1 00:00:02,040 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: You're listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast DAM 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,840 Speaker 1: Paranormal podcast network, where we offer you podcasts of the paranormal, supernatural, 3 00:00:09,960 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: and the unexplained. Get ready now for Beyond Contact with 4 00:00:13,880 --> 00:00:14,640 Speaker 1: Captain Rong. 5 00:00:21,320 --> 00:00:24,639 Speaker 2: Welcome to our podcast. Please be aware the thoughts and 6 00:00:24,680 --> 00:00:29,000 Speaker 2: opinions expressed by the host are their thoughts and opinions only, 7 00:00:29,360 --> 00:00:34,000 Speaker 2: and do not reflect those of iHeartMedia, iHeartRadio, Coast to 8 00:00:34,040 --> 00:00:39,280 Speaker 2: Coast AM, employees of Premier Networks, or their sponsors and associates. 9 00:00:39,680 --> 00:00:42,000 Speaker 2: We would like to encourage you to do your own 10 00:00:42,040 --> 00:00:45,280 Speaker 2: research and discover the subject matter for yourself. 11 00:00:58,280 --> 00:01:02,400 Speaker 3: Hey everyone, it's Captain Ron and each week on Beyond Contact, 12 00:01:02,560 --> 00:01:06,319 Speaker 3: we'll explore the latest news in ufology, discuss some of 13 00:01:06,319 --> 00:01:09,880 Speaker 3: the classic cases, and bring you the latest information from 14 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 3: the newest cases as we talk with the top experts. 15 00:01:14,760 --> 00:01:17,200 Speaker 4: Welcome to Beyond Contact. I am Captain Ron, and today 16 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:19,720 Speaker 4: we're going to be speaking with Richard Dolan. He's, of course, 17 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 4: one of the world's leading historians, authors, and researchers of 18 00:01:23,120 --> 00:01:27,280 Speaker 4: the UFO and USO phenomenon. He has a brand new 19 00:01:27,319 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 4: book called A History of USO's Unidentified Submerged Objects volume 20 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:36,160 Speaker 4: two from nineteen seventy to nineteen eighty nine. So today 21 00:01:36,200 --> 00:01:39,720 Speaker 4: we're going to be focusing on his research into these USOS. 22 00:01:40,200 --> 00:01:43,600 Speaker 4: Hi Richard, it's been a very very long time, seven 23 00:01:43,640 --> 00:01:47,240 Speaker 4: whole days since we've had you on BRON. 24 00:01:47,319 --> 00:01:49,680 Speaker 5: It's always a pleasure to be here. I really enjoy 25 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:52,040 Speaker 5: this and I'm looking forward to talking about this with you. 26 00:01:52,520 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 4: So before we dive into your second book here in 27 00:01:55,040 --> 00:01:58,800 Speaker 4: the three volume series on USOS, I wanted to ask 28 00:01:58,880 --> 00:02:01,600 Speaker 4: you about something we touched on during the last show 29 00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:04,600 Speaker 4: when we spoke about those two events in June on 30 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 4: the ninth and the twenty fifth. One of the mean 31 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:11,000 Speaker 4: drives of this event was getting whistleblow or protection in place. 32 00:02:11,040 --> 00:02:13,160 Speaker 4: And I know you're a big advocate for that and 33 00:02:13,400 --> 00:02:16,040 Speaker 4: I agree, But I was thinking about it, isn't this 34 00:02:16,120 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 4: one area where they really do have some legitimate pushback. 35 00:02:19,960 --> 00:02:24,120 Speaker 4: It seems like there's legitimate national security reasons not to 36 00:02:24,240 --> 00:02:27,639 Speaker 4: have this, that it could open up a can of worms, 37 00:02:27,680 --> 00:02:32,560 Speaker 4: and it'd be foreign intelligence benefits and damaging relationships with 38 00:02:32,600 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 4: our allies, and it could break down the whole security 39 00:02:35,600 --> 00:02:37,280 Speaker 4: clearance system. So I want to find out what you 40 00:02:37,360 --> 00:02:40,680 Speaker 4: thought about. Isn't it more complex than people think when 41 00:02:40,720 --> 00:02:42,760 Speaker 4: they just say, oh, just protect the whistleblowers. 42 00:02:43,200 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 5: Yeah, that's you're absolutely right, You're one hundred percent right. Look, 43 00:02:47,080 --> 00:02:51,480 Speaker 5: every story, every fact of our world has complexity to it, 44 00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:54,440 Speaker 5: and that includes this one. And anytime that any one 45 00:02:54,480 --> 00:02:57,560 Speaker 5: of us gets into this black and white aspect that like, 46 00:02:57,639 --> 00:03:00,720 Speaker 5: these people are good, those people are evil. This cause 47 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:03,280 Speaker 5: is just and right, and anyone who poses it is 48 00:03:03,639 --> 00:03:06,720 Speaker 5: on the wrong side. I mean, that's just turning reality 49 00:03:06,720 --> 00:03:09,160 Speaker 5: into like a cartoon, and it's not accurate. It doesn't 50 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:12,120 Speaker 5: do us any favors. I do support whistleblower protection. I 51 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:16,120 Speaker 5: do believe that we're better served at this point in 52 00:03:16,160 --> 00:03:21,160 Speaker 5: our history with more openness on the genuine truth of UFOs, 53 00:03:21,200 --> 00:03:24,240 Speaker 5: what governments know, and all of that. But look, the 54 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:27,360 Speaker 5: reality is this subject has always been tied in deeply 55 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:31,919 Speaker 5: to national security. People can find that a legitimate cause 56 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:33,680 Speaker 5: for secrecy, or they can just say no, the US 57 00:03:33,760 --> 00:03:37,200 Speaker 5: has no right to genuine national security secrets, because there 58 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:39,200 Speaker 5: are people who do believe that. I don't think there's 59 00:03:39,240 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 5: any reason to doubt that there has been a genuine, 60 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:46,560 Speaker 5: like below the surface Cold war going on. Relating to you, 61 00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:51,560 Speaker 5: a UFO tech technology. I, for one, strongly, very strongly, 62 00:03:51,560 --> 00:03:55,360 Speaker 5: I would say believe that there has been recovered hardware 63 00:03:55,480 --> 00:03:57,880 Speaker 5: that did not originate from our civilization. You can talk 64 00:03:57,920 --> 00:04:00,680 Speaker 5: about Roswell and a number of other instance. It's quite 65 00:04:00,720 --> 00:04:03,600 Speaker 5: a few actually potentially, So I think we've got that 66 00:04:03,760 --> 00:04:07,480 Speaker 5: and that's valuable. And there's evidence that the Russians have 67 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:10,960 Speaker 5: acquired their share of this, and in fact, I think 68 00:04:11,000 --> 00:04:14,960 Speaker 5: it's not impossible and probably likely that the Chinese acquired 69 00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:18,159 Speaker 5: something as well. Maybe other nations as well, although other 70 00:04:18,240 --> 00:04:21,640 Speaker 5: nations that are in the western orbit are probably dominated 71 00:04:21,680 --> 00:04:23,600 Speaker 5: by the United States, and I think there's a lot 72 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:25,040 Speaker 5: of reason to think the US has been able to 73 00:04:25,040 --> 00:04:27,080 Speaker 5: get a lot of the material added, like out of 74 00:04:27,080 --> 00:04:31,000 Speaker 5: Brazil for example, in Virginia nineteen ninety six. I think 75 00:04:31,000 --> 00:04:33,120 Speaker 5: there's a strong James Fox, the filmmaker, made a very 76 00:04:33,120 --> 00:04:36,640 Speaker 5: good case that the US probably absconded with the goodies 77 00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:39,920 Speaker 5: that were there. But overall, like there are genuine weapons 78 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:45,040 Speaker 5: implications for this, and beyond weapons implications, there are structural 79 00:04:45,480 --> 00:04:49,400 Speaker 5: implications for our world system, our global system relating to energy, 80 00:04:49,440 --> 00:04:53,240 Speaker 5: relating to propulsion. Like most of us, we're not in 81 00:04:53,279 --> 00:04:55,839 Speaker 5: the circles of power, so we just want everything now. 82 00:04:56,040 --> 00:04:58,520 Speaker 5: We want free energy. Now, we want to you know, 83 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:01,280 Speaker 5: give the finger to our uti tility companies, and we 84 00:05:01,320 --> 00:05:03,480 Speaker 5: want to be able to heat our home for free 85 00:05:03,520 --> 00:05:04,880 Speaker 5: for the rest of our lives and all of that. 86 00:05:05,120 --> 00:05:09,000 Speaker 5: But there are powerful implications when you think of a global, 87 00:05:09,240 --> 00:05:13,400 Speaker 5: deeply deeply integrated global system. I mean, look what happened 88 00:05:13,440 --> 00:05:16,240 Speaker 5: when we had an interruption and are having an interruption 89 00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:18,520 Speaker 5: of oil and energy out of the strait of hormones. 90 00:05:18,760 --> 00:05:22,360 Speaker 5: And we can see how sensitive and perhaps we might 91 00:05:22,400 --> 00:05:26,279 Speaker 5: even say brittle our global infrastructure actually is. In other words, 92 00:05:26,520 --> 00:05:30,040 Speaker 5: messing with that actually could have implications. And even for 93 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:34,919 Speaker 5: something as potentially positive and transformative as UFO tech and science, 94 00:05:35,320 --> 00:05:37,719 Speaker 5: none of us really know all the implications of what's 95 00:05:37,760 --> 00:05:39,800 Speaker 5: going on there. You know what if some of the 96 00:05:39,839 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 5: technology involves space time engineering, you know, we talked about 97 00:05:43,640 --> 00:05:45,760 Speaker 5: this in the last program a week ago. I mean, 98 00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 5: I for want assume that they the visitors, let's just 99 00:05:49,120 --> 00:05:51,160 Speaker 5: call them, I found a way to master that and 100 00:05:51,440 --> 00:05:53,880 Speaker 5: that's probably what allows them to be here. So if 101 00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:56,040 Speaker 5: there is an answer in that technology that we can 102 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:59,560 Speaker 5: figure out, would it actually be an unmitigated positive for 103 00:05:59,760 --> 00:06:03,000 Speaker 5: human and being? So have access to spacetime metric engineering. 