Speaker 1: Welcome to trillions. I'm Joel Webber and I'm Eric bel
Speaker 1: Tunis back in the booth. It sounds for real, way
Speaker 1: better than my closet. It's the reads, it's it's great.
Speaker 1: I love it. It's elevated. Yeah, it's good to see you.
Speaker 1: You too. You brought us somebody today who we're gonna
Speaker 1: hear from. Yeah, I grabbed him off of the AM track.
Speaker 1: I was like, you look only a good guest. We're desperate,
Speaker 1: we're getting lazy these days. Um No, this is Tim Edwards,
Speaker 1: who is an et F industry veteran. His SMP now
Speaker 1: and what he's bringing to us and where we're talking
Speaker 1: to him today is the SPEVA Report. For nerds know
Speaker 1: exactly what I just said, but if you don't, it's
Speaker 1: the SMP Index versus Active Report. It's a scorecard that
Speaker 1: says how will our active managers doing versus their benchmarks.
Speaker 1: This report has been out Tim make correct fifteen years
Speaker 1: and has been pretty instrumental in sort of driving the
Speaker 1: narrative and thus the flows towards passive because the numbers
Speaker 1: are pretty bad. Okay, so we're gonna hear from Tim
Speaker 1: Edwards of SMP this timeand trillions the SPIVA Report. Tim
Speaker 1: wakan a trillions. Hi, thanks very much for having me. Okay,
Speaker 1: Tim Spiver. For those not familiar, what is this going
Speaker 1: to reveal? Well, it was in fact first published twenty
Speaker 1: years ago that Chack the good Time Flies. The concept
Speaker 1: is is really really simple. Um. The idea is to
Speaker 1: take a database of actively managed funds, assign each fund
Speaker 1: correctly to a representative benchmark, so if it's a large
Speaker 1: cap us equity fund, the sp and then on a
Speaker 1: regular basis to report how many of those funds survived,
Speaker 1: survived and beat the benchmark. And then there's a wealth
Speaker 1: of additional data around the spread in performance average performance
Speaker 1: across funds, both over the short term and over the
Speaker 1: long term. So it's a report that gives you a
Speaker 1: sense of where active management is doing really well different geographies,
Speaker 1: different market segments. What the long term statistics tell us
Speaker 1: about where indexing might work as an investment strategy. Okay,
Speaker 1: so who's winning? Who's writing? Um? Well, we just today
Speaker 1: published our latest edition of the spever U score cord Um.
Speaker 1: It runs data up to the media point of two
Speaker 1: and unusually perhaps um, it's really really close year to
Speaker 1: date in two of actively managed US large cap funds
Speaker 1: underperformed the SMP five dred So it's not it's not
Speaker 1: exactly fifty fifty's before, but essentially it's it's a coin flip.
Speaker 1: So in the short term I'd say that it's a
Speaker 1: really close race for two. Over the long term, a
Speaker 1: much higher proportion of actively managed funds have underperformed the
Speaker 1: s Yeah, I mean fifty percent is a huge feed
Speaker 1: for active there. When I think of active, especially in
Speaker 1: the large cap space, I think of like a third
Speaker 1: outperforming right this year half have So that's pretty good,
Speaker 1: is it? Because of the violatility, I think, I think
Speaker 1: there's a combination of factors. Um. So, there is traditionally
Speaker 1: a conception that active managers tend to do better in
Speaker 1: bear markets, and of course that's something that happened this year,
Speaker 1: and in the first half of the year, the US
Speaker 1: exty market turned from from boll to bear. Um the
Speaker 1: data suggests a much more nuanced picture. Actually, a downturn
Speaker 1: tends to make things a lot more noisy and a
Speaker 1: bit more random. What we also saw this year, as
Speaker 1: well as slightly higher volatility, was a massive increase in dispersion,
Speaker 1: which is a measure of how differently stocks are performing.
Speaker 1: This was most visible in the performance of of different sectors.
