WEBVTT - Corporate Espionage in the Tech Sector

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey thereon

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the tech

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<v Speaker 1>are you? So? In past Tech Stuff episodes, I've talked

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<v Speaker 1>a lot about stuff like intellectual property and patents and

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<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing, and a lot of those episodes

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<v Speaker 1>dip into how companies can end up causing frustration among

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<v Speaker 1>customers and others by being a little too enthusiastic about

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<v Speaker 1>protecting their IP. But how about we look at things

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<v Speaker 1>from a different angle. Why don't we consider some of

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<v Speaker 1>the cases in which a company experienced a hefty loss

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<v Speaker 1>due to someone yoinking IP that wasn't their own. Today,

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<v Speaker 1>I want to talk about industrial espionage, or corporate espionage,

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<v Speaker 1>or economic espionage. So here in the United States you'll

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<v Speaker 1>often hear about the threats of industrial espionage to the

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<v Speaker 1>tech sector as well as to national security, usually with

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<v Speaker 1>the implication that China is behind it all. At least

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<v Speaker 1>in recent years, that's been the narrative. That is a

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<v Speaker 1>driving concern for a lot of legislation and executive orders

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<v Speaker 1>that the US government has issued over the last few years,

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<v Speaker 1>there's this desire to protect US innovations from China, which

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<v Speaker 1>we see manifest in some hefty trade restrictions and that

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<v Speaker 1>kind of thing. But first let's define some terms. So,

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<v Speaker 1>industrial espionage generally covers the situation in which one party

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<v Speaker 1>is spying on the operations of another party, typically a

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<v Speaker 1>company of some sort, in an effort to discover trade secrets.

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<v Speaker 1>The end goal usually is to give some competitor and advantage,

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<v Speaker 1>or to potentially copy the company's work elsewhere, or maybe

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<v Speaker 1>even just to hurt the target company. We're gonna look

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<v Speaker 1>at a whole array of different motivations for corporate espionage

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<v Speaker 1>in this episode. And you know, industrial espionage itself may

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<v Speaker 1>or may not be illegal, depending upon the jurisdiction and

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<v Speaker 1>the nature of the espionage. It could just be considered

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<v Speaker 1>very bad ethics, depending again on the situation. In addition,

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<v Speaker 1>if other factors are involved, matters can clearly escalate. So

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<v Speaker 1>here in the United States we have the Economic Espionage

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<v Speaker 1>Act of nineteen ninety six. This act actually has two provisions.

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<v Speaker 1>The second of the two provisions is your plain old,

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<v Speaker 1>everyday industrial espionage. So essentially, a case where something like

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<v Speaker 1>Company A wants to know how Company B makes its widgets,

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<v Speaker 1>and so Company A sends in a spy to work

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<v Speaker 1>at Company B and then ferret out the secrets and

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<v Speaker 1>then bring it back to Company A so that they

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<v Speaker 1>can capitalize on it and then just claim like, oh, no,

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<v Speaker 1>we reverse engineered the technology, or we came up with

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<v Speaker 1>our own way of doing this. We didn't violate IP

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<v Speaker 1>in any way. The first provision of the Economic Espionage

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<v Speaker 1>Act deals with cases in which the aim of the

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<v Speaker 1>espionage is to benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is international economic espionage baby, and as such

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<v Speaker 1>it is viewed as being a very serious matter. Indeed,

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<v Speaker 1>that'd be fair. Really, all industrial espionage can be serious stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>So we're going to talk about some specific cases of

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<v Speaker 1>espionage in the tech sector and what happened. Now. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not going to be talking about a few of the

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<v Speaker 1>really big espionage cases because they didn't really happen in tech,

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<v Speaker 1>Like there was one industrial espionage case that involved a

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<v Speaker 1>company that makes adhesives, which admittedly was a sticky situation,

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<v Speaker 1>but it wasn't a tech company. I am going to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about these stories in chronological order, and we'll start

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<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen eighties. So first up, let's talk about

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<v Speaker 1>IBM and the company Hitachi. So our story begins with

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<v Speaker 1>a guy named Raymond Cadet, and Cadet had worked as

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<v Speaker 1>a computer scientist for IBM, but he had left the

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<v Speaker 1>company in nineteen eighty in order to go work for

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<v Speaker 1>another business called National Advanced Systems or NAS. Now, Allegedly,

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<v Speaker 1>upon his departure from IBM, Cadet had a case of

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<v Speaker 1>sticky fingers and he took with him ten three ring

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<v Speaker 1>binder workbooks about the IBM's upcoming THREEH eight X series

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<v Speaker 1>of computers. Now, there were twenty seven of these types

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<v Speaker 1>of workbooks total for these systems, twenty seven totals, so

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<v Speaker 1>he only came away with ten volumes of the twenty seven,

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<v Speaker 1>so he had fewer than half of all the workbooks.

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<v Speaker 1>His boss at NAS, a man named Barry Safe, allegedly

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<v Speaker 1>made photo copies of those ten binders, and in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>eighty one, Sefei traveled to Japan, and according to the

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<v Speaker 1>US Department of Justice, he then handed those copies of

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<v Speaker 1>these ten workbooks to executives at Hatachi because NAS was

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<v Speaker 1>marketing Hatachi computers back in the United States, so it

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<v Speaker 1>was kind of like saying, hey, here's IBM's information on

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<v Speaker 1>this upcoming system of computers so that you can get

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<v Speaker 1>the jump on creating your own compatible components and thus

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<v Speaker 1>undercut IBM's sales. So word got back to IBM that

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<v Speaker 1>something hinky was going on when a Hatachi computer engineer

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<v Speaker 1>named Kinji Hayashi revealed to a computer consultant named Maxwell

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<v Speaker 1>Paley that Hitachi had ten of these twenty seven volumes

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<v Speaker 1>from IBM and that he, that is, Hayashi, would be

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<v Speaker 1>really interesting did in acquiring any of the other volumes

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<v Speaker 1>that happened to be out there, you know, if Pailey

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<v Speaker 1>happened to have access to the other seventeen volumes. So

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<v Speaker 1>Pale immediately smelled something fishy. He was also a former

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<v Speaker 1>IBM employee before he became an independent consultant, so he

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<v Speaker 1>sussed out that Hitachi must have gained possession of those

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<v Speaker 1>workbooks without IBM's consent, because it wasn't the sort of

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<v Speaker 1>thing that Big Blue would be sharing just in general.

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<v Speaker 1>So Pilee then calls up one of his former colleagues

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<v Speaker 1>who was still at IBM, and Pailey says, hey, I

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<v Speaker 1>was chatting with this computer engineer over at Hitachi, and

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<v Speaker 1>he had access to ten of your twenty seven workbooks

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<v Speaker 1>about the upcoming three H eight X series of computers.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that cool or is something shady happening? So immediately

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<v Speaker 1>IBM recruited Pailey to come on and act as kind

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<v Speaker 1>of a spy for themselves. So they partnered Paley with

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<v Speaker 1>another fellow named Richard Callahan. And before Richard Callahan had

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<v Speaker 1>joined IBM to be like kind of like a head

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<v Speaker 1>of security, he had been a captain in the Marines.

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<v Speaker 1>He also had been an FBI agent, so he meant business.

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<v Speaker 1>So Pialee was able to go back to Hayashi you

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<v Speaker 1>know who again. Hayashi worked for Haitachi, and Paley told

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<v Speaker 1>Hayashi that, you know, I need to see these workbooks

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<v Speaker 1>to know what I'm looking for. Can you bring them

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<v Speaker 1>to a meeting? And Hayashi said, oh, yes, sure, and

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<v Speaker 1>he brought three of the workbooks with him and showed

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<v Speaker 1>them to Paley and to Callahan, and this gave enough

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<v Speaker 1>proof to IBM to take the next steps. They then

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<v Speaker 1>prosecuted Hitachi by actually first going to the Justice Department

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<v Speaker 1>with their problem and saying we have evidence that this

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<v Speaker 1>is happening. This would bring the FBI into the situation,

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<v Speaker 1>so the FBI would have their own investigation. So at

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<v Speaker 1>this point we're up to nineteen eighty one. No legal

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<v Speaker 1>action has happened yet, but obviously you have the case

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<v Speaker 1>of this former IBM manager leaves the company, hands information

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<v Speaker 1>that's proprietary to IBM to his boss. His boss then

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<v Speaker 1>goes and offers the information up to Hitachi Haitachi is

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<v Speaker 1>now seeking the rest of that information. IBM does its

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<v Speaker 1>little sting operation and discovers that this is the case.

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<v Speaker 1>They now go to the FBI, and the FBI then

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<v Speaker 1>launches their honeypot operation. So some FBI agents pose as

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<v Speaker 1>computer consultants who supposedly had high level access to the

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<v Speaker 1>inner workings of IBM, including these other workbooks that Hitachi

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<v Speaker 1>executives wanted. So the FBI agents approach executives from both

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<v Speaker 1>Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric and they offer to sell trade

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<v Speaker 1>secrets to these Japanese companies. And if they were to

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<v Speaker 1>get hold of these secrets, then they could make computer

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<v Speaker 1>components compatible with upcoming IBM machines. So big big business

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<v Speaker 1>deal here, and Hitachi took the bait. Executives authorized a

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<v Speaker 1>payment of more than half a million dollars for those

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<v Speaker 1>trade secrets, and over the course of seven months, the

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<v Speaker 1>FBI operated this ruse until the US Department of Justice

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<v Speaker 1>was ready to move on the issue. So originally FBI

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<v Speaker 1>agents figured that this operation would take a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>weeks tops, but as they conducted it, they became more

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<v Speaker 1>and more convinced that the issues going on in Tatachi

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<v Speaker 1>weren't just related to a computer engineer right like, they

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<v Speaker 1>went much further up the chain of command. So they

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<v Speaker 1>kept the operation going to try and find out how

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<v Speaker 1>high up does this go. So the FBI alleged that

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<v Speaker 1>more than a dozen Hitachi employees, including high rank executives,

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<v Speaker 1>were responsible for engaging in what was at that point

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<v Speaker 1>the largest industrial espionage case ever in the United States.