104 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:05,400 Speaker 5: I'm not so sure. Or what if you can make 105 00:06:05,440 --> 00:06:08,039 Speaker 5: a really really powerful weapon out of some of this tech? 106 00:06:08,240 --> 00:06:10,280 Speaker 5: Could you trust every Could you trust all of your 107 00:06:10,279 --> 00:06:12,919 Speaker 5: neighbors have that access to it? Everyone in your city, 108 00:06:12,960 --> 00:06:15,599 Speaker 5: everyone in the country, everyone in the world. Someone is 109 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:17,760 Speaker 5: likely to blow up the Pacific Ocean, like you can 110 00:06:17,839 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 5: just imagine someone's going to do that for sure. 111 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,880 Speaker 4: Look what they do now. Yeah, without these technologies. You know. 112 00:06:22,920 --> 00:06:24,960 Speaker 4: Another thing I wanted to point out is something we 113 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:26,719 Speaker 4: kind of touched on during the last show as well, 114 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:30,119 Speaker 4: is these files that the government's been releasing. They actually 115 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:35,560 Speaker 4: hit on various USOS, including objects reportedly transitioning between air 116 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:38,280 Speaker 4: and water, you know, the trans medium travel as they 117 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:40,400 Speaker 4: call it. Did you notice that in the files when 118 00:06:40,440 --> 00:06:40,880 Speaker 4: they came. 119 00:06:40,760 --> 00:06:44,360 Speaker 5: Out, Yeah, there's one in the last release, the third release, 120 00:06:44,480 --> 00:06:49,040 Speaker 5: I should say, it's stated it's basically has USO water implications. 121 00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:51,880 Speaker 5: And I looked at that video very carefully. It's quite interesting. 122 00:06:52,440 --> 00:06:55,279 Speaker 5: I have to admit, to my eye, I had a 123 00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:59,440 Speaker 5: hard time seeing the a clear water connection. But the 124 00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:02,680 Speaker 5: document or the information around that video did kind of 125 00:07:02,680 --> 00:07:04,719 Speaker 5: state that it was a water based case and the 126 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:06,920 Speaker 5: object seem to enter the water. So I'm just going 127 00:07:06,960 --> 00:07:09,440 Speaker 5: to take that is yes. So that's interesting. You know, 128 00:07:09,520 --> 00:07:12,400 Speaker 5: we've had a couple of instances over the years of 129 00:07:12,640 --> 00:07:16,560 Speaker 5: videos being kind of authenticated dealing with the USNavy, where 130 00:07:16,600 --> 00:07:18,760 Speaker 5: you know, there's one I think Jeremy Corbel was the 131 00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 5: first one to release this off the West coast, just 132 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:23,600 Speaker 5: within the last five years or so, of an object 133 00:07:23,880 --> 00:07:27,480 Speaker 5: clearly doing a controlled entry into the water. So we 134 00:07:27,840 --> 00:07:31,360 Speaker 5: do have these those are I think confirmed as much 135 00:07:31,360 --> 00:07:33,440 Speaker 5: as they're confirmed, I mean they're confirmed in the sense 136 00:07:33,440 --> 00:07:37,840 Speaker 5: that military video shows this. What you don't have and 137 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:40,760 Speaker 5: what we're probably not likely to get soon is a 138 00:07:40,800 --> 00:07:44,559 Speaker 5: statement from let's say the President who says, yes, that's real, 139 00:07:44,760 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 5: and we confirm that it's a USO and so that 140 00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:50,080 Speaker 5: we know that's a fact. Like they haven't done that. 141 00:07:50,120 --> 00:07:52,160 Speaker 5: So they kind of put the video out there where 142 00:07:52,160 --> 00:07:54,800 Speaker 5: it just sits there and where people who are inclined 143 00:07:54,840 --> 00:07:57,200 Speaker 5: to believe it's legit will say yes, legit, and where 144 00:07:57,240 --> 00:07:59,440 Speaker 5: people who are inclined to not believe in this subject 145 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:00,000 Speaker 5: will just ignore. 146 00:08:00,360 --> 00:08:03,080 Speaker 4: That's the way everything goes. Right now, everybody's picked their team, 147 00:08:03,760 --> 00:08:06,040 Speaker 4: you know, looking at this as long as you have. 148 00:08:06,280 --> 00:08:10,880 Speaker 4: Do you feel that these are probably related phenomenon, Like, 149 00:08:10,920 --> 00:08:14,520 Speaker 4: do you think UFOs and usos are probably coming from 150 00:08:14,520 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 4: the same source, the same intelligence, or is it your 151 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:19,360 Speaker 4: sense that they could be completely unrelated. 152 00:08:19,520 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 5: I think they're coming from the same intelligence, and I 153 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:25,000 Speaker 5: think this for a number of reasons, because a when 154 00:08:25,040 --> 00:08:27,320 Speaker 5: you look at the morphology or the structure of the 155 00:08:27,320 --> 00:08:30,560 Speaker 5: craft themselves, they basically mirror the all the shapes that 156 00:08:30,600 --> 00:08:34,240 Speaker 5: people report above their heads. So there are disc like 157 00:08:34,320 --> 00:08:37,480 Speaker 5: saucer shaped objects that are reported below the water. We're 158 00:08:37,480 --> 00:08:40,480 Speaker 5: emerging from the water. There are cigar shaped or tubular 159 00:08:40,520 --> 00:08:43,520 Speaker 5: shaped objects. You get those with aerial UAP, you get 160 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:47,440 Speaker 5: those with the usos. There are spherical objects, both of 161 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:50,920 Speaker 5: the glowing plasma type as well as the non glowing 162 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,600 Speaker 5: that look metallic types. Both of those are reported as 163 00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 5: usos as well as being reported as aerial UFOs, And 164 00:08:59,080 --> 00:09:01,800 Speaker 5: even triangles. You get a couple of triangular shapes as 165 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:04,120 Speaker 5: well that are reported in the water, and you get 166 00:09:04,120 --> 00:09:07,160 Speaker 5: those of course in the air. So on that basis, 167 00:09:07,200 --> 00:09:09,719 Speaker 5: I think they sure look the same in terms of 168 00:09:09,800 --> 00:09:13,000 Speaker 5: the types of behaviors that they engage in. The behaviors 169 00:09:13,080 --> 00:09:16,120 Speaker 5: seem very similar as well, so, for example, you know, 170 00:09:16,160 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 5: with most of these USO cases, particularly when they're encountering 171 00:09:20,440 --> 00:09:23,360 Speaker 5: a military like the US or the Russians, and what 172 00:09:23,440 --> 00:09:25,520 Speaker 5: they will do is the same kind of behavior that 173 00:09:25,559 --> 00:09:27,840 Speaker 5: they do for aerial cases, like they will come in, 174 00:09:28,040 --> 00:09:31,400 Speaker 5: they will loiter around for a very short period of time, 175 00:09:31,720 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 5: usually or frequently, I should say, disable our own electronic 176 00:09:36,120 --> 00:09:39,400 Speaker 5: equipment so that we are unable to respond, either with 177 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:42,680 Speaker 5: weapons or even in terms of tracking them. So you 178 00:09:42,720 --> 00:09:46,040 Speaker 5: get that with the oceanic USO cases, and you get 179 00:09:46,040 --> 00:09:49,720 Speaker 5: it with aerial cases over land. So the behaviors strike 180 00:09:49,760 --> 00:09:52,440 Speaker 5: me as similar enough that the look of the craft 181 00:09:52,520 --> 00:09:54,760 Speaker 5: strike me as similar enough that I tend to think 182 00:09:54,960 --> 00:09:58,800 Speaker 5: they're probably the same. The aerial ones very likely have 183 00:09:58,920 --> 00:10:01,079 Speaker 5: the capability of going into the water. We just we're 184 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:01,760 Speaker 5: not watching that. 185 00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:06,319 Speaker 4: Sure. Do you see us getting anything of real significance 186 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:10,640 Speaker 4: approaching undeniability of the phenomenon through any of these channels, 187 00:10:10,640 --> 00:10:13,960 Speaker 4: like these releases that we're getting these files not yet. 188 00:10:14,040 --> 00:10:16,679 Speaker 5: I mean, we have a couple of pretty good videos 189 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:18,720 Speaker 5: that have been out there that have not been denied 190 00:10:18,720 --> 00:10:21,800 Speaker 5: and that have been authenticated as real. What I think 191 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:24,200 Speaker 5: is really needed for this to move forward is an 192 00:10:24,240 --> 00:10:28,240 Speaker 5: officially established body US government or a major media. But 193 00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:30,319 Speaker 5: as we know, like major media. 194 00:10:30,120 --> 00:10:31,480 Speaker 4: They won't touch that. No way. 195 00:10:31,600 --> 00:10:34,559 Speaker 5: Well, they're not independent, you know. They they're intimately connected 196 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:36,320 Speaker 5: to the deep state in the intelligence community. 