Speaker 1: So energy doing fantastically well at the same time this
Speaker 1: technology was doing rather badly. And what you had across
Speaker 1: different styles, across different sectors, across different stocks was a
Speaker 1: really big difference between if you like winners and losers.
Speaker 1: What what that does? It doesn't make any sort of
Speaker 1: strategy smarter, but it does really turn it into more
Speaker 1: of a game of luck rather than skill. Um. The
Speaker 1: last time we saw a dispersion as high as we've
Speaker 1: seen it so far in twenty two was two thousand
Speaker 1: and nine. Funnily enough, that's the last time that active
Speaker 1: managers had such a good record. Yeah, I mean, um,
Speaker 1: I remember going back in two thousand and eight and
Speaker 1: looking at the twenty biggest active funds, and I found
Speaker 1: two thirds of them underperformed the horrendous year. Like the
Speaker 1: SMP was down, two thirds were down worse. And this
Speaker 1: was part of our big theme that we've been saying
Speaker 1: for I don't know a decade. At this point we're
Speaker 1: pretty proven, right, is that a bear market is actually
Speaker 1: not going to help active um. It's it made help
Speaker 1: a couple of funds, but generally speaking, the same amount
Speaker 1: will outperform and the same amount will underperform um And
Speaker 1: the other thing I think just a bear market tends
Speaker 1: to be when investors flee their funds and their assets
Speaker 1: go down anyway, So it's just generally not they sort of.
Speaker 1: I don't know the turnaround opportunity that I think people
Speaker 1: think it is, although if they can keep up fifty
Speaker 1: for the year or a couple of years, that I
Speaker 1: guess they would go a little further with maybe changing
Speaker 1: the narrative. Yeah, I think if if if they can
Speaker 1: maintain that that rate over the long term, then it
Speaker 1: does get to be more of a balanced picture. I mean,
Speaker 1: you know, something to bear in mind is we don't
Speaker 1: apply any due diligence, if you like, on when producing
Speaker 1: our speed reports. We don't say how did the good funds? Do?
Speaker 1: You know? How do the funds that I would judge
Speaker 1: as being likely to outperform do? Instead? It's it's really
Speaker 1: about measuring the universe. So you might think, as an investor, oh, well,
Speaker 1: you know, overall half of the funds out performed, but
Speaker 1: I might be able to identify it half. That's the problem.
Speaker 1: This is the problem for active and why I don't
Speaker 1: even know if it matters. Okay, fifty out perform, let's
Speaker 1: just say they actually held that up for five years.
Speaker 1: They won't, but let's just say they did. Most people,
Speaker 1: I think, especially advisors, have just sort of resigned themselves
Speaker 1: to going well. I I admit some will outperform, but
Speaker 1: I don't know which one is ahead of time, and
Speaker 1: I don't want to roll the dice on that. I'll
Speaker 1: just go Vanguard and buy a three basis point beta fund.
Speaker 1: And that's what the flow show. So I mean, can
Speaker 1: active turn around at all? Is there? I mean? Is
Speaker 1: it over? Um? Well, let me say two things about
Speaker 1: that would say not. First of all, that's well no,
Speaker 1: it's the persistence problem too, and they if they do
Speaker 1: it one year, they usually or five year period, they
Speaker 1: usually do not do it the next five year period.
Speaker 1: And and advisors know this. This information is now out
Speaker 1: there thanks to Spiva and the Internet and whatnot. And
Speaker 1: obviously Vanguard and Bogel beat the drum on this for
Speaker 1: many years. Um. I mean I'm not I'm I'm torn
Speaker 1: on how these tim tim is the game over? Well,
Speaker 1: first of all, let's just put some data around this conversation.
