Speaker 1>of our favorite subjects, our tendency to believe things that

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<v Speaker 1>aren't true. Uh. Now, Robert, I wonder is there a

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<v Speaker 1>false factoid or claim that you just always find yourself

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<v Speaker 1>recalling as true even though you've checked it before and

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<v Speaker 1>discovered it to be false in the past. Yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is an interesting question because I feel like there are

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<v Speaker 1>things that come up in research all the time, certainly

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<v Speaker 1>key things over the years. Uh. You know, as we

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<v Speaker 1>research and riot different topics where I have to correct on,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, where I think I knew something and then

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<v Speaker 1>I'm like, oh, well that's that's actually now that actually

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<v Speaker 1>do the research, it's not not a not a fact.

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<v Speaker 1>And then then you know, the same goes for false beliefs,

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<v Speaker 1>that beliefs that they creep in the sort of Mandela

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<v Speaker 1>fact type of scenario. For instance, there was a time

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<v Speaker 1>when I thought Gene Wilder was dead prior to his

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<v Speaker 1>actual death, and then as he actually dead, now he

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<v Speaker 1>was actually dead now. So I thought he was dead

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<v Speaker 1>before he was dead exactly because and I think it

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<v Speaker 1>was just a combination of he was not as active anymore,

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<v Speaker 1>and I wasn't really keeping up with the Gene Wilder

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<v Speaker 1>filmography and like current events related to Gene Wilder and

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<v Speaker 1>something maybe I picked up on some news piece at

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<v Speaker 1>some point and somehow he got clicked to the dead category.

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<v Speaker 1>And then when I found out he was alive, it

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<v Speaker 1>was it was really like he came back to life.

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<v Speaker 1>And I had the same thing happened literally just the

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<v Speaker 1>other day with a standout comedian, Larry Miller. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>think I remember who that is. Oh. He he had

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<v Speaker 1>to kind of you know, dry observational comedy. He he

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<v Speaker 1>had a I think he still acts, but he would

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<v Speaker 1>show up on say night chord. I think, oh wait

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<v Speaker 1>a minute of seeing some Christopher Guest movies. He may

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<v Speaker 1>have been. Yeah, But for some reason years ago, I

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<v Speaker 1>got into my had that he had passed away, And

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<v Speaker 1>so occasionally I would think of Larry Miller and be like, oh, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I remember Larry Miller. Too bad he passed. And then

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<v Speaker 1>I actually looked him up the other day and it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out he has not passed away. He's still very

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<v Speaker 1>much alive and active, and I was just living in

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<v Speaker 1>this fantasy world of dead Larry Miller's. You know, I

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<v Speaker 1>have false beliefs that recur with much more significance, Like

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<v Speaker 1>I keep remembering that. Yeah, maybe it's just because I

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<v Speaker 1>was told this all the time when I was a kid,

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<v Speaker 1>that vitamin C supplements will ward off colds. That is

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<v Speaker 1>not experimentally proven, that that is like not a finding

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<v Speaker 1>of science. And yet I just always if I haven't

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<v Speaker 1>checked in a while, it just seeps right back in, like, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>that is true, vitamin C it'll keep colds away. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it's easy to fall into the trap. I do this

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<v Speaker 1>all the time with with various vitamins and some supplements

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<v Speaker 1>where I'm like, I don't know if it works, probably

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't work, but I'm gonna go and take it just

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<v Speaker 1>in case, because it's it's vitamin C. You know, what's

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<v Speaker 1>the what's what's the harm there? It's kind of like

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<v Speaker 1>believing in God's in cases that he exists. Believing in vitamins. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but then you end up with like a weird sort

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<v Speaker 1>of vitamin tentnacle going out of your neck and you

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<v Speaker 1>didn't see that coming. That's fake news. The Joe Vitamin

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<v Speaker 1>C will not cause a tentacle to grow out of

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<v Speaker 1>your neck. But now you've heard it, it's true. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, I feel like there are things that have

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<v Speaker 1>popped up where where I'll think, well, I've always heard X,

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<v Speaker 1>but I've never actually looked it up. Um. And and

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<v Speaker 1>then that's where the problem seeps in, you know, where

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<v Speaker 1>I just I think I know something, but I'm not sure,

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<v Speaker 1>but I don't care enough to actually investigate. Um. There

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<v Speaker 1>is one possible example that that comes up, and that

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<v Speaker 1>is there was this, of course, the idea that George

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<v Speaker 1>Washington Carver invented peanut better. He did know he had

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<v Speaker 1>something to do with peanuts. He had, so yeah, he was.

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<v Speaker 1>He was. He is a famous inventor, important to African

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<v Speaker 1>American inventor. And I just I didn't know a lot

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<v Speaker 1>about him, and I had always heard the peanut better thing,

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<v Speaker 1>but I didn't actually research until I helped my son

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<v Speaker 1>with a class project about him earlier this year, and

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<v Speaker 1>then I was able to definitely, you know, check that

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<v Speaker 1>one off on the mental list, like, okay, this is

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is false. He did not invent peanut butter.

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<v Speaker 1>He did, but he did do stuff with peanuts, do

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<v Speaker 1>stuff with peanuts, but not peanut butter. Okay. You know.

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<v Speaker 1>A huge place where you can see false beliefs persisting

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<v Speaker 1>um is in people's beliefs about sort of like political

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<v Speaker 1>facts or sociological data. A very very common one is

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<v Speaker 1>people's beliefs about crime. I think it's because like crime

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<v Speaker 1>is one of those like sensational types of subjects and

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<v Speaker 1>makes people think about violence, images of blood they see

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<v Speaker 1>on the news and stuff like that. In a poll

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<v Speaker 1>conducted by Pew in the fall of get this, fifty

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<v Speaker 1>seven percent, so a majority of people who had voted

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<v Speaker 1>or planned to vote in ten said that crime had

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<v Speaker 1>gotten worse in the United States since two thousand eight

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<v Speaker 1>by every objective measure. Exactly. The opposite is true. That's

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<v Speaker 1>just not true. FBI statistics based off of like nationwide

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<v Speaker 1>police reports UH found that violent crime and property crime

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<v Speaker 1>in the United States fell nineteen percent and twenty three percent, respectively,

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<v Speaker 1>between two thousand and eight. And and so you think, okay, well,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe that if that's just police reports, maybe fewer people

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<v Speaker 1>are reporting crimes to the police, right, But also the

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<v Speaker 1>U S Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics does

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<v Speaker 1>direct annual surveys of more than ninety thousand households to

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<v Speaker 1>see about rates of crime that might not be reported

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<v Speaker 1>to police, and quote the b j S state to

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<v Speaker 1>show that violent crime and property crime rates fell twenty

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<v Speaker 1>six percent and twenty two percent, respectively between two thousand eight.

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<v Speaker 1>And so a majority of people are believing something that

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<v Speaker 1>by every measure we know, is not true. Crime has

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<v Speaker 1>gone down, and yet a majority of people believe it

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<v Speaker 1>has gone up. And it's not hard to see why

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<v Speaker 1>that might be true when you consider like the political

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<v Speaker 1>messaging of certain politicians. It's also you could also, of

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<v Speaker 1>course think about just people negativity bias, right, the tendency

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<v Speaker 1>to believe things are worse than they are in the

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<v Speaker 1>broad sense or mean world syndrome looking at dangerous stuff

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<v Speaker 1>happening on the news and thus having an overrepresentation of

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<v Speaker 1>it in your mind. But I think we would be

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<v Speaker 1>wrong to ignore the effects of hearing specific politicians well,

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<v Speaker 1>for for example, in twenty sixteen, specifically, it was Donald

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<v Speaker 1>Trump a lot talking about how crime is through the roof, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And to your point, we can look to statistics on this.

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<v Speaker 1>This is not something that is uh, that is just

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<v Speaker 1>you know, in the ether, we have hard data. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not a matter of opinion. It's just like every measure

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<v Speaker 1>we have says that's not correct. But what about other beliefs,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean that that's certainly not in isolation. There are

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<v Speaker 1>lots of cases where there are widespread beliefs in things

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<v Speaker 1>that are just simply factually not true. Yeah. I'll run

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<v Speaker 1>through a few here that that range on topic. For instance,

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<v Speaker 1>here's a nice science related one to kick off with. UH.

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<v Speaker 1>In a two thousand fifteen PU survey, only thirty percent

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<v Speaker 1>of Americans knew that water boils at a lower temperature

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<v Speaker 1>at higher altitudes. Thirty nine percent said it would boil

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<v Speaker 1>at the same temperature in Denver in l A, again

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<v Speaker 1>Denver being at a far higher altitude, and had it reversed.

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<v Speaker 1>So the majority, something like two thirds of people were

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<v Speaker 1>just flat wrong, yes and uh yeah. And to put

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<v Speaker 1>that in perspective with another science fact, most Americans in

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<v Speaker 1>this two thousand fifteen survey eight correctly identified the Earth's

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<v Speaker 1>inner layer, the core, as its hottest part. And uh

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<v Speaker 1>nearly as many two percent knew that uranium was needed

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<v Speaker 1>to make nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Well, should we

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<v Speaker 1>be comforted by the fact that that's what people know.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't like, they don't know much about water, but

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<v Speaker 1>they know about nuclear weapons. Well. I mean, on one hand,

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear weapons is was is and was more in the news. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And then on the other hand, like the the inside

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<v Speaker 1>of the earth is more engaging and and also completely unpoliticized. Uh. Well, well,

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<v Speaker 1>water is not politically boiling point of water is not politicized.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's also not very sexy. I guess like it's

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's one of those things where unless you're actively

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<v Speaker 1>moving from low to high altitudes, or you know, living

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<v Speaker 1>part of your time and dinner from part of your

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<v Speaker 1>time in l A, I guess it's it's very possible

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<v Speaker 1>to live your entire life without really having any real

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<v Speaker 1>world experience with the difference. Uh. Though, I do feel

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<v Speaker 1>like if you read enough baking manuals, it comes up. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but maybe you just don't remember which way it goes.

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<v Speaker 1>I guess I say that you know one of the

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<v Speaker 1>ones you've got here that that has come up many

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<v Speaker 1>times in my life. It's come up enough that I

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<v Speaker 1>know the right answer now. But the misconception that you

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<v Speaker 1>can see the Great Wall of China from space. Oh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is one that I have to admit. I think

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<v Speaker 1>I used to adhere to again without really a rap

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<v Speaker 1>princing it, because it just it had that kind of

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<v Speaker 1>truthiness to it, right, and you want it to be

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<v Speaker 1>to be real. The idea that that this this epic

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<v Speaker 1>structure created uh you know long ago, is visible from space,

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<v Speaker 1>but it's actually been been disproven multiple times. It's it's

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<v Speaker 1>only visible from low orbit under very ideal conditions, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's not visible from the moon at all. Because that's

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<v Speaker 1>another version of it, that it's that that the Great

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<v Speaker 1>Wall of China can be seen from the moon. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I guess there are nuances to the word visible. What's

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<v Speaker 1>that mean? But in the normal sense that you would

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<v Speaker 1>mean it's not visible from space. Now a two thousand

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<v Speaker 1>sixteen you gov poll, this was this is a UK group.

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<v Speaker 1>They looked at how belief in Pizza Gate, that thing,

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<v Speaker 1>how that shakes out across different voter groups. Now, that

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<v Speaker 1>was this vast conspiracy theory people had about how there

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<v Speaker 1>was a pizza restaurant in Washington, d C. That was

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<v Speaker 1>like running child slavery ings that was linked to the

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<v Speaker 1>Democratic Party. Yeah, it had to do with an idea

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<v Speaker 1>that Clinton campaign emails supposedly talked about human trafficking and pedophilia.

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<v Speaker 1>And according to this particular poll, seventeen percent of polled

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<v Speaker 1>Clinton voters believed that that this was the case, this

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<v Speaker 1>was a reality, and forty percent of Trump voters did. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>And then there's another classic they looked out to to

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<v Speaker 1>put this in perspective, the idea that President Barack Obama

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<v Speaker 1>was born in Kenya. Kind Of alarmingly enough, across both

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<v Speaker 1>groups of voters, both the Clinton voters and the Trump voters,

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<v Speaker 1>they found thirty six percent believed it, despite the fact

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<v Speaker 1>that that too, has been debunked time and time again. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's crazy that these types of beliefs can

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<v Speaker 1>catch on so well, especially like we we understand very

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<v Speaker 1>well the way that political ideology and tribal thinking affects

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<v Speaker 1>the way we form opinions. Obviously, our our opinions are

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<v Speaker 1>deeply informed by what people we view as our in

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<v Speaker 1>group believe, and so we want to be in line

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<v Speaker 1>with the in group and and stuff like that. But

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<v Speaker 1>you also can't really ignore the fact that these are

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<v Speaker 1>things that if you pay attention to certain sources you're

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<v Speaker 1>going to be hearing over and over and over again,

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<v Speaker 1>and what effect that might have, Because it's, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>widely accepted folk wisdom that if you repeat a lie enough,

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<v Speaker 1>people start to believe that it's the truth. Right, That's

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<v Speaker 1>one of the things. I mean, I don't know, you've

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<v Speaker 1>said it enough times that I'm already convinced exactly, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean almost going along with this. Uh. There's a quote

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<v Speaker 1>that often gets sourced to the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Gebbele's. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>Some versions of the quote say something like, if you

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<v Speaker 1>repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it, and

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<v Speaker 1>you will even come to believe it yourself. I couldn't

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<v Speaker 1>find any evidence that just Gebbels actually said that. It

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<v Speaker 1>seems to be a misattribution, but it's sort of a

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<v Speaker 1>paraphrase of similar ideas that are you know, within that

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<v Speaker 1>that frame of thinking. Like Adolf Hitler himself throat in

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<v Speaker 1>mind comp quote, The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield

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<v Speaker 1>no success unless one fundamental principle is born in mind

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<v Speaker 1>constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to

0:12:13.080 --> 0:12:16.439
<v Speaker 1>a few points and repeat them over and over here,

0:12:16.480 --> 0:12:19.360
<v Speaker 1>as so often in the world, persistence is the first

0:12:19.679 --> 0:12:23.760
<v Speaker 1>and most important requirement for success. So just the fact

0:12:23.760 --> 0:12:26.480
<v Speaker 1>that Hitler said it obviously shouldn't make us think, well,

0:12:26.520 --> 0:12:28.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, he's right. He was Hitler though. If if

0:12:28.679 --> 0:12:30.960
<v Speaker 1>Hitler was good at anything, it was getting lots of

0:12:30.960 --> 0:12:34.880
<v Speaker 1>people to believe lies. Certainly. So, I think because this

0:12:34.960 --> 0:12:38.319
<v Speaker 1>is such an important issue, and because widespread misconceptions are

0:12:38.360 --> 0:12:41.640
<v Speaker 1>so common, and because they can, in fact, especially in

0:12:41.640 --> 0:12:45.680
<v Speaker 1>some political circumstances, be so destructive, and because the repetition

0:12:45.720 --> 0:12:49.400
<v Speaker 1>of lies and false statements in in at every scale

0:12:49.440 --> 0:12:51.760
<v Speaker 1>of existence, you know, in in mass media and in

0:12:51.800 --> 0:12:55.040
<v Speaker 1>our personal private lives, is so common, I think it's

0:12:55.040 --> 0:12:58.720
<v Speaker 1>worth looking at the actual empirical case. Is this true,

0:12:59.000 --> 0:13:04.040
<v Speaker 1>the idea that repeeding statements over and over does that

0:13:04.120 --> 0:13:06.760
<v Speaker 1>actually change what we believe. It's one of those things

0:13:06.800 --> 0:13:09.080
<v Speaker 1>that you know, it sounds so common sensical you just

0:13:09.160 --> 0:13:13.040
<v Speaker 1>assume it's true. But according to the logic we're using now,

0:13:13.080 --> 0:13:15.720
<v Speaker 1>those are exactly the kinds of statements that maybe we

0:13:15.760 --> 0:13:18.240
<v Speaker 1>should be careful about. Yeah, and I think this is

0:13:18.240 --> 0:13:21.200
<v Speaker 1>an important important topic for for everybody. I don't care

0:13:21.200 --> 0:13:24.559
<v Speaker 1>who you voted for in any previous elections, or which

0:13:24.760 --> 0:13:27.920
<v Speaker 1>political party in your given system that you adhere to.

