1 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:12,399 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey Therein 2 00:00:12,560 --> 00:00:16,320 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm 3 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:19,480 Speaker 1: an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the tech 4 00:00:19,520 --> 00:00:22,880 Speaker 1: are you? So? On Monday's episode of tech Stuff, I 5 00:00:23,000 --> 00:00:28,360 Speaker 1: covered the topic of active noise canceling headphones or active 6 00:00:28,360 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 1: noise reduction headphones, and I mentioned in that episode the 7 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:35,600 Speaker 1: development of a system designed to cause discomfort in young 8 00:00:35,680 --> 00:00:38,640 Speaker 1: people through the use of sound played at a pitch 9 00:00:38,720 --> 00:00:42,960 Speaker 1: that most adults can't hear, because as we age, we 10 00:00:43,040 --> 00:00:46,879 Speaker 1: start to lose the upper range of our hearing. This 11 00:00:47,000 --> 00:00:50,040 Speaker 1: device is called the mosquito. And while I was a 12 00:00:50,080 --> 00:00:54,200 Speaker 1: little flippant in the noise canceling episode, the truth is 13 00:00:54,440 --> 00:00:59,080 Speaker 1: that acoustic weaponry is a thing. It might potentially cause 14 00:00:59,120 --> 00:01:02,120 Speaker 1: significant heart depending on how it is used. And one 15 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:05,640 Speaker 1: of the scariest things about acoustic weaponry is that we 16 00:01:05,680 --> 00:01:10,800 Speaker 1: don't actually really know how dangerous or not dangerous it is. 17 00:01:11,200 --> 00:01:13,559 Speaker 1: So today I thought i'd talk a little bit about 18 00:01:13,600 --> 00:01:16,640 Speaker 1: the history of using sound as a weapon, the technology 19 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:20,039 Speaker 1: created to harness sound in such a way, and the 20 00:01:20,240 --> 00:01:24,480 Speaker 1: scholarship or lack thereof, surrounding the topic. Now On the 21 00:01:24,520 --> 00:01:29,400 Speaker 1: one hand, sound has undoubtedly been weaponized in the past. 22 00:01:29,480 --> 00:01:32,560 Speaker 1: You can't deny that sound has been used as a weapon. 23 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:35,640 Speaker 1: But on the other hand, there remain many questions as 24 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:39,679 Speaker 1: to the efficacy of acoustic weaponry. I guess it depends 25 00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:43,679 Speaker 1: upon your intent. There's little doubt that someone could use 26 00:01:43,720 --> 00:01:47,039 Speaker 1: sound to cause irritation or even pain in an effort 27 00:01:47,160 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 1: to say, disperse a crowd. That's been used many times, 28 00:01:51,720 --> 00:01:53,960 Speaker 1: especially over the last couple of decades here in the 29 00:01:54,040 --> 00:01:59,480 Speaker 1: United States. There are stories about more sinister weapons, ones 30 00:01:59,520 --> 00:02:03,560 Speaker 1: that you know, use sound to cause physical trauma up 31 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:07,760 Speaker 1: to and including lethal injury to targets. In fact, according 32 00:02:07,800 --> 00:02:10,600 Speaker 1: to one scholarly article on the subject, one that I'll 33 00:02:10,639 --> 00:02:14,480 Speaker 1: talk about a lot more in this episode, some stories 34 00:02:14,520 --> 00:02:18,880 Speaker 1: allege that through sound and acoustic weapon could induce cavitation 35 00:02:19,480 --> 00:02:23,959 Speaker 1: in tissue. That is, the sound could create bubbles within 36 00:02:24,320 --> 00:02:28,960 Speaker 1: tissue like your organs, and then those bubbles could implode 37 00:02:29,120 --> 00:02:32,920 Speaker 1: and that could cause significant damage. Nothing like the thought of, 38 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:37,040 Speaker 1: you know, liquefying organs. To really spice up your research now, 39 00:02:37,240 --> 00:02:39,760 Speaker 1: I think it is very important to add that the 40 00:02:39,800 --> 00:02:44,360 Speaker 1: scientific paper I just mentioned, it's titled Acoustic Weapons a 41 00:02:44,480 --> 00:02:48,680 Speaker 1: prospective assessment. It was written by Jurgen Altman, and the 42 00:02:48,720 --> 00:02:53,560 Speaker 1: author stresses that these are merely allegations. There's a distinct 43 00:02:53,800 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 1: lack of evidence supporting these kinds of claims. Altman makes 44 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:02,640 Speaker 1: this very clear. Is a long and thorough article, and 45 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:05,760 Speaker 1: I highly recommend you read it. It was originally published 46 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:10,040 Speaker 1: in the scientific journal Science and Global Security, volume nine. 47 00:03:10,400 --> 00:03:12,800 Speaker 1: It originally published in two thousand and one. It is 48 00:03:13,080 --> 00:03:15,120 Speaker 1: free to read, so if you want to read the 49 00:03:15,160 --> 00:03:18,480 Speaker 1: whole thing, you should. It's really a good read. I mean, 50 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:22,680 Speaker 1: it's actually written in a way that's very accessible. I think. Now, 51 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:26,040 Speaker 1: obviously it could be the case that since two thousand 52 00:03:26,080 --> 00:03:29,359 Speaker 1: and one there have been more scientific focus directed at 53 00:03:29,480 --> 00:03:33,520 Speaker 1: acoustic weaponry. But doing that is kind of tricky because, 54 00:03:33,520 --> 00:03:37,280 Speaker 1: for one thing, how do you study potentially traumatic or 55 00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:41,839 Speaker 1: even deadly effects of sound on human subjects, Because that's 56 00:03:41,880 --> 00:03:45,080 Speaker 1: not exactly an ethical thing to do. If part of 57 00:03:45,120 --> 00:03:49,360 Speaker 1: your question is will this hurt someone? If I play 58 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:53,680 Speaker 1: this frequency of sound at this volume putting someone in 59 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:58,520 Speaker 1: the path of that, that's really questionable, not questionable even 60 00:03:58,560 --> 00:04:01,600 Speaker 1: I think that's just downright on ethic. Meanwhile, you have 61 00:04:01,680 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: folks in the real world building real stuff that is 62 00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:12,360 Speaker 1: weaponizing sound, So we don't fully understand what effect this 63 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:16,920 Speaker 1: could have on people. It may be largely benign apart 64 00:04:16,960 --> 00:04:21,440 Speaker 1: from the obvious dangers of like hearing loss and stuff, 65 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:25,240 Speaker 1: but it might be worse. We just don't know. And meanwhile, 66 00:04:25,360 --> 00:04:30,320 Speaker 1: we actually have companies making these things and various militaries 67 00:04:30,320 --> 00:04:34,760 Speaker 1: and law enforcement agencies using them, so it's kind of scary. 68 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:37,839 Speaker 1: It's almost like the lack of evidence gives cover to 69 00:04:38,080 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 1: those who are profiting off turning sound into a weapon 70 00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:46,560 Speaker 1: because there's no proof showing that these weapons can be lethal, right, 71 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:51,320 Speaker 1: so they're non lethal weapons. They're not causing real harm, 72 00:04:51,800 --> 00:04:54,039 Speaker 1: at least that could be the argument. So it should 73 00:04:54,040 --> 00:04:56,720 Speaker 1: be totally fine for like a police force to use 74 00:04:56,760 --> 00:04:59,680 Speaker 1: a directed acoustic weapon on a group of students who 75 00:04:59,720 --> 00:05:03,359 Speaker 1: are testing something on a college campus because it's not lethal. 76 00:05:03,640 --> 00:05:08,760 Speaker 1: And if you're thinking that sounds incredibly irresponsible and potentially criminal, 77 00:05:08,960 --> 00:05:12,160 Speaker 1: then you're catching on quick. But let's talk about the 78 00:05:12,240 --> 00:05:16,920 Speaker 1: history of acoustic weapons. Now. One place that a lot 79 00:05:16,960 --> 00:05:20,599 Speaker 1: of articles about the history of acoustic weapons are sound 80 00:05:20,640 --> 00:05:23,919 Speaker 1: as a weapon will pick as their starting point is 81 00:05:24,040 --> 00:05:28,000 Speaker 1: the biblical account of the Battle of Jericho, which I 82 00:05:28,040 --> 00:05:31,960 Speaker 1: think is a fun way to start, but not really helpful. 