1 00:00:00,880 --> 00:00:04,080 Speaker 1: Welcome to you stuff you should know from house stuff 2 00:00:04,080 --> 00:00:12,440 Speaker 1: Works dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm 3 00:00:12,520 --> 00:00:17,120 Speaker 1: Josh Clark, and there's Charles W Chuck Bryant. Yeah, howdye uh? 4 00:00:17,160 --> 00:00:19,400 Speaker 1: And that makes the stuff as you know. That's right 5 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,400 Speaker 1: minus Jerry. But with no that's right, we lose a 6 00:00:23,480 --> 00:00:28,280 Speaker 1: Jerry gain anale. One step forward and another step forward. 7 00:00:29,360 --> 00:00:33,159 Speaker 1: Oh where Jerry? You've just been wailing on it. Well, 8 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:35,199 Speaker 1: I'm not gonna say two steps back with Nol sit 9 00:00:35,280 --> 00:00:37,680 Speaker 1: in five ft away, but it could be one and one. 10 00:00:38,640 --> 00:00:40,720 Speaker 1: One step forward with Noel, one step back for not 11 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 1: having Jerry. You're saying it's a step forward not having 12 00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:47,320 Speaker 1: Jerry and a step forward having Nol. I'm just trying 13 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:53,000 Speaker 1: to make everyone like me doing a poor job of it. 14 00:00:54,560 --> 00:00:57,080 Speaker 1: You do a great job of it. Everybody loves the chuck, 15 00:00:57,480 --> 00:00:59,920 Speaker 1: not everybody who doesn't. I have some mortal in it 16 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:03,640 Speaker 1: means mortal enemies. Yeah, they want to kill trying to 17 00:01:03,680 --> 00:01:07,480 Speaker 1: kill you know, we'll chuck. Yes, I will tell you 18 00:01:07,520 --> 00:01:11,600 Speaker 1: what if they did want to kill you, they wanted 19 00:01:11,600 --> 00:01:14,360 Speaker 1: to hire a hit many. Yeah, the deep web is 20 00:01:14,400 --> 00:01:17,800 Speaker 1: a good place to start. Looking quite a segue. It's 21 00:01:18,040 --> 00:01:22,520 Speaker 1: a while that one up unintentionally. Yeah, I spotted it 22 00:01:22,560 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: and went after Yeah. This is about both the deep 23 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:28,600 Speaker 1: and dark web, which are two different things. The dark 24 00:01:28,640 --> 00:01:30,640 Speaker 1: web is part of the deep web, thank you, But 25 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:35,280 Speaker 1: the deep web isn't necessarily dark a dark Yeah, that's 26 00:01:35,440 --> 00:01:37,880 Speaker 1: very well put. The dark web is the nefarious things 27 00:01:37,880 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 1: that go on in the deep web, and not necessarily 28 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 1: a nefarious but the purposefully hidden. Yeah, because there are 29 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:47,760 Speaker 1: some good things in the dark web. I totally misspoke. Yeah, well, 30 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:49,520 Speaker 1: you know what. I think that it's great that you 31 00:01:49,560 --> 00:01:52,960 Speaker 1: confess to it. You feel better, do Man. This is 32 00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:56,480 Speaker 1: a really upfront kind of episode, isn't It's a very 33 00:01:56,480 --> 00:02:02,040 Speaker 1: honest we're bearing it all man. Uh so, do you 34 00:02:02,080 --> 00:02:05,160 Speaker 1: have a fancy intro story? No? You think I would? Right? 35 00:02:05,560 --> 00:02:09,280 Speaker 1: My intro gets buried later on. It's a great intro, 36 00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:14,240 Speaker 1: but it's just I'll use it as the intro. Okay, 37 00:02:14,240 --> 00:02:19,240 Speaker 1: go ahead, okay, okay, Chuck. Yes, have you heard of 38 00:02:19,240 --> 00:02:23,360 Speaker 1: our favorite band, Iron Maiden? Uh? Yeah, sure so. Iron 39 00:02:23,400 --> 00:02:27,880 Speaker 1: Maiden is arguably the most awesome band of all time. 40 00:02:29,560 --> 00:02:32,400 Speaker 1: Oh dude, all right, I'm not a huge fan, but 41 00:02:32,600 --> 00:02:35,359 Speaker 1: you you wouldn't be, like I hate Iron Maiden. They 42 00:02:35,440 --> 00:02:37,519 Speaker 1: suck of course not no, because it makes you crazy. 43 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:40,160 Speaker 1: It's right. Iron Maid has been around for a while. 44 00:02:40,480 --> 00:02:43,480 Speaker 1: They're pretty smart. They know what they're doing. Um, and 45 00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 1: recently they figured out a way to maximize their touring 46 00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:53,280 Speaker 1: dollars by flying their own plane. They well, Bruce Dickinson 47 00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:57,240 Speaker 1: always did. He's he's a certified pilot. It's gotta be efficient. 48 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:00,920 Speaker 1: I would imagine plus fun all unless Bruce was partying 49 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:02,720 Speaker 1: too hard and then they got to fly to the 50 00:03:02,760 --> 00:03:05,280 Speaker 1: next city that night. He wouldn't do that, I hope not, 51 00:03:05,720 --> 00:03:09,880 Speaker 1: because that's that's dangerous. I mean, driving drunk is bad enough, 52 00:03:09,919 --> 00:03:13,280 Speaker 1: but flying drunk I can only imagine. Sure. Uh, and 53 00:03:13,320 --> 00:03:16,320 Speaker 1: it's probably not just drunk, you know what I'm saying. No, no, no, 54 00:03:16,360 --> 00:03:20,360 Speaker 1: he's he's straight. Has he always been? I don't know. 55 00:03:20,440 --> 00:03:23,400 Speaker 1: I can't verify that. Well anyway, Um, Bruce and the 56 00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:27,520 Speaker 1: boys uh figured out that a good way to figure 57 00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:30,960 Speaker 1: out where to tour, where to decide to tour, um 58 00:03:31,160 --> 00:03:35,480 Speaker 1: would be to figure out where their music was getting pirated. 59 00:03:35,520 --> 00:03:40,720 Speaker 1: The most that sounds reasonable. It does sound reasonable. It's it. 60 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:44,360 Speaker 1: It provides you with evidence of an established fan base, 61 00:03:45,440 --> 00:03:49,000 Speaker 1: and a fan base that is unwilling to pay for 62 00:03:49,120 --> 00:03:53,280 Speaker 1: your record, but would probably pay to see you live. 63 00:03:53,680 --> 00:03:58,080 Speaker 1: How does that reason? Well, they like your music, but 64 00:03:58,120 --> 00:04:00,640 Speaker 1: they don't want to pay for your CD, so why 65 00:04:00,640 --> 00:04:03,000 Speaker 1: would they go see live and pay? Because it's different. Like, 66 00:04:03,080 --> 00:04:06,000 Speaker 1: seeing a live show is way different than buying a CD. 67 00:04:06,040 --> 00:04:07,920 Speaker 1: You can't you can't get a live show. You could 68 00:04:07,920 --> 00:04:09,600 Speaker 1: get a video of a live show, it's still not 69 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:12,000 Speaker 1: the same experience. A live show is a live show. Plus, 70 00:04:12,440 --> 00:04:17,279 Speaker 1: everybody always knows that anybody involved in the very entrenched 71 00:04:17,279 --> 00:04:20,880 Speaker 1: in the old guard music industry does any band doesn't 72 00:04:20,920 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 1: make any money on their records. They make it on touring. 