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<v Speaker 1>Now in at least one of these situations, Haitachi the

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<v Speaker 1>Company did plead guilty, as did two Hitachi employees. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>Hitachi the Company maintained that the executive leadership was not

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<v Speaker 1>aware that the information was coming in from an illegal source,

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<v Speaker 1>though I don't really know where else it could have

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<v Speaker 1>come from, But the defense was, hey, they thought that

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<v Speaker 1>this was just legitimate information, that nothing was obtained illegally.

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<v Speaker 1>The Hitachi staff who pled guilty received fines of ten

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<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars or less. Hatachi the company settled out of

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<v Speaker 1>court with IBM and submitted to inspections for five years

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<v Speaker 1>so that IBM could actually determine if Hitachi was infringing

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<v Speaker 1>on IBMIP like if they were actually acting on some

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<v Speaker 1>of this information. So while this could have been a

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<v Speaker 1>big case really and you could argue, yeah, it was

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<v Speaker 1>a huge case, the fines were not what you would expect, right,

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<v Speaker 1>We're talking like ten thousand dollars here, five thousand dollars there.

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<v Speaker 1>That's not that much money when you think about the

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<v Speaker 1>things that are going on at the corporate level. But

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<v Speaker 1>we also have to remember this was happening in the

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen eighties. This is before the nineteen ninety six Espionage

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<v Speaker 1>Act was signed into law. IBM, on top of a

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<v Speaker 1>criminal case, pursued a civil case and Hatachi eventually settled

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<v Speaker 1>that one out of court as well for a reported

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<v Speaker 1>three hundred million dollars, which is a big old yaoza.

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<v Speaker 1>Now we are talking as for the National Advanced Systems

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<v Speaker 1>and its parent company of National Semi Conductor. That's the

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<v Speaker 1>company that the former IBM manager had gone to work

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<v Speaker 1>for Well. IBM went after Cadet and Cefe and another

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<v Speaker 1>NAS employee named Tibasuma Yazi, and the case went back

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<v Speaker 1>and forth in the courts. Sometimes a court would find

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<v Speaker 1>for the plaintiffs, sometimes for the defendants, as it would

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<v Speaker 1>get through appeals, and eventually National Semi Conductor ultimately would

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<v Speaker 1>settle out of court in nineteen eighty four for three

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<v Speaker 1>million dollars. So that was the big IBM Haitachi battle.

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<v Speaker 1>Obviously there are a lot more details there, but it

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<v Speaker 1>was already getting pretty complicated just to give the summation.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's move forward a decade to nineteen ninety three.

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<v Speaker 1>That's when the auto manufacturer Volkswagen got into some really

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<v Speaker 1>hot water, which, you know, not that surprising because Volkswagen

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<v Speaker 1>is also the car company that became the center of

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<v Speaker 1>diesel gate. That was when it was discovered that Volkswagen

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<v Speaker 1>had built in a way to fool emissions testing facilities

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<v Speaker 1>with its diesel powered vehicles, so that there was a

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<v Speaker 1>test mode where it wouldn't put out as many emissions,

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<v Speaker 1>but then as soon as it was out of test mode,

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<v Speaker 1>it would go into performance mode and emissions would be

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<v Speaker 1>much worse, they would have failed emissions tests. But as

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<v Speaker 1>it turns out, that's not the only time Volkswagen was

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<v Speaker 1>caught doing something a little bit underhanded. So in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>ninety three, the company higher to a man named Jose Lopez,

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<v Speaker 1>who previously had worked as a purchasing executive for General Motors,

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<v Speaker 1>and in fact Lopez was in line to become the

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<v Speaker 1>head of North American operations for GM. He was known

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<v Speaker 1>as an incredibly effective purchasing executive, like could just create

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<v Speaker 1>the most killer deals for a company and was absolutely

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<v Speaker 1>cutthroat in his negotiations. Well before he could become North

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<v Speaker 1>American operations lead for GM, Volkswagen swooped in and made

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<v Speaker 1>him an offer he couldn't refuse. Specifically, Volkswagen executives promised

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<v Speaker 1>Lopez that the company would build a manufacturing facility in

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<v Speaker 1>the Basque region of Spain. That was something Lopez had

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<v Speaker 1>wanted for a very long time. He wanted to bring

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<v Speaker 1>manufacturing to his homeland, and so Lopez decided he'd take

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<v Speaker 1>the job. And Volkswagen had been in a bit of

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<v Speaker 1>a struggle before Lopez came on board, but quickly they

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<v Speaker 1>started to turn around for the company and the folks

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<v Speaker 1>back at GM were suspicious, and they accused Volkswagen and

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<v Speaker 1>Lopez of capitalizing on GM trade secrets such as the

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<v Speaker 1>company systems for purchasing parts and also their plans for

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<v Speaker 1>their own manufacturing facility. So these accusations ended up becoming

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<v Speaker 1>a big legal battle that stretched through most of the

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen nineties. It all started in ninety three, and GM

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<v Speaker 1>would subsequently file a civil lawsuit against Volkswagen, and the

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<v Speaker 1>two parties would not come to an out of court

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<v Speaker 1>settlement until nineteen ninety seven. At that point, Volkswagen agreed

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<v Speaker 1>to pay GM a cool one hundred million dollars and

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<v Speaker 1>agreed to purchase one billion dollars worth of GM parts

0:14:44.160 --> 0:14:48.800
<v Speaker 1>over the following seven years. Back in Germany, authorities continued

0:14:48.800 --> 0:14:52.440
<v Speaker 1>to pursue a criminal case against Lopez and three associates

0:14:52.480 --> 0:14:56.280
<v Speaker 1>who followed him over from GM to Volkswagen. Now Eventually,

0:14:56.280 --> 0:14:59.120
<v Speaker 1>in nineteen ninety eight, the police agreed to drop charges

0:14:59.200 --> 0:15:03.840
<v Speaker 1>provided that the four former GM executives donate a substantial

0:15:03.920 --> 0:15:07.200
<v Speaker 1>sum of money to charity. Lopez himself had resigned from

0:15:07.240 --> 0:15:10.200
<v Speaker 1>Volkswagen back in nineteen ninety seven. Then he was in

0:15:10.240 --> 0:15:12.560
<v Speaker 1>a terrible car accident and left him in a coma

0:15:12.600 --> 0:15:15.640
<v Speaker 1>for months in nineteen ninety eight. He did recover, however,

0:15:16.000 --> 0:15:19.160
<v Speaker 1>and is still alive today at the age of eighty three.

0:15:20.000 --> 0:15:22.960
<v Speaker 1>All right, we've got several more cases of espionage to

0:15:22.960 --> 0:15:24.840
<v Speaker 1>talk about, but we need to take a quick break

0:15:24.840 --> 0:15:38.800
<v Speaker 1>to thank our sponsors. Okay, Our next case of industrial

0:15:38.960 --> 0:15:43.160
<v Speaker 1>espionage is arguably on the razor's edge of being a

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:45.880
<v Speaker 1>text story in the first place. But I think despite

0:15:45.880 --> 0:15:48.960
<v Speaker 1>the fact that it's a close shave, it still counts.

0:15:49.200 --> 0:15:53.120
<v Speaker 1>And this tale isn't about trying to cash in on secrets,

0:15:53.120 --> 0:15:56.800
<v Speaker 1>but rather to make a perceived enemy bleed from one

0:15:56.840 --> 0:16:00.680
<v Speaker 1>thousand cuts. It's the story of Gillette and a guy

0:16:00.800 --> 0:16:04.040
<v Speaker 1>named Stephen Louis Davis. You see what I did there

0:16:04.040 --> 0:16:07.120
<v Speaker 1>with other the razor punds wasn't clear until I got

0:16:07.120 --> 0:16:09.840
<v Speaker 1>to the end of that. Anyway, Steven L. Davis worked

0:16:09.880 --> 0:16:15.200
<v Speaker 1>for a company called Right Industries Incorporated. That's Right Wright,

0:16:15.480 --> 0:16:19.440
<v Speaker 1>like the Wright brothers. That company is an industrial fabrication company.

