1 00:00:00,400 --> 00:00:05,720 Speaker 1: Well, well, well, uh, Matt, we're going back to the 2 00:00:05,720 --> 00:00:10,520 Speaker 1: the National Security Agency. Do you remember when when did 3 00:00:10,560 --> 00:00:16,400 Speaker 1: we do this one? This is early, early, and uh man, 4 00:00:16,560 --> 00:00:18,279 Speaker 1: we learned a lot about the n s A, what 5 00:00:18,440 --> 00:00:21,280 Speaker 1: they could do that we were unaware of, and then 6 00:00:21,320 --> 00:00:23,840 Speaker 1: we're made it was made known to us, and we 7 00:00:23,920 --> 00:00:26,440 Speaker 1: don't think about the n s A that often anymore, 8 00:00:26,720 --> 00:00:30,160 Speaker 1: I think in the zeitgeist of it all right, Yeah, 9 00:00:30,240 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 1: for a lot of people, in SA means no strings attached, 10 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:39,040 Speaker 1: but the National Security Agency attaches a lot of strings, 11 00:00:39,400 --> 00:00:43,640 Speaker 1: as it turns out. So in this week's classic episode, 12 00:00:44,479 --> 00:00:49,040 Speaker 1: Matt and I are diving into the fact and the 13 00:00:49,080 --> 00:00:53,519 Speaker 1: fiction surrounding the n s A, as well as a 14 00:00:53,600 --> 00:00:57,200 Speaker 1: good dose of frightening conspiracy about them. I would say 15 00:00:57,320 --> 00:01:00,760 Speaker 1: I was. I was a little shook. Yeah, yeah, I 16 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:04,360 Speaker 1: think we all should be. So get prepared for that. 17 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:07,560 Speaker 1: Put on your thunder shirts if you've got them, and 18 00:01:07,959 --> 00:01:13,280 Speaker 1: let's jump in from UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. 19 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:17,240 Speaker 1: History is riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back 20 00:01:17,319 --> 00:01:35,199 Speaker 1: now or learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Hello, 21 00:01:35,240 --> 00:01:37,720 Speaker 1: and welcome back to the show. My name is My 22 00:01:37,840 --> 00:01:41,279 Speaker 1: name is Noel I'm Ben, and we want to start 23 00:01:41,319 --> 00:01:45,240 Speaker 1: this in a little bit of a different format today. 24 00:01:45,520 --> 00:01:47,880 Speaker 1: At the very top of the show, ladies and gentlemen, 25 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:51,680 Speaker 1: we have a very important correction. Can you guess what 26 00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:56,440 Speaker 1: it is. It's a single vocabulary word. It is. It's 27 00:01:56,480 --> 00:02:01,760 Speaker 1: a very important one too, five syllables m. It is 28 00:02:01,840 --> 00:02:05,640 Speaker 1: not in fact pre lapse sarian. That means before the flood. 29 00:02:05,680 --> 00:02:09,960 Speaker 1: That's a different word. It's anti Deluvian. Pre lapse arian 30 00:02:10,040 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 1: means before the fall, and you know, in other words, 31 00:02:13,000 --> 00:02:16,960 Speaker 1: before the fall of Lucifer and the various rebellious angels 32 00:02:16,960 --> 00:02:20,120 Speaker 1: in biblical war. Thank you to everyone who wrote in. 33 00:02:20,240 --> 00:02:23,120 Speaker 1: This was on me. This is just on me, guys, 34 00:02:23,160 --> 00:02:25,800 Speaker 1: not on maternal and I'm grateful for everyone who wrote 35 00:02:25,800 --> 00:02:27,840 Speaker 1: in to help me out with this. Dufe I caught 36 00:02:27,880 --> 00:02:30,919 Speaker 1: it too late, as we were, as we were quean 37 00:02:31,000 --> 00:02:34,520 Speaker 1: and stuff and and we Matt Nolan. I often like 38 00:02:34,639 --> 00:02:38,040 Speaker 1: to point out that you, our listeners, not a general 39 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:41,840 Speaker 1: you specifically, you are not just as much of a 40 00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:43,760 Speaker 1: part of this show as we are. You are the 41 00:02:43,800 --> 00:02:46,360 Speaker 1: most important part of the show, and we all of 42 00:02:46,440 --> 00:02:49,720 Speaker 1: us are incredibly lucky to have you here, specifically you 43 00:02:50,040 --> 00:02:52,760 Speaker 1: helping us make this show the best thing you can be, 44 00:02:53,000 --> 00:02:55,160 Speaker 1: just a little peek behind the curtain que a ng 45 00:02:55,240 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 1: as when we we all listened to the edit to 46 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:00,959 Speaker 1: make sure that NOL didn't miss anything and any goofs. 47 00:03:01,200 --> 00:03:03,640 Speaker 1: So you know, there are layers of of of a 48 00:03:03,680 --> 00:03:06,200 Speaker 1: blame to go around, and I am first to admit 49 00:03:06,280 --> 00:03:10,160 Speaker 1: my part in this. Um. I was gonna say, if 50 00:03:10,200 --> 00:03:12,639 Speaker 1: you'll only knew how many things get through my watch, 51 00:03:13,480 --> 00:03:15,359 Speaker 1: uh Latin prize, that I let a lot of things 52 00:03:15,360 --> 00:03:17,560 Speaker 1: get through Matt. So well, yeah, that's what I'm saying 53 00:03:17,919 --> 00:03:22,000 Speaker 1: all the time. It's not your fault. Fault you have 54 00:03:22,040 --> 00:03:25,639 Speaker 1: to edit while you're recording. No, that's not true. Well okay, 55 00:03:25,800 --> 00:03:30,079 Speaker 1: it's always true. We're taking all this out. Oh, let's 56 00:03:30,120 --> 00:03:33,119 Speaker 1: keep it in. Uh the point the point being here 57 00:03:33,280 --> 00:03:36,280 Speaker 1: is that you keep us honest. We try our best, 58 00:03:36,320 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 1: and I personally rely on you to help us stay accurate. 59 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:43,040 Speaker 1: We Matt, Noel and I and you are accountable to 60 00:03:43,160 --> 00:03:46,360 Speaker 1: each other. So thank you to everyone who wrote in. 61 00:03:46,440 --> 00:03:50,520 Speaker 1: We appreciate it immensely. And everybody was so like, very 62 00:03:50,600 --> 00:03:54,560 Speaker 1: supportive too, you know, and that even more so I 63 00:03:54,600 --> 00:03:56,640 Speaker 1: appreciate you. I love that they took that tone of 64 00:03:56,720 --> 00:04:01,480 Speaker 1: like you poor idiots less you're a little hearts mixing 65 00:04:01,560 --> 00:04:03,960 Speaker 1: up words. I thought y'all have the best words. It 66 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:07,840 Speaker 1: turns out you did not. Every one of those emails 67 00:04:07,880 --> 00:04:11,640 Speaker 1: we read in that little Southern lady voice, just so 68 00:04:11,720 --> 00:04:13,320 Speaker 1: you all know that's how you sound to us, no 69 00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:16,520 Speaker 1: matter who you are. We have a list of words 70 00:04:16,560 --> 00:04:19,360 Speaker 1: we say to ourselves before we read the email to 71 00:04:19,360 --> 00:04:25,240 Speaker 1: help us getting that genteel southern approach. A delicious mint up, 72 00:04:27,080 --> 00:04:31,560 Speaker 1: oh good gravy you are? You are mixing up some 73 00:04:32,240 --> 00:04:34,279 Speaker 1: sense there. That's how I do it, though you have to. 74 00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:37,039 Speaker 1: You have to let them kind of combine together. We 75 00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:39,400 Speaker 1: like to have fun. Yeah, and you're an award winning 76 00:04:39,400 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 1: method actor, so you really live in the characters you know. Actually, 77 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:44,440 Speaker 1: as it turns out, today we're talking about an entire 78 00:04:44,520 --> 00:04:48,080 Speaker 1: agency staffed with award winning method actors. And we're not 79 00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:52,480 Speaker 1: talking about the studio audience of inside the actor's studio, right, 80 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:56,080 Speaker 1: So let's explore today we're talking about a much much 81 00:04:56,160 --> 00:05:00,080 Speaker 1: more powerful group, one that affects your life again and 82 00:05:00,400 --> 00:05:05,040 Speaker 1: specifically you, in profound, immense, and often invisible ways. It's 83 00:05:05,040 --> 00:05:08,359 Speaker 1: an organization that you support, that you pay for with 84 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:11,159 Speaker 1: a percentage of every paycheck you receive if you are 85 00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:14,760 Speaker 1: an American citizen or heck, even a resident, a group 86 00:05:14,800 --> 00:05:18,520 Speaker 1: that may know almost everything about you, A group that 87 00:05:18,720 --> 00:05:23,760 Speaker 1: is not, unlike this show, accountable to you, even if 88 00:05:23,760 --> 00:05:26,000 Speaker 1: you're one of the people paying for it. And you've 89 00:05:26,040 --> 00:05:29,479 Speaker 1: probably heard the name of this group before, the n 90 00:05:29,839 --> 00:05:33,720 Speaker 1: s A or National Security Agency. It sounds so nice. 91 00:05:33,800 --> 00:05:36,560 Speaker 1: Who doesn't want to be secure today? Whether you live 92 00:05:36,560 --> 00:05:39,240 Speaker 1: in a foreign country or the good old US of A. 93 00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:43,320 Speaker 1: We guarantee this organization may know an immense amount of 94 00:05:43,360 --> 00:05:46,480 Speaker 1: stuff about you, and it probably has dirt on numerous 95 00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:52,920 Speaker 1: government officials as well. So how did we get here? Well, 96 00:05:52,960 --> 00:05:55,240 Speaker 1: let's take a look at the history. So while the 97 00:05:55,320 --> 00:05:58,680 Speaker 1: n s A was officially founded on November four, nineteen 98 00:05:58,839 --> 00:06:02,560 Speaker 1: fifty four, it's roots go much much further back, all 99 00:06:02,600 --> 00:06:06,600 Speaker 1: the way to nineteen seventeen, and that's when a man 100 00:06:06,720 --> 00:06:10,320 Speaker 1: named Herbert oh Yardley became the head of this newly 101 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:15,440 Speaker 1: creative thing called the Cipher Bureau of Military Intelligence, which 102 00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:17,880 Speaker 1: it's just a wonderful name. I feel like we should 103 00:06:17,880 --> 00:06:20,920 Speaker 1: have stayed with that the entire way through. People get 104 00:06:20,960 --> 00:06:23,240 Speaker 1: cyber and cipher mixed up. Now, Oh yeah, I guess 105 00:06:23,240 --> 00:06:26,200 Speaker 1: it's true. But cipher bureau, cipher bureau. It's in a a 106 00:06:26,360 --> 00:06:28,760 Speaker 1: comic book. It does sound like a comic book. It's 107 00:06:28,839 --> 00:06:32,680 Speaker 1: very hell boy. So this was just three months or 108 00:06:32,680 --> 00:06:36,640 Speaker 1: so after the United States had declared war on Germany. 109 00:06:36,760 --> 00:06:39,320 Speaker 1: One of the major factors that brought the US into 110 00:06:39,320 --> 00:06:42,440 Speaker 1: the war was a thing called the Zimmerman Telegram. And 111 00:06:42,480 --> 00:06:45,720 Speaker 1: that's a situation where the Foreign Secretary of Germany tried 112 00:06:45,760 --> 00:06:50,320 Speaker 1: to get Mexico to enter into war against the United States, 113 00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:54,680 Speaker 1: but British codebreakers intercepted the message and they told their 114 00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:57,520 Speaker 1: friends in the US. You know, they said, oh, the 115 00:06:57,640 --> 00:07:01,640 Speaker 1: Yanks should probably hear of this, which is apparently how 116 00:07:01,640 --> 00:07:06,000 Speaker 1: they sound. Uh and uh. The government finally acknowledged the 117 00:07:06,080 --> 00:07:11,800 Speaker 1: US government acknowledged the value of what is called signals intelligences. 