1 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:06,199 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuffwork 2 00:00:06,280 --> 00:00:15,760 Speaker 1: dot Com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. 3 00:00:15,920 --> 00:00:19,079 Speaker 1: My name is Joe McCormick, and I'm Christian Sager, and 4 00:00:19,120 --> 00:00:21,720 Speaker 1: our regular host Robert Lamb is out on vacation. So 5 00:00:21,840 --> 00:00:24,880 Speaker 1: Christian and I are returning to finish our discussion about 6 00:00:24,880 --> 00:00:28,640 Speaker 1: science and pseudoscience and criminal investigation and the justice system. 7 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:31,520 Speaker 1: So if you haven't heard part one yet, you should 8 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:33,879 Speaker 1: go back and listen to that first so you can 9 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:36,919 Speaker 1: understand what we're going to be talking about in this episode. So, 10 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: without further ado, here is the second half of our conversation. 11 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:46,080 Speaker 1: So Christian, yeah, tell me about fingerprint analysis and ballistics matching. Okay, 12 00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:49,279 Speaker 1: So fingerprint analysis is one of those ones that, like, 13 00:00:49,760 --> 00:00:51,720 Speaker 1: you know, especially based on the C S I effect, 14 00:00:51,760 --> 00:00:53,880 Speaker 1: like a lot of us just assume, like, yeah, well 15 00:00:54,040 --> 00:00:57,400 Speaker 1: that's that's accurate, right, Like your your fingerprint is your fingerprint. 16 00:00:57,480 --> 00:01:02,160 Speaker 1: Everybody's got a unique snowflake, and uh like how hard 17 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:06,800 Speaker 1: that's got to be bulletproof? Right, No pun intended. There's 18 00:01:06,840 --> 00:01:08,680 Speaker 1: a little bit of wiggle room there, right, So legal 19 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:13,000 Speaker 1: experts are concerned. Actually there's inaccuracies in something that's called 20 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:18,000 Speaker 1: the friction ridge analysis that's used in fingerprint identification. So 21 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:22,440 Speaker 1: fingerprints are believed to be unique. The process of matching them, however, 22 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:26,240 Speaker 1: isn't statistically valid, mainly because prints on an ink pad 23 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:30,000 Speaker 1: are compared to smudged or partials, which you always hear 24 00:01:30,040 --> 00:01:32,520 Speaker 1: that on shows right, we only got a partial, right 25 00:01:33,000 --> 00:01:35,679 Speaker 1: that that's the stuff that's often found at crime scenes. 26 00:01:36,160 --> 00:01:41,480 Speaker 1: Fingerprint examiners often testify, however, with absolute certainty. This isn't 27 00:01:41,520 --> 00:01:43,360 Speaker 1: like like when you watch I don't know, like a 28 00:01:43,480 --> 00:01:45,280 Speaker 1: like a Batman movie or something like that, and he 29 00:01:45,280 --> 00:01:46,920 Speaker 1: finds a fingerprint and he runs it through the bat 30 00:01:46,920 --> 00:01:51,360 Speaker 1: computer and it's like finds all those points of agreement 31 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:54,360 Speaker 1: and it's a perfect match. But in those examples, it's 32 00:01:54,400 --> 00:01:57,560 Speaker 1: usually like a very clear fingerprint matched against a very 33 00:01:57,560 --> 00:02:00,760 Speaker 1: clear fingerprint. What if it's a kind of smudge fingerprint 34 00:02:00,800 --> 00:02:04,080 Speaker 1: match against a partial, kind of smudged fingerpot exactly, it's 35 00:02:04,120 --> 00:02:08,560 Speaker 1: it's much harder to tell, and it's not with absolute certainty. 36 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:11,600 Speaker 1: A two thousand six study by the University of Southampton 37 00:02:11,680 --> 00:02:16,840 Speaker 1: in England asked six veteran fingerprint examiners to study prints 38 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 1: taken from their own cases without even telling them where 39 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:24,800 Speaker 1: these came from their results were totally inconsistent. Only two 40 00:02:24,919 --> 00:02:27,520 Speaker 1: of the six reached the same conclusion that they had 41 00:02:27,560 --> 00:02:32,280 Speaker 1: come to on the second examination. On the first a 42 00:02:32,360 --> 00:02:37,040 Speaker 1: pattern recognition expert at Sunny Buffalo is actually developing software 43 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:41,840 Speaker 1: to quantify the certain the certainty of fingerprint matches. So 44 00:02:42,080 --> 00:02:44,080 Speaker 1: it's kind of the back computer metaphor that we were 45 00:02:44,120 --> 00:02:47,520 Speaker 1: just using. Right, So if you had an automated method, uh, 46 00:02:47,560 --> 00:02:50,079 Speaker 1: and it was scientifically valid at the beginning, that would 47 00:02:50,080 --> 00:02:53,120 Speaker 1: take sort of the subjectiveness out of it. Well, and 48 00:02:53,280 --> 00:02:55,880 Speaker 1: that but also I mean think about it, like it 49 00:02:55,960 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 1: could also easily tell you how what thecentage of accuracy 50 00:03:01,560 --> 00:03:04,960 Speaker 1: was versus rather than like, I don't know, it was 51 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:08,400 Speaker 1: sort of the same, you know, like the well, that's 52 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 1: what I talked about earlier, how it's important to have 53 00:03:10,880 --> 00:03:14,320 Speaker 1: numerical quantities to deal with rather than just letting people 54 00:03:14,320 --> 00:03:16,760 Speaker 1: go with their gut feeling. Right. So if this program 55 00:03:16,800 --> 00:03:19,040 Speaker 1: works the way it's supposed to work, right, it could say, well, 56 00:03:19,040 --> 00:03:21,079 Speaker 1: it's got twenty six percent match or it's got a 57 00:03:21,200 --> 00:03:24,480 Speaker 1: nine percent match. You know, you just you can't do 58 00:03:24,520 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: that as a human being with your eyes. And that's 59 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:29,560 Speaker 1: essentially what we've been relying on. Right, is like, well 60 00:03:29,600 --> 00:03:31,320 Speaker 1: I looked at that one. That I looked at that one, 61 00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:33,119 Speaker 1: and I've been doing this for twenty years. They looked 62 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:35,760 Speaker 1: the same to me. So boom, absolute certainty, you know. 63 00:03:36,320 --> 00:03:38,960 Speaker 1: And that's a little bit like more complicated than it's 64 00:03:39,040 --> 00:03:43,080 Speaker 1: portrayed to be. Ye, same thing happens with ballistics matching again. 65 00:03:43,080 --> 00:03:45,120 Speaker 1: Another Yeah, Batman's coming up all over the place in 66 00:03:45,160 --> 00:03:47,040 Speaker 1: this one, right, Like was it the Dark Knight where 67 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:49,120 Speaker 1: they were like doing the ballistic right, get that brick 68 00:03:49,200 --> 00:03:51,160 Speaker 1: and he finds the bullet and then he matches it 69 00:03:51,200 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: to It's ridiculous. Um. Ballistics matching is often done the 70 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:57,440 Speaker 1: same way, based on the theory that when a bullet 71 00:03:57,520 --> 00:04:00,120 Speaker 1: is fired from a gun, it leaves unique marks on 72 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:03,839 Speaker 1: the slug by the guns barrel, but there's no standards 73 00:04:03,920 --> 00:04:08,240 Speaker 1: to constitute what operates as a match between bullets. The 74 00:04:08,320 --> 00:04:12,680 Speaker 1: National Research Council has actually called ballistics testing into question 75 00:04:13,080 --> 00:04:16,440 Speaker 1: and that they say, look, it's neither unique nor is 76 00:04:16,480 --> 00:04:19,280 Speaker 1: it reproducible, so why should we be using this in 77 00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:22,640 Speaker 1: the court. A lab in Saint Paul, Minnesota, this is 78 00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:24,719 Speaker 1: one of the ones I mentioned earlier was found with 79 00:04:24,960 --> 00:04:29,440 Speaker 1: major errors that impacted their fingerprint and other evidence processing. 80 00:04:29,760 --> 00:04:33,560 Speaker 1: This included sloppy documentation, dirty equipment, as well as a 81 00:04:33,680 --> 00:04:38,120 Speaker 1: lack of basic scientific procedure. They actually used Wikipedia as 82 00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:43,040 Speaker 1: technical reference. In one case, there was no clean area 83 00:04:43,120 --> 00:04:48,040 Speaker 1: designated for Roobe for review even for their DNA evidence. So, 84 00:04:48,120 --> 00:04:50,320 Speaker 1: for instance, like we've been saying, you know, we'll talk 85 00:04:50,320 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: about it later at the end of the episode, but 86 00:04:51,800 --> 00:04:54,520 Speaker 1: we've been saying DNA evidence is is pretty good, right, 87 00:04:54,760 --> 00:04:56,960 Speaker 1: But when you've got like a pig style of a 88 00:04:57,000 --> 00:04:59,560 Speaker 1: work environment and there's no clean area to review the 89 00:04:59,640 --> 00:05:02,400 Speaker 1: d N a, yeah, it could be tainted. Yeah, And 90 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,560 Speaker 1: so these are basic problems with the just like the 91 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:08,919 Speaker 1: environment and procedure of analysis. They might not even be 92 00:05:09,000 --> 00:05:13,280 Speaker 1: problems necessarily with the underlying theory that they're using to 93 00:05:13,839 --> 00:05:16,560 Speaker 1: uh to determine the outcomes, though there might be problems 94 00:05:16,600 --> 00:05:18,919 Speaker 1: there to be, yeah, exactly, So when you combine the 95 00:05:18,960 --> 00:05:22,880 Speaker 1: two it gets even worse. Right, So, like ballistics matching 96 00:05:22,960 --> 00:05:25,880 Speaker 1: or fingerprint matching, it's not always a d percent certain 97 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:28,600 Speaker 1: there's it's not absolute. And then you throw in the 98 00:05:28,640 --> 00:05:32,839 Speaker 1: idea that well, like maybe this fingerprint technician is also 99 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:36,039 Speaker 1: like spilling. I don't know, like a HOGI on his fingerprint. 