0:13:28.320 --> 0:13:31.240
<v Speaker 1>I think if you're listening to this show especially, you

0:13:31.280 --> 0:13:35.320
<v Speaker 1>want to think for yourself. You want to reduce the

0:13:35.360 --> 0:13:38.120
<v Speaker 1>amount of manipulation that's going on with your your own

0:13:38.200 --> 0:13:41.600
<v Speaker 1>view of reality and and and that's what we're going

0:13:41.679 --> 0:13:45.360
<v Speaker 1>to discuss here today. We're gonna discuss the degree to

0:13:45.440 --> 0:13:51.480
<v Speaker 1>which false information can manipulate our view of reality and ultimately,

0:13:51.720 --> 0:13:54.440
<v Speaker 1>what are some of the things we can do to

0:13:54.440 --> 0:13:57.679
<v Speaker 1>to hold onto our our our individuality and all of

0:13:57.679 --> 0:13:59.760
<v Speaker 1>this exactly. So this is going to be the first

0:13:59.760 --> 0:14:02.680
<v Speaker 1>of a two part episode where we explore the liar's

0:14:02.800 --> 0:14:07.360
<v Speaker 1>best trick, the question of repetition and exposure in forming

0:14:07.360 --> 0:14:10.880
<v Speaker 1>our beliefs and changing our attitudes. So that's going to

0:14:10.960 --> 0:14:13.920
<v Speaker 1>be the jumping off point for today's episode. Does exposure

0:14:13.960 --> 0:14:17.880
<v Speaker 1>and repetition Is hearing a claim and hearing it repeated

0:14:17.960 --> 0:14:21.280
<v Speaker 1>actually have the power to change our beliefs or is

0:14:21.320 --> 0:14:24.880
<v Speaker 1>that just unverified folk wisdom? Yeah? And and of course

0:14:24.920 --> 0:14:26.880
<v Speaker 1>it goes it goes well beyond politics. It also gets

0:14:26.880 --> 0:14:30.560
<v Speaker 1>into marketing. You know, we've we've touched on the manipulative

0:14:30.920 --> 0:14:34.760
<v Speaker 1>nature of marketing and advertisement on the show before, And

0:14:35.440 --> 0:14:37.360
<v Speaker 1>it's always one of the things you always come back to.

0:14:37.360 --> 0:14:39.800
<v Speaker 1>It's always about messaging, right, like what is the message

0:14:39.800 --> 0:14:42.080
<v Speaker 1>of the product, what's the message of the ad campaign?

0:14:42.360 --> 0:14:45.520
<v Speaker 1>And how they just continue to hammer that home. Why

0:14:45.600 --> 0:14:49.040
<v Speaker 1>do brands have slogans? Yeah? Why don't they just tell

0:14:49.160 --> 0:14:52.560
<v Speaker 1>you a positive message about the brand that's different every time?

0:14:52.720 --> 0:14:55.400
<v Speaker 1>Why do they tell you the same message in the

0:14:55.480 --> 0:14:59.640
<v Speaker 1>same words in every commercial? Yeah? Why did those fabulous

0:15:00.120 --> 0:15:02.440
<v Speaker 1>horror trailers from the nineteen seventies say the name of

0:15:02.440 --> 0:15:05.880
<v Speaker 1>the film eighteen times, don't go in the basement, don't

0:15:05.920 --> 0:15:10.120
<v Speaker 1>go in the basement? No one er seventeen will be admitted. Yeah,

0:15:10.160 --> 0:15:12.360
<v Speaker 1>it's all. It's all kind of part of the same situation.

0:15:12.680 --> 0:15:14.480
<v Speaker 1>All right, Well, we're going to take a quick break

0:15:14.520 --> 0:15:16.760
<v Speaker 1>and when we get back we will dive into the

0:15:16.880 --> 0:15:21.160
<v Speaker 1>research in the history of psychology about repetition and exposure.

0:15:22.120 --> 0:15:26.200
<v Speaker 1>Thank alright, we're back. So the first question we're going

0:15:26.240 --> 0:15:29.280
<v Speaker 1>to be looking at today is whether anyone has actually

0:15:29.360 --> 0:15:33.240
<v Speaker 1>studied this question, this question of whether exposing people to

0:15:33.400 --> 0:15:37.000
<v Speaker 1>acclaim and then repeating the claim makes them believe it,

0:15:37.360 --> 0:15:40.880
<v Speaker 1>Whether anybody studied that in a controlled scientific context. And

0:15:40.880 --> 0:15:43.960
<v Speaker 1>the answer is a resounding yes. There are I think

0:15:44.080 --> 0:15:47.760
<v Speaker 1>dozens of studies on this subject in various forms. Probably

0:15:47.800 --> 0:15:50.800
<v Speaker 1>the flagship study on this, the first big one that

0:15:50.840 --> 0:15:54.360
<v Speaker 1>everybody sites that that really got people into the subject,

0:15:54.440 --> 0:15:56.680
<v Speaker 1>that got the ball rolling on it was from ninety

0:15:56.760 --> 0:16:00.120
<v Speaker 1>seven and it was by Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein, and

0:16:00.160 --> 0:16:04.280
<v Speaker 1>Thomas Topino, and it was called Frequency and the Conference

0:16:04.360 --> 0:16:08.240
<v Speaker 1>of Referential Validity in the Journal of Verbal Learning and

0:16:08.320 --> 0:16:10.680
<v Speaker 1>Verbal Behavior. And that was, as I said, in nineteen

0:16:10.760 --> 0:16:13.800
<v Speaker 1>seventy seven. So the authors started out in the study

0:16:13.840 --> 0:16:16.720
<v Speaker 1>by talking about how most studies of memory that take

0:16:16.800 --> 0:16:21.560
<v Speaker 1>place in the lab involved useless or meaningless information units.

0:16:21.560 --> 0:16:24.320
<v Speaker 1>So researchers, for example, might try to see how well

0:16:24.560 --> 0:16:27.400
<v Speaker 1>subjects remember a phrase like I just made this up.

0:16:27.640 --> 0:16:31.720
<v Speaker 1>The purple donkey was made of soft spoken muscular elves, Like,

0:16:31.760 --> 0:16:35.240
<v Speaker 1>can you remember that word for word? The purple donkey

0:16:35.360 --> 0:16:40.000
<v Speaker 1>was made by muscular elves, now, now you're close, not

0:16:40.160 --> 0:16:42.840
<v Speaker 1>made of Yeah, it makes a lot more sense to

0:16:42.880 --> 0:16:45.120
<v Speaker 1>say made by wo But I see, I've already messed

0:16:45.200 --> 0:16:49.400
<v Speaker 1>up the origin story of the purple donkey. Statements like

0:16:49.400 --> 0:16:51.800
<v Speaker 1>this have no importance in the real world, and part

0:16:51.800 --> 0:16:54.680
<v Speaker 1>of what they were talking about is that we're testing

0:16:54.720 --> 0:16:59.360
<v Speaker 1>for memory and things that don't have any validity to reality. Um,

0:16:59.600 --> 0:17:02.120
<v Speaker 1>so the authors right that they're curious about what kind

0:17:02.160 --> 0:17:05.720
<v Speaker 1>of processing subjects do with information units that might have

0:17:05.880 --> 0:17:10.359
<v Speaker 1>validity in the real world. For example, factual statements like quote,

0:17:10.560 --> 0:17:14.360
<v Speaker 1>the total population of Greenland is about fifty thou which

0:17:14.359 --> 0:17:17.040
<v Speaker 1>at the time of the study it was I checked. Though,

0:17:17.080 --> 0:17:18.840
<v Speaker 1>that seems like a lot more people than should be

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:22.320
<v Speaker 1>in Greenland, right I was. I was surprised by that. Well, yeah,

0:17:22.280 --> 0:17:25.600
<v Speaker 1>I would agree based on I'll be a limited amount

0:17:25.640 --> 0:17:29.680
<v Speaker 1>of of information that I've I've read and viewed about Greenland.

0:17:29.720 --> 0:17:32.639
<v Speaker 1>You know, typically in my experience, Greenland shows up in

0:17:32.920 --> 0:17:36.080
<v Speaker 1>nature documentaries and of course you're going to see rather

0:17:36.160 --> 0:17:40.399
<v Speaker 1>barren h locations in those films. Well, greenlanders out there

0:17:40.400 --> 0:17:42.840
<v Speaker 1>in the audience. Let us know, if you're listening, what's

0:17:42.920 --> 0:17:46.720
<v Speaker 1>life like up there in Greenland? I'm interested now. But

0:17:46.800 --> 0:17:49.840
<v Speaker 1>anyway back, so, yeah, population of Greenland at the times

0:17:49.880 --> 0:17:53.399
<v Speaker 1>about fifty and so statements like this both refer to

0:17:53.480 --> 0:17:56.119
<v Speaker 1>something that could be true or false in the real world,

0:17:56.480 --> 0:17:59.280
<v Speaker 1>and there are also things that people are probably uncertain about,

0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:02.200
<v Speaker 1>like do you know what the actual population of Greenland

0:18:02.320 --> 0:18:04.639
<v Speaker 1>is I didn't know before I looked it up, And

0:18:04.680 --> 0:18:07.040
<v Speaker 1>so we know that the statement is either true or false,

0:18:07.119 --> 0:18:10.000
<v Speaker 1>but we aren't sure whether it's true or false. And

0:18:10.040 --> 0:18:12.800
<v Speaker 1>of course, to go back to a previous episode, you're

0:18:12.840 --> 0:18:16.879
<v Speaker 1>kind of anchoring my expectations by throwing out without any

0:18:17.040 --> 0:18:20.200
<v Speaker 1>population data in my head about Greenland, like that's suddenly

0:18:20.240 --> 0:18:22.960
<v Speaker 1>all I have to go on. Oh yeah, that's interesting. Also,

0:18:23.080 --> 0:18:25.359
<v Speaker 1>it's so like it could be three thousand or it

0:18:25.400 --> 0:18:29.040
<v Speaker 1>could be like a million, and either you're sort of

0:18:29.119 --> 0:18:33.479
<v Speaker 1>moving your guests range toward fifty. So the thing they

0:18:33.520 --> 0:18:35.520
<v Speaker 1>point out is even though most people don't know what

0:18:35.600 --> 0:18:38.399
<v Speaker 1>the population of Greenland is, we're often willing, into some

0:18:38.480 --> 0:18:41.280
<v Speaker 1>extent able to make guesses as to whether statements like

0:18:41.359 --> 0:18:45.560
<v Speaker 1>this are true. So where does this semantic knowledge come from?

0:18:45.640 --> 0:18:48.320
<v Speaker 1>When we feel like we have knowledge to offer a

0:18:48.359 --> 0:18:51.120
<v Speaker 1>guess about what the population of Greenland is even when

0:18:51.160 --> 0:18:54.959
<v Speaker 1>we don't really know what is that what allows us

0:18:55.000 --> 0:19:00.400
<v Speaker 1>to judge these questions? And the authors note that frequency

0:19:00.640 --> 0:19:03.560
<v Speaker 1>is a really powerful variable in all kinds of judgments

0:19:03.560 --> 0:19:07.000
<v Speaker 1>we make about the world, so they hypothesize that quote

0:19:07.000 --> 0:19:11.639
<v Speaker 1>frequency might also serve as the major access route that

0:19:11.760 --> 0:19:16.280
<v Speaker 1>plausible statements have into our pool of general knowledge. So

0:19:16.320 --> 0:19:20.479
<v Speaker 1>the idea is that we build our knowledge base based

0:19:20.520 --> 0:19:23.880
<v Speaker 1>on how frequently we are exposed to ideas. You hear

0:19:23.880 --> 0:19:26.480
<v Speaker 1>an idea a lot, and that gets reinforced in the

0:19:26.520 --> 0:19:29.080
<v Speaker 1>knowledge base. You've never heard an idea before, or you

0:19:29.119 --> 0:19:31.399
<v Speaker 1>don't hear it a lot, it doesn't get reinforced and

0:19:31.440 --> 0:19:34.159
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't exist in the knowledge base. So here's the

0:19:34.160 --> 0:19:36.960
<v Speaker 1>experimental part. Researchers came up with a list of a

0:19:37.000 --> 0:19:40.560
<v Speaker 1>hundred and forty true statements and false statements, crafted so

0:19:40.680 --> 0:19:43.320
<v Speaker 1>they all sound plausible. Yeah, they could be true. You know,

0:19:43.440 --> 0:19:46.800
<v Speaker 1>the average person would be unsure whether or not they're true,

0:19:47.160 --> 0:19:50.000
<v Speaker 1>and the statements were on all kinds of subjects like geography,

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:54.920
<v Speaker 1>arts and literature, history, sports, current events science. A few

0:19:54.920 --> 0:19:59.320
<v Speaker 1>examples of true statements included things like Cairo, Egypt has

0:19:59.359 --> 0:20:04.040
<v Speaker 1>a larger population than Chicago, Illinois, and French horn players

0:20:04.080 --> 0:20:08.560
<v Speaker 1>get cash bonuses to stay in the U. S. Army. Well,

0:20:08.600 --> 0:20:10.800
<v Speaker 1>i'd see it. I should have joined the army after

0:20:10.880 --> 0:20:13.119
<v Speaker 1>I'll see I was a french horn player really in

0:20:13.200 --> 0:20:15.600
<v Speaker 1>high school. Yeah, I didn't know that. What's it like

0:20:15.640 --> 0:20:18.240
<v Speaker 1>playing the French horn? It's just you know, there's a

0:20:18.280 --> 0:20:20.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of spit and a lot of shoving your hand

0:20:20.280 --> 0:20:24.520
<v Speaker 1>up horns. That's it. Otherwise it's like playing a trumpet.

0:20:24.560 --> 0:20:27.000
<v Speaker 1>Now see I actually played trumpet, and it's a lot

0:20:27.080 --> 0:20:29.840
<v Speaker 1>less fun than what you're describing. Yeah, I mean, I

0:20:29.880 --> 0:20:31.439
<v Speaker 1>don't know. There is an elegance to the way you

0:20:31.480 --> 0:20:34.000
<v Speaker 1>hold it and you again, you have your hand in

0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:37.640
<v Speaker 1>the inside the horn. I don't know. Being a trumpet

0:20:37.680 --> 0:20:40.200
<v Speaker 1>player to me always felt like being a person who's

0:20:40.280 --> 0:20:44.560
<v Speaker 1>complaining at full volume. Yeah, yeah, there is. There's more

0:20:44.600 --> 0:20:47.719
<v Speaker 1>of an outward stance with the trumpet, right, you are

0:20:47.720 --> 0:20:50.440
<v Speaker 1>blasting outward, But in the French horn, you it's it's

0:20:50.480 --> 0:20:54.960
<v Speaker 1>more like you're playing music into yourself. That's quite beautiful,

0:20:56.000 --> 0:20:57.879
<v Speaker 1>more beautiful than any music I've ever played on the

0:20:57.880 --> 0:21:01.000
<v Speaker 1>French horn. Uh so we got to get back to

0:21:01.040 --> 0:21:03.840
<v Speaker 1>the study. Okay, So that's that's supposedly true. French horn

0:21:03.880 --> 0:21:05.920
<v Speaker 1>players at the time got cash bonuses to stay in

0:21:05.920 --> 0:21:08.520
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. Army. Examples of false statements where things

0:21:08.560 --> 0:21:11.280
<v Speaker 1>like the People's Republic of China was founded in nineteen

0:21:11.320 --> 0:21:14.600
<v Speaker 1>forty seven, who was actually nineteen forty nine, or the

0:21:14.640 --> 0:21:18.280
<v Speaker 1>copy Bara is the largest of the marsupials. That's not true.

0:21:18.320 --> 0:21:21.680
<v Speaker 1>The largest marcipial is the red kangaroo. The largest known

0:21:21.680 --> 0:21:24.119
<v Speaker 1>in the fossil record is this thing called the extinct

0:21:24.560 --> 0:21:28.560
<v Speaker 1>dip protodon. Now that in the capy bar is a rodent, right,

0:21:29.080 --> 0:21:31.440
<v Speaker 1>only is the capy bar and marsupial. I didn't even

0:21:31.440 --> 0:21:33.200
<v Speaker 1>look it up. I only know that because I go

0:21:33.280 --> 0:21:35.800
<v Speaker 1>to a lot of zoos these days. But it is

0:21:35.800 --> 0:21:37.680
<v Speaker 1>a mammal, it's a it's a rodent. It is a mammal,

0:21:37.720 --> 0:21:40.119
<v Speaker 1>and it is a rodent, not a marsupial. Well, there

0:21:40.160 --> 0:21:42.560
<v Speaker 1>we go. So it's wrong in multiple ways. So you

0:21:42.680 --> 0:21:44.879
<v Speaker 1>got this big list that came up with of true

0:21:44.920 --> 0:21:47.880
<v Speaker 1>and false statements, and all of them should sound plausible

0:21:47.920 --> 0:21:49.960
<v Speaker 1>to the average person, But most people are not going

0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:52.040
<v Speaker 1>to be likely to know for sure whether they're true

0:21:52.080 --> 0:21:54.919
<v Speaker 1>unless they just happen to have some special random knowledge

0:21:54.960 --> 0:21:59.720
<v Speaker 1>or expertise. And so researchers held three sessions with participants,

0:21:59.720 --> 0:22:03.440
<v Speaker 1>each separated by two weeks, and on each of the sessions,

0:22:03.520 --> 0:22:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the participants were played back a tape of a selection

0:22:07.080 --> 0:22:11.480
<v Speaker 1>of sixty recorded statements from that list, and the subjects

0:22:11.520 --> 0:22:14.600
<v Speaker 1>were asked to judge how confident they were that the

0:22:14.640 --> 0:22:16.679
<v Speaker 1>statements were true. And this was on a scale of

0:22:16.680 --> 0:22:20.080
<v Speaker 1>one to seven, with like four being uncertain, five being

0:22:20.119 --> 0:22:24.160
<v Speaker 1>possibly true, six being probably true, seven being definitely true.