83 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:34,440 Speaker 1: But yeah. In the in the Bible, the story is 84 00:05:34,800 --> 00:05:39,320 Speaker 1: Joshua leads the Israelites to conquer Canaan, and the city 85 00:05:39,360 --> 00:05:42,000 Speaker 1: of Jericho's on their to do list, and the big 86 00:05:42,040 --> 00:05:44,960 Speaker 1: guy upstairs tells Joshua that he and his army are 87 00:05:44,960 --> 00:05:47,359 Speaker 1: to carry the Ark of the Covenant, as featured in 88 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:50,920 Speaker 1: the documentary Raiders of the Lost Arc, and they're going 89 00:05:51,000 --> 00:05:54,279 Speaker 1: to have the procession led by seven priests who are 90 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:57,600 Speaker 1: blowing trumpets made of Ram's horn, and they're to do 91 00:05:57,680 --> 00:06:00,680 Speaker 1: that for six days, going around the city one time 92 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:03,560 Speaker 1: each day. On the seventh day, they are to march 93 00:06:03,600 --> 00:06:07,160 Speaker 1: around the city seven times, blowing the trumpets, and then 94 00:06:07,279 --> 00:06:11,400 Speaker 1: afterward letting out a big old whoah, you know, shouting out, 95 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:15,640 Speaker 1: and at that point the city walls will come a tumblin' down, 96 00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:20,960 Speaker 1: as Professor Harold Hill would say, now, not to burst 97 00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:25,039 Speaker 1: any bubbles. But archaeological digs suggest that while there was 98 00:06:25,160 --> 00:06:30,279 Speaker 1: a city in Jericho's spot before this particular period in history, 99 00:06:30,440 --> 00:06:33,800 Speaker 1: and there was a city in Jericho's spot after this 100 00:06:33,839 --> 00:06:37,599 Speaker 1: particular era of history, during the time when the story 101 00:06:37,680 --> 00:06:40,520 Speaker 1: is actually supposed to have taken place, there were no 102 00:06:40,640 --> 00:06:43,880 Speaker 1: people living in Jericho. So, in other words, the story's 103 00:06:44,000 --> 00:06:46,240 Speaker 1: just a story, but it's a fun one to start with. 104 00:06:46,640 --> 00:06:50,880 Speaker 1: So could sonic blasts actually knock down walls? Well, I 105 00:06:50,920 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 1: would argue that, since this is a biblical story, it's 106 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:58,080 Speaker 1: not really like the pressure wave coming from these trumpets 107 00:06:58,440 --> 00:07:02,080 Speaker 1: knocked the walls down. Rather, it's more like God saying, 108 00:07:02,320 --> 00:07:05,960 Speaker 1: all right, y'all seem to follow my arbitrary orders I 109 00:07:06,000 --> 00:07:08,760 Speaker 1: gave you, so now you get to kill everybody in town, 110 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:12,160 Speaker 1: which you know that's wild, But yeah, I would argue 111 00:07:12,200 --> 00:07:15,760 Speaker 1: that the implication here is not that the trumpets knocked 112 00:07:15,760 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 1: down the walls, but rather it was the big deity 113 00:07:18,120 --> 00:07:20,880 Speaker 1: in charge who did the knock and down part. Still, 114 00:07:21,160 --> 00:07:25,400 Speaker 1: you can imagine how sound could play a part in war. 115 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:29,680 Speaker 1: You could use sound in order to convey signals across distance. 116 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:33,520 Speaker 1: You could use sound in an attempt to intimidate the enemy. 117 00:07:33,840 --> 00:07:38,320 Speaker 1: There's the infamous scene in Apocalypse Now in which a 118 00:07:38,400 --> 00:07:43,800 Speaker 1: fleet of helicopters are blasting Wagner's Ride of the Valkyries 119 00:07:44,080 --> 00:07:49,240 Speaker 1: as they fire down upon Viet Cong soldiers and Vietnamese 120 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:53,320 Speaker 1: civilians alike. So there's that now, Granted, that's fiction and 121 00:07:53,520 --> 00:07:56,440 Speaker 1: people will tell you that didn't really happen, but that's 122 00:07:56,880 --> 00:08:00,920 Speaker 1: a popular media depiction of using sound and warfare. Scottish 123 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:04,480 Speaker 1: bagpipes have been used for the purposes of kind of 124 00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:07,600 Speaker 1: intimidating foes, as anyone who has heard them up close 125 00:08:07,680 --> 00:08:09,920 Speaker 1: inevitably wants to find a way to get away from 126 00:08:09,960 --> 00:08:15,320 Speaker 1: that point really quickly. I'm joking, kind of fun. Sign note, 127 00:08:15,520 --> 00:08:18,560 Speaker 1: there's a bit of lore in bagpiping that the British 128 00:08:18,600 --> 00:08:22,600 Speaker 1: actually outlawed the playing of bagpipes in Scotland around seventeen 129 00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:26,080 Speaker 1: forty five as part of a larger disarming act, because 130 00:08:26,080 --> 00:08:29,840 Speaker 1: bagpipes have been deemed an instrument of war literally in 131 00:08:29,880 --> 00:08:34,119 Speaker 1: this case. But historian John Gibson, in his book Traditional 132 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:38,800 Speaker 1: Gaelic Bagpiping seventeen forty five to nineteen forty five, argues 133 00:08:38,920 --> 00:08:43,400 Speaker 1: that the text of this disarmament Act does not actually 134 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:47,240 Speaker 1: name bagpipes as being prohibited, and that pipers who bring 135 00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:50,679 Speaker 1: up this era of supposed persecution are probably just tired 136 00:08:50,679 --> 00:08:55,000 Speaker 1: of people asking if they could kindly stop that awful racket. 137 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:56,959 Speaker 1: I'm having a lot of fun here, but I think 138 00:08:56,960 --> 00:08:58,760 Speaker 1: it's only fair to say I actually kind of like 139 00:08:58,840 --> 00:09:03,600 Speaker 1: bagpipe music. Anyway, Sounds played an important role in warfare, 140 00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:06,800 Speaker 1: but that's not the same thing as using sound as 141 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:10,720 Speaker 1: an actual weapon. Now, according to Yurigen Altman's research, there's 142 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:13,960 Speaker 1: not much on record of militaries using sound as a 143 00:09:13,960 --> 00:09:16,920 Speaker 1: weapon of war, though he did find suggestions that both 144 00:09:17,040 --> 00:09:20,600 Speaker 1: Japan and the United Kingdom looked into the possibility of 145 00:09:20,679 --> 00:09:26,280 Speaker 1: using acoustic weapons to lethal effect over some distance. Now. 146 00:09:26,280 --> 00:09:29,840 Speaker 1: According to that research, both countries ultimately came to the 147 00:09:29,880 --> 00:09:33,800 Speaker 1: conclusion that if it were in fact possible to create 148 00:09:33,880 --> 00:09:38,199 Speaker 1: a sound so strong as to be lethal, it would 149 00:09:38,200 --> 00:09:41,520 Speaker 1: require more power than would be practical. It would make 150 00:09:41,559 --> 00:09:43,960 Speaker 1: way more sense to, you know, just use the conventional 151 00:09:44,000 --> 00:09:46,680 Speaker 1: weapons we already have at our disposal. Why would you 152 00:09:46,760 --> 00:09:50,199 Speaker 1: go and build this thing to get the same result 153 00:09:50,240 --> 00:09:53,280 Speaker 1: you would get from weapons we already have. Which makes 154 00:09:53,320 --> 00:09:56,320 Speaker 1: me think of Jurassic World. So big spoiler for the 155 00:09:56,360 --> 00:09:59,559 Speaker 1: Jurassic World series, although I have a low opinion of 156 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:02,280 Speaker 1: those movies anyway, one of the plot points in that 157 00:10:02,320 --> 00:10:05,520 Speaker 1: series is that the military wants to make use of dinosaurs, 158 00:10:05,600 --> 00:10:09,040 Speaker 1: essentially using them to be like beasts of war and 159 00:10:09,160 --> 00:10:12,520 Speaker 1: using lasers to point at enemies and then the dinosaurs 160 00:10:12,520 --> 00:10:15,080 Speaker 1: attack the lasers because they've been trained to do that. 161 00:10:15,160 --> 00:10:18,040 Speaker 1: But you know, we've got stuff like guns with laser 162 00:10:18,120 --> 00:10:21,400 Speaker 1: sights or bombs and missiles with laser guidance. So it 163 00:10:21,440 --> 00:10:24,280 Speaker 1: seems like it's an unnecessary and and practical use of 164 00:10:24,280 --> 00:10:27,640 Speaker 1: our time and resources. Anyway, let's get back to sound. 