0:16:19.840 --> 0:16:22.960
<v Speaker 1>This means that Right Industries is a company that other

0:16:23.080 --> 0:16:27.320
<v Speaker 1>companies go to when it comes time to produce specific

0:16:27.360 --> 0:16:31.520
<v Speaker 1>stuff that these other, you know, originating companies aren't equipped

0:16:31.560 --> 0:16:35.480
<v Speaker 1>to make. So Gellette was a customer of Right Industries,

0:16:35.520 --> 0:16:39.560
<v Speaker 1>and Stephen Davis worked for Right. At the time, Gellette

0:16:39.600 --> 0:16:43.720
<v Speaker 1>was working on something that was top secret. Now, it

0:16:43.840 --> 0:16:47.400
<v Speaker 1>turned out this top secret project would be their Mock

0:16:47.560 --> 0:16:51.400
<v Speaker 1>three triple blade razor. I remember when those came out,

0:16:51.720 --> 0:16:55.120
<v Speaker 1>and it obviously would spawn a bunch of imitators among

0:16:55.400 --> 0:16:58.760
<v Speaker 1>the various competitors in the space. You started seeing razors

0:16:58.760 --> 0:17:01.920
<v Speaker 1>with lots more blaze, sometimes a ludicrous amount, to the

0:17:01.960 --> 0:17:04.679
<v Speaker 1>point where I think there were like parody commercials like

0:17:04.720 --> 0:17:07.760
<v Speaker 1>the seventeen bladed raiser. But this was back when the

0:17:07.840 --> 0:17:10.480
<v Speaker 1>double bladed eraser was kind of the standard. No one

0:17:10.480 --> 0:17:13.119
<v Speaker 1>had cracked the code on answering the question why not

0:17:13.280 --> 0:17:18.480
<v Speaker 1>three blades? So Gellette obviously would need to share information

0:17:18.560 --> 0:17:22.199
<v Speaker 1>about this top secret project with their fabrication partners in

0:17:22.280 --> 0:17:26.440
<v Speaker 1>order to manufacture the things. That information was incredibly valuable,

0:17:26.680 --> 0:17:29.959
<v Speaker 1>so reportedly, Gellette had sunk around seven hundred and fifty

0:17:30.160 --> 0:17:34.000
<v Speaker 1>million dollars in research and development to get to a

0:17:34.040 --> 0:17:38.160
<v Speaker 1>design where the Mock III would work. Now, obviously that

0:17:38.280 --> 0:17:41.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of commitment to a project is enormous, and if

0:17:41.640 --> 0:17:44.359
<v Speaker 1>Gellette couldn't realize a profit off of that work, it

0:17:44.359 --> 0:17:48.000
<v Speaker 1>would be in a huge corporate jam. Kind of like

0:17:48.040 --> 0:17:50.800
<v Speaker 1>when you shave a bit too much before you rense

0:17:50.800 --> 0:17:53.120
<v Speaker 1>out your razor and it gets all jammed up. That's

0:17:53.240 --> 0:17:57.960
<v Speaker 1>kind of what Gellette would be in. So enter Steven L. Davis,

0:17:58.080 --> 0:18:01.880
<v Speaker 1>who again worked for Wright. He was mightily cheesed off

0:18:01.960 --> 0:18:05.600
<v Speaker 1>both at his own direct employer and at Gillette itself.

0:18:05.840 --> 0:18:09.600
<v Speaker 1>So Davis had been working in a rather prominent role

0:18:09.760 --> 0:18:13.239
<v Speaker 1>on the project, but then found himself demoted to a

0:18:13.359 --> 0:18:17.080
<v Speaker 1>lesser role, and he was bitter about that. So he

0:18:17.119 --> 0:18:20.920
<v Speaker 1>thought perhaps one way to vent his spleen would be

0:18:21.280 --> 0:18:25.240
<v Speaker 1>he could take this top secret design of this triple

0:18:25.280 --> 0:18:29.840
<v Speaker 1>bladed razor. He could go to Gellette's competitors in the industry,

0:18:30.000 --> 0:18:32.480
<v Speaker 1>and then he could stick it to Gellette as well

0:18:32.480 --> 0:18:35.800
<v Speaker 1>as his own direct employer. And reportedly, he wasn't even

0:18:35.800 --> 0:18:39.040
<v Speaker 1>looking to profit all this. He wasn't looking to sell

0:18:39.080 --> 0:18:41.840
<v Speaker 1>this information off and then make a huge amount of

0:18:41.880 --> 0:18:45.159
<v Speaker 1>money and then you know, retired to Patagonia or something.

0:18:45.200 --> 0:18:51.520
<v Speaker 1>He just wanted revenge. So off Davis goes with information

0:18:51.600 --> 0:18:55.720
<v Speaker 1>about Gellette's top secret innovation to a couple of different

0:18:55.720 --> 0:19:00.640
<v Speaker 1>companies that included Big the American Safety Razor cup and

0:19:00.920 --> 0:19:04.560
<v Speaker 1>Shick as in Shick Wilkinson's Sword, the makers of the

0:19:04.600 --> 0:19:09.120
<v Speaker 1>Shick razor. Now the folks at Shick immediately contacted their

0:19:09.160 --> 0:19:12.399
<v Speaker 1>peers over at Gillette to tattle on Davis because they

0:19:12.400 --> 0:19:16.399
<v Speaker 1>were like, Okay, this is non information we should have.

0:19:16.560 --> 0:19:19.280
<v Speaker 1>It is really illegal for us to have it. This

0:19:19.359 --> 0:19:22.760
<v Speaker 1>isn't cool. Let's get in front of this and let

0:19:22.800 --> 0:19:26.840
<v Speaker 1>Gellette know what's going on. So Gillette, the executive's there.

0:19:26.880 --> 0:19:30.080
<v Speaker 1>When they find out that Davis had leaked their information

0:19:30.200 --> 0:19:33.879
<v Speaker 1>to their competitors, they contacted the FBI, So the FBI

0:19:34.040 --> 0:19:37.560
<v Speaker 1>launched an investigation. The FBI was able to verify that

0:19:37.680 --> 0:19:41.040
<v Speaker 1>Davis had in fact absconded with these trade secrets and

0:19:41.080 --> 0:19:46.159
<v Speaker 1>attempted corporate espionage, and they apprehended Davis. He was tried

0:19:46.200 --> 0:19:49.320
<v Speaker 1>and found guilty of five counts of corporate espionage under

0:19:49.359 --> 0:19:53.520
<v Speaker 1>the then new Espionage Act of nineteen ninety six. Now,

0:19:53.560 --> 0:19:56.880
<v Speaker 1>he could have received a sentence of up to ten

0:19:57.080 --> 0:20:01.080
<v Speaker 1>years for his crimes, but the judge was far less

0:20:01.160 --> 0:20:05.480
<v Speaker 1>vindictive and gave him a twenty seven month sentence instead.

0:20:05.760 --> 0:20:09.440
<v Speaker 1>Still some you know, serious time, but not ten years. Now,

0:20:10.160 --> 0:20:13.160
<v Speaker 1>around the same time that this whole Stephen Davis Gillette

0:20:13.240 --> 0:20:18.399
<v Speaker 1>case was unfolding. There was another industrial espionage trial that

0:20:18.640 --> 0:20:22.680
<v Speaker 1>was coming to prominence, but this one would actually happen

0:20:22.800 --> 0:20:26.680
<v Speaker 1>before the Espionage Act was signed into law, so there

0:20:26.720 --> 0:20:31.520
<v Speaker 1>is like overlap here. Technically, the Gillette case concluded first,

0:20:31.920 --> 0:20:34.440
<v Speaker 1>but when it came time to decide which ones when

0:20:34.480 --> 0:20:36.880
<v Speaker 1>in the order of this particular episode, it was kind

0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:40.560
<v Speaker 1>of a toss up. This other case involved the Eastman

0:20:40.760 --> 0:20:46.159
<v Speaker 1>Kodak Company and a former manager named Harold Warden. So

0:20:46.680 --> 0:20:50.760
<v Speaker 1>remember we're talking about the mid nineteen nineties at this point.

0:20:51.040 --> 0:20:54.440
<v Speaker 1>This is back when film cameras were far more common

0:20:54.800 --> 0:20:59.080
<v Speaker 1>than digital cameras. This is an era before everyone carried

0:20:59.080 --> 0:21:01.720
<v Speaker 1>around a smartphone that had a digital camera in it.

0:21:02.000 --> 0:21:04.520
<v Speaker 1>So if you were taking pictures back in the nineties,

0:21:04.720 --> 0:21:09.280
<v Speaker 1>chances are you were doing so on film, and Kodak

0:21:09.840 --> 0:21:13.280
<v Speaker 1>was the name in film. The company had a long

0:21:13.480 --> 0:21:16.600
<v Speaker 1>history of research and development in the world of film.

0:21:16.880 --> 0:21:21.000
<v Speaker 1>They were responsible for creating all new processes and they

0:21:21.040 --> 0:21:25.200
<v Speaker 1>tested new materials on an effort to gain market dominance.

0:21:25.800 --> 0:21:30.520
<v Speaker 1>So Warden had worked for Kodak for nearly thirty years

0:21:30.960 --> 0:21:34.440
<v Speaker 1>and then he retired from Kodak in nineteen ninety two,

0:21:35.119 --> 0:21:37.520
<v Speaker 1>and one thing that Kodak had worked on during that

0:21:37.640 --> 0:21:42.200
<v Speaker 1>time was a secret method for making film. Their process

0:21:42.880 --> 0:21:46.359
<v Speaker 1>gave the company a real advantage because they could make

0:21:46.680 --> 0:21:50.000
<v Speaker 1>film at a faster pace than their competitors and at

0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:53.359
<v Speaker 1>a higher level of quality than their competitors could do.