0:22:24.560 --> 0:22:27.320
<v Speaker 1>And in each session, some of the statements were true,

0:22:27.359 --> 0:22:30.040
<v Speaker 1>some were false. But here's where the real magic happened.

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:33.720
<v Speaker 1>At the second session and the third session. Each time,

0:22:34.200 --> 0:22:38.120
<v Speaker 1>subjects got a mix of new true and false statements

0:22:38.119 --> 0:22:41.480
<v Speaker 1>that they've never seen before, plus true and false statements

0:22:41.520 --> 0:22:44.840
<v Speaker 1>that they had already seen in the previous sessions. So

0:22:44.880 --> 0:22:46.760
<v Speaker 1>while most of the claims they saw were new, a

0:22:46.880 --> 0:22:50.959
<v Speaker 1>minority got repeated each time. And what the researchers found

0:22:51.119 --> 0:22:55.119
<v Speaker 1>was that whether a statement was true or false, the

0:22:55.280 --> 0:22:59.199
<v Speaker 1>more times the students saw it, the more they believed it.

0:23:00.200 --> 0:23:02.800
<v Speaker 1>So again, this would be this, this, this would be

0:23:02.840 --> 0:23:05.600
<v Speaker 1>the principle in action. The more they're hearing this, uh,

0:23:05.680 --> 0:23:09.280
<v Speaker 1>this this false fact, the more they're coming to believe

0:23:09.320 --> 0:23:12.000
<v Speaker 1>that it is true. Yeah, even in this constrained, kind

0:23:12.000 --> 0:23:15.359
<v Speaker 1>of weird experimental context where they're aware that some of

0:23:15.400 --> 0:23:17.320
<v Speaker 1>these facts are going to be false, it's not like

0:23:17.600 --> 0:23:20.639
<v Speaker 1>they're being told this persuasively by a person trying to

0:23:20.680 --> 0:23:24.080
<v Speaker 1>convince them. They're just reading this from a list of

0:23:24.160 --> 0:23:27.040
<v Speaker 1>statements that are known to be either true or false.

0:23:27.080 --> 0:23:31.439
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's no there's no persuasive aspect to this

0:23:31.520 --> 0:23:34.359
<v Speaker 1>at all, right, right, these are not politically charged or

0:23:34.400 --> 0:23:37.399
<v Speaker 1>really charged by worldview at all. They're they're just plain

0:23:37.600 --> 0:23:41.440
<v Speaker 1>neutral statements that really have very little interest to most people.

0:23:41.520 --> 0:23:45.399
<v Speaker 1>Also probably, but what happened was whether the statement was

0:23:45.440 --> 0:23:48.920
<v Speaker 1>true or false, people believed it more if they saw

0:23:48.960 --> 0:23:52.199
<v Speaker 1>it more times. So I've got a little chart in

0:23:52.240 --> 0:23:54.400
<v Speaker 1>here of what happened with the false statements. You can

0:23:54.400 --> 0:23:56.480
<v Speaker 1>have a look at Robert as you can see the

0:23:56.640 --> 0:24:00.320
<v Speaker 1>new false statements. The false statements people saw the very

0:24:00.320 --> 0:24:03.280
<v Speaker 1>first time covered around you know, like four or four

0:24:03.320 --> 0:24:06.119
<v Speaker 1>point one across all three sessions. That would correspond to

0:24:06.160 --> 0:24:08.199
<v Speaker 1>people saying they're uncertain. I don't know. I don't know

0:24:08.240 --> 0:24:10.520
<v Speaker 1>whether French horn players get a cash bonus for staying

0:24:10.520 --> 0:24:13.080
<v Speaker 1>in the army and playing into the self and sticking

0:24:13.080 --> 0:24:16.400
<v Speaker 1>the hand up the horn. But in the second session

0:24:16.440 --> 0:24:20.480
<v Speaker 1>there repeated false statements jumped up from about four point

0:24:20.520 --> 0:24:23.439
<v Speaker 1>over four point one to about four point five, and

0:24:23.480 --> 0:24:26.320
<v Speaker 1>then in the third session up again to about four

0:24:26.400 --> 0:24:29.239
<v Speaker 1>point seven. And we only saw what happened with two

0:24:29.280 --> 0:24:31.800
<v Speaker 1>sessions who knows what have happened, what might have happened

0:24:31.840 --> 0:24:36.120
<v Speaker 1>if you had continued adding more sessions. So just seeing

0:24:36.160 --> 0:24:38.840
<v Speaker 1>a statement more than once appeared to make it more believable,

0:24:38.960 --> 0:24:41.800
<v Speaker 1>even though it wasn't true. And the pattern was roughly

0:24:41.840 --> 0:24:44.400
<v Speaker 1>the same for true statements, which isn't all that surprising

0:24:44.440 --> 0:24:47.080
<v Speaker 1>since the experiment was based on, you know, statements that

0:24:47.119 --> 0:24:48.879
<v Speaker 1>people didn't know whether they were true or false to

0:24:48.920 --> 0:24:52.280
<v Speaker 1>begin with. So the authors wrote in conclusion, quote, the

0:24:52.359 --> 0:24:55.879
<v Speaker 1>present research has demonstrated that the repetition of a plausible

0:24:55.920 --> 0:25:01.240
<v Speaker 1>statement increases a person's belief in the referentialvalidity or truth

0:25:01.480 --> 0:25:03.359
<v Speaker 1>of that statement. I don't know why they had to

0:25:03.400 --> 0:25:06.840
<v Speaker 1>say referential validity. They could have just said truth. That's

0:25:06.920 --> 0:25:09.639
<v Speaker 1>that's some science writing for you. Uh, in the truth

0:25:09.720 --> 0:25:13.560
<v Speaker 1>of that statement. And indeed, the present experiment appears to

0:25:13.680 --> 0:25:16.919
<v Speaker 1>lend empirical support to the idea that quote, if people

0:25:17.000 --> 0:25:22.040
<v Speaker 1>are told something often enough, they'll believe it. Uh So so, yeah,

0:25:22.080 --> 0:25:23.960
<v Speaker 1>this is this is the first real study to find

0:25:24.000 --> 0:25:25.880
<v Speaker 1>this and a few other things the authors thought were

0:25:25.880 --> 0:25:29.280
<v Speaker 1>worth considering. Uh. The fact that this effect was displayed

0:25:29.280 --> 0:25:32.200
<v Speaker 1>in statements from a big, broad pool of different types

0:25:32.240 --> 0:25:36.320
<v Speaker 1>of subject matter suggests this is not extremely context dependent. Right,

0:25:36.359 --> 0:25:38.399
<v Speaker 1>It's not just going to be political beliefs that are

0:25:38.440 --> 0:25:41.399
<v Speaker 1>subject to this. It seems to be all different kinds

0:25:41.440 --> 0:25:44.800
<v Speaker 1>of statements in all different kinds of domains. Another thing

0:25:44.880 --> 0:25:47.480
<v Speaker 1>they noted was that the effect was present for true

0:25:47.480 --> 0:25:50.960
<v Speaker 1>statements and false statements. Either way, if students saw the

0:25:51.000 --> 0:25:55.040
<v Speaker 1>claims more often, they believed them with greater confidence. But

0:25:55.160 --> 0:25:58.919
<v Speaker 1>another takeaway is that the effect is not huge for

0:25:58.960 --> 0:26:02.160
<v Speaker 1>false statements. Through exposures was roughly enough to get you

0:26:02.240 --> 0:26:06.040
<v Speaker 1>from I'm uncertain too. It's possibly true, but as we

0:26:06.080 --> 0:26:08.800
<v Speaker 1>mentioned before, how many this is just two or three

0:26:08.800 --> 0:26:11.679
<v Speaker 1>sessions right right? Right? Who knows what what would have

0:26:11.720 --> 0:26:14.840
<v Speaker 1>happened if maybe you had done this more times in

0:26:14.880 --> 0:26:18.359
<v Speaker 1>a row, or if there had been other factors affecting

0:26:18.359 --> 0:26:20.840
<v Speaker 1>whether people were likely to believe these things to begin with,

0:26:20.960 --> 0:26:25.040
<v Speaker 1>say if they had valences to the person's political identity

0:26:25.200 --> 0:26:28.600
<v Speaker 1>or something like that. Yeah, you know, as we're researching

0:26:28.640 --> 0:26:30.520
<v Speaker 1>this into and discussing it, I couldn't help but think

0:26:30.680 --> 0:26:37.240
<v Speaker 1>of notable examples of uh false stories about generally like

0:26:37.240 --> 0:26:39.440
<v Speaker 1>like celebrities from the past, And I'm not going to

0:26:39.520 --> 0:26:42.600
<v Speaker 1>mention any of them specifically, Why not well, because you know,

0:26:42.600 --> 0:26:45.000
<v Speaker 1>they all tend to be a bit crude. There. There

0:26:45.040 --> 0:26:48.560
<v Speaker 1>are several of them about like tearing down various sort

0:26:48.600 --> 0:26:52.639
<v Speaker 1>of you know, pretty boy rockers or actors from the past,

0:26:53.440 --> 0:26:55.679
<v Speaker 1>uh in in the in. The interesting thing about him

0:26:55.680 --> 0:26:59.639
<v Speaker 1>is these are generally like pre internet um stories that

0:26:59.760 --> 0:27:02.399
<v Speaker 1>had circulate the word of mouth or I think in

0:27:02.480 --> 0:27:04.440
<v Speaker 1>one case there was talk of like a whole bunch

0:27:04.440 --> 0:27:07.960
<v Speaker 1>of of facts is going out in Hollywood where someone

0:27:08.080 --> 0:27:10.320
<v Speaker 1>was just basically just wanted to take somebody down because

0:27:10.359 --> 0:27:12.800
<v Speaker 1>they didn't like them. I remember, I think like ninth

0:27:12.880 --> 0:27:15.960
<v Speaker 1>grade here starting to hear this bizarre story about Richard

0:27:16.000 --> 0:27:18.359
<v Speaker 1>gear Yeah, that's that's the main one I'm thinking of.

0:27:18.560 --> 0:27:21.720
<v Speaker 1>And I think it basically comes down to Richard Geary's

0:27:21.720 --> 0:27:24.840
<v Speaker 1>a is a handsome, successful guy and and for a

0:27:24.880 --> 0:27:26.920
<v Speaker 1>lot of people you want to like, really, you know,

0:27:27.840 --> 0:27:31.760
<v Speaker 1>knock him down and not you Yeah, and uh and

0:27:31.840 --> 0:27:36.280
<v Speaker 1>so when you encounter a bit of slander or libel

0:27:36.400 --> 0:27:40.080
<v Speaker 1>like that or uh, just a ridiculous story, you're gonna

0:27:40.119 --> 0:27:42.520
<v Speaker 1>be more inclined to believe it if you kind of

0:27:42.560 --> 0:27:44.520
<v Speaker 1>want it to be true, right or if you or

0:27:45.040 --> 0:27:47.320
<v Speaker 1>you're like, yeah, let screw that guy. I'm gonna I'm

0:27:47.320 --> 0:27:48.680
<v Speaker 1>gonna go ahead and believe this, or even if I

0:27:48.680 --> 0:27:50.919
<v Speaker 1>don't believe it, I'm gonna pass it on. But either way,

0:27:51.000 --> 0:27:53.679
<v Speaker 1>whether or not you're predisposed to believe it's true, it

0:27:53.720 --> 0:27:56.520
<v Speaker 1>looks like this initial study at least provides evidence that

0:27:56.640 --> 0:28:00.239
<v Speaker 1>you would be more disposed to believe it's true in

0:28:00.280 --> 0:28:03.880
<v Speaker 1>either case. Like, so, whatever you're starting point is, it's

0:28:03.880 --> 0:28:06.919
<v Speaker 1>gonna nudge you up. Like if nothing else, it becomes

0:28:06.960 --> 0:28:10.120
<v Speaker 1>word association. Like if you're not really a fan of say,

0:28:10.240 --> 0:28:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Richard Gear's work, uh, and you can't name your your

0:28:13.920 --> 0:28:16.160
<v Speaker 1>favorite Richard Gear film off the top of your head,

0:28:16.359 --> 0:28:19.520
<v Speaker 1>that might be the primary keyword that pops up when

0:28:19.520 --> 0:28:22.920
<v Speaker 1>you hear his name. Yeah, it could be. Uh. Yeah.

0:28:22.960 --> 0:28:26.240
<v Speaker 1>So so this bizarre effect that we're talking about, where

0:28:26.720 --> 0:28:29.400
<v Speaker 1>hearing a fact repeated, even if you've got no good

0:28:29.400 --> 0:28:33.640
<v Speaker 1>reason to believe it's true, just hearing it repeated causes

0:28:33.680 --> 0:28:35.560
<v Speaker 1>you to be more likely to believe it. This came

0:28:35.600 --> 0:28:38.200
<v Speaker 1>to be known first as the truth effect, and then

0:28:38.680 --> 0:28:42.200
<v Speaker 1>later on probably a better title was the illusory truth effect.

0:28:42.280 --> 0:28:44.440
<v Speaker 1>I think we should use the second one because otherwise

0:28:44.480 --> 0:28:47.120
<v Speaker 1>that makes it sound true. Yeah, it just makes it

0:28:47.120 --> 0:28:48.840
<v Speaker 1>sound like, yeah, if you if you repeat something, then

0:28:48.960 --> 0:28:51.520
<v Speaker 1>it is then it is true. There is no question anymore. So.

0:28:51.560 --> 0:28:54.280
<v Speaker 1>The basic version of the illusory truth effect is quote.

0:28:54.480 --> 0:28:58.040
<v Speaker 1>People are more likely to judge repeated statements as true

0:28:58.320 --> 0:29:01.280
<v Speaker 1>compared to new statements. In another way of putting it

0:29:01.320 --> 0:29:04.160
<v Speaker 1>is that, all other things being equal, you're more likely

0:29:04.240 --> 0:29:06.920
<v Speaker 1>to believe a claim if you've heard it before than

0:29:06.960 --> 0:29:09.840
<v Speaker 1>one you haven't heard before. And the more times you

0:29:09.880 --> 0:29:12.479
<v Speaker 1>hear the claim, the more likely you are to believe it.

0:29:13.440 --> 0:29:15.640
<v Speaker 1>But so far we've just talked about one study, right,

0:29:15.680 --> 0:29:19.280
<v Speaker 1>this this one seven study. Uh, we can call it

0:29:19.320 --> 0:29:21.640
<v Speaker 1>the Star Wars study if you want. Okay, uh, the

0:29:21.640 --> 0:29:24.800
<v Speaker 1>Star Wars study. Here. It's a fairly small sample, just

0:29:24.920 --> 0:29:27.000
<v Speaker 1>one study. If you want to be skeptical and rigorous,

0:29:27.000 --> 0:29:29.600
<v Speaker 1>maybe especially because this backs up ful quisdom, which is

0:29:29.600 --> 0:29:31.960
<v Speaker 1>always something you should be careful about. We should see

0:29:31.960 --> 0:29:35.960
<v Speaker 1>if the effect has been replicated by other researchers, and boy,

0:29:36.040 --> 0:29:39.000
<v Speaker 1>howdy it has. That's right. This next one comes to

0:29:39.080 --> 0:29:42.880
<v Speaker 1>us from nineteen seventy nine Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human

0:29:42.960 --> 0:29:46.640
<v Speaker 1>Learning and Memory, the work of Frederick T. Bacon. Yeah,

0:29:46.640 --> 0:29:50.600
<v Speaker 1>this was called the Credibility of Repeated statements memory for trivia,

0:29:51.280 --> 0:29:54.920
<v Speaker 1>so Bacon performed he was trying to replicate this this effect.

0:29:54.960 --> 0:29:58.760
<v Speaker 1>He performed additional experiments to test the previous team's conclusions

0:29:59.080 --> 0:30:01.600
<v Speaker 1>and add some new on So his first experiment, you

0:30:01.680 --> 0:30:04.720
<v Speaker 1>got ninety eight undergrads and they had two sessions in

0:30:04.760 --> 0:30:07.520
<v Speaker 1>which they were asked to rate sentences as true or false,

0:30:07.680 --> 0:30:11.040
<v Speaker 1>with three weeks between the two sessions, and Bacon found

0:30:11.080 --> 0:30:15.160
<v Speaker 1>that the repetition illusory truth effect was modulated by whether

0:30:15.320 --> 0:30:19.880
<v Speaker 1>the subjects consciously believed that a sentence had been repeated.

0:30:19.920 --> 0:30:22.560
<v Speaker 1>That is, if they remembered that they had seen the

0:30:22.600 --> 0:30:25.720
<v Speaker 1>sentence last time, they were more inclined to believe it.