165 00:10:28,080 --> 00:10:33,040 Speaker 1: Altman's research included a nineteen sixty nine book titled Riot 166 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:38,400 Speaker 1: Control Material and Techniques by Our Applegate. Now. The book 167 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:41,680 Speaker 1: mentioned that many scientific articles had discussed the use of 168 00:10:41,720 --> 00:10:47,280 Speaker 1: acoustic weapons in a non lethal capacity, specifically using low 169 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:52,000 Speaker 1: frequency sounds to counter, say a riot. Now, Altman points 170 00:10:52,040 --> 00:10:54,760 Speaker 1: out that he was unable to find evidence of the 171 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:59,240 Speaker 1: mentioned scientific articles. He said, if these articles exist, I 172 00:10:59,320 --> 00:11:02,760 Speaker 1: couldn't find them. The book alleges they exist, but I 173 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:07,000 Speaker 1: don't know where. According to Applegate, whomever it was that 174 00:11:07,280 --> 00:11:11,920 Speaker 1: looked into using devices to create this low frequency sound 175 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:16,040 Speaker 1: to make this effect to do riot control ultimately determined 176 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:18,680 Speaker 1: it would be too expensive to be practical. Now, some 177 00:11:18,800 --> 00:11:21,320 Speaker 1: of that makes sense, because I'm going to talk more 178 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:25,560 Speaker 1: about sound waves and frequencies and wavelengths and stuff later 179 00:11:25,600 --> 00:11:28,800 Speaker 1: in this episode. But if you're talking about low frequencies 180 00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 1: like below, the threshold of typical human hearing, which at 181 00:11:32,280 --> 00:11:35,240 Speaker 1: the low end is around twenty hurts. If you're talking 182 00:11:35,320 --> 00:11:39,640 Speaker 1: about below that, well, the sound waves you're talking about 183 00:11:39,440 --> 00:11:43,880 Speaker 1: are long. Those wavelengths are pretty long. You're talking about 184 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:49,360 Speaker 1: a low frequency and long wavelengths. High frequency have shorter wavelengths. 185 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:53,240 Speaker 1: With those long wavelengths, you also need a large loud 186 00:11:53,280 --> 00:11:56,920 Speaker 1: speaker in order to actually produce those wavelengths. If you've 187 00:11:56,960 --> 00:12:01,040 Speaker 1: ever seen the speakers on a stereo system, you know 188 00:12:01,080 --> 00:12:04,079 Speaker 1: you've got different types, right, You've got your tweeters, you've 189 00:12:04,080 --> 00:12:08,280 Speaker 1: got your subwiffers, that kind of thing. Well, the speakers 190 00:12:08,320 --> 00:12:12,840 Speaker 1: responsible for the higher pitches are going to be smaller. 191 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:17,640 Speaker 1: The diaphragm needed to push air around to create those 192 00:12:17,760 --> 00:12:21,360 Speaker 1: higher frequency sounds is smaller and needs to move very 193 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:26,000 Speaker 1: quickly in order to do that. The base speaker is 194 00:12:26,040 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 1: going to be much larger, and it's going to move 195 00:12:28,720 --> 00:12:32,000 Speaker 1: more slowly in order to push the air properly to 196 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:34,680 Speaker 1: create those low frequencies. So, if you want to create 197 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:40,319 Speaker 1: a really powerful, very low frequency generator, it's going to 198 00:12:40,360 --> 00:12:42,800 Speaker 1: be huge and it's going to require a lot of 199 00:12:42,880 --> 00:12:46,920 Speaker 1: power to move that massive diaphragm, especially if you want 200 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:49,800 Speaker 1: to do so at a really high amplitude, as in 201 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:52,360 Speaker 1: a really high volume, that just is going to require 202 00:12:52,480 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 1: an enormous amount of energy, which is I think one 203 00:12:55,400 --> 00:12:59,199 Speaker 1: of the reasons why even if militaries did look at 204 00:12:59,320 --> 00:13:02,560 Speaker 1: infra sound as a potential weapon, they ultimately came to 205 00:13:02,600 --> 00:13:05,360 Speaker 1: the conclusion that it was impractical because you would have 206 00:13:05,400 --> 00:13:08,400 Speaker 1: to build things that are so large and so power 207 00:13:08,840 --> 00:13:12,160 Speaker 1: or energy hungry that it just didn't make sense like 208 00:13:12,200 --> 00:13:15,600 Speaker 1: you could achieve the same effect through other means without 209 00:13:15,679 --> 00:13:19,160 Speaker 1: spending all that time and effort and energy to operate 210 00:13:19,240 --> 00:13:24,720 Speaker 1: an impractical weapon. So sound did become important when it 211 00:13:24,760 --> 00:13:28,040 Speaker 1: was playing a part in you know, like psychological operations 212 00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:31,360 Speaker 1: aka SYOPS. I feel like I should get the stuff. 213 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:33,640 Speaker 1: They don't want you to know, guys on here to 214 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:36,000 Speaker 1: talk about syops because that's kind of right in their 215 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:38,480 Speaker 1: sweet spot. But this gets back to the concept of 216 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:43,480 Speaker 1: using sound in an effort to intimidate the enemy. So 217 00:13:43,840 --> 00:13:47,320 Speaker 1: while Apocalypse Now was a fictional use of sound to 218 00:13:47,559 --> 00:13:50,880 Speaker 1: get the sort of achievement, there are real world analogs 219 00:13:51,480 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 1: that used sound or attempted to use sound in ways 220 00:13:55,480 --> 00:13:59,200 Speaker 1: to get a very similar result. So, for example, during 221 00:13:59,240 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: the Vietnam War, our US forces used recorded sounds in 222 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:07,080 Speaker 1: an attempt to demoralize Viet Cong soldiers. One such operation 223 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:12,080 Speaker 1: was called Wandering Soul, and this hinged on Vietnamese culture. 224 00:14:12,440 --> 00:14:15,199 Speaker 1: So in Vietnam there was a widely held belief. This 225 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:18,319 Speaker 1: is widely held belief that if someone dies and they 226 00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:21,920 Speaker 1: do not receive a proper burial, their spirit would be 227 00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:25,600 Speaker 1: forced to wander the earth in pain for all eternity. 228 00:14:25,920 --> 00:14:30,520 Speaker 1: So the US started blasting a spooky recording of South 229 00:14:30,680 --> 00:14:36,120 Speaker 1: Vietnamese people impersonating deceased Viet Cong soldiers, the ghosts of 230 00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:40,400 Speaker 1: Viet Cong soldiers who apparently were consigned to this fate. 231 00:14:40,720 --> 00:14:44,680 Speaker 1: Some of the recordings included messages urging soldiers to return 232 00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:47,600 Speaker 1: home to their families and to abandon the fight. Now, 233 00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:50,640 Speaker 1: the effectiveness of this campaign is questionable, as it's pretty 234 00:14:50,640 --> 00:14:53,920 Speaker 1: hard to conceal the fact that a helicopter is blasting 235 00:14:53,920 --> 00:14:56,960 Speaker 1: out a recorded message as opposed to just believing there's 236 00:14:57,000 --> 00:15:00,800 Speaker 1: an actual ghost jamboree going on outside. And nineteen seventy 237 00:15:01,040 --> 00:15:04,760 Speaker 1: the US had stopped using this tactic in Vietnam, but 238 00:15:04,880 --> 00:15:08,720 Speaker 1: it was an attempt to use sound to intimidate. I'll 239 00:15:08,760 --> 00:15:13,040 Speaker 1: talk more about the exploration of acoustic weapons. But first, 240 00:15:13,120 --> 00:15:25,320 Speaker 1: let's take a quick break to think our sponsors. All right, 241 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:28,880 Speaker 1: let's get back to Jurigen Altman's work. He did find 242 00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:34,400 Speaker 1: some other instances of acoustic weapons in scholarly journals, though 243 00:15:34,480 --> 00:15:37,600 Speaker 1: tracking down any hard evidence that any of these things 244 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:41,040 Speaker 1: were ever built and or used was a totally different story. 245 00:15:41,280 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: But one such instance involved a supposed device created by 246 00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:47,760 Speaker 1: the British Army in an effort to deal with protesters 247 00:15:47,800 --> 00:15:53,200 Speaker 1: in Northern Ireland. The device, nicknamed the squawk Box, produced 248 00:15:53,560 --> 00:15:57,760 Speaker 1: two high pitch frequencies within the range of typical human hearing, 249 00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:01,600 Speaker 1: although if you're old enough you wouldn't pick up bottom inherently. 250 00:16:01,920 --> 00:16:04,560 Speaker 1: One of the pitches was at sixteen killer hurts and 251 00:16:04,560 --> 00:16:08,480 Speaker 1: the other was at sixteen point zero zero two killer hurtz. 