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Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My

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Speaker 1: name is Joe McCormick. This week Rob and I are out,

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Speaker 1: so in our Tuesday and Thursday slots, we are bringing

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Speaker 1: you a couple of older episodes of Stuff to Blow

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Speaker 1: Your Mind, episodes from the vault, continuing the series we

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Speaker 1: started this past Saturday. Today's episode is part two of

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Speaker 1: our series on the illusion of control. This originally aired

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Speaker 1: on February tenth, twenty twenty four.

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Speaker 2: We hope you enjoy.

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Speaker 3: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind, a production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My name

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Speaker 2: is Robert Lamb.

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Speaker 1: And I am Joe McCormick, and today we are back

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Speaker 1: to continue our series on the psychology concept known as

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Speaker 1: the illusion of control. This is a cognitive illusion, or

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Speaker 1: a common error in thinking and judgment, in which we

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Speaker 1: overestimate the amount of control we have over outcomes in

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Speaker 1: the world, even outcomes that are in no way determined

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Speaker 1: by our actions. So if you haven't heard part one,

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Speaker 1: you should probably go back and listen to that first.

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Speaker 1: But for a brief recap, we talked about some examples

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Speaker 1: last time of the illusion of control. One would be

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Speaker 1: the belief that you can control your chances of winning

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Speaker 1: at a slot machine based on you know, who presses

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Speaker 1: the button and how, and actually you know, it's a

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Speaker 1: purely random process.

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Speaker 2: There's no like.

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Speaker 1: You know, you can't be like better at working a

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Speaker 1: slot machine. But other examples would include like the belief

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Speaker 1: that you can improve your chances of hitting a desired

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Speaker 1: number on a dice throw by concentrating before the throw.

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Speaker 2: I do this, yeah, yeah, and yeah. I was going

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Speaker 2: to save this for a listener mail, but I go

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Speaker 2: ahead mention it now heard from a listener on Discord

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Speaker 2: who pointed out, this is I believe it's passy cish.

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Speaker 2: I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing that correctly, so you

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Speaker 2: use your name. But anyway. They pointed out that in

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Speaker 2: Dungeons and Dragons there's an additional element here that we

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Speaker 2: didn't touch on, and that's the drama of rolling your dice,

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Speaker 2: of rolling that d twenty, doing that saving throw. You

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Speaker 2: may put some concentration into it, not because not as

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Speaker 2: much because you're hoping to influence the role, but because

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Speaker 2: this matters, This is an important role. Perhaps the life

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Speaker 2: or death of your character may hinge on the outcome,

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Speaker 2: and you're going to play it up a little bit. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: it's a socially performative drum roll, but I think undeniably

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Speaker 2: there's off also that sense of like, all right, NAT twenty,

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Speaker 2: let's do it.

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Speaker 1: I can do this.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Other examples would be like the belief that you can

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Speaker 1: influence the outcome of a sporting event hundreds of miles

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Speaker 1: away by wearing a lucky charm. We talked about the

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Speaker 1: childhood belief that you can control gameplay on video game

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Speaker 1: with like a controller that's not plugged in, or by

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Speaker 1: moving the joystick on a on an arcade cabinet you

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Speaker 1: haven't put any quarters in. Yeah, yeah, And we also

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Speaker 1: ended up talking about an influential early paper on the

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Speaker 1: illusion of control from nineteen seventy five called the Illusion

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Speaker 1: of Control in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Speaker 1: by the American psychologist Ellen J. Langer. And for a

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Speaker 1: quick summary of this paper, it used experiments involving games

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Speaker 1: of chance with superficial elements inserted from games of skill

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Speaker 1: to see if people would behave consistent with a belief

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Speaker 1: that they had impossible levels of control over chance outcomes,

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Speaker 1: and this study found that yes. In its experiments people

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Speaker 1: did behave in a way that was consistent with overestimating

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Speaker 1: their level of control over chance determined outcomes. However, the

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Speaker 1: thing about this paper was the experiments did use indirect

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Speaker 1: methods of studying the phenomenon, so these results came with

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Speaker 1: some limitations that I'll describe in just a minute. I

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Speaker 1: wanted to learn some more about the history of how

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Speaker 1: the illusion of control has been studied, because there have

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Speaker 1: been tons of papers on this, tons of experiments, and

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Speaker 1: I wanted to kind of general overview, so I turned

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Speaker 1: to a very helpful book chapter by a psychologist named

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Speaker 1: Suzanne C. Thompson. The chapter is called Illusions of Control

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Speaker 1: and it appears in a book called Cognitive Illusions, edited

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Speaker 1: by Rudiger F. Pohl, published by Psychology Press twenty sixteen,

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Speaker 1: though the version I read seems to have been an

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Speaker 1: updated edition because it included references to more recent studies,

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Speaker 1: such as one paper from twenty twenty one. So in

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Speaker 1: this overview, Thompson uses a broader definition of the illusion

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Speaker 1: of control than Langer did. Langer's definition was specifically about

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Speaker 1: seeking desired outcomes in chance determined events, to Thompson says, instead,

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Speaker 1: quote illusions of control occur when individuals overestimate their personal

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Speaker 1: influence over an outcome, So that that's a more general

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Speaker 1: way of stating it. You know, maybe your influence could

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Speaker 1: be good or bad. It could be in getting something

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Speaker 1: you want or in something you don't want.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so this broader definition could apply to like various

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Speaker 2: games that have some sort of random element that you

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Speaker 2: truly can't control. For you may be really great at

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Speaker 2: the game, but you have this added level of illusion

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Speaker 2: of control that thinks that you can you can definitely

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Speaker 2: navigate any random occurrence. And I guess you could also

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Speaker 2: apply it even to interpersonal relationships, you know, thinking that

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Speaker 2: you have more control over other people in your circle

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Speaker 2: than you do.