100 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:40,760 Speaker 1: Uh slides you know everything goes out the window. Yeah, 101 00:05:41,080 --> 00:05:44,520 Speaker 1: let us committed this crime, right. Uh So I want 102 00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:47,320 Speaker 1: to talk about fire analysis. Yeah, I don't know. It 103 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:51,080 Speaker 1: doesn't want to look at fire. It's it's a glowing 104 00:05:51,120 --> 00:05:53,400 Speaker 1: god that draws all of us to it. But so, 105 00:05:54,120 --> 00:05:57,480 Speaker 1: getting a joking aside for a minute, this is pretty serious. Actually. 106 00:05:57,800 --> 00:06:01,240 Speaker 1: In February two four, a man named you may have 107 00:06:01,279 --> 00:06:04,479 Speaker 1: heard about this, A man named Cameron Todd Willingham was 108 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,880 Speaker 1: put to death in Texas after being convicted of murdering 109 00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:12,080 Speaker 1: his three children by arson. I have not heard of this, Okay. 110 00:06:12,080 --> 00:06:15,040 Speaker 1: According to the charges, Williams set fire to his own 111 00:06:15,160 --> 00:06:18,640 Speaker 1: house with his children trapped inside in order to kill them. 112 00:06:19,480 --> 00:06:21,839 Speaker 1: And Uh, if you've heard about this case before, it 113 00:06:21,880 --> 00:06:25,080 Speaker 1: was probably likely from one of the many articles and reports, 114 00:06:25,120 --> 00:06:27,239 Speaker 1: maybe the most famous among them being this two thousand 115 00:06:27,320 --> 00:06:29,960 Speaker 1: nine article in The New Yorker called Trial by Fire 116 00:06:30,120 --> 00:06:33,640 Speaker 1: by David Grant. Uh. And they're all making the case 117 00:06:33,760 --> 00:06:37,000 Speaker 1: that the state of Texas had very likely in this case, 118 00:06:37,160 --> 00:06:42,240 Speaker 1: executed an innocent man. So why were people saying this? Well, 119 00:06:42,720 --> 00:06:46,960 Speaker 1: the main thrust of the cases against the case against 120 00:06:47,279 --> 00:06:51,159 Speaker 1: william were the only solid pieces of evidence against him 121 00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:53,880 Speaker 1: were Number one, the testimony of a jail house informant 122 00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:57,400 Speaker 1: of the criminal informants are sort of notoriously those are 123 00:06:57,400 --> 00:07:00,560 Speaker 1: the cis that we were really talking about yeah, unreliable, 124 00:07:00,680 --> 00:07:04,320 Speaker 1: yeah uh, and that that's that testimony itself has been 125 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,960 Speaker 1: subsequently called into question in this case, and a fire 126 00:07:08,080 --> 00:07:12,520 Speaker 1: investigation concluding that the fire showed signs of deliberate arson 127 00:07:12,760 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 1: pointing to the defendant, how do you come up with that? Well, 128 00:07:15,920 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 1: I'm gonna get into it. So this fire analysis has 129 00:07:18,120 --> 00:07:21,680 Speaker 1: been roundly criticized by experts as being pretty much without 130 00:07:21,720 --> 00:07:25,320 Speaker 1: any scientific marriage. So I'm about to quote from David 131 00:07:25,360 --> 00:07:28,240 Speaker 1: Grand's New Yorker article in a section where he describes 132 00:07:28,320 --> 00:07:32,920 Speaker 1: this scientist and fire investigator named Dr. Gerald Hurst's reaction 133 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:38,840 Speaker 1: to what was happening in the field during fire investigations. Okay, quote. 134 00:07:39,160 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: By the nineties, Hurst had begun devoting significant time to 135 00:07:42,640 --> 00:07:45,480 Speaker 1: criminal arson cases, and as he was exposed to the 136 00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:49,640 Speaker 1: methods of local and state fire investigators, he was shocked 137 00:07:49,680 --> 00:07:53,440 Speaker 1: by what he saw. Many arson investigators, it turned out, 138 00:07:53,640 --> 00:07:57,040 Speaker 1: had only a high school education. In most states, in 139 00:07:57,120 --> 00:07:59,880 Speaker 1: order to be certified, investigators had to take a four 140 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:03,920 Speaker 1: our course on fire investigation, and pass a written exam. 141 00:08:04,040 --> 00:08:07,679 Speaker 1: Often the bulk of an investigator's training came on the job, 142 00:08:07,840 --> 00:08:11,520 Speaker 1: learning from Quote old timers in the field who passed 143 00:08:11,560 --> 00:08:14,760 Speaker 1: down a body of wisdom about the telltale signs of arson, 144 00:08:15,160 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: even though a study in nineteen seventy seven warned that 145 00:08:17,960 --> 00:08:22,640 Speaker 1: there was nothing in the scientific literature to substantiate their validity, 146 00:08:23,560 --> 00:08:25,960 Speaker 1: and then later in the piece Grand Rights quote in 147 00:08:26,040 --> 00:08:30,040 Speaker 1: nineteen seven, the International Association of Arson Investigators filed a 148 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:34,000 Speaker 1: legal brief arguing that arson sleuths should not be bound 149 00:08:34,120 --> 00:08:37,880 Speaker 1: by a nineteen nine Supreme Court decision that's probably referring 150 00:08:37,920 --> 00:08:42,160 Speaker 1: to Daubert there Um, requiring experts who testified at trials 151 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:46,360 Speaker 1: to adhere to the scientific method. What arson sleuths did, 152 00:08:46,480 --> 00:08:51,400 Speaker 1: the brief claimed, was quote less scientific. By two thousand, 153 00:08:52,240 --> 00:08:56,360 Speaker 1: after the courts had rejected such claims, arson investigators increasingly 154 00:08:56,400 --> 00:09:00,280 Speaker 1: recognized the scientific method, but there remained a great verys 155 00:09:00,320 --> 00:09:03,520 Speaker 1: in the field, with many practitioners still relying on the 156 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:07,960 Speaker 1: unverified techniques that have been used for generations. Quote. People 157 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:11,480 Speaker 1: investigated fire largely with a flat earth approach. Hurst told 158 00:09:11,480 --> 00:09:13,920 Speaker 1: me that this means the common sense thing that we 159 00:09:13,920 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 1: were talking about earlier. Yes, exactly, the quote continues, it 160 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,240 Speaker 1: looks like arson, therefore it's arson, he went on. My 161 00:09:21,360 --> 00:09:24,040 Speaker 1: view is you have to have a scientific basis otherwise 162 00:09:24,080 --> 00:09:26,800 Speaker 1: it's no different than witch hunting. I know arson when 163 00:09:26,800 --> 00:09:29,760 Speaker 1: I see it right now. I don't claim to know 164 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:32,679 Speaker 1: one way or another about willing him personally, whether he 165 00:09:32,800 --> 00:09:36,160 Speaker 1: was guilty or innocent. But this does make a close 166 00:09:36,240 --> 00:09:39,679 Speaker 1: look at the field of fire analysis very worthwhile. Uh And, 167 00:09:39,840 --> 00:09:41,839 Speaker 1: and I want to point out that, like pretty much 168 00:09:41,880 --> 00:09:44,360 Speaker 1: all of these others in theory, fire analysis is a 169 00:09:44,480 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 1: perfectly legitimate field of study. It's not for anology. It's 170 00:09:47,840 --> 00:09:51,480 Speaker 1: not just wrong from the ground up. So what might 171 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:55,760 Speaker 1: a fire investigation look like? Often it involves searching through 172 00:09:55,760 --> 00:09:58,760 Speaker 1: the remains of a burned building for indications of how 173 00:09:58,800 --> 00:10:01,520 Speaker 1: a fire was started, what course it took once it 174 00:10:01,559 --> 00:10:06,439 Speaker 1: was ignited. Um And in forensic investigation, for fairly obvious reasons, 175 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:09,760 Speaker 1: this often involves looking for indications of arson. You're trying 176 00:10:09,760 --> 00:10:12,439 Speaker 1: to figure out, did somebody set this fire or did 177 00:10:12,440 --> 00:10:16,720 Speaker 1: it happen accidentally? Uh And if you can find evidence 178 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:20,160 Speaker 1: that accelerants such as gasoline or lighter fluid, where used 179 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:22,360 Speaker 1: to start the fire. That's one of the most common 180 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:28,200 Speaker 1: indications of varson, of deliberate intention in the fire. But unfortunately, 181 00:10:28,240 --> 00:10:31,440 Speaker 1: in practice, some fire investigators have been known to use 182 00:10:31,480 --> 00:10:35,400 Speaker 1: these highly faulty techniques that are not established to have 183 00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:38,280 Speaker 1: any scientific validity. It's just like we're saying earlier, kind 184 00:10:38,280 --> 00:10:41,320 Speaker 1: of like folk knowledge. The investigators pass it down, but 185 