252 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:11,360 Speaker 1: I probably wouldn't be able to hear these my hearing 253 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:14,680 Speaker 1: tops out somewhere in the fifteen to sixteen killer hurtz range, 254 00:16:14,800 --> 00:16:17,120 Speaker 1: at least the last time I tested it. That's where 255 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: it was, so I might not perceive this directly at all. However, 256 00:16:21,800 --> 00:16:26,000 Speaker 1: at high amplitudes, at high volumes, these higher pitch frequencies 257 00:16:26,320 --> 00:16:29,240 Speaker 1: can interact with one another and interfere with one another. 258 00:16:29,560 --> 00:16:32,960 Speaker 1: When we talked about noise canceling headphones, I talked about 259 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 1: how this works in that context, where you create a 260 00:16:37,680 --> 00:16:41,080 Speaker 1: sound wave that's in opposite to the one that you're 261 00:16:41,120 --> 00:16:43,720 Speaker 1: trying to block, and if you're doing that, the two 262 00:16:44,240 --> 00:16:47,160 Speaker 1: waves cancel each other out and you get silence or 263 00:16:47,240 --> 00:16:50,400 Speaker 1: near silence as a result. So the production of these 264 00:16:50,520 --> 00:16:55,480 Speaker 1: two different frequencies would induce a third frequency to form 265 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:59,760 Speaker 1: within the ears of protesters, and the effect was supposedly 266 00:16:59,840 --> 00:17:03,400 Speaker 1: so so intense that people couldn't withstand it. They had 267 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:06,639 Speaker 1: to get away from the sound. Altman points out that 268 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:10,639 Speaker 1: the UK has denied that such a device has ever existed, 269 00:17:10,960 --> 00:17:14,040 Speaker 1: and he also mentions another source that concluded that while 270 00:17:14,040 --> 00:17:17,280 Speaker 1: the British may have looked into actually making such a thing, 271 00:17:17,640 --> 00:17:20,320 Speaker 1: it may never have been built. So it sounds like 272 00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:22,320 Speaker 1: this is another one of those things where people said, 273 00:17:22,400 --> 00:17:24,919 Speaker 1: you know, this should be able to work, but no 274 00:17:24,960 --> 00:17:28,800 Speaker 1: one actually made the thing. But it does come into 275 00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:32,160 Speaker 1: play when we get to audio spotlights a little later 276 00:17:32,240 --> 00:17:35,639 Speaker 1: in this episode, so that's a fun little tidbit. Further, 277 00:17:35,840 --> 00:17:40,200 Speaker 1: Altman writes about articles claiming that infrasound you know below 278 00:17:40,240 --> 00:17:43,000 Speaker 1: the typical range of human hearing, so below that twenty 279 00:17:43,119 --> 00:17:46,000 Speaker 1: Hurtz range, played at a high enough volume, like at 280 00:17:46,040 --> 00:17:50,200 Speaker 1: around one hundred decibels, can disorient the listener. But Altman's 281 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:52,800 Speaker 1: research also came across scientists who said they could not 282 00:17:52,960 --> 00:17:56,439 Speaker 1: confirm these findings, so whether that's actually true or not 283 00:17:56,600 --> 00:17:59,600 Speaker 1: remains unknown. It's kind of funny because you know, this 284 00:17:59,680 --> 00:18:03,120 Speaker 1: is an anecdote, so it's not really it's not evidence 285 00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:04,919 Speaker 1: at all. But this is something that happened to me 286 00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:06,840 Speaker 1: not too long ago. I was in a car with 287 00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: my partner and a jeep pulled up behind us, and 288 00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:12,119 Speaker 1: the person in the jeep had their sound system blasting 289 00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:15,439 Speaker 1: at an incredible volume, and the bass was cranked up, 290 00:18:15,560 --> 00:18:17,920 Speaker 1: probably about as far as it could go, And even 291 00:18:17,960 --> 00:18:19,840 Speaker 1: though we were sitting in a car with our windows 292 00:18:19,920 --> 00:18:22,840 Speaker 1: rolled up, we could hear that bass pretty clearly, and 293 00:18:22,880 --> 00:18:27,000 Speaker 1: it did create a rather unpleasant and disorienting sensation, though 294 00:18:27,080 --> 00:18:29,600 Speaker 1: that might just be because I'm old and cranky and 295 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:34,000 Speaker 1: have nothing to do with any physiological reason. Altman specifically 296 00:18:34,040 --> 00:18:37,880 Speaker 1: states that his research focused on acoustic weapons that are 297 00:18:37,880 --> 00:18:41,520 Speaker 1: intended to do physical damage to a target, rather than 298 00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:45,240 Speaker 1: just using sound as a way to annoy or distress 299 00:18:45,280 --> 00:18:48,160 Speaker 1: someone by you know, like preventing them from getting rest, 300 00:18:48,240 --> 00:18:51,040 Speaker 1: for example, which is legit. But I think we should 301 00:18:51,240 --> 00:18:56,240 Speaker 1: take the use of sound as a deterrent or way 302 00:18:56,320 --> 00:18:59,639 Speaker 1: of distressing someone into consideration, because while there is a 303 00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:03,200 Speaker 1: lack of firm scholarship on the efficacy of sound as 304 00:19:03,240 --> 00:19:06,960 Speaker 1: a weapon that causes direct physical harm or perhaps even death, 305 00:19:07,240 --> 00:19:09,960 Speaker 1: we do have plenty of examples of folks using sound 306 00:19:10,040 --> 00:19:14,520 Speaker 1: to make someone else's life more difficult. For example, Christmas 307 00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:18,520 Speaker 1: nineteen eighty nine, five years after the song do they 308 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,240 Speaker 1: Know It's Christmas? Came out? Now, I think there's no 309 00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:24,720 Speaker 1: denying that that particular song is torture all by itself, 310 00:19:24,760 --> 00:19:27,600 Speaker 1: but it doesn't factor into the story now. In nineteen 311 00:19:27,680 --> 00:19:32,359 Speaker 1: eighty nine, the US military used rock and or roll 312 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:37,160 Speaker 1: music to force Manuel Noriega to exit the Vatican embassy 313 00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:39,919 Speaker 1: in Panama City, at least that was their intent. So 314 00:19:39,960 --> 00:19:42,960 Speaker 1: the US won in Noriega on charges of drug trafficking 315 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:46,399 Speaker 1: and such, and Noriega had sought refuge in the embassy. 316 00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:50,560 Speaker 1: So the US put some really powerful speakers on hum v's, 317 00:19:51,040 --> 00:19:54,520 Speaker 1: drove the humv's around the embassy, and blasted the embassy 318 00:19:54,560 --> 00:19:57,760 Speaker 1: with tunes like I thought the Law by the Clash, 319 00:19:57,840 --> 00:20:01,600 Speaker 1: which is classic, or all I what is you by 320 00:20:01,640 --> 00:20:04,760 Speaker 1: you too? And because the military really does have a 321 00:20:04,840 --> 00:20:09,160 Speaker 1: six sense of humor Hanama by Van Halen. But mostly 322 00:20:09,160 --> 00:20:11,280 Speaker 1: they played a lot of songs by guns n' Roses 323 00:20:11,359 --> 00:20:15,679 Speaker 1: and the Doors. This musical assault lasted three days, but 324 00:20:15,760 --> 00:20:18,719 Speaker 1: then the Pope called the President and said, hey, can 325 00:20:18,800 --> 00:20:21,960 Speaker 1: y'all knock it off please? That's our embassy. And the 326 00:20:22,119 --> 00:20:26,520 Speaker 1: US complied, and Noriega ultimately surrendered himself just a few 327 00:20:26,560 --> 00:20:29,200 Speaker 1: days later. I don't know, maybe he missed the music. 328 00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:33,439 Speaker 1: In nineteen ninety three, law enforcement agents employed the let's 329 00:20:33,480 --> 00:20:38,919 Speaker 1: blast them with sound technique on David Koresh's compound in Waco, Texas. 330 00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:42,959 Speaker 1: This is the infamous Branch Davidian holdout. Now. Among the 331 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:47,280 Speaker 1: sonic bombs that they dropped were various songs as well 332 00:20:47,320 --> 00:20:52,280 Speaker 1: as the sound of jet planes and disturbingly, one report said, 333 00:20:52,440 --> 00:20:57,400 Speaker 1: the screams of rabbits as they were being slaughtered. Yikes. 