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Speaker 1: Right, because this idea would also apply to things where

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Speaker 1: you do have some control, but you're imagining you have

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Speaker 1: more control than you actually do. And Thompson says that

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Speaker 1: since the origins of this research in the nineteen seventies,

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Speaker 1: there have been basically three different ways of experimentally demonstrating

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Speaker 1: that people experience or control. There's like three branches of

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Speaker 1: experiments on this tree. So approach number one that she

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Speaker 1: outlines is the main example. Here is the original research

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Speaker 1: by Ellen Langer, which we already described in the last episode.

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Speaker 1: This general strategy involves gauging people's guesses about their likelihood

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Speaker 1: of success in chance games that have superficial elements of

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Speaker 1: skill games introduced. So to emphasize again, this approach does

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Speaker 1: not actually directly measure people's perceptions of control. Instead, these

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Speaker 1: experiments would kind of infer it from their behavior in

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Speaker 1: a game. So you see that people bet more money.

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Speaker 1: That suggests they think they have more control over the outcome,

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Speaker 1: But it's possible there's another factor operating there, so there's

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Speaker 1: less certainty that you're testing for the variable you're actually

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Speaker 1: looking for. And Thompson explains some other ways of doing

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Speaker 1: these kind of tests apart from like Langer's original experimental design.

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Speaker 1: One thing she talks about is a type of study

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Speaker 1: that you could call observer participant discrepancies. So an example

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Speaker 1: of this would be you get a test group, you know,

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Speaker 1: maybe a classroom of students or whatever, and you split

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Speaker 1: them up into pairs, and you give each pair of

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Speaker 1: subjects a random number generating apparatus, maybe a die that's

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Speaker 1: a simple one. So in each pair, there's one person

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Speaker 1: who gets to roll the die and the other person

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Speaker 1: records all the numbers that they roll, and participants do

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Speaker 1: this like twenty times, and then across the whole test group,

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Speaker 1: whichever pair in the group has the highest total sum

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Speaker 1: of rolls wins a cash prize, and both subjects in

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Speaker 1: each pair guess their likelihood of winning before the game.

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Speaker 1: Thompson says that if you try to replicate this sort

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Speaker 1: of experiment with students, you will usually find that subjects,

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Speaker 1: on average rate their chance of winning a little bit

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Speaker 1: higher if they're the one rolling the die than if

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Speaker 1: they're the one recording the roles. Again, that should not

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Speaker 1: make a difference. So even though we both rationally know

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Speaker 1: that the outcome is random, it just feels a little

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Speaker 1: luckier if I'm the one doing it. However, and I

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Speaker 1: thought this was interesting. Thompson says that some research has

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Speaker 1: found that this effect can be reduced or even neutralized

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Speaker 1: completely by the context of the game, for example, if

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Speaker 1: it takes place in a classroom that has previously discussed

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Speaker 1: the correct way to estimate probability on games like this.

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Speaker 1: And that was interesting to me because it made me

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Speaker 1: think about how people overcome cognitive biases and cognitive illusions.

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Speaker 1: You know, sometimes the unfortunate fact is that simply being

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Speaker 1: aware of a cognitive illusion, like knowing that sometimes our

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Speaker 1: brains have a certain kind of bias, is not sufficient

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Speaker 1: to keep us from falling for that bias. So you

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Speaker 1: can know about the tricks your brain plays, and you

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Speaker 1: can fall for them anyway. It happens to all of us,

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Speaker 1: but in a case.

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Speaker 2: And this obviously applies to many other aspects of the

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Speaker 2: human psyche as well. I mean awareness, self awareness is

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Speaker 2: often the first step, but that doesn't mean you've completely

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Speaker 2: defeated the illusion or illusion that you are having to

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Speaker 2: deal with.

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Speaker 1: Exactly. This is true for everybody, but in other cases,

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Speaker 1: and it varies from case to case. So in some cases,

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Speaker 1: research has shown that we can be successfully inoculated mentally

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Speaker 1: from certain irrational tendencies by being made aware of them,

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Speaker 1: and this seems to be one of those cases. You

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Speaker 1: can sometimes neutralize illusions of control just by like having

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Speaker 1: a context in which people have already been reminded about

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Speaker 1: how probabilities work. And I think that's interesting because you

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Speaker 1: might naturally assume that the variable in resistance to cognitive

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Speaker 1: illusions like the illusion of control is the person you know,

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Speaker 1: like permanent features of a person's personality, and you might

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Speaker 1: be inclined to think like well, a more rational person

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Speaker 1: is better able to overcome their biases and think clearly.