197 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:38,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, don't stand by for that. When we come back, 198 00:10:38,520 --> 00:10:41,000 Speaker 4: we're going to ask Richard about any patterns that he's 199 00:10:41,080 --> 00:10:44,320 Speaker 4: noticed in the data collection on USO cases. You're listening 200 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:46,839 Speaker 4: to Beyond Contact and the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast 201 00:10:46,880 --> 00:11:04,760 Speaker 4: AM Paranormal podcast network. We are back on Beyond Contact. 202 00:11:04,760 --> 00:11:07,440 Speaker 4: We're speaking again with Richard Dolan. You know, Richard, I 203 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:11,240 Speaker 4: am so appreciative, as will many people be, for all 204 00:11:11,280 --> 00:11:13,560 Speaker 4: the work you've done in this series. And I think 205 00:11:13,720 --> 00:11:17,160 Speaker 4: it's the sort of painstaking data collection that is really 206 00:11:17,200 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 4: imperative for us to get to answers as to what 207 00:11:20,960 --> 00:11:23,640 Speaker 4: these things may be. It's important to call all this 208 00:11:23,760 --> 00:11:25,880 Speaker 4: data together so that we can look at it for 209 00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:29,520 Speaker 4: patterns and trends. It's very reminiscent of the great compilation 210 00:11:29,640 --> 00:11:32,720 Speaker 4: that Cheryl Costa did putting together all the UFO data 211 00:11:33,040 --> 00:11:35,400 Speaker 4: for the last twenty twenty five years, and she was 212 00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:38,160 Speaker 4: able to notice things like, you know, certain areas where 213 00:11:38,200 --> 00:11:41,080 Speaker 4: hotspots and we're far more likely than others, as well 214 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:45,240 Speaker 4: as things like sightings over nuclear sites and whatnot. Were 215 00:11:45,240 --> 00:11:47,520 Speaker 4: you able to find certain things in the USO data 216 00:11:47,559 --> 00:11:48,480 Speaker 4: that jumped out at you? 217 00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:52,400 Speaker 5: Yes, And I'll say a few things about this. A 218 00:11:52,679 --> 00:11:55,400 Speaker 5: was very much to my surprise. But be I didn't 219 00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:59,959 Speaker 5: even when I started this project of collecting USO cases 220 00:12:00,160 --> 00:12:02,720 Speaker 5: a little over four years ago, I didn't plan to 221 00:12:02,760 --> 00:12:06,679 Speaker 5: do a data a data analysis. I noticed that there 222 00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:09,199 Speaker 5: are some very good water based cases that just seemed 223 00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:11,040 Speaker 5: to be scattered all over the place that there was 224 00:12:11,080 --> 00:12:13,160 Speaker 5: no They didn't seem to be a very good single 225 00:12:13,200 --> 00:12:16,920 Speaker 5: repository for them. Turns out there was one. It was 226 00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 5: a website by a deceased researcher by the name of 227 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:22,360 Speaker 5: Carl Fint, who did very good work on this. His 228 00:12:22,440 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 5: website is now gone, Thank goodness. I was able to 229 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 5: data mine it completely and fully before it went off. 230 00:12:28,920 --> 00:12:31,680 Speaker 5: But there really wasn't a very easy place for people 231 00:12:31,760 --> 00:12:34,760 Speaker 5: to get data on these USO cases. So my goal 232 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 5: was simply I wanted to kind of bring them to life. 233 00:12:37,440 --> 00:12:40,960 Speaker 5: There were just too many of them, so I searched 234 00:12:40,960 --> 00:12:44,360 Speaker 5: through places like Carl's website and mof on and many 235 00:12:44,400 --> 00:12:48,920 Speaker 5: other sources, a lot of old magazines and every other 236 00:12:48,920 --> 00:12:50,920 Speaker 5: place that I could find, and I put them together, 237 00:12:50,960 --> 00:12:54,199 Speaker 5: and I collected about seven hundred such cases. I actually 238 00:12:54,280 --> 00:12:56,320 Speaker 5: found many times more than that, but a lot of 239 00:12:56,360 --> 00:12:58,280 Speaker 5: them just had not enough meat on the bones for 240 00:12:58,320 --> 00:13:00,000 Speaker 5: me to do much with, so I left them all 241 00:13:00,320 --> 00:13:03,720 Speaker 5: but seven hundred good cases i'd broken into three volumes. 242 00:13:03,920 --> 00:13:06,360 Speaker 5: Each of those volumes is about four hundred pages, and 243 00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:08,800 Speaker 5: as you just mentioned, the second one came out. What 244 00:13:08,880 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 5: I ended up doing this is actually a suggestion of 245 00:13:11,640 --> 00:13:14,160 Speaker 5: my wife, So I have to give Tracy credit here. 246 00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 5: After I'd finished putting all the cases together, she said, 247 00:13:18,280 --> 00:13:20,160 Speaker 5: you know, what would be great idea if you just 248 00:13:20,200 --> 00:13:23,400 Speaker 5: created some categories and put at the beginning of each 249 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:27,199 Speaker 5: case a summation of it, So like, what color was theft, 250 00:13:27,280 --> 00:13:29,720 Speaker 5: what shape was the craft, what was it doing? Did 251 00:13:29,800 --> 00:13:31,600 Speaker 5: it enter the water? Was it under the water? Did 252 00:13:31,679 --> 00:13:34,240 Speaker 5: it emerge in the water? Were there any type of 253 00:13:34,240 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 5: effects that people and this type of thing. So I 254 00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:40,240 Speaker 5: ended up coming up with fifteen and sometimes sixteen categories, 255 00:13:40,559 --> 00:13:43,559 Speaker 5: and I put them in and it was an additional 256 00:13:43,600 --> 00:13:44,880 Speaker 5: amount of work I didn't want to do, but I'm 257 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:47,000 Speaker 5: glad I did so then after I did that, then 258 00:13:47,080 --> 00:13:50,640 Speaker 5: I decided I wasn't really a spreadsheet kind of a guy. 259 00:13:50,679 --> 00:13:53,079 Speaker 5: I've really done very little work with spreadsheets, that's the truth. 260 00:13:53,240 --> 00:13:57,120 Speaker 5: But I created a massive spreadsheet that was like thirty 261 00:13:57,160 --> 00:14:01,240 Speaker 5: seven sheets. Wow. It was like, oh my god, this 262 00:14:01,320 --> 00:14:02,800 Speaker 5: is my first spreadsheet. It's like the one that was 263 00:14:02,800 --> 00:14:04,880 Speaker 5: going to kill me. But I put it together. But 264 00:14:05,120 --> 00:14:08,160 Speaker 5: thank goodness I did that because that's what allowed me 265 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,520 Speaker 5: to see patterns. This is what Cheryl Costa did in 266 00:14:10,559 --> 00:14:13,600 Speaker 5: her work as well. Sah absolutely basically the spreadsheet type thing, 267 00:14:13,840 --> 00:14:15,600 Speaker 5: and so when you do that, you can see things. 268 00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:18,680 Speaker 5: So one thing I noticed this was a shocker to me. 269 00:14:19,360 --> 00:14:21,720 Speaker 5: One of the data points that I noted was a 270 00:14:21,800 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 5: very simple one. It was that this occur during daylight 271 00:14:24,760 --> 00:14:27,120 Speaker 5: or at night. Forget like the time of day. That 272 00:14:27,480 --> 00:14:29,160 Speaker 5: because a lot of these cases like they don't tell 273 00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,600 Speaker 5: you the exact time, but in most instances I was 274 00:14:31,640 --> 00:14:33,240 Speaker 5: able to figure out if this is a day or 275 00:14:33,240 --> 00:14:36,040 Speaker 5: at night time, usually that information can come out. So 276 00:14:36,080 --> 00:14:37,920 Speaker 5: one thing I noted is that in all of the 277 00:14:37,960 --> 00:14:41,040 Speaker 5: cases that I found, right up until the end of 278 00:14:41,080 --> 00:14:45,000 Speaker 5: the nineteen sixties, it was almost exactly fifty to fifty 279 00:14:45,040 --> 00:14:48,960 Speaker 5: day versus night. Wow, And then almost like flipping a switch, 280 00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:52,280 Speaker 5: after nineteen sixty eight it went to like three quarters 281 00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:54,520 Speaker 5: seventy five percent started to take place at night, and 282 00:14:54,560 --> 00:14:57,280 Speaker 5: which has been to this day. Then if you factor 283 00:14:57,360 --> 00:15:01,000 Speaker 5: in military cases, they take place at almost a ninety 284 00:15:01,000 --> 00:15:05,240 Speaker 5: percent regularity at night. So now that to me tells 285 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:07,800 Speaker 5: me that this is not a random effect, that this 286 00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 5: is behavior. That's the first thing that jumps out of me. 287 00:15:10,560 --> 00:15:13,400 Speaker 5: In other words, that there is an intelligence. 288 00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:14,960 Speaker 4: There intentionally clandestine. 