334 00:20:57,680 --> 00:21:00,399 Speaker 1: Now the military has used loud music to rock the 335 00:21:00,440 --> 00:21:04,119 Speaker 1: sleep and morale of prisoners of war as well, in 336 00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:07,640 Speaker 1: order to soften them up for interrogation or break down 337 00:21:07,680 --> 00:21:10,919 Speaker 1: their resistance by preventing them from getting enough rest, so 338 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:15,360 Speaker 1: mentally they wouldn't be able to withstand interrogation techniques. Now, 339 00:21:15,359 --> 00:21:18,840 Speaker 1: I find all of this ethically troubling, to say the least, 340 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:23,080 Speaker 1: particularly in light of research that has suggested repeatedly that 341 00:21:23,200 --> 00:21:27,160 Speaker 1: torture is not effective. At least, it's not effective if 342 00:21:27,160 --> 00:21:29,800 Speaker 1: your goal is to get at some sort of truth, 343 00:21:30,119 --> 00:21:33,400 Speaker 1: no matter how popular media might suggest otherwise. I'm looking 344 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:36,399 Speaker 1: at you, Jack Bauer, But I mean, I guess you 345 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:39,159 Speaker 1: could argue it is effective if your only goal is 346 00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:42,639 Speaker 1: to make the tortured person feel miserable and powerless. Yeah, 347 00:21:42,800 --> 00:21:46,080 Speaker 1: it works to that extent, but that seems you know, repugnant. 348 00:21:46,560 --> 00:21:50,000 Speaker 1: You know, again, not really the same as using a 349 00:21:50,480 --> 00:21:54,880 Speaker 1: weapon of war. So what about l rads l RAD 350 00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:59,639 Speaker 1: That initialism stands for long range acoustic device, and in 351 00:21:59,680 --> 00:22:03,520 Speaker 1: turn these actually evolved from an earlier device, the AHD 352 00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:08,600 Speaker 1: or acoustic hailing device. All right, this involves a pretty 353 00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:12,960 Speaker 1: tragic story. So back in two thousand, US forces aboard 354 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:17,600 Speaker 1: a Navy destroyer named the USS Coal were attacked when 355 00:22:17,720 --> 00:22:21,919 Speaker 1: terrorists aboard a small boat approached the vessel and then 356 00:22:22,119 --> 00:22:25,720 Speaker 1: bombed the destroyer. The attack killed more than a dozen 357 00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:29,640 Speaker 1: US service members as a result. As the boat was approaching, 358 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:33,720 Speaker 1: the USS Coal attempted to hail the vessel to determine 359 00:22:33,720 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: the crew's intent, but they got no response. There was 360 00:22:36,880 --> 00:22:40,040 Speaker 1: no radio contact with the boat, so hailing involved using 361 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,679 Speaker 1: loudspeakers to send out a message over the water. But 362 00:22:43,000 --> 00:22:47,360 Speaker 1: sound doesn't travel forever. As I mentioned in Monday's episode, 363 00:22:47,560 --> 00:22:53,719 Speaker 1: over distance, sound waves attenuate they diminish in strength, so 364 00:22:54,080 --> 00:22:56,520 Speaker 1: it was reasonable to assume that the crew on the 365 00:22:56,560 --> 00:23:00,000 Speaker 1: smaller boat just couldn't hear the messages. Once the boat 366 00:23:00,359 --> 00:23:03,960 Speaker 1: was close enough that those aboard the USS Coal could 367 00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:07,600 Speaker 1: be sure that they were being heard, it was already 368 00:23:07,640 --> 00:23:12,119 Speaker 1: too late, and the attack immediately followed. One consequence of 369 00:23:12,160 --> 00:23:16,200 Speaker 1: this attack was that engineers began to develop technology designed 370 00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:19,160 Speaker 1: to focus sound waves and to blast them out at 371 00:23:19,240 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 1: high enough amplitude or volume so that intelligible sound could 372 00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:28,919 Speaker 1: travel much, much further in a directed fashion. This was 373 00:23:28,960 --> 00:23:32,400 Speaker 1: the acoustic hailing device, and it would allow naval forces 374 00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:36,200 Speaker 1: to send an audible message, not just audible, but intelligible, 375 00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:39,399 Speaker 1: as in you can understand what someone is saying, in 376 00:23:39,520 --> 00:23:43,680 Speaker 1: order to warn approaching craft that they need to make 377 00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:47,240 Speaker 1: their intent clear and follow orders or else potentially face 378 00:23:47,400 --> 00:23:50,840 Speaker 1: defensive measures from the Navy. Essentially, the Navy would be 379 00:23:50,840 --> 00:23:54,120 Speaker 1: able to say stop where you are, or we will 380 00:23:54,119 --> 00:23:57,959 Speaker 1: shoot you now. To accomplish this, the device needed to 381 00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:01,440 Speaker 1: be able to one blast out sound with enough energy 382 00:24:01,800 --> 00:24:06,600 Speaker 1: enough amplitude to travel a far distance, and two focus 383 00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:11,040 Speaker 1: that energy toward the target. And turns out you can 384 00:24:11,440 --> 00:24:14,560 Speaker 1: do this with sound. So let's talk about sound beams 385 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:18,640 Speaker 1: or audio spotlights, because this is really cool. All right. 386 00:24:18,680 --> 00:24:22,760 Speaker 1: So I mentioned in the previous episode that sound travels 387 00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:26,720 Speaker 1: in waves, in longitudinal waves. Actually we talked about that 388 00:24:26,760 --> 00:24:30,320 Speaker 1: in the active Noise Canceling episode, but these waves are 389 00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 1: pretty darn long. So I'm talking about the wavelengths of 390 00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:36,400 Speaker 1: sound that are within the typical range of human hearings, 391 00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:39,280 Speaker 1: so between twenty hurts to twenty killer herts. If you 392 00:24:39,320 --> 00:24:43,199 Speaker 1: compare those wavelengths to like light waves sound waves in 393 00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:47,560 Speaker 1: the audible range, they are enormous. And that link means 394 00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 1: that sound waves can and do bend around physical objects. 395 00:24:51,920 --> 00:24:56,320 Speaker 1: They diffract. So here's a way of imagining this. Let's 396 00:24:56,359 --> 00:24:59,160 Speaker 1: say you're standing on one side of a free standing 397 00:24:59,320 --> 00:25:01,840 Speaker 1: opaque wall. Let's say the wall is like eight feet tall. 398 00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:04,720 Speaker 1: I'm on the other side of this opaque wall. We 399 00:25:04,760 --> 00:25:06,720 Speaker 1: would still be able to talk to each other, right, 400 00:25:06,800 --> 00:25:08,520 Speaker 1: You could speak and I could hear you, and I 401 00:25:08,560 --> 00:25:11,560 Speaker 1: could speak and you could hear me, even though there's 402 00:25:11,600 --> 00:25:14,280 Speaker 1: a wall in the way and we can't see each other. Well, 403 00:25:14,320 --> 00:25:16,840 Speaker 1: the light is not able to diffract around the height 404 00:25:16,880 --> 00:25:20,280 Speaker 1: of the wall. The light wavelengths are so small they 405 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:23,720 Speaker 1: don't diffract around this wall. But the sound waves are 406 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:27,359 Speaker 1: long enough where they can diffract around the wall. Otherwise, 407 00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:30,440 Speaker 1: if they couldn't, we would speak and the sound would 408 00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:32,960 Speaker 1: just not be able to cross the wall. It would 409 00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:36,040 Speaker 1: go in every other direction and we wouldn't be able 410 00:25:36,080 --> 00:25:38,600 Speaker 1: to hear one another. But we know that's not the case. 411 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:40,400 Speaker 1: We know we would be able to hear each other. 