Speaker 1: So we mentioned under performing year to day in two,
Speaker 1: but the Spever reports to include longer term statistics. If
Speaker 1: you look at three years, that number goes up to
Speaker 1: under performing, If you go to ten years, that number
Speaker 1: goes up to under performing, and if you go out
Speaker 1: to twenty years since we've started producing these reports, it
Speaker 1: is actively managed under performing UM so. So so that's
Speaker 1: the challenge I think that Eric's getting at right that
Speaker 1: the short term number is it's always be the long
Speaker 1: term number UM. Then you have the issue with as
Speaker 1: you say, persistence so UM. There are lots of different
Speaker 1: ways that you could try and identify a manager who's
Speaker 1: UM your well positioned to to beat the market. One
Speaker 1: of the challenges is the data suggests that the most
Speaker 1: obvious thing to look at, did this manager beat the market?
Speaker 1: Historically UM tends to be a low information signal, So
Speaker 1: that's something that we cover in our Persistence report, which
Speaker 1: is a separate Spever report comes out similarly on a
Speaker 1: semi annual schedule, and what we look at is did
Speaker 1: the funds that used to beat the market or used
Speaker 1: to be their pays continue to do so? And there
Speaker 1: you find actually there's a there's a degree of reversion
Speaker 1: to the mean. It's really interesting to think about the
Speaker 1: mechanics as to what happens to successful managers. That means
Speaker 1: that you know, they might be challenged in their future
Speaker 1: out performance. What the data says is that it is
Speaker 1: difficult to identify a fund that will win based on
Speaker 1: those that have outperformed in the past. Morning Star has
Speaker 1: this great report, uh like yours, but they put fee
Speaker 1: buckets into it, and what they find is there's a
Speaker 1: high correlation between the ones that do outperform um and
Speaker 1: the and the ones that are cheapest. So the lowest
Speaker 1: quartile fee has a much better our performance rate than
Speaker 1: the highest quartile fee, which is almost like they all underperform.
Speaker 1: Is that kind of a common thread with the let's
Speaker 1: look at the tenure the ten percent or nine percent
Speaker 1: that outperformed. Is low fee a common thread or is
Speaker 1: there something else they haven't in common? So we um
Speaker 1: I've seen in the morning Star report and I like it,
Speaker 1: and it probably is. Now I should emphasize what we
Speaker 1: do with SPEVER is to compare actively manage funds net
Speaker 1: of fees to benchmarks, which by convention do not include
Speaker 1: any trading costs. Right, So we're giving them a hard
Speaker 1: benchmark to be um. Over the years, we've heard this,
Speaker 1: you know, is it all about fees and so on,
Speaker 1: And so we started producing a different report which was
Speaker 1: published exactly a week ago, which looks at grosser fee
Speaker 1: performance and also looks at the performance of institutional accounts.
Speaker 1: That's called spever institutional. And what that does is is
Speaker 1: answers first of all, the question of how much difference
Speaker 1: do fees make UM and what difference would it make
Speaker 1: if I had institutional resources devoted to selecting an outperforming
Speaker 1: active manager, and to take a just abroad look at
Speaker 1: the results, what you see is, first of all, fees
Speaker 1: do matter. Second of all, actually the performance of those
Speaker 1: institutionally managed accounts is slightly better than the performance of
Speaker 1: mutual funds. However, most active funds underperform the benchmark, so
Speaker 1: even even gross of film. You know why you know,
Speaker 1: I again my study of Bogel and this book. I
Speaker 1: he would describe the active managers as sitting in a circle,
Speaker 1: and they're all trading with each other, like at a
Speaker 1: poker table. And I think sometimes people think of the
Speaker 1: stock market as something else, but it's really just a
Speaker 1: bunch of people trading with each other. And for for
Speaker 1: me to win, Joel has to lose, and then I
Speaker 1: have to basically find losers, like four or five times
Speaker 1: in a row to be that that person who have performs,
Speaker 1: and the odds are tough. It's just very difficult to
Speaker 1: sort of gamble your way into having more money than
Speaker 1: everybody else. I guess a couple do it, but largely
Speaker 1: that everybody's sort of netting out zero plus you added
Speaker 1: the fees and then it's overall people. It's not quite
Speaker 1: a zero some game. I think it's it's um. So
Speaker 1: here's here's the thing. We could all invest in the
Speaker 1: equity markets and we could all make money. It's not
Speaker 1: zero sum. What really is zero sum is is outperformance
Speaker 1: is being smarter than than than everyone else or than
Speaker 1: well exactly. The capital markets will build money, right, if
Speaker 1: you just put your money in there, it will grow.