118 00:07:12,240 --> 00:07:14,080 Speaker 1: By the way, we're speaking about World War One there 119 00:07:14,240 --> 00:07:16,880 Speaker 1: when talking about going to where with Germany? Yes, yes, 120 00:07:18,080 --> 00:07:21,320 Speaker 1: so signals intelligence. We're we've all seem spy movies were 121 00:07:21,320 --> 00:07:25,320 Speaker 1: familiar with the idea of intelligence, which in some cases 122 00:07:25,360 --> 00:07:29,000 Speaker 1: may seem paradoxical. According to the Office of the Director 123 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:34,040 Speaker 1: of National Intelligence, there's six types of intelligence sources, or 124 00:07:34,080 --> 00:07:37,960 Speaker 1: what they call collection disciplines. Now a list these off 125 00:07:38,040 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: along with their shorthand sort of an acronym I guess um, 126 00:07:42,400 --> 00:07:45,120 Speaker 1: not quite an acronym now, just shorthand, that's better. So 127 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:48,080 Speaker 1: first we have imagery intelligence, which is I'm going to 128 00:07:48,160 --> 00:07:51,640 Speaker 1: pronounce it, I meant, but I think immant maybe I 129 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:55,320 Speaker 1: don't know. Uh. Then we have measurement and signature intelligent 130 00:07:55,560 --> 00:08:00,520 Speaker 1: or massens. Next we have human source intelligence or human 131 00:08:01,800 --> 00:08:05,600 Speaker 1: Then we have open source intelligent O SENT and geo 132 00:08:05,840 --> 00:08:10,480 Speaker 1: spatial intelligence g O. And then the first two that 133 00:08:10,520 --> 00:08:17,360 Speaker 1: we mentioned communications intelligent comment uh no comment and electronic 134 00:08:17,400 --> 00:08:23,800 Speaker 1: intelligence ellent ellent perhaps. And then we have foreign instrumentation 135 00:08:24,080 --> 00:08:30,960 Speaker 1: signals intelligent my personal favorite fisent yes. And those those 136 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:34,800 Speaker 1: three comment, ellent, and fificent are all under the umbrella 137 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:39,760 Speaker 1: of SIGAN signals intelligence, and that essentially just means the 138 00:08:39,840 --> 00:08:45,000 Speaker 1: interception from signals, whether there would be electronic communication, maybe 139 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:51,520 Speaker 1: short wave radio interceptions all around the world, foreign and domestic, 140 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:55,160 Speaker 1: and SIGANT can be any of those three things on 141 00:08:55,200 --> 00:08:59,319 Speaker 1: their own, or a combination of any any of those three. 142 00:08:59,480 --> 00:09:03,280 Speaker 1: Is there communication occurring via a signal, we need to 143 00:09:03,280 --> 00:09:06,920 Speaker 1: hear it, right, And so these other things that these 144 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:10,080 Speaker 1: other things were mentioning like human source intelligence is what 145 00:09:10,120 --> 00:09:11,880 Speaker 1: a lot of people think of when they think of 146 00:09:11,920 --> 00:09:15,920 Speaker 1: spy movies, you know what I mean, Like Noel goes 147 00:09:16,040 --> 00:09:18,320 Speaker 1: and sits on a park bench at twelve oh three, 148 00:09:18,679 --> 00:09:21,560 Speaker 1: someone sits with their back to them and says, you know, 149 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:24,719 Speaker 1: the proper code phrase, which what would that mean? That 150 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:34,520 Speaker 1: the cranberry sauce was quite fragrant last afternoon, it was, indeed, 151 00:09:36,360 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 1: and they like, yeah, they just agreed in that in 152 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:43,880 Speaker 1: that kind of human environment, you know, who knows, they 153 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:48,160 Speaker 1: may be just agreed to an arms deal. Sauce is 154 00:09:48,200 --> 00:09:52,120 Speaker 1: the target. Yeah, and the fragrancy, like the amount of 155 00:09:52,640 --> 00:09:56,280 Speaker 1: that's that's the state of the the condition that's like, 156 00:09:56,480 --> 00:09:59,920 Speaker 1: you know, conducive to doing the deal. That is the 157 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:03,760 Speaker 1: affirmative of the target is prepped and ready for interception. 158 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:07,440 Speaker 1: We're all just pulling this out of our ears. But 159 00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:11,920 Speaker 1: also pretty frequent. Yeah, totally, you guys. I actually had 160 00:10:12,040 --> 00:10:16,679 Speaker 1: the uh, the pleasure of UM going to the International 161 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:21,640 Speaker 1: Spy Museum in Washington, d C. This past weekend. Yeah, 162 00:10:21,720 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 1: they had a whole section with UM all of these 163 00:10:25,360 --> 00:10:30,800 Speaker 1: amazing like iterations of various intelligence gathering devices. You know, 164 00:10:31,080 --> 00:10:33,760 Speaker 1: A main one being tape recorders. And it never never 165 00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:36,520 Speaker 1: really occurred to me that like the same companies that 166 00:10:36,640 --> 00:10:40,000 Speaker 1: make tape machines now still they use in the film 167 00:10:40,280 --> 00:10:42,520 Speaker 1: and you know that have now got versions that are 168 00:10:42,679 --> 00:10:46,840 Speaker 1: electronic digital. Rather are the ones who made the best 169 00:10:47,400 --> 00:10:50,199 Speaker 1: tape machines that they would use conceal and they got 170 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:52,640 Speaker 1: progressively smaller and smaller. The first ones that would be 171 00:10:52,679 --> 00:10:54,920 Speaker 1: like these, you know, about the size of a laptop, 172 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:56,959 Speaker 1: but obviously much thicker, and you would have to put 173 00:10:56,960 --> 00:11:00,200 Speaker 1: it inside a big giant suitcase to be that guy 174 00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:01,880 Speaker 1: on the park bench. And then they would have a 175 00:11:01,960 --> 00:11:04,920 Speaker 1: little wire that would run up a coat and through 176 00:11:04,960 --> 00:11:06,959 Speaker 1: your sleeve, and that would be the remote control, a 177 00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:09,600 Speaker 1: little clickie button to stop and start the recording, and 178 00:11:09,640 --> 00:11:13,240 Speaker 1: then the microphone would often be picked up into a wristwatch, 179 00:11:13,559 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: so the wrist watch would have the mic in it, 180 00:11:15,559 --> 00:11:17,240 Speaker 1: and the cord would have to go all the way 181 00:11:17,320 --> 00:11:20,000 Speaker 1: up from the suitcase through your coat, down around and 182 00:11:20,120 --> 00:11:22,800 Speaker 1: up your sleeve and then plug into your wristwatch. You know, obviously, 183 00:11:23,520 --> 00:11:28,360 Speaker 1: just consumer electronics nowadays are much more concealable and higher 184 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:31,000 Speaker 1: quality than that um but it was fascinating to see 185 00:11:31,040 --> 00:11:35,360 Speaker 1: the way they progressed to these tiny, um little they 186 00:11:35,360 --> 00:11:39,120 Speaker 1: almost looked like microcassette recorders, but they still are ultimately 187 00:11:39,160 --> 00:11:42,680 Speaker 1: real to real um what's the name of Nagar. Nagra 188 00:11:42,880 --> 00:11:44,880 Speaker 1: was a company and they they're still around. In fact, 189 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:49,560 Speaker 1: they make really really high end um field recording devices 190 00:11:49,559 --> 00:11:53,360 Speaker 1: that are used in film and television, um, you know recording. 191 00:11:53,600 --> 00:11:55,719 Speaker 1: So that was super cool, Uh, not to go too 192 00:11:55,720 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 1: far off track, but that they had a whole section 193 00:11:57,440 --> 00:12:00,440 Speaker 1: with like concealed weapons, one of which is like an 194 00:12:00,559 --> 00:12:03,560 Speaker 1: umbrella that you could shoot a poisoned dart out of 195 00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:06,160 Speaker 1: by like you know, doing the umbrella mechanism, and it 196 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:08,360 Speaker 1: kind of had a cross section of it. But super 197 00:12:08,360 --> 00:12:11,040 Speaker 1: super fun. Uh you know. I was in d C 198 00:12:11,280 --> 00:12:13,960 Speaker 1: for another show that I work on, and I was 199 00:12:14,040 --> 00:12:17,040 Speaker 1: there the day of the inauguration and walked around the 200 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:20,760 Speaker 1: National Mall by myself and actually posted some a couple 201 00:12:20,760 --> 00:12:23,520 Speaker 1: of good creepy picks on the stuff they don't want 202 00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:25,559 Speaker 1: you to know Instagram accounts if you want to check 203 00:12:25,600 --> 00:12:29,160 Speaker 1: those out. Conspiracy stuff show, conspiracy stuff show. Um. But 204 00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:32,880 Speaker 1: let's get back to uh intel. Ah, yes, and we 205 00:12:33,120 --> 00:12:34,920 Speaker 1: I'd love to go to that museum in person. It 206 00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:36,800 Speaker 1: was really really net I recommended anyone that's in the 207 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:39,360 Speaker 1: DC area. It's right by the Gordon beersch so you 208 00:12:39,360 --> 00:12:41,120 Speaker 1: can go over there and get you a sausage platter 209 00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:45,240 Speaker 1: and then check out some some you know spycraft, and 210 00:12:45,360 --> 00:12:48,120 Speaker 1: also check out our interview with Robert Mazer where he 211 00:12:48,520 --> 00:12:52,600 Speaker 1: discusses his whole setup that yeah, similar that you're describing 212 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:57,040 Speaker 1: with a big tape recorder inside a briefly previous audio podcast. 213 00:12:57,120 --> 00:13:01,760 Speaker 1: And while we're talking about his jury, let's go back 214 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:05,480 Speaker 1: to in nineteen nineteen when the war ended, the cipher 215 00:13:05,559 --> 00:13:09,440 Speaker 1: bureau moved all the way up to New York City. 216 00:13:09,679 --> 00:13:12,720 Speaker 1: I've always am going to remember that salsa commercial whenever 217 00:13:12,760 --> 00:13:16,120 Speaker 1: I say New York City. Every time advertising is in cities, 218 00:13:16,200 --> 00:13:19,800 Speaker 1: New York City and they shift us very forceful. It's 219 00:13:19,840 --> 00:13:22,520 Speaker 1: much more of a New York City. Oh, I guess 220 00:13:22,520 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 1: you're right. I thought they got angry, like you got 221 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:26,559 Speaker 1: more and more angry. It depends on which it was 222 00:13:26,600 --> 00:13:33,840 Speaker 1: a very successful act content. If you ever feel like 223 00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:37,600 Speaker 1: wasting your time on YouTube, go check those out, and 224 00:13:37,600 --> 00:13:41,320 Speaker 1: then also stay for that Egyptian panda commercial for cheese. 225 00:13:41,480 --> 00:13:44,760 Speaker 1: That's my favorite that has nothing to do with the 226 00:13:44,800 --> 00:13:49,280 Speaker 1: cipher Bureau because in nineteen twenty two, uh, they had 227 00:13:49,320 --> 00:13:54,440 Speaker 1: shifted from twenty two from military intelligence where the tanks 228 00:13:54,440 --> 00:13:58,280 Speaker 1: were the planes, to diplomatic intelligence. In twenty two they 229 00:13:58,320 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 1: prove their worth because they served they intercepted Japanese communications 230 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:09,599 Speaker 1: that helped American diplomats negotiate with Japan on naval arms limitations. 