412 00:25:40,640 --> 00:25:42,040 Speaker 1: If light did that, by the way, it would be 413 00:25:42,080 --> 00:25:44,439 Speaker 1: almost like we have X ray vision, But it doesn't 414 00:25:44,480 --> 00:25:48,159 Speaker 1: work that way. That same feature, however, this long wavelength 415 00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:51,480 Speaker 1: of sound makes it very hard to focus sound into 416 00:25:51,560 --> 00:25:54,240 Speaker 1: a beam. Sound on its own would just travel outward 417 00:25:54,280 --> 00:25:57,840 Speaker 1: from the source essentially in all directions and lose energy 418 00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:01,200 Speaker 1: as it travels, or, if you prefer, the energy disperses 419 00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:05,960 Speaker 1: as the sound travels outward from the source. So as 420 00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:08,480 Speaker 1: you go further away from where the sound was made, 421 00:26:08,480 --> 00:26:11,000 Speaker 1: it gets less audible until you get to a point 422 00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:13,760 Speaker 1: where you just can't detect it at all. So how 423 00:26:13,760 --> 00:26:17,640 Speaker 1: do you make sure sound is audible from very far away? Well, 424 00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:20,080 Speaker 1: one way is you could just keep upping the amplitude, 425 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: but that gets dangerous. Also, it would get to a 426 00:26:22,760 --> 00:26:25,320 Speaker 1: point where it's so loud that everyone near the audio 427 00:26:25,320 --> 00:26:28,560 Speaker 1: device would need some serious air protection, and even then 428 00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:32,320 Speaker 1: there's some worry about how those vibrations would affect the 429 00:26:32,359 --> 00:26:35,720 Speaker 1: human body. Keep in mind that sound through a gaseous 430 00:26:35,760 --> 00:26:38,760 Speaker 1: medium is essentially changes in air pressure, and if you're 431 00:26:38,800 --> 00:26:41,600 Speaker 1: blasting stuff out at like one hundred and sixty decibels, 432 00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:45,400 Speaker 1: that's massive amounts of air pressure, Like it would feel 433 00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:48,480 Speaker 1: like you're getting punched. Now, remember the decibel scale is 434 00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:52,280 Speaker 1: also logarithmic. This is something that's hard to get your 435 00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:54,960 Speaker 1: mind wrapped around unless you deal with logarithms all the time, 436 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:57,400 Speaker 1: in which case it's easy, but I think for most 437 00:26:57,440 --> 00:27:01,080 Speaker 1: people it's not intuitive. So if you have a sound 438 00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:05,240 Speaker 1: that's ten decibels, that means that it's ten times louder 439 00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:09,000 Speaker 1: than something that's at zero decibels. Zero decibels is a 440 00:27:09,040 --> 00:27:13,400 Speaker 1: sound that is barely audible. If you are talking about 441 00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:17,560 Speaker 1: a sound that's at twenty decibels, twenty decibels is one 442 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:21,640 Speaker 1: hundred times louder than zero decibels. So once you get 443 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:23,880 Speaker 1: up to around one hundred and twenty decibels, you're talking 444 00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:27,000 Speaker 1: about sound that's loud enough to cause permanent hearing damage 445 00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:30,560 Speaker 1: or hearing loss. Once you get a little higher, you're 446 00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:33,440 Speaker 1: talking about sound that's above the pain threshold. That'd be 447 00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:36,240 Speaker 1: around one hundred and forty decibels or so l rads 448 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:40,840 Speaker 1: can go up to one hundred sixty decibels. That's pretty 449 00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 1: serious stuff. So it would be great if you could 450 00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:48,280 Speaker 1: direct sound in a significant way, one to focus that sound, 451 00:27:48,359 --> 00:27:51,119 Speaker 1: and two to prevent the sound from freaking havoc on 452 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,679 Speaker 1: your own side. And one way to do that is 453 00:27:54,720 --> 00:27:58,240 Speaker 1: through what is called an audio spotlight, which emits sound 454 00:27:58,320 --> 00:28:02,800 Speaker 1: at very very high frequencies, frequencies that are much too 455 00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:05,080 Speaker 1: high for humans to be able to hear them. In fact, 456 00:28:05,280 --> 00:28:08,240 Speaker 1: they're too high for dogs to hear them. Cats could 457 00:28:08,280 --> 00:28:11,840 Speaker 1: probably hear them, Bats definitely could, but not so much 458 00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:15,440 Speaker 1: with people. I'll explain more after we take this quick 459 00:28:15,520 --> 00:28:27,960 Speaker 1: break before the break, I was talking about audio spotlights. 460 00:28:28,320 --> 00:28:32,400 Speaker 1: What is an audio spotlight. It's a surface over which 461 00:28:32,440 --> 00:28:35,959 Speaker 1: there are are hundreds of transducers that are capable of 462 00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:40,120 Speaker 1: emitting sound. And at these frequencies, the sound wave links 463 00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:44,000 Speaker 1: are much smaller than in what's in our audible range, 464 00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:46,640 Speaker 1: So we're talking about things like in the say sixty 465 00:28:46,640 --> 00:28:51,360 Speaker 1: five kilohertz frequency. So these transducers, they're like very tiny 466 00:28:51,400 --> 00:28:54,320 Speaker 1: little speakers that are able to move super fast and 467 00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:57,000 Speaker 1: super powerful, Like they don't have to be that strong 468 00:28:57,080 --> 00:28:59,680 Speaker 1: because they're smaller, so you don't use as much energy 469 00:28:59,720 --> 00:29:03,720 Speaker 1: to move the speaker in order to generate sound. But 470 00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:08,000 Speaker 1: they are very very tiny, and because the wavelengths that 471 00:29:08,040 --> 00:29:11,640 Speaker 1: they are generating are also really tiny, they aren't as 472 00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:14,760 Speaker 1: affected by diffraction, So like this is something that acts 473 00:29:14,800 --> 00:29:19,560 Speaker 1: more like lightwood than audible sound. So you wouldn't necessarily 474 00:29:19,560 --> 00:29:22,479 Speaker 1: be able to pick up these very high frequencies if 475 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:24,360 Speaker 1: there were a wall in the way, because the sound 476 00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:26,600 Speaker 1: waves are so small that they wouldn't wrap around the 477 00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,520 Speaker 1: top of the wall and you wouldn't be able to 478 00:29:28,520 --> 00:29:31,080 Speaker 1: detect them on the other side. However, it also means 479 00:29:31,080 --> 00:29:34,200 Speaker 1: that the sound will travel in a much more focused way. 480 00:29:34,280 --> 00:29:38,400 Speaker 1: You can direct the sound toward a target, But if 481 00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:41,680 Speaker 1: you're generating sounds that are well above the range of 482 00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:45,040 Speaker 1: human hearing, what good does that do? Right? Like, yeah, 483 00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:48,760 Speaker 1: we can shoot a beam of sound waves using this 484 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:53,160 Speaker 1: focused approach, using very very very tiny sound waves, but 485 00:29:53,240 --> 00:29:56,360 Speaker 1: if you can't perceive them directly, then what good does 486 00:29:56,400 --> 00:29:59,560 Speaker 1: that do? Well? It turns out you can create actual 487 00:29:59,680 --> 00:30:04,520 Speaker 1: audit sounds using these higher frequencies, because again, sound waves 488 00:30:04,560 --> 00:30:07,920 Speaker 1: at high enough amplitude will interfere with one another. At 489 00:30:07,960 --> 00:30:10,840 Speaker 1: low amplitude, they'll just pass through each other, but at 490 00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:15,240 Speaker 1: high amplitude they will interfere. So again I talked about 491 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:20,520 Speaker 1: how noise canceling headphones creates destructive interference by creating an 492 00:30:20,600 --> 00:30:25,960 Speaker 1: anti phase sound that will cancel out incoming sound. But 493 00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:30,640 Speaker 1: it's also true that if you play slightly different ultrasonic frequencies, 494 00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:33,600 Speaker 1: their interaction with one another can create frequencies that are 495 00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:37,960 Speaker 1: actually in the audible range. I mentioned that supposed project 496 00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:41,040 Speaker 1: that the Ministry of Defense of the UK did in 497 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:44,760 Speaker 1: order to dissuade protesters in Northern Ireland, and of course 498 00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:46,840 Speaker 1: the Ministry of Defense said they never built that thing. 