Speaker 1: It's more of the outperformance zero some the trading. But
Speaker 1: I mean, here's one question I have in the in
Speaker 1: the equity and we'll go to some other categories. I mean,
Speaker 1: all the numbers are pretty bad here, but you know,
Speaker 1: it seems to me that some of these funds were
Speaker 1: like built in the seventies, eighties, and nineties, and they
Speaker 1: have to be real close to the SMP, and it's
Speaker 1: tough to beat the SMP when you're close to it,
Speaker 1: whereas some funds now like an ARC, they go way
Speaker 1: out there and they're either gonna like crush it or
Speaker 1: get crushed, and seems to be investors sort of prefer
Speaker 1: that because in the core they're moving to passive. Before
Speaker 1: you answer that, though, I think it's important that we
Speaker 1: talked about this universe of funds in general, right because
Speaker 1: this is everything. It's e T s, mutual funds, everything
Speaker 1: grouped up and evaluated as one. Yes, so ets are
Speaker 1: included on a report, but it's it's basically and did
Speaker 1: you break them out at all? Or is it all?
Speaker 1: We didn't, although that that is something I've been thinking
Speaker 1: about doing, and it is also something I mean, I
Speaker 1: don't think we'll ever do a daily spever, but you
Speaker 1: could with the actually can see you know how many
Speaker 1: how many beat the market today? Anyway to the question, yes,
Speaker 1: so there aren't different categories. We've been talking a lot
Speaker 1: about the large cap category. The growth category is actually
Speaker 1: quite interesting. So growth was one of those areas where
Speaker 1: the record of active managers had been going pretty strong.
Speaker 1: If we were here one year ago, you've been asking
Speaker 1: me why is it that I think it was a
Speaker 1: thirty percent of growth managers were out performing over three
Speaker 1: years UM. That record has strongly reverted to the mean
Speaker 1: with the downturn in growth. There's you mentioned Cathy Woods
Speaker 1: Arc Fund, which which came in for a lot of
Speaker 1: perhaps unfair criticism. She was not alone. If you look
Speaker 1: over the three year period now at large cap growth,
Speaker 1: it's it's come back completely other the other way, it's
Speaker 1: under performing. And what you see is is that, yes,
Speaker 1: there is this aspect to which investors more generally I think,
Speaker 1: have come to their active managers and demanded They said, look,
Speaker 1: I can get very low cost access to my benchmark.
Speaker 1: What I need you to do is to focus on
Speaker 1: your best ideas and to concentrate on your highest conviction picks.
Speaker 1: And I think many men managers have done that. It
Speaker 1: does make it then the end result a little more
Speaker 1: more of a broad distribution. Right there are either gonna
Speaker 1: win big or they're gonna lose big um. And it
Speaker 1: does in some categories like like growth, I mean that
Speaker 1: you can get quite strong extremes. I think there's evidence
Speaker 1: in our data suggest that the growth segment was kind
Speaker 1: of more growth than than our growth index in particularly
Speaker 1: in the downturn in growth relatively that started back in September. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think the I think I'm getting at here is
Speaker 1: if you were running a fund in the eighties and nineties,
Speaker 1: before indexing was big, you were used in the course,
Speaker 1: you were ben smart hugging largely because you couldn't get
Speaker 1: too crazy you can go you couldn't go for Cathy
Speaker 1: would because you're sort of delivering core exposure. And I
Speaker 1: think that locks them in because there are a lot
Speaker 1: of their existing clients are those people who alathem for that.