231 00:14:10,640 --> 00:14:13,520 Speaker 1: But the thing was, even at this point, the Cipher 232 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:17,800 Speaker 1: bureaus methods were always questionable, and if the public had 233 00:14:17,800 --> 00:14:21,360 Speaker 1: been more aware, they probably would have noticed that these 234 00:14:21,440 --> 00:14:26,800 Speaker 1: are technically illegal, or you know, everything the public knows 235 00:14:26,840 --> 00:14:31,120 Speaker 1: would indicate these are illegal. And we've heard a lot 236 00:14:31,160 --> 00:14:33,640 Speaker 1: of let me just paint this picture and tell me 237 00:14:33,640 --> 00:14:36,880 Speaker 1: if this sounds familiar. The Cipher Bureau, working for the 238 00:14:36,880 --> 00:14:41,560 Speaker 1: federal government, made a deal with private telegraph companies, you know, 239 00:14:41,680 --> 00:14:44,360 Speaker 1: Western Union and the like, and these companies gave the 240 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:49,480 Speaker 1: Cipher Bureau unprecedented access the messages entering and exiting the 241 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:54,720 Speaker 1: United States, all telegrams, and the Secretary of State Henry 242 00:14:54,720 --> 00:15:00,600 Speaker 1: Stimpson closed the agency and he thought he had some 243 00:15:00,640 --> 00:15:05,080 Speaker 1: moral issues with the increasing surveillance. But then also it's 244 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:09,960 Speaker 1: pretty expensive at that time to pay off these companies, right, 245 00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:12,120 Speaker 1: even if they are making what they feel as a 246 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:16,760 Speaker 1: patriotic decision, and to have the just the people power 247 00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:20,320 Speaker 1: to double or you know, copy every single message that 248 00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:24,560 Speaker 1: goes in or out of their systems, read every telegram. Ultimately, 249 00:15:25,920 --> 00:15:32,000 Speaker 1: the Hoover administration wouldn't see the need for peacetime surveillance, 250 00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:35,920 Speaker 1: like why do we have this if there's not a war, 251 00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:39,160 Speaker 1: why are we monitoring this and we don't have any 252 00:15:39,200 --> 00:15:42,200 Speaker 1: active enemies? Then why are we wasting all his money? 253 00:15:42,360 --> 00:15:44,560 Speaker 1: And it's seductive to have that much power, you know, 254 00:15:44,640 --> 00:15:47,160 Speaker 1: So we'd like to think they saw the danger of 255 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:54,200 Speaker 1: this agency monitoring all citizens and peacetime. After the end 256 00:15:54,240 --> 00:15:59,520 Speaker 1: of the cyber Bureau, cipher bureauf every time, I'm just 257 00:15:59,560 --> 00:16:03,800 Speaker 1: gonna call the cyberman with cyber is tough cyber and stuff. 258 00:16:04,960 --> 00:16:10,120 Speaker 1: After after the end of that era, Yardly, the man 259 00:16:10,160 --> 00:16:13,080 Speaker 1: we mentioned at the beginning was not only out of 260 00:16:13,080 --> 00:16:16,760 Speaker 1: a job, he was very, very bitter and a nineteen 261 00:16:16,880 --> 00:16:20,320 Speaker 1: thirty one he published a book called The American Black Chamber, 262 00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:22,600 Speaker 1: and this was the first time that much of the 263 00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:27,120 Speaker 1: public knew the activities and exploits of the Bureau. The 264 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:32,160 Speaker 1: Saturday Evening Post published an excerpt, and the thing is 265 00:16:32,200 --> 00:16:37,000 Speaker 1: not only was the public and Saturday Evening Post readership 266 00:16:37,680 --> 00:16:43,240 Speaker 1: astounded and no small part, uh terror terrified. The intelligence 267 00:16:43,280 --> 00:16:50,960 Speaker 1: community was also having a gigantic WTF moment. So the 268 00:16:50,960 --> 00:16:56,120 Speaker 1: founding father of American surveillance in many ways, you'll you'll 269 00:16:56,160 --> 00:16:58,880 Speaker 1: hear this quote around I was gonna say, around town, 270 00:16:58,880 --> 00:17:01,240 Speaker 1: you'll hear this quote around the topic. The founding father 271 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:06,320 Speaker 1: of American surveillance also became its first trader. Now, by 272 00:17:06,320 --> 00:17:08,560 Speaker 1: the time you published this book, it was already out 273 00:17:08,600 --> 00:17:12,840 Speaker 1: of date on American spy programs. That's because five months 274 00:17:12,840 --> 00:17:16,159 Speaker 1: before the end of the Cipher Bureau, before they closed 275 00:17:16,200 --> 00:17:20,240 Speaker 1: it down back in May of nine, the United States 276 00:17:20,320 --> 00:17:22,400 Speaker 1: Army decided that it was going to start up its 277 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:26,000 Speaker 1: own version of an agency of this sort, its own independent, 278 00:17:26,800 --> 00:17:31,080 Speaker 1: let's say, State Department spy agency. So, uh, it's own 279 00:17:31,119 --> 00:17:35,639 Speaker 1: military intelligence instead of diplomatic. Yes, And in nineteen thirty 280 00:17:35,680 --> 00:17:40,200 Speaker 1: William Friedman began building this thing called the Signal Intelligence 281 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:46,040 Speaker 1: Service or SIS. SIS. It's a sweeter name, not quite 282 00:17:46,119 --> 00:17:50,359 Speaker 1: as you know comic bookie as the Cipher Bureau. But 283 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:52,639 Speaker 1: it's okay, well, we'll we'll roll with it. So it's 284 00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:58,159 Speaker 1: unclear really to what extent the end of the Cipher Bureau. Um, 285 00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:01,199 Speaker 1: like how that when it into the birth of this 286 00:18:01,280 --> 00:18:04,800 Speaker 1: new agency, Like because it ended, was this one created 287 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:08,280 Speaker 1: or was this one created? Uh? And that one killed 288 00:18:08,320 --> 00:18:11,119 Speaker 1: off simultaneously? Like was that the thinking? Well, you know, 289 00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:14,960 Speaker 1: every new beginning comes from some other beginnings. And man, 290 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:17,520 Speaker 1: it's a window. A door was closed. The window was opened. 291 00:18:19,440 --> 00:18:23,240 Speaker 1: But in October nineteen twenty nine, Freedman did go to 292 00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:26,240 Speaker 1: New York and obtain all of the files of the 293 00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:30,760 Speaker 1: Cipher Bureau. So whether or not they were related bureaucratically 294 00:18:31,240 --> 00:18:38,560 Speaker 1: in terms of archives and contents, they were even more comprehensive. Wait, 295 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:40,399 Speaker 1: so he was he sent or was he just like 296 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:43,120 Speaker 1: unilaterally like I'm gonna have that give me those files. 297 00:18:43,480 --> 00:18:45,800 Speaker 1: I'm gonna do whatever I want to have to be sent. 298 00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:50,000 Speaker 1: I mean that the power of the Cipher Bureaus library 299 00:18:50,200 --> 00:18:52,920 Speaker 1: at that point is pretty significant. Think it makes so 300 00:18:53,000 --> 00:18:55,639 Speaker 1: much sense you you have to It's It's kind of 301 00:18:55,680 --> 00:18:59,359 Speaker 1: like in our Human Experimentation episodes, we discuss how it 302 00:18:59,480 --> 00:19:02,679 Speaker 1: is scary and terrible the way some of that information 303 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:06,280 Speaker 1: is obtained and the way the experiments are carried out, 304 00:19:06,359 --> 00:19:08,520 Speaker 1: And in the same way with the Cipher Bureau it's 305 00:19:08,680 --> 00:19:11,240 Speaker 1: things that are looked down upon by the public and 306 00:19:11,359 --> 00:19:14,720 Speaker 1: perhaps even by some government agencies. But you have the information, 307 00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:17,840 Speaker 1: and do you just let it go away or do 308 00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:20,440 Speaker 1: you use it to build this new thing? Is that's 309 00:19:20,480 --> 00:19:22,680 Speaker 1: a that's a very good comparison. It's already sort of 310 00:19:22,720 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 1: a sunk cost at this point, and we're not even 311 00:19:24,840 --> 00:19:30,280 Speaker 1: the World War two. So CIS big SIS expanded rapidly 312 00:19:30,280 --> 00:19:33,920 Speaker 1: in the nineteen thirties, UH and open bases to help 313 00:19:33,920 --> 00:19:38,480 Speaker 1: it concentrate on the Pacific theater so Alaska, China, Australia. 314 00:19:38,880 --> 00:19:43,119 Speaker 1: And this was in response to the expansion of the 315 00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:48,280 Speaker 1: Japanese Empire during World War two. CIS played a crucial 316 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:51,639 Speaker 1: role in helping to crack some of these Japanese codes. 317 00:19:52,320 --> 00:19:59,040 Speaker 1: After the war, President Truman reorganized the the entire American 318 00:19:59,080 --> 00:20:03,040 Speaker 1: pursuit of this sort of intelligence under something he called 319 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:08,240 Speaker 1: the National Security Agency. In nine seven, the NSA moved 320 00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:12,480 Speaker 1: to Fort Meade in Maryland. It began as a secret organization. 321 00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:17,200 Speaker 1: UH in many ways, I mean they're keepers of intelligence, 322 00:20:17,280 --> 00:20:20,639 Speaker 1: right uh. And it was half jokingly referred to by 323 00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:25,480 Speaker 1: a lot of people as uh, not national security agency, 324 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:31,240 Speaker 1: but no such agency, no agency here and growing up, 325 00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:36,320 Speaker 1: my father had a had a running joke with within 326 00:20:36,600 --> 00:20:40,800 Speaker 1: his his field where it's such a bad joke, do 327 00:20:40,840 --> 00:20:42,800 Speaker 1: you guys want to hear it? I do want to 328 00:20:42,800 --> 00:20:45,159 Speaker 1: hear it. I live for your bad jokes. Ben. Well, 329 00:20:45,280 --> 00:20:50,640 Speaker 1: let's uh just the joke. So so, the the old 330 00:20:50,760 --> 00:20:55,600 Speaker 1: joke that people would tell all around these various circles, 331 00:20:55,680 --> 00:20:59,080 Speaker 1: right was, how can you tell the extrovert at the 332 00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:03,199 Speaker 1: N s A. It's one in the elevator looking at 333 00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:10,199 Speaker 1: someone else's shoes. It's that bad in those circles. Hold on, 334 00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:14,040 Speaker 1: I'm trying to get it though, okay, because they're also controverted, 335 00:21:14,080 --> 00:21:17,239 Speaker 1: that they're little introverted, that they're all staring at their 336 00:21:17,280 --> 00:21:21,320 Speaker 1: own shoes. That is their form of reaching out, like 337 00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:23,159 Speaker 1: to look at the other shoes. I said it was 338 00:21:23,200 --> 00:21:26,040 Speaker 1: a bad no, But I think I think I think 339 00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,000 Speaker 1: it's appropriate. Yeah, it works. I guess you have to 340 00:21:30,720 --> 00:21:33,480 Speaker 1: be in those circles to go ha ha. Yes, you 341 00:21:33,560 --> 00:21:35,359 Speaker 1: gotta be in an elevator with a bunch of N 342 00:21:35,440 --> 00:21:38,760 Speaker 1: s A agents. Oh man, I know, don't put me 343 00:21:38,840 --> 00:21:40,920 Speaker 1: in there, you know, I would like to avoid that. 344 00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:43,680 Speaker 1: So this made the U the N s A grew 345 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:46,560 Speaker 1: to a peak of more than nine employees and sixty 346 00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:50,240 Speaker 1: nine This made it the largest intelligence organization in the 347 00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:57,960 Speaker 1: US and possibly in the world. People known oh good call. 348 00:21:59,160 --> 00:22:02,680 Speaker 1: So the n s A did contribute valuable intelligence to 349 00:22:02,720 --> 00:22:06,200 Speaker 1: help the US anticipate UH several things, especially during the 350 00:22:06,280 --> 00:22:09,359 Speaker 1: Cold War, like the foundation, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban 351 00:22:09,440 --> 00:22:13,800 Speaker 1: Missile crisis, but they weren't always successful. In nineteen sixty four, 352 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:19,399 Speaker 1: the n ESSAY was considered largely responsible for the Gulf 353 00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:23,600 Speaker 1: of Tonkin incident, which drew the US into the Vietnam War. 354 00:22:24,200 --> 00:22:26,760 Speaker 1: They say it was faulty intelligence, They say, you know what, 355 00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:30,840 Speaker 1: not everybody gets everything right all the time. But the 356 00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:34,159 Speaker 1: big question here is whether or not it was truly 357 00:22:34,240 --> 00:22:37,520 Speaker 1: faulty the intelligence they had or was it something else? 358 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:42,080 Speaker 1: And what are they up to today? Left feel as 359 00:22:42,080 --> 00:22:45,240 Speaker 1: though these things are all right for exploration. But first 360 00:22:46,119 --> 00:22:59,800 Speaker 1: a word from our sponsor. So the n s A today, 361 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:02,600 Speaker 1: what are its goals? What is its purpose? What is 362 00:23:02,760 --> 00:23:06,399 Speaker 1: it doing with all that stuff it has? On you? Again, 363 00:23:06,520 --> 00:23:11,240 Speaker 1: specifically you that's here? You ask fan, aren't those the 364 00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:16,320 Speaker 1: fellas what listen to my phone calls? Yes, asked, and 365 00:23:17,040 --> 00:23:20,000 Speaker 1: you shall receive the answer. Uh. They are the people 366 00:23:20,040 --> 00:23:22,399 Speaker 1: who run the computers that listen to the phone calls, 367 00:23:22,520 --> 00:23:26,000 Speaker 1: and if the certain conditions are met, yeah, there will 368 00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:28,520 Speaker 1: be a person on there. I do declare if I 369 00:23:28,680 --> 00:23:31,480 Speaker 1: have nothing to hide, I have nothing to hide, and 370 00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:34,639 Speaker 1: you can riffle through my phone calls. Hivot e Phivot 371 00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:40,200 Speaker 1: is sea ladies and gentleman. We told you Bett, it's 372 00:23:40,240 --> 00:23:42,880 Speaker 1: gotta crack it up here. Part of it's the costume. 373 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:47,160 Speaker 1: Part of it's also the nerve gas that's slowly filling 374 00:23:47,280 --> 00:23:51,880 Speaker 1: up this chamber. Um that THEA is clearly employ Yes, 375 00:23:52,000 --> 00:23:56,040 Speaker 1: so before they cut us off, before we pass out. Officially, 376 00:23:56,280 --> 00:24:00,440 Speaker 1: the National Security Agency slash Central Security Service leads the 377 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:05,719 Speaker 1: US government in cryptology that encompasses signals, intelligence, and information 378 00:24:05,960 --> 00:24:10,720 Speaker 1: assurance products and services, and it enables computer network operations 379 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:14,159 Speaker 1: UH to gain what they call a decision advantage for 380 00:24:14,240 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: the nation and its allies under all circumstances. That gobbledegook 381 00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:24,680 Speaker 1: in English means that they're both receiving intelligence and they're 382 00:24:24,760 --> 00:24:29,480 Speaker 1: making sure that it's real so it's not incorrect or 383 00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:36,440 Speaker 1: purposefully misleading, and then their their networking computers together so 384 00:24:36,760 --> 00:24:40,520 Speaker 1: that the US and the US as friends and the 385 00:24:40,600 --> 00:24:42,879 Speaker 1: rest of five eyes or whatever, will all have the 386 00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:48,600 Speaker 1: best information going into any sort of any sort of 387 00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:54,680 Speaker 1: geopolitical situation, ultimately to gain a decision advantage, right right, 388 00:24:54,960 --> 00:24:58,439 Speaker 1: And did you notice that part about the UH air 389 00:24:58,560 --> 00:25:03,960 Speaker 1: quotes Central Security Service. That's a tricky thing that a 390 00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:07,200 Speaker 1: lot of like I missed as well. The Central Security 391 00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:11,399 Speaker 1: Service affiliated here includes elements of the Armed forces that 392 00:25:12,040 --> 00:25:15,320 Speaker 1: that perform code making and code breaking work with the 393 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:19,119 Speaker 1: n s A. This was established in two and the 394 00:25:19,240 --> 00:25:22,400 Speaker 1: n s A directors also the chief of the CSS. 395 00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:26,399 Speaker 1: So members of the c s S work side by 396 00:25:26,440 --> 00:25:30,359 Speaker 1: side with the n s A around the world and 397 00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:32,800 Speaker 1: we do mean literally around the world, so that there's 398 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:37,200 Speaker 1: not as much of a barrier between civilian code cracking 399 00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:40,720 Speaker 1: and military code cracking. Sort of an efficient way to 400 00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:44,920 Speaker 1: UH to streamline efforts and get the most bang for 401 00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:48,679 Speaker 1: your cryptographic buck. Essentially, think of these folks almost as 402 00:25:48,720 --> 00:25:53,440 Speaker 1: intelligence agencies embedded in the armed forces. Yeah, well, okay, 403 00:25:53,520 --> 00:26:00,680 Speaker 1: so that's the official goal decision advantage. So if it's 404 00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:03,800 Speaker 1: just collecting information making sure that information, whatever it is, 405 00:26:03,960 --> 00:26:06,840 Speaker 1: is accurate, how do they use it? Use it for 406 00:26:06,960 --> 00:26:10,800 Speaker 1: multiple purposes? From assisting in trade negotiations, you know, So 407 00:26:10,960 --> 00:26:13,880 Speaker 1: let's say Matt is an ambassador gets a hot tip 408 00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:17,560 Speaker 1: from the n s A right before he goes into 409 00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:21,879 Speaker 1: negotiate some sort of deal about tea in China or whatever. 410 00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:26,919 Speaker 1: Then he knows essentially insider information or something that got 411 00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:31,040 Speaker 1: Leverage's got leverage exactly. But then it also can go 412 00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:35,480 Speaker 1: down to what to blow up when it's a dirty job. 413 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:39,840 Speaker 1: But it would be disingenuous to not admit it's one 414 00:26:39,920 --> 00:26:43,720 Speaker 1: of the prime reasons that the US achieved hedge, became 415 00:26:43,760 --> 00:26:47,480 Speaker 1: a hedgemony, you know, the most powerful of the nation's 416 00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:52,600 Speaker 1: currently for for for the moment, for the moments. Oh boy, 417 00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:54,680 Speaker 1: did you guys feel that chill that went through the room? 418 00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:59,080 Speaker 1: I really did. I noticed that Are we dripping? Is 419 00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:03,000 Speaker 1: there something dripping here? Because oh I feel like we 420 00:27:03,119 --> 00:27:07,640 Speaker 1: have been invaded by some kind of foreign uh intelligence 421 00:27:07,720 --> 00:27:14,080 Speaker 1: here with this water that doth dripped down? Oh my goodness. Yeah, 422 00:27:14,280 --> 00:27:17,920 Speaker 1: all right, you guys, this isn't good. The n s 423 00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:20,920 Speaker 1: A is a floor above us, and it's poisoning the 424 00:27:21,040 --> 00:27:24,639 Speaker 1: roof of our building. It's right around the valve for 425 00:27:24,880 --> 00:27:28,960 Speaker 1: the fire um system. Yeah, sprinkler system. Was that that 426 00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:31,440 Speaker 1: siren that was going off? Do anybody else here that 427 00:27:31,560 --> 00:27:34,399 Speaker 1: I just just well, I'm usually actively hallucinating, so I 428 00:27:34,440 --> 00:27:37,120 Speaker 1: didn't know. I don't I still don't know the best 429 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:42,359 Speaker 1: way to check. Put your arms up and go just 430 00:27:43,119 --> 00:27:46,200 Speaker 1: spin a top and if it stays spinning, then you 431 00:27:46,280 --> 00:27:48,760 Speaker 1: know you're hallucinating. If it falls down, then but if 432 00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:51,879 Speaker 1: the camera cuts away before it falls, then you don't know. 433 00:27:52,320 --> 00:27:55,240 Speaker 1: You'll never know what I do without you guys. Well, 434 00:27:55,840 --> 00:27:59,040 Speaker 1: before we drown or die from nerve gas, we should 435 00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 1: mention that the n s A is full of controversies, 436 00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:07,280 Speaker 1: a little bit historical controversies. We mentioned the Gulf of 437 00:28:07,359 --> 00:28:12,680 Speaker 1: Tonkin already. It's commonly it's it's commonly acknowledged outside of 438 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:16,840 Speaker 1: the US by various organizations as a false flag operation. 439 00:28:17,040 --> 00:28:22,400 Speaker 1: And that would be someone purposely pretending to be an 440 00:28:22,520 --> 00:28:28,800 Speaker 1: enemy to create the circumstances for their own aggression. Right, 441 00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:31,720 Speaker 1: so then something becomes a war of defense or retaliation 442 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:36,400 Speaker 1: rather than an invasion. It helps to make the populace 443 00:28:36,680 --> 00:28:40,840 Speaker 1: agree with the reason for going to war. Another one 444 00:28:40,960 --> 00:28:43,400 Speaker 1: would be U the U. S. Senate when they formed 445 00:28:43,440 --> 00:28:48,840 Speaker 1: the Church Committee to investigate possible abuses by the n 446 00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:52,120 Speaker 1: s A as well as the CIA, FBI, I R. 447 00:28:52,320 --> 00:28:55,680 Speaker 1: S UH. This went on for nine months. UH. The 448 00:28:56,000 --> 00:28:59,760 Speaker 1: committee chair, Frank Church, who was a military intelligence officer 449 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:03,200 Speaker 1: time in his life, got kind of freaked out by 450 00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:08,320 Speaker 1: their tremendous surveillance ability. And he has a great quotation 451 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:13,800 Speaker 1: here from The New York Times in nineteen that capability 452 00:29:13,880 --> 00:29:17,320 Speaker 1: at any time could be turned around on the American people, 453 00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:21,840 Speaker 1: and no American would have any privacy left, such as 454 00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:27,640 Speaker 1: the capability to monitor everything, telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. 