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:44,920 Speaker 1: there's never been a study dedicated to figuring out whether 186 00:10:45,040 --> 00:10:50,240 Speaker 1: these rules of analysis are true or not. So in 187 00:10:50,320 --> 00:10:54,000 Speaker 1: a short article in September, the skeptic writer Michael Schermer 188 00:10:54,600 --> 00:10:57,240 Speaker 1: reported a conversation he had with a guy named John 189 00:10:57,320 --> 00:11:00,680 Speaker 1: Jay Lntini, who is a fire analysis expert and the 190 00:11:00,720 --> 00:11:04,880 Speaker 1: author of this this criminal this forensics textbook called Scientific 191 00:11:04,920 --> 00:11:08,120 Speaker 1: Protocols for Fire Investigation. So this is a guy who's 192 00:11:08,160 --> 00:11:11,680 Speaker 1: taking the scientific approach, and Lean Teeny tells him that 193 00:11:11,800 --> 00:11:17,320 Speaker 1: lots of fire investigators follow scientifically baseless folk wisdom, such 194 00:11:17,320 --> 00:11:20,360 Speaker 1: as that so called alligator ing can indicate whether a 195 00:11:20,400 --> 00:11:24,400 Speaker 1: fire burned fast or slow. And this alligator ing, this 196 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,000 Speaker 1: this idea is that it's it's like looking at an 197 00:11:27,040 --> 00:11:29,800 Speaker 1: alligator's hide. So you look at wood that burned during 198 00:11:29,800 --> 00:11:31,880 Speaker 1: a fire, and if you look at it and you 199 00:11:31,920 --> 00:11:35,360 Speaker 1: see small flat blisters, that means that the fire burned 200 00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:39,480 Speaker 1: quote slow. And if you see large shiny blisters, that 201 00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:45,240 Speaker 1: means that it burned quote fast. Lntini his analysis of 202 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:50,440 Speaker 1: this rule is quote nonsense. Yeah. Ok, that nobody's actually 203 00:11:50,440 --> 00:11:53,800 Speaker 1: measured that essentially, and then we quantified it and published 204 00:11:53,800 --> 00:11:57,280 Speaker 1: papers that we can refer back to. Right. Also, according 205 00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:00,240 Speaker 1: to len Tina, it used to be fire investing gator 206 00:12:00,280 --> 00:12:02,800 Speaker 1: wisdom that when you see crazing and window glass, you 207 00:12:02,840 --> 00:12:05,840 Speaker 1: know what crazing is. It's like when you see these, uh, 208 00:12:05,920 --> 00:12:09,679 Speaker 1: these sort of crazy spiderweb patterns virgin not exactly, not 209 00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:13,320 Speaker 1: like the circular spiderwebs, but just cracks all through the glass, 210 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:18,920 Speaker 1: crazy all over the place. Right, This glass is now 211 00:12:19,000 --> 00:12:23,240 Speaker 1: legally insane. Yeah, So they uh, they used to say 212 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:25,640 Speaker 1: that this was an indicator that the glass had been 213 00:12:25,720 --> 00:12:28,959 Speaker 1: heated very rapidly, which would indicate the use of an accelerant. 214 00:12:28,960 --> 00:12:32,240 Speaker 1: It heated rapidly because somebody squirted gasoline or lighter fluid 215 00:12:32,280 --> 00:12:36,240 Speaker 1: all over the place. In fact, that's not true, and 216 00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:39,959 Speaker 1: it turns out after scientific investigation that window crazing is 217 00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:42,960 Speaker 1: caused by the opposite. It's caused by rapid cooling, like 218 00:12:43,040 --> 00:12:46,960 Speaker 1: what would happen when firefighters douse the area with water. Okay, 219 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:50,440 Speaker 1: I can picture this, yeah yeah. Um. Also another thing 220 00:12:50,480 --> 00:12:53,959 Speaker 1: that's common puddle shaped burns on the floor that can 221 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:56,640 Speaker 1: make it look certainly like there was an ignited pool 222 00:12:56,720 --> 00:12:58,840 Speaker 1: of liquid on the floor, like somebody emptied a gas 223 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,160 Speaker 1: can all over the place set it on fire. According 224 00:13:02,200 --> 00:13:05,160 Speaker 1: to Lenten E wrong again, even though fire and heat 225 00:13:05,240 --> 00:13:09,000 Speaker 1: do tend rise when an entire room burns, the floor 226 00:13:09,080 --> 00:13:11,720 Speaker 1: burns along with it, and these marks can appear without 227 00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:15,440 Speaker 1: the presence of an accelerant. Um. So, fire analysis is 228 00:13:15,480 --> 00:13:18,680 Speaker 1: one of the forensic fields addressed in this two thousand 229 00:13:18,760 --> 00:13:21,360 Speaker 1: nine in our C report, and they conclude that while 230 00:13:21,400 --> 00:13:25,000 Speaker 1: there is a fairly solid basis for explosion analysis like 231 00:13:25,000 --> 00:13:29,199 Speaker 1: when a bomb goes off, fire analysis is much shakier 232 00:13:29,240 --> 00:13:33,559 Speaker 1: than explosion analysis is as practice today. Um. They say, 233 00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:36,040 Speaker 1: quote many of the rules of thumb that are typically 234 00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:38,839 Speaker 1: assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used e g. 235 00:13:39,040 --> 00:13:43,120 Speaker 1: Alligatoring of wood specific char patterns have been shown not 236 00:13:43,280 --> 00:13:46,640 Speaker 1: to be true. Experiments should be designed to put arson 237 00:13:46,760 --> 00:13:51,320 Speaker 1: investigations on a more solid scientific footing. Uh. And again 238 00:13:51,360 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 1: this is just crazy. I mean, this is yet another 239 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:55,120 Speaker 1: one of these that has been used to convict people, 240 00:13:55,160 --> 00:13:58,000 Speaker 1: like in the case of William So we don't know, 241 00:13:58,120 --> 00:14:00,320 Speaker 1: I guess whether he was guilty or innocent, But if 242 00:14:00,360 --> 00:14:03,079 Speaker 1: this was the main evidence to show he was guilty, 243 00:14:03,320 --> 00:14:07,800 Speaker 1: that's that makes it look pretty bad. Yeah, that's kind 244 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,200 Speaker 1: of stuff is depressing, especially like when you I don't 245 00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:12,200 Speaker 1: know if you watched Making a Murderer, right, when you 246 00:14:12,200 --> 00:14:15,320 Speaker 1: watch these like long form documentaries about the justice system 247 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:18,000 Speaker 1: and just how flawed it is. Not saying that in 248 00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:20,920 Speaker 1: that particular case, I know whether anybody is guilty or 249 00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:23,560 Speaker 1: innocent or anything, but it's you think about how often 250 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:26,000 Speaker 1: this stuff goes on and then you've got examples like this. 251 00:14:26,120 --> 00:14:30,080 Speaker 1: It's heartbreaking. Uh. This section though, highlights one thing I 252 00:14:30,080 --> 00:14:32,040 Speaker 1: do want to emphasize again where we don't want to 253 00:14:32,080 --> 00:14:35,720 Speaker 1: paint all forensic science professionals and experts in these fields 254 00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:38,040 Speaker 1: with a with a you know, tainted brush, I mean, 255 00:14:38,200 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: and also saying here like most of them are doing 256 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:42,000 Speaker 1: the best they can with what they have available to 257 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:45,280 Speaker 1: him exactly, and in this case, the bad forensic science 258 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:48,560 Speaker 1: and fire investigation is being exposed by good scientists and 259 00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:52,400 Speaker 1: fire investigation so it's not like everyone in this field 260 00:14:52,520 --> 00:14:54,880 Speaker 1: is doing a bad job of it, but many people 261 00:14:54,920 --> 00:14:59,320 Speaker 1: who are practicing it are. Yeah, this is truly a 262 00:14:59,320 --> 00:15:02,240 Speaker 1: wicked problem. I wish we had more money to divide 263 00:15:02,360 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 1: to divert into research and resources for stuff like this. Yeah. Well, 264 00:15:06,160 --> 00:15:09,280 Speaker 1: hair analysis is one of the ones we brought up 265 00:15:09,280 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: at the top because that was actually one of the 266 00:15:11,400 --> 00:15:13,560 Speaker 1: hair and fiber was one of the things we're talking about, 267 00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:16,400 Speaker 1: Josh about. Yeah, we're and we were also like, maybe 268 00:15:16,400 --> 00:15:18,840 Speaker 1: we'll do something like that in our little like video series, 269 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:20,400 Speaker 1: and then the more we start to look into it, 270 00:15:20,440 --> 00:15:22,600 Speaker 1: we're like, I don't know about this, this is a 271 00:15:22,640 --> 00:15:25,320 Speaker 1: little hokey. Well okay, so one thing I can say is, 272 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:28,680 Speaker 1: if you find a perpetrator's hair at the crime, couldn't 273 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:31,480 Speaker 1: you use that to do some DNA analysis? That would 274 00:15:31,480 --> 00:15:35,280 Speaker 1: be pretty conclusive. I don't know, I would think so. 275 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:38,560 Speaker 1: But again, remember the statistics on how often they use 276 00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:42,680 Speaker 1: DNA and say versus something like this, probably because of 277 00:15:42,720 --> 00:15:47,120 Speaker 1: the timing and the money involved. Yeah, um, whereas like 278 00:15:47,520 --> 00:15:50,320 Speaker 1: to just look at two fibers and have somebody come 279 00:15:50,360 --> 00:15:52,360 Speaker 1: in as an expert and say, yep, it's a match. 