Speaker 1: So I find that they're kind of in this sort
Speaker 1: of unfortunate like conundrum about still serving core exposure, so
Speaker 1: they can't go really active. But people weren't really active
Speaker 1: now because they use indexing for their core. Yeah, I
Speaker 1: think I think you might be right. I would say
Speaker 1: I'm not an expert in anten eighties fund history, but
Speaker 1: there were concentrated technology funds at the time. There were
Speaker 1: you know, top twenty funds, just twenty great idea funds
Speaker 1: at the time. Um, I think you're right that more broadly,
Speaker 1: it used to be the case that managers could could
Speaker 1: essentially sell beta as alpha, that that might be a
Speaker 1: bit a bit unfair, but I think that's a lot
Speaker 1: harder to do nowadays. I still think there's look, there's
Speaker 1: there's still massive need for active managers in our markets,
Speaker 1: and they do provide a valuable service in terms of
Speaker 1: you know, price efficiency an allocation of capital. The challenge
Speaker 1: I think is is your much do you need and
Speaker 1: how much do you as as an individual investor need
Speaker 1: to to allocate to a to an active manager when
Speaker 1: actually a lot of what's driving and performance to be
Speaker 1: yours allocation. So walk us through some other headlines here
Speaker 1: we had an equities there, fixed income. Yeah, so, um so,
Speaker 1: I'll pick to too. Highlights from from other categories. The
Speaker 1: first is um so, international managers had a slightly better
Speaker 1: record in the latest Speeded edition and although again it's
Speaker 1: it's we're still not seeing categories generally where you get
Speaker 1: a high proportion of active managers beating the index over
Speaker 1: the long term. One area that we have commented upon
Speaker 1: frequently as one where the active record is much better
Speaker 1: international small caps. So compared to an international small cap benchmarks,
Speaker 1: managers picking small international stocks have actually had a pretty
Speaker 1: good record over the long term. Fixed income well fixed
Speaker 1: income has been was it was a bit more of
Speaker 1: a mix this year. One area where active funds seem
Speaker 1: to be having a particularly tough time was in the
Speaker 1: intermediate US US government, and I guess that's it's just
Speaker 1: a downturn in US government and also one of the
Speaker 1: typical strategies that managers use in fixed income going along
Speaker 1: the duration was a painful one this year. One area
Speaker 1: where we saw managers do actually pretty well was just
Speaker 1: general investment grade funds UM, seeing an under performance rate
Speaker 1: of seventeen percent there um. So there does appear to be,
Speaker 1: at least in the short term, evidence for for strong
Speaker 1: performance from active managers in the fixed income space. So
Speaker 1: the fixed income has always been a little better than
Speaker 1: equity in these Beaver reports, and some say, well, look,
Speaker 1: if your benchmark is the AGG it doesn't hold high
Speaker 1: yield international. A lot of these managers will buy high
Speaker 1: yield international, jag up the credit risk. Um do you
Speaker 1: account for that, because in the equity world, if you
Speaker 1: do that, you sort of get put into a different
Speaker 1: bucket that's called style drift. How do you account for that?
Speaker 1: Because I do think sometimes fixed income. The bond managers. Actually,
Speaker 1: I think I have it lucky. They've got this agg
Speaker 1: benchmark which is waited by debt. It's whereas the smps
Speaker 1: got like momentum baked into it. It's a harder index
Speaker 1: to beat on the bond side. I just feel like
Speaker 1: maybe the index is easier to beat in general. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, my my team took over the production of
Speaker 1: these reports quite recently and I did a deep dive
Speaker 1: into the fixed income segment. And let me, let me
Speaker 1: tell you something. Fixed income benchmarking is hard. It's really hard. Um.