289 00:15:15,280 --> 00:15:18,880 Speaker 5: Yes, yes, absolutely, that's something we can surmise, and I 290 00:15:18,920 --> 00:15:21,320 Speaker 5: think that would be accurate, frankly. And then you know, 291 00:15:21,360 --> 00:15:24,520 Speaker 5: that got me asking myself, like what happened by the 292 00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:27,240 Speaker 5: late sixties that might have prompted this, And I didn't 293 00:15:27,240 --> 00:15:30,040 Speaker 5: have a full answer. But actually I was chatting a 294 00:15:30,200 --> 00:15:32,720 Speaker 5: number of months ago with Ross Coulthart, the journalist, and 295 00:15:32,800 --> 00:15:35,800 Speaker 5: Ross said to me that he had his contact who 296 00:15:36,080 --> 00:15:38,560 Speaker 5: learned about this in my research, and chuckled because he 297 00:15:38,600 --> 00:15:41,160 Speaker 5: told Ross that, yeah, that's when the I think it was. 298 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:44,880 Speaker 5: The Keyhole satellite radically upped its game to be able 299 00:15:44,880 --> 00:15:49,440 Speaker 5: to take like ultra high resolution images from Earth orbit 300 00:15:49,800 --> 00:15:52,560 Speaker 5: down to the surface, but during the daytime, so whereas 301 00:15:52,560 --> 00:15:54,840 Speaker 5: at night it wasn't as effective, but in daytime it's 302 00:15:54,960 --> 00:15:59,240 Speaker 5: it's resolution was became amazing, it was already good. So 303 00:15:59,680 --> 00:16:02,160 Speaker 5: I under maybe was at it was that, you know, 304 00:16:02,240 --> 00:16:05,520 Speaker 5: were these operators thinking we don't really want to be 305 00:16:05,520 --> 00:16:08,120 Speaker 5: as visible, so let's let's take it out at night, 306 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 5: And maybe they couldn't go completely one hundred percent at night, 307 00:16:12,040 --> 00:16:14,360 Speaker 5: so some of these maybe had to happen during the daytime. 308 00:16:14,720 --> 00:16:17,200 Speaker 5: Just again I'm guessing, but the fact that I saw 309 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:21,960 Speaker 5: this pattern in my spreadsheet really really caused me to think, Okay, 310 00:16:22,120 --> 00:16:24,640 Speaker 5: a I'm probably I think I'm getting good information because 311 00:16:24,640 --> 00:16:26,920 Speaker 5: this is a consistent pattern that I'm seeing that I 312 00:16:26,960 --> 00:16:30,320 Speaker 5: wasn't really expecting to look for another pattern I noticed, 313 00:16:30,360 --> 00:16:32,960 Speaker 5: and this I think might be related. It might not 314 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:38,360 Speaker 5: be related. Particularly during the nineteen seventies, was a radical 315 00:16:38,480 --> 00:16:44,480 Speaker 5: increase in cases of electromagnetic interference by these objects against 316 00:16:44,480 --> 00:16:49,640 Speaker 5: the witnesses, whether military or non military em interference essentially, 317 00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:52,440 Speaker 5: so that would mean like the radio would go out, 318 00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:55,200 Speaker 5: or your car engine would go out if it was 319 00:16:55,200 --> 00:16:58,080 Speaker 5: an aerial case, or if it's a ship, your radar 320 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 5: or sonar system would go offline, or your communication system 321 00:17:01,160 --> 00:17:03,880 Speaker 5: would go offline, or your weapons systems would go offline, 322 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:07,280 Speaker 5: or in some cases, your ship's engine would stop and 323 00:17:07,320 --> 00:17:09,280 Speaker 5: you'd be dead in the water for a little while. 324 00:17:09,320 --> 00:17:11,679 Speaker 5: Like that's what I'm talking about. And those types of 325 00:17:11,840 --> 00:17:15,200 Speaker 5: cases became much much more common during the nineteen seventies, 326 00:17:15,560 --> 00:17:18,000 Speaker 5: and so that was a definite pattern I noticed. And 327 00:17:18,040 --> 00:17:22,119 Speaker 5: then that declined back to more standard levels after really 328 00:17:22,160 --> 00:17:24,480 Speaker 5: the beginning of the early eighties, and it went back 329 00:17:24,520 --> 00:17:27,120 Speaker 5: to what looks like it always was. So something happened 330 00:17:27,280 --> 00:17:29,159 Speaker 5: during that period of time, and I don't have the 331 00:17:29,200 --> 00:17:31,640 Speaker 5: answer to this. What I can tell you is that 332 00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:36,359 Speaker 5: the nineteen seventies also were by far the busiest decade 333 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:39,280 Speaker 5: for USO cases. That all the cases that I'm able 334 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:42,240 Speaker 5: to find, the nineteen seventies takes the lead, and by 335 00:17:42,240 --> 00:17:44,960 Speaker 5: a large margin. And what's interesting is that that's all 336 00:17:45,000 --> 00:17:47,359 Speaker 5: pre internet, you know, that decade. A lot of the 337 00:17:47,400 --> 00:17:50,520 Speaker 5: cases that I have from the seventies were reported years 338 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:51,560 Speaker 5: after the fact. 339 00:17:51,320 --> 00:17:53,600 Speaker 4: On the Internet, but date to the seventies. 340 00:17:53,680 --> 00:17:55,480 Speaker 5: Yeah, they go back to the nineteen seventies, and there's 341 00:17:55,520 --> 00:17:57,840 Speaker 5: just an enormous number of these cases. Something I think 342 00:17:57,920 --> 00:18:01,160 Speaker 5: was going on. The seventies were busy decades for aerial 343 00:18:01,359 --> 00:18:04,000 Speaker 5: UFO sidings as well. Very busy people may not always 344 00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:07,840 Speaker 5: remember this, but it's the truth. So something important was 345 00:18:07,880 --> 00:18:08,199 Speaker 5: going on. 346 00:18:08,280 --> 00:18:11,159 Speaker 4: I think, well, it just seems like this whole time, 347 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 4: from your earliest cases up till now. I would anticipate 348 00:18:15,560 --> 00:18:19,120 Speaker 4: there being more sightings as we get closer, as our 349 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:22,080 Speaker 4: technology grows and we have different craft under the water, 350 00:18:22,560 --> 00:18:27,320 Speaker 4: and our detection capabilities to see these objects has probably 351 00:18:27,320 --> 00:18:29,119 Speaker 4: improved in the last fifty years. 352 00:18:29,240 --> 00:18:32,639 Speaker 5: This is probably true, And in fact, the twenty tens, 353 00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:36,480 Speaker 5: at least in my research, is the second busiest decade 354 00:18:36,520 --> 00:18:39,119 Speaker 5: after the nineteen seventies, so that is true. One of 355 00:18:39,160 --> 00:18:43,040 Speaker 5: the things against getting the contemporary reports is simply time. 356 00:18:43,440 --> 00:18:46,760 Speaker 5: Like a lot of these cases, if they're a military case, 357 00:18:46,960 --> 00:18:49,760 Speaker 5: like usually you're getting it from someone many years after 358 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:52,280 Speaker 5: the fact, often toward the later part of their life, 359 00:18:52,440 --> 00:18:54,480 Speaker 5: when you can see like their attitude is the hell 360 00:18:54,520 --> 00:18:56,120 Speaker 5: with it. I'm just putting this out there. I want 361 00:18:56,119 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 5: the world to know. It's very likely that some of 362 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:01,720 Speaker 5: the more recent cases too recent and we don't know 363 00:19:01,760 --> 00:19:04,119 Speaker 5: about them yet, but we may know about them twenty 364 00:19:04,119 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 5: thirty years from now. That's rarely possible. Yeah, so I 365 00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:09,439 Speaker 5: would I would think that's an important aspect of it. 366 00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:12,080 Speaker 5: I think you know your instinct on this is probably 367 00:19:12,160 --> 00:19:15,639 Speaker 5: correct that were We're getting better and better tools for 368 00:19:15,800 --> 00:19:19,399 Speaker 5: noticing them, but there are still dips that I noticed. 369 00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:21,879 Speaker 5: One dip was the nineteen nineties, and I wonder, like, 370 00:19:21,960 --> 00:19:24,520 Speaker 5: is that because the Cold War ended and some of 371 00:19:24,560 --> 00:19:28,280 Speaker 5: the Shenanigans that I noticed were actually US versus Soviet 372 00:19:28,560 --> 00:19:32,439 Speaker 5: operations that passed as USOS. I mean, I wonder this 373 00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:34,840 Speaker 5: when I look at the cases from the nineteen seventies 374 00:19:34,840 --> 00:19:36,800 Speaker 5: and eighties, I have a hard time thinking that these 375 00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:39,919 Speaker 5: are generally human tech. But I can't really say for 376 00:19:39,960 --> 00:19:42,720 Speaker 5: sure definitely, though the nineteen nineties showed a dip in 377 00:19:42,800 --> 00:19:44,400 Speaker 5: the sightings. 378 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,040 Speaker 4: It feels conintuitive. 379 00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:49,000 Speaker 5: That could be that simply there's more cases from the 380 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:51,240 Speaker 5: nineties that have not come out yet because it's still 381 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:54,239 Speaker 5: the people, at least in the military who experienced them. 382 00:19:54,240 --> 00:19:56,440 Speaker 5: They're not yet ready to Yeah. 383 00:19:56,560 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 4: Zell retire. Then they'll put that on the internet, and 384 00:19:58,920 --> 00:20:01,200 Speaker 4: then you'll have to redo the work again. Richard, we 385 00:20:01,280 --> 00:20:03,200 Speaker 4: got to take a break here. We come back. We're 386 00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:06,199 Speaker 4: going to ask you about the growing difficulty in knowing 387 00:20:06,520 --> 00:20:09,520 Speaker 4: what is real in the UFO space. You're listening to 388 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:12,159 Speaker 4: Beyond Contact and the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast AM 389 00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:31,840 Speaker 4: Paranormal Podcast Network. We are back on Beyond Contact. We're 390 00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:34,720 Speaker 4: speaking with Richard Dolan. Richard, do you have a favorite, 391 00:20:34,880 --> 00:20:38,439 Speaker 4: perhaps really strong case that stood out to you in 392 00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:39,520 Speaker 4: the USO research? 