280 00:15:52,480 --> 00:15:55,200 Speaker 1: Seems easier to a lot of people, I would guess 281 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:58,040 Speaker 1: are cheaper. Okay, what happens when there is hair matching 282 00:15:58,120 --> 00:16:01,600 Speaker 1: or hair fiber analysis. Well, I want to back up, 283 00:16:01,640 --> 00:16:05,600 Speaker 1: because there was just last year the Justice Department and 284 00:16:05,640 --> 00:16:10,640 Speaker 1: the FBI formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in the 285 00:16:10,720 --> 00:16:16,920 Speaker 1: FBI's laboratory on microscopic hair comparison gave flawed testimony in 286 00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:20,120 Speaker 1: the trials that they offered evidence. And this is over 287 00:16:20,160 --> 00:16:22,760 Speaker 1: the course of two decades. This is huge. It's like 288 00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:27,960 Speaker 1: the biggest UH scandal in forensic science to date as 289 00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:31,479 Speaker 1: far as I can tell. Um. They were giving statements 290 00:16:31,520 --> 00:16:35,320 Speaker 1: that were quote, beyond the bounds of proper science. What 291 00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:38,960 Speaker 1: they were basically doing was saying there's a hundred percent 292 00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:42,440 Speaker 1: match between two hair fibers or a hair fiber found 293 00:16:42,440 --> 00:16:45,840 Speaker 1: on the scene the hair from you know, a defendant, uh, 294 00:16:46,080 --> 00:16:49,640 Speaker 1: when there's just a similarity. So they're totally misleading. The 295 00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:53,760 Speaker 1: jury's twenty six out of the twenty eight overstated forensic 296 00:16:53,880 --> 00:16:58,520 Speaker 1: mass matches favor the prosecutors, of course, because they're working together. 297 00:16:59,000 --> 00:17:02,880 Speaker 1: This equated to nine of the two hundred sixty trials. 298 00:17:02,920 --> 00:17:06,919 Speaker 1: According to the National Association of Criminal Defense lawyers and 299 00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:11,720 Speaker 1: the Innocence Project. This is the nation's largest post conviction 300 00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:16,880 Speaker 1: review of question forensic evidence. It's crazy. Of these cases, 301 00:17:17,359 --> 00:17:21,479 Speaker 1: thirty two defendants were sentenced to death. Fourteen have already 302 00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:26,760 Speaker 1: been executed or died in prison. So that's I mean, 303 00:17:26,920 --> 00:17:30,800 Speaker 1: whether they were innocent or guilty, we don't know, but 304 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:34,160 Speaker 1: they don't yeah, and we'll never have a chance. Now 305 00:17:34,200 --> 00:17:37,399 Speaker 1: the cases against them have been undermined. And keep in 306 00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:40,880 Speaker 1: mind that just because the FBI made these errors, there 307 00:17:40,960 --> 00:17:44,280 Speaker 1: was other evidence used to convict these defendants of guilt. Okay, 308 00:17:44,320 --> 00:17:47,160 Speaker 1: so it wasn't the only thing. But still each case 309 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:49,439 Speaker 1: has to be reviewed to see if there are grounds 310 00:17:49,440 --> 00:17:53,720 Speaker 1: for an appeal. Four were previously exonerated, So this is 311 00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:58,000 Speaker 1: a landmark revelation that pattern based forensic techniques, things like 312 00:17:58,240 --> 00:18:05,160 Speaker 1: hair bite mark analysis, ballistics largely subjective, and these contributed 313 00:18:05,240 --> 00:18:08,040 Speaker 1: to more than twenty five of the three hundred and 314 00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:11,560 Speaker 1: twenty nine cases where a defendant has been exonerated with 315 00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:15,680 Speaker 1: DNA analysis post conviction. So that's how DNA analysis has 316 00:18:15,680 --> 00:18:18,240 Speaker 1: been used very much in the last like ten to 317 00:18:18,280 --> 00:18:21,320 Speaker 1: twenty years. Well, we talked about the exclusionary principle earlier, 318 00:18:21,359 --> 00:18:23,600 Speaker 1: you know, a lot of what DNA evidence is actually 319 00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:26,640 Speaker 1: brought to the field is uh, not just matching and 320 00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:29,639 Speaker 1: saying here, you know this criminal, definitely, that's that's his 321 00:18:29,760 --> 00:18:32,760 Speaker 1: or her blood there, but excluding people saying, look, this 322 00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:36,000 Speaker 1: is not their day genetic material. Yeah, this is not 323 00:18:36,080 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 1: a match. So a lot of politicians weighed in on this. 324 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:41,320 Speaker 1: Of course, they asked the FBI to do a systematic 325 00:18:41,320 --> 00:18:45,080 Speaker 1: analysis to breakdown their system, and the FBI says that 326 00:18:45,080 --> 00:18:49,640 Speaker 1: their hair examiners lacked written standards that defined what were 327 00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:52,800 Speaker 1: the appropriate ways to explain their results in court. That 328 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:55,680 Speaker 1: was until two thousand and twelve. This all came to 329 00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:59,600 Speaker 1: light after the Washington Post reported on flawed forensic hair 330 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:03,960 Speaker 1: match is. Federal authorities investigated this and they found it 331 00:19:04,000 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 1: to be true. They found that the experts quote unquote 332 00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:09,560 Speaker 1: that we're testifying to near certainty of matches in a 333 00:19:09,600 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 1: crime scene, they were citing incomplete and misleading statistics drawn 334 00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:17,440 Speaker 1: from their own work. So I want to make this clear, 335 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:21,040 Speaker 1: there is no accepted research on how hair from different 336 00:19:21,119 --> 00:19:24,959 Speaker 1: people can appear the same. So, I mean, like you 337 00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:26,639 Speaker 1: asked at the topic, well, how does that work? I 338 00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:28,560 Speaker 1: mean I think it's literally like you look under a 339 00:19:28,600 --> 00:19:30,840 Speaker 1: microscope at the two pieces of hair, and that looks 340 00:19:30,840 --> 00:19:33,879 Speaker 1: similar to me. Yeah, And I mean I'm sure that 341 00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:36,800 Speaker 1: there's some more to it than that, right, in the 342 00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:39,879 Speaker 1: same way as like there's some old timey wisdom passed 343 00:19:39,880 --> 00:19:43,879 Speaker 1: down about how fires look the same, right, but there's 344 00:19:44,040 --> 00:19:47,679 Speaker 1: no accepted research that one one thing leads to another. 345 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:53,280 Speaker 1: Even before this, the FBI reported it's examiners were reporting 346 00:19:53,320 --> 00:19:56,240 Speaker 1: false hair matches more than eleven percent of the time, 347 00:19:56,440 --> 00:19:58,840 Speaker 1: and at the time of this report, five defendants were 348 00:19:58,840 --> 00:20:01,800 Speaker 1: exonerated through d in a testing, all of whom had 349 00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:05,560 Speaker 1: served between twenty and thirty years in prison for either 350 00:20:05,720 --> 00:20:09,240 Speaker 1: rape or murder. Jeez, I mean, this is just, again, 351 00:20:09,280 --> 00:20:13,520 Speaker 1: like I said, heartbreaking. Of twenty one thousand federal or 352 00:20:13,600 --> 00:20:17,080 Speaker 1: state requests for hair comparison evidence from nineteen seventy two 353 00:20:17,080 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: to nineteen ninety nine, the FBI found that two thousand, 354 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 1: five hundred of those cases had examiners declare hair matches. 355 00:20:26,440 --> 00:20:29,560 Speaker 1: They're reviewing every single one of those cases now, like 356 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:32,159 Speaker 1: they have to go back and just review everything. The 357 00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:36,359 Speaker 1: same examiners who are now under review also taught five 358 00:20:36,440 --> 00:20:40,760 Speaker 1: hundred to a thousand state and local crime analysis labs 359 00:20:41,040 --> 00:20:43,159 Speaker 1: how to testify in the same way. So this is 360 00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:45,760 Speaker 1: like the old timers passing down the wisdom, and so 361 00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,520 Speaker 1: it's an endemic problem. It's not just the FBI, it's 362 00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:52,520 Speaker 1: everywhere now. So these same testimonies were likely flawed at 363 00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:56,120 Speaker 1: the same level. It's just it's it's insane. In one 364 00:20:56,200 --> 00:20:59,240 Speaker 1: shocking example, this is just one example of how it 365 00:20:59,280 --> 00:21:04,040 Speaker 1: affected a person, a lot person's life. Sante Tribble served 366 00:21:04,080 --> 00:21:08,399 Speaker 1: twenty eight years for murder based on FBI hair testimony. 