73 00:04:24,320 --> 00:04:26,920 Speaker 1: So going to see a band live also is kind 74 00:04:26,920 --> 00:04:30,640 Speaker 1: of a true active fandom because you're really you're you're 75 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:33,520 Speaker 1: contributing directly to your band that you like. You know. 76 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:36,080 Speaker 1: Um So what they did was they hired a company 77 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:40,720 Speaker 1: to look at bit torrent sites and find the regions 78 00:04:40,760 --> 00:04:44,160 Speaker 1: where their music was most pirate ID and they created 79 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:46,360 Speaker 1: a tour map from it and went and played those regions. 80 00:04:46,440 --> 00:04:49,120 Speaker 1: Did you do you have the number one Iron Maiden 81 00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:55,200 Speaker 1: pirated region? But we're gonna say Rio, all right, they're 82 00:04:55,279 --> 00:04:58,280 Speaker 1: huge in South America. That's that's my guess we'll look 83 00:04:58,320 --> 00:05:01,320 Speaker 1: it up afterwards, I guess. And so they were like, 84 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:03,520 Speaker 1: we're gonna start our tor and rio. Yeah, and it 85 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,440 Speaker 1: wasn't just that that one place, but it was basically 86 00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:09,680 Speaker 1: a tour that was built on the areas where the 87 00:05:09,800 --> 00:05:11,919 Speaker 1: music was most pirated. It was a Stroker genius. But 88 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:16,880 Speaker 1: they couldn't have done it without harvesting the deep web 89 00:05:17,640 --> 00:05:21,160 Speaker 1: because bit torrent sites. When you search bit torrent, it 90 00:05:21,200 --> 00:05:25,600 Speaker 1: doesn't the average search engine doesn't respond with a list 91 00:05:25,680 --> 00:05:28,919 Speaker 1: of bit torrent activity. It'll just send you to a 92 00:05:28,960 --> 00:05:32,039 Speaker 1: bit torrent site, which means that those pages of bit 93 00:05:32,080 --> 00:05:35,200 Speaker 1: torrent activity, which are web pages and they do exist, 94 00:05:35,680 --> 00:05:38,440 Speaker 1: they're part of what's called the deep web. That's right, 95 00:05:38,600 --> 00:05:41,880 Speaker 1: the surface web as we know it, and search engines 96 00:05:41,920 --> 00:05:46,159 Speaker 1: that we all use like Google and Bing supposedly only 97 00:05:46,200 --> 00:05:49,640 Speaker 1: have access to about point zero three percent of what 98 00:05:49,800 --> 00:05:55,000 Speaker 1: is truly on the world Wide Web. It's like scary 99 00:05:55,040 --> 00:05:59,479 Speaker 1: and weird and thrilling all at the same time. Point yeah, 100 00:06:00,000 --> 00:06:03,800 Speaker 1: and anything else that's buried is the deep web. And 101 00:06:03,839 --> 00:06:08,640 Speaker 1: it's not necessarily Uh, the deep web is not is 102 00:06:08,720 --> 00:06:10,760 Speaker 1: not when you're purposely trying to hide things, it just 103 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:15,680 Speaker 1: may not be cataloged and index a password. Sure, maybe 104 00:06:16,360 --> 00:06:20,040 Speaker 1: one of those timed sites that uh don't let you 105 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:23,200 Speaker 1: access date after a certain amount of time. Could be 106 00:06:23,200 --> 00:06:27,720 Speaker 1: anything with a caption involved, anything that's not hyperlinked. Uh, 107 00:06:27,800 --> 00:06:29,920 Speaker 1: there's lots of reasons that something could find it so 108 00:06:30,080 --> 00:06:32,800 Speaker 1: buried in the deep web. Right And and you make 109 00:06:32,839 --> 00:06:35,640 Speaker 1: a good point to separate the deep web and in 110 00:06:35,720 --> 00:06:37,200 Speaker 1: dark web. So let me give you an example of 111 00:06:37,400 --> 00:06:41,000 Speaker 1: deep web aside from those bit torrent sites. Um, there's 112 00:06:41,040 --> 00:06:43,440 Speaker 1: this company called bright Planet and they had this they 113 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:46,039 Speaker 1: provide deep web harvesting, and they had this primer on 114 00:06:46,360 --> 00:06:48,159 Speaker 1: you know what is the deep web. One of the 115 00:06:48,200 --> 00:06:51,480 Speaker 1: examples they used was if you look up government grants 116 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:55,440 Speaker 1: on a traditional search engine, it will probably provide you 117 00:06:55,520 --> 00:06:58,919 Speaker 1: with www dot grants dot gov as one of the 118 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:02,640 Speaker 1: first returns. Right right up. Um, when you go on 119 00:07:02,640 --> 00:07:05,440 Speaker 1: to grant stock CoV, you can then search and find 120 00:07:05,600 --> 00:07:08,320 Speaker 1: pages of all these different government grants. You can search 121 00:07:08,360 --> 00:07:11,200 Speaker 1: by keyword, you can browse, but those pages aren't going 122 00:07:11,240 --> 00:07:14,280 Speaker 1: to come up on your normal Google search. You have 123 00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:16,760 Speaker 1: to go to the site, which means that those pages 124 00:07:16,800 --> 00:07:19,120 Speaker 1: of the actual grants are part of the deep web. 125 00:07:20,160 --> 00:07:23,440 Speaker 1: Your bank account, your checking account online if you have 126 00:07:23,640 --> 00:07:26,680 Speaker 1: a mobile banking or online banking, it has a web 127 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:30,840 Speaker 1: page all to its own right now, And if I 128 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:34,960 Speaker 1: searched Chuck Bryant's checking account, it would not come back. 129 00:07:35,880 --> 00:07:38,360 Speaker 1: I would not get that because it's behind a password. 130 00:07:38,400 --> 00:07:41,320 Speaker 1: It's a it's a website page. It's a web page, 131 00:07:41,640 --> 00:07:45,760 Speaker 1: but it's password encrypted. Therefore it's part of the deep web. 132 00:07:46,000 --> 00:07:50,320 Speaker 1: Twitter until it index tweets used to be you couldn't 133 00:07:50,320 --> 00:07:54,880 Speaker 1: search tweets individual tweets. Now you can, so that made 134 00:07:54,920 --> 00:07:57,840 Speaker 1: them formerly a part of the deep web. Actual tweets 135 00:07:58,240 --> 00:08:01,560 Speaker 1: or every company on the planet has some sort of 136 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 1: internal employee pages like internal dot discovery that only we 137 00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:11,080 Speaker 1: can access, and you can't Google search any of that stuff, 138 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:15,880 Speaker 1: right or somebody could conceivably access it. Maybe it depends 139 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:18,200 Speaker 1: on the page, but you have to know the exact 140 00:08:18,320 --> 00:08:21,760 Speaker 1: u r L. So the idea is, if it's blind, 141 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:25,200 