0:21:54.040 --> 0:21:56.880
<v Speaker 1>And most folks at Kodak only had a tiny glimpse

0:21:56.960 --> 0:22:00.760
<v Speaker 1>into how it all worked. Because the philosophy Kodak was

0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:06.440
<v Speaker 1>to protect corporate information, they would compartmentalize everyone. You would

0:22:06.520 --> 0:22:09.800
<v Speaker 1>only need to know the stuff that directly pertained to

0:22:09.880 --> 0:22:13.480
<v Speaker 1>your job, and you were ignorant of everything else. But Warden,

0:22:13.880 --> 0:22:17.040
<v Speaker 1>because he was a manager, knew a bit more than

0:22:17.080 --> 0:22:20.160
<v Speaker 1>most people did. He had a larger view of how

0:22:20.200 --> 0:22:23.560
<v Speaker 1>the process worked. So he goes off to retire, and

0:22:23.600 --> 0:22:27.359
<v Speaker 1>when he does, he creates his own independent consulting firms.

0:22:27.359 --> 0:22:30.040
<v Speaker 1>So he retires from Kodak, but he's not done working.

0:22:30.080 --> 0:22:33.600
<v Speaker 1>He's now working for himself. As well as that, he

0:22:33.760 --> 0:22:36.359
<v Speaker 1>ends up keeping up this line of communication open with

0:22:36.440 --> 0:22:39.520
<v Speaker 1>some of his former colleagues who were still at Kodak

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:43.280
<v Speaker 1>or who had recently left the company, and would occasionally

0:22:43.280 --> 0:22:45.439
<v Speaker 1>be able to convince them to hand over or to

0:22:45.600 --> 0:22:50.280
<v Speaker 1>sell proprietary information from Kodak. Now, using this method, he

0:22:50.440 --> 0:22:55.440
<v Speaker 1>essentially assembled the book on Kodak's processes that was not

0:22:55.640 --> 0:22:58.439
<v Speaker 1>within the company itself, and then he would kind of

0:22:58.520 --> 0:23:01.600
<v Speaker 1>use this information to see if any Kodak's competitors would

0:23:01.640 --> 0:23:05.679
<v Speaker 1>be interested and you know, taking advantage of his wealth

0:23:05.720 --> 0:23:08.479
<v Speaker 1>of information. So he would kind of coach clients on

0:23:08.480 --> 0:23:11.280
<v Speaker 1>how to work the way that Kodak worked. This was

0:23:11.359 --> 0:23:14.399
<v Speaker 1>kind of a clever workaround, like he was trying not

0:23:14.600 --> 0:23:19.800
<v Speaker 1>to sell outright patented information to others. He was trying

0:23:19.840 --> 0:23:25.080
<v Speaker 1>to avoid a crystal clear violation of the law, but

0:23:25.520 --> 0:23:29.720
<v Speaker 1>he was playing in a very gray area himself. So

0:23:29.840 --> 0:23:34.040
<v Speaker 1>Kodak gets wind of something going on when one of

0:23:34.080 --> 0:23:37.720
<v Speaker 1>its competitors said, hey, a former manager who used to

0:23:37.760 --> 0:23:41.679
<v Speaker 1>work for y'all offered to tell us how you do everything.

0:23:42.240 --> 0:23:45.520
<v Speaker 1>So then Kodak conducts a little sting operation of their own.

0:23:45.960 --> 0:23:48.840
<v Speaker 1>A Kodak executive pretended to be a representative of a

0:23:48.960 --> 0:23:52.679
<v Speaker 1>Chinese company that was just getting into film manufacturing. So,

0:23:53.640 --> 0:23:58.879
<v Speaker 1>posing as this supposed Chinese executive, he offered Warden a

0:23:58.920 --> 0:24:03.040
<v Speaker 1>buttload of cash in return for some trade secrets from Kodak,

0:24:03.400 --> 0:24:06.840
<v Speaker 1>and Warden said he would not sell any patented technology,

0:24:06.880 --> 0:24:09.480
<v Speaker 1>but he did offer to bend the rules so that

0:24:09.520 --> 0:24:12.040
<v Speaker 1>pretty much everything else would still be on the table.

0:24:12.480 --> 0:24:16.720
<v Speaker 1>Kodak then contacted the FBI. The FBI investigated Warden and

0:24:16.760 --> 0:24:19.840
<v Speaker 1>they found that he had pretty much all the documentation

0:24:19.960 --> 0:24:24.160
<v Speaker 1>you needed to copy some of Kodak's most important processes

0:24:24.200 --> 0:24:28.800
<v Speaker 1>in manufacturing. So the FBI arrested Warden, and at this point,

0:24:28.840 --> 0:24:31.160
<v Speaker 1>like I said, the Espionage Act of nineteen ninety six

0:24:31.280 --> 0:24:34.480
<v Speaker 1>hadn't been signed into law, so they couldn't charge him

0:24:34.840 --> 0:24:38.000
<v Speaker 1>on that act because it was not yet law. Instead,

0:24:38.520 --> 0:24:41.720
<v Speaker 1>they held him on a charge of transporting stolen property

0:24:41.760 --> 0:24:46.119
<v Speaker 1>across state lines. Now, he ultimately would plead guilty to

0:24:46.200 --> 0:24:48.560
<v Speaker 1>this charge, and he received a sentence of one year

0:24:48.600 --> 0:24:52.080
<v Speaker 1>in prison, three months of house arrest, three years of probation,

0:24:52.320 --> 0:24:56.480
<v Speaker 1>and a fine of thirty thousand dollars. Again, that's a lot,

0:24:56.560 --> 0:24:58.960
<v Speaker 1>I mean thirty grand. That's a lot of money to

0:24:59.000 --> 0:25:01.520
<v Speaker 1>get hit with as a fine. But when you're looking

0:25:01.560 --> 0:25:05.560
<v Speaker 1>at the possible damage that this would do to a

0:25:05.560 --> 0:25:09.240
<v Speaker 1>company like Kodak, where you're talking about countless millions of

0:25:09.280 --> 0:25:13.240
<v Speaker 1>dollars that had been spent on creating the system in

0:25:13.280 --> 0:25:18.480
<v Speaker 1>the first place, and then the weight of that secrecy.

0:25:19.119 --> 0:25:21.639
<v Speaker 1>It was obviously an important thing at Kodak, where they

0:25:21.640 --> 0:25:24.960
<v Speaker 1>were trying to keep it compartmentalized as much as possible.

0:25:25.240 --> 0:25:27.919
<v Speaker 1>Thirty grand is nothing compared to the damage that you

0:25:27.920 --> 0:25:31.600
<v Speaker 1>could do. Now let's talk about a case that was

0:25:31.680 --> 0:25:35.520
<v Speaker 1>total garbage, and by that I mean it involves total garbage.

0:25:35.560 --> 0:25:39.119
<v Speaker 1>I'm talking about Oracle's fight with Microsoft. Now, some of

0:25:39.160 --> 0:25:41.399
<v Speaker 1>y'all might already know where this story is going. You

0:25:41.480 --> 0:25:45.280
<v Speaker 1>might have memories of this, but let's set the stage

0:25:45.280 --> 0:25:49.080
<v Speaker 1>for everybody in case you either are young, maybe you

0:25:49.119 --> 0:25:52.200
<v Speaker 1>weren't all round when this happened, or maybe you've just forgotten.

0:25:52.600 --> 0:25:56.080
<v Speaker 1>But first we have to understand the parties involved. Right,

0:25:56.119 --> 0:25:59.159
<v Speaker 1>you've got Oracle, which is a computer technology company, and

0:25:59.240 --> 0:26:02.199
<v Speaker 1>back in two thousand, when this story was unfolding, it

0:26:02.240 --> 0:26:06.600
<v Speaker 1>was primarily known as a database software company. These days,

0:26:06.640 --> 0:26:09.320
<v Speaker 1>Oracle does tons of stuff. To call it a database

0:26:09.359 --> 0:26:12.280
<v Speaker 1>software company would be reductive. They are a big player

0:26:12.280 --> 0:26:15.200
<v Speaker 1>in things like cloud computing. Oracle is also the company

0:26:15.200 --> 0:26:20.560
<v Speaker 1>that actually houses TikTok's servers, the servers that hold information

0:26:20.600 --> 0:26:23.320
<v Speaker 1>about American citizens. You might remember that was like a

0:26:23.359 --> 0:26:29.240
<v Speaker 1>big deal during President Trump's administration was that TikTok would

0:26:29.240 --> 0:26:34.920
<v Speaker 1>make certain that it would sequester its servers from its

0:26:35.000 --> 0:26:38.159
<v Speaker 1>parent company byte Dance, which is a Chinese company, and

0:26:38.200 --> 0:26:41.920
<v Speaker 1>that Oracle would end up housing the servers that TikTok

0:26:42.400 --> 0:26:46.640
<v Speaker 1>would use for American citizen data. Well, anyway, before all

0:26:46.680 --> 0:26:51.879
<v Speaker 1>that would happen, Oracle was really a software database company,

0:26:52.160 --> 0:26:58.040
<v Speaker 1>and one of their big corporate competitors was obviously Microsoft. Now,

0:26:58.359 --> 0:27:02.080
<v Speaker 1>since the early nineteen nine Microsoft had really been on

0:27:02.240 --> 0:27:05.240
<v Speaker 1>the defensive with the US Department of Justice because the

0:27:05.280 --> 0:27:09.960
<v Speaker 1>government was concerned that Microsoft was essentially operating monopoly because

0:27:10.119 --> 0:27:14.000
<v Speaker 1>spoiler alert, they were kind of operating a monopoly specifically

0:27:14.040 --> 0:27:17.959
<v Speaker 1>in the consumer computer space. You know, things like Windows

0:27:18.560 --> 0:27:22.760
<v Speaker 1>was practically the default operating system for most computers at

0:27:22.760 --> 0:27:25.600
<v Speaker 1>that time. Like Apple did have a presence, but it

0:27:25.640 --> 0:27:30.000
<v Speaker 1>was a sliver of the pie. It was essentially Microsoft's world.