367 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:10,720 Speaker 1: It later turned out that one of the hairs that 368 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:16,200 Speaker 1: was used to prosecute him came from a dog. Oh 369 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:22,960 Speaker 1: my god, he was exonerated in Wow, So hair analysis 370 00:21:23,000 --> 00:21:27,400 Speaker 1: not so much bite mark analysis. Okay, here's another example. 371 00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:32,840 Speaker 1: Expert in forensic odeontology, we mentioned that earlier testified that 372 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:35,760 Speaker 1: multiple bite marks found on a murder victim were entirely 373 00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:38,440 Speaker 1: consistent with the dental impressions taken from a guy named 374 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:42,040 Speaker 1: Roy Brown. This was the only physical evidence in this case. 375 00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:45,640 Speaker 1: Brown was sentenced to twenty five years to life in prison. 376 00:21:46,119 --> 00:21:50,719 Speaker 1: DNA tests later confirmed that a second suspect was actually guilty, 377 00:21:50,920 --> 00:21:54,840 Speaker 1: but Brown. He spent fifteen years in prison. So bite 378 00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:58,600 Speaker 1: mark analysis is now also widely considered unreliable. Yeah, it 379 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:00,760 Speaker 1: was explored in the two is a nine in RC 380 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:05,240 Speaker 1: document and that they outlined several problems with current use 381 00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:08,840 Speaker 1: of bite mark evidence. Uh, they say, quote, uniqueness of 382 00:22:08,920 --> 00:22:12,720 Speaker 1: human dentition has not been scientifically established. I mean you'd 383 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:15,560 Speaker 1: think that that's pretty basic. You'd have to start with 384 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:20,440 Speaker 1: the study making it statistically clear that humans have unique 385 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:23,959 Speaker 1: bite marks. But I mean, what if they don't usually 386 00:22:23,960 --> 00:22:26,440 Speaker 1: have unique bite marks. I mean, I don't know what 387 00:22:26,480 --> 00:22:29,000 Speaker 1: you would expect bite marks to look like. Maybe lots 388 00:22:29,000 --> 00:22:31,440 Speaker 1: of people have very similar looking bite marks. And I 389 00:22:31,480 --> 00:22:34,920 Speaker 1: would also think that again, like this is I haven't 390 00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: done research on this, but I would imagine that the 391 00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:39,480 Speaker 1: force of the bite would contribute to what the bite 392 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:42,440 Speaker 1: marks look like. Well, that's another thing. So they say, 393 00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:45,879 Speaker 1: even if dentition is unique, even if everybody has a 394 00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:48,360 Speaker 1: unique bite mark in the same way that it's commonly 395 00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:55,159 Speaker 1: assumed people have unique fingerprints. Uh, the ability of the 396 00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:59,520 Speaker 1: person to transfer a unique pattern to human skin, and 397 00:22:59,520 --> 00:23:02,840 Speaker 1: then the ability of the skin to maintain the uniqueness 398 00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:07,240 Speaker 1: of that pattern has not been scientifically established. So, so 399 00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:10,440 Speaker 1: imagine just what happens when people are trying to analyze 400 00:23:10,440 --> 00:23:13,159 Speaker 1: a bite mark on skin that maybe sagging or distorting 401 00:23:13,200 --> 00:23:17,359 Speaker 1: the bites. The marks might not leave a clear impression 402 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:20,080 Speaker 1: that's still there when the forensic scientist gets a picture 403 00:23:20,119 --> 00:23:22,280 Speaker 1: of it or gets to examine it. I don't even 404 00:23:22,280 --> 00:23:25,560 Speaker 1: know how you test this, like, well, I meanlock style, 405 00:23:25,680 --> 00:23:28,520 Speaker 1: Like you get like some molds of teeth and then 406 00:23:28,560 --> 00:23:32,119 Speaker 1: you take like a corpse and and have the molds 407 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:34,960 Speaker 1: bite the corpse several times and see how they line up. Yeah, 408 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:37,560 Speaker 1: I think you'd have to. You'd have to examine it 409 00:23:37,720 --> 00:23:41,920 Speaker 1: statistically with a large sample size, just testing different Yeah, 410 00:23:42,040 --> 00:23:44,480 Speaker 1: different molds of teeth or something like that. I don't know, 411 00:23:44,520 --> 00:23:47,480 Speaker 1: if you test on dead people's bodies or something like that. Well, 412 00:23:47,520 --> 00:23:49,399 Speaker 1: I don't know. I mean, it's the thing. I admit 413 00:23:49,480 --> 00:23:51,960 Speaker 1: this is difficult to test, but this is this is 414 00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:54,879 Speaker 1: ground level research that should be done if you're going 415 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:57,560 Speaker 1: to be using this to convict people. Oh yeah, yeah, 416 00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:01,159 Speaker 1: yeah absolutely, or to defend people either way. All right, 417 00:24:01,280 --> 00:24:03,879 Speaker 1: so you're ready for the big one. Yeah, So DNA 418 00:24:03,960 --> 00:24:06,280 Speaker 1: analysis we established at the beginning, and I think this 419 00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:10,119 Speaker 1: is true, is widely considered, and I think with good reason, 420 00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:14,200 Speaker 1: the most reliable forensic science field. When you when you're 421 00:24:14,240 --> 00:24:17,760 Speaker 1: matching DNA evidence, you can know if the if the 422 00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:21,040 Speaker 1: procedures have been carried out carefully and and all of 423 00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:23,320 Speaker 1: the protocols have been followed, that if you have a 424 00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:25,520 Speaker 1: DNA sample of the crime scene, and you have a 425 00:24:25,640 --> 00:24:28,639 Speaker 1: DNA sample from the defendant, you can know, you know, 426 00:24:29,240 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 1: beyond a one in billions chance of error, that this 427 00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:38,080 Speaker 1: is the same person or it's not the same person. Yeah. 428 00:24:38,320 --> 00:24:42,520 Speaker 1: Except The Atlantic published an article this year called a 429 00:24:42,560 --> 00:24:46,359 Speaker 1: reasonable doubt. Uh, and it said exactly that it starts 430 00:24:46,400 --> 00:24:49,480 Speaker 1: off and saying yes. D NA analysis has long been 431 00:24:49,560 --> 00:24:52,800 Speaker 1: held as the exception to the rule about forensics. Arose 432 00:24:52,840 --> 00:24:56,240 Speaker 1: from academics. It's been studied and validated by researchers all 433 00:24:56,320 --> 00:24:58,919 Speaker 1: around the world. Uh, just a little history here. It 434 00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:03,960 Speaker 1: was pioneered by British geneticist named Alec Jeffreys. He was 435 00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:06,679 Speaker 1: looking into genetic sequencing and he applied it in the 436 00:25:06,720 --> 00:25:09,480 Speaker 1: field with police to help solve a pair of murders 437 00:25:09,480 --> 00:25:13,439 Speaker 1: in the British Midlands. Following that, several private companies in 438 00:25:13,440 --> 00:25:16,919 Speaker 1: the US and the UK opened their own forensic DNA labs. 439 00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:21,680 Speaker 1: But defense teams have argued against it for years. Well why, Well, 440 00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: the first thing they said was, at first DNA analysis 441 00:25:25,119 --> 00:25:28,200 Speaker 1: actually didn't pass the fry test. I can understand when 442 00:25:28,240 --> 00:25:31,480 Speaker 1: it's new, it's not generally accepted yet. Yeah, they set 443 00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:34,800 Speaker 1: a legal standard requiring scientific evidence to have widespread acceptance 444 00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:37,200 Speaker 1: in his field was needed. Okay, well we have that now. 445 00:25:37,880 --> 00:25:42,560 Speaker 1: Academics complained that these firms weren't actually being transparent about 446 00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:45,800 Speaker 1: their testing technique. Well, our methodology wasn't. Well, that's a 447 00:25:45,960 --> 00:25:49,240 Speaker 1: perfectly acceptable concern. I think anybody doing this kind of 448 00:25:49,280 --> 00:25:52,800 Speaker 1: analysis should be making public exactly what their methodologies are. 449 00:25:53,440 --> 00:25:57,040 Speaker 1: And then, as we've well, I maybe not all of us. 450 00:25:57,119 --> 00:25:59,600 Speaker 1: I I was paying attention to the news at the time, 451 00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:03,120 Speaker 1: but as popularized by the O. J. Simpson trial, the 452 00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,840 Speaker 1: argument that DNA samples can in fact be contaminated during 453 00:26:07,080 --> 00:26:12,480 Speaker 1: both collection or in the crime lab. But throughout the years, 454 