Speaker 1: if search engines are blind to it, it's part of 142 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:28,720 Speaker 1: the deep web. If search engines can index it and 143 00:08:28,720 --> 00:08:33,280 Speaker 1: bring it back as a return results search results, um, 144 00:08:33,320 --> 00:08:35,760 Speaker 1: it's part of the surface web. Yeah, because that's all 145 00:08:35,760 --> 00:08:38,960 Speaker 1: the search engine is doing. They are We might do 146 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:41,600 Speaker 1: a full podcast on search engines at some point. But 147 00:08:41,640 --> 00:08:44,400 Speaker 1: the general thing is that there's an index of data, 148 00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:49,040 Speaker 1: and they use spiders or crawlers because it is a web, 149 00:08:49,559 --> 00:08:54,040 Speaker 1: to crawl around and locate domain names and hyperlinks and 150 00:08:54,160 --> 00:08:57,680 Speaker 1: basically index all that in what they think will be 151 00:08:57,720 --> 00:09:00,880 Speaker 1: most helpful to what you're looking for. Right, So, Chuck 152 00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:04,120 Speaker 1: Bryant's bank account. There are some web pages out there 153 00:09:04,160 --> 00:09:09,280 Speaker 1: that contain information related to that keyword search. So a 154 00:09:09,320 --> 00:09:12,680 Speaker 1: search engine will keep an index with that keyword search 155 00:09:13,080 --> 00:09:16,800 Speaker 1: with the u r l s, the locations, the page content, 156 00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:20,360 Speaker 1: some of the page content, the meta tags or the metadata, 157 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:27,080 Speaker 1: and other very brief sketch information about those pages associated 158 00:09:27,080 --> 00:09:30,000 Speaker 1: with the keyword for an index, which means that when 159 00:09:30,080 --> 00:09:34,280 Speaker 1: you type in Chuck Bryant's bank account that sorry, I 160 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:36,360 Speaker 1: thought about it as I was saying it that last time. 161 00:09:36,600 --> 00:09:41,320 Speaker 1: But when you type in UM Birds of Paradise bank account, 162 00:09:41,679 --> 00:09:45,720 Speaker 1: bank account, um, it will the search engine goes and 163 00:09:45,880 --> 00:09:48,960 Speaker 1: accesses the index. It doesn't have to go all the 164 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:51,520 Speaker 1: way across every page on the web that it can find. 165 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 1: It just goes to its indices, and that's how search 166 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:57,560 Speaker 1: results are returned so quickly. It's not going across the 167 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:02,360 Speaker 1: internet it's already got the spider crawlers, the bots doing 168 00:10:02,360 --> 00:10:05,480 Speaker 1: that constantly. The search engine is just going to the 169 00:10:05,480 --> 00:10:08,800 Speaker 1: index is that the bots have created from their searches. Yeah, 170 00:10:08,840 --> 00:10:10,920 Speaker 1: and it is super shallow. I mean, we said point 171 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:13,640 Speaker 1: zero three percent. We do. We do our whole job 172 00:10:13,679 --> 00:10:17,679 Speaker 1: as researching online mainly, and we run into this all 173 00:10:17,679 --> 00:10:20,600 Speaker 1: the time where you feel like you're getting a very 174 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:24,040 Speaker 1: slim portion of what you're trying to find out because 175 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:28,000 Speaker 1: so many of the best uh, medical journals and things 176 00:10:28,040 --> 00:10:31,360 Speaker 1: like this don't just pop up as you know, It's 177 00:10:31,600 --> 00:10:34,440 Speaker 1: more likely to be some headline from scene and dot 178 00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:37,599 Speaker 1: com and not like a Harvard Medical Journal paper that 179 00:10:37,720 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: could really help you out. Yeah. And I mean like 180 00:10:39,720 --> 00:10:44,480 Speaker 1: you can get deeper and deeper with your keyword skills 181 00:10:44,480 --> 00:10:48,440 Speaker 1: and your search skills, but for the most part that Yeah, 182 00:10:48,440 --> 00:10:50,880 Speaker 1: the first returns of first results, depending on what you 183 00:10:50,960 --> 00:10:54,600 Speaker 1: search for, are gonna be, like you said, superficial. Yeah. 184 00:10:54,600 --> 00:10:58,360 Speaker 1: But even if you're super a super sleuth, a Google 185 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:01,120 Speaker 1: master like we all think we are, I mean, how 186 00:11:01,120 --> 00:11:04,199 Speaker 1: can how much can that be bumping it up point one? Yeah. Well, 187 00:11:04,240 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 1: a lot of the problem too, though, Chuck, is the 188 00:11:07,200 --> 00:11:10,959 Speaker 1: so much of science is behind a paywall, really really 189 00:11:11,120 --> 00:11:14,640 Speaker 1: really expensive paywalls to um, which is like, here's the 190 00:11:14,640 --> 00:11:17,480 Speaker 1: first eight lines of this awesome medical research paper, exactly 191 00:11:17,480 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 1: if you want it, give us. Yeah, which is a 192 00:11:21,160 --> 00:11:23,640 Speaker 1: problem in and of itself, not necessarily related to this, 193 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: but with current search engine technology, you have, like you said, 194 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:33,360 Speaker 1: a superficial result from a query um on the other 195 00:11:33,440 --> 00:11:35,240 Speaker 1: end of the spectrum, and this is kind of what 196 00:11:35,320 --> 00:11:38,920 Speaker 1: search instance are dealing with now. Um, the deeper you 197 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:41,360 Speaker 1: go into the deep web. Again, the surface web is 198 00:11:41,559 --> 00:11:44,120 Speaker 1: point zero three percent of all of the web pages 199 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 1: on the entire Internet. So the further you go into it, 200 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:50,480 Speaker 1: the more data you have, and you eventually can run 201 00:11:50,480 --> 00:11:53,599 Speaker 1: into the problem of what's called big data, which not 202 00:11:54,040 --> 00:11:57,160 Speaker 1: capitalized B or D, which refers to like companies like 203 00:11:57,200 --> 00:12:01,720 Speaker 1: Google and and that that can dig and harvest and 204 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:05,080 Speaker 1: maintain a large amount of data. Yes, just it's basically 205 00:12:05,320 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 1: data that's so much and so unwieldy you can't even 206 00:12:09,520 --> 00:12:13,480 Speaker 1: process and search it. It's like not even helpful. It's yeah, 207 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:16,839 Speaker 1: it's like a really bad Internet search. Yeah yeah. Um. 208 00:12:16,920 --> 00:12:22,240 Speaker 1: So the the the current state of search engine design 209 00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:26,960 