0:30:26.040 --> 0:30:28.160
<v Speaker 1>If they believed they were seeing a sentence for the

0:30:28.240 --> 0:30:31.080
<v Speaker 1>first time, they were less likely to believe it. And

0:30:31.120 --> 0:30:35.080
<v Speaker 1>this was true regardless of the statements themselves. I can't

0:30:35.080 --> 0:30:37.440
<v Speaker 1>help but think of our modern version of this with

0:30:37.760 --> 0:30:41.560
<v Speaker 1>Facebook feed right, because you're inevitably, if you're your Facebook user,

0:30:42.080 --> 0:30:44.040
<v Speaker 1>or perhaps if you're a Twitter user or some other

0:30:44.120 --> 0:30:46.920
<v Speaker 1>social media you're you're scrolling down right and there are

0:30:46.960 --> 0:30:49.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of sentences coming at you. Some you just

0:30:49.360 --> 0:30:51.240
<v Speaker 1>kind of read in passing, so maybe you don't read

0:30:51.280 --> 0:30:54.920
<v Speaker 1>at all. But are you actually stopping to really think

0:30:54.960 --> 0:30:58.800
<v Speaker 1>about what a particular headline or you know, or paragraph

0:30:58.920 --> 0:31:01.400
<v Speaker 1>is saying, or to just kind of scrolling in the

0:31:01.400 --> 0:31:03.880
<v Speaker 1>background of your mind. Yeah, And the results of this

0:31:03.920 --> 0:31:07.560
<v Speaker 1>one experiment here would seem to indicate if it has validity,

0:31:07.600 --> 0:31:09.360
<v Speaker 1>it would mean that the ones you stop and pay

0:31:09.400 --> 0:31:12.240
<v Speaker 1>attention to and make a memory about are the ones

0:31:12.240 --> 0:31:15.800
<v Speaker 1>you're more likely to believe later on. But then also

0:31:16.520 --> 0:31:18.760
<v Speaker 1>in another experiment, he had a group of sixty four

0:31:18.840 --> 0:31:22.400
<v Speaker 1>undergrads and he replicated the illusory truth effect and found

0:31:22.400 --> 0:31:25.720
<v Speaker 1>that students believed repeated statements to be more credible even

0:31:25.800 --> 0:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>if the students were informed that the statements were being repeated.

0:31:29.360 --> 0:31:32.320
<v Speaker 1>So you can directly tell somebody, Hey, I know, I

0:31:32.400 --> 0:31:34.959
<v Speaker 1>just asked you if it was true or false that

0:31:35.080 --> 0:31:38.120
<v Speaker 1>zebras could automatically detach their own tongues and fling the

0:31:38.160 --> 0:31:41.560
<v Speaker 1>tongues at attacking hyenas. I asked you that same thing

0:31:41.640 --> 0:31:43.920
<v Speaker 1>three weeks ago. It may or may not be true.

0:31:44.800 --> 0:31:48.200
<v Speaker 1>And even in this case, repeating the statement still makes

0:31:48.200 --> 0:31:50.400
<v Speaker 1>them judge it to be more true than statements they're

0:31:50.400 --> 0:31:52.920
<v Speaker 1>seeing for the first time. So you can warn people

0:31:53.040 --> 0:31:55.440
<v Speaker 1>that something fishy is going on and they still fall

0:31:55.520 --> 0:31:58.800
<v Speaker 1>for it. So you could you could straight up share

0:31:58.840 --> 0:32:03.959
<v Speaker 1>a piece of just undeniably fake news on social media

0:32:04.200 --> 0:32:06.160
<v Speaker 1>and and said, hey, guys, this is this is some

0:32:06.200 --> 0:32:09.719
<v Speaker 1>fake news. This has been totally debunked. Um, you can

0:32:09.720 --> 0:32:12.920
<v Speaker 1>look it up on Snopes, etcetera. And that's still not

0:32:12.960 --> 0:32:15.600
<v Speaker 1>going to completely disarm the piece that you're sharing. Well,

0:32:15.640 --> 0:32:18.240
<v Speaker 1>we will talk, so I would say, yes, we will

0:32:18.280 --> 0:32:20.760
<v Speaker 1>talk more about that in the second episode where this

0:32:20.840 --> 0:32:23.840
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing comes into conflict with real world beliefs.

0:32:24.480 --> 0:32:26.200
<v Speaker 1>And just to be clear, I made up that zebra

0:32:26.280 --> 0:32:28.560
<v Speaker 1>thing that that wasn't find of the Bacon study. Okay,

0:32:28.600 --> 0:32:31.160
<v Speaker 1>I thought that would be clear. But that's number one,

0:32:31.240 --> 0:32:33.280
<v Speaker 1>not true. Number two as far as I know, not

0:32:33.320 --> 0:32:35.600
<v Speaker 1>one of the examples Bacon used. Right, Well, I'm sorry

0:32:35.640 --> 0:32:38.000
<v Speaker 1>you had to drag Zebras into all of this. Joe. Well,

0:32:38.040 --> 0:32:40.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, I like the idea of a weaponized tongue

0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:44.560
<v Speaker 1>that's gonna go beyond the X men. Surely that exists

0:32:44.560 --> 0:32:47.880
<v Speaker 1>in reality. Well yes, but but not with Zebras. No. No,

0:32:48.000 --> 0:32:51.320
<v Speaker 1>I guess that's amphibians and stuff. Okay, okay, So back

0:32:51.320 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 1>to the study, So Bacon says in his abstract quote.

0:32:54.440 --> 0:32:58.520
<v Speaker 1>It was further determined that statements that contradicted early ones

0:32:59.000 --> 0:33:04.480
<v Speaker 1>were rated as relatively true if misclassified as repetitions, but

0:33:04.560 --> 0:33:08.800
<v Speaker 1>that statements judged to be changed were rated as relatively false.

0:33:09.080 --> 0:33:12.200
<v Speaker 1>So even if you misremember that you saw something before,

0:33:12.360 --> 0:33:15.440
<v Speaker 1>you're more likely to believe it's true. It's kind of odd.

0:33:15.800 --> 0:33:19.800
<v Speaker 1>That makes you wonder, what is the initial uh, what's

0:33:19.840 --> 0:33:22.880
<v Speaker 1>the initial stimulus that caused you to misremember that you

0:33:22.920 --> 0:33:25.560
<v Speaker 1>had seen it before. Well, as we've discussed on the

0:33:25.560 --> 0:33:28.400
<v Speaker 1>show before, I mean, there are multiple ways that false

0:33:28.440 --> 0:33:32.200
<v Speaker 1>memories can be can be encoded. Oh yeah, absolutely. So

0:33:32.280 --> 0:33:36.400
<v Speaker 1>Bacon concludes that basically, people are predisposed to believe statements

0:33:36.400 --> 0:33:40.320
<v Speaker 1>that affirm existing knowledge and to disbelieve statements that contradict

0:33:40.360 --> 0:33:44.000
<v Speaker 1>existing knowledge. That's not all that unusual, right, But but

0:33:44.080 --> 0:33:47.280
<v Speaker 1>it's specifically the repetition effect that seems to be playing

0:33:47.320 --> 0:33:50.000
<v Speaker 1>a role here. Let's take a look at another study.

0:33:50.040 --> 0:33:54.720
<v Speaker 1>How about nine two Maryan Schwartz Repetition and Rated truth

0:33:54.840 --> 0:33:58.480
<v Speaker 1>Value of Statements from the American Journal of Psychology. So

0:33:58.800 --> 0:34:02.800
<v Speaker 1>Schwartz here conducted two experiments on what psychologists were by

0:34:02.840 --> 0:34:05.200
<v Speaker 1>this time calling the truth effect, what we're calling the

0:34:05.240 --> 0:34:09.200
<v Speaker 1>illusory truth effect UM. So experiment one, you get a

0:34:09.200 --> 0:34:11.480
<v Speaker 1>group of subjects and they rate claims on a seven

0:34:11.520 --> 0:34:13.840
<v Speaker 1>point truth value scale. Just like in the first study,

0:34:13.880 --> 0:34:17.080
<v Speaker 1>the Star Wars study, the seventy seven study, UM and

0:34:17.200 --> 0:34:20.160
<v Speaker 1>a different group of subjects rated the same statements on

0:34:20.200 --> 0:34:23.239
<v Speaker 1>a seven point scale of how familiar they were with

0:34:23.320 --> 0:34:27.120
<v Speaker 1>the statements before the experiment started. How familiar are you

0:34:27.160 --> 0:34:32.080
<v Speaker 1>with this? Repetition increased both ratings, So both pre experimental

0:34:32.080 --> 0:34:35.839
<v Speaker 1>familiarity as well as the perceived truth value, they both

0:34:35.880 --> 0:34:38.840
<v Speaker 1>went up when people saw them more than once. That's

0:34:39.000 --> 0:34:42.959
<v Speaker 1>not surprising. Again the replication and then also the fact

0:34:43.040 --> 0:34:45.080
<v Speaker 1>that you have seen something before, we'll tend to make

0:34:45.080 --> 0:34:48.319
<v Speaker 1>you more familiar with it. Then you've got another experiment here.

0:34:48.600 --> 0:34:52.239
<v Speaker 1>Second one replicated the illusory truth effect. Again found that

0:34:52.280 --> 0:34:55.560
<v Speaker 1>it didn't matter whether you mixed up repeated statements that

0:34:55.600 --> 0:34:58.960
<v Speaker 1>people had seen before with new statements or only showed

0:34:59.000 --> 0:35:03.759
<v Speaker 1>them repeated statement. Either way, belief and repeated statements went up.

0:35:03.800 --> 0:35:05.600
<v Speaker 1>And this was done so that they could rule out

0:35:05.600 --> 0:35:07.839
<v Speaker 1>the possibility they're thinking, you know, maybe it's only by

0:35:07.880 --> 0:35:11.399
<v Speaker 1>contrast with new and unfamiliar statements that repeated ones seem

0:35:11.480 --> 0:35:14.279
<v Speaker 1>more credible. That is not the case either way you

0:35:14.360 --> 0:35:16.799
<v Speaker 1>do it. If you've seen it before, you believe it more.

0:35:17.400 --> 0:35:19.839
<v Speaker 1>And so this study has taken as evidence that the

0:35:19.920 --> 0:35:23.600
<v Speaker 1>feeling of familiarity with an idea might be an important part,

0:35:23.680 --> 0:35:26.080
<v Speaker 1>or even the most important part, of how we judge

0:35:26.160 --> 0:35:29.480
<v Speaker 1>something as true or plausible. But we should shift to

0:35:29.520 --> 0:35:34.640
<v Speaker 1>asking the question of why why would increasing familiarity with

0:35:34.680 --> 0:35:38.600
<v Speaker 1>the statement through repetition make it seem more true to us?

0:35:39.239 --> 0:35:41.920
<v Speaker 1>It makes me think about this passage from Wittgenstein in

0:35:42.040 --> 0:35:45.440
<v Speaker 1>his philosophical Investigations, about how absurd it would be to

0:35:45.520 --> 0:35:49.520
<v Speaker 1>use repetition of a mental representation as evidence that the

0:35:49.560 --> 0:35:53.680
<v Speaker 1>representation is correct. He writes, quote for example, I don't

0:35:53.760 --> 0:35:56.440
<v Speaker 1>know if I've remembered the time of departure of a

0:35:56.520 --> 0:35:59.480
<v Speaker 1>train right, And to check it, I call to mind

0:35:59.520 --> 0:36:02.680
<v Speaker 1>how a age of the timetable looked. Is it the

0:36:02.719 --> 0:36:06.320
<v Speaker 1>same here? No, For this process has got to produce

0:36:06.320 --> 0:36:09.800
<v Speaker 1>a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image

0:36:09.800 --> 0:36:13.600
<v Speaker 1>of the timetable could not itself be tested for correctness,

0:36:13.640 --> 0:36:16.560
<v Speaker 1>how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory.

0:36:17.120 --> 0:36:20.000
<v Speaker 1>As if someone were to buy several copies of the

0:36:20.040 --> 0:36:23.480
<v Speaker 1>morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.

0:36:24.000 --> 0:36:25.960
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's kind of what we're doing. Like he's

0:36:25.960 --> 0:36:28.400
<v Speaker 1>talking about mental images, but the general point is a

0:36:28.400 --> 0:36:31.960
<v Speaker 1>good one. We're essentially buying several copies of the same

0:36:32.080 --> 0:36:36.839
<v Speaker 1>newspaper to to increase our belief that what the newspaper

0:36:36.920 --> 0:36:42.239
<v Speaker 1>says is actually accurate. Now, one it possible interpretation that

0:36:42.280 --> 0:36:44.920
<v Speaker 1>comes to mind is just like the idea of say,

0:36:45.520 --> 0:36:49.560
<v Speaker 1>walking us picking out stepping stones to cross a creek. Right,

0:36:50.120 --> 0:36:52.440
<v Speaker 1>you step to one stone and it doesn't slip out

0:36:52.440 --> 0:36:54.680
<v Speaker 1>from underneath you, and so you use that too to

0:36:55.600 --> 0:36:57.799
<v Speaker 1>make your way across the other stones and hopefully make

0:36:57.840 --> 0:37:00.640
<v Speaker 1>it across the entire creek without getting your feet wet

0:37:00.719 --> 0:37:03.840
<v Speaker 1>or falling in being swept down stream to the to

0:37:03.880 --> 0:37:07.880
<v Speaker 1>the waterfall. So to what extent are we just like

0:37:08.000 --> 0:37:12.600
<v Speaker 1>trusting anything that hasn't resulted in catastrophe thus fire? Well,

0:37:12.719 --> 0:37:15.200
<v Speaker 1>I would say that it would make more sense for

0:37:15.239 --> 0:37:20.000
<v Speaker 1>that to be true with sort of embodied physical experimental

0:37:20.040 --> 0:37:22.480
<v Speaker 1>knowledge about the world than it would for that to

0:37:22.520 --> 0:37:25.239
<v Speaker 1>make sense for that to apply to semantic knowledge of

0:37:25.360 --> 0:37:27.920
<v Speaker 1>things people tell us. Or maybe our brains just aren't

0:37:27.920 --> 0:37:32.000
<v Speaker 1>good at differentiating between semantic knowledge that's imparted through words.

0:37:32.080 --> 0:37:35.160
<v Speaker 1>You know, maybe somebody saying all those stones will hold

0:37:35.200 --> 0:37:37.360
<v Speaker 1>you up is encoded by the brain in sort of

0:37:37.360 --> 0:37:41.480
<v Speaker 1>the same way as testing out one stone at a time. Uh, yeah,

0:37:41.560 --> 0:37:44.000
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. So this is what we should explore

0:37:44.040 --> 0:37:46.360
<v Speaker 1>for the rest of the episode. I think, why should

0:37:46.440 --> 0:37:51.279
<v Speaker 1>repeatedly exposing ourselves to the same information increase our confidence

0:37:51.320 --> 0:37:53.800
<v Speaker 1>in it if we didn't have good reasons to believe

0:37:53.800 --> 0:37:56.160
<v Speaker 1>it the first time. It's clear that this is what's happening,

0:37:56.160 --> 0:37:58.680
<v Speaker 1>But why does it happen this way? All right, we'll

0:37:58.719 --> 0:38:00.919
<v Speaker 1>take one more break and when we im back, well

0:38:00.960 --> 0:38:05.560
<v Speaker 1>we'll jump into this. Thank thank Alright, we're back. So

0:38:05.640 --> 0:38:10.080
<v Speaker 1>we're asking this question of why repeatedly exposing ourselves to

0:38:10.120 --> 0:38:14.359
<v Speaker 1>the same information would increase our confidence if we didn't

0:38:14.400 --> 0:38:17.160
<v Speaker 1>have good reasons to believe the information the first time.

0:38:17.480 --> 0:38:20.320
<v Speaker 1>It's clear from several experiments that this is what happens

0:38:20.320 --> 0:38:23.120
<v Speaker 1>in our brains if if a statement is repeated, we

0:38:23.200 --> 0:38:26.239
<v Speaker 1>believe it more. But why do our brains work that way?

0:38:26.280 --> 0:38:30.839
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't necessarily make sense. Yeah, And one possible interpretation

0:38:30.880 --> 0:38:32.719
<v Speaker 1>that came to mind is, of course, we we've touched

0:38:32.719 --> 0:38:35.919
<v Speaker 1>on this before that that we're all social animals. Yeah,

0:38:36.520 --> 0:38:39.120
<v Speaker 1>so I've I've wondered if there this is a byproduct

0:38:39.160 --> 0:38:41.120
<v Speaker 1>of the drive to fit in with a given group

0:38:41.200 --> 0:38:45.040
<v Speaker 1>or tribe, that there's ultimately a survival advantage and getting

0:38:45.040 --> 0:38:47.799
<v Speaker 1>along with the group, and so does that bleed over

0:38:47.840 --> 0:38:51.480
<v Speaker 1>into highly repeated or highly circulated lies or untruths. So

0:38:51.560 --> 0:38:54.640
<v Speaker 1>basically like, if there is a lie going around in

0:38:54.760 --> 0:38:57.200
<v Speaker 1>the group, you'll get along with the group better if

0:38:57.239 --> 0:39:00.120
<v Speaker 1>you just accept the lie. Yeah, And I'm not know

0:39:00.239 --> 0:39:02.120
<v Speaker 1>certainly after looking at more of the research, I'm not

0:39:02.200 --> 0:39:06.319
<v Speaker 1>arguing that that is the core um mechanism involved here.