00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:16,600 Speaker 1: the thoroughness of labs and analysis list they all got better, right, 455 00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:19,320 Speaker 1: so so much so that the Innocence Project, which we've 456 00:26:19,359 --> 00:26:21,919 Speaker 1: been mentioning over and over again this episode, was founded 457 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:26,200 Speaker 1: in because they were absolutely convinced that DNA evidence could 458 00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:31,239 Speaker 1: exonerate questionable convictions. They have since won one hundred and 459 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:35,399 Speaker 1: seventy eight exonerations due to DNA testing. In a book 460 00:26:35,520 --> 00:26:38,639 Speaker 1: by the founders of the Innocence Project, they said, quote, 461 00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:42,560 Speaker 1: DNA testing is to justice what the telescope is for 462 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:46,240 Speaker 1: the stars. But yeah, I think in many ways that's true. 463 00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:50,080 Speaker 1: And now we're gonna say what the flaws are. But overall, 464 00:26:50,200 --> 00:26:53,960 Speaker 1: DNA testing, I will agree, is super solid. Yeah, yeah, no, 465 00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:56,400 Speaker 1: I think you're right too. But it's important to sort 466 00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:58,520 Speaker 1: of lay this out to know that there are problems 467 00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:03,439 Speaker 1: with it. Uh So this has been amplified, of course 468 00:27:03,600 --> 00:27:05,320 Speaker 1: by the c s I effect that we've also been 469 00:27:05,359 --> 00:27:09,119 Speaker 1: talking about, right the expectation of jurors to see DNA 470 00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:12,119 Speaker 1: evidence in corn cases. In fact, in two thousand and eight, 471 00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:14,840 Speaker 1: there was a study done by a felony judge in 472 00:27:14,960 --> 00:27:20,000 Speaker 1: Michigan where he randomly pulled a thousand, twenty seven summon jurors, 473 00:27:20,040 --> 00:27:22,600 Speaker 1: and seventy five percent of them expected that they would 474 00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:26,560 Speaker 1: see DNA in a rape case. Fifty of them expected 475 00:27:26,600 --> 00:27:29,080 Speaker 1: that in a murder or an attempted murder case. They 476 00:27:29,080 --> 00:27:33,080 Speaker 1: would see DNA in expected they would see it in 477 00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:35,359 Speaker 1: any criminal case that they were a part of. The 478 00:27:35,440 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 1: DNA was just so widely available to research and use 479 00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:41,200 Speaker 1: as evidence that of course it would pop up. Yeah, 480 00:27:41,480 --> 00:27:43,800 Speaker 1: and this has got to be frustrating to I mean, 481 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:47,000 Speaker 1: well meaning prosecutors. Who are you know, they're they're not 482 00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:49,200 Speaker 1: trying to cut corners or something, But in many cases 483 00:27:49,280 --> 00:27:51,960 Speaker 1: DNA evidence just might not be available. Well, and the 484 00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:54,600 Speaker 1: other side of it, too, is that DNA has become 485 00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:57,320 Speaker 1: such a powerful tool in the courtroom that it almost 486 00:27:57,320 --> 00:28:03,119 Speaker 1: automatically secures convictions, right because people hear those words d 487 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:06,000 Speaker 1: N A and they're just like, well, that's irrefutable. Well, 488 00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:08,480 Speaker 1: I mean, I can say if if there's a murder 489 00:28:08,520 --> 00:28:12,880 Speaker 1: case and uh, and there are blood stains found on 490 00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:16,600 Speaker 1: a victim, and you can take those blood stains and 491 00:28:16,600 --> 00:28:20,120 Speaker 1: and several different DNA analysis labs, I'll say that it's 492 00:28:20,119 --> 00:28:22,760 Speaker 1: a perfect match for the defendant. I think it's pretty 493 00:28:22,840 --> 00:28:25,720 Speaker 1: likely that looks like guilt to me. You should watch 494 00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:27,919 Speaker 1: Making a Murderer Man, because there's a whole thing in 495 00:28:27,960 --> 00:28:30,920 Speaker 1: that about how like they found this guy's blood at 496 00:28:30,960 --> 00:28:33,560 Speaker 1: a at a crime scene in a car. And then 497 00:28:33,640 --> 00:28:36,840 Speaker 1: the argument is made, well, the police actually had access 498 00:28:36,840 --> 00:28:40,000 Speaker 1: to his blood from previous case. They may have planted 499 00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:42,240 Speaker 1: the blood there. Well, in that case, that's I would 500 00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:45,280 Speaker 1: say that's again not a problem with the scientific methodology, 501 00:28:45,320 --> 00:28:49,320 Speaker 1: but a problem with the with the investigation and the procedures. Yeah, 502 00:28:49,400 --> 00:28:54,040 Speaker 1: like you're right, so okay. Research from Australia found that 503 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:57,880 Speaker 1: sexual assault cases involving DNA evidence were twice as likely 504 00:28:57,960 --> 00:29:01,800 Speaker 1: to reach trial and thirty three times is likely to 505 00:29:01,840 --> 00:29:06,240 Speaker 1: result in a guilty verdict. There's DNA right. Homicide cases 506 00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:09,160 Speaker 1: fourteen times is likely to reach trial, twenty three times 507 00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 1: is likely to end in a guilty verdict. Another major 508 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:14,120 Speaker 1: study in the UK found that just the knowledge that 509 00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:18,400 Speaker 1: prosecution intended to introduce DNA evidence before it was even 510 00:29:18,880 --> 00:29:21,960 Speaker 1: actually like introduced in a case was enough to get 511 00:29:21,960 --> 00:29:26,200 Speaker 1: a defendant to capitulate because they're just like, okay, so 512 00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:29,360 Speaker 1: there's questions about collection and storage, but they just they 513 00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:32,360 Speaker 1: just stopped because what do you mean stopped? Well, because 514 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:35,000 Speaker 1: people were starting to think, like, well, this is just 515 00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:38,320 Speaker 1: irrefutable evidence. Why should we bother looking at the collection 516 00:29:38,360 --> 00:29:40,960 Speaker 1: and storage of it. DNA is just winning so many cases, 517 00:29:41,040 --> 00:29:45,200 Speaker 1: let's not bother with it. So as the cases we 518 00:29:45,360 --> 00:29:48,920 Speaker 1: use DNA evidence and become more complicated, it actually becomes 519 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:51,120 Speaker 1: less of an objective science. And I'll give you an 520 00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:55,720 Speaker 1: example here so just real quick primer on this, nine 521 00:29:55,760 --> 00:29:58,960 Speaker 1: percent of our genes are the same as every other 522 00:29:59,040 --> 00:30:02,480 Speaker 1: human on the planet. My genes are the same as 523 00:30:02,720 --> 00:30:05,600 Speaker 1: Joe's jeans. But the DNA analysts know this, of course, 524 00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:08,680 Speaker 1: So we need to look for things that are called alleles. 525 00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:12,320 Speaker 1: They're very specific locations on each DNA strand that vary 526 00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:15,880 Speaker 1: from individual to individual, the different versions of a gene 527 00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:18,760 Speaker 1: in the different places on your chromosomes. The standard is 528 00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:23,120 Speaker 1: to compare alleles at thirteen locations. Now, if you do 529 00:30:23,160 --> 00:30:26,320 Speaker 1: it that way, the odds of two unrelated people matching 530 00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:29,400 Speaker 1: are less than one in a billion, So that's pretty good, right, 531 00:30:30,440 --> 00:30:32,920 Speaker 1: But what happens if you're looking at a case and 532 00:30:32,960 --> 00:30:36,280 Speaker 1: it involves a third person, So you're not just comparing 533 00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:39,680 Speaker 1: two DNA, you're comparing three, or what if you're comparing four? 534 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:42,320 Speaker 1: What if there are four people at the scene. Figuring 535 00:30:42,320 --> 00:30:45,960 Speaker 1: out which alleles belong to whom becomes more complicated the 536 00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:48,680 Speaker 1: more people that are involved, And if a sample is 537 00:30:48,760 --> 00:30:52,240 Speaker 1: small or degraded, which they often are from crime scenes, 538 00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:55,520 Speaker 1: the alleles might drop out in some locations as well. 539 00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:58,680 Speaker 1: So there's a study done by a guy's name a 540 00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:02,600 Speaker 1: teal drawer and Greg hamp A key in they took 541 00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:06,040 Speaker 1: DNA paperwork from a two thousand to Georgia