Speaker 1: Telling how a fund in particular is generating its returns
Speaker 1: is difficult. Because I can take an equity fund, I
Speaker 1: could tell you you've show me its performance. I can
Speaker 1: tell you whether it's investing in emerging markets or not
Speaker 1: simply by you know how it's doing and how emerging
Speaker 1: markets are doing. Whereas in fixed income, if you're taking
Speaker 1: a little bit of extra credit risk, if you're taking
Speaker 1: on a little bit more duration, if you're using tips,
Speaker 1: what you'll see is in the short term you'll return
Speaker 1: to be really really correlated is your benchmark. Over the
Speaker 1: long term, there will be a drift. And this makes
Speaker 1: benchmarking really really difficult. I think there is a good
Speaker 1: point to be made there in terms of aggregate bond
Speaker 1: indices not representing what is the typical active manager activity.
Speaker 1: I do think there's an open question there, and I
Speaker 1: would certainly say that it's it's it's still a challenge. However,
Speaker 1: I still think the way we do speaver is the
Speaker 1: right way to do it, in the sense that we
Speaker 1: should be comparing what an active manager can do versus
Speaker 1: what is the simple choice in terms of gating broad
Speaker 1: market exposure. Yeah, there's an index called the Bloomberg Universal Index,
Speaker 1: which is like the AGG, but it has a little
Speaker 1: high yield international. When we put that against intermediate total
Speaker 1: return managers, the beat rate guts cut in half. They
Speaker 1: become more like active stock pickers UM. But that that
Speaker 1: ticker for that universal is actually ETF growing pretty quickly.
Speaker 1: So some of these it's I U s B. It's
Speaker 1: one of the fastest growing and I could see why.
Speaker 1: It's the AGG with a little extra something, and it's
Speaker 1: sort of, in my opinion, probably the best replacement for
Speaker 1: a bond manager versus say the AGG or be you
Speaker 1: know a g G R B N d UM. What
Speaker 1: one question I have is sometimes the speed reports come out,
Speaker 1: someone will be like, especially on Twitter, Hey, this is
Speaker 1: an index company. You know, of course they're going to
Speaker 1: want to promote this. And you know what would you
Speaker 1: say to somebody say, this is actually in your vested
Speaker 1: interest to have all this these numbers be so bad?
Speaker 1: I get it, it's true. But do you ever get
Speaker 1: people saying that or do you get maybe active manager
Speaker 1: hate mail? Um? So well, let me let me say,
Speaker 1: first of all, if you are an outperforming active manager. Um,
Speaker 1: if you're one of theft in the short term or
Speaker 1: one of the ten percent in the long term in
Speaker 1: U S equities, you should love the Spever report because
Speaker 1: what it shows is how special you are. So I
Speaker 1: don't get hate mail from from good active managers. Secondly, Um,
Speaker 1: what we committed to do was to report this number
Speaker 1: on a regular frequency, i e. Every six months, will
Speaker 1: report it when the numbers in our favor, will report
Speaker 1: it when the number isn't in our favor, and we'll
Speaker 1: try and give people perspectives UH and insights into what's
Speaker 1: driving those numbers. Now, you're right, the long term data
Speaker 1: does carry an implication that perhaps in an index based
Speaker 1: approach could be suitable. Um. But the important point is
Speaker 1: that we commit to reporting those numbers whatever they are,
Speaker 1: and then let the data speak for itself. I noticed
Speaker 1: you guys asset weight a section of the report and
Speaker 1: then you equal weight is were there differences in the
Speaker 1: our performance when you do those two different methods, Yes,
Speaker 1: there are. So the reason we do both. So speeder
Speaker 1: is not a kind of weighted number. How many funds
Speaker 1: were there in the universe, how many beating the market? Um?
Speaker 1: And obviously well not maybe not obviously, but but in practice,
Speaker 1: what what happens is that doesn't represent the invested assets.
Speaker 1: So there's a lot more money in some big funds
Speaker 1: than there are in many small funds. Um. So in
Speaker 1: the report we do report the equal weighted average returned
Speaker 1: from each category and the asset weighted returned from each category.
Speaker 1: If the big funds are doing better than the asset
Speaker 1: weighted performance should be better than the equal weight to performance.