0:39:06.440 --> 0:39:08.200
<v Speaker 1>This is worth exploring that. But but I but I

0:39:08.239 --> 0:39:10.759
<v Speaker 1>do like wonder to what extent that is that's playing

0:39:10.760 --> 0:39:12.799
<v Speaker 1>a role, because you we we all have our our

0:39:12.840 --> 0:39:15.360
<v Speaker 1>groups that we are involved in, our our our friends,

0:39:15.360 --> 0:39:18.160
<v Speaker 1>our family, or our work groups, our social media groups

0:39:18.160 --> 0:39:20.800
<v Speaker 1>are are sort of echo chambers that we find online.

0:39:21.520 --> 0:39:24.200
<v Speaker 1>And uh, does it make you more susceptible to the

0:39:24.239 --> 0:39:29.799
<v Speaker 1>lie just because there is this this ingrained need to

0:39:29.960 --> 0:39:33.000
<v Speaker 1>fit in with that group too, to share the same

0:39:33.080 --> 0:39:36.640
<v Speaker 1>values and to put it all in the prehistoric framework,

0:39:36.719 --> 0:39:39.560
<v Speaker 1>to to continue to have access to the fire and

0:39:39.640 --> 0:39:41.879
<v Speaker 1>the and the feast. Yeah, I think I think that's

0:39:41.880 --> 0:39:45.160
<v Speaker 1>the possibility worth exploring. Let's let's take a look at it. Okay, Well,

0:39:45.320 --> 0:39:47.160
<v Speaker 1>I started looking into this a little bit, and I

0:39:47.600 --> 0:39:52.160
<v Speaker 1>ran across a paper titled the Evolution of Misbelief, Misbelief,

0:39:52.239 --> 0:39:55.880
<v Speaker 1>Misbelief from two thousand nine. This is published in Behavioral

0:39:55.880 --> 0:39:58.760
<v Speaker 1>and Brain Sciences, and it was by Ryan T. McKay

0:39:58.920 --> 0:40:01.719
<v Speaker 1>and Daniel in it. Oh, Daniel's in it all right.

0:40:02.280 --> 0:40:06.239
<v Speaker 1>So they approached the following I guess you could call

0:40:06.280 --> 0:40:09.080
<v Speaker 1>a paradox in the paper. Given that we evolve to

0:40:09.200 --> 0:40:12.400
<v Speaker 1>thrive in a fact based world, what other kind of

0:40:12.440 --> 0:40:14.560
<v Speaker 1>world could there? Exactly? Yeah, I mean, we we're dealing

0:40:14.560 --> 0:40:18.160
<v Speaker 1>with with with actual reality here. But but given that

0:40:18.239 --> 0:40:21.560
<v Speaker 1>we've evolved to thrive in this world, shouldn't true beliefs

0:40:21.680 --> 0:40:26.839
<v Speaker 1>be adaptive and misbeliefs be maladaptive. It's clear that in

0:40:26.960 --> 0:40:30.839
<v Speaker 1>many cases, probably most cases, that is the way things are. Right.

0:40:31.000 --> 0:40:33.440
<v Speaker 1>Believing that you are able to fly off the edge

0:40:33.480 --> 0:40:36.520
<v Speaker 1>of a cliff is not good for you. Believing that

0:40:36.560 --> 0:40:39.840
<v Speaker 1>polar bears want to cuddle with you is not advantageous.

0:40:40.120 --> 0:40:44.120
<v Speaker 1>Holding false beliefs like this doesn't work out well for people. Yeah,

0:40:44.160 --> 0:40:48.600
<v Speaker 1>they're they're they're reckless and dangerous misbeliefs that clearly like,

0:40:48.840 --> 0:40:50.840
<v Speaker 1>if you reach the point where you're believing in that,

0:40:51.239 --> 0:40:53.600
<v Speaker 1>you're going to go extinct. So it's obvious that there

0:40:53.680 --> 0:40:55.560
<v Speaker 1>is going to be at least some kind of major

0:40:55.680 --> 0:40:59.680
<v Speaker 1>selection pressure in the brain for shaping brains that believe

0:41:00.120 --> 0:41:04.240
<v Speaker 1>sly true things, unless there are cases where believing something

0:41:04.280 --> 0:41:09.640
<v Speaker 1>that's false outweighs the negative the drawbacks essentially. So here

0:41:09.680 --> 0:41:13.120
<v Speaker 1>here's a here's what they wrote quote on this assumption,

0:41:13.200 --> 0:41:16.440
<v Speaker 1>our beliefs about the world are essentially tools that enable

0:41:16.560 --> 0:41:21.520
<v Speaker 1>us to act effectively in the world. Moreover, to be reliable,

0:41:21.600 --> 0:41:24.640
<v Speaker 1>such tools must be produced in us, it is assumed

0:41:24.680 --> 0:41:28.400
<v Speaker 1>by systems designed by evolution to be truth aiming and

0:41:28.520 --> 0:41:32.760
<v Speaker 1>hence barring miracles, these systems must be designed to generate

0:41:33.040 --> 0:41:37.480
<v Speaker 1>grounded beliefs. A system for generating ungrounded but mostly true

0:41:37.480 --> 0:41:41.040
<v Speaker 1>beliefs would be an oracle, as impossible as a perpetual

0:41:41.080 --> 0:41:43.440
<v Speaker 1>motion machine. I like that. Yeah, So there's got to

0:41:43.480 --> 0:41:46.880
<v Speaker 1>be like a grounding procedure through which we can discover

0:41:47.040 --> 0:41:49.480
<v Speaker 1>true beliefs if we're going to have them. Otherwise we're

0:41:49.520 --> 0:41:52.400
<v Speaker 1>just talking about magic. But we have to account for

0:41:52.440 --> 0:41:55.080
<v Speaker 1>these varying levels of misbelief and self deception in the

0:41:55.160 --> 0:41:58.840
<v Speaker 1>human experience. They write, if evolution has designed us to

0:41:58.960 --> 0:42:02.560
<v Speaker 1>appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how

0:42:02.600 --> 0:42:05.200
<v Speaker 1>are we to account for the routine exceptions to this

0:42:05.320 --> 0:42:09.480
<v Speaker 1>rule instances of misbelief? Most of us at times believe

0:42:09.800 --> 0:42:13.560
<v Speaker 1>propositions that end up being disproved. Many of us produce

0:42:13.680 --> 0:42:17.080
<v Speaker 1>beliefs that others consider obviously false to begin with, and

0:42:17.120 --> 0:42:19.880
<v Speaker 1>some of his form beliefs that are not just manifestly

0:42:19.960 --> 0:42:24.359
<v Speaker 1>but bizarrely false. How can this be? Are all these

0:42:24.400 --> 0:42:29.120
<v Speaker 1>misbeliefs just accidents, incidences of pathology or breakdown, or at

0:42:29.160 --> 0:42:33.520
<v Speaker 1>best undesirable but tolerable byproducts. Might some of them contrat

0:42:33.520 --> 0:42:38.080
<v Speaker 1>the default presumption be adaptive in and of themselves. I

0:42:38.160 --> 0:42:41.080
<v Speaker 1>like this distinction they're making. I think this is actually useful.

0:42:41.120 --> 0:42:44.759
<v Speaker 1>So they're breaking misbeliefs down into two basic kinds of

0:42:44.840 --> 0:42:49.280
<v Speaker 1>categories right right that they're talking about one those resulting

0:42:49.320 --> 0:42:52.280
<v Speaker 1>from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief

0:42:52.360 --> 0:42:57.000
<v Speaker 1>formation system. This would be delusions malfunctions, So things like

0:42:57.280 --> 0:43:01.080
<v Speaker 1>face blindness or or catard syndrow. Okay, this is when

0:43:01.239 --> 0:43:05.959
<v Speaker 1>the brain is creating incorrect beliefs because it's not working right,

0:43:06.000 --> 0:43:08.640
<v Speaker 1>it's not doing what it's supposed to be doing. But

0:43:08.680 --> 0:43:12.360
<v Speaker 1>then the second category are those that are arising in

0:43:12.400 --> 0:43:16.520
<v Speaker 1>the normal course of that system's operations, so beliefs based

0:43:16.560 --> 0:43:19.879
<v Speaker 1>on incomplete or inaccurate information. These would be this would

0:43:19.880 --> 0:43:22.480
<v Speaker 1>be a case of manufacture. And we'll get into examples

0:43:22.480 --> 0:43:24.480
<v Speaker 1>of this in a second. There could be tons of examples.

0:43:24.480 --> 0:43:26.160
<v Speaker 1>One that comes to my mind that would be an

0:43:26.160 --> 0:43:28.879
<v Speaker 1>example of this would be optical illusions. When you when

0:43:28.880 --> 0:43:31.800
<v Speaker 1>you witness an optical illusion, you have a false belief

0:43:31.880 --> 0:43:33.799
<v Speaker 1>that has been generated by your brain. But it's not

0:43:33.840 --> 0:43:37.200
<v Speaker 1>because your brain is doing anything wrong. It's just because,

0:43:37.320 --> 0:43:40.160
<v Speaker 1>like it's being exploited by a situation that's not part

0:43:40.160 --> 0:43:43.839
<v Speaker 1>of its normal what it normally needs to do. Right. Yeah,

0:43:44.000 --> 0:43:46.279
<v Speaker 1>they point out that it's it's easy to think of

0:43:46.320 --> 0:43:49.040
<v Speaker 1>these in light of of an artifact. Is it failing

0:43:49.080 --> 0:43:51.200
<v Speaker 1>due to a limitation in the design in a way

0:43:51.239 --> 0:43:54.400
<v Speaker 1>that is culpable or tolerable. Examples here being say a

0:43:54.520 --> 0:43:57.640
<v Speaker 1>clock that doesn't keep time keep good time versus a

0:43:57.640 --> 0:44:00.480
<v Speaker 1>toaster of and that doesn't keep time at all. You

0:44:00.480 --> 0:44:03.600
<v Speaker 1>can't expect the toast drivant to keep time unless it's

0:44:03.600 --> 0:44:05.600
<v Speaker 1>got a time right. Well, yes, but that's true. Yes,

0:44:05.920 --> 0:44:08.240
<v Speaker 1>I would have said a purple donkey built by muscular

0:44:08.239 --> 0:44:13.000
<v Speaker 1>elves that doesn't keep because he wouldn't even expect yes now.

0:44:13.000 --> 0:44:14.680
<v Speaker 1>But but it gets more complicated when you go into

0:44:14.680 --> 0:44:18.799
<v Speaker 1>the biological realm, because what counts as immune function, dysfunction,

0:44:19.200 --> 0:44:23.040
<v Speaker 1>a pathogen infection, but what it would have Ultimately, the

0:44:23.040 --> 0:44:26.120
<v Speaker 1>immune system airs by defending the body against say, a

0:44:26.200 --> 0:44:30.720
<v Speaker 1>transplant organ, and may ensure its survival because the body

0:44:30.800 --> 0:44:33.520
<v Speaker 1>is going to reject that attempt, to reject that that

0:44:33.640 --> 0:44:37.520
<v Speaker 1>heart transplant. Uh, even though the heart transplant could save

0:44:37.560 --> 0:44:39.719
<v Speaker 1>the patient, will save the patients. So it seems like

0:44:39.880 --> 0:44:42.640
<v Speaker 1>in order to understand this, you almost have to understand

0:44:42.680 --> 0:44:45.400
<v Speaker 1>the context, right right. They say that they invoked the

0:44:45.400 --> 0:44:49.200
<v Speaker 1>work of Ruth Garrett Milliken, who in saying that we

0:44:49.280 --> 0:44:52.160
<v Speaker 1>can't look to an organ's current properties or disposition, we

0:44:52.200 --> 0:44:54.440
<v Speaker 1>have to look to its history. That makes sense to me.

0:44:54.920 --> 0:44:58.480
<v Speaker 1>Organ transplants, of course, are not part of our evolutionary history.

0:44:58.520 --> 0:45:01.319
<v Speaker 1>So this is just the body function normally in rejecting

0:45:01.440 --> 0:45:05.040
<v Speaker 1>the invader heart. Right, The body is not malfunctioning is

0:45:05.040 --> 0:45:06.840
<v Speaker 1>doing what it's supposed to do. We're just throwing a

0:45:06.880 --> 0:45:09.799
<v Speaker 1>situation at it that it's not prepared to deal with. Yeah,

0:45:10.080 --> 0:45:14.000
<v Speaker 1>so that brings us to the more human examples, you know,

0:45:14.120 --> 0:45:17.520
<v Speaker 1>lies and uh and so forth. Oh, that's interesting. So

0:45:17.560 --> 0:45:20.560
<v Speaker 1>a lie could be like a thing that our bodies

0:45:20.600 --> 0:45:24.040
<v Speaker 1>were not really prepared to deal with very well, which

0:45:24.080 --> 0:45:27.680
<v Speaker 1>is weird to think of because of how common lies are. Yeah,

0:45:27.680 --> 0:45:30.120
<v Speaker 1>they right. However adaptive it may be for us to

0:45:30.160 --> 0:45:33.680
<v Speaker 1>believe truly, it may be adaptive for other parties if

0:45:33.719 --> 0:45:36.440
<v Speaker 1>we believe falsely. Now that and of course this is

0:45:36.480 --> 0:45:38.719
<v Speaker 1>something just to to interject here, I think this is

0:45:38.760 --> 0:45:42.960
<v Speaker 1>something that we ultimately see holds holds true with other animals,

0:45:43.000 --> 0:45:46.040
<v Speaker 1>like the role of deception of course in u in

0:45:46.040 --> 0:45:50.160
<v Speaker 1>in in certainly in hunting, in defense, and even acquiring mates.

0:45:50.920 --> 0:45:54.440
<v Speaker 1>They continue. An evolutionary arms race of deceptive ploys and

0:45:54.520 --> 0:45:59.120
<v Speaker 1>counterploys may thus ensue. In some cases, the other parties

0:45:59.120 --> 0:46:02.520
<v Speaker 1>in question may not even be animate agents, but cultural

0:46:02.560 --> 0:46:05.879
<v Speaker 1>traits or systems. Although such cases are interesting in their

0:46:05.880 --> 0:46:09.440
<v Speaker 1>own right, the adaptive misbeliefs we pursue in this article

0:46:09.719 --> 0:46:13.360
<v Speaker 1>are beneficial to their consumers. Misbeliefs that evolved to the

0:46:13.400 --> 0:46:17.200
<v Speaker 1>detriment of their believers are not our quarries, so they

0:46:17.200 --> 0:46:20.360
<v Speaker 1>stress the difference between beliefs and what they referred to

0:46:20.400 --> 0:46:24.680
<v Speaker 1>as a leafs uh and uh. So for instance, if

0:46:24.680 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm freaked out by tall buildings, I might not believe

0:46:27.600 --> 0:46:29.840
<v Speaker 1>that I'm going to fall off, but I might a

0:46:29.920 --> 0:46:32.640
<v Speaker 1>lieve that I'm going to fall off. They leave as

0:46:32.680 --> 0:46:36.239
<v Speaker 1>in like like a moral yes. Yeah, And in this

0:46:36.280 --> 0:46:38.360
<v Speaker 1>case it seems to be something that is tall, a

0:46:38.400 --> 0:46:41.920
<v Speaker 1>tolerated side effect of an imperfect system. But it's not

0:46:42.000 --> 0:46:44.440
<v Speaker 1>McKay and Dinnett that end up bringing up the illusory

0:46:44.520 --> 0:46:49.759
<v Speaker 1>truth effect, but psychologists Pascal boy Yer in commentary on

0:46:49.800 --> 0:46:53.680
<v Speaker 1>the paper. Uh, this particular paper from from McKay and

0:46:53.719 --> 0:46:55.920
<v Speaker 1>dine Itt, by the ways, available online. I'll try to

0:46:55.960 --> 0:46:57.440
<v Speaker 1>include a link to it on the landing page for

0:46:57.520 --> 0:47:01.520
<v Speaker 1>this episode. But in his commentary, a boy A rights

0:47:01.840 --> 0:47:06.240
<v Speaker 1>dramatic memory distortion seem to influence belief fixation. For instance,

0:47:06.400 --> 0:47:09.480
<v Speaker 1>in the illusory truth effect, statements read several times are

0:47:09.520 --> 0:47:12.920
<v Speaker 1>more likely rated as true than statements read only once.

0:47:13.600 --> 0:47:16.759
<v Speaker 1>People who repeatedly imagine performing a particular action may end

0:47:16.840 --> 0:47:19.440
<v Speaker 1>up believing they actually performed it. Oh, yeah, this is

0:47:19.440 --> 0:47:21.840
<v Speaker 1>something I've read before. If yeah, if so, if you

0:47:21.920 --> 0:47:24.879
<v Speaker 1>just like have people walk through a task in their

0:47:24.920 --> 0:47:27.759
<v Speaker 1>mind and then ask them later if they remember doing it.

0:47:27.800 --> 0:47:31.000
<v Speaker 1>A lot of times they remember physically acting it out. Yeah,

0:47:31.080 --> 0:47:34.080
<v Speaker 1>I've certainly had this occur with me, Like There'll be

0:47:34.120 --> 0:47:36.120
<v Speaker 1>something I need to do and I'm thinking about doing it,

0:47:36.400 --> 0:47:39.759
<v Speaker 1>and then I can't remember if I actually carried it out. Uh.