Speaker 1: or creation is balancing that figuring out how to get 210 00:12:27,120 --> 00:12:31,480 Speaker 1: less superficial without running into the big data problem of 211 00:12:32,120 --> 00:12:37,000 Speaker 1: incoherent data due to just massive amounts of returns. And 212 00:12:37,080 --> 00:12:39,840 Speaker 1: you might think that these search engines do a great 213 00:12:39,880 --> 00:12:41,959 Speaker 1: job because I can always find out what I need. 214 00:12:42,240 --> 00:12:45,320 Speaker 1: But you don't know what you're missing, you know, right, 215 00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:48,640 Speaker 1: So it's it's sort of not even correct to say 216 00:12:48,679 --> 00:12:50,440 Speaker 1: that I always find out what I need. Does you 217 00:12:50,480 --> 00:12:53,280 Speaker 1: meanly know you need it because it's hidden? That's true, 218 00:12:53,280 --> 00:12:57,200 Speaker 1: And I mean you're you're missing quite a bit. Like, uh, okay, 219 00:12:57,240 --> 00:13:03,640 Speaker 1: there's apparently fifty million registered domains on the Internet. Yeah, 220 00:13:03,679 --> 00:13:06,680 Speaker 1: and that's I looked at like just in two thousand twelve, 221 00:13:06,679 --> 00:13:09,000 Speaker 1: I think there're only like two hundred and fifty or something. 222 00:13:09,080 --> 00:13:10,920 Speaker 1: I mean, it seems like it's doubled in the last 223 00:13:10,920 --> 00:13:14,240 Speaker 1: couple of years, right, So there's five million domains for example, 224 00:13:14,240 --> 00:13:16,840 Speaker 1: a lot of more garbage, yes, But how stuff Works 225 00:13:16,880 --> 00:13:20,360 Speaker 1: dot Com is one domain. And I asked Tracy Wilson, 226 00:13:20,679 --> 00:13:23,600 Speaker 1: who's the site director and runs stuff you missed in 227 00:13:23,640 --> 00:13:26,640 Speaker 1: history class. It's one of the co hosts. How many 228 00:13:26,679 --> 00:13:31,360 Speaker 1: pages there are how stuff Works? She said roughly at least, 229 00:13:32,440 --> 00:13:35,760 Speaker 1: so one domain out of five fifty million has fifty 230 00:13:35,760 --> 00:13:39,200 Speaker 1: thou pages itself. Right, so you kind of get an 231 00:13:39,240 --> 00:13:42,839 Speaker 1: idea of the Scalpe deep web is anywhere from four 232 00:13:42,920 --> 00:13:46,600 Speaker 1: hundred to five hundred times bigger than the surface web. 233 00:13:47,400 --> 00:13:49,640 Speaker 1: And like you said, you don't know what you're missing 234 00:13:49,760 --> 00:13:51,839 Speaker 1: because you don't know what's out there because your search 235 00:13:51,840 --> 00:13:55,240 Speaker 1: returns aren't bringing you back anything. Yeah. I mean there's 236 00:13:55,240 --> 00:13:57,040 Speaker 1: a lot of important stuff out there. We talked about 237 00:13:57,080 --> 00:14:02,520 Speaker 1: medical papers. Um, apparently there's engineering database is financial financial information, 238 00:14:02,840 --> 00:14:06,760 Speaker 1: a lot of things that could really help research. Uh, 239 00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:10,280 Speaker 1: but you just can't find it, right, Um, unpublished blog 240 00:14:10,360 --> 00:14:16,800 Speaker 1: posts just basically anything that a person creates on the Internet. Yeah, um, 241 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:20,560 Speaker 1: is if a page is created, it's part of the 242 00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:23,720 Speaker 1: deep web. Yeah. Unless you take this stuff down, it's 243 00:14:23,720 --> 00:14:27,480 Speaker 1: living there forever, just gathering dust exactly. So Um, and 244 00:14:27,520 --> 00:14:32,880 Speaker 1: it's not just necessarily engineering databases or medical information. Um, 245 00:14:32,920 --> 00:14:37,000 Speaker 1: there's also a lot of shady stuff too. The dark web. 246 00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:39,440 Speaker 1: That's the that's the dark web. Yeah, that is the 247 00:14:39,520 --> 00:14:44,440 Speaker 1: dark web. Is when is um these sites intentionally uh 248 00:14:44,880 --> 00:14:47,240 Speaker 1: reroute you. Well, we'll get to how they do it. 249 00:14:47,280 --> 00:14:51,960 Speaker 1: But basically it's an it's an intentional anonymity. Um, it's 250 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:53,560 Speaker 1: not oh, it just happens to be buried on the 251 00:14:53,560 --> 00:14:55,840 Speaker 1: deep web because it's not index it's it is purposely 252 00:14:55,880 --> 00:15:01,040 Speaker 1: hidden from the surface web, so people can't try the 253 00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:06,720 Speaker 1: person searching for something, or the the end uh website. 254 00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 1: I guess like those are all just private essentially, right, 255 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:14,400 Speaker 1: and privacy advocates are way into it. You're not necessarily 256 00:15:14,440 --> 00:15:17,600 Speaker 1: a child pornographer, although there is that a lot of 257 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:20,200 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff on the dark web. Um, there's 258 00:15:20,240 --> 00:15:22,760 Speaker 1: also a lot of good that happens on the dark web. Yeah. 259 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:26,200 Speaker 1: The the anonymity and privacy and the desire for it 260 00:15:26,320 --> 00:15:28,760 Speaker 1: isn't in and of itself proof of wrongdoing, of course, 261 00:15:28,840 --> 00:15:32,240 Speaker 1: not no, which is frequently it's frequently pointed out as that, 262 00:15:32,320 --> 00:15:34,680 Speaker 1: but incorrectly. Yeah, I like, I don't want the n 263 00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:36,280 Speaker 1: s A and my business people like, well, what are 264 00:15:36,280 --> 00:15:38,840 Speaker 1: you doing right? Exactly nothing. Yeah, I just don't want 265 00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:42,600 Speaker 1: them in my business. Yeah. Um, that's an answer. That's 266 00:15:42,720 --> 00:15:45,560 Speaker 1: good enough. That answer is good enough. And for a 267 00:15:45,560 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: lot of people, um, they say, well, then I need 268 00:15:48,080 --> 00:15:51,400 Speaker 1: to go to the dark web to maintain anonymity, um 269 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:55,400 Speaker 1: or higher hit man right to kill Chuck Bryant. That 270 00:15:55,480 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 1: you could do? That's crazy. Um, you could do. There's 271 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:01,320 Speaker 1: a site for a while, Um, I don't know if 272 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 1: you've heard of it or not. It's called Silk Road, Yeah, 273 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:07,080 Speaker 1: which got shut down, and I teach Chuck, I know 274 00:16:07,160 --> 00:16:09,560 Speaker 1: you've heard of it. It's like the most famous dark 275 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:12,920 Speaker 1: website of all time. Yeah. The the Feds busted Um 276 00:16:13,120 --> 00:16:16,760 Speaker 1: Ross Olbrick, who may or may not be dread Pirate Roberts, 277 00:16:17,280 --> 00:16:19,560 Speaker 1: which was the online name that they said he's the 278 