0:27:30.160 --> 0:27:34.199
<v Speaker 1>They could operate like a monopoly since they made the

0:27:34.320 --> 0:27:38.520
<v Speaker 1>operating system and they also made other types of software

0:27:38.640 --> 0:27:42.400
<v Speaker 1>like productivity software think about the Office Suite of programs.

0:27:42.800 --> 0:27:46.280
<v Speaker 1>There was this concern that Microsoft was using the leverage

0:27:46.320 --> 0:27:51.360
<v Speaker 1>of having operating system dominance to also dominate in those

0:27:51.400 --> 0:27:55.280
<v Speaker 1>other areas. And to suppress competition from other software companies

0:27:55.359 --> 0:28:00.159
<v Speaker 1>like Oracle. And Microsoft had essentially agreed to in the

0:28:00.200 --> 0:28:03.400
<v Speaker 1>early nineties that it would keep Windows and its other

0:28:03.480 --> 0:28:08.800
<v Speaker 1>products separate. That yes, you could buy Microsoft Office, but

0:28:08.880 --> 0:28:13.800
<v Speaker 1>that it wouldn't be deeply integrated into Windows, so that customers,

0:28:13.800 --> 0:28:17.440
<v Speaker 1>whether they were you know, end consumers or PC manufacturers

0:28:17.520 --> 0:28:20.400
<v Speaker 1>or whatever, would have the freedom to choose which software

0:28:20.400 --> 0:28:23.040
<v Speaker 1>products they actually wanted to run on their Windows machines

0:28:23.440 --> 0:28:25.760
<v Speaker 1>and not force them to go all in with Microsoft

0:28:25.840 --> 0:28:28.880
<v Speaker 1>branded products. So that way, if you wanted to use

0:28:28.920 --> 0:28:31.800
<v Speaker 1>Word Perfect instead of Microsoft Word, or you want to

0:28:31.840 --> 0:28:34.840
<v Speaker 1>LOADUE one, two three instead of Excel, that would be fine.

0:28:35.040 --> 0:28:39.680
<v Speaker 1>Except Microsoft did package Internet Explorer with Windows, and the

0:28:39.760 --> 0:28:44.200
<v Speaker 1>two were heavily integrated together, and the Department of Justice

0:28:44.320 --> 0:28:49.120
<v Speaker 1>was concerned about that, as were companies like Netscape. Now

0:28:49.200 --> 0:28:52.680
<v Speaker 1>Microsoft was essentially saying, hey, yeah, no, no, no, no, no,

0:28:52.840 --> 0:28:56.320
<v Speaker 1>you don't get it. Internet Explorer isn't a product, It's

0:28:56.560 --> 0:29:01.080
<v Speaker 1>just a feature of Windows. But since the word competing

0:29:01.240 --> 0:29:05.360
<v Speaker 1>internet browsers on the market like Netscape, that argument didn't

0:29:05.400 --> 0:29:08.360
<v Speaker 1>really fly with the government, and so you had this

0:29:08.680 --> 0:29:15.920
<v Speaker 1>massive antitrust lawsuit brought against Microsoft by the United States government.

0:29:16.600 --> 0:29:20.680
<v Speaker 1>But justice does not move swiftly here in the US

0:29:21.000 --> 0:29:24.080
<v Speaker 1>most of the time, and this issue dragged on for

0:29:24.160 --> 0:29:28.640
<v Speaker 1>the full decade. So as two thousand came around, we

0:29:28.640 --> 0:29:30.840
<v Speaker 1>were finally getting to a point where the judge in

0:29:30.880 --> 0:29:34.000
<v Speaker 1>the case was nearing a decision as to whether Microsoft

0:29:34.080 --> 0:29:37.000
<v Speaker 1>had been acting as a monopoly or not. From a

0:29:37.120 --> 0:29:41.040
<v Speaker 1>legal perspective, Oracle clearly had something to gain here with

0:29:41.080 --> 0:29:44.920
<v Speaker 1>that decision, But Oracle also wanted to see Microsoft's hold

0:29:45.280 --> 0:29:48.520
<v Speaker 1>slip a bit so that Microsoft couldn't just throw its

0:29:48.560 --> 0:29:52.680
<v Speaker 1>weight around and dictate terms to everybody else. And then

0:29:52.760 --> 0:29:56.760
<v Speaker 1>an organization called the Independent Institute took out a full

0:29:56.880 --> 0:30:00.440
<v Speaker 1>page of ads and newspapers across the United States, and

0:30:00.520 --> 0:30:05.400
<v Speaker 1>this ad quoted different academics who said that the government

0:30:05.480 --> 0:30:09.360
<v Speaker 1>was unfairly targeting Microsoft and didn't have any justification to

0:30:09.400 --> 0:30:12.440
<v Speaker 1>say that the company was behaving as a monopoly. And

0:30:12.480 --> 0:30:17.800
<v Speaker 1>the folks at Oracle began to wonder just how independent

0:30:18.160 --> 0:30:22.120
<v Speaker 1>that Independent Institute was, and they suspected that, in fact,

0:30:22.640 --> 0:30:25.720
<v Speaker 1>it might be a group that perhaps received some funding

0:30:25.920 --> 0:30:30.040
<v Speaker 1>and direction from Microsoft itself in an effort to shape

0:30:30.120 --> 0:30:33.479
<v Speaker 1>public opinion about the case and to coerce the judge

0:30:33.600 --> 0:30:37.520
<v Speaker 1>into dismissing the whole thing, and then they decided they

0:30:37.520 --> 0:30:40.520
<v Speaker 1>were going to find out. I'll talk about how they

0:30:40.560 --> 0:30:43.360
<v Speaker 1>did that after we come back from this quick break

0:30:43.360 --> 0:30:57.840
<v Speaker 1>from our sponsors. Okay, so Microsoft is under the microscope

0:30:57.840 --> 0:31:00.720
<v Speaker 1>by the US government. It is on the defensive. It's

0:31:00.760 --> 0:31:04.800
<v Speaker 1>trying to claim it's not acting as a monopoly. And

0:31:05.240 --> 0:31:11.160
<v Speaker 1>this supposed independent Institute of Academics publishes these ads, buys ads,

0:31:11.160 --> 0:31:13.520
<v Speaker 1>but all the goodness of their hearts, they purchase ads

0:31:13.520 --> 0:31:17.120
<v Speaker 1>and newspapers across the United States to say, hey, government,

0:31:17.560 --> 0:31:22.160
<v Speaker 1>they're overstepping yourself. This is not a case of monopoly.

0:31:23.360 --> 0:31:27.280
<v Speaker 1>And moreover, you don't really have the jurisdiction or authority

0:31:27.320 --> 0:31:31.440
<v Speaker 1>to do this. This is anti American, it's bad for business,

0:31:31.480 --> 0:31:34.440
<v Speaker 1>et cetera, et cetera. So the folks in the Oracle

0:31:34.480 --> 0:31:37.160
<v Speaker 1>are saying, I think something's up, don't. I don't think

0:31:37.200 --> 0:31:40.000
<v Speaker 1>this is really an independent group at all. So the

0:31:40.080 --> 0:31:43.080
<v Speaker 1>executives at Oracle then hire on a firm, a couple

0:31:43.120 --> 0:31:44.880
<v Speaker 1>of firms actually, but the one we really want to

0:31:44.920 --> 0:31:47.800
<v Speaker 1>talk about. The investigators were from a firm that was

0:31:47.840 --> 0:31:51.600
<v Speaker 1>called IGI to look into the whole thing, and the

0:31:51.640 --> 0:31:55.600
<v Speaker 1>executives told IGI do whatever it takes as long as

0:31:55.600 --> 0:31:59.400
<v Speaker 1>it's within the boundaries of the law, and find out

0:31:59.440 --> 0:32:03.920
<v Speaker 1>if micro Soft is actually funding this supposed independent institute.

0:32:04.200 --> 0:32:09.000
<v Speaker 1>So IGI came back to Oracle with receipts. Like literally,

0:32:09.240 --> 0:32:12.480
<v Speaker 1>IGI found documentation linking a one hundred and fifty three

0:32:12.600 --> 0:32:17.440
<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars payment from Microsoft to the institute, and a

0:32:17.480 --> 0:32:20.360
<v Speaker 1>New York Times journalist was then given access to this

0:32:20.480 --> 0:32:23.840
<v Speaker 1>little nugget of information and published an article about it.