0:47:39.760 --> 0:47:43.640
<v Speaker 1>And this is uh, this is called imagination inflation. He writes.

0:47:44.120 --> 0:47:48.200
<v Speaker 1>Misinformation paradigms show that most people are vulnerable to memory revision.

0:47:48.440 --> 0:47:53.920
<v Speaker 1>When plausible information is implied by experimenters in social contagion protocols,

0:47:53.960 --> 0:47:56.040
<v Speaker 1>people tend to believe they actually saw what is in

0:47:56.120 --> 0:47:59.640
<v Speaker 1>fact suggested by the confederate with whom they watched a video.

0:48:00.040 --> 0:48:02.440
<v Speaker 1>So that he's just listing lots of the ways that

0:48:02.560 --> 0:48:06.280
<v Speaker 1>we are end up with false beliefs. There's a plethora

0:48:06.360 --> 0:48:11.279
<v Speaker 1>of examples of mechanisms for putting false beliefs in our brains. Yeah.

0:48:11.280 --> 0:48:13.000
<v Speaker 1>I know there's a lot of territory covered in this

0:48:13.040 --> 0:48:17.359
<v Speaker 1>paper in the attached responses, but I can't I come

0:48:17.360 --> 0:48:20.360
<v Speaker 1>back to the sort of key reason that I sought

0:48:20.360 --> 0:48:23.480
<v Speaker 1>it out like, like, when is self self deception helpful?

0:48:23.520 --> 0:48:27.320
<v Speaker 1>Is it necessary for the deception of others? It doesn't

0:48:27.640 --> 0:48:30.080
<v Speaker 1>quite seem to be, like, you don't have to believe

0:48:30.120 --> 0:48:33.480
<v Speaker 1>the lie yourself to tell someone else the lie, regardless

0:48:33.520 --> 0:48:38.120
<v Speaker 1>of what telling the lie repeatedly might do to you. Well, so, boy,

0:48:38.200 --> 0:48:41.120
<v Speaker 1>he's skeptical of the idea, right, So is he basically

0:48:41.160 --> 0:48:44.880
<v Speaker 1>saying like, you don't want to overstate the the adaptiveness

0:48:45.000 --> 0:48:48.480
<v Speaker 1>of believing lies, but yeah, he drives sound that memory

0:48:48.560 --> 0:48:51.160
<v Speaker 1>need only be as good as the advantage and decision

0:48:51.200 --> 0:48:54.799
<v Speaker 1>making it affords. Okay, so he's essentially going for the

0:48:54.800 --> 0:48:59.319
<v Speaker 1>byproduct thing for most most beliefs He's he's saying like, look,

0:48:59.680 --> 0:49:03.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, memory needs to do certain things, and in

0:49:03.200 --> 0:49:05.600
<v Speaker 1>the course of doing those things, it may generate some

0:49:05.680 --> 0:49:07.880
<v Speaker 1>false beliefs. We don't have to assume that those false

0:49:07.880 --> 0:49:11.960
<v Speaker 1>beliefs themselves are beneficial, right, Yeah. And And to come

0:49:12.000 --> 0:49:14.360
<v Speaker 1>back to McKay and Dinnett, they point out that natural

0:49:14.360 --> 0:49:17.479
<v Speaker 1>selection doesn't seem to care about truth. It only cares

0:49:17.520 --> 0:49:20.440
<v Speaker 1>about reproductive success, so that there are various cases where

0:49:20.440 --> 0:49:24.239
<v Speaker 1>a particular false belief or misbelief is seemingly adaptive. You

0:49:24.239 --> 0:49:27.239
<v Speaker 1>believe in a non existent fire god. Okay, but say

0:49:27.280 --> 0:49:31.680
<v Speaker 1>that its laws inhibit overt selfish behavior gets you in

0:49:31.719 --> 0:49:33.879
<v Speaker 1>trouble and not work out for you in the long run.

0:49:34.239 --> 0:49:37.640
<v Speaker 1>So in that case, you have an adaptive misbelief. Now,

0:49:37.680 --> 0:49:40.319
<v Speaker 1>if the fire God wherever to actually appear, then this

0:49:40.360 --> 0:49:43.040
<v Speaker 1>would be an adaptive belief. But then there are arguably

0:49:43.080 --> 0:49:45.960
<v Speaker 1>a whole host of other false ideas that seem adaptive,

0:49:46.080 --> 0:49:50.879
<v Speaker 1>positive self deceptions about ability, the placebo effect for instance. Um,

0:49:51.040 --> 0:49:54.360
<v Speaker 1>they bring up the self theories of intelligence, entity and

0:49:54.440 --> 0:49:58.560
<v Speaker 1>incremental view of intelligence. Um, this being like, m am,

0:49:58.560 --> 0:50:01.480
<v Speaker 1>I born with a certain in uh intellect? Or do

0:50:01.520 --> 0:50:04.319
<v Speaker 1>I develop it over time? And how those different core

0:50:04.440 --> 0:50:09.680
<v Speaker 1>beliefs can affect your effectiveness in life Like doesn't mean like, oh,

0:50:09.719 --> 0:50:11.600
<v Speaker 1>I've got to work really hard in order to stay

0:50:12.239 --> 0:50:14.840
<v Speaker 1>stay on top of this, or is it a situation

0:50:14.840 --> 0:50:17.600
<v Speaker 1>where oh, I'm I'm brilliant, I can accomplish anything. And and

0:50:17.160 --> 0:50:19.960
<v Speaker 1>and of course I think you can argue for pitfalls

0:50:20.000 --> 0:50:23.000
<v Speaker 1>on both sides. And of course there's always the optimal

0:50:23.040 --> 0:50:25.799
<v Speaker 1>margin of illusion in play, which comes to us from

0:50:25.920 --> 0:50:29.720
<v Speaker 1>Roy f Ball moister. Uh. And you know, ultimately crazy

0:50:29.760 --> 0:50:32.279
<v Speaker 1>over confidence as we do as we discussed is going

0:50:32.320 --> 0:50:34.560
<v Speaker 1>to lead to extinction? Right, you don't want to cuddle

0:50:34.560 --> 0:50:36.840
<v Speaker 1>the polar bear. Right, cuddling the polar bear thinking you

0:50:36.880 --> 0:50:40.800
<v Speaker 1>can fly? Uh, these are going to lead you falling

0:50:40.800 --> 0:50:42.400
<v Speaker 1>off the side of a mountain or winding up in

0:50:42.440 --> 0:50:46.040
<v Speaker 1>a polar bear's tummy. Yeah. Now, I could certainly understand

0:50:46.040 --> 0:50:49.120
<v Speaker 1>the idea of socially adaptive misbeliefs. I think that thing.

0:50:49.920 --> 0:50:52.920
<v Speaker 1>Those things definitely do exist, and in some cases there

0:50:53.000 --> 0:50:55.960
<v Speaker 1>might be some overlap with the types of things that

0:50:56.080 --> 0:50:59.600
<v Speaker 1>get repeated so often, Like reasons for believing untrue things

0:51:00.080 --> 0:51:03.960
<v Speaker 1>can also compound each other. I mean, I'm I'm about

0:51:04.000 --> 0:51:06.760
<v Speaker 1>to explain why I think false beliefs gained through exposure

0:51:06.760 --> 0:51:10.319
<v Speaker 1>and repetition are not adaptive in themselves. But you can

0:51:10.360 --> 0:51:13.640
<v Speaker 1>have more than one reason for believing something that's untrue.

0:51:14.040 --> 0:51:17.239
<v Speaker 1>Think about objectively untrue statements that get repeated, as we

0:51:17.320 --> 0:51:20.280
<v Speaker 1>were talking about earlier, in a political context. The evidence

0:51:20.320 --> 0:51:23.120
<v Speaker 1>shows that we believe them partially because of how often

0:51:23.120 --> 0:51:27.320
<v Speaker 1>they repeated, but there's also social cognition and also identity

0:51:27.360 --> 0:51:30.479
<v Speaker 1>protective cognition. In other words, we tend to believe things

0:51:30.480 --> 0:51:33.520
<v Speaker 1>that members of our political tribe and social in groups, say,

0:51:33.760 --> 0:51:37.719
<v Speaker 1>and for social cohesion reasons that that is adaptive for us.

0:51:38.400 --> 0:51:41.480
<v Speaker 1>We also believe things that validate our sense of personal identity.

0:51:41.520 --> 0:51:44.280
<v Speaker 1>But I think it's pretty clear that that these types

0:51:44.320 --> 0:51:48.759
<v Speaker 1>of effects can work in a nasty perverse tag team format,

0:51:49.480 --> 0:51:53.000
<v Speaker 1>boosting and complementing one another. But even if we we

0:51:53.080 --> 0:51:57.359
<v Speaker 1>put aside these complementary effects, put aside uh social and

0:51:57.480 --> 0:52:01.400
<v Speaker 1>identity protective cognition, put those aside, and just focus on

0:52:01.440 --> 0:52:05.680
<v Speaker 1>the explanation for the illusory truth effect and repetition, there's

0:52:05.680 --> 0:52:08.279
<v Speaker 1>a really interesting thing that comes out. And this is

0:52:08.440 --> 0:52:12.680
<v Speaker 1>based on the idea of processing fluency, which is it's

0:52:12.719 --> 0:52:15.440
<v Speaker 1>a it's a concept that is way more interesting than

0:52:15.480 --> 0:52:19.360
<v Speaker 1>the name would let you believe. So the dominant explanation

0:52:19.440 --> 0:52:22.480
<v Speaker 1>for the illusory truth effect in the psychology literature, which

0:52:22.480 --> 0:52:27.040
<v Speaker 1>we're about to get into, um fits into this byproduct

0:52:27.160 --> 0:52:29.759
<v Speaker 1>category that we were just talking about. Based on all

0:52:29.800 --> 0:52:33.320
<v Speaker 1>I've read, it seems the informed majority opinion of psychologists

0:52:33.719 --> 0:52:36.000
<v Speaker 1>is that the illusion of truth that we get from

0:52:36.040 --> 0:52:40.520
<v Speaker 1>exposure and repetition is an unfortunate byproduct of generally useful

0:52:41.000 --> 0:52:44.720
<v Speaker 1>cognitive heuristic. Now, a heuristic, as we've talked about before,

0:52:44.760 --> 0:52:48.000
<v Speaker 1>is a mental shortcut. It's a fast and cheap trick

0:52:48.520 --> 0:52:51.520
<v Speaker 1>that the brain uses to arrive at a judgment or

0:52:51.560 --> 0:52:54.600
<v Speaker 1>produce some kind of result without using too much effort.

0:52:54.840 --> 0:52:57.680
<v Speaker 1>And it's it's worth driving home that our brains need

0:52:57.840 --> 0:53:01.520
<v Speaker 1>fast and cheap tricks. Yeah, brains are very energy hungry.

0:53:01.600 --> 0:53:04.319
<v Speaker 1>Yeah yeah, there's only there's only so much power to

0:53:04.320 --> 0:53:06.920
<v Speaker 1>go around there. So it's, uh, it's kind of has

0:53:06.960 --> 0:53:09.719
<v Speaker 1>to hold everything together with a bunch of of of

0:53:09.840 --> 0:53:13.040
<v Speaker 1>cheap tricks. Yeah, so it works something like this. Let's

0:53:13.120 --> 0:53:15.720
<v Speaker 1>let's go on, let's go with it. Assume that on balance,

0:53:16.000 --> 0:53:20.000
<v Speaker 1>true statements get uttered more often than lies. As cynical

0:53:20.040 --> 0:53:22.600
<v Speaker 1>as we like to be, that's probably true, right, True

0:53:22.640 --> 0:53:26.480
<v Speaker 1>statements are generally more useful to people. Also, there's a

0:53:26.520 --> 0:53:30.440
<v Speaker 1>sort of convergence effect where there's only one way for

0:53:30.480 --> 0:53:33.080
<v Speaker 1>a true statement to be true, but there are lots

0:53:33.080 --> 0:53:36.080
<v Speaker 1>of different ways to say a lie about the subject

0:53:36.160 --> 0:53:38.840
<v Speaker 1>of that statement. So like, true statements on the subject

0:53:38.880 --> 0:53:42.319
<v Speaker 1>are going to be more consistent usually than lies about

0:53:42.320 --> 0:53:44.400
<v Speaker 1>the subject because a lie about the subject could be

0:53:44.440 --> 0:53:49.719
<v Speaker 1>anything well, and also lies lies it in large part

0:53:49.920 --> 0:53:53.040
<v Speaker 1>have to be believable. Like think about the various true

0:53:53.040 --> 0:53:56.239
<v Speaker 1>statements and uh and false statements that might be uttered

0:53:56.320 --> 0:53:59.799
<v Speaker 1>during the course of a given day at work. Yeah, somebody, hey,

0:53:59.800 --> 0:54:02.280
<v Speaker 1>we're the bathroom, you know, it's a new building. Say.

0:54:02.360 --> 0:54:04.719
<v Speaker 1>Then they're they're gonna probably say, oh, it's over there,

0:54:04.760 --> 0:54:07.040
<v Speaker 1>and they're they're they're probably going to tell you the truth.

0:54:07.880 --> 0:54:10.279
<v Speaker 1>Generally does not serve people well to lie about the

0:54:10.280 --> 0:54:12.600
<v Speaker 1>location of the bathroom, right because you're gonna find out

0:54:12.719 --> 0:54:14.359
<v Speaker 1>and then you're gonna say, hey, why did you tell

0:54:14.360 --> 0:54:16.560
<v Speaker 1>me the bathroom is over there and not over there?

0:54:16.600 --> 0:54:21.400
<v Speaker 1>Are you insane? But then some of the false statements

0:54:21.440 --> 0:54:24.279
<v Speaker 1>you're liable to hear might be, hey, if you uh,

0:54:24.680 --> 0:54:26.200
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, let's see have you started on that

0:54:26.239 --> 0:54:29.000
<v Speaker 1>report yet, Let's do on Friday, And they'll say, oh, yeah,

0:54:29.000 --> 0:54:30.359
<v Speaker 1>I've got it, I've got it taken care of. I'll

0:54:30.360 --> 0:54:32.640
<v Speaker 1>get it to you on Friday. You know. There there's

0:54:32.719 --> 0:54:34.239
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of statements like that that are

0:54:34.560 --> 0:54:36.799
<v Speaker 1>that ultimately you can't really check in on, like you're

0:54:36.840 --> 0:54:38.400
<v Speaker 1>just gonna have to take their word for it, right,

0:54:38.440 --> 0:54:40.879
<v Speaker 1>and that kind of lie. Yeah, you'll never find out,

0:54:41.440 --> 0:54:44.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, yeah exactly. Or I can't come into work

0:54:44.320 --> 0:54:46.440
<v Speaker 1>today because I'm sick. Well, all right, I'm you know,

0:54:46.480 --> 0:54:48.560
<v Speaker 1>we're not going to ask for a doctor's note. You

0:54:48.640 --> 0:54:51.160
<v Speaker 1>might be lying, you might not, but it's just kind

0:54:51.160 --> 0:54:54.040
<v Speaker 1>of a gimme on that situation. Yeah, that's another reason

0:54:54.120 --> 0:54:57.960
<v Speaker 1>that we're more likely to be exposed to true statements generally,

0:54:58.040 --> 0:55:00.320
<v Speaker 1>or at least that were more likely to detect true

0:55:00.320 --> 0:55:04.720
<v Speaker 1>statements generally, because false statements are harder to verify, usually

0:55:04.719 --> 0:55:07.200
<v Speaker 1>by design of the person making them. So you're able

0:55:07.200 --> 0:55:09.479
<v Speaker 1>to find yourself in an environment it's mostly built out

0:55:09.560 --> 0:55:15.400
<v Speaker 1>of true statements and believable lies. Right, So on this assumption,

0:55:16.080 --> 0:55:18.840
<v Speaker 1>you know you're you're in a hurry, and your brain

0:55:19.600 --> 0:55:22.959
<v Speaker 1>it is not designed to consume infinite energy. It wants

0:55:23.000 --> 0:55:25.319
<v Speaker 1>to try to be efficient. You don't have time to

0:55:25.400 --> 0:55:28.239
<v Speaker 1>evaluate all claims rigorously. I mean, even no matter how

0:55:28.280 --> 0:55:32.319
<v Speaker 1>skeptical you want to be, we can confirm this eventually.