455 00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:31,200 Speaker 1: There would be no place to hide. And boy, was 456 00:29:31,320 --> 00:29:35,560 Speaker 1: it ever turned around on the American people. I feel 457 00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:38,440 Speaker 1: like we're living in a time where, because of various 458 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 1: leaks Mr. Snowden and the like, we are painfully aware 459 00:29:43,680 --> 00:29:48,239 Speaker 1: that this technology is impact and has been used on us. 460 00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:52,320 Speaker 1: And at the same time, as as outraged as many 461 00:29:52,400 --> 00:29:55,840 Speaker 1: of us are, a whole lot of us also very 462 00:29:55,920 --> 00:30:02,440 Speaker 1: willingly participate, uh in feed being this beast by giving 463 00:30:02,520 --> 00:30:06,400 Speaker 1: our own personal information out higgody pigody, as Matt would say, 464 00:30:07,080 --> 00:30:09,920 Speaker 1: via various social media networks. I mean, it's it's like 465 00:30:10,040 --> 00:30:14,680 Speaker 1: turning on location services, Like we are exchanging the convenience 466 00:30:15,120 --> 00:30:17,960 Speaker 1: of being able to know that there's a Burger King 467 00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:25,520 Speaker 1: nearby for basically seven monitoring. And you know, again, as 468 00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:30,440 Speaker 1: Matt said earlier in his delightful voice, uh, we many 469 00:30:30,520 --> 00:30:32,920 Speaker 1: people feel like they have nothing to hide, so who cares? 470 00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:35,440 Speaker 1: And honestly, I'm one of those people. Do You guys 471 00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:37,040 Speaker 1: are not so much? You guys both have the tape 472 00:30:37,080 --> 00:30:40,080 Speaker 1: over your phone. I'm I'm I'm just like, what am I? 473 00:30:40,160 --> 00:30:41,440 Speaker 1: What are you gonna do? What are you gonna see 474 00:30:41,480 --> 00:30:44,080 Speaker 1: me doing? I'm I'm very boring. I know that's not 475 00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:47,720 Speaker 1: the point, but it is kind of how I justify 476 00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:50,840 Speaker 1: it because I like all the tech with technologies. Yeah, 477 00:30:50,920 --> 00:30:55,320 Speaker 1: and there's a larger conversation the concept of privacies. We 478 00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:59,600 Speaker 1: understand it is fairly recent in the span of human civilization. 479 00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:01,880 Speaker 1: And I've had you been before say that you feel like, 480 00:31:02,480 --> 00:31:06,520 Speaker 1: further down the line, privacy will be not a right 481 00:31:06,600 --> 00:31:08,720 Speaker 1: at all. It will be a luxury afforded only to 482 00:31:08,840 --> 00:31:13,200 Speaker 1: the super rich. Yes, I do believe what I won't 483 00:31:13,520 --> 00:31:16,880 Speaker 1: get on a soapbox quite yet. Well, okay, you know what, No, 484 00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:19,680 Speaker 1: we're halfway there. Let's just walk up the box. So 485 00:31:20,520 --> 00:31:23,720 Speaker 1: what we are facing as a country and as a 486 00:31:23,800 --> 00:31:28,080 Speaker 1: species is not so much the end of privacy or 487 00:31:28,160 --> 00:31:31,760 Speaker 1: the erosion of privacy, but the rise of an inequality 488 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:37,720 Speaker 1: in privacy. This means that, just as Noel said, the 489 00:31:37,960 --> 00:31:41,120 Speaker 1: one of the most precious resources of the future, maybe 490 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:44,800 Speaker 1: the ability to have an unmonitored thought. Will that happen 491 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:49,320 Speaker 1: within our lifetimes. That's a tough call to make. But 492 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:55,200 Speaker 1: do you want to live in a world where, based 493 00:31:55,360 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 1: on your income or your family, you may or may 494 00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:04,960 Speaker 1: not have of the privilege of holding your thoughts to yourself. 495 00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:09,920 Speaker 1: It's a it's a scary question, and some of these 496 00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:13,880 Speaker 1: past controversies have just been have been escalating to the 497 00:32:13,960 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 1: point where that's less and less of a matter of 498 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:18,680 Speaker 1: science fiction. Now. I know that sounds alarmist, and to 499 00:32:18,760 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 1: a degree it is, but it is not as impossible 500 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:26,640 Speaker 1: as it was just a few decades ago. Well again, 501 00:32:26,680 --> 00:32:28,320 Speaker 1: let me read this quote again one more time. That 502 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:30,240 Speaker 1: capability at any time could be turned around on the 503 00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:33,120 Speaker 1: American people, and no American would have any privacy left. 504 00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 1: Such is the capability to monitor everything. It doesn't matter. 505 00:32:37,520 --> 00:32:40,400 Speaker 1: There would be no place to hide. Yeah, I mean, 506 00:32:40,600 --> 00:32:44,720 Speaker 1: that's that about some style. Unless you can encrypt things really, 507 00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:51,640 Speaker 1: really efficiently, which great point. That's another controversy. The Data 508 00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:55,240 Speaker 1: Encryption Standard or d e s It's an algorithm developed 509 00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:58,720 Speaker 1: by IBM in the early nineteen seventies to encrypt sensitive 510 00:32:58,800 --> 00:33:02,640 Speaker 1: electronic By the late nineteen seventies it had become the 511 00:33:02,680 --> 00:33:07,840 Speaker 1: worldwide standard. Everybody was into this. It was the new 512 00:33:07,960 --> 00:33:11,080 Speaker 1: It was like when Pokemon Go first came out, but 513 00:33:11,240 --> 00:33:14,280 Speaker 1: with a encryption that didn't work. I think it's fairly 514 00:33:14,320 --> 00:33:20,080 Speaker 1: obvious they don't play Pokemon God, right. So what happened 515 00:33:20,160 --> 00:33:24,840 Speaker 1: is some civilians who were affiliated with this movement alleged 516 00:33:24,920 --> 00:33:29,440 Speaker 1: that the n s A had really become involved in 517 00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:32,840 Speaker 1: the development of the algorithm, and they convinced IBM to 518 00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:35,720 Speaker 1: change some things to shorten the key, to make it 519 00:33:35,800 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: possible for the n ESSAY to decipher every message, and 520 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:43,120 Speaker 1: it keeps going. In the BBC reported a story that 521 00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:46,320 Speaker 1: they said sounded like science fiction. They claimed that the 522 00:33:46,480 --> 00:33:51,000 Speaker 1: n s A, along with partner agencies in the UK, Canada, 523 00:33:51,120 --> 00:33:55,480 Speaker 1: New Zealand and Australia, operated a worldwide surveillance network capable 524 00:33:55,560 --> 00:34:01,400 Speaker 1: of intercepting every international phone call, facts an email. This 525 00:34:01,600 --> 00:34:07,240 Speaker 1: was called Project Echelon. The US, Canada and the UK 526 00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:12,680 Speaker 1: still deny it officially, but Australia and New Zealand officials 527 00:34:12,760 --> 00:34:16,080 Speaker 1: there say that it is a real thing, and warrantless 528 00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:22,440 Speaker 1: surveillance went mainstream under some previous presidential administrations, believe Bush. 529 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:26,280 Speaker 1: But it's existed since the days of the Black Chamber. 530 00:34:26,680 --> 00:34:32,600 Speaker 1: And then, of course the bomb that dropped which Noel mentioned, 531 00:34:33,719 --> 00:34:40,520 Speaker 1: was when Edward Snowden revealed prism. That was a crazy day. Yes, 532 00:34:41,280 --> 00:34:45,000 Speaker 1: you remember, we were in the office. That was a 533 00:34:45,320 --> 00:34:50,200 Speaker 1: crazy day. We're not going to we of all people 534 00:34:50,239 --> 00:34:52,400 Speaker 1: are not going to judge you, ladies and gentlemen, but 535 00:34:52,520 --> 00:34:59,359 Speaker 1: we would say that at this point, I think very 536 00:34:59,520 --> 00:35:04,400 Speaker 1: careful you before sending inappropriate pictures to your friends, or 537 00:35:04,440 --> 00:35:07,920 Speaker 1: even taking inappropriate pictures with something that's connected to the internet, 538 00:35:09,320 --> 00:35:14,080 Speaker 1: even taking appropriate pictures to be careful. Oh boy, Yeah, 539 00:35:14,640 --> 00:35:17,360 Speaker 1: some things can come back to haunt you. So here's 540 00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:21,960 Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. Though. Legislation passed quite recently in 541 00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:26,120 Speaker 1: the final days of President Obama's administration um and also 542 00:35:26,280 --> 00:35:30,600 Speaker 1: passed relatively quietly. Uh you may not have heard of 543 00:35:30,680 --> 00:35:34,400 Speaker 1: it because it was sort of slipped in under the radar. 544 00:35:34,480 --> 00:35:37,480 Speaker 1: But here's here's how it went down and why it's important. 545 00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:39,880 Speaker 1: From the New York Times, the n s A can 546 00:35:39,960 --> 00:35:45,880 Speaker 1: now quote share globally intercepted personal communications with the government's 547 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:53,880 Speaker 1: sixteen other intelligence agencies before applying privacy protections. Yeah, so 548 00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:57,239 Speaker 1: the way it used to work until now, The way 549 00:35:57,239 --> 00:35:58,560 Speaker 1: it used to work is that the n s A 550 00:35:58,680 --> 00:36:02,880 Speaker 1: would do some things to tech American citizens privacy so 551 00:36:03,560 --> 00:36:07,800 Speaker 1: they could share intelligence about something happening, but not you know, 552 00:36:07,920 --> 00:36:11,160 Speaker 1: necessarily attached it to Matt Frederick, who is just a 553 00:36:11,280 --> 00:36:15,200 Speaker 1: guy who happened to be on the conference call and 554 00:36:15,320 --> 00:36:19,200 Speaker 1: didn't do anything. Has no idea, you know of, has 555 00:36:19,280 --> 00:36:23,520 Speaker 1: no nefarious plans because you'd be dealing with IP addresses 556 00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 1: and numbers. And so now what's happened again, very very recently, 557 00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:33,359 Speaker 1: is that these new rules significantly relax those limits. Now 558 00:36:35,040 --> 00:36:40,360 Speaker 1: the surveillance operations are beyond wire tapping regulations, and they're 559 00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:43,479 Speaker 1: shipping out raw data, so they're shipping out the data 560 00:36:43,640 --> 00:36:48,840 Speaker 1: with your personal information. And again, of course there's the 561 00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:52,120 Speaker 1: old idea of you know, well, why should I be worried. 