00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:22,960 Speaker 1: guy running this, and he is now saying, actually that's 279 00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:26,720 Speaker 1: not me, Um, but all those bitcoins are mine, So 280 00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:30,800 Speaker 1: you can't seize those bitcoins. And there it's in courts now. 281 00:16:30,880 --> 00:16:34,240 Speaker 1: They're trying to determine whether or not it's it counts 282 00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:37,320 Speaker 1: as something that you can seize as an asset from 283 00:16:37,360 --> 00:16:39,440 Speaker 1: a criminal. And they were saying that this is literally 284 00:16:39,680 --> 00:16:42,720 Speaker 1: a case that no court has ever heard before. Yeah, 285 00:16:42,760 --> 00:16:48,760 Speaker 1: they they it's never been questioned whether you could seize cryptocurrency. Yeah, 286 00:16:48,760 --> 00:16:51,160 Speaker 1: and you should listen to our podcast on bitcoins by 287 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:54,160 Speaker 1: the way, from not too many months ago. But it's 288 00:16:54,240 --> 00:16:57,160 Speaker 1: essentially just yeah, encrypted digital currency. And they have a 289 00:16:57,240 --> 00:17:02,720 Speaker 1: really really fascinating, circumstantial case against a brick Um not 290 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:07,840 Speaker 1: just for operating the silk road site. Um, that's where 291 00:17:07,840 --> 00:17:09,640 Speaker 1: you could buy drugs and things by the way, right, 292 00:17:09,680 --> 00:17:12,000 Speaker 1: which being the operator of that in and of itself 293 00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:13,800 Speaker 1: shouldn't be a crime. I'm sure that they would have 294 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:16,440 Speaker 1: prosecuted him for that if they'd been able to get 295 00:17:16,440 --> 00:17:19,760 Speaker 1: their hands on him for just that. But apparently they 296 00:17:19,800 --> 00:17:23,680 Speaker 1: also have him for at least two hired contract killings. 297 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:30,919 Speaker 1: One he he um I guess hired an undercover cop 298 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:34,080 Speaker 1: to do it, and the guy went to the person 299 00:17:34,119 --> 00:17:37,200 Speaker 1: who he was taking the hit out on and said, 300 00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:39,440 Speaker 1: this guy's trying to kill you. I need you to cooperate, 301 00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:42,560 Speaker 1: and I'm going to take pictures of you dead and 302 00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:45,400 Speaker 1: send them to this guy. And Old Brick apparently gave 303 00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:48,879 Speaker 1: him like forty grand up front another forty after he 304 00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:52,520 Speaker 1: saw the photos. So like in bitcoins? No, I think 305 00:17:52,520 --> 00:17:55,160 Speaker 1: in cash, although no, it would have been in bitcoins. 306 00:17:55,160 --> 00:17:57,639 Speaker 1: You're right, yea, yeah, so who knows? It could have 307 00:17:57,680 --> 00:18:01,200 Speaker 1: been two bitcoins at the time or five. Well. Silk 308 00:18:01,280 --> 00:18:04,840 Speaker 1: Row two point oh launched in November. It's out and 309 00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:08,639 Speaker 1: um there are other uh copycatters like the black market 310 00:18:08,720 --> 00:18:11,680 Speaker 1: reloaded and um which that went down for a little 311 00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: while after Silk Road went down, but then it went 312 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:15,680 Speaker 1: back up. I think, yeah, like, I don't know. Man. 313 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:17,760 Speaker 1: I hate to say you shouldn't try and fight crime, 314 00:18:17,840 --> 00:18:20,920 Speaker 1: but you're not going to stop this stuff when one, 315 00:18:21,280 --> 00:18:22,720 Speaker 1: you know, you cut off the head of one and 316 00:18:22,760 --> 00:18:25,320 Speaker 1: another grows right out of it in its place. You know, 317 00:18:26,080 --> 00:18:31,240 Speaker 1: it's true if the structure that's allowing for the anonymity 318 00:18:31,320 --> 00:18:36,160 Speaker 1: can remain intact, which is the dark web, right, But 319 00:18:36,320 --> 00:18:38,360 Speaker 1: it's not just the dark web, it's like how you 320 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:41,320 Speaker 1: traverse the dark web, like using tour. Yeah, I guess 321 00:18:41,359 --> 00:18:44,520 Speaker 1: we haven't explained. UM. The Onion Router t o R 322 00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:47,320 Speaker 1: is what it's called, and it is software that you 323 00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:50,600 Speaker 1: use to access the deep web and the dark Web 324 00:18:50,640 --> 00:18:55,040 Speaker 1: if you choose to UM, and it searches for these 325 00:18:55,080 --> 00:18:57,800 Speaker 1: anonymous sites for you like a search engine, but instead 326 00:18:57,840 --> 00:19:00,840 Speaker 1: of dot com or dot org or net, they end 327 00:19:00,920 --> 00:19:03,600 Speaker 1: in dot onion, right the idea and onion has many 328 00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:08,560 Speaker 1: layers and UM that's that's how you access it through tour. 329 00:19:08,640 --> 00:19:13,360 Speaker 1: You have to buy it install it on your computer. Yeah, 330 00:19:13,400 --> 00:19:17,320 Speaker 1: Firefox had UM something that it was basically a tour bundle. 331 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:19,440 Speaker 1: It was the most popular one and you could download 332 00:19:19,480 --> 00:19:22,760 Speaker 1: it for free. But it's not a web browser itself. 333 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,239 Speaker 1: It's like an add on to a web browser that 334 00:19:25,280 --> 00:19:29,320 Speaker 1: allows anonymity, and it does two things. One, it bounces 335 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,040 Speaker 1: your trail all over the world from server to server, 336 00:19:32,160 --> 00:19:36,040 Speaker 1: so it makes you and your activity extraordinarily difficult to track. 337 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:38,480 Speaker 1: It's not just like this computer went to this site. 338 00:19:39,040 --> 00:19:42,240 Speaker 1: It's like, that's that whole Onion thing. There's so many layers. 339 00:19:42,240 --> 00:19:44,040 Speaker 1: It's like we can't We don't know who this is 340 00:19:44,119 --> 00:19:46,000 Speaker 1: or where they're, where they are, what they're doing, or 341 00:19:46,040 --> 00:19:48,560 Speaker 1: anything like that. We just know right now that this 342 00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,920 Speaker 1: particular person happens to be there's a user on Silk Road, 343 00:19:52,240 --> 00:19:54,119 Speaker 1: but we don't know who it is or anything. You 344 00:19:54,119 --> 00:19:56,720 Speaker 1: can't track them because they're using tour. The other thing 345 00:19:56,800 --> 00:19:59,960 Speaker 1: is that you can't get into dot onion domain site 346 00:20:00,480 --> 00:20:03,960 Speaker 1: dark websites unless you're using tour, Like they won't let 347 00:20:03,960 --> 00:20:07,320 Speaker 1: you in unless you're an anonymous user. Um So tour 348 00:20:07,359 --> 00:20:10,360 Speaker 1: has this kind of twofold thing. But there was recently 349 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:12,439 Speaker 1: a breach in it and it turned out the FBI 350 00:20:12,960 --> 00:20:16,920 Speaker 1: was using malware to break through the anonymity of tour users. 