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Speaker 1: But I don't know if that's always the case. I

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Speaker 1: wonder if it's really more about setting and context. Maybe

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Speaker 1: setting and context are equally, if not more, powerful predictors

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Speaker 1: of how well people overcome cognitive illusions. In other words,

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Speaker 1: does like currently being in the setting of a statistics

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Speaker 1: class inoculate you against the illusion of control better than

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Speaker 1: being a person who is generally aware of cognitive illusions.

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Speaker 1: I don't know the answer for sure there, but it

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Speaker 1: seems worth considering rather than just defaulting to the explanation

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Speaker 1: of permanent internal personality based differences. But anyway, so to

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Speaker 1: move on, That was approach number Experimental approach number two

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Speaker 1: is different. In this type of experiment, you give subjects

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Speaker 1: a laboratory task where researchers can program exactly how much

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Speaker 1: control the subject actually has. And in many of these

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Speaker 1: experiments the subject has zero control. Sometimes they have more control,

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Speaker 1: and then you ask the subject how much control they

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Speaker 1: think they had. So an experiment typical of this type

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Speaker 1: is one that was done by Alloy and Abrahamson in

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Speaker 1: nineteen seventy nine, in which subjects would be given a

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Speaker 1: button to press and they're told to see if they

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Speaker 1: can use that button to control whether or not a

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Speaker 1: light comes on, and then they're asked to judge at

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Speaker 1: the end what amount of control they think the button

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Speaker 1: had over the light. In reality, the light had no

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Speaker 1: relationship to whether the button was pressed or not. It

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Speaker 1: was simply programmed to come on at some fixed percentage

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Speaker 1: of the trials with each subject, and unsurprisingly, even though

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Speaker 1: it had nothing to do with whether the button was

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Speaker 1: pushed or not or when subjects broadly thought they had

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Speaker 1: some amount of control, and experiments when the light came

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Speaker 1: on more frequently but again unconnected to the button, caused

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Speaker 1: people to believe that they had more control over the light. So,

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Speaker 1: at least in some cases, it seems like success at

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Speaker 1: getting a desired outcome makes people more likely to believe

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Speaker 1: they have control over that outcome, whether or not they do.

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Speaker 1: And while at the risk of over extrapolating from a

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Speaker 1: very contained laboratory outcome, this does sort of suggest to

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Speaker 1: me connections to behaviors in the world, Like you know,

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Speaker 1: when somebody has very good fortune at a particular juncture,

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Speaker 1: they're like, yep, that was all me. Later, Thompson describes

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Speaker 1: another version of this kind of test. This one is

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Speaker 1: called the computer screen on set task. And so in

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Speaker 1: this test, like you sit in front of a computer

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Speaker 1: and you're looking at a screen, and the screen will

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Speaker 1: sequentially produce a series of forty images, and all of

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Speaker 1: these images are either a green X or a red O.

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Speaker 1: And with each new screen, you can choose to press

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Speaker 1: a button or not press a button, and your goal

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Speaker 1: is to make the green X appear as many times

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Speaker 1: as possible. So people will be trying to figure out

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Speaker 1: if there's some pattern like pressing the button or not,

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Speaker 1: you know, pressing it or not in what sequence, et

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Speaker 1: cetera that'll make the green exes appear. Actually, once again,

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Speaker 1: the button has no relation whatsoever to whether the symbols

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Speaker 1: appear on the screen. The button doesn't do anything. And

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Speaker 1: you can vary what percentage of each symbol the subjects get.

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Speaker 1: At the end of the test, you have them rate,

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Speaker 1: on a scale of zero to one hundred how much

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Speaker 1: control they think they had over what appeared on the screen.

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Speaker 1: People who got the green X seventy five percent of

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Speaker 1: their random screens believed that they had a lot of

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Speaker 1: control over the display.

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Speaker 2: This is also interesting to think of in terms of

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Speaker 2: the sample we discussed in the last episode about as

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Speaker 2: a child thinking you had control over a video game. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: maybe this doesn't play out. I'd be interested to hear

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Speaker 2: from folks much younger than me. But looking back on

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Speaker 2: the video games that I was doing this on, like

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Speaker 2: these were the old school arcade games, where it was

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Speaker 2: maybe a little more directly comparable to just pressing a

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Speaker 2: button and seeing a random O or an AX on

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Speaker 2: the screen, Like, there is a lot more room to

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Speaker 2: ask the question, am I controlling it? I have fifty

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Speaker 2: percent chance I am.

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Speaker 1: In a way, I'm almost nostalgic for that mindset, Like

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Speaker 1: there's something kind of beautiful about the ambiguity of wondering

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Speaker 1: if you're controlling what's happening on the screen. I feel

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Speaker 1: like maybe I'm wrong about this. I feel like I

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Speaker 1: wouldn't fall for that now, but I kind of wish

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Speaker 1: I could, because it suggests a more I don't know,

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Speaker 1: just kind of like totally radically opened state of mind

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Speaker 1: in which anything is possible, a more magical way of

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Speaker 1: relating to the world.

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Speaker 2: It's a cheaper way to go about going to the arcade.

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Speaker 2: You know, I wonder what they would think if there

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Speaker 2: was an adult who regularly came into the arcade and

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Speaker 2: they're like, oh, man, he never spends anything. He just

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Speaker 2: stands at the machines and pretends to play.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, just toggling the joystick at the demo.

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Speaker 2: It's great. You gotta sell this guy's nachos or something.