562 00:36:52,160 --> 00:36:55,560 Speaker 1: I'm not I'm not moving, you know, I'm not illegally 563 00:36:55,640 --> 00:37:01,719 Speaker 1: smuggling iguanas in and out of the o's arks. I 564 00:37:01,920 --> 00:37:05,640 Speaker 1: don't know much about the iguana smuggling tree. Nobody does. 565 00:37:06,200 --> 00:37:10,160 Speaker 1: It's a racket. It's a racket. Uh. So there's not 566 00:37:10,280 --> 00:37:13,560 Speaker 1: going to be any warrant necessary, there's not any privacy 567 00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: baked into it, and perhaps more importantly, there's no real oversight. Uh. This, 568 00:37:21,280 --> 00:37:27,040 Speaker 1: this raw intelligence it shares is derived from mass surveillance 569 00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:30,799 Speaker 1: under Executive Order twelve three three three, and that's been 570 00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:34,880 Speaker 1: in effect since it's raw intelligence would be stuff like emails, 571 00:37:34,960 --> 00:37:38,760 Speaker 1: phone calls, not just the metadata of the phone calls, 572 00:37:39,160 --> 00:37:43,160 Speaker 1: not just null called this number at three two PM 573 00:37:43,280 --> 00:37:45,880 Speaker 1: or something chas we know, can be very very useful 574 00:37:45,920 --> 00:37:48,120 Speaker 1: in and of itself, but taking it to the next level, 575 00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:51,520 Speaker 1: you know, it's pretty much godlike. Yeah, they're not minimized, 576 00:37:51,520 --> 00:37:55,480 Speaker 1: they're not redacted to mask identifying information. Previously, the n 577 00:37:55,600 --> 00:37:58,040 Speaker 1: s A filtered this stuff before they shared it with 578 00:37:58,480 --> 00:38:00,400 Speaker 1: you know, the CIA, or they f b I or 579 00:38:00,440 --> 00:38:03,400 Speaker 1: the d e A, and the analyst at the n 580 00:38:03,520 --> 00:38:07,080 Speaker 1: s A, who are very very intelligent people, uh, passed 581 00:38:07,160 --> 00:38:10,239 Speaker 1: on information only if they deemed it pertinent and they 582 00:38:10,280 --> 00:38:15,879 Speaker 1: could tell if someone's innocent. Usually But because the way 583 00:38:16,080 --> 00:38:18,400 Speaker 1: so this is supposed to be foreign communication, right, But 584 00:38:18,480 --> 00:38:21,000 Speaker 1: here's the scary thing. Because of the way the internet works, 585 00:38:21,360 --> 00:38:24,160 Speaker 1: you might be surprised at how much of your personal 586 00:38:24,280 --> 00:38:28,960 Speaker 1: communication activity accounts as foreign communication. Like, let's let's think 587 00:38:28,960 --> 00:38:34,040 Speaker 1: about it this way, all right, If you imagine our office, Matt, 588 00:38:34,320 --> 00:38:37,600 Speaker 1: you and Knowls sit relatively close to each other. Yeah, 589 00:38:37,680 --> 00:38:41,360 Speaker 1: just just across the room. Yeah, you'll literally maybe twelve 590 00:38:41,480 --> 00:38:45,879 Speaker 1: feet from each other, fifteen ft And that's really busy 591 00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:50,120 Speaker 1: on something. So he sends Nolan email. By the time 592 00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:54,240 Speaker 1: the email travels to Noll's inbox, it might have gone 593 00:38:54,280 --> 00:38:56,719 Speaker 1: to a server across the country or even outside of 594 00:38:56,760 --> 00:39:00,279 Speaker 1: the country before landing with him. So that young Pope 595 00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:03,719 Speaker 1: meme that you just sent became foreign communication, which makes 596 00:39:03,760 --> 00:39:05,719 Speaker 1: it fair game for the n s A and I 597 00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:08,520 Speaker 1: thought you would appreciate a young Pope shot up. Thanks, 598 00:39:08,560 --> 00:39:11,040 Speaker 1: but it yet, but I'm still excited to still haven't 599 00:39:11,080 --> 00:39:16,399 Speaker 1: seen it yet. I like the concept of it though, Matt, Well, yeah, 600 00:39:16,920 --> 00:39:19,560 Speaker 1: it's we don't have to get into more young pope stuff. 601 00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:23,440 Speaker 1: This is not a young popecast young popecast. Yeah, that's 602 00:39:23,480 --> 00:39:27,759 Speaker 1: pretty good. Yes, but I've watched it. I watched some 603 00:39:27,880 --> 00:39:30,919 Speaker 1: of it. Well, since we've derailed the conversation yet again, 604 00:39:31,000 --> 00:39:34,480 Speaker 1: should we go ahead and break for a sponsor you 605 00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:48,920 Speaker 1: approve sounds great good. So there we are. There we 606 00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:52,400 Speaker 1: are an innocent meme has traveled around the world between 607 00:39:52,440 --> 00:39:55,680 Speaker 1: two innocent people, and because it's traveled around, it now 608 00:39:55,840 --> 00:39:59,520 Speaker 1: counts as foreign communication, which means that now the FBI, 609 00:39:59,680 --> 00:40:02,640 Speaker 1: the c I A, the whole Uncle Sam Alphabet can 610 00:40:02,760 --> 00:40:07,080 Speaker 1: check it out. If Matt has accidentally or purposefully included 611 00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:09,480 Speaker 1: certain words and phrases, or if he has already been 612 00:40:09,520 --> 00:40:11,239 Speaker 1: flagged as someone to keep an eye on, then the 613 00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:13,879 Speaker 1: US may also and share it with the other five 614 00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:18,839 Speaker 1: eyes countries the echelons. And years later on vacation, Matt 615 00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:22,560 Speaker 1: might just land at the airport in Australia to be 616 00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:26,279 Speaker 1: refused entry and he might never know exactly why I 617 00:40:26,360 --> 00:40:28,319 Speaker 1: got put on a no fly list and nobody even 618 00:40:28,400 --> 00:40:31,560 Speaker 1: told me about it. We're not saying this will happen, 619 00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:33,839 Speaker 1: but we are saying that right now. The scary thing 620 00:40:33,960 --> 00:40:39,600 Speaker 1: is there's not a solid way for someone to tell 621 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:43,680 Speaker 1: if abuse occurs, and the definition of foreign communication is 622 00:40:43,840 --> 00:40:49,480 Speaker 1: even more deceptive. Check out this, this great quote from Slate. 623 00:40:50,360 --> 00:40:53,920 Speaker 1: Foreign intelligence is really a catch all that can include 624 00:40:53,960 --> 00:40:57,680 Speaker 1: most anything happening abroad. Executive Order twelve three three three 625 00:40:58,120 --> 00:41:02,719 Speaker 1: defines it as information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and 626 00:41:02,960 --> 00:41:07,920 Speaker 1: activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons. Don't let the 627 00:41:08,520 --> 00:41:11,959 Speaker 1: quote organizations or persons part of that definition hide behind 628 00:41:12,040 --> 00:41:17,200 Speaker 1: the more important seeming term foreign powers. Exactly. This definition 629 00:41:17,320 --> 00:41:22,400 Speaker 1: means that quote unquote for an intelligence includes speech about 630 00:41:22,520 --> 00:41:25,440 Speaker 1: political and human rights activities. So if you send an 631 00:41:25,800 --> 00:41:31,839 Speaker 1: email as part of a nonprofit thing to free political prisoner, uh, 632 00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:35,840 Speaker 1: it can include stuff impacting the economy. One of the 633 00:41:35,920 --> 00:41:40,120 Speaker 1: great examples that Slate has is what about an email 634 00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:42,640 Speaker 1: that talks about a business trip to Europe to get 635 00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:47,239 Speaker 1: the finest French chocolate for your cookies? Then that would 636 00:41:47,320 --> 00:41:52,320 Speaker 1: qualify technically. And there's one last note here. William Benny, 637 00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:54,080 Speaker 1: who we have mentioned on the show before, is one 638 00:41:54,080 --> 00:41:57,000 Speaker 1: of the highest level whistleblowers to ever come from the 639 00:41:57,200 --> 00:42:00,720 Speaker 1: n Essay. He was a leading code bre aker against 640 00:42:00,760 --> 00:42:03,200 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but after the 641 00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:08,120 Speaker 1: events of September eleven he resigned. He saw that, in 642 00:42:08,280 --> 00:42:12,080 Speaker 1: his opinion, Washington was moving toward mass surveillance and it 643 00:42:12,400 --> 00:42:15,720 Speaker 1: disgusted him on a profound level of its own people. 644 00:42:16,200 --> 00:42:20,440 Speaker 1: Right on en he spoke in London at the Center 645 00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:26,680 Speaker 1: for Investigative Journalism and revealed that people in general had 646 00:42:26,800 --> 00:42:31,480 Speaker 1: no idea about the scope of these programs under their 647 00:42:31,520 --> 00:42:35,759 Speaker 1: growth under the President Bush and President Obama administrations. In 648 00:42:35,880 --> 00:42:39,680 Speaker 1: his quote, he says, at least of fiber optic cables 649 00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:43,160 Speaker 1: globally go via the US. This is no accident and 650 00:42:43,239 --> 00:42:46,480 Speaker 1: allows the US to view all communication coming in. At 651 00:42:46,560 --> 00:42:50,600 Speaker 1: least of all audio calls, not just metadata, are recorded 652 00:42:50,640 --> 00:42:53,160 Speaker 1: and stored in the US. The n S A Ben, 653 00:42:53,280 --> 00:42:58,279 Speaker 1: he said, lies about what it stores, and he said 654 00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:00,759 Speaker 1: that the ultimate goal of the In essay we talked 655 00:43:00,760 --> 00:43:03,879 Speaker 1: about the official goals, all understandable said the ultimate goal 656 00:43:04,040 --> 00:43:08,799 Speaker 1: is about total population control. And it's disturbing. Yeah, it's 657 00:43:08,840 --> 00:43:11,399 Speaker 1: disturbing because it means the information gathered on people could 658 00:43:11,440 --> 00:43:15,640 Speaker 1: be used to theoretically suppress the scent. Let's say you're 659 00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:18,759 Speaker 1: a senator and you're gunning to stop programs like these. 660 00:43:18,800 --> 00:43:21,840 Speaker 1: You got elected on this is your main platform, and 661 00:43:21,920 --> 00:43:26,080 Speaker 1: all of a sudden you receive notice, subtle notice that 662 00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:30,560 Speaker 1: you're pasted in discretions, perhaps ideological or sexual, or financial 663 00:43:30,719 --> 00:43:34,640 Speaker 1: or something else will be made painfully public if you 664 00:43:35,120 --> 00:43:39,560 Speaker 1: persist in this mission, if you pursue this line of investigation, 665 00:43:40,120 --> 00:43:44,919 Speaker 1: what would you do, Ladies and gentlemen, So blackmail, huh, Yeah, 666 00:43:45,320 --> 00:43:48,040 Speaker 1: it seems like a good way to use this information. Well, 667 00:43:48,320 --> 00:43:52,439 Speaker 1: it looks like we're going to find out how people 668 00:43:52,440 --> 00:43:55,000 Speaker 1: answer that question, perhaps sooner than we all would like 669 00:43:55,520 --> 00:43:59,600 Speaker 1: to think. We are to be completely clear in no 670 00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:04,680 Speaker 1: way saying that we have proof this has occurred. We don't. 671 00:44:04,800 --> 00:44:07,680 Speaker 1: The three of us have not found an example of 672 00:44:07,920 --> 00:44:11,320 Speaker 1: a senator who was out gunning for the n s 673 00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:15,960 Speaker 1: A and then got some weird, you know, compromising photos 674 00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:18,600 Speaker 1: and then turned off the search or anything. But we're 675 00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:23,680 Speaker 1: saying with this increasing move, with this move, it's increasingly possible. 