393 00:20:40,160 --> 00:20:44,040 Speaker 5: Several? Yes, quite a few, almost too many to mention one. 394 00:20:44,320 --> 00:20:47,600 Speaker 5: I like a lot of the Russian Soviet cases, just 395 00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:51,000 Speaker 5: because some of them are so crazy, like I really 396 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:52,520 Speaker 5: have to wonder like is this one true? Is this 397 00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:54,280 Speaker 5: one not true? One that I think is that, but 398 00:20:54,600 --> 00:21:00,480 Speaker 5: I'm quite confident is absolutely true. Is during the nineteen seventies, particular, 399 00:21:00,960 --> 00:21:07,320 Speaker 5: Soviet submarines frequently encountered a very very strange and unnerving 400 00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:11,400 Speaker 5: acoustic phenomenon while they were under the water, which they 401 00:21:11,440 --> 00:21:13,520 Speaker 5: called and I'm sure I'm going to butcher the pronunciation, 402 00:21:13,960 --> 00:21:18,280 Speaker 5: the kavakeri, which is the Russian word for croakers or 403 00:21:18,320 --> 00:21:21,760 Speaker 5: like the croaking of a frog. And they called it 404 00:21:21,800 --> 00:21:24,960 Speaker 5: that because it sounded like a croaking sound apparently. So 405 00:21:25,160 --> 00:21:28,040 Speaker 5: you know, imagine like you're down, you're blow the surface, 406 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:31,560 Speaker 5: it's totally dark, you're looking for the Americans. The Americans 407 00:21:31,600 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 5: are looking for you. The game is going on a time, 408 00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:36,919 Speaker 5: it's to dance, a dance in the dark, you know, 409 00:21:37,320 --> 00:21:39,800 Speaker 5: and then they would pick up this strange sound and 410 00:21:39,840 --> 00:21:42,800 Speaker 5: the sound would surround them that they could detect it 411 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:46,920 Speaker 5: circling them. Apparently, according to what we have on this, 412 00:21:47,800 --> 00:21:50,880 Speaker 5: they never figured it out. They wondered, is this American tech? 413 00:21:50,960 --> 00:21:54,120 Speaker 5: What the heck is this? To my knowledge, they never 414 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:57,600 Speaker 5: really determined a solution, but they didn't. They determined it 415 00:21:57,640 --> 00:22:01,280 Speaker 5: wasn't the Americans and that it was probably some kind 416 00:22:01,320 --> 00:22:05,560 Speaker 5: of intelligence. One Russian researcher and a lot of these 417 00:22:05,600 --> 00:22:08,440 Speaker 5: researchers out of Russia, like X Navy themselves, like they're 418 00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:12,280 Speaker 5: serious guys. I think he speculated, Yeah, they probably look 419 00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:13,639 Speaker 5: at us the way we look at the fish in 420 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:17,679 Speaker 5: the ocean, you know. So that's the Kabakri. There are 421 00:22:17,680 --> 00:22:21,399 Speaker 5: a couple of very good cases. One of my favorite 422 00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:28,240 Speaker 5: American cases is in my latest volume, Volume two, concerns 423 00:22:28,240 --> 00:22:32,080 Speaker 5: the USS John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier. This is nineteen 424 00:22:32,119 --> 00:22:34,560 Speaker 5: seventy one, July second, nineteen seventy one. We have an 425 00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:39,160 Speaker 5: exact date that's given, which we don't have exact dates 426 00:22:39,160 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 5: for some of these cases, especially if they're being reported 427 00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:44,320 Speaker 5: years later by a military person, but we have one 428 00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:46,000 Speaker 5: on this. We even have the name of the person 429 00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:48,000 Speaker 5: who put this one out there. He mentioned this a 430 00:22:48,080 --> 00:22:52,040 Speaker 5: number of several blog sites. He's a known person. So 431 00:22:52,080 --> 00:22:56,080 Speaker 5: the story is that this individual was a communication specialist 432 00:22:56,080 --> 00:22:59,520 Speaker 5: aboard the USSJFK. They were just north of Puerto Rico 433 00:22:59,640 --> 00:23:03,200 Speaker 5: in nineteen seventy one, and it's about eight eight thirty 434 00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:05,359 Speaker 5: in the evening, so it's getting dark, but not totally 435 00:23:05,400 --> 00:23:08,760 Speaker 5: dark because it's summertime, and he's at the comms and 436 00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:11,399 Speaker 5: he the first thing he notices is that all the 437 00:23:11,400 --> 00:23:15,080 Speaker 5: communications coming into the ship are gibberish, like they had. 438 00:23:15,119 --> 00:23:18,320 Speaker 5: He described they had four incoming and four outgoing, and 439 00:23:18,359 --> 00:23:21,000 Speaker 5: the incoming would I guess they would print out probably 440 00:23:21,000 --> 00:23:23,720 Speaker 5: like I'm imagining, like a dot matrix type printer, you know, 441 00:23:23,800 --> 00:23:25,760 Speaker 5: they would print out me. And so all of that 442 00:23:25,880 --> 00:23:29,480 Speaker 5: was gibberish. And he's looking at thinking that's that's wrong, 443 00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:32,399 Speaker 5: what's wrong here? And then he hears someone on the 444 00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:36,879 Speaker 5: ship's intercom in a state of utter panic, screaming it's God, 445 00:23:37,080 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 5: It's the end of the world. 446 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:38,840 Speaker 4: Wow. 447 00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:41,880 Speaker 5: So that definitely got his attention. So he eventually quickly 448 00:23:41,920 --> 00:23:45,679 Speaker 5: he goes top side to see like what's happening, and 449 00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:50,800 Speaker 5: he described a glowing orange ball that was hovering directly 450 00:23:51,000 --> 00:23:53,119 Speaker 5: or right over the ship. He said it was about 451 00:23:53,160 --> 00:23:55,600 Speaker 5: the size of a beach ball at arm's length, so 452 00:23:55,720 --> 00:23:59,600 Speaker 5: pretty kind of big. That sounds very big, frankly. And 453 00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:02,159 Speaker 5: it had I had a kind of swirling colors of 454 00:24:02,240 --> 00:24:05,920 Speaker 5: like orange and dark yellow and reddish, and he said 455 00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:08,920 Speaker 5: it gave off about half the amount of light of sunlight, 456 00:24:09,119 --> 00:24:11,240 Speaker 5: so it was kind of bright. So he's watching this 457 00:24:11,359 --> 00:24:14,320 Speaker 5: for not even a full minute when the ship went 458 00:24:14,359 --> 00:24:16,840 Speaker 5: to battle stations general quarters and he had to return 459 00:24:17,280 --> 00:24:21,639 Speaker 5: to his communications station, so he didn't directly see the 460 00:24:21,680 --> 00:24:25,280 Speaker 5: object do anything else. The ship was in battle stations 461 00:24:25,320 --> 00:24:29,080 Speaker 5: for the next half hour, and he learned that fighter 462 00:24:29,200 --> 00:24:32,399 Speaker 5: aircraft were unable to launch, so the ship was not 463 00:24:32,480 --> 00:24:36,119 Speaker 5: able to engage. So apparently the order was given for 464 00:24:36,480 --> 00:24:39,399 Speaker 5: the fighter jets on the ship to engage his object, 465 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:42,280 Speaker 5: but they were unable to do so. So this went 466 00:24:42,320 --> 00:24:45,000 Speaker 5: on for I think twenty five minutes. And that's his story. 467 00:24:45,240 --> 00:24:47,600 Speaker 5: I mean, it's kind of amazing. That's a great case, 468 00:24:47,960 --> 00:24:50,720 Speaker 5: he said after the fact. A few days later, when 469 00:24:50,720 --> 00:24:53,560 Speaker 5: they were about to leave the ship for surely that 470 00:24:53,640 --> 00:24:56,359 Speaker 5: the captain made an announcement. He didn't refer directly to 471 00:24:56,400 --> 00:24:58,359 Speaker 5: the event, but he just said, well, all of you 472 00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:00,480 Speaker 5: who serve aboard are us n able to will know 473 00:25:01,040 --> 00:25:03,719 Speaker 5: that there are certain things that must never leave this vessel. 474 00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:06,920 Speaker 5: And so according to the person who mentioned this, he said, 475 00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:09,720 Speaker 5: that was my cue that captain's talking about this event. 476 00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:13,160 Speaker 4: Yeah, that's enough. Interesting, Hey, do you think there's some 477 00:25:13,280 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 4: of the newer technology that could really help identify what 478 00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:20,480 Speaker 4: some of these objects are? Things like underwater drones and 479 00:25:20,560 --> 00:25:24,160 Speaker 4: underwater scanning abilities are being developed right now, and I'm 480 00:25:24,160 --> 00:25:27,639 Speaker 4: thinking specifically about some of these huge leaves that have 481 00:25:27,680 --> 00:25:32,119 Speaker 4: been made. There's this thing called synthetic aperture sonar systems, 482 00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:36,600 Speaker 4: which are AI enhanced multi beam systems that are carried 483 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:41,280 Speaker 4: by autonomous underwater vehicles and they allow for huge areas 484 00:25:41,280 --> 00:25:43,800 Speaker 4: to be scanned and mapped. You know, they're doing that 485 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:47,840 Speaker 4: twenty thirty project to map all of the oceans. What 486 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 4: do you think of those? 487 00:25:49,359 --> 00:25:52,240 Speaker 5: Very interesting? And I look at the history of the 488 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:56,880 Speaker 5: USO phenomenon as a dance between us and them, as 489 00:25:56,880 --> 00:25:59,600 Speaker 5: I say, and what I mean by that is you 490 00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:02,240 Speaker 5: go back to one hundred and twenty six years ago 491 00:26:02,240 --> 00:26:04,439 Speaker 5: to the year nineteen hundred was the year that we 492 00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:08,840 Speaker 5: first developed an operational submarine. So from that point and 493 00:26:08,880 --> 00:26:13,240 Speaker 5: then you think of all of our developments sonar, radar, battleships, 494 00:26:13,280 --> 00:26:16,560 Speaker 5: aircraft carriers, nuclear submarine. By the nineteen fifties, I could 495 00:26:16,560 --> 00:26:19,440 Speaker 5: stay under water almost forever, and all these other advances. 