Speaker 1: Generally speaking, just sort of summarizing lots and lots of
Speaker 1: data pointance and lots of years of reports, asset wasted
Speaker 1: performance is better. Generally speaking, is that because money flow helps,
Speaker 1: because you're buying the stocks that the flows are coming
Speaker 1: in and therefore the stocks to go up when you
Speaker 1: buy them, which is sort of like a nice upward spiral. NOA.
Speaker 1: Is it more just the big managers are able to
Speaker 1: get better execution costs, they can actually move the market
Speaker 1: in their favor. I think. I think that's part of it.
Speaker 1: I think also there are generally economies of scale or low.
Speaker 1: When we talked about fees, generally low fees do matter.
Speaker 1: Lower few funds do tend to attract more assets. And
Speaker 1: I think also bear in mind we're talking about the
Speaker 1: whole universe, so that the there's quite a long tale
Speaker 1: here of potentially quite small funds with potentially quite high fees. Jim,
Speaker 1: what was the single most surprising thing that jumped out
Speaker 1: of you when you got your hands on this Dad report?
Speaker 1: Uh So, I think the the the one that I
Speaker 1: was most interested by was there was the reversion to
Speaker 1: the meaning in growth managers. And the reason it was
Speaker 1: surprising is more often what you see is is the
Speaker 1: best thing for say the small cap US equity category
Speaker 1: is for large caps to do really well, because your
Speaker 1: small cap funds might have a few large caps and
Speaker 1: that sort of so compared to their benchmark, which is
Speaker 1: only small caps. See what I mean. The same happens
Speaker 1: for growth and value. So what happened this year is
Speaker 1: that growth did really badly. And my expectation was was
Speaker 1: that that would be good for growth managers because they
Speaker 1: can have a little you know, a little bit of
Speaker 1: value as well if they want to UM and so
Speaker 1: j really and growth doing really badly made me think
Speaker 1: that growth managers would do relatively well. That did not happen.
Speaker 1: And as as we said earlier, it's suggestive of the
Speaker 1: fact that growth managers actually we're really doubling down on
Speaker 1: the growthiest part of the market, as Eric was suggesting,
Speaker 1: you know, maybe concentrating with bets and so that that
Speaker 1: is something that seems to be corroborated by this day,
Speaker 1: so which I found really interesting and surprising. We talk growth.
Speaker 1: Value finally had its day, right, This is one of
Speaker 1: the big stories of the last year. How did value
Speaker 1: managers do versus their benchmark value managers? UM It was
Speaker 1: not quite a coin flip, but pretty close of value
Speaker 1: managers A performed. Feels like they've been waiting for this moment,
Speaker 1: just like it's like the moment came and it's like, oh, well,
Speaker 1: I will say value e t fs have taken in
Speaker 1: a ton of money, like there's a real you can
Speaker 1: tell people are like ready for a regime change. And
Speaker 1: I'm guessing their numbers were better than growth because they
Speaker 1: probably were diligently buying actual value stocks that were below value,
Speaker 1: whereas growth might have been, you know, sort of like
Speaker 1: leaning into more growthy stocks and got caught on the
Speaker 1: wrong side for the half of year. Maybe they'll flip back,
Speaker 1: but that makes sense to me in a way. Okay,
Speaker 1: damn question that we ask everyone at the end of
Speaker 1: trillion's favorite et F ticker, what's yours? Well, as a
Speaker 1: representative of an index company, also have to kindly I'll
Speaker 1: answer that if you work at SMP, it has to
Speaker 1: be spy. I mean, I mean, it would be weird
Speaker 1: if it wasn't. He could have no comment, but okay,
Speaker 1: that's We'll just say a pretty strong contender. We'll say
Speaker 1: it's spy. Tim Edwards, thanks for joining us in Trillions.
Speaker 1: You thanks for listening to Trillions until next time. You
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Speaker 1: We'd love to hear from you more on Twitter. I'm
Speaker 1: at Joel Webber Show. He's at Air Caltunist. This episode
Speaker 1: of Trayance was produced by Magnus Hendricksen. Bye. M hm
Speaker 1: m m hm hmm