676 00:44:24,040 --> 00:44:27,399 Speaker 1: It'll be interesting to see how Donald Trump's seeming animosity 677 00:44:28,280 --> 00:44:32,640 Speaker 1: um that between himself and the intelligence community. There's no animosity. 678 00:44:33,719 --> 00:44:37,839 Speaker 1: There's definitely animosity. Now, did you not see his speech? Yeah, 679 00:44:38,480 --> 00:44:43,600 Speaker 1: that doesn't existing. I maybe let's say between the intelligence 680 00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:46,359 Speaker 1: agencies and the president. I kid you guys. I mean, 681 00:44:46,480 --> 00:44:49,520 Speaker 1: he clearly had a little bit of a Twitter feud 682 00:44:49,600 --> 00:44:51,960 Speaker 1: with the CIA and the n s A. I mean 683 00:44:52,040 --> 00:44:56,560 Speaker 1: about he accused them of having shoddy intelligence when finding 684 00:44:56,800 --> 00:44:58,759 Speaker 1: weapons of mass destruction and things like that. You know, 685 00:44:59,680 --> 00:45:02,759 Speaker 1: I'm I'm interested to see how that relationship plays out. 686 00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:06,760 Speaker 1: It goes to it goes to a larger conversation, of course, 687 00:45:06,800 --> 00:45:11,480 Speaker 1: about what the deep state is, you know, who holds 688 00:45:11,640 --> 00:45:15,239 Speaker 1: the reins of power and who functions more in a 689 00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:18,800 Speaker 1: figurehead uh manner. And I'm not, of course, seeing that 690 00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:23,320 Speaker 1: the president or any president is necessarily a figurehead. I 691 00:45:23,400 --> 00:45:26,680 Speaker 1: am saying that there are groups of unelected people who 692 00:45:26,760 --> 00:45:31,840 Speaker 1: wield tremendous amounts of power. And also, in defense of 693 00:45:32,080 --> 00:45:36,000 Speaker 1: the n essay, to be absolutely fair, the n s 694 00:45:36,120 --> 00:45:43,520 Speaker 1: A has done immense amounts of work and successfully accomplished 695 00:45:43,600 --> 00:45:46,600 Speaker 1: intelligence goals for the United States. And I just want 696 00:45:46,640 --> 00:45:48,560 Speaker 1: to put this out there. This maybe an obvious thing 697 00:45:48,640 --> 00:45:51,640 Speaker 1: to too many listeners, but a big difference between the 698 00:45:51,760 --> 00:45:53,560 Speaker 1: n s A and the c i A is that 699 00:45:53,640 --> 00:45:57,799 Speaker 1: the n s A they don't have field operatives. You're yeah, 700 00:45:57,840 --> 00:46:00,080 Speaker 1: you're not. You're not gonna see an n s A 701 00:46:00,360 --> 00:46:03,400 Speaker 1: age or an s A squad, you know, like kicking 702 00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:08,359 Speaker 1: down the door or something. And we are, as Matt said, 703 00:46:08,400 --> 00:46:12,799 Speaker 1: and we're in a very fascinating and unpredictable time. It's 704 00:46:12,880 --> 00:46:17,359 Speaker 1: quite possible that within a few months this podcast could 705 00:46:17,920 --> 00:46:21,600 Speaker 1: need an update, at which case we will endeavor to 706 00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:25,960 Speaker 1: do so. But for now, as always, whether or not 707 00:46:26,680 --> 00:46:30,120 Speaker 1: an organization like this exist, whether or not you are 708 00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:38,200 Speaker 1: concerned or unconcerned about the state of surveillance. I think 709 00:46:38,400 --> 00:46:43,080 Speaker 1: very carefully about what you put out there. It's not 710 00:46:43,440 --> 00:46:48,640 Speaker 1: just a black box. The stuff does not disappear. And 711 00:46:50,080 --> 00:46:53,959 Speaker 1: if you have information that you would like to share, 712 00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:56,880 Speaker 1: if you're affiliated with the n s A. Remember how 713 00:46:56,960 --> 00:46:59,080 Speaker 1: he's always joke about if the n ess A was 714 00:46:59,160 --> 00:47:02,600 Speaker 1: monitoring us, it had to be some poor, unfortunate intern. 715 00:47:03,200 --> 00:47:07,880 Speaker 1: I'm painfully familiar with the intern that poor guy. Oh buddy, 716 00:47:07,960 --> 00:47:10,000 Speaker 1: I hope if you're listening, I hope things are all right. 717 00:47:10,040 --> 00:47:16,680 Speaker 1: He's seen me at the worst. Uh joking joking aside um, 718 00:47:16,920 --> 00:47:20,320 Speaker 1: the stuff they don't want you to know here is 719 00:47:20,480 --> 00:47:24,239 Speaker 1: perhaps the extent of the monitoring that is occurring. And 720 00:47:24,320 --> 00:47:27,839 Speaker 1: it is not a theory. It is happening. So let 721 00:47:27,920 --> 00:47:30,160 Speaker 1: us know what you think. We would I would like 722 00:47:30,239 --> 00:47:32,919 Speaker 1: to hear your opinions on the n s A. We'd 723 00:47:33,000 --> 00:47:35,960 Speaker 1: like to hear if it's um a bunch of you know, 724 00:47:36,120 --> 00:47:43,440 Speaker 1: alarmists ado about nothing hegety piggoty, if you will or 725 00:47:44,920 --> 00:47:50,560 Speaker 1: should people be concerned And speaking of listener mail shut 726 00:47:50,680 --> 00:47:56,560 Speaker 1: at Corners two days. First shout out goes to Miguel. 727 00:47:57,440 --> 00:47:59,560 Speaker 1: Miguel says, you guys should make a video on Seth 728 00:47:59,719 --> 00:48:01,960 Speaker 1: rich a person who worked for the d n C 729 00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:05,040 Speaker 1: who was randomly murdered when someone tried to rob him 730 00:48:05,120 --> 00:48:07,919 Speaker 1: but took nothing. At the end, Wiki leaks said someone 731 00:48:08,239 --> 00:48:10,360 Speaker 1: leaked the information of the d n C and it 732 00:48:10,440 --> 00:48:13,440 Speaker 1: wasn't Russian hackers, but the news went with Russian hack 733 00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:16,920 Speaker 1: just the same. Uh. The guy who ran against Debbie 734 00:48:16,960 --> 00:48:21,160 Speaker 1: Wasserman Schultz, Tim Canova, made a video talking about the situation, 735 00:48:21,520 --> 00:48:24,200 Speaker 1: and he didn't seem convinced it was a robbery gone 736 00:48:24,239 --> 00:48:27,960 Speaker 1: wrong or either of you fellas familiar with this incident. Yes, 737 00:48:28,280 --> 00:48:32,400 Speaker 1: very familiar with Seth Rich. Um. You know there's an 738 00:48:32,440 --> 00:48:35,280 Speaker 1: interview with Juliana Sang where he discussed it. He doesn't 739 00:48:35,360 --> 00:48:40,120 Speaker 1: say Seth Rich was or wasn't the source of the 740 00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:43,600 Speaker 1: leaks from the d n C, but I would say 741 00:48:44,040 --> 00:48:49,400 Speaker 1: if you watch it very closely, it seems perhaps that 742 00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:52,800 Speaker 1: he's leaning in that way without saying it. Yeah, it's interesting. 743 00:48:52,800 --> 00:48:57,600 Speaker 1: I read about this story when it first emerged. But sadly, 744 00:48:58,080 --> 00:49:02,360 Speaker 1: there are apparently a lot of explained murders that have 745 00:49:02,480 --> 00:49:06,600 Speaker 1: been happening or deaths that have been happening in the 746 00:49:06,680 --> 00:49:09,680 Speaker 1: past decade or so. I always remember the British intelligence 747 00:49:09,760 --> 00:49:14,400 Speaker 1: officer who apparently committed suicide by what shooting himself and 748 00:49:14,520 --> 00:49:18,040 Speaker 1: zipping himself into a bag that was locked on the outside. 749 00:49:18,120 --> 00:49:21,919 Speaker 1: That's what I would do. We talked about that. But yeah, 750 00:49:22,160 --> 00:49:24,279 Speaker 1: I'm gonna dig into this and and thank you so 751 00:49:24,400 --> 00:49:30,439 Speaker 1: much for writing. Our next message comes from Eric says, Hey, guys, 752 00:49:30,520 --> 00:49:33,560 Speaker 1: I was listening to your podcast about Grimois and I 753 00:49:33,680 --> 00:49:37,320 Speaker 1: was surprised that you didn't mention the malius maleficarum. Is 754 00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:39,560 Speaker 1: that how you say that? The witches hammer? That's how 755 00:49:39,640 --> 00:49:42,520 Speaker 1: I know it, which is hammer. It was a text 756 00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:47,080 Speaker 1: published in four six on how to identify and interrogate witches. 757 00:49:47,680 --> 00:49:50,520 Speaker 1: That is good information to know. Always have that information 758 00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:53,680 Speaker 1: with you. I went to school at California State University, 759 00:49:53,719 --> 00:49:55,720 Speaker 1: Long Beach, and they have the They have an original 760 00:49:56,000 --> 00:49:59,600 Speaker 1: edition from that year when it was published. Uh In 761 00:49:59,680 --> 00:50:02,680 Speaker 1: there's Special Collections archive. Anyone can go to the Special 762 00:50:02,760 --> 00:50:05,239 Speaker 1: Collections and actually sit down with the text and look 763 00:50:05,320 --> 00:50:09,120 Speaker 1: through it. It makes your skin crawl just looking at it. 764 00:50:09,239 --> 00:50:12,319 Speaker 1: Does it have a big bald green lady witch? Face 765 00:50:12,520 --> 00:50:15,279 Speaker 1: that pops out of the spine. I don't know about that, 766 00:50:15,520 --> 00:50:18,440 Speaker 1: but there are sections that are underlined with notes in 767 00:50:18,480 --> 00:50:22,960 Speaker 1: the margins that could have been made by interrogators. I 768 00:50:23,120 --> 00:50:25,600 Speaker 1: just thought if there were listeners in southern California, they 769 00:50:25,680 --> 00:50:27,600 Speaker 1: might wanted the chance to go and see something like 770 00:50:27,680 --> 00:50:30,279 Speaker 1: that in person. Thanks keep up the good work, Eric, 771 00:50:31,360 --> 00:50:35,799 Speaker 1: Thanks for Ryan. Eric, it seems like we're off to California. Yeah, Noel, 772 00:50:35,880 --> 00:50:37,759 Speaker 1: you and I had talked a little bit about some 773 00:50:37,920 --> 00:50:40,759 Speaker 1: of these different grim wis off air, when we were 774 00:50:40,840 --> 00:50:43,440 Speaker 1: kind of talking about what makes something a grim one, 775 00:50:43,760 --> 00:50:47,320 Speaker 1: and and we we went back and forth on some 776 00:50:47,440 --> 00:50:51,800 Speaker 1: of this because one of the one of the questions 777 00:50:51,840 --> 00:50:55,640 Speaker 1: would be is it just a collection of perhaps lore, yeah, 778 00:50:55,920 --> 00:51:00,320 Speaker 1: pagan text or something more of um a comp Asian 779 00:51:01,000 --> 00:51:06,040 Speaker 1: or is it anything related to magical signs? And if 780 00:51:06,120 --> 00:51:10,399 Speaker 1: this was written for the purposes of witch hunts, still 781 00:51:10,480 --> 00:51:14,200 Speaker 1: counted as a grimoire. And I was after we were 782 00:51:14,239 --> 00:51:16,560 Speaker 1: off the arrow is reading intensely in that. And I 783 00:51:16,640 --> 00:51:20,759 Speaker 1: appreciate you writing in, Eric, because I want us to 784 00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:24,560 Speaker 1: travel to southern California. What do you think, guys, I'm 785 00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:30,520 Speaker 1: all about some travels. Hey, what a science textbook be 786 00:51:30,680 --> 00:51:35,560 Speaker 1: considered a grimoire in the future perhaps where maybe we've 787 00:51:35,640 --> 00:51:39,840 Speaker 1: lost some of what some of these scientific experiments that 788 00:51:39,960 --> 00:51:43,640 Speaker 1: are now we would consider normal and regular. Now something 789 00:51:43,680 --> 00:51:48,280 Speaker 1: as simple as using baking soda to make a volcano. 