0:32:24.080 --> 0:32:27.280
<v Speaker 1>And when that article showed up and it showed this

0:32:27.440 --> 0:32:32.640
<v Speaker 1>link between Microsoft and the supposed independent institute, well there

0:32:32.720 --> 0:32:35.120
<v Speaker 1>was a lot of egg on Microsoft's face, and there

0:32:35.160 --> 0:32:40.480
<v Speaker 1>was some suspicion that IGI had stolen that information. The

0:32:40.520 --> 0:32:45.080
<v Speaker 1>president of the Independent Institute said as much. But the

0:32:45.280 --> 0:32:49.920
<v Speaker 1>truth appeared to be that IGI didn't steal anything because

0:32:49.960 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 1>stealing is obviously illegal and they were told to operate

0:32:54.280 --> 0:32:57.920
<v Speaker 1>within the bounds of the law. So what IGI had

0:32:58.000 --> 0:33:02.600
<v Speaker 1>done was they went on a little dive. They literally

0:33:03.000 --> 0:33:08.040
<v Speaker 1>sifted through the trash from the Independent Institute until they

0:33:08.040 --> 0:33:11.400
<v Speaker 1>were able to find a copy of financial statements that

0:33:11.520 --> 0:33:15.000
<v Speaker 1>included the Microsoft payment information. That was not the end

0:33:15.040 --> 0:33:19.280
<v Speaker 1>of it, however, Oracle also directed IGI to investigate another

0:33:19.440 --> 0:33:25.120
<v Speaker 1>organization called the National Taxpayers Union, which, like the Independent Institute,

0:33:25.480 --> 0:33:28.880
<v Speaker 1>had been shaming the US government for having the audacity

0:33:29.080 --> 0:33:33.280
<v Speaker 1>to go after Microsoft, that little scrappy mom and pop

0:33:33.440 --> 0:33:36.560
<v Speaker 1>store that just happened to be run by a massive billionaire.

0:33:36.920 --> 0:33:39.760
<v Speaker 1>Keep in mind that Oracle was also being run by

0:33:39.800 --> 0:33:43.080
<v Speaker 1>a billionaire. But this is two billionaires kind of hating

0:33:43.120 --> 0:33:46.240
<v Speaker 1>on each other. So I'm all for it. If billionaires

0:33:46.280 --> 0:33:50.200
<v Speaker 1>want to rock'em sockem robots for my entertainment, have ad it?

0:33:50.360 --> 0:33:54.440
<v Speaker 1>I say. Anyway, IGI once again took to the garbage

0:33:54.520 --> 0:33:58.400
<v Speaker 1>cans and found evidence that Microsoft had paid this so

0:33:58.520 --> 0:34:03.960
<v Speaker 1>called National tax Payers Union around two hundred thousand dollars.

0:34:04.600 --> 0:34:09.359
<v Speaker 1>So IGI made sure through a different organization that the

0:34:09.520 --> 0:34:12.880
<v Speaker 1>Washington Post got access to this little bit of info,

0:34:12.960 --> 0:34:16.200
<v Speaker 1>and the Washington Post posted an article that once again

0:34:16.239 --> 0:34:21.439
<v Speaker 1>showed Microsoft was kind of astroturfing by paying all these

0:34:21.480 --> 0:34:26.600
<v Speaker 1>different supposed independent organizations to say that Microsoft had done

0:34:26.640 --> 0:34:29.319
<v Speaker 1>nothing wrong and that in fact, the US government was

0:34:29.400 --> 0:34:34.239
<v Speaker 1>harming American commerce through this this whole court case in

0:34:34.280 --> 0:34:37.879
<v Speaker 1>the first case. Now, around the same time, some other

0:34:38.000 --> 0:34:42.360
<v Speaker 1>organizations that were on Microsoft side reported that on occasion

0:34:42.800 --> 0:34:47.320
<v Speaker 1>people were showing up to their various corporate headquarters claiming

0:34:47.320 --> 0:34:50.360
<v Speaker 1>to be someone they were not. That strangers were showing

0:34:50.480 --> 0:34:55.080
<v Speaker 1>up and claiming to be representatives of various organizations or

0:34:55.360 --> 0:34:58.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, high level executives or something, and that sometimes

0:34:59.360 --> 0:35:03.600
<v Speaker 1>stuff would go so missing after these visits, like say

0:35:03.800 --> 0:35:08.400
<v Speaker 1>a laptop with company information on it. Now, nothing solid

0:35:08.800 --> 0:35:12.680
<v Speaker 1>would link these supposed incidents to Oracle or to the

0:35:12.719 --> 0:35:16.320
<v Speaker 1>firms that Oracle was using, like IGI, but the implication

0:35:16.600 --> 0:35:20.239
<v Speaker 1>was that Oracle was not just sifting through garbage or

0:35:20.280 --> 0:35:23.279
<v Speaker 1>not just using investigators to sift through garbage, but we're

0:35:23.320 --> 0:35:27.920
<v Speaker 1>outright stealing stuff in order to show that Microsoft was

0:35:28.000 --> 0:35:32.480
<v Speaker 1>kind of behind all these supposed independent groups and that

0:35:32.640 --> 0:35:36.120
<v Speaker 1>therefore there was you know, law breaking going on. But

0:35:36.200 --> 0:35:39.759
<v Speaker 1>again there was no firm evidence to actually show that

0:35:39.840 --> 0:35:43.319
<v Speaker 1>this was the case. Now, eventually, while this is all

0:35:43.360 --> 0:35:46.759
<v Speaker 1>going on, at least initially, no one knows that Oracle's

0:35:46.800 --> 0:35:50.719
<v Speaker 1>doing this. Right, these these articles are coming out, but

0:35:50.800 --> 0:35:55.200
<v Speaker 1>it's not clear where the information came from that ends

0:35:55.280 --> 0:35:58.280
<v Speaker 1>up being you know, the central point of the article.

0:35:58.600 --> 0:36:01.200
<v Speaker 1>So New York Times and the Washington Post they start

0:36:01.239 --> 0:36:04.920
<v Speaker 1>publishing these articles linking Microsoft to these different groups but

0:36:05.000 --> 0:36:07.799
<v Speaker 1>there was no clear link to where this was all

0:36:07.840 --> 0:36:13.279
<v Speaker 1>coming from. Eventually, Oracle's role became public knowledge, and at

0:36:13.280 --> 0:36:19.600
<v Speaker 1>that point, Lawrence Ellison, the billionaire behind Oracle, was completely unrepentant.

0:36:20.000 --> 0:36:23.840
<v Speaker 1>He did not apologize. He said the stuff that was

0:36:23.920 --> 0:36:27.440
<v Speaker 1>directly linked to his company wasn't technically illegal, like some

0:36:27.480 --> 0:36:30.920
<v Speaker 1>of it might be considered, you know, unsavory that you're

0:36:31.000 --> 0:36:34.480
<v Speaker 1>sifting through garbage or whatever, but it wasn't against the law.

0:36:35.280 --> 0:36:39.560
<v Speaker 1>And further, he was saying Microsoft is the real bad

0:36:39.600 --> 0:36:43.480
<v Speaker 1>guy here. The company is essentially trying to sell the

0:36:43.600 --> 0:36:46.919
<v Speaker 1>story that anything that would be bad for Microsoft would

0:36:46.920 --> 0:36:49.800
<v Speaker 1>also be bad for the United States of America, which

0:36:50.320 --> 0:36:54.280
<v Speaker 1>just isn't the case. And it was a completely disingenuous argument.

0:36:54.320 --> 0:36:56.759
<v Speaker 1>So he's like, I don't feel sorry about this at all.

0:36:56.880 --> 0:37:01.799
<v Speaker 1>I absolutely feel I'm justified in investigating Microsoft's connection to

0:37:01.840 --> 0:37:05.279
<v Speaker 1>these groups that supposedly are saying they're coming forth on

0:37:05.400 --> 0:37:11.080
<v Speaker 1>their own to defend Microsoft. There are a ton more

0:37:11.280 --> 0:37:14.040
<v Speaker 1>examples of things that happen in that case as well.

0:37:14.080 --> 0:37:16.680
<v Speaker 1>You could do just a full episode that really dives

0:37:16.719 --> 0:37:19.520
<v Speaker 1>into that one. It was a juicy one, but we

0:37:19.600 --> 0:37:24.000
<v Speaker 1>should probably conclude this episode with just one more espionage

0:37:24.120 --> 0:37:25.960
<v Speaker 1>case to talk about. There are a lot of other

0:37:26.000 --> 0:37:28.800
<v Speaker 1>ones I could choose from. I mean, there's a Lewandowski

0:37:29.120 --> 0:37:32.720
<v Speaker 1>Waimo Uber story that I feel I need to follow

0:37:32.800 --> 0:37:36.080
<v Speaker 1>up on I've talked about in past episodes many years ago.