rape trial 542 00:31:06,160 --> 00:31:08,720 Speaker 1: here in the state that we're recording this in. They 543 00:31:08,760 --> 00:31:13,000 Speaker 1: gave the evidence to seventeen technicians without context. All of 544 00:31:13,040 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 1: these people were experienced DNA technicians with an average of 545 00:31:16,360 --> 00:31:20,160 Speaker 1: nine years in the field. They were asked to determine 546 00:31:20,400 --> 00:31:22,720 Speaker 1: if the DNA was from the defendant in the case. 547 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 1: Only one of the seventeen people concurred that it was 548 00:31:26,920 --> 00:31:31,200 Speaker 1: the defendant, twelve said it was exclusionary, for said it 549 00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:36,160 Speaker 1: was totally inconclusive. Since this example, there have been accounts 550 00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:39,000 Speaker 1: of dozens of DNA typing cases that have gone wrong, 551 00:31:39,200 --> 00:31:43,280 Speaker 1: especially because it's so easily contaminated depending on who comes 552 00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:45,960 Speaker 1: in contact with it. Right. So there's something that's called 553 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:48,760 Speaker 1: d N A transfer which contributes to this the most. 554 00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:51,920 Speaker 1: It's when cells migrate from people to people or from 555 00:31:51,960 --> 00:31:55,320 Speaker 1: people to objects, inevitably when we just touched things. Right. 556 00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,680 Speaker 1: Another study asked participants to shake hands for two minutes 557 00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,680 Speaker 1: and hold a knife when the DNA on the knife 558 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:08,160 Speaker 1: was analyzed. Well, to be a participant there just sitting 559 00:32:08,200 --> 00:32:10,400 Speaker 1: there holding the knife, and now you hold the knife. 560 00:32:10,520 --> 00:32:12,240 Speaker 1: What do I do with it? Just hold it? Just 561 00:32:12,280 --> 00:32:15,720 Speaker 1: hold it. Man. When the DNA on the knife was analyzed, 562 00:32:15,760 --> 00:32:19,920 Speaker 1: the partner was identified as a contributor in the cases 563 00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:23,920 Speaker 1: found them to be the sole contributor. They didn't even 564 00:32:23,920 --> 00:32:27,200 Speaker 1: find the DNA from the second person. So going forward, 565 00:32:27,280 --> 00:32:32,240 Speaker 1: more context needs to be around for this DNA analysis. Right. 566 00:32:32,280 --> 00:32:37,520 Speaker 1: The science is is there, but it it's complicated and 567 00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:41,320 Speaker 1: there needs to be like, I guess again, procedures put 568 00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:44,640 Speaker 1: in place for like, well, how how do you what? 569 00:32:44,640 --> 00:32:47,880 Speaker 1: What's the percentage of accuracy? I think is what we 570 00:32:47,920 --> 00:32:53,080 Speaker 1: need to come down on. Uh. Houston, Oh boy, Houston. 571 00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:56,640 Speaker 1: Houston had a real bad incident of this. Their crime 572 00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:01,000 Speaker 1: lab handled DNA evidence from five cases a year. A 573 00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:04,920 Speaker 1: local television station obtained dozens of the DNA profiles that 574 00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:07,760 Speaker 1: were processed by this lab and they sent them to 575 00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:11,600 Speaker 1: independent experts for analysis. It turned out that the technicians 576 00:33:11,600 --> 00:33:15,800 Speaker 1: were routinely misinterpreting even the most basic of DNA samples. 577 00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:20,239 Speaker 1: So this was just like a technician error, and the 578 00:33:20,280 --> 00:33:24,200 Speaker 1: Innocence Project themselves said, well, we don't take cases where 579 00:33:24,240 --> 00:33:27,040 Speaker 1: there are positive DNA matches. And one example, a tech 580 00:33:27,080 --> 00:33:30,560 Speaker 1: created a profile for a victim from three different sets 581 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:34,760 Speaker 1: of DNA, the result profiles all totally varied. Then she 582 00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:38,680 Speaker 1: mismatched the DNA from the crime scene and the accused defendants. 583 00:33:38,680 --> 00:33:41,280 Speaker 1: This led to a retrial where the defendant was released. 584 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:45,040 Speaker 1: So this tech was fired. This is the same Houston 585 00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:48,479 Speaker 1: lab she was fired. Then she was reinstated because her 586 00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:51,800 Speaker 1: lawyer said, well, the problem was systemic. It was the 587 00:33:51,840 --> 00:33:54,640 Speaker 1: whole lab in Houston that was the problem here. They 588 00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:57,640 Speaker 1: had inadequate supervision. Well that may have been the case, 589 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:00,200 Speaker 1: it could have been. Yeah, but think about all five 590 00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:04,440 Speaker 1: of those cases. I mean, we think that this DNA 591 00:34:04,480 --> 00:34:06,720 Speaker 1: analysis is rock solid, and then you hear this and 592 00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:08,759 Speaker 1: it's like, well, there's five cases we have to go 593 00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:13,319 Speaker 1: back and review again. You know. So, oh man, this 594 00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:18,400 Speaker 1: is so crazy because it's you think of scientific evidence 595 00:34:18,520 --> 00:34:21,560 Speaker 1: as being the most reliable kind of evidence that you 596 00:34:21,600 --> 00:34:24,680 Speaker 1: can have in a courtroom, at least I would, I think. 597 00:34:24,840 --> 00:34:28,479 Speaker 1: But and and that's so scary that you often will 598 00:34:28,520 --> 00:34:31,360 Speaker 1: have this problem of not knowing whether you can trust 599 00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:34,799 Speaker 1: the expert witness telling you something because you don't know 600 00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:37,240 Speaker 1: if there if there was something wrong with the data 601 00:34:37,280 --> 00:34:40,759 Speaker 1: collection and contamination. You don't know if their methodologies are 602 00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:44,719 Speaker 1: actually sound to begin with, whether they've been based on 603 00:34:45,040 --> 00:34:48,480 Speaker 1: well tested scientific principles, do they have a clean lab. 604 00:34:49,600 --> 00:34:53,200 Speaker 1: Is their supervisor pushing them to do more work than 605 00:34:53,239 --> 00:34:56,040 Speaker 1: they're capable of doing exactly? Or is there is there 606 00:34:56,160 --> 00:34:59,879 Speaker 1: prosecutorial bias or something. Is there pressure from the dep 607 00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:06,400 Speaker 1: artment for them to uh basically convict more cases? Yeah? 608 00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:11,280 Speaker 1: And man, that's so tough because we've already seen evidence 609 00:35:11,280 --> 00:35:13,880 Speaker 1: in courtrooms undermined by lots of other kinds of studies. 610 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:17,040 Speaker 1: I mean, the more we learn about the reliability of 611 00:35:17,080 --> 00:35:22,800 Speaker 1: eyewitness testimony, nothing ever makes it look more reliable. Uh. People, 612 00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:26,600 Speaker 1: it just turns out, man, people's memories are not very good. 613 00:35:26,760 --> 00:35:31,120 Speaker 1: And in many cases, people have they profess confidence in 614 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:35,160 Speaker 1: identifying a you know, a perpetrator or something in a courtroom, 615 00:35:35,200 --> 00:35:38,880 Speaker 1: but then it turns out there wrong. And uh so, 616 00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:41,959 Speaker 1: so eyewitness testimony. What I'm not saying it's always wrong, 617 00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:46,560 Speaker 1: but it's just you can't be very confident in trusting it. Um. 618 00:35:47,160 --> 00:35:50,239 Speaker 1: We we've seen all these problems with forensic science and 619 00:35:50,320 --> 00:35:53,200 Speaker 1: so man, it is just it's just tough out there 620 00:35:53,239 --> 00:35:55,800 Speaker 1: to know that you're getting the right answer in a courtroom. 