351 00:20:17,320 --> 00:20:19,400 Speaker 1: And yeah, and found out a lot of people on 352 00:20:19,560 --> 00:20:22,359 Speaker 1: some sites that are that were hosted by something called 353 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:27,000 Speaker 1: Freedom Hosting, which apparently had a horrible reputation for being 354 00:20:27,359 --> 00:20:29,960 Speaker 1: the repository on the web, on the dark web for 355 00:20:30,040 --> 00:20:34,240 Speaker 1: child pornography and knowingly like basically just not doing anything 356 00:20:34,240 --> 00:20:40,800 Speaker 1: about it. Um, So the FBI had a They hacked 357 00:20:41,600 --> 00:20:46,080 Speaker 1: the Freedom Hosting servers and inserted this malware. So if 358 00:20:46,119 --> 00:20:48,159 Speaker 1: you went to a Freedom Hosting site, any of them, 359 00:20:48,240 --> 00:20:50,960 Speaker 1: not just necessarily a child pornography, but any site hosted 360 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:53,560 Speaker 1: by Freedom Hosting, which is like say go Daddy for 361 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:58,760 Speaker 1: the dark web, um, you would get this malware package 362 00:20:59,119 --> 00:21:04,879 Speaker 1: that exploited a key hole in Firefox's tore bundle. It 363 00:21:04,960 --> 00:21:08,320 Speaker 1: went into your computer, said hey, give me your mac address, 364 00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:13,919 Speaker 1: which is basically like your computer hardware, like serial numbers 365 00:21:13,960 --> 00:21:18,119 Speaker 1: your computers and your computers a loans tracking number, and 366 00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:21,000 Speaker 1: then also tell me where the computer is, and it 367 00:21:21,119 --> 00:21:24,800 Speaker 1: sent it back to a server, a mystery server in McLean, Virginia. 368 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:27,840 Speaker 1: And finally, after like a month, fb I was like, yeah, 369 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:29,800 Speaker 1: that was us. We got we have everybody who went 370 00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:33,360 Speaker 1: on that site's name and address and everything on them. 371 00:21:33,560 --> 00:21:37,119 Speaker 1: So that's done a huge ripple. And Firefox fixed this loophole, 372 00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:39,600 Speaker 1: but it's done a huge ripple. Through you know, the 373 00:21:39,800 --> 00:21:43,480 Speaker 1: dark web, deep web community saying like whoa, whoa. We 374 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:47,680 Speaker 1: were anonymous before, but you know now it's it's been 375 00:21:47,720 --> 00:21:52,400 Speaker 1: shown definitively that the Feds can find out who we are. 376 00:21:52,520 --> 00:21:56,120 Speaker 1: So the anonymity is reduced, if not taken away, which 377 00:21:56,160 --> 00:21:58,600 Speaker 1: defeats the whole purpose. Yeah, so if you don't have that, 378 00:21:58,640 --> 00:22:00,880 Speaker 1: then you can keep lop the heads off of these things, 379 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:03,440 Speaker 1: and they're not going to grow back because people are afraid. 380 00:22:03,800 --> 00:22:06,480 Speaker 1: People will be afraid because they won't feel like they're 381 00:22:06,480 --> 00:22:10,639 Speaker 1: anonymous any longer. Well, tour has a sort of an 382 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:13,320 Speaker 1: ironic background, which we will get to right after this 383 00:22:13,359 --> 00:22:22,240 Speaker 1: message break. Alright, so we're back and we left you 384 00:22:22,320 --> 00:22:25,200 Speaker 1: with the the nugget that tour has an interesting background, 385 00:22:25,960 --> 00:22:29,000 Speaker 1: and the background of tours actually, the US Naval Research 386 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:33,000 Speaker 1: Laboratory in two thousand three launched this program for political 387 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:36,600 Speaker 1: dissidents and whistleblowers so they can get their message out 388 00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:39,359 Speaker 1: without fear of proprisal. Right, and this is still a 389 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:42,200 Speaker 1: use of tour like the New York Times wiki leaks, 390 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:48,280 Speaker 1: some other news agencies have um tour sites that if 391 00:22:48,320 --> 00:22:50,400 Speaker 1: you want to go and in contact the New York 392 00:22:50,440 --> 00:22:53,600 Speaker 1: Times or wiki leaks anonymously, Like you can go to 393 00:22:53,640 --> 00:22:58,960 Speaker 1: their tour, their onion site and um upload documents or say, hey, 394 00:22:58,760 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 1: I have some informa I want to share and you 395 00:23:01,480 --> 00:23:04,440 Speaker 1: can do it anonymously. So the government, though, is basically 396 00:23:04,520 --> 00:23:08,800 Speaker 1: law enforcements trying to track down criminals using the software 397 00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:11,040 Speaker 1: that the government created to begin with. So it's an 398 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:16,840 Speaker 1: interesting loop. Um, But like we said, it's not all badness. Um, 399 00:23:16,880 --> 00:23:20,760 Speaker 1: if you live in a country where bad things are 400 00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:22,919 Speaker 1: going on and you don't feel safe getting on the 401 00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:26,199 Speaker 1: regular web as a political dissident, you can do so 402 00:23:26,320 --> 00:23:29,359 Speaker 1: on the dark web. But it offers a virtual meeting 403 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:34,040 Speaker 1: place for sometimes people are trying to, you know, combat 404 00:23:34,119 --> 00:23:38,119 Speaker 1: these oppressive regimes in their countries and they can't just 405 00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:41,720 Speaker 1: hop on Facebook and organize a meeting because they'll get 406 00:23:41,720 --> 00:23:45,520 Speaker 1: smacked down. Right if you're a person who values privacy 407 00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:48,919 Speaker 1: for whatever reason or no reason at all, Um, the 408 00:23:49,160 --> 00:23:53,080 Speaker 1: deep web and the dark web offer file sharing services. 