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Speaker 1: Okay, anyway, that's approach number two, these very tightly controlled

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Speaker 1: laboratory experiments. Approach number three is different. Once again, you

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Speaker 1: get people to report their judgments of control in real

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Speaker 1: life scenarios. An example here is a study by McKenna

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Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety three. Not that McKenna different, Chaya, I

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Speaker 1: think this is Frank P.

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Speaker 2: McKenna.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. Ask participants to rate the likelihood that, compared to

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Speaker 1: other drivers, they would experience an auto collision, and they

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Speaker 1: were asked to judge this when imagining themself as the

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Speaker 1: driver versus imagining themselves as the passenger. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most

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Speaker 1: people thought that accidents would be relatively less likely if

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Speaker 1: they were the driver.

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Speaker 2: This absolutely matches up with my experience. You know, even

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Speaker 2: when I'm in the car with a driver that I

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Speaker 2: definitely trust and even know that they are a better

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Speaker 2: driver than me. You know, maybe they have more experience

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Speaker 2: or they've undergone training. They're still like that gut feeling

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Speaker 2: of like I'm not actually in control. I can't hit

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Speaker 2: the brake when I see the brake lights ahead getting closer,

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Speaker 2: and therefore I feel like a little more anxious about

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Speaker 2: the whole scenario oftentimes, like realizing that this is irrational,

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Speaker 2: but feeling it.

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Speaker 1: Nonetheless, I totally relate to that. I feel that too,

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Speaker 1: the same thing. It's not like I actually think this

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Speaker 1: other person is a more dangerous driver than me. I

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Speaker 1: just it's just hard to get over that feeling.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: In the second study in this mckinna paper, participants were

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Speaker 1: asked about specific types of collisions, those that would seem

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Speaker 1: to involve either more or less driver control. So they

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Speaker 1: were talking about like rear ending someone versus being rear

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Speaker 1: ended versus having a tire blowout, And the idea was

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Speaker 1: rear ending someone is generally thought to be largely subject

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Speaker 1: to driver control. Of course, we know that there are

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Speaker 1: factors that other factors that can intervene breaks could fail whatever,

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Speaker 1: whereas getting rear ended seems to be out of the

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Speaker 1: driver's hands, and people were highly likely to say that

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Speaker 1: they were less likely to have the type of collision

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Speaker 1: in which the driver was in control. Has high control,

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Speaker 1: So I am much less likely than other people to

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Speaker 1: rear end someone. Whether it's me or someone else, makes

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Speaker 1: less difference in getting rear ended. Quote. Thus, people show

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Speaker 1: illusory control over avoiding an accident by assuming that they

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Speaker 1: will be able to exert control that others cannot.

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Speaker 2: And I guess this is what's in play when you

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Speaker 2: see drivers, so many drivers just riding bumpers through terrifyingly

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Speaker 2: fast traffic all the time, like they just maybe they

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Speaker 2: have just heightened control over things. I would tend to

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Speaker 2: doubt it.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, that would be dangerous if someone else did it,

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Speaker 1: But I can handle it.

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Speaker 2: I alone can weave in and out of traffic and

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Speaker 2: make it to my destination two minutes ahead of schedule.

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Speaker 1: So this type of experiment is taken to show that

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Speaker 1: people have an illusion of control when they consider themselves

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Speaker 1: relative to other people. A driver has some degree of

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Speaker 1: control over whether they end up in a collision. On average,

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Speaker 1: people think that they are better able to avoid that

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Speaker 1: outcome than other people are, and so looking back over

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Speaker 1: these three methodologies, Thompson says, you know, each of them

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Speaker 1: have strengths and weaknesses. So approach number one kind of

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Speaker 1: the Langer approach. The pros are that it uses realistic

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Speaker 1: situations that people engage in every day, like lottery drawings

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Speaker 1: and games and stuff. And also it has the pro

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Speaker 1: that the indirect measure can help detect an illusory belief

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Speaker 1: in control that does in reality guide behavior, but which

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Speaker 1: people might resist admits if they were asked directly, and

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Speaker 1: that does seem big to me. It helps avoid like

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Speaker 1: people tailoring their answers to avoid embarrassment. Cons on the

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Speaker 1: other hand, are it's indirect, so it doesn't test whether

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Speaker 1: control is really the deciding factor. You kind of have

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Speaker 1: to infer that and wonder if other factors could be

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Speaker 1: contributing as well. Approach number two the laboratory experiments like

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Speaker 1: Alloy and Abramson with like you know, the light coming

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Speaker 1: on or the greenexes and red o's on the computer screen.

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Speaker 1: The pros of that are that the dependent variable is

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Speaker 1: definitely judgment of control, like it's a very tightly controlled experiment.

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Speaker 1: Cons would be that these tasks do not have what

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Speaker 1: psychologists call external validity, So they're like weird tasks with

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Speaker 1: no close analogy in our day to day lives, so

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Speaker 1: they might not be telling us how people would actually

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Speaker 1: behave in reality. They might just be like producing a

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Speaker 1: weird kind of behavior that's specific to the lab task.