0:55:32.480 --> 0:55:34.959
<v Speaker 1>You are just not going to have time to look

0:55:35.000 --> 0:55:37.439
<v Speaker 1>into everything you believe. You're just gonna have to take

0:55:37.440 --> 0:55:40.440
<v Speaker 1>somebody's word for it. It's not practical to try to

0:55:40.520 --> 0:55:44.000
<v Speaker 1>live by verifying every single belief. Oh yeah, I mean

0:55:44.080 --> 0:55:47.360
<v Speaker 1>it would. You've just got to have something firm underneath

0:55:47.400 --> 0:55:49.399
<v Speaker 1>your feet in order to proceed. Oh yeah, you've got

0:55:49.400 --> 0:55:51.279
<v Speaker 1>a bedrock, but then you've also got to have you

0:55:51.440 --> 0:55:53.759
<v Speaker 1>just I mean, you take somebody's word on where the

0:55:53.800 --> 0:55:57.680
<v Speaker 1>bathroom is, like, you're not gonna try to fact check them,

0:55:57.719 --> 0:55:59.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, well, I guess you will by trying to

0:55:59.640 --> 0:56:02.000
<v Speaker 1>go there. But other other things like that, mundane things

0:56:02.000 --> 0:56:04.480
<v Speaker 1>people tell you throughout the day, You're just gonna have

0:56:04.560 --> 0:56:07.879
<v Speaker 1>to believe them. There's just no, it doesn't make any

0:56:07.920 --> 0:56:10.520
<v Speaker 1>sense to try to verify all of it because you

0:56:10.520 --> 0:56:15.320
<v Speaker 1>don't have time. So therefore, an easy shortcut for assuming

0:56:15.360 --> 0:56:18.160
<v Speaker 1>that a statement is more likely true is have I

0:56:18.200 --> 0:56:22.440
<v Speaker 1>heard this statement before? Statements they get uttered more often

0:56:22.480 --> 0:56:26.520
<v Speaker 1>are more likely to be from that class of true statements. Okay,

0:56:26.600 --> 0:56:29.160
<v Speaker 1>I can roll with that. Now, there's another type of

0:56:29.200 --> 0:56:33.200
<v Speaker 1>parallel thinking that says, uh, that says, you know, also,

0:56:33.440 --> 0:56:36.400
<v Speaker 1>it's actually more difficult to disbelieve something than it is

0:56:36.440 --> 0:56:40.000
<v Speaker 1>to believe it because and I don't know if this

0:56:40.040 --> 0:56:42.320
<v Speaker 1>is really confirmed or if this is just one theory

0:56:42.360 --> 0:56:45.200
<v Speaker 1>about how the information processing in the brain works. But

0:56:45.520 --> 0:56:49.359
<v Speaker 1>just as a quick tangent, there is a model of

0:56:49.400 --> 0:56:52.400
<v Speaker 1>thinking that says, Okay, to believe a statement is true,

0:56:52.440 --> 0:56:54.680
<v Speaker 1>to hear a statement and say I believe it is

0:56:54.719 --> 0:56:57.800
<v Speaker 1>just one step in the brain. To hear a statement

0:56:57.840 --> 0:57:00.840
<v Speaker 1>and reject it as false is a two step procedure

0:57:00.880 --> 0:57:03.399
<v Speaker 1>where first you have to hear it and believe it

0:57:03.480 --> 0:57:06.080
<v Speaker 1>to understand it, and then you have to go back

0:57:06.120 --> 0:57:08.960
<v Speaker 1>and revise what you just did and say, but it's

0:57:09.000 --> 0:57:12.200
<v Speaker 1>not true. Yeah. It's ultimately like a king setting down

0:57:12.400 --> 0:57:15.360
<v Speaker 1>at a banquet table. Right, is the king to simply

0:57:15.960 --> 0:57:19.800
<v Speaker 1>eat every uh, every food item on the plate and

0:57:19.840 --> 0:57:21.800
<v Speaker 1>trust in it and trust that he's not going to

0:57:21.840 --> 0:57:25.400
<v Speaker 1>be poisoned or is he going to independently test each thing?

0:57:25.560 --> 0:57:28.440
<v Speaker 1>Have the food taster come up, put the mid transfer

0:57:28.520 --> 0:57:31.760
<v Speaker 1>this goblet of wine into the rhinoceros horn, etcetera. Hold

0:57:31.800 --> 0:57:34.600
<v Speaker 1>the magic crystal over this plate of beans. And you know,

0:57:34.640 --> 0:57:37.640
<v Speaker 1>another thing that came to mind was some of our

0:57:37.640 --> 0:57:40.760
<v Speaker 1>discussions we've had in the past about consciousness and imagination

0:57:40.800 --> 0:57:44.520
<v Speaker 1>as a simulation engine, that we use our imagination to

0:57:45.360 --> 0:57:50.360
<v Speaker 1>mentally simulate possible outcomes so that we can best choose

0:57:50.440 --> 0:57:52.720
<v Speaker 1>how we're going to react to the world. And when

0:57:52.720 --> 0:57:54.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm presented with something that might be a lie or

0:57:55.200 --> 0:57:57.800
<v Speaker 1>or of some sort of untruth or a bit of

0:57:57.800 --> 0:58:02.200
<v Speaker 1>of misinformation. I still can't help but imagine it, right,

0:58:02.240 --> 0:58:05.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm having to create a mental picture of it. Um

0:58:05.240 --> 0:58:08.720
<v Speaker 1>in a sense, you're kind of believing it for the moment. Yeah, yeah,

0:58:08.720 --> 0:58:11.320
<v Speaker 1>because I have to simulate it in my head. And

0:58:11.360 --> 0:58:13.600
<v Speaker 1>in cases of people who can form mental pictures, you

0:58:13.600 --> 0:58:16.520
<v Speaker 1>have to form those mental pictures and uh, now you know,

0:58:16.560 --> 0:58:19.280
<v Speaker 1>And I imagine a lot of this what shakes out

0:58:19.320 --> 0:58:23.320
<v Speaker 1>after has to do with an individual's particular worldview. But

0:58:23.840 --> 0:58:26.440
<v Speaker 1>I wonder if in some cases it's like a type

0:58:26.520 --> 0:58:29.320
<v Speaker 1>one error in cognition, you know, and it's a false positive.

0:58:29.800 --> 0:58:34.280
<v Speaker 1>Uh that uh, that I I'm imagining this is a

0:58:34.320 --> 0:58:37.680
<v Speaker 1>possible outcome, and then maybe I'm more inclined to believe

0:58:37.760 --> 0:58:40.720
<v Speaker 1>it just so that I can keep it from harming me. Yeah.

0:58:40.760 --> 0:58:43.520
<v Speaker 1>I think that's a very very reasonable way of imagining it.

0:58:44.000 --> 0:58:46.240
<v Speaker 1>But so here's where we get into the final part

0:58:46.240 --> 0:58:49.160
<v Speaker 1>of our discussion today, which is the idea of what

0:58:49.200 --> 0:58:53.040
<v Speaker 1>I mentioned a minute ago, processing fluency. So processing fluency

0:58:53.160 --> 0:58:57.200
<v Speaker 1>just means how easy it is to process incoming information.

0:58:58.080 --> 0:59:00.960
<v Speaker 1>And you wouldn't believe the research, John, how many of

0:59:01.000 --> 0:59:04.200
<v Speaker 1>our decisions and mental outcomes seem to be based at

0:59:04.240 --> 0:59:08.840
<v Speaker 1>least in part on processing fluency. The brain really really

0:59:08.920 --> 0:59:12.360
<v Speaker 1>likes things to be easy. It really likes things to

0:59:12.400 --> 0:59:16.200
<v Speaker 1>be to go smooth, to not be too difficult. Uh So,

0:59:16.720 --> 0:59:20.000
<v Speaker 1>to start off, based on existing research, it definitely seems

0:59:20.000 --> 0:59:23.800
<v Speaker 1>true that people have an easier time processing statements and

0:59:23.880 --> 0:59:27.960
<v Speaker 1>information they've heard before. In fact, Robert, you probably know

0:59:28.040 --> 0:59:32.080
<v Speaker 1>this from direct experience. Like a familiar statement, when used

0:59:32.080 --> 0:59:34.240
<v Speaker 1>in the context of a sentence or an argument, is

0:59:34.240 --> 0:59:38.840
<v Speaker 1>processed quite smoothly, but a new, unfamiliar statement in the

0:59:38.880 --> 0:59:41.520
<v Speaker 1>same context often causes you to say, wait, hold on,

0:59:41.560 --> 0:59:43.360
<v Speaker 1>back up, I need to wrap my head around this.

0:59:44.080 --> 0:59:48.360
<v Speaker 1>Familiar is easy. Unfamiliar is difficult. But how would you

0:59:48.520 --> 0:59:52.720
<v Speaker 1>test whether the ease of processing information we're actually affecting

0:59:52.720 --> 0:59:56.360
<v Speaker 1>our judgment of of the truth of a statement. And

0:59:56.440 --> 0:59:58.360
<v Speaker 1>I want to get into a couple of quick, really

0:59:58.360 --> 1:00:02.480
<v Speaker 1>interesting studies on this that we're so simple and so brilliant.

1:00:02.880 --> 1:00:07.720
<v Speaker 1>So in Rayburn Schwartz did a study in consciousness and

1:00:07.760 --> 1:00:11.720
<v Speaker 1>cognition called Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth.

1:00:12.800 --> 1:00:14.640
<v Speaker 1>They took true or false statements, kind of like in

1:00:14.680 --> 1:00:17.640
<v Speaker 1>the studies we've seen before of the variety osorn no

1:00:17.760 --> 1:00:21.960
<v Speaker 1>is in Chile, or Greenland has roughly fifty inhabitants, and

1:00:22.000 --> 1:00:25.040
<v Speaker 1>they presented those statements to people, and the main independent

1:00:25.080 --> 1:00:28.280
<v Speaker 1>variable was that they presented the statements either against a

1:00:28.320 --> 1:00:31.960
<v Speaker 1>white background in a high contrast, easy to read color,

1:00:32.520 --> 1:00:35.960
<v Speaker 1>or in a low contrast, hard to read color, and

1:00:36.000 --> 1:00:38.360
<v Speaker 1>apparently that made all the difference in the world. The

1:00:38.440 --> 1:00:42.000
<v Speaker 1>idea is that the hard to read one has low

1:00:42.080 --> 1:00:45.360
<v Speaker 1>processing fluency, it's difficult, and the easy to read one

1:00:45.400 --> 1:00:49.520
<v Speaker 1>has high processing fluency, it's easy to process. And they

1:00:49.560 --> 1:00:52.680
<v Speaker 1>found that this made a big difference in what people

1:00:52.760 --> 1:00:57.720
<v Speaker 1>believed was true or false. Uh quote. Moderately visible statements

1:00:57.720 --> 1:01:01.800
<v Speaker 1>were judged as true at chance all, whereas highly visible

1:01:01.840 --> 1:01:05.720
<v Speaker 1>statements were judged as true significantly above chance level. We

1:01:05.760 --> 1:01:10.560
<v Speaker 1>conclude the perceptual fluency affects judgments of truth. This is

1:01:10.560 --> 1:01:12.800
<v Speaker 1>another one that makes sense from a marketing standpoint, right,

1:01:12.840 --> 1:01:17.440
<v Speaker 1>just make your message very clear, very very easily absorbed,

1:01:17.680 --> 1:01:20.280
<v Speaker 1>and people will begin to buy into it. Oh, absolutely,

1:01:20.320 --> 1:01:23.520
<v Speaker 1>And this has actually been studied in marketing and consumer preference.

1:01:23.600 --> 1:01:27.080
<v Speaker 1>Like there is one study from Novimski at All published

1:01:27.080 --> 1:01:29.360
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand seven in the Journal of Marketing Research

1:01:29.560 --> 1:01:32.600
<v Speaker 1>that in short, it found that consumers more often tend

1:01:32.600 --> 1:01:36.560
<v Speaker 1>to choose brands that represent ease and fluency. Like say,

1:01:36.600 --> 1:01:39.600
<v Speaker 1>if the information about a brand is easy to read,

1:01:39.880 --> 1:01:42.600
<v Speaker 1>consumers are more likely to choose that brand that's the

1:01:42.640 --> 1:01:45.000
<v Speaker 1>one they want. So that makes me wonder why Coca

1:01:45.000 --> 1:01:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Cola is written in cursive. It seems like you would

1:01:46.840 --> 1:01:49.160
<v Speaker 1>want it just very clear, bold letters. Well didn't they

1:01:49.160 --> 1:01:52.240
<v Speaker 1>try to change the can? When did? I haven't really

1:01:52.280 --> 1:01:56.040
<v Speaker 1>looked at a can recently. Maybe it's not incursive anymore,

1:01:56.160 --> 1:01:59.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, they're Actually you might have two things in conflict, right,

1:01:59.520 --> 1:02:02.160
<v Speaker 1>So you could have in conflict if you if you've

1:02:02.200 --> 1:02:04.920
<v Speaker 1>got an old logo that people are familiar with but

1:02:05.000 --> 1:02:07.760
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to read, that the hard to read part

1:02:08.080 --> 1:02:11.160
<v Speaker 1>might be undercutting their preference for it, but the fact

1:02:11.240 --> 1:02:13.920
<v Speaker 1>that it's familiar might be boosting their preference for it.

1:02:13.960 --> 1:02:15.960
<v Speaker 1>If you try to change it to something that's easier

1:02:16.000 --> 1:02:20.240
<v Speaker 1>to read, the change might introduce more difficulty in processing

1:02:20.360 --> 1:02:23.640
<v Speaker 1>than the ease of reading would improve processing. Yeah, that

1:02:23.680 --> 1:02:25.600
<v Speaker 1>makes sense, all right, So I want to cite one

1:02:25.640 --> 1:02:28.439
<v Speaker 1>more study, a study by Christian uncle Bach in two

1:02:28.440 --> 1:02:32.800
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven from the Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning, Memory,

1:02:32.800 --> 1:02:36.840
<v Speaker 1>and Cognition and Uncle Bach does an interesting thing in

1:02:36.880 --> 1:02:40.000
<v Speaker 1>the study where he's got a hypothesis he wants to test.

1:02:40.080 --> 1:02:44.320
<v Speaker 1>He writes, quote, I argue that experienced fluency is used

1:02:44.360 --> 1:02:46.920
<v Speaker 1>as a que and judgments of truth according to the

1:02:46.960 --> 1:02:52.040
<v Speaker 1>cues ecological validity, meaning like successfulness in the real world.

1:02:52.840 --> 1:02:56.680
<v Speaker 1>Quote that is, the truth effect occurs because repetition leads

1:02:56.720 --> 1:03:00.120
<v Speaker 1>to more fluent processing of a statement, and people have

1:03:00.280 --> 1:03:04.840
<v Speaker 1>learned that the experience of processing fluency correlates positively with

1:03:04.920 --> 1:03:07.280
<v Speaker 1>the truth of a statement. So this is sort of

1:03:07.280 --> 1:03:09.400
<v Speaker 1>what we were talking about earlier. It's a heuristic that

1:03:09.760 --> 1:03:12.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, you're more likely to encounter true statements in

1:03:12.240 --> 1:03:16.360
<v Speaker 1>the wild. People learn this through experience, and then they

1:03:16.480 --> 1:03:21.160
<v Speaker 1>use the the the queue of processing fluency to to

1:03:21.400 --> 1:03:23.880
<v Speaker 1>be the judge of whether something is familiar or not.

1:03:24.800 --> 1:03:27.800
<v Speaker 1>And if it's familiar and they get that processing fluency

1:03:27.800 --> 1:03:31.680
<v Speaker 1>bump it's easy to process, then they're more likely to

1:03:31.680 --> 1:03:34.160
<v Speaker 1>believe it's true because that's what has worked for them

1:03:34.160 --> 1:03:37.040
<v Speaker 1>in the past. And if this is true, Uncle Box says,

1:03:37.360 --> 1:03:39.160
<v Speaker 1>I bet I could reverse it with a little bit

1:03:39.160 --> 1:03:42.760
<v Speaker 1>of training, and he does. He's got an experiment where

1:03:42.800 --> 1:03:46.000
<v Speaker 1>with a training phase he actually does three different experiments,

1:03:46.320 --> 1:03:49.720
<v Speaker 1>and essentially what he does is that he trains people

1:03:49.760 --> 1:03:52.560
<v Speaker 1>in a scenario where things that are easier to process,

1:03:52.640 --> 1:03:55.800
<v Speaker 1>either because of being easier to read or because of

1:03:55.880 --> 1:03:59.919
<v Speaker 1>repetition and familiarity. Either way, those things are more core

1:04:00.040 --> 1:04:03.320
<v Speaker 1>related with the thing, with the thing being false, and

1:04:03.360 --> 1:04:06.400
<v Speaker 1>when people get trained in sessions like that, they lose

1:04:06.440 --> 1:04:09.720
<v Speaker 1>the effect. So the good takeaway there is that if

1:04:09.720 --> 1:04:12.600
<v Speaker 1>he's correct, it would probably also mean that your susceptibility

1:04:12.640 --> 1:04:15.760
<v Speaker 1>to the lusory truth effect is dependent on what kind

1:04:15.840 --> 1:04:18.800
<v Speaker 1>of environment you've trained in, and that you could potentially

1:04:19.280 --> 1:04:22.280
<v Speaker 1>untrain yourself on it. But that would be hard to

1:04:22.320 --> 1:04:24.280
<v Speaker 1>do because we all live in this world all the

1:04:24.280 --> 1:04:26.120
<v Speaker 1>time where most of the time people are telling us

1:04:26.160 --> 1:04:28.760
<v Speaker 1>true things. Right, and and again, the brain is still

1:04:28.800 --> 1:04:31.480
<v Speaker 1>going to need all of these shortcuts in order to

1:04:31.640 --> 1:04:34.240
<v Speaker 1>function properly. Yeah, exactly, But you could just be using

1:04:34.280 --> 1:04:36.800
<v Speaker 1>the opposite shortcut, Like if you live in a world

1:04:36.800 --> 1:04:40.000
<v Speaker 1>where people lie to you all the time, Uncle Bock's

1:04:40.040 --> 1:04:42.440
<v Speaker 1>results here would suggest that you would eventually adapt to

1:04:42.480 --> 1:04:45.280
<v Speaker 1>this and you would instead become exactly the opposite. New

1:04:45.320 --> 1:04:48.000
<v Speaker 1>claims you've never heard before would seem more true to you,

1:04:48.080 --> 1:04:50.840
<v Speaker 1>and repeated claims that you're familiar with would seem like

1:04:50.920 --> 1:04:53.440
<v Speaker 1>lies to you. Okay, so there's hope for us after all. Yeah,

1:04:53.520 --> 1:04:55.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, but we can't expect to live in a

1:04:55.920 --> 1:04:57.440
<v Speaker 1>world like that, and we don't want to live in

1:04:57.440 --> 1:04:59.320
<v Speaker 1>a world like like like that, Like you don't want

1:04:59.320 --> 1:05:02.480
<v Speaker 1>to train your brain to live in a world where

1:05:02.520 --> 1:05:06.200
<v Speaker 1>everything is assumed to be a lie. Oh and I

1:05:06.680 --> 1:05:10.920
<v Speaker 1>surely somebody has has considered exploring this in fiction. It

1:05:10.920 --> 1:05:13.320
<v Speaker 1>would be it would be a delicate affair to to

1:05:13.320 --> 1:05:14.960
<v Speaker 1>really put it together and make it work on paper.