790 00:51:49,880 --> 00:51:53,120 Speaker 1: But then it's magic again if we've lost that knowledge 791 00:51:53,160 --> 00:51:54,919 Speaker 1: that there's a book that tells you it's a spell 792 00:51:55,000 --> 00:51:56,160 Speaker 1: of how to do it. And that was the thing 793 00:51:56,239 --> 00:51:58,640 Speaker 1: that I was saying, is like, what constitutes a grimoire 794 00:51:58,760 --> 00:52:03,040 Speaker 1: is largely determined by what you considered to be magic. Right, 795 00:52:03,840 --> 00:52:05,480 Speaker 1: that's a very good I mean, I don't know, maybe 796 00:52:05,520 --> 00:52:07,520 Speaker 1: I'm reaching there, but it just feels to me like 797 00:52:08,080 --> 00:52:11,240 Speaker 1: you could be absolutely right. It could be a collection 798 00:52:11,840 --> 00:52:17,839 Speaker 1: of procedural, you know, steps to create a battery. Oh 799 00:52:18,960 --> 00:52:22,800 Speaker 1: right there. I don't know. I think it's interesting the 800 00:52:22,920 --> 00:52:28,839 Speaker 1: way we interpret the contents and the intent. Yeah, that's great. 801 00:52:28,880 --> 00:52:31,200 Speaker 1: So in that case, if there was someone who considered 802 00:52:31,239 --> 00:52:34,880 Speaker 1: themselves a practicing magician or someone who would consider themselves 803 00:52:35,600 --> 00:52:38,919 Speaker 1: a dept at witchcraft, and they were using this book 804 00:52:39,000 --> 00:52:42,600 Speaker 1: by which hunters to you know, enact some kind of 805 00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:45,160 Speaker 1: magical process, then wouldn't the fact it would become a 806 00:52:45,200 --> 00:52:47,200 Speaker 1: groom ware. Well that was the thing too. That book 807 00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:49,040 Speaker 1: that I brought up, the name Escapes Me, where it 808 00:52:49,239 --> 00:52:52,560 Speaker 1: was one of the early collections of witchcraft lore, and 809 00:52:52,600 --> 00:52:55,600 Speaker 1: it was kind of meant by the writer to um 810 00:52:56,400 --> 00:52:59,640 Speaker 1: make it appear foolish and frivolous in some way and 811 00:52:59,719 --> 00:53:02,759 Speaker 1: to not lend any weight to it, and to kind 812 00:53:02,800 --> 00:53:05,360 Speaker 1: of degrade the Catholic Church for the part that it 813 00:53:05,440 --> 00:53:08,759 Speaker 1: played and killing so many of of what the writer 814 00:53:08,920 --> 00:53:12,680 Speaker 1: considered to be innocent victims potentially practicing witchcraft, which was 815 00:53:12,960 --> 00:53:15,840 Speaker 1: completely harmless. What ended up being the use of this 816 00:53:16,040 --> 00:53:19,920 Speaker 1: book was much more in the witchcraft community, people trying 817 00:53:19,960 --> 00:53:23,919 Speaker 1: to find remnants of spells and different things. So again, 818 00:53:23,960 --> 00:53:26,440 Speaker 1: I think it's also the intent of the user that 819 00:53:26,560 --> 00:53:29,600 Speaker 1: determines whether or not sagramore since how it seems to 820 00:53:29,640 --> 00:53:33,280 Speaker 1: me and a lot of magical working is about ultimately intent. 821 00:53:34,280 --> 00:53:37,600 Speaker 1: There you go, it's pretty interesting. We have one more 822 00:53:38,080 --> 00:53:40,560 Speaker 1: We have one more shout out today and that is 823 00:53:40,640 --> 00:53:44,040 Speaker 1: from Michael. Michael says, hey, guys, love the podcast. Listened 824 00:53:44,040 --> 00:53:46,680 Speaker 1: to it every week, downloaded all the episodes from iTunes. 825 00:53:46,760 --> 00:53:49,640 Speaker 1: Thank you. Michael. Have you ever thought about doing a 826 00:53:49,800 --> 00:53:52,080 Speaker 1: video episode, as in just having a camera in the 827 00:53:52,200 --> 00:53:55,080 Speaker 1: studio set up and we can see what happens when 828 00:53:55,120 --> 00:53:58,279 Speaker 1: you're doing the podcast. Can I please have a shout out? 829 00:53:58,560 --> 00:54:01,560 Speaker 1: If you guys are ever embrid Spain, Australia, I can 830 00:54:01,640 --> 00:54:04,040 Speaker 1: be your tour guide and you've always got a free 831 00:54:04,120 --> 00:54:07,640 Speaker 1: room to stay in nice Michael, I would say, I 832 00:54:07,760 --> 00:54:09,800 Speaker 1: kind of don't want to do that because I'd have 833 00:54:09,880 --> 00:54:12,520 Speaker 1: to put a shirt on. I guess I don't know. 834 00:54:14,080 --> 00:54:18,040 Speaker 1: You know, only podcast in the nude, the nude in 835 00:54:18,200 --> 00:54:21,960 Speaker 1: the nude with the mint, with a mint julip, a 836 00:54:22,120 --> 00:54:25,200 Speaker 1: cold mental julip in my hand. I do declare it's 837 00:54:25,239 --> 00:54:28,640 Speaker 1: a bit hot for Lennen's. Somebody's gonna get so offended 838 00:54:28,680 --> 00:54:30,960 Speaker 1: by us doing this, and we're totally just having fun 839 00:54:31,040 --> 00:54:35,440 Speaker 1: with it because we're in Atlanta, we're Southern boys. I 840 00:54:35,480 --> 00:54:38,680 Speaker 1: don't think it's offensive. Somebody's gonna be upset. Please don't 841 00:54:38,680 --> 00:54:43,160 Speaker 1: be upset. If someone is offended by that, by that 842 00:54:43,440 --> 00:54:47,359 Speaker 1: character that we're hatching up, then please send us an 843 00:54:47,440 --> 00:54:51,800 Speaker 1: audio version of your complaint and tell us how we 844 00:54:51,840 --> 00:54:55,200 Speaker 1: should do the voice. Thank you to Michael, thank you 845 00:54:55,360 --> 00:54:59,520 Speaker 1: to Eric, and thank you to Miguel. This concludes this 846 00:54:59,640 --> 00:55:05,480 Speaker 1: week's edition of Gosh and Before we get out of here. 847 00:55:05,520 --> 00:55:07,800 Speaker 1: Holy cow, you guys. We got some plugs to plug. 848 00:55:08,760 --> 00:55:11,560 Speaker 1: I want to get pluggy. We have one huge plug. 849 00:55:12,200 --> 00:55:15,200 Speaker 1: We're doing it. We're doing it so big. We're going 850 00:55:15,320 --> 00:55:19,759 Speaker 1: to New York City, New York City. That's what I 851 00:55:19,960 --> 00:55:24,520 Speaker 1: said past for content TM. We're going April eight, New 852 00:55:24,640 --> 00:55:28,719 Speaker 1: York City as part of the Podfest. We are going 853 00:55:28,800 --> 00:55:34,320 Speaker 1: to be doing a live show with a cavalcade of 854 00:55:34,600 --> 00:55:38,040 Speaker 1: other podcasters and we would love it if you're in 855 00:55:38,080 --> 00:55:40,239 Speaker 1: the area and want to come by and say, Hi, 856 00:55:40,440 --> 00:55:44,560 Speaker 1: we're we're I was gonna say, we're normal people, We're 857 00:55:44,640 --> 00:55:47,880 Speaker 1: fun to hang out with. Yes, it's a fun thing though. 858 00:55:47,920 --> 00:55:51,840 Speaker 1: It's a three day festival. Um Ticket info is available 859 00:55:51,960 --> 00:55:55,960 Speaker 1: online at the Bellhouse in y dot com um and 860 00:55:56,120 --> 00:55:59,720 Speaker 1: the events are from the I will leave the sixth, 861 00:56:00,080 --> 00:56:03,400 Speaker 1: no the seventh, which is a Friday through the ninth Sunday, 862 00:56:03,760 --> 00:56:08,160 Speaker 1: and we are on Saturday, April eight with The Majority 863 00:56:08,239 --> 00:56:11,399 Speaker 1: Report with Sam Seter. Really looking forward to hanging out 864 00:56:11,920 --> 00:56:15,800 Speaker 1: with Sam. Yeah, another great podcast that has pretty ancient 865 00:56:15,880 --> 00:56:19,359 Speaker 1: roots in the podcasting in radio world. So check you're 866 00:56:19,400 --> 00:56:21,239 Speaker 1: definitely gonna want to listen to that and watch that, 867 00:56:21,440 --> 00:56:23,040 Speaker 1: and then you know, we'll be there too, and Michael 868 00:56:23,040 --> 00:56:26,359 Speaker 1: iam Black's podcast is going to be there there, Yeah, 869 00:56:26,440 --> 00:56:31,959 Speaker 1: Lore and Kevin McDonald, Kevin McDonald and smattering of other 870 00:56:32,280 --> 00:56:36,640 Speaker 1: podcast Illuminaire, the Book of Ya if you're into Kanye West. 871 00:56:37,560 --> 00:56:40,920 Speaker 1: So we're really excited to we're really excited to be 872 00:56:41,000 --> 00:56:43,520 Speaker 1: a part of this and we would I would love 873 00:56:43,600 --> 00:56:46,279 Speaker 1: to see you there. And if you can't make this one, 874 00:56:46,760 --> 00:56:49,800 Speaker 1: right in and let us know where we should travel next, 875 00:56:49,920 --> 00:56:52,399 Speaker 1: because apparently we've got a budget now for this kind 876 00:56:52,440 --> 00:56:56,080 Speaker 1: of jazz, watch out just sign out here. It's twelve 877 00:56:56,120 --> 00:56:58,400 Speaker 1: dollars in advance if you buy your tickets now. If 878 00:56:58,440 --> 00:57:00,239 Speaker 1: you want to wait till you get to the door, 879 00:57:00,360 --> 00:57:02,480 Speaker 1: it's going to be an extra three perfect but I 880 00:57:02,560 --> 00:57:04,839 Speaker 1: believe we get a solid hour so you will get 881 00:57:05,480 --> 00:57:08,480 Speaker 1: a live podcast from us, and you also get to 882 00:57:08,520 --> 00:57:11,360 Speaker 1: see the majority Report. And I think they let you 883 00:57:11,480 --> 00:57:14,960 Speaker 1: drink during the show, pretty sure if anyone's on the 884 00:57:15,040 --> 00:57:20,840 Speaker 1: fence about that. Also unlimited high fives from that from that. Yes, 885 00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:24,200 Speaker 1: So that's our that's our show for this week. We've 886 00:57:24,200 --> 00:57:26,720 Speaker 1: gotta show coming up in April. And if you want 887 00:57:26,760 --> 00:57:30,080 Speaker 1: to take a page from your fellow listeners, book right 888 00:57:30,200 --> 00:57:33,000 Speaker 1: to us. And let us know what you think we 889 00:57:33,040 --> 00:57:34,880 Speaker 1: should cover in the future, what you think about the 890 00:57:34,920 --> 00:57:37,200 Speaker 1: state of MAS surveillance, where you think we should go 891 00:57:37,280 --> 00:57:40,080 Speaker 1: on tour, or any of the other questions that we 892 00:57:40,400 --> 00:57:43,560 Speaker 1: asked throughout this podcast. You can write to us directly 893 00:57:43,680 --> 00:57:48,280 Speaker 1: on Facebook and Twitter, where we are conspiracy stuff. Check 894 00:57:48,320 --> 00:57:52,320 Speaker 1: out some of those awesome and somewhat frightening pictures that 895 00:57:52,520 --> 00:57:55,760 Speaker 1: Noel has from Washington, d C on our Instagram. It 896 00:57:55,880 --> 00:57:58,560 Speaker 1: was weird. Man. I'm not gonna I'm not gonna wax 897 00:57:58,640 --> 00:58:00,680 Speaker 1: to poetic about it, but it was just like walking 898 00:58:00,760 --> 00:58:05,320 Speaker 1: around in a weird, foggy, gray dream. Uh. And I 899 00:58:05,440 --> 00:58:07,560 Speaker 1: hope that the pictures reflect that, so let me know. Hey, 900 00:58:07,600 --> 00:58:09,800 Speaker 1: and guys, also, if you're interested, I've really I've started 901 00:58:09,840 --> 00:58:12,960 Speaker 1: getting into glitch art. I've been glitching out videos and 902 00:58:13,280 --> 00:58:15,760 Speaker 1: making weird music to it. Uh. They're kind of weird 903 00:58:15,840 --> 00:58:18,320 Speaker 1: and reflective and meditative in a sort of disturbing way. 904 00:58:18,360 --> 00:58:20,120 Speaker 1: So if you're interested in seeing any of that, hit 905 00:58:20,200 --> 00:58:22,080 Speaker 1: us up and well maybe we'll post some you had. 906 00:58:22,240 --> 00:58:24,080 Speaker 1: You should post them right now, the one you just 907 00:58:24,160 --> 00:58:27,440 Speaker 1: showed me. Yeah. Well, and that's the end of this 908 00:58:27,760 --> 00:58:31,920 Speaker 1: classic episode. If you have any thoughts or questions about 909 00:58:32,120 --> 00:58:34,880 Speaker 1: this episode. You can get into contact with us in 910 00:58:34,960 --> 00:58:37,080 Speaker 1: a number of different ways. One of the best is 911 00:58:37,120 --> 00:58:39,160 Speaker 1: to give us a call. Our number is one eight 912 00:58:39,400 --> 00:58:42,720 Speaker 1: three three st d w y t K. If you 913 00:58:42,760 --> 00:58:44,560 Speaker 1: don't want to do that, you can send us a 914 00:58:44,640 --> 00:58:48,080 Speaker 1: good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at i heart 915 00:58:48,160 --> 00:58:51,520 Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know 916 00:58:51,840 --> 00:58:54,800 Speaker 1: is a production of I heart Radio. For more podcasts 917 00:58:54,840 --> 00:58:57,040 Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart radio app, 918 00:58:57,120 --> 00:58:59,920 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.