409 00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:56,879 Speaker 1: Email is a big one too, Like, I know, I 410 00:23:56,920 --> 00:23:58,919 Speaker 1: can't remember the name of the one Edwards Snowden has 411 00:23:58,960 --> 00:24:01,399 Speaker 1: been using, but I got shut down, like just the 412 00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:04,440 Speaker 1: whole company shutdown. Sorry, you're out of business now because 413 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:08,400 Speaker 1: you're helping Edward Snowden um. But there are other email 414 00:24:08,760 --> 00:24:13,840 Speaker 1: um email services. Basically, everything you have on the web, 415 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:16,879 Speaker 1: if you want to do it anonymously, you have to 416 00:24:16,920 --> 00:24:19,399 Speaker 1: go to a company that operates on the dark web 417 00:24:20,119 --> 00:24:25,160 Speaker 1: that uses tour to to route its information or your information. Yeah. 418 00:24:25,200 --> 00:24:29,000 Speaker 1: The University of Luxembourg did a study where they tried 419 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 1: to rank the most commonly accessed stuff on the dark 420 00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:35,840 Speaker 1: web and sadly what they did find a lot of 421 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:38,960 Speaker 1: things like child pornography. There were also a lot of 422 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:42,720 Speaker 1: UH sites and chat rooms for human rights and freedom 423 00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:47,240 Speaker 1: of information and just people that don't want to type 424 00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:52,320 Speaker 1: in a search for uh how to grow marijuana and 425 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:54,880 Speaker 1: then the next time they go to their Gmail account, 426 00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:59,280 Speaker 1: they're a bunch of ads for grow lights and you're going, huh, 427 00:24:59,480 --> 00:25:03,879 Speaker 1: how that happen? Well, happen because you're searching the surface 428 00:25:03,920 --> 00:25:06,679 Speaker 1: web with an IP that can be traced back to you, 429 00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:09,919 Speaker 1: and not even even illegal activities like that. You know, 430 00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:14,240 Speaker 1: you want to research a fitbit bracelet and then you 431 00:25:14,320 --> 00:25:17,359 Speaker 1: go and they say, hey, Chuck, are you fat? You 432 00:25:17,400 --> 00:25:20,120 Speaker 1: want to lose weight? While else you want to fitbit? 433 00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 1: Why would you want to fit You're definitely creepy. You know, 434 00:25:25,600 --> 00:25:29,359 Speaker 1: there's the big brother effect. I think everyone feels it. Uh, 435 00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:31,719 Speaker 1: there's all there, the existence of the deep web, not 436 00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:34,520 Speaker 1: necessarily the dark web, but just the deep web, all 437 00:25:34,560 --> 00:25:37,480 Speaker 1: of those pages of information that are out there. Some 438 00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:40,159 Speaker 1: companies that figure out how to exploit it, or the 439 00:25:40,160 --> 00:25:44,399 Speaker 1: fact that search engines, normal search engines, aren't doing a 440 00:25:44,400 --> 00:25:46,760 Speaker 1: good job of looking into the deep web. There that 441 00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:50,760 Speaker 1: company bright Planet I mentioned, they have a deep Web harvester, 442 00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:55,760 Speaker 1: which is basically a proprietary search engine algorithm that goes 443 00:25:55,800 --> 00:26:00,720 Speaker 1: into websites and gets everything like it's not it doesn't 444 00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:03,880 Speaker 1: form an index. It grabs every bit of text off 445 00:26:03,880 --> 00:26:07,080 Speaker 1: of every site associated with a U r L. Sounds 446 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:10,639 Speaker 1: like big data. It is, but they're doing it for 447 00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:16,200 Speaker 1: companies like big pharma, big government and saying like, oh, 448 00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:18,160 Speaker 1: you want to know what your competitors up to, Well, 449 00:26:18,240 --> 00:26:22,560 Speaker 1: here's every letter of every word of every strip of 450 00:26:22,640 --> 00:26:27,320 Speaker 1: text on your competitor's website, including all internal stuff everything. 451 00:26:28,600 --> 00:26:32,000 Speaker 1: Please give us ten million dollars for that search. Um. 452 00:26:32,119 --> 00:26:35,760 Speaker 1: There's also this site called Vocative which uses something like 453 00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:39,239 Speaker 1: bright planets deep web harvesting, but it does it for 454 00:26:39,440 --> 00:26:44,000 Speaker 1: journalism purposes and it's basically, rather than searching using Google, 455 00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:47,199 Speaker 1: you or I would for a story idea, they're um 456 00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:50,399 Speaker 1: searching using a deep web harvester to find all this 457 00:26:50,480 --> 00:26:53,200 Speaker 1: other information that we wouldn't be able to find because 458 00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:55,199 Speaker 1: we don't know how to search the deep web and 459 00:26:55,240 --> 00:26:57,600 Speaker 1: writing stories like that, And there's some pretty interesting stuff 460 00:26:57,640 --> 00:27:00,640 Speaker 1: that that sites put together already. When you think about 461 00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:02,639 Speaker 1: if you're only getting if you think the Internet is 462 00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:07,600 Speaker 1: cool and you're only getting point of it, yeah, not bad. 463 00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:10,080 Speaker 1: And you know this is the webs. The surface web 464 00:27:10,119 --> 00:27:13,280 Speaker 1: is getting deeper, the deep web is getting deeper. Search 465 00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:16,840 Speaker 1: engines are searching deeper. It's it's all like and they're 466 00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:21,840 Speaker 1: trying to anonymize more effectively. So it's it's like this 467 00:27:22,359 --> 00:27:25,000 Speaker 1: cyber war is going on. Oh yes, you know that 468 00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:27,240 Speaker 1: was another good one we did. What do we do 469 00:27:27,320 --> 00:27:29,520 Speaker 1: cyber War one? On cyber war you? Yeah, I knew 470 00:27:29,560 --> 00:27:33,200 Speaker 1: I've heard that before, So there you go. I would 471 00:27:33,240 --> 00:27:36,440 Speaker 1: have to say that this is one of those episodes 472 00:27:36,520 --> 00:27:40,639 Speaker 1: where we did it, but it is not done. No, No, 473 00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:43,160 Speaker 1: Sometimes we do them and it's like that's it. There's 474 00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:45,720 Speaker 1: nothing more to say about this topic. Yeah, I'm interested 475 00:27:45,720 --> 00:27:48,400 Speaker 1: to see what happens with Uh with old brick for sure. 476 00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:52,640 Speaker 1: That's that's gonna be a big monument landmark case. You