621 00:35:56,040 --> 00:36:01,000 Speaker 1: I would hate to be I would hate to be 622 00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:03,440 Speaker 1: the defendant in any case, especially a case in which 623 00:36:03,480 --> 00:36:07,120 Speaker 1: I was innocent. Right now, that's yecially if you're innocent, Yeah, 624 00:36:07,120 --> 00:36:09,680 Speaker 1: I think, yeah, it's guilty. I'd still hate it, but 625 00:36:09,719 --> 00:36:13,640 Speaker 1: I'd be like, but I did beat Joe down with 626 00:36:13,680 --> 00:36:15,920 Speaker 1: the folding chair, Yeah exactly, But how are they going 627 00:36:16,000 --> 00:36:20,200 Speaker 1: to tell bruise marks? There's no science that unless you're 628 00:36:20,400 --> 00:36:22,719 Speaker 1: Sherlock and you're beating corpses with a horse whip, like 629 00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:26,759 Speaker 1: I said, Uh, okay, jokes aside, Seriously, this is a 630 00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:29,680 Speaker 1: big problem. What do we do, like, what's the future 631 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:31,800 Speaker 1: of this look like? How do we reform it? Well? 632 00:36:31,960 --> 00:36:35,600 Speaker 1: One of the problems is that forensic science encompasses many 633 00:36:35,680 --> 00:36:38,400 Speaker 1: different fields, right, so that lots all these fields have 634 00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:41,839 Speaker 1: different standards, and some have different problems. Some are more 635 00:36:41,920 --> 00:36:45,840 Speaker 1: solid than others, Some have more regulations in place to 636 00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:49,600 Speaker 1: keep all of the practitioners in line than others do. So, 637 00:36:49,600 --> 00:36:52,719 Speaker 1: so it's a it's a big, hairy, complicated problem, and 638 00:36:53,040 --> 00:36:56,200 Speaker 1: there's not one simple prescription that will fix it all. Yeah, 639 00:36:56,440 --> 00:36:59,799 Speaker 1: but there are some sort of general rules that some 640 00:37:00,040 --> 00:37:03,319 Speaker 1: fields may already be following pretty well, and others could 641 00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:06,120 Speaker 1: do a much better job of Yeah, some possibilities that 642 00:37:06,160 --> 00:37:08,480 Speaker 1: people are throwing out as they're saying, defendants should have 643 00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:12,160 Speaker 1: their own forensics experts that are paid for. Uh. There 644 00:37:12,200 --> 00:37:14,719 Speaker 1: should be separate crime labs from the prosecutors and the 645 00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:18,359 Speaker 1: police that they're answering to. And there should be, of course, 646 00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:21,160 Speaker 1: as we've been alluding to all episode, an established system 647 00:37:21,200 --> 00:37:25,279 Speaker 1: of verification and standards. Yeah. I mean one one hypothetical 648 00:37:25,400 --> 00:37:29,400 Speaker 1: you could imagine would be something like that. There is. 649 00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:33,640 Speaker 1: It would be sort of like the uh, forensic science 650 00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:38,359 Speaker 1: version of public financing of elections, where you say, you know, 651 00:37:38,480 --> 00:37:41,480 Speaker 1: like if you have mismatched resources going in, you can 652 00:37:41,520 --> 00:37:44,560 Speaker 1: make this fairer if you just give both sides equal 653 00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:46,440 Speaker 1: money from the government and that's what they have to 654 00:37:46,440 --> 00:37:50,320 Speaker 1: spend on elections. Uh. In in this case, you could say, well, 655 00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:54,719 Speaker 1: what if we just have a a crime lab that is, 656 00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:57,440 Speaker 1: you know, big national crime lab that works for neither 657 00:37:57,560 --> 00:38:01,040 Speaker 1: the defense nor the prosecution, and that in order to 658 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,040 Speaker 1: get forensic science that's admissible in court, you have to 659 00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:09,640 Speaker 1: go through this this big uh, this big well regulated system, 660 00:38:09,680 --> 00:38:13,200 Speaker 1: and that that they don't work for either side. Yeah. 661 00:38:13,239 --> 00:38:16,279 Speaker 1: In fact, an independent entity that would be called the 662 00:38:16,400 --> 00:38:19,880 Speaker 1: National Institute of forensic science has been recommended for something 663 00:38:19,920 --> 00:38:23,759 Speaker 1: like this, and they would be responsible for both establishing 664 00:38:23,800 --> 00:38:26,880 Speaker 1: the standards that we're talking about and for certifying people 665 00:38:26,920 --> 00:38:30,759 Speaker 1: as experts. Another another way of helping the problem is 666 00:38:30,840 --> 00:38:32,960 Speaker 1: just from the ground up in each field itself. Like 667 00:38:33,000 --> 00:38:36,320 Speaker 1: we were talking about earlier in in fire analysis, they're 668 00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:39,400 Speaker 1: very legitimate scientists working in this field who are just 669 00:38:39,440 --> 00:38:42,960 Speaker 1: trying to improve the field by doing scientific research and 670 00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:46,960 Speaker 1: holding others in their field accountable to pay attention to it. Yeah, yeah, 671 00:38:47,040 --> 00:38:50,520 Speaker 1: that's true. Uh. There's also this one like case that 672 00:38:50,600 --> 00:38:53,719 Speaker 1: came up about DNA, which is interesting. There's a company 673 00:38:53,880 --> 00:38:56,960 Speaker 1: that's using software and automation to take the human element 674 00:38:57,000 --> 00:38:59,080 Speaker 1: out of it completely, and I've alluded to that as 675 00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:03,560 Speaker 1: well with like finger analysis things like that. Um, they're saying, well, 676 00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:06,360 Speaker 1: we take the subjective decisions out of it, and the 677 00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:09,480 Speaker 1: analyst is the one who's making the flawed conclusions. The 678 00:39:09,520 --> 00:39:13,520 Speaker 1: company calls itself true Allele uh. And the software, however, 679 00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,840 Speaker 1: has been criticized for whether it actually met the FRIES standard, 680 00:39:16,840 --> 00:39:19,279 Speaker 1: even though we're no longer using the price standard is 681 00:39:19,320 --> 00:39:21,800 Speaker 1: being criticized because it hasn't been accepted by the larger 682 00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:24,560 Speaker 1: science community. But one thing I would say about that 683 00:39:24,640 --> 00:39:27,280 Speaker 1: is I think if you have a computer program that's 684 00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:30,279 Speaker 1: that's doing analysis on forensic science, I think that would 685 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,880 Speaker 1: need to be open source. And company who develops that 686 00:39:33,920 --> 00:39:35,960 Speaker 1: probably isn't gonna want that because they're gonna want it 687 00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:39,880 Speaker 1: to be proprietary own it. But that should be something 688 00:39:39,920 --> 00:39:42,279 Speaker 1: that anybody can go look at the source code and 689 00:39:42,320 --> 00:39:46,040 Speaker 1: make sure that it's working accurately and not biasing towards 690 00:39:46,160 --> 00:39:53,240 Speaker 1: a certain conclusion. Okay, so that was a lot about 691 00:39:53,280 --> 00:39:56,880 Speaker 1: forensic science, and unfortunately we don't this is already a 692 00:39:56,880 --> 00:40:00,120 Speaker 1: long episode. We don't have time to two more here, 693 00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:01,920 Speaker 1: and there were a bunch of other topics we wanted 694 00:40:01,960 --> 00:40:03,799 Speaker 1: to get into and just didn't even have space for, 695 00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:09,279 Speaker 1: like handwriting analysis, lie detection, the polygraph recovered memories. So 696 00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:12,279 Speaker 1: maybe we can address those. If you're interested, you can 697 00:40:12,280 --> 00:40:13,680 Speaker 1: write us and let us know you want to learn 698 00:40:13,719 --> 00:40:15,920 Speaker 1: about them, and we'll talk about them in a future episode. Yeah, 699 00:40:15,960 --> 00:40:18,279 Speaker 1: we can sit down record a future episode, maybe bring 700 00:40:18,280 --> 00:40:22,360 Speaker 1: in old Robert Lamb and uh we could uh um. Also, 701 00:40:22,520 --> 00:40:25,239 Speaker 1: like I would love to hear in the meantime from 702 00:40:25,280 --> 00:40:28,200 Speaker 1: some of you who perhaps work in this field, you know, 703 00:40:28,320 --> 00:40:30,920 Speaker 1: we have something to add to the discussion. Yes, is 704 00:40:30,960 --> 00:40:33,640 Speaker 1: there anything we missed out on or that's a really 705 00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:37,200 Speaker 1: interesting case of of of how these standards are enforced 706 00:40:37,200 --> 00:40:40,000 Speaker 1: in the field that you're familiar with. So if you 707 00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:42,560 Speaker 1: want to write into us about forensic science, you want 708 00:40:42,600 --> 00:40:45,200 Speaker 1: to talk to us about maybe your experiences, maybe you've 709 00:40:45,239 --> 00:40:47,879 Speaker 1: been on a jury like I have, or you work 710 00:40:47,920 --> 00:40:52,040 Speaker 1: in forensic science lab and you have some argument perhaps 711 00:40:52,080 --> 00:40:55,120 Speaker 1: with how we've portrayed the science here. Please let us know. 712 00:40:55,239 --> 00:40:58,120 Speaker 1: We'd love to hear from you. We are all over 713 00:40:58,160 --> 00:41:02,840 Speaker 1: the internet. You can find us on social media on Facebook, Twitter, Tumbler, 714 00:41:03,160 --> 00:41:06,480 Speaker 1: and Instagram now right. You can also visit us at 715 00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:08,879 Speaker 1: our home base, stuff to Blow your Mind dot com. 716 00:41:08,920 --> 00:41:11,319 Speaker 1: That's where you can find all of the podcasts we've done. 717 00:41:11,520 --> 00:41:14,319 Speaker 1: We also right there and all of our videos are 718 00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:17,120 Speaker 1: there as well. And of course, if you want to 719 00:41:17,160 --> 00:41:19,160 Speaker 1: email us and let us know your feedback on this 720 00:41:19,200 --> 00:41:21,560 Speaker 1: episode or any other, or just let us know a 721 00:41:21,600 --> 00:41:23,200 Speaker 1: topic you might like us to do in the future, 722 00:41:23,200 --> 00:41:25,440 Speaker 1: you can email us at blow the Mind at how 723 00:41:25,480 --> 00:41:37,480 Speaker 1: stuff works dot com for more on this and thousands 724 00:41:37,520 --> 00:42:02,680 Speaker 1: of other topics. Is that how stuff works dot com