1:05:15.040 --> 1:05:17.560
<v Speaker 1>But it's a world that I don't want to live in,

1:05:17.600 --> 1:05:20.120
<v Speaker 1>but I kind of want to visit fictionally. Oh yeah,

1:05:20.160 --> 1:05:21.840
<v Speaker 1>i'd go there with you. That that's a good one

1:05:21.880 --> 1:05:24.439
<v Speaker 1>to to come back to. But just as a quick

1:05:24.440 --> 1:05:27.520
<v Speaker 1>note before we close out today, I think this idea

1:05:27.520 --> 1:05:30.520
<v Speaker 1>of processing fluency is a really interesting one. There's tons

1:05:30.560 --> 1:05:33.400
<v Speaker 1>of research on it, Like, uh, there is a study

1:05:33.440 --> 1:05:38.720
<v Speaker 1>I found by Sasha Topalinski from in Cognition and Emotion

1:05:38.800 --> 1:05:42.520
<v Speaker 1>about how processing fluency affects how funny we find jokes

1:05:43.120 --> 1:05:46.120
<v Speaker 1>that apparently, if a joke is easier to process, we've

1:05:46.120 --> 1:05:49.640
<v Speaker 1>got high processing fluency on the joke. We think it's funnier.

1:05:49.800 --> 1:05:51.960
<v Speaker 1>I guess it just like feels good to get it

1:05:52.000 --> 1:05:55.680
<v Speaker 1>without with less effort or something. Uh So, there were

1:05:55.760 --> 1:05:59.200
<v Speaker 1>multiple experiments, but basically here let me let me give

1:05:59.200 --> 1:06:02.000
<v Speaker 1>you a quick preview. Gonna say a word, Robert, Peanuts.

1:06:02.560 --> 1:06:05.640
<v Speaker 1>Do you like that word when you think about it? Peanuts? Peanuts?

1:06:06.040 --> 1:06:08.040
<v Speaker 1>It's pretty good. It's it's not the funniest where it's

1:06:08.080 --> 1:06:10.720
<v Speaker 1>no cheese. But but but I like it. Okay, I

1:06:10.800 --> 1:06:13.240
<v Speaker 1>just said that word. So one example of this type

1:06:13.240 --> 1:06:16.440
<v Speaker 1>of study would be if you prime somebody with significant

1:06:16.560 --> 1:06:19.840
<v Speaker 1>nouns from the punch line of a joke fifteen minutes

1:06:19.960 --> 1:06:22.720
<v Speaker 1>or even up to just one minute before you tell

1:06:22.760 --> 1:06:27.400
<v Speaker 1>them the joke, people find the joke more hilarious. However,

1:06:27.480 --> 1:06:29.760
<v Speaker 1>if you tell them a significant noun from the punch

1:06:29.800 --> 1:06:33.080
<v Speaker 1>line immediately before the joke, they find the joke less funny,

1:06:33.080 --> 1:06:35.080
<v Speaker 1>and the authors think this is probably just or the

1:06:35.120 --> 1:06:37.920
<v Speaker 1>author thinks this is because if you tell them right

1:06:37.960 --> 1:06:40.200
<v Speaker 1>before the joke, it sort of spoils the punch line.

1:06:40.840 --> 1:06:45.120
<v Speaker 1>But knock, knock, who's there? Cash? Cash? Who? No? Thanks?

1:06:45.160 --> 1:06:49.840
<v Speaker 1>I prefer peanuts. Ah See, it works, it's not not

1:06:49.920 --> 1:06:52.880
<v Speaker 1>even but you already established peanuts, so it helped, right.

1:06:53.120 --> 1:06:55.200
<v Speaker 1>I tried to let a minute or so elapse there.

1:06:55.800 --> 1:06:58.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if it worked well. It's also complicated

1:06:58.080 --> 1:07:00.280
<v Speaker 1>because we did bring up peanuts and peanut better earlier

1:07:00.280 --> 1:07:02.640
<v Speaker 1>in the episode. I didn't even think about that, but

1:07:02.920 --> 1:07:06.080
<v Speaker 1>this Actually I am not a student of of stand

1:07:06.160 --> 1:07:09.760
<v Speaker 1>up comedy by any stretch of the imagination, but I

1:07:09.840 --> 1:07:12.440
<v Speaker 1>watch enough stand up to see that just that that

1:07:12.520 --> 1:07:15.360
<v Speaker 1>common structural tool that they use where you have the

1:07:15.400 --> 1:07:18.080
<v Speaker 1>call back to a previous joke, and they'll often do

1:07:18.120 --> 1:07:20.480
<v Speaker 1>it right at the end and then it's good night everybody.

1:07:20.520 --> 1:07:23.720
<v Speaker 1>That's the high note. And it it's not even necessarily

1:07:23.920 --> 1:07:27.400
<v Speaker 1>like a call back to their to the funniest moment

1:07:27.400 --> 1:07:29.360
<v Speaker 1>in the bit or the funniest bit in the in

1:07:29.600 --> 1:07:32.080
<v Speaker 1>the stand up performance, but just the fact that they've

1:07:32.400 --> 1:07:36.600
<v Speaker 1>brought your mind back to it. It generates laughter, and

1:07:36.640 --> 1:07:38.760
<v Speaker 1>it's the the moment to end the show. On Yeah.

1:07:38.760 --> 1:07:42.360
<v Speaker 1>The theory is that it's it's very satisfying to have

1:07:42.400 --> 1:07:45.240
<v Speaker 1>a joke that you've where you've been primed for the

1:07:45.280 --> 1:07:49.040
<v Speaker 1>punch line already, because it's so much easier to get

1:07:49.080 --> 1:07:52.680
<v Speaker 1>the punchline quickly and have that experience of familiarity in

1:07:52.680 --> 1:07:55.640
<v Speaker 1>the yaha movement moment, because when you say a word

1:07:56.040 --> 1:07:58.200
<v Speaker 1>and then you say the word again later, the second

1:07:58.240 --> 1:08:00.680
<v Speaker 1>time you hear the word, you've been primed, like, you know,

1:08:00.720 --> 1:08:03.320
<v Speaker 1>it's more fluid. So yeah, I think that may very

1:08:03.320 --> 1:08:06.120
<v Speaker 1>well be going on with callbacks. Another part of the

1:08:06.160 --> 1:08:09.120
<v Speaker 1>same study was that, like the studies we've been seeing before,

1:08:09.200 --> 1:08:12.160
<v Speaker 1>jokes presented in an easy to read font were rated

1:08:12.200 --> 1:08:14.800
<v Speaker 1>as funnier than jokes presented in a really hard to

1:08:14.840 --> 1:08:18.720
<v Speaker 1>read font. That's kind of not surprising, but processing fluency

1:08:18.840 --> 1:08:21.439
<v Speaker 1>it plays into all this stuff, like there is research

1:08:21.479 --> 1:08:26.400
<v Speaker 1>about how opinions that are repeated more often, even just

1:08:26.520 --> 1:08:29.599
<v Speaker 1>by a single person in a group, come to seem

1:08:29.680 --> 1:08:32.000
<v Speaker 1>more prevalent in a group. So you've got ten people

1:08:32.040 --> 1:08:34.280
<v Speaker 1>standing around, and then you've just got Jeff over here,

1:08:34.560 --> 1:08:37.639
<v Speaker 1>and Jeff keeps saying the same opinion over and over again,

1:08:37.680 --> 1:08:40.360
<v Speaker 1>even if you're aware it's just Jeff saying it in

1:08:40.439 --> 1:08:42.720
<v Speaker 1>the end. If he does that, you will think that

1:08:42.720 --> 1:08:45.920
<v Speaker 1>that opinion is more prevalent in the entire group the

1:08:46.000 --> 1:08:48.360
<v Speaker 1>more people hold it. Well, that would make sense. You

1:08:48.400 --> 1:08:51.120
<v Speaker 1>have one person in a group who say continually trashes

1:08:51.200 --> 1:08:54.040
<v Speaker 1>on the movie Aliens. Oh no, why would that happen.

1:08:54.080 --> 1:08:55.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, but let's say it it happens. You know,

1:08:55.720 --> 1:08:57.280
<v Speaker 1>I could see where it could reach the point where

1:08:57.280 --> 1:08:58.720
<v Speaker 1>you're kind of like, I don't really know how I

1:08:58.720 --> 1:09:00.880
<v Speaker 1>feel about aliens now, but because I sure do here

1:09:01.000 --> 1:09:04.360
<v Speaker 1>here Jeff uh talking trash about it all the time,

1:09:04.520 --> 1:09:06.679
<v Speaker 1>or you could walk away from it being like, man,

1:09:06.760 --> 1:09:09.639
<v Speaker 1>I don't understand all these people who hate aliens even

1:09:09.680 --> 1:09:12.280
<v Speaker 1>though it's just one person. Yeah, that that seems to

1:09:12.280 --> 1:09:14.960
<v Speaker 1>be something that would go on. Processing fluency also appears

1:09:15.000 --> 1:09:17.360
<v Speaker 1>to have something to do with aesthetic pleasure. There's been

1:09:17.400 --> 1:09:20.479
<v Speaker 1>a lot of research and theory about this that that's

1:09:20.520 --> 1:09:24.599
<v Speaker 1>a major component of what feels aesthetically pleasing to us

1:09:24.760 --> 1:09:28.760
<v Speaker 1>is based on what's easy to process. Another part is

1:09:28.840 --> 1:09:32.519
<v Speaker 1>that processing fluencing fluency apparently affects how credible a face looks.

1:09:33.160 --> 1:09:35.840
<v Speaker 1>Uh So, if are you going to believe somebody, Well,

1:09:35.880 --> 1:09:38.799
<v Speaker 1>it turns out if their face is easier to process,

1:09:38.880 --> 1:09:41.400
<v Speaker 1>especially because you've seen it a bunch of times before,

1:09:41.560 --> 1:09:43.400
<v Speaker 1>you're more likely to believe it. Even if they're not

1:09:43.479 --> 1:09:46.000
<v Speaker 1>famous and they're not somebody you know, they're not like

1:09:46.040 --> 1:09:48.840
<v Speaker 1>somebody you've had experience with that you can you know,

1:09:48.960 --> 1:09:52.200
<v Speaker 1>judge their credibility. Just random faces shown to you in

1:09:52.240 --> 1:09:54.880
<v Speaker 1>different sessions of an experiment. If you've seen them before,

1:09:55.000 --> 1:09:57.920
<v Speaker 1>they're more credible. Of course, that reminds me of various

1:09:57.960 --> 1:10:02.519
<v Speaker 1>experiments over the years involving the believability of people with beards,

1:10:02.840 --> 1:10:07.120
<v Speaker 1>people with facial hair or beards harder to process they have.

1:10:07.400 --> 1:10:09.200
<v Speaker 1>I have not looked into it recently, so I don't

1:10:09.200 --> 1:10:11.720
<v Speaker 1>know if there are any more recent studies that that

1:10:11.760 --> 1:10:14.120
<v Speaker 1>that crack this nut. But but there there have been

1:10:14.160 --> 1:10:15.680
<v Speaker 1>studies that have looked out in the past where they

1:10:15.680 --> 1:10:17.600
<v Speaker 1>make the argument that, yes, an individual with the with

1:10:17.640 --> 1:10:19.680
<v Speaker 1>the beard, you're going to have a little more distrust

1:10:19.840 --> 1:10:23.240
<v Speaker 1>towards them. Well, obviously nobody should trust me. Well, no,

1:10:23.360 --> 1:10:26.680
<v Speaker 1>we trust you because we know you. Joe, Yeah, do

1:10:26.720 --> 1:10:29.120
<v Speaker 1>you really? Do you ever really know someone? Well, I'll

1:10:29.120 --> 1:10:31.080
<v Speaker 1>tell you one thing I know, and that's peanuts stuff.

1:10:32.880 --> 1:10:34.680
<v Speaker 1>You got me. You got me there, you made me

1:10:34.800 --> 1:10:38.439
<v Speaker 1>laugh and my joke didn't make you laugh. Okay, Okay,

1:10:38.479 --> 1:10:40.479
<v Speaker 1>So we gotta wrap up there. We've gone long here,

1:10:40.520 --> 1:10:43.120
<v Speaker 1>but so we'll be back in the next episode to

1:10:43.160 --> 1:10:45.600
<v Speaker 1>explore more recent findings and some of the ways that

1:10:45.680 --> 1:10:49.200
<v Speaker 1>the illusory truth effect really does matter in our in

1:10:49.240 --> 1:10:53.040
<v Speaker 1>our political and social world. Um. But so main takeaways

1:10:53.040 --> 1:10:56.320
<v Speaker 1>I would say today is that the illusory truth effect

1:10:56.400 --> 1:10:59.479
<v Speaker 1>is real. Exposure and repetition really does change our beliefs.

1:10:59.760 --> 1:11:03.920
<v Speaker 1>The lusory truth effect is small, meaning it doesn't automatically

1:11:04.000 --> 1:11:08.280
<v Speaker 1>overwhelm other criteria in our decision making and judgment. In fact,

1:11:08.280 --> 1:11:10.360
<v Speaker 1>in many cases it appears that whether or not a

1:11:10.400 --> 1:11:13.960
<v Speaker 1>statement is actually true is more important to our judgment

1:11:13.960 --> 1:11:16.800
<v Speaker 1>than whether or not it's repeated or made easier to read,

1:11:16.920 --> 1:11:21.000
<v Speaker 1>or any of these other processing fluency boosts. But on average,

1:11:21.000 --> 1:11:23.240
<v Speaker 1>over lots of repetitions, it's easy to see how this

1:11:23.280 --> 1:11:25.560
<v Speaker 1>could have a big effect, especially when you bring it

1:11:25.600 --> 1:11:29.280
<v Speaker 1>back to propaganda purposes on things we believe as a society,

1:11:29.400 --> 1:11:33.080
<v Speaker 1>things that shift voting patterns in small but significant ways

1:11:33.160 --> 1:11:34.880
<v Speaker 1>and stuff like that. Yeah, that's the key. That it's

1:11:34.880 --> 1:11:38.360
<v Speaker 1>not occurring within a vacuum. It's uh, it's it's it's

1:11:38.520 --> 1:11:42.320
<v Speaker 1>affecting and being affected by all these other um mental

1:11:42.360 --> 1:11:46.360
<v Speaker 1>processes and UH and factors that are affecting our decision

1:11:46.360 --> 1:11:49.559
<v Speaker 1>making and worldview totally. But we will get more into

1:11:49.600 --> 1:11:52.519
<v Speaker 1>that in our next episode. In the meantime, be sure

1:11:52.520 --> 1:11:54.280
<v Speaker 1>to check out all the episodes of Stuff to Blow

1:11:54.280 --> 1:11:56.479
<v Speaker 1>Your Mind at stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

1:11:56.520 --> 1:11:59.720
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1:11:59.840 --> 1:12:02.840
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1:12:03.080 --> 1:12:05.280
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1:12:05.280 --> 1:12:08.840
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1:12:09.000 --> 1:12:11.760
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1:12:11.760 --> 1:12:15.160
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1:12:15.200 --> 1:12:18.640
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1:12:18.640 --> 1:12:20.080
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1:12:20.120 --> 1:12:22.120
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1:12:22.400 --> 1:12:24.680
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1:12:24.680 --> 1:12:26.679
<v Speaker 1>to cover in a future episode, you can always email

1:12:26.800 --> 1:12:29.599
<v Speaker 1>us at blow the Mind at how stuff works dot

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<v Speaker 1>com for more on this and thousands of other topics.

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<v Speaker 1>Is it how stuff Works dot Com was first time

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<v Speaker 1>a US bad by a brother