0:37:36.360 --> 0:37:40.960
<v Speaker 1>But instead, let's talk about a case of espionage in

0:37:41.000 --> 0:37:45.359
<v Speaker 1>which a company spied on its own boardroom and its

0:37:45.400 --> 0:37:50.120
<v Speaker 1>executives and employees. Shall we. So at this point, chronologically,

0:37:50.680 --> 0:37:53.720
<v Speaker 1>we're up to the mid two thousands, so it's after

0:37:53.800 --> 0:37:57.480
<v Speaker 1>the dot com crash, and the tech industry is kind

0:37:57.560 --> 0:38:02.040
<v Speaker 1>of on the road to recovery, really being shaken by

0:38:02.080 --> 0:38:05.200
<v Speaker 1>the whole dot com bubble bursting. The company we're talking

0:38:05.200 --> 0:38:08.480
<v Speaker 1>about is Hewitt Packard or HP, and it had been

0:38:08.520 --> 0:38:13.400
<v Speaker 1>through some chucha changes, as David Bowie would say. In

0:38:13.480 --> 0:38:18.399
<v Speaker 1>nineteen ninety nine, HP had brought on Carly Fiorina as

0:38:18.560 --> 0:38:22.440
<v Speaker 1>the new CEO for HP. She came in from outside

0:38:22.440 --> 0:38:25.920
<v Speaker 1>the company. She jumped the head of internal candidates who

0:38:25.960 --> 0:38:30.200
<v Speaker 1>were under consideration for CEO, and she took charge of it. Now,

0:38:30.719 --> 0:38:33.480
<v Speaker 1>that was something that some people on the board weren't

0:38:33.520 --> 0:38:35.799
<v Speaker 1>really crazy about. In fact, a lot of people at

0:38:35.920 --> 0:38:39.760
<v Speaker 1>HP weren't crazy about it, and she had never held

0:38:39.800 --> 0:38:44.560
<v Speaker 1>a CEO level position before, and according to some her

0:38:44.600 --> 0:38:47.240
<v Speaker 1>appointment was due to members of the Board of directors

0:38:47.320 --> 0:38:50.600
<v Speaker 1>kind of playing game of thrones against each other that

0:38:50.640 --> 0:38:54.000
<v Speaker 1>it was a really toxic environment at the board level,

0:38:54.280 --> 0:38:56.400
<v Speaker 1>and it sounds like things got really nasty. It sounds

0:38:56.400 --> 0:39:00.480
<v Speaker 1>like there was like this generational gap between two halves

0:39:00.480 --> 0:39:05.600
<v Speaker 1>of the board. Now, HP traditionally had this group of

0:39:05.680 --> 0:39:10.160
<v Speaker 1>principles that its founders had suggested were like the guiding

0:39:10.320 --> 0:39:14.799
<v Speaker 1>light for their managerial style at HP. So these were

0:39:14.880 --> 0:39:18.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of like the commandments from HP. They were considered

0:39:18.960 --> 0:39:22.759
<v Speaker 1>to be like the ethical core of the company. The

0:39:22.840 --> 0:39:28.080
<v Speaker 1>principles included we have trust and respect for individuals. We

0:39:28.120 --> 0:39:31.799
<v Speaker 1>focus on a high level of achievement and contribution. We

0:39:31.840 --> 0:39:36.800
<v Speaker 1>conduct our business with uncompromising integrity. We achieve our common

0:39:36.840 --> 0:39:42.399
<v Speaker 1>objectives through teamwork. We encourage flexibility and innovation in how

0:39:42.480 --> 0:39:47.920
<v Speaker 1>the company is managed. But by this point in HP's history,

0:39:48.040 --> 0:39:52.200
<v Speaker 1>those principles were starting to become what Barbosa in parts

0:39:52.200 --> 0:39:55.239
<v Speaker 1>of the Caribbean would say were more like guidelines than

0:39:55.239 --> 0:40:00.640
<v Speaker 1>actual rules, and Carly Fiorina viewed these princes as being

0:40:00.719 --> 0:40:05.040
<v Speaker 1>outdated and actually holding HP back from taking its place

0:40:05.800 --> 0:40:11.080
<v Speaker 1>in the next century. So she started making some really

0:40:11.200 --> 0:40:15.240
<v Speaker 1>drastic changes at HP that included stuff like asking employees

0:40:15.280 --> 0:40:18.239
<v Speaker 1>to take pay cuts so that they could avoid layoffs,

0:40:18.600 --> 0:40:22.759
<v Speaker 1>and then following that with massive layoffs. And to say

0:40:22.800 --> 0:40:26.520
<v Speaker 1>that she was unpopular among the HP staff is putting

0:40:26.600 --> 0:40:31.400
<v Speaker 1>it lightly. She also had some supporters in the boardroom,

0:40:31.640 --> 0:40:34.520
<v Speaker 1>and then she had some enemies in the boardroom. She

0:40:34.600 --> 0:40:37.920
<v Speaker 1>herself was chair of the board and CEO, so she

0:40:37.960 --> 0:40:41.360
<v Speaker 1>would have these brutal corporate fights with the rest of

0:40:41.400 --> 0:40:44.160
<v Speaker 1>the board in order to see her vision through, including

0:40:44.920 --> 0:40:47.960
<v Speaker 1>a massive merger with Compact, which at the time was

0:40:48.000 --> 0:40:51.959
<v Speaker 1>one of the largest mergers ever. So she fought these

0:40:52.080 --> 0:40:55.480
<v Speaker 1>battles in the boardroom, and some battles she won, but

0:40:55.560 --> 0:40:58.000
<v Speaker 1>she didn't win all of them. In fact, in two

0:40:58.040 --> 0:41:00.920
<v Speaker 1>thousand and four, the rest of the board succeeded in

0:41:01.080 --> 0:41:05.359
<v Speaker 1>forcing Carly Fiorina to resign from HP, and they said

0:41:05.360 --> 0:41:07.680
<v Speaker 1>that she had just done a massive amount of damage

0:41:07.680 --> 0:41:10.760
<v Speaker 1>to the company and that she had forced the company

0:41:10.800 --> 0:41:14.480
<v Speaker 1>to abandon its corporate culture. It was just a really

0:41:14.600 --> 0:41:18.400
<v Speaker 1>nasty situation. Her replacement as chair of the board was

0:41:18.440 --> 0:41:22.560
<v Speaker 1>a woman named Patricia Dunn. Patricia Dunn had been CEO

0:41:22.640 --> 0:41:25.439
<v Speaker 1>of Barclay's Global Investors in the past. She had also

0:41:25.480 --> 0:41:28.520
<v Speaker 1>been a member of HP's board of directors since two

0:41:28.560 --> 0:41:31.480
<v Speaker 1>thousand and one, so she was no stranger to that environment.

0:41:31.880 --> 0:41:36.680
<v Speaker 1>And starting in early two thousand and five, someone began

0:41:36.840 --> 0:41:41.520
<v Speaker 1>leaking information about boardroom activities and discussions and meetings to

0:41:41.600 --> 0:41:45.280
<v Speaker 1>the press. And this obviously was a huge no note.

0:41:45.400 --> 0:41:48.200
<v Speaker 1>It also meant that whoever was doing this was at

0:41:48.200 --> 0:41:51.319
<v Speaker 1>a very high level or who had access to very

0:41:51.400 --> 0:41:54.640
<v Speaker 1>high level information. Now, there was a lot of distrust

0:41:54.640 --> 0:41:59.080
<v Speaker 1>and animosity at the company at the leadership levels, including

0:41:59.120 --> 0:42:01.719
<v Speaker 1>amongst various members of the board who just did not

0:42:02.040 --> 0:42:05.440
<v Speaker 1>like each other. And then here's done as chair of

0:42:05.440 --> 0:42:07.839
<v Speaker 1>the board and she wants to clamp down on all

0:42:07.880 --> 0:42:11.440
<v Speaker 1>of these leaks. They're harming the company. They're hurting her

0:42:11.480 --> 0:42:15.400
<v Speaker 1>ability to help lead the company or at least to

0:42:15.520 --> 0:42:18.680
<v Speaker 1>guide the company as chair of the board. Now, how

0:42:18.760 --> 0:42:24.560
<v Speaker 1>much of what would follow was directly under her guidance

0:42:24.760 --> 0:42:28.799
<v Speaker 1>is a matter of dispute. She would maintain that she

0:42:28.960 --> 0:42:32.000
<v Speaker 1>was unaware of the particulars. She just had sort of

0:42:32.000 --> 0:42:34.880
<v Speaker 1>the big vision kind of view of what was going on.

0:42:35.239 --> 0:42:38.520
<v Speaker 1>Others would argue that she was much more responsible than

0:42:38.560 --> 0:42:41.560
<v Speaker 1>she led on. But what happened was she turned to

0:42:41.600 --> 0:42:45.879
<v Speaker 1>an independent security company to investigate the situation, to find

0:42:45.920 --> 0:42:48.319
<v Speaker 1>out where are these leaks coming from, who is the

0:42:48.400 --> 0:42:53.240
<v Speaker 1>person who's privy to these board proceedings, who has loose lips.

0:42:53.760 --> 0:42:58.080
<v Speaker 1>To do this, the security team would use a method

0:42:58.200 --> 0:43:02.759
<v Speaker 1>called pretexting, like this is what you do before you

0:43:02.800 --> 0:43:06.200
<v Speaker 1>send a text message. No, I'm talking about a pretext

0:43:06.440 --> 0:43:11.400
<v Speaker 1>like an invented situation that gives you the ability to

0:43:11.440 --> 0:43:14.680
<v Speaker 1>put leverage on someone to trick them. It's a kind

0:43:14.719 --> 0:43:17.440
<v Speaker 1>of social engineering. It's what hackers do all the time.

0:43:17.520 --> 0:43:20.080
<v Speaker 1>When a hacker shows up at a company claiming to

0:43:20.120 --> 0:43:24.279
<v Speaker 1>be a representative from it, they are pretexting. So that's

0:43:24.320 --> 0:43:27.840
<v Speaker 1>what the security team was doing to various folks at HP.