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Speaker 1: Approach Number three the self reporting of control judgments about

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Speaker 1: everyday activities like driving. Ala McKenna pros this does have

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Speaker 1: external validity cons are it relies on reflective self reporting,

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Speaker 1: which can be subject to all kinds of biases you

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Speaker 1: know when you're trying to when you ask people to

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Speaker 1: self report on their own judgments about their lives. However,

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Speaker 1: Thompson says that a strength of illusion of control research

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Speaker 1: is that even though these methodologies all have their strengths

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Speaker 1: and weaknesses, they mostly point to a similar conclusion, which

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Speaker 1: is the fact that on average, people believe we have

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Speaker 1: more control over outcomes than we actually do. And there

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Speaker 1: do seem to be some doubts about in exactly what

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Speaker 1: scenarios this applies and what causes it, but the core

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Speaker 1: finding seems fairly robust. Though I'm going to talk about

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Speaker 1: one paper later in this episode that has some theoretical

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Speaker 1: criticisms of how this research and how the experimental findings

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Speaker 1: are framed. So it seems there probably is an illusion

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Speaker 1: of control, especially for outcomes that we have very little

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Speaker 1: control over. But it would be very surprising if people

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Speaker 1: showed an illusory belief in control over all variables in

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Speaker 1: all situations equally. So there has to be some more

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Speaker 1: granular research on like when illusions of control happen, Like

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Speaker 1: what are the kinds of things that we think we

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Speaker 1: have more control of than others, more illusory control over

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Speaker 1: than others, And what kind of situations or states can

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Speaker 1: we be in that heighten this illusion? And to continue

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Speaker 1: with Thompson's overview, Thompson highlights seven variables that have been

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Speaker 1: studied and found to affect the illusion of control. This

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Speaker 1: list does not mean that these are the only factors

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Speaker 1: influencing it. It's just that these have been studied well

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Speaker 1: enough to discuss in this book chapter. So the first

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Speaker 1: one is skill related factors. Now, this was a major

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Speaker 1: part of the original nineteen seventy five paper by Langer.

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Speaker 1: A lot of studies have found that if a situation

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Speaker 1: has features we associate with with dependence on skill, we're

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Speaker 1: more likely to experience an illusion of control and Examples

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Speaker 1: of these features could include quote, familiarity, making choices, active

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Speaker 1: engagement with the material, competition, and four knowledge. So we

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Speaker 1: talked about several of these in the previous episode. For example, familiarity,

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Speaker 1: you know you might be more inclined to think you

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Speaker 1: have control over the outcome of a chance game if

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Speaker 1: you are familiar with the game, or if there are

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Speaker 1: elements of the game that are familiar to you. And

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Speaker 1: this is generally true of skill based games, but wouldn't

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Speaker 1: affect chance based games. One of these variables though, Actually

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Speaker 1: there was a twenty twenty one paper that casts some

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Speaker 1: doubt over whether it affects illusions of control, and that

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Speaker 1: variable is choice. So the original idea is that if

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Speaker 1: you have a choice to make that gives you illusions

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Speaker 1: of control. An example would be a lottery type game.

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Speaker 1: So imagine a game where you buy a lottery ticket.

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Speaker 1: The ticket has a random series of numbers on it,

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Speaker 1: and you win a prize if the winning number matches

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Speaker 1: your ticket. Now consider the same game, except you get

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Speaker 1: to pick your ticket numbers. Maybe you can use your

402
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Speaker 1: lucky number, which of course is the ISBN. For the

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Speaker 1: novelization of Halloween three season of the Witch by Jack Martin.

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Speaker 2: To your number, that's the one you play.

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Speaker 1: It's got to be what could be a luckier number? Happy,

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Speaker 1: Happy Halloween. Now, of course, in a fair lottery like,

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Speaker 1: whatever the number is, it makes no difference whatsoever to

408
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Speaker 1: your chance of winning. Winning numbers are selected randomly. No

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Speaker 1: number has a higher chance of victory than any other.

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Speaker 1: And yet the fact that you get to choose your

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Speaker 1: number might make it seem like there's some element of

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Speaker 1: skill involved in this game, and thus increases your illution

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Speaker 1: of control. Langer did find this kind of result in

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Speaker 1: the nineteen seventy five paper. However, Thompson mentions that this

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Speaker 1: particular metric of choice specifically has been contradicted by recent research,

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Speaker 1: a paper by Klousowski at All in twenty twenty one,

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Speaker 1: which found that choice did not reliably cause an illusion

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Speaker 1: of control.

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Speaker 2: Okay, Like the scenario I'm instantly thinking of would be

420
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Speaker 2: like the classic magician game of Like, Okay, draw a

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Speaker 2: card from this deck, and now I'm going to guess it.

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Speaker 2: Assuming in this case that you are the magician, but

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Speaker 2: you have actually absolutely no magic up your sleeve, no trick.

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Speaker 2: You're just going completely off of chance. You know, you

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Speaker 2: have a certain percentage chance of guessing it right because

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Speaker 2: there are only so many cards in that deck versus, Okay,

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Speaker 2: you draw a card at random from this deck. I'll

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Speaker 2: draw a card at random from this deck. Do you

429
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Speaker 2: think we're going to have the same card like by

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Speaker 2: being able to pick a car by saying I believe

431
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Speaker 2: you have the Ace of Spades in your hand when

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Speaker 2: it's just completely random, would you feel confident in making

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Speaker 2: that choice now? I feel like you would be more

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Speaker 2: confident in making that choice if the other person picked

435
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Speaker 2: their card, because then you can potentially overestimate your ability

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Speaker 2: to guess the mind of the individual. Okay, this is

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Speaker 2: the kind of person's going to choose a king or

438
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Speaker 2: a queen, or they can try and outsmart me by,

439
00:25:22,640 --> 00:25:25,160
Speaker 2: you know, choosing a two or three something that isn't

440
00:25:25,200 --> 00:25:26,440
Speaker 2: superficially interesting.