496 00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:23,480 Speaker 5: We started developing undersea sonar systems in the nineteen fifties 497 00:26:23,480 --> 00:26:26,040 Speaker 5: that were becoming pretty good. So if you're them, if 498 00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:29,840 Speaker 5: you're these other beings, you're realizing that these human beings 499 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:34,239 Speaker 5: are not static. They are constantly innovating, and so you 500 00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:38,119 Speaker 5: have to calibrate your self against this. And one of 501 00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:39,760 Speaker 5: the things that I think that they've been doing all 502 00:26:39,760 --> 00:26:42,359 Speaker 5: these years is when they come up to a vessel 503 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:45,960 Speaker 5: and do what I call data denial, where they will 504 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:49,080 Speaker 5: shut us down, They will shut down our ability to 505 00:26:49,240 --> 00:26:53,119 Speaker 5: observe them at their closest approach. Frequently they do this, 506 00:26:53,760 --> 00:26:57,480 Speaker 5: and I sometimes think they do this because they're testing 507 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:00,960 Speaker 5: can we do this. It's like them that something new here. 508 00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:03,600 Speaker 5: We have to make sure that we can deal with this, 509 00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:07,520 Speaker 5: so let's go and test it. So with the newest 510 00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:11,719 Speaker 5: technologies that we are developing. I actually would expect that 511 00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:15,840 Speaker 5: it might have initial success. But I might also expect 512 00:27:15,960 --> 00:27:19,040 Speaker 5: that whatever the intelligences are that operate below the water 513 00:27:19,280 --> 00:27:21,760 Speaker 5: are probably aware of this and may be taking their 514 00:27:21,760 --> 00:27:25,359 Speaker 5: own countermeasures. You know, arms races may not simply occur 515 00:27:25,720 --> 00:27:28,120 Speaker 5: between US and the Russians and US and the Chinese. 516 00:27:28,200 --> 00:27:31,760 Speaker 5: They may actually be taking place, in a sense, between 517 00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:33,840 Speaker 5: US and these other beings that are here. 518 00:27:34,040 --> 00:27:36,960 Speaker 4: You know, there's another aspect of the USO and UFO thing, 519 00:27:37,080 --> 00:27:40,680 Speaker 4: and that's this trust factor. We have such a divided 520 00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:44,000 Speaker 4: society and world for that matter, that I honestly believe 521 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:47,080 Speaker 4: if certain people came out with official pictures or videos 522 00:27:47,160 --> 00:27:49,840 Speaker 4: or whatever like we touched on earlier, there will still 523 00:27:49,880 --> 00:27:52,359 Speaker 4: be a good percentage of people who won't believe it. 524 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:54,439 Speaker 4: You know, you can couple that with the rise of 525 00:27:54,520 --> 00:27:57,080 Speaker 4: AI and some of these technologies we're talking about, and 526 00:27:57,119 --> 00:28:00,800 Speaker 4: we're living in a world where we don't ever know 527 00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:01,520 Speaker 4: what's real. 528 00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:05,720 Speaker 5: It's a serious problem. Yeah, twenty plus years ago. I 529 00:28:05,800 --> 00:28:07,640 Speaker 5: used to think a lot about AI at that time, 530 00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:10,560 Speaker 5: and I'd read some books by Ray Kurzweil, and I 531 00:28:10,600 --> 00:28:13,520 Speaker 5: was like, I'm into this subject. And back then, tuck 532 00:28:13,560 --> 00:28:16,200 Speaker 5: in two thousand and three, two thousand and four, I 533 00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:20,480 Speaker 5: really convinced myself. It feels so naive now thinking, but 534 00:28:20,560 --> 00:28:22,679 Speaker 5: I thought, well, when we get to a place of 535 00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:26,879 Speaker 5: stronger AI, that will solve the UFO mystery, because you'll 536 00:28:26,920 --> 00:28:30,520 Speaker 5: just be able to ask your artificially intelligent computer, hey, 537 00:28:30,720 --> 00:28:34,439 Speaker 5: I'm looking for some UFO evidence, and they'll say, oh, yes, absolutely, 538 00:28:35,320 --> 00:28:38,080 Speaker 5: the data shows that there's six different groups of intelligences, 539 00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:40,120 Speaker 5: and this and that and the other. And that's not 540 00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:42,400 Speaker 5: to say the least, that is not what has happened. 541 00:28:42,680 --> 00:28:45,960 Speaker 5: So lllm's are quite a different ballpark. They're only as 542 00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,040 Speaker 5: good as the data that goes into them, exactly, and 543 00:28:48,120 --> 00:28:50,800 Speaker 5: they have their guardrails, as we know, and they can 544 00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:53,720 Speaker 5: be weaponized for all kinds of purposes, so that whole 545 00:28:53,760 --> 00:28:55,680 Speaker 5: idea of mine goes right out the window. But even 546 00:28:55,720 --> 00:28:58,120 Speaker 5: beyond that, AI is a problem because now we're in 547 00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:00,000 Speaker 5: an error where evident we all know evidence can be 548 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:03,200 Speaker 5: fabricated easily. I mean, in the recent movie Disclosure Day 549 00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:05,680 Speaker 5: by Steven Spielberg, one of the ironies I always felt 550 00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:08,120 Speaker 5: was at the end, I'm sorry about a spoiler, but 551 00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:11,800 Speaker 5: at the end they're they're releasing video like powerful video 552 00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:15,720 Speaker 5: of Roswell and of all these other historical events. And 553 00:29:16,120 --> 00:29:18,480 Speaker 5: in the movie, the people are looking at this thinking, wow, 554 00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:21,600 Speaker 5: this is real. But the proof actually is that Steven 555 00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:24,760 Speaker 5: Spielberg proved in this movie that he's able to create 556 00:29:24,840 --> 00:29:27,640 Speaker 5: very realistic looking video. He's got some resources and he 557 00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:28,040 Speaker 5: can do it. 558 00:29:28,080 --> 00:29:31,160 Speaker 4: But sure anyone, but in the year or two it's 559 00:29:31,200 --> 00:29:33,200 Speaker 4: going to be as good for a kid on his eye. 560 00:29:33,440 --> 00:29:35,640 Speaker 5: And I'll tell you that, so anyone can create at 561 00:29:35,720 --> 00:29:39,440 Speaker 5: least video. So video is not enough anymore, and we 562 00:29:39,560 --> 00:29:42,840 Speaker 5: have to really ask what does constitute proof? And then 563 00:29:42,880 --> 00:29:45,680 Speaker 5: you know, to your point about society being fractured, I 564 00:29:45,800 --> 00:29:48,440 Speaker 5: completely agree with this. But the one difference I would 565 00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:50,880 Speaker 5: say here is that you know, I think it was 566 00:29:50,960 --> 00:29:54,120 Speaker 5: last week we talked about Donald Trump do disclosure. Okay, 567 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:56,600 Speaker 5: so you can either love Trump or you can hate Trump. 568 00:29:56,600 --> 00:29:59,240 Speaker 5: But obviously it's unavoidable that half the world, half the 569 00:29:59,280 --> 00:30:02,400 Speaker 5: country anyway, hates this man. Right, he lived rent free 570 00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:04,840 Speaker 5: in their head, and so if he were to say something, 571 00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:08,520 Speaker 5: it would probably not be believed by at least some people 572 00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:11,000 Speaker 5: just because it's him, right, But if he did that, 573 00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:13,520 Speaker 5: and if the evidence was out there, I tend to think. 574 00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:16,959 Speaker 5: Over time, more and more people would probably slowly come 575 00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:17,800 Speaker 5: around and accept it. 576 00:30:18,160 --> 00:30:19,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, it has to. 577 00:30:19,040 --> 00:30:20,480 Speaker 5: I don't know how long it would take. 578 00:30:20,520 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 4: But it's different than it would have been twenty years ago. 579 00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:26,480 Speaker 4: Twenty years ago, any president makes that statement and ninety 580 00:30:26,520 --> 00:30:28,280 Speaker 4: five percent of the people go for it, where it's 581 00:30:28,320 --> 00:30:29,160 Speaker 4: not the case today. 582 00:30:29,400 --> 00:30:30,120 Speaker 5: Totally agree on that. 583 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:32,200 Speaker 4: Brother, We got to take a break here. We'll pick 584 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:34,000 Speaker 4: this up on the other side here when we come back. 585 00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,800 Speaker 4: We're going to ask Richard about his thoughts on what would, 586 00:30:37,080 --> 00:30:40,520 Speaker 4: could and should happen next regarding the disclosure moment and 587 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:43,880 Speaker 4: the study of UFOs and USOS. Plus, you can wager 588 00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:47,000 Speaker 4: on whether or not he'll make a fifth Dance metaphor. 