know. Uh, 477 00:27:52,680 --> 00:27:54,520 Speaker 1: if you want to know more about the deep Web, 478 00:27:54,560 --> 00:27:57,760 Speaker 1: you can type deep web into the search engine and 479 00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:01,160 Speaker 1: how stuff works. It'll bring back super fisher results only 480 00:28:01,160 --> 00:28:04,760 Speaker 1: how stuff works stuff. But it's pretty good, so you'll 481 00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:07,760 Speaker 1: be happy. And since I said search bar, that means 482 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:11,960 Speaker 1: it's time for listener mat All right, Josh, I'm gonna 483 00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:15,720 Speaker 1: call this uh birthday shout out that we rarely do. Okay, 484 00:28:16,359 --> 00:28:19,160 Speaker 1: Hey guys, I'm a longtime listener shamelessly writing to ask 485 00:28:19,160 --> 00:28:22,280 Speaker 1: for a huge favor. Here's the sitch. I first became 486 00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:25,840 Speaker 1: aware of your podcast when my last girlfriend, Natalie David 487 00:28:26,480 --> 00:28:28,399 Speaker 1: h introduced me to it when we started dating, and 488 00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:30,520 Speaker 1: I've heard it. Thank for getting hooked as we spent 489 00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:32,480 Speaker 1: a lot of time listening to your show and learning together. 490 00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:35,200 Speaker 1: As huge supporters of your podcast, we were compelled last 491 00:28:35,240 --> 00:28:37,239 Speaker 1: year to make the trip up from Virginia to New 492 00:28:37,320 --> 00:28:39,960 Speaker 1: York when you were putting on your Tribuae night and 493 00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:42,400 Speaker 1: Natalie is the one who gave us the mics on 494 00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:45,800 Speaker 1: pants off T shirts and David her boyfriend. They were 495 00:28:45,840 --> 00:28:48,880 Speaker 1: super cool, super nice. They sat at the table right 496 00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:51,480 Speaker 1: near us, so I uh, you know, got to know 497 00:28:51,560 --> 00:28:55,960 Speaker 1: him a little bit. And um, he says. Anyhow, here's 498 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:58,320 Speaker 1: where the favor comes in. She moved to Shanghai, China 499 00:28:58,800 --> 00:29:03,040 Speaker 1: to teach, and she's teaching little kids English, and sadly 500 00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,640 Speaker 1: they you know, separated when she moved over there. Uh, 501 00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 1: which to me are always like the saddest breakups, right, like, 502 00:29:11,680 --> 00:29:15,480 Speaker 1: there's nothing wrong to China. So they just thought it 503 00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:18,200 Speaker 1: was probably the thing to do. But they um. Because 504 00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:20,120 Speaker 1: I inquired back to David, emailed them about this and 505 00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:22,400 Speaker 1: it's like, oh, no, you guys broke up and he said, yeah, 506 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:24,160 Speaker 1: but we still really support each other and care about 507 00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:26,840 Speaker 1: each other, and hopefully our pass across again one day. 508 00:29:26,960 --> 00:29:30,360 Speaker 1: So anyway, Natalie David is in China, and because of 509 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:32,120 Speaker 1: this distance, I was at a loss when considering what 510 00:29:32,200 --> 00:29:35,360 Speaker 1: to get her. He made a donation to Cooperative for 511 00:29:35,480 --> 00:29:37,760 Speaker 1: Education in her name. And I know you guys like 512 00:29:37,800 --> 00:29:39,640 Speaker 1: to read those names of people who contribute, but in 513 00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:41,760 Speaker 1: this case, I was hoping you would just do a 514 00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:44,720 Speaker 1: little something more special by wishing her happy birthday. So 515 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:48,560 Speaker 1: in January, which I think should be very soon, Natalie 516 00:29:48,640 --> 00:29:51,280 Speaker 1: Happy birthday. Yeah, happy birthday. We remember you. I wear 517 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:53,680 Speaker 1: that shirt all the time. Oh, I think it's funny. 518 00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:57,240 Speaker 1: And uh, I hope you're doing well in China. And 519 00:29:57,960 --> 00:30:01,240 Speaker 1: don't give up on David just because he's here in 520 00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:07,360 Speaker 1: stupid United States. Her new Chinese boyfriends like what that guy? Wait? 521 00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:10,479 Speaker 1: Rewind that? So um Anyway, I hope you're doing well 522 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:12,600 Speaker 1: over there in China, and thanks again for all the support. 523 00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:14,800 Speaker 1: And I hope you guys. I hope your pass across 524 00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:16,640 Speaker 1: again one day. It was very nice that it's from 525 00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:21,920 Speaker 1: David Austin Bury. If you have a special request for 526 00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:25,800 Speaker 1: Chucker Me or us, you can tweet to us at 527 00:30:25,960 --> 00:30:28,200 Speaker 1: s Y s K podcast. You can join us on 528 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:30,920 Speaker 1: Facebook dot com, slash Stuff you Should Know. You can 529 00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:34,720 Speaker 1: send us an email to Stuff Podcast at Discovery dot com, 530 00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:37,800 Speaker 1: and you can as always join us at our home 531 00:30:37,840 --> 00:30:45,640 Speaker 1: on the web. Stuff you Should Know dot com for 532 00:30:45,720 --> 00:30:48,040 Speaker 1: more on this and thousands of other topics. Does it 533 00:30:48,120 --> 00:30:57,600 Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com. This episode of Stuff you 534 00:30:57,600 --> 00:31:00,000 Speaker 1: Should Know is brought to you by Linda dot Com. 535 00:31:00,040 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: Linda dot com offers thousands of engaging, easy to follow 536 00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:06,920 Speaker 1: video tutorials taught by industry experts to help you learn software, 537 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:10,080 Speaker 1: creative and business skills. Membership starts at twenty five dollars 538 00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:13,680 Speaker 1: a month and provides unlimited seven access tri Linda dot 539 00:31:13,680 --> 00:31:16,400 Speaker 1: com free for seven days by visiting Linda dot com 540 00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:17,760 Speaker 1: slash s y s k