441
00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:30,679
Speaker 1: I guess that would introduce other elements because it would introduce, like,

442
00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:33,280
Speaker 1: I don't know if the other person picking a card

443
00:25:33,280 --> 00:25:35,680
Speaker 1: in the scenario is technically a competitor. But we did

444
00:25:35,720 --> 00:25:39,200
Speaker 1: talk last time about how like competition in some experiments

445
00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:44,199
Speaker 1: seem to increase the illusion of control. And I don't know.

446
00:25:45,640 --> 00:25:49,119
Speaker 1: That's an interesting scenario because it adds these other variables too.

447
00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:54,480
Speaker 1: My intuition is that that would increase illusions of control.

448
00:25:54,520 --> 00:25:57,000
Speaker 1: It feels like it would for me, it would it

449
00:25:57,000 --> 00:26:00,600
Speaker 1: would falsely increase my belief that I could control the

450
00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:04,200
Speaker 1: outcome even though I can't. And just to go again

451
00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:07,240
Speaker 1: on my intuitions, it would seem to me that the

452
00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:11,160
Speaker 1: choices could increase illusions of control, like if I get

453
00:26:11,160 --> 00:26:13,640
Speaker 1: to pick the lottery numbers, it would feel more likely

454
00:26:13,880 --> 00:26:16,600
Speaker 1: like I had a better chance of winning. But again,

455
00:26:16,720 --> 00:26:19,720
Speaker 1: this twenty twenty one study found that in some circumstances, no,

456
00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:22,199
Speaker 1: that's not the case. So it might It might have

457
00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:24,679
Speaker 1: to do with just like how people are primed to

458
00:26:24,840 --> 00:26:27,439
Speaker 1: think about the task they're about to do, you know,

459
00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:31,000
Speaker 1: like you say, as we talked about earlier, like, are

460
00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:34,840
Speaker 1: you given some kind of hint of remembering how probabilities

461
00:26:34,880 --> 00:26:37,159
Speaker 1: actually work as you're engaging in the task.

462
00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:39,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, okay, I don't know.

463
00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:41,800
Speaker 1: But anyway, So to come back to more factors that

464
00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:46,000
Speaker 1: can apparently influence it. According to experiments, one factor is

465
00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:50,560
Speaker 1: success or failure emphasis. This is the second thing Thompson lists.

466
00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:55,240
Speaker 1: So does the task or the context highlight the idea

467
00:26:55,400 --> 00:27:00,359
Speaker 1: of success or failure? One example, here would be early

468
00:27:00,600 --> 00:27:04,959
Speaker 1: streaks in a game where you repeatedly guess or draw something.

469
00:27:05,920 --> 00:27:09,119
Speaker 1: So experiments have found if you let somebody gamble on

470
00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:13,280
Speaker 1: calling coin tosses again, coin tosses something that in reality

471
00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:16,880
Speaker 1: might not be truly perfectly random, it is close enough

472
00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:20,399
Speaker 1: to random. It's basically random, so you should not have

473
00:27:20,480 --> 00:27:23,840
Speaker 1: any skill at calling a coin toss. But if people

474
00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:26,800
Speaker 1: are gambling on coin tosses and they have an early

475
00:27:27,160 --> 00:27:31,160
Speaker 1: string of successes at making the right call, this will

476
00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:35,440
Speaker 1: apparently increase the illusion of control relative to subjects who

477
00:27:35,480 --> 00:27:39,000
Speaker 1: have an early string of failures. So if you lose

478
00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:42,280
Speaker 1: a lot at the beginning, outcomes feel random. If you

479
00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:45,480
Speaker 1: win a lot at the beginning, you think I'm doing this.

480
00:27:46,720 --> 00:27:50,120
Speaker 1: In reality, it's equally random either way. But we can

481
00:27:50,160 --> 00:27:54,080
Speaker 1: get tricked into thinking that we have control because we've

482
00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:56,680
Speaker 1: been winning and it just seems like winning is happening,

483
00:27:56,840 --> 00:27:59,439
Speaker 1: so somehow I must be making it happen.

484
00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:03,679
Speaker 2: See feel rather opposite in Dungeons and Dragons. If like

485
00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:05,760
Speaker 2: the first couple of D twenty rolls of the night

486
00:28:05,920 --> 00:28:09,879
Speaker 2: are really high for me, or or heaven forbid their

487
00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:13,000
Speaker 2: natural twenties on things that don't matter, I have this

488
00:28:13,119 --> 00:28:15,359
Speaker 2: sinking suspicion that I'm just doomed when we get to

489
00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:17,480
Speaker 2: actual combat because that's when the ones are going to

490
00:28:17,520 --> 00:28:17,840
Speaker 2: come out.

491
00:28:17,920 --> 00:28:20,960
Speaker 1: That is really funny. I've had the same feeling before.