499 00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:51,760 Speaker 1: But since those days we have had people build audio spotlights, 500 00:30:51,800 --> 00:30:55,600 Speaker 1: and they work on essentially the same principle. You generate 501 00:30:55,680 --> 00:30:58,880 Speaker 1: these different frequencies, maybe even the same frequency, just out 502 00:30:58,880 --> 00:31:03,320 Speaker 1: of phase, and through that you can encode information on 503 00:31:03,440 --> 00:31:06,600 Speaker 1: top of this frequency, and that information can be within 504 00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:10,080 Speaker 1: the audible range. So the audio is not coming or 505 00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:14,240 Speaker 1: the audible audios not coming from the speakers themselves. Right, 506 00:31:14,440 --> 00:31:17,840 Speaker 1: if you were able to just isolate them playing a 507 00:31:17,880 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 1: single frequency, you still wouldn't hear anything, even though the 508 00:31:21,120 --> 00:31:24,400 Speaker 1: transducers would be generating sound, it would just be beyond our 509 00:31:24,560 --> 00:31:28,080 Speaker 1: capability of sensing it. But the interaction of the sound 510 00:31:28,160 --> 00:31:33,000 Speaker 1: waves themselves creates the audible sound. It's incredible. It's a 511 00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:36,800 Speaker 1: really neat phenomenon. There's actually a great demonstration of this 512 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:41,520 Speaker 1: on YouTube. The channel I saw it on was NPS Physics. 513 00:31:41,760 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 1: The videos title is audio Spotlight How a audio spotlight works. 514 00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:50,560 Speaker 1: That's their grammatical error, not mine. It's actually taken from 515 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:54,280 Speaker 1: a lecture given by doctor Bruce DeNardo, and it's really entertaining. 516 00:31:54,320 --> 00:31:58,280 Speaker 1: He's a great lecturer. He's very good at explaining how 517 00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:00,880 Speaker 1: this works at a very high level. Does explain it's 518 00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:04,280 Speaker 1: much more complicated than he's letting on. But that he's 519 00:32:04,320 --> 00:32:07,760 Speaker 1: giving kind of the basic explanation of what's happening, and 520 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:12,520 Speaker 1: they do use the music of the Eagles in their demonstration. 521 00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:15,239 Speaker 1: Now I happen to share the same opinion as the 522 00:32:15,360 --> 00:32:18,840 Speaker 1: dude from The Big Lebowski on that particular band, except 523 00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:21,280 Speaker 1: for Journey of the Sorcerer, which I think is an 524 00:32:21,320 --> 00:32:25,080 Speaker 1: awesome instrumental track, and anyone who's familiar with Hitchhiker's Guide 525 00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:27,720 Speaker 1: through the Galaxy is probably gonna dig it anyway. Using 526 00:32:27,760 --> 00:32:31,240 Speaker 1: this method, it is possible to direct sound, and with 527 00:32:31,320 --> 00:32:34,400 Speaker 1: acoustic haaling devices, the intent is to make that sound 528 00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:40,160 Speaker 1: intelligible so that oncoming vessels can hear commands to stop 529 00:32:40,240 --> 00:32:42,960 Speaker 1: or whatever, or to turn around. But you can also 530 00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:47,080 Speaker 1: use the same capability to blast noise that is unpleasant 531 00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 1: or unsettling and that segues into the long range acoustic 532 00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:57,760 Speaker 1: devices or lriads. These are not necessarily meant for haling purposes, 533 00:32:57,840 --> 00:33:01,240 Speaker 1: but for stuff like crowd dispersal, and there are questions 534 00:33:01,240 --> 00:33:03,960 Speaker 1: as to whether or not it is ethical to use them, 535 00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:06,680 Speaker 1: or should even be legal to use them. There have 536 00:33:06,760 --> 00:33:10,880 Speaker 1: been cases in which US law enforcement have used lrad's 537 00:33:11,280 --> 00:33:15,560 Speaker 1: l rads for crowd control, blasting out a siren noise 538 00:33:15,680 --> 00:33:19,800 Speaker 1: that's usually projecting sound between two and four killer hurts. 539 00:33:20,040 --> 00:33:22,080 Speaker 1: Two killer hurts to four killer hurts. That is, that 540 00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:26,080 Speaker 1: range is fairly high pitched, and it's unpleasant, especially at 541 00:33:26,200 --> 00:33:30,480 Speaker 1: very high volumes. It's this piercing siren kind of sound, 542 00:33:30,600 --> 00:33:33,200 Speaker 1: and if it's blasted at you loud enough, it's probably 543 00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:36,960 Speaker 1: going to cause at least discomfort. And as I mentioned earlier, 544 00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:39,200 Speaker 1: if the amplitude is high enough, like if you have 545 00:33:39,240 --> 00:33:41,800 Speaker 1: a decibel level of around one hundred and twenty or more, 546 00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:44,200 Speaker 1: and these things are capable of much more than that, 547 00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:49,280 Speaker 1: then you could experience hearing loss just from relatively short 548 00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:52,640 Speaker 1: exposure to these things. Of course, you could protect yourself 549 00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:56,560 Speaker 1: with hearing protection, which actually works pretty darn well. That's 550 00:33:56,560 --> 00:33:59,920 Speaker 1: another reason why a lot of militaries have abandoned the 551 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:04,880 Speaker 1: use of acoustic weapons, because if your enemy has ear protection, 552 00:34:05,160 --> 00:34:09,760 Speaker 1: then your weapon isn't any good. It doesn't work so great. 553 00:34:09,800 --> 00:34:13,040 Speaker 1: Hearing protection will reduce the decimal level enough so that 554 00:34:13,080 --> 00:34:15,560 Speaker 1: it's at safe levels. It still probably won't sound great. 555 00:34:15,600 --> 00:34:18,160 Speaker 1: You'll still get some of that siren noise in, but 556 00:34:18,239 --> 00:34:20,920 Speaker 1: you wouldn't be in as much risk of experiencing actual 557 00:34:21,000 --> 00:34:24,440 Speaker 1: hearing loss as a result of that. According to musicology 558 00:34:24,600 --> 00:34:28,520 Speaker 1: now dot org, the most powerful acoustic healing devices are 559 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:31,399 Speaker 1: capable of transmitting audible sound from a distance of more 560 00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:36,600 Speaker 1: than five kilometers, though most are meant for much shorter distances, 561 00:34:36,640 --> 00:34:39,000 Speaker 1: like in the five hundred meter range. But don't get 562 00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:41,839 Speaker 1: me wrong. Five hundred meters is still pretty darn far. 563 00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:45,799 Speaker 1: I mean, that's more than five American football fields, So 564 00:34:46,080 --> 00:34:48,520 Speaker 1: that's a pretty darn good distance to be able to 565 00:34:48,920 --> 00:34:53,640 Speaker 1: transmit intelligible sound to a target. And as mentioned, we 566 00:34:53,719 --> 00:34:56,640 Speaker 1: still don't really have a full understanding of what this 567 00:34:56,680 --> 00:35:01,440 Speaker 1: effect could have on people. Jurgen Altmann research suggests that 568 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:04,399 Speaker 1: folks have made a lot of assumptions without much hard 569 00:35:04,480 --> 00:35:07,160 Speaker 1: evidence to back those assumptions up. But that doesn't mean 570 00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:11,080 Speaker 1: the assumptions are entirely wrong. It means that we can't 571 00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:14,440 Speaker 1: be sure one way or the other without further study. 572 00:35:14,560 --> 00:35:17,920 Speaker 1: And study is difficult because if the work could potentially 573 00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:22,480 Speaker 1: harm your subjects, that's a huge problem. So can infra sound, 574 00:35:22,760 --> 00:35:25,640 Speaker 1: you know, those very low frequency sounds below the range 575 00:35:25,680 --> 00:35:29,360 Speaker 1: of human hearing. Can it at a high enough volume 576 00:35:29,440 --> 00:35:34,200 Speaker 1: at enough decibels cause stuff like nausea or intestinal pain. 577 00:35:34,520 --> 00:35:38,560 Speaker 1: Could it cause the dreaded brown noise, as in a 578 00:35:38,680 --> 00:35:41,600 Speaker 1: sound frequency that, when played at a high enough volume, 579 00:35:41,880 --> 00:35:45,360 Speaker 1: forces you to evacuate, to defecate, in other words, to 580 00:35:45,440 --> 00:35:48,640 Speaker 1: poop yourself. There's no evidence of that, By the way, 581 00:35:49,120 --> 00:35:51,440 Speaker 1: doesn't mean it can't happen. I just mean there's no evidence. 