589 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:49,200 Speaker 4: My money's on yes. We'll see what happens when we 590 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:52,280 Speaker 4: come back. You're listening to Beyond Contact on the iHeartRadio 591 00:30:52,320 --> 00:31:13,360 Speaker 4: and Coast to Coast AM Paranormal podcast network. We are 592 00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:17,280 Speaker 4: back on Beyond Contact. It's Captain Ron speaking with Richard Dolan. Hey, Richard, 593 00:31:17,720 --> 00:31:21,760 Speaker 4: after decades of looking at both UFOs and USOS, what 594 00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:25,160 Speaker 4: questions stand out to you is the most that you 595 00:31:25,360 --> 00:31:27,880 Speaker 4: think we need answers to in order to get a 596 00:31:27,880 --> 00:31:30,280 Speaker 4: better handle on what the phenomenon. 597 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,480 Speaker 5: Is also very good question. 598 00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:34,680 Speaker 4: They're all, Richard, come on. 599 00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:38,840 Speaker 5: They are really a good time here. I tend to 600 00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:42,200 Speaker 5: think that in our community, let's just call it, there's 601 00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:45,280 Speaker 5: a lot of focus on disclosure. They understand that they 602 00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:47,120 Speaker 5: want the government to reveal the truth, they want their 603 00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:49,040 Speaker 5: government to be responsive to them. I mean, there's a 604 00:31:49,040 --> 00:31:51,040 Speaker 5: lot of good reasons to ask for that. But this 605 00:31:51,160 --> 00:31:55,120 Speaker 5: subject is much much bigger than disclosure. It's a phenomenon. 606 00:31:55,360 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 5: And not only is it a phenomenon, I like to 607 00:31:57,960 --> 00:32:01,400 Speaker 5: remind people, it is a phenomenon that strongly appears to 608 00:32:01,400 --> 00:32:05,960 Speaker 5: be intelligent, strongly appears to be highly sophisticated, very precise, 609 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:09,720 Speaker 5: very confident, I would add, and seems to have no 610 00:32:10,360 --> 00:32:13,800 Speaker 5: problem operating anywhere it wants to in any part of 611 00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:17,760 Speaker 5: this world. So that's that's the big thing that I 612 00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:21,280 Speaker 5: think we sometimes easily lose sight of that there is 613 00:32:21,400 --> 00:32:24,120 Speaker 5: someone here that we don't have a good explanation for them, 614 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:27,960 Speaker 5: and they seem to operate well well beyond our capability. 615 00:32:28,640 --> 00:32:30,360 Speaker 5: You know, I could just only talk about my own 616 00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:34,240 Speaker 5: interest and where I have moved, but I have definitely moved. 617 00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 5: You know, we talked about behavioral aspects of this phenomenon, 618 00:32:37,680 --> 00:32:40,280 Speaker 5: and that is probably the main thing that drives me 619 00:32:40,400 --> 00:32:44,720 Speaker 5: these days, is trying to understand their behavior and to 620 00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:50,040 Speaker 5: understand our relationship to them. What if there is a relationship, 621 00:32:50,160 --> 00:32:52,760 Speaker 5: and not simply like do they make us or do 622 00:32:52,880 --> 00:32:56,240 Speaker 5: they guide our evolution? Which I don't believe, actually, but 623 00:32:56,800 --> 00:32:59,960 Speaker 5: how long have they been observing us? What changes historic 624 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:03,160 Speaker 5: have occurred in the patterns of that observation. So by 625 00:33:03,160 --> 00:33:05,200 Speaker 5: that I simply mean I'm not on board with a 626 00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:08,680 Speaker 5: lot of the ancient aliens beliefs set where they'll say, oh, 627 00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:10,800 Speaker 5: they've been here forever and they've been doing this and 628 00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:13,000 Speaker 5: that forever. I actually don't believe that. I do think 629 00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:14,920 Speaker 5: that we've been observed for a long time. And I 630 00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:17,240 Speaker 5: also think that a lot of the so called evidence 631 00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:20,840 Speaker 5: for ancient UFOs ancient aliens is way overblown and probably 632 00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:21,320 Speaker 5: not trip. 633 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:25,840 Speaker 4: There wasn't much to see. We weren't doing anything, no technology. 634 00:33:25,240 --> 00:33:28,440 Speaker 5: Exactly exact that. I think that's probably the main reason. 635 00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:31,280 Speaker 5: What could they do with us? What could we do 636 00:33:31,360 --> 00:33:31,720 Speaker 5: with them? 637 00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:32,160 Speaker 4: Really? 638 00:33:32,200 --> 00:33:34,640 Speaker 5: We couldn't. We would have no ability really to relate 639 00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:37,680 Speaker 5: to them. What I see is a pattern of vastly 640 00:33:37,720 --> 00:33:42,040 Speaker 5: increased observation starting in the nineteenth century, early nineteenth century, 641 00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:45,800 Speaker 5: and then really going to the next level during and 642 00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:48,880 Speaker 5: immediately after World War Two. You know, why weren't there 643 00:33:48,920 --> 00:33:51,360 Speaker 5: big numbers of UFO sidings in the nineteen twenties. We 644 00:33:51,360 --> 00:33:54,400 Speaker 5: were advanced, we had radio, we had ability to notice 645 00:33:54,400 --> 00:33:57,320 Speaker 5: the things, and yet the phenomenon wasn't there. But after 646 00:33:57,320 --> 00:34:01,239 Speaker 5: the forties it was, so something was definitely happening after that. 647 00:34:01,560 --> 00:34:04,800 Speaker 5: But I'm interested in their behavior. I'm interested in seeing 648 00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:09,120 Speaker 5: both parallels and differences between us and them that I'm 649 00:34:09,160 --> 00:34:12,480 Speaker 5: able to figure out, and I think looking at them 650 00:34:12,520 --> 00:34:16,359 Speaker 5: as a kind of anthropologist is one maybe productive way 651 00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:19,799 Speaker 5: to do it, studying their behavior. What I tend to 652 00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:23,640 Speaker 5: think is that based on what I've studied, is, hey, 653 00:34:23,640 --> 00:34:26,520 Speaker 5: they're not interested in open contact with us, probably because 654 00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:29,480 Speaker 5: it would almost be impossible for them to do it. 655 00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:31,440 Speaker 5: It would be like us trying to have open contact 656 00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:33,960 Speaker 5: with If you went back one million years into the 657 00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:37,120 Speaker 5: past and try to meet one of the human ancestors 658 00:34:37,120 --> 00:34:40,040 Speaker 5: that existed, then yes, they walked up right, Yes they 659 00:34:40,040 --> 00:34:42,160 Speaker 5: were intelligent. No, you would not be able to have 660 00:34:42,239 --> 00:34:45,640 Speaker 5: a real conversation with them without destroying their community. It 661 00:34:45,640 --> 00:34:48,239 Speaker 5: would just not be possible, and I suspect it might 662 00:34:48,239 --> 00:34:51,840 Speaker 5: be the same here. So to answer your question, I 663 00:34:51,840 --> 00:34:56,000 Speaker 5: think what is needed more focus on actually understanding this 664 00:34:56,040 --> 00:34:59,560 Speaker 5: phenomenon rather than focusing on is the government going to 665 00:34:59,560 --> 00:35:02,440 Speaker 5: give us discs closure. I think that's important. I don't 666 00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:04,760 Speaker 5: want to minimize it, but I think we're really starting 667 00:35:04,760 --> 00:35:06,440 Speaker 5: to lose sight of it over the last ten years 668 00:35:06,880 --> 00:35:09,120 Speaker 5: since this subject has been in the kind of more 669 00:35:09,160 --> 00:35:12,399 Speaker 5: in the mainstream. I really think that a lot of 670 00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,480 Speaker 5: the research community also has potentially lost sight of some 671 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:17,480 Speaker 5: of the more traditional things that are going on. Are 672 00:35:17,520 --> 00:35:20,040 Speaker 5: there still abductions? Yes, I think there are still abductions. 