492
00:28:21,119 --> 00:28:24,920
Speaker 1: It's almost as bad as like rolling a critical fail

493
00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:28,760
Speaker 1: on something important is rolling a critical success on something

494
00:28:28,800 --> 00:28:31,800
Speaker 1: that doesn't matter at all? Ye feel like I've wasted it?

495
00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:36,240
Speaker 2: Yeah, decks, check to see if you can pick up

496
00:28:36,280 --> 00:28:38,520
Speaker 2: a stick and it's a natural twenty. It's like, all right,

497
00:28:38,760 --> 00:28:41,120
Speaker 2: I needed to get like a three on that probably.

498
00:28:41,520 --> 00:28:44,400
Speaker 1: Yeah. So on the other hand, though, in this success

499
00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:50,640
Speaker 1: failure thing, failure apparently sometimes neutralizes illusory beliefs of control.

500
00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:54,960
Speaker 1: So in some studies they have found this is only

501
00:28:55,040 --> 00:28:59,160
Speaker 1: true if failure is clear and explicit. If there's like

502
00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:02,880
Speaker 1: ambiguity and the feedback and it's not one hundred percent

503
00:29:02,920 --> 00:29:05,840
Speaker 1: clear whether you have failed or not, the illusion of

504
00:29:05,880 --> 00:29:06,960
Speaker 1: control can persist.

505
00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 2: All right, Yeah, a natural one on your D twenty

506
00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:14,160
Speaker 2: row Definitely, I think we'll knock that illusion out of place.

507
00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:18,080
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, okay. Third factor that seems to influence it

508
00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:23,280
Speaker 1: need or desire for outcome. So evidence shows that how

509
00:29:23,360 --> 00:29:26,960
Speaker 1: much you want an outcome can increase the illusion of

510
00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:31,280
Speaker 1: control over the process of getting it. So an example

511
00:29:31,280 --> 00:29:34,320
Speaker 1: would be in a computer screen on set task. So

512
00:29:34,400 --> 00:29:36,200
Speaker 1: we talked about that earlier. That's the one with the

513
00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:39,080
Speaker 1: green exes and the red o's where people are pressing

514
00:29:39,080 --> 00:29:41,240
Speaker 1: a button trying to figure out if they can control

515
00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:44,160
Speaker 1: making the green exes appear on the screen. In this

516
00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:47,680
Speaker 1: kind of experiment, people believed that they had more They

517
00:29:47,720 --> 00:29:52,880
Speaker 1: had significantly more control if they received cash payments proportional

518
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:55,960
Speaker 1: to the number of greenexes that appeared compared to people

519
00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:58,240
Speaker 1: who did the same task but did not get a

520
00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:01,320
Speaker 1: cash reward. There was no cash involve And remember in

521
00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,720
Speaker 1: this experiment either way, subjects have zero control at all.

522
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:08,800
Speaker 1: A study by Buyer at All in nineteen ninety five

523
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:12,080
Speaker 1: found a similar kind of thing that the illusion of

524
00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:16,320
Speaker 1: control was increased for a random lottery with a food

525
00:30:16,440 --> 00:30:20,480
Speaker 1: reward if people getting a hamburger if the subject was hungry,

526
00:30:20,840 --> 00:30:24,160
Speaker 1: compared to subjects who were not hungry. So like, if

527
00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:28,040
Speaker 1: the reward is food and you are currently hungry, you

528
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,680
Speaker 1: have more illusions of control over a chance outcome than

529
00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:32,600
Speaker 1: if you're not hungry.

530
00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:35,880
Speaker 2: All right, well, that makes sense. I mean the scenario,

531
00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:38,760
Speaker 2: I mean the outcome, not so much the Hamburger lottery.

532
00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:41,040
Speaker 2: I don't think I've encountered one of those in real life.

533
00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:44,000
Speaker 2: But yeah, the more desirable the outcome, the more acceptable

534
00:30:44,040 --> 00:30:46,960
Speaker 2: the gambling risk becomes, the more confident you are that

535
00:30:47,040 --> 00:30:49,320
Speaker 2: you can pull it off. I think I've felt this

536
00:30:49,360 --> 00:30:52,520
Speaker 2: way in the past, regarding things like DVD giveaways and all,

537
00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:56,480
Speaker 2: you know, where it's like, oh, I'd like to win that. Sure,

538
00:30:56,520 --> 00:30:59,960
Speaker 2: it's worth worth my time to go ahead and and enter,

539
00:31:00,160 --> 00:31:02,719
Speaker 2: because uh yeah, I can imagine that on my shelf.

540
00:31:02,800 --> 00:31:04,600
Speaker 1: Do you have a specific disc in mind here?

541
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:09,080
Speaker 2: Yeah? Yeah, I uh. Ages ago, I entered a contest

542
00:31:09,160 --> 00:31:12,080
Speaker 2: and won DVD copies of The Fly and The Fly Too,

543
00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:15,360
Speaker 2: and and it was like and it was it was

544
00:31:15,360 --> 00:31:17,320
Speaker 2: like magic, you know, because I'm like, yeah, I would

545
00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:20,520
Speaker 2: mind winning that, and bam I won it. And in

546
00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:22,960
Speaker 2: a way it kind of like ruined it. It ruined

547
00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:25,160
Speaker 2: things for me moving forward because then anytime there's like

548
00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:27,800
Speaker 2: a DVD giveaway, I'm like, well, I won this, I

549
00:31:27,880 --> 00:31:30,360
Speaker 2: won this once before it could happen again. I'm good

550
00:31:30,360 --> 00:31:31,160
Speaker 2: at this. Apparently.