0:43:28.320 --> 0:43:31.879
<v Speaker 1>That included members of the board, that included some high

0:43:31.960 --> 0:43:35.640
<v Speaker 1>level executives, included some of their staff. And what the

0:43:36.239 --> 0:43:39.680
<v Speaker 1>security team was trying to do was to get access

0:43:39.760 --> 0:43:44.480
<v Speaker 1>to people's personal phone records. They would include ways of

0:43:44.920 --> 0:43:48.440
<v Speaker 1>contacting the phone companies directly and try to get records.

0:43:48.640 --> 0:43:50.920
<v Speaker 1>Trying to get these phone records, they were posing as

0:43:50.920 --> 0:43:53.440
<v Speaker 1>different people in order to do that. So HP was

0:43:53.520 --> 0:43:57.400
<v Speaker 1>spying on their own, their board members, as well as

0:43:57.440 --> 0:44:01.440
<v Speaker 1>high level executives and other staff. This skullduggery did not

0:44:01.760 --> 0:44:05.720
<v Speaker 1>go unnoticed, however, so word got to the US House

0:44:05.760 --> 0:44:10.720
<v Speaker 1>Committee on Energy and Commerce, a very high level group,

0:44:11.280 --> 0:44:15.280
<v Speaker 1>and the committee launched its own investigation. Its subpoenad done

0:44:15.360 --> 0:44:18.440
<v Speaker 1>as well as some other executives over at HP to

0:44:18.760 --> 0:44:21.759
<v Speaker 1>appear before the committee and give testimony as to what

0:44:21.800 --> 0:44:24.960
<v Speaker 1>the heck was going on. And they were not super

0:44:25.040 --> 0:44:28.920
<v Speaker 1>keen on a company using security professionals with all sorts

0:44:28.960 --> 0:44:32.440
<v Speaker 1>of these underheaded methods used to spy on people, because

0:44:32.480 --> 0:44:34.400
<v Speaker 1>the government doesn't like it if they're not the ones

0:44:34.440 --> 0:44:38.720
<v Speaker 1>doing that kind of thing. Anyway, the use of pretexting

0:44:39.560 --> 0:44:42.799
<v Speaker 1>became really the center point of this whole investigation, as

0:44:42.800 --> 0:44:46.480
<v Speaker 1>well as how much insight Done had into what had

0:44:46.520 --> 0:44:49.440
<v Speaker 1>been going on, as well as the legality of everything,

0:44:50.040 --> 0:44:53.480
<v Speaker 1>because at least some of the actions were not illegal

0:44:53.640 --> 0:44:57.800
<v Speaker 1>as classified under California law at the time, for example,

0:44:58.640 --> 0:45:01.279
<v Speaker 1>but there are other things that were illegal that were

0:45:01.600 --> 0:45:05.120
<v Speaker 1>classified under stuff like wire fraud. The whole scandal got

0:45:05.120 --> 0:45:09.200
<v Speaker 1>really ugly. Board member George Keyworth was identified as the

0:45:09.200 --> 0:45:12.800
<v Speaker 1>source of the leaks, although he continued to deny his involvement.

0:45:12.840 --> 0:45:15.280
<v Speaker 1>He said that he was not the source of the leaks,

0:45:15.520 --> 0:45:17.480
<v Speaker 1>but that was who it got penned on, and he

0:45:17.640 --> 0:45:21.000
<v Speaker 1>was removed from the board. Another board member, a friend

0:45:21.120 --> 0:45:25.880
<v Speaker 1>to George Keyworth named Tom Perkins, quit the board in protest.

0:45:26.120 --> 0:45:28.760
<v Speaker 1>When Keyworth was removed. He said, I said I'm leaving

0:45:28.800 --> 0:45:34.640
<v Speaker 1>as well. And Perkins was a real staunch opponent to

0:45:34.719 --> 0:45:38.560
<v Speaker 1>Patricia Dunn. The two did not like each other at all.

0:45:39.000 --> 0:45:43.640
<v Speaker 1>Perkins then communicated with an attorney named Viet Din. Viet

0:45:43.680 --> 0:45:46.560
<v Speaker 1>Den figured out that there was no way HP could

0:45:46.600 --> 0:45:51.040
<v Speaker 1>have conducted this investigation legally. There just wasn't. Like the

0:45:51.080 --> 0:45:53.480
<v Speaker 1>way that they had to get this information meant that

0:45:53.560 --> 0:45:57.000
<v Speaker 1>they had to engage in illegal activities in order to

0:45:57.080 --> 0:45:59.720
<v Speaker 1>do so. So he was like, this is bad news,

0:46:00.440 --> 0:46:05.120
<v Speaker 1>and Perkins said that Done was responsible for the whole scandal. Done, however,

0:46:05.160 --> 0:46:07.799
<v Speaker 1>said that Perkins was the one who was responsible and

0:46:07.840 --> 0:46:10.880
<v Speaker 1>the whole spying scandal was really just a ploy to

0:46:10.880 --> 0:46:14.240
<v Speaker 1>get Patricia Done removed from HP board in the first place,

0:46:14.480 --> 0:46:16.760
<v Speaker 1>and if that's the case, well it kind of worked.

0:46:17.120 --> 0:46:19.840
<v Speaker 1>But Perkins himself was not on the board either. Both

0:46:20.000 --> 0:46:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Perkins and Don would resign from the board of directors.

0:46:23.840 --> 0:46:26.799
<v Speaker 1>Dunn left the board while she was also under investigation

0:46:26.880 --> 0:46:29.360
<v Speaker 1>for her role in the whole affair. A bunch of

0:46:29.400 --> 0:46:33.120
<v Speaker 1>people were brought up on charges, including Patricia Dunn, but

0:46:33.320 --> 0:46:36.120
<v Speaker 1>a judge would later drop the charges against her, and

0:46:36.239 --> 0:46:40.440
<v Speaker 1>all charges brought against other members of HP board and

0:46:40.520 --> 0:46:44.759
<v Speaker 1>executive staff were dropped as well. No one in HP

0:46:45.640 --> 0:46:50.120
<v Speaker 1>was found guilty of anything or had their charges saw through.

0:46:50.160 --> 0:46:53.120
<v Speaker 1>In fact, the only person who actually saw jail time

0:46:53.440 --> 0:46:55.480
<v Speaker 1>as a result of all of this was one of

0:46:55.560 --> 0:47:00.560
<v Speaker 1>the security investigators from that independent company, Brian Agner is

0:47:00.560 --> 0:47:03.080
<v Speaker 1>his name. He got a three month sentence for his

0:47:03.160 --> 0:47:05.560
<v Speaker 1>part in securing those private phone records, but no one

0:47:05.560 --> 0:47:08.600
<v Speaker 1>at HP served any time at all. Now that doesn't

0:47:08.600 --> 0:47:10.840
<v Speaker 1>mean the company got off lightly. For one thing, the

0:47:10.880 --> 0:47:13.719
<v Speaker 1>board level leadership was in a right state of disarray.

0:47:13.800 --> 0:47:16.879
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it was just undeniable that it was this

0:47:17.280 --> 0:47:21.160
<v Speaker 1>toxic environment of people who did not see eye to eye.

0:47:21.400 --> 0:47:24.520
<v Speaker 1>That situation also prompted the state of California to update

0:47:24.560 --> 0:47:26.600
<v Speaker 1>its laws to make it much more clear that the

0:47:26.640 --> 0:47:31.360
<v Speaker 1>practice of pretexting is absolutely illegal. And on top of

0:47:31.360 --> 0:47:34.080
<v Speaker 1>all that, HP's reputation took a huge hit. It was

0:47:34.560 --> 0:47:37.120
<v Speaker 1>obvious the company had moved far away from the old

0:47:38.000 --> 0:47:41.480
<v Speaker 1>HP way days, you know, back with those five principles.

0:47:41.719 --> 0:47:45.200
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, it was an ugly situation and it did

0:47:45.239 --> 0:47:47.759
<v Speaker 1>not help HP at all during a period that was

0:47:47.920 --> 0:47:51.680
<v Speaker 1>pretty tumultuous for the tech industry as a whole. So

0:47:51.760 --> 0:47:55.120
<v Speaker 1>there you go. There's some examples of industrial espionage. Like

0:47:55.160 --> 0:47:57.440
<v Speaker 1>I said, those are just a few. There were actually

0:47:57.560 --> 0:48:00.200
<v Speaker 1>quite a bunch that made my list that you know,

0:48:00.239 --> 0:48:02.200
<v Speaker 1>it just got too long for me to do all

0:48:02.280 --> 0:48:04.800
<v Speaker 1>of them. But maybe I'll revisit this topic in the future,

0:48:04.840 --> 0:48:07.160
<v Speaker 1>maybe do some deep dives on a couple of other ones,

0:48:07.440 --> 0:48:11.120
<v Speaker 1>because it's fascinating to see the links that companies will

0:48:11.160 --> 0:48:15.120
<v Speaker 1>go to in order to find out information that they

0:48:15.160 --> 0:48:19.400
<v Speaker 1>don't easily have access to. It gets a little James

0:48:19.400 --> 0:48:24.640
<v Speaker 1>BONDI or Mission Impossibly or something. Anyway, I hope all

0:48:24.640 --> 0:48:27.439
<v Speaker 1>of you out there are well and I will talk

0:48:27.480 --> 0:48:38.400
<v Speaker 1>to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production.

0:48:38.680 --> 0:48:43.719
<v Speaker 1>For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

0:48:43.840 --> 0:48:49.520
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.