673 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:23,080 Speaker 5: I don't really hear much many people researching there things 674 00:35:23,080 --> 00:35:23,399 Speaker 5: like that. 675 00:35:24,239 --> 00:35:28,480 Speaker 4: The scientific resource to this cause, to me is I 676 00:35:28,640 --> 00:35:31,440 Speaker 4: say it all the time, we need more scientific resource 677 00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:33,560 Speaker 4: to dedicate it to this. If you had the opportunity 678 00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:37,759 Speaker 4: to ask just one question directly to those who do 679 00:35:37,960 --> 00:35:40,560 Speaker 4: know the full truth, you know, as best as humans 680 00:35:40,640 --> 00:35:44,000 Speaker 4: can know, inside our government, private industry, wherever it is 681 00:35:44,040 --> 00:35:47,200 Speaker 4: that really is at the top, what question would it be? 682 00:35:47,719 --> 00:35:51,799 Speaker 5: I would probably my instinct would be to ask what's 683 00:35:51,880 --> 00:35:54,520 Speaker 5: the worst, like, what's the most dangerous aspect of This 684 00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:58,279 Speaker 5: is because I've often heard rumors but not confirmed, but 685 00:35:58,360 --> 00:36:02,480 Speaker 5: certainly in behavior support this that at least one of 686 00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:05,200 Speaker 5: the groups, if we can say that that's here, is 687 00:36:05,960 --> 00:36:09,680 Speaker 5: very very very terrifying, very scary. So if that's true, 688 00:36:09,760 --> 00:36:12,880 Speaker 5: that's certainly one reason you might not want to have 689 00:36:12,920 --> 00:36:16,120 Speaker 5: a disclosure. You know, if there is a group that's 690 00:36:16,120 --> 00:36:19,680 Speaker 5: here that you have no control over, that is terrifying 691 00:36:19,840 --> 00:36:22,400 Speaker 5: in one way or another. So that's probably what I 692 00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:24,240 Speaker 5: want to know. If I were to ask the secret keepers, 693 00:36:24,600 --> 00:36:25,319 Speaker 5: how bad is it? 694 00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:27,719 Speaker 4: Well, let me ask you this related question about the 695 00:36:27,760 --> 00:36:30,799 Speaker 4: secret keepers. How many people do you think, take a 696 00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:33,680 Speaker 4: wild guess, because I know this is complete speculative, do 697 00:36:33,719 --> 00:36:36,240 Speaker 4: you think would have the full picture within our government? 698 00:36:36,920 --> 00:36:38,560 Speaker 5: Well, too, you said within our government. I had a 699 00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:41,560 Speaker 5: different answer. So I think, first, I think some of 700 00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:45,120 Speaker 5: the secret goes beyond government. I think probably a lot 701 00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:47,640 Speaker 5: of it goes beyond government at this point, I think 702 00:36:47,960 --> 00:36:50,960 Speaker 5: a lot of this has been shopped out to private 703 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:56,279 Speaker 5: and semi public organizations and things like that. But of that, 704 00:36:56,360 --> 00:36:59,800 Speaker 5: people who actually have really the full the full dirt, 705 00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:02,400 Speaker 5: really know. But I wouldn't be surprised if it's between 706 00:37:02,440 --> 00:37:04,440 Speaker 5: fifty and one hundred maybe somebody else. 707 00:37:04,640 --> 00:37:07,600 Speaker 4: That's extremely low, whatever that number is. I mean it's 708 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:10,960 Speaker 4: under a thousand for sure, and that's that's pretty terrifying 709 00:37:11,000 --> 00:37:11,560 Speaker 4: to think about. 710 00:37:12,120 --> 00:37:14,000 Speaker 5: I think probably, yeah, I think less than one thousand, 711 00:37:14,239 --> 00:37:16,840 Speaker 5: almost for sure. I mean, when you think about everything 712 00:37:16,840 --> 00:37:20,360 Speaker 5: relating to this, it has it's a mystery, it's a 713 00:37:20,400 --> 00:37:25,600 Speaker 5: sign of external intelligence. It has powerful national security implications, 714 00:37:25,800 --> 00:37:29,560 Speaker 5: it has powerful existential implications. It is powerful implications for 715 00:37:29,600 --> 00:37:34,879 Speaker 5: our global system, both economic, financial, in every way imaginable. 716 00:37:35,080 --> 00:37:38,200 Speaker 5: It's a powerful subject and that is why it was 717 00:37:38,200 --> 00:37:40,440 Speaker 5: subjected to so much ridicule for so long, because that 718 00:37:40,560 --> 00:37:43,960 Speaker 5: was an effective way of keeping it sidelined. So the 719 00:37:44,040 --> 00:37:46,600 Speaker 5: ridicule doesn't really work anymore, and that's a real loss 720 00:37:46,640 --> 00:37:48,920 Speaker 5: for the Secret Secrecy Group, if we can own that. 721 00:37:49,160 --> 00:37:54,440 Speaker 5: But I think this is a profoundly consequential subject and 722 00:37:54,760 --> 00:37:57,800 Speaker 5: it's much it goes way beyond like you know, cocktail 723 00:37:57,840 --> 00:38:02,680 Speaker 5: party conversation. Yeah, I'm very interested. Well, yeah, that's great. 724 00:38:02,719 --> 00:38:03,960 Speaker 5: I'm glad you like the subject. 725 00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:08,040 Speaker 4: But it's the fate of humanity is in your hands, right, 726 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:12,759 Speaker 4: last question here, brothers, you're nearly seventy percent through this. 727 00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:14,760 Speaker 4: You know, you've got two out of the three books done. 728 00:38:16,080 --> 00:38:19,560 Speaker 4: It's an amazing task of documenting all these historical cases. 729 00:38:19,840 --> 00:38:22,320 Speaker 4: After the whole series is done. Is there a lesson 730 00:38:22,400 --> 00:38:25,479 Speaker 4: or takeaway that you hope that that we would draw 731 00:38:25,600 --> 00:38:27,600 Speaker 4: from that data that you've compiled. 732 00:38:28,000 --> 00:38:31,319 Speaker 5: Well, I think even from the first two books, one 733 00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:35,200 Speaker 5: can take the main messages away, which is that USOS 734 00:38:35,239 --> 00:38:39,520 Speaker 5: in particular, this is a serious aspect of the overall 735 00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:43,200 Speaker 5: UAP subject. For one, it continues to this day. That's 736 00:38:43,239 --> 00:38:46,680 Speaker 5: another thing. And it is global. There is no part 737 00:38:46,719 --> 00:38:49,719 Speaker 5: of this planet where they do not appear, So that 738 00:38:49,920 --> 00:38:51,960 Speaker 5: would be a quick thing to say. The thing I 739 00:38:52,000 --> 00:38:54,879 Speaker 5: would just add, and I've said this in I've said 740 00:38:54,880 --> 00:38:56,920 Speaker 5: this a great length in my first volume of this 741 00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:00,520 Speaker 5: is that as important as is, this is still a 742 00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:05,600 Speaker 5: fairly small subset of the overall UFO or UAP mystery. 743 00:39:05,640 --> 00:39:09,160 Speaker 5: And I say this because some people occasionally will say, oh, well, yeah, 744 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:11,799 Speaker 5: water accounts for half of the UFO cases that are 745 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:13,920 Speaker 5: out there, and I just don't see evidence for that. 746 00:39:14,520 --> 00:39:16,839 Speaker 5: When I look for these cases, I can tell you 747 00:39:16,880 --> 00:39:19,080 Speaker 5: I feel like I'm hunting for a needle in a haystack. 748 00:39:19,320 --> 00:39:23,440 Speaker 5: I go through large numbers of cases in various databases, 749 00:39:23,640 --> 00:39:26,400 Speaker 5: the National UFO Reporting Center and the mof ON database. 750 00:39:26,600 --> 00:39:29,080 Speaker 5: I've gone through both and it's it's not easy to 751 00:39:29,080 --> 00:39:31,439 Speaker 5: find a good USO case in them. They are there, 752 00:39:31,680 --> 00:39:35,279 Speaker 5: but you have to be diligent put on ten that 753 00:39:35,320 --> 00:39:38,520 Speaker 5: are usos. Oh even much less intent less than ten. Okay, 754 00:39:38,680 --> 00:39:41,680 Speaker 5: maybe maybe one percent? Oh wow, Okay, that might be. 755 00:39:42,000 --> 00:39:44,360 Speaker 5: Like if I go through one hundred cases on the 756 00:39:44,440 --> 00:39:47,719 Speaker 5: National UFO Reporting Center database, I would feel lucky if 757 00:39:47,719 --> 00:39:48,920 Speaker 5: I found one out of one hundred. 758 00:39:49,120 --> 00:39:52,160 Speaker 4: Well not everyone's on the water, to be fair, exactly. 759 00:39:52,239 --> 00:39:54,160 Speaker 5: Like, it's not that there's no action in the center 760 00:39:54,239 --> 00:39:56,520 Speaker 5: of the Atlantic Ocean, but who goes out there. Navy 761 00:39:56,560 --> 00:39:59,040 Speaker 5: goes out there startings, and they're not inclined to talk, 762 00:39:59,120 --> 00:40:02,120 Speaker 5: so we're we're at a disadvantage. Most of the USO 763 00:40:02,200 --> 00:40:05,640 Speaker 5: cases that I have noted were seen by people at 764 00:40:05,680 --> 00:40:07,920 Speaker 5: the shore, so they're not in the deep water. Some 765 00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:09,480 Speaker 5: are in the deep water because there are people who 766 00:40:09,480 --> 00:40:11,839 Speaker 5: are out there, but one. I didn't mention this as 767 00:40:11,840 --> 00:40:14,840 Speaker 5: a hotspot, but Puerto Rico really needs to be mentioned 768 00:40:14,840 --> 00:40:17,080 Speaker 5: as a major hotspot of this. And all of the 769 00:40:17,120 --> 00:40:20,040 Speaker 5: cases that I have are essentially people on the shore 770 00:40:20,239 --> 00:40:23,000 Speaker 5: seeing something incredible thing go on off the island right 771 00:40:23,080 --> 00:40:24,839 Speaker 5: very close to the shore. I think that's the case 772 00:40:24,960 --> 00:40:26,800 Speaker 5: with a lot of these Catalina Island off in the 773 00:40:26,840 --> 00:40:29,120 Speaker 5: Channel Islands off La Is another of these places in 774 00:40:29,200 --> 00:40:31,359 Speaker 5: our hotspots. But I suspect, you know, we're not out 775 00:40:31,360 --> 00:40:33,960 Speaker 5: in the deep water, so we're probably missing a lot. 776 00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:36,480 Speaker 4: That's right. Well, thanks Richard, I really appreciate it. Everyone 777 00:40:36,560 --> 00:40:39,000 Speaker 4: check out that book and you can find more about 778 00:40:39,120 --> 00:40:42,080 Speaker 4: Richard at Richard dolanmembers dot com. You can find me 779 00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:45,120 Speaker 4: on Twitter and Instagram at ci TD Underscore Captain Ron. 780 00:40:45,280 --> 00:40:48,560 Speaker 4: Stay connected by checking out Contact Inthdesert dot com. Stay 781 00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:51,680 Speaker 4: open minded and rational as we explore the unknown right 782 00:40:51,719 --> 00:40:54,600 Speaker 4: here on the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast am Paranormal 783 00:40:54,640 --> 00:41:08,879 Speaker 4: Podcast Network. 784 00:41:20,680 --> 00:41:23,200 Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Ghost 785 00:41:23,280 --> 00:41:26,239 Speaker 1: Day and Paranormal Podcast Network. Make sure and check out 786 00:41:26,320 --> 00:41:29,560 Speaker 1: all our shows on the iHeartRadio app or by going 787 00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:36,400 Speaker 1: to iHeartRadio dot com.