582 00:35:51,760 --> 00:35:55,160 Speaker 1: So could it cause actual physical trauma? If you were 583 00:35:55,239 --> 00:35:58,400 Speaker 1: blasting sound at like, you know, one hundred and fifty decibels, 584 00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:01,759 Speaker 1: let's say it's inaudible sound. Maybe it's too low to hear. 585 00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:04,319 Speaker 1: Could that very low sound at one hundred and fifty 586 00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:08,280 Speaker 1: decibels cause physical harm Could it resonate with your internal 587 00:36:08,360 --> 00:36:11,640 Speaker 1: organs causing them to vibrate with enough energy to hurt you. 588 00:36:12,000 --> 00:36:15,080 Speaker 1: A resonance, I mean, is a thing. The classic example 589 00:36:15,120 --> 00:36:18,239 Speaker 1: of resonance is you tap a crystal glass, like a 590 00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:20,560 Speaker 1: champagne glass made out of crystal, and you're gonna hear 591 00:36:20,600 --> 00:36:23,800 Speaker 1: it ring out a tone. Actually it rings out several tones. 592 00:36:24,040 --> 00:36:27,160 Speaker 1: You get your base tone and then the harmonics of 593 00:36:27,200 --> 00:36:30,200 Speaker 1: that tone, but the harmonics have less energy than your 594 00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:33,400 Speaker 1: primary tone does. Anyway, if you were to play back 595 00:36:33,680 --> 00:36:38,400 Speaker 1: that same base tone, that would induce the crystal champagne 596 00:36:38,480 --> 00:36:42,440 Speaker 1: glass to start vibrating. It would vibrate along with this 597 00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:45,760 Speaker 1: frequency you're blasting it at, if it was the resonant frequency. 598 00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:48,319 Speaker 1: If it's the same frequency that generates when it when 599 00:36:48,360 --> 00:36:51,680 Speaker 1: you tap it, if you blast that glass with enough 600 00:36:52,440 --> 00:36:56,240 Speaker 1: volume of that tone, then it will cause the glass 601 00:36:56,239 --> 00:36:59,200 Speaker 1: to deform to the point where it will shatter. So 602 00:36:59,320 --> 00:37:02,320 Speaker 1: this is the class like opera singer causes glass to 603 00:37:02,400 --> 00:37:05,279 Speaker 1: break using their voice trick. It's actually pretty hard to 604 00:37:05,320 --> 00:37:08,040 Speaker 1: do for most singers. Usually you would need a pretty 605 00:37:08,080 --> 00:37:12,240 Speaker 1: significant amount of amplification as well as incredibly good pitch 606 00:37:12,520 --> 00:37:17,680 Speaker 1: to manage. It can be done, but usually it requires amplifications. 607 00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:21,200 Speaker 1: It's very hard to do with your voice alone anyway. 608 00:37:21,560 --> 00:37:24,680 Speaker 1: It's not just champagne flutes made of crystal that resonate. 609 00:37:25,000 --> 00:37:27,920 Speaker 1: So the thought is that if you dialed an audio 610 00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:30,840 Speaker 1: emitter to the right frequency, one that's low enough to 611 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:34,479 Speaker 1: penetrate the body and strong enough to really get things 612 00:37:34,520 --> 00:37:37,400 Speaker 1: moving around in there, you can make a person's inerds 613 00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:41,120 Speaker 1: or their air cavities inside their body vibrate. That would 614 00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:44,880 Speaker 1: cause that tissue to heat up. Right. Vibration is energy, 615 00:37:44,960 --> 00:37:47,919 Speaker 1: and it's like friction essentially, kind of the same way 616 00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:50,759 Speaker 1: microwaves end up heating up food when you put them 617 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:53,600 Speaker 1: in the microwave, so of course that's using microwave radiation 618 00:37:53,719 --> 00:37:58,040 Speaker 1: per of the electromagnetic spectrum, not acoustic waves. But I 619 00:37:58,040 --> 00:38:01,160 Speaker 1: think we can all agree that having your organs all 620 00:38:01,200 --> 00:38:04,480 Speaker 1: start to heat up is bad, or maybe induce air 621 00:38:04,520 --> 00:38:07,840 Speaker 1: bubbles to form inside tissue that's also really bad. But 622 00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:11,000 Speaker 1: as Altman points out repeatedly, there just is an evidence 623 00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:14,759 Speaker 1: that this actually happens or has happened, just that there 624 00:38:14,760 --> 00:38:18,560 Speaker 1: are a lot of articles that hypothesize maybe it could happen, 625 00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:21,879 Speaker 1: So maybe it would, maybe it wouldn't. Finding out would 626 00:38:21,920 --> 00:38:25,359 Speaker 1: require deeply unethical research and a cruel disregard for human 627 00:38:25,480 --> 00:38:28,440 Speaker 1: safety or animal safety, as it turns out, and it 628 00:38:28,520 --> 00:38:31,279 Speaker 1: might mean that the technology necessary to carry out such 629 00:38:31,320 --> 00:38:34,440 Speaker 1: an effect would be prohibitively expensive to build and or 630 00:38:34,560 --> 00:38:37,080 Speaker 1: operate if you did try to do this. So I 631 00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:40,480 Speaker 1: guess that's good news. Altman's article, as I mentioned, it's 632 00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:42,640 Speaker 1: free to read. I recommend going through it. It is 633 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:45,600 Speaker 1: quite long, and Alman really did his work trying to 634 00:38:45,640 --> 00:38:49,000 Speaker 1: track down reputable research on the topic. The paper is 635 00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:52,440 Speaker 1: longer than sixty pages, but again very easy to understand. 636 00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:55,360 Speaker 1: So if you have time, check it out. That article 637 00:38:55,640 --> 00:38:57,759 Speaker 1: that is really the basis for a lot of what 638 00:38:57,960 --> 00:39:01,320 Speaker 1: this episode is all about, although again I went off 639 00:39:01,520 --> 00:39:05,000 Speaker 1: book for the stuff that was about disrupting someone's sleep 640 00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:07,600 Speaker 1: cycles or whatever. The article again, its title is Acoustic 641 00:39:07,640 --> 00:39:12,759 Speaker 1: Weapons a Prospective Assessment. It's in Science and Global Security, 642 00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:16,080 Speaker 1: Volume nine, two thousand and one, so check that out. Anyway, 643 00:39:16,360 --> 00:39:18,839 Speaker 1: Acoustic weapons remain a thing. I still think it's really 644 00:39:18,880 --> 00:39:22,040 Speaker 1: scary that we have these things that are in active 645 00:39:22,160 --> 00:39:25,719 Speaker 1: use and we don't have a full understanding of the 646 00:39:25,760 --> 00:39:29,239 Speaker 1: effects of that technology and how harmful they may or 647 00:39:29,320 --> 00:39:32,680 Speaker 1: may not be. It may turn out that they're relatively 648 00:39:33,160 --> 00:39:36,040 Speaker 1: not harmful at all, as long as your exposure to 649 00:39:36,160 --> 00:39:38,879 Speaker 1: them isn't too long. But it could also turn out 650 00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:43,000 Speaker 1: that they cause some pretty gnarly effects. There's the whole 651 00:39:43,040 --> 00:39:46,400 Speaker 1: havana syndrome thing that I didn't get into. I'm sure 652 00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:48,520 Speaker 1: the stuff they don't want you to know. Crew has 653 00:39:48,560 --> 00:39:50,839 Speaker 1: done an episode on the havana syndrome. I'll have to 654 00:39:50,880 --> 00:39:52,959 Speaker 1: reach out to them to make sure, but it would 655 00:39:52,960 --> 00:39:56,880 Speaker 1: be weird if they hadn't. Anyway, I hope that you 656 00:39:56,960 --> 00:39:59,439 Speaker 1: found this episode interesting. I hope you go check out 657 00:39:59,440 --> 00:40:01,960 Speaker 1: that article. Read up on this subject, Read up on 658 00:40:02,000 --> 00:40:06,600 Speaker 1: acoustic spotlights. Those things are cool. What a neat way 659 00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:10,400 Speaker 1: to create this effect, Like to be able to use 660 00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:14,840 Speaker 1: sound that's not in our audible spectrum to create audible 661 00:40:15,120 --> 00:40:18,799 Speaker 1: sounds at a point in the distance. That's just incredible 662 00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:22,080 Speaker 1: to me, Like it's phenomenal. It blows my mind. In 663 00:40:22,120 --> 00:40:25,080 Speaker 1: the meantime, I hope all of you out there are 664 00:40:25,160 --> 00:40:29,319 Speaker 1: doing well and I will talk to you again really soon. 665 00:40:35,600 --> 00:40:40,240 Speaker 1: Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, 666 00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:44,280 Speaker 1: visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen 667 00:40:44,320 --> 00:40:48,759 Speaker 1: to your favorite shows.