551
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:35,600
Speaker 1: Oh so you apparently had an early success that increased

552
00:31:35,680 --> 00:31:38,120
Speaker 1: the success salience of that kind of lottery for you.

553
00:31:38,280 --> 00:31:41,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, I had a similar scenario happened with my son.

554
00:31:41,960 --> 00:31:44,440
Speaker 2: I took him to local bowling alleys for years and

555
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:46,480
Speaker 2: years ago when he was much younger. And you know

556
00:31:46,520 --> 00:31:49,080
Speaker 2: the claw machines. We've talked about claw machines before. Oh yeah,

557
00:31:49,280 --> 00:31:53,080
Speaker 2: the show. You know, they're they're they're tricky if you're predatory,

558
00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:55,640
Speaker 2: if you want to describe them as such. You know,

559
00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:57,880
Speaker 2: it seems like an easy thing. You just put in

560
00:31:57,880 --> 00:31:59,880
Speaker 2: a quarter of claw grabs a toy, you get the toy,

561
00:32:00,320 --> 00:32:04,120
Speaker 2: but there are a number of additional tricks in play

562
00:32:04,640 --> 00:32:08,840
Speaker 2: that that enable the house to win. And you know,

563
00:32:08,920 --> 00:32:11,240
Speaker 2: of course he was interested in trying out his claw machine,

564
00:32:11,280 --> 00:32:13,560
Speaker 2: and I was like, well, this is a teaching moment.

565
00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:16,880
Speaker 2: I'd say, tell him, all right, I'm going to give you,

566
00:32:17,200 --> 00:32:19,760
Speaker 2: give you one quarter or whatever it took to use

567
00:32:19,760 --> 00:32:23,200
Speaker 2: the machine, but I want you to know that these

568
00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:26,240
Speaker 2: machines are tricky. They are made to trick you. You're

569
00:32:26,280 --> 00:32:28,080
Speaker 2: not going to win anything. And then then I'm like,

570
00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:32,080
Speaker 2: go forth and lose, you know, learn this lesson immediate jackpot.

571
00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:34,440
Speaker 2: He got some stuffy out of that, and I think

572
00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:36,840
Speaker 2: he still has that stuffy that I occasionally see in

573
00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:38,920
Speaker 2: his room. And it mocks me because I'm like, you

574
00:32:39,080 --> 00:32:41,720
Speaker 2: were never supposed to come out of that machine, and

575
00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:44,440
Speaker 2: you you gave him too much confidence in these claw machines.

576
00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:47,280
Speaker 1: Oh that's terrible, though, I would say at least the

577
00:32:47,360 --> 00:32:49,880
Speaker 1: claw machine is not a slot machine because there is

578
00:32:50,080 --> 00:32:52,320
Speaker 1: some minor amount of skill involved.

579
00:32:52,520 --> 00:32:56,720
Speaker 2: Minor, yes, and if memory serves like we'd have to

580
00:32:56,760 --> 00:32:59,040
Speaker 2: go deeper in. But I believe there's some some additional

581
00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:04,640
Speaker 2: Shenanigan's going on with those machines that enable occasional win

582
00:33:04,720 --> 00:33:07,000
Speaker 2: because that's the thing. People need to occasionally win those

583
00:33:07,040 --> 00:33:10,960
Speaker 2: toys out of those machines. Otherwise people will realized that, Okay,

584
00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:13,600
Speaker 2: there's just a bunch of dust covered stuff. He's in there.

585
00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:15,200
Speaker 2: Nobody's getting anything out of there.

586
00:33:15,920 --> 00:33:18,920
Speaker 1: I'm very sorry your son had an early success emphasis

587
00:33:18,960 --> 00:33:21,840
Speaker 1: on claw machines. That is an unfortunate fate.

588
00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:25,560
Speaker 2: Well, I let him have a number of failures after

589
00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:28,960
Speaker 2: that on other visits, so I think the lesson finally

590
00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:40,560
Speaker 2: hammered him. Oh.

591
00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:43,320
Speaker 1: But the flip side of the success failure emphasis is

592
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:47,840
Speaker 1: that research has also found that there are increased illusions

593
00:33:47,880 --> 00:33:50,560
Speaker 1: of control in a situation where somebody is trying to

594
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:55,360
Speaker 1: avoid an outcome they find extremely undesirable. Don't worry, these

595
00:33:55,400 --> 00:33:59,360
Speaker 1: experiments didn't have actual torture or anything. The really undesirable

596
00:33:59,360 --> 00:34:02,440
Speaker 1: conditions things like having to speak in front of a group,

597
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:06,920
Speaker 1: which is a very terrifying prospect to many of us,

598
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:10,960
Speaker 1: including myself, even though I speak into a microphone for

599
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:13,120
Speaker 1: a living. So let that be a comfort to you

600
00:34:13,120 --> 00:34:14,480
Speaker 1: out there who have this same fear.

601
00:34:15,080 --> 00:34:17,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean it's a different scenario, to be sure.

602
00:34:17,760 --> 00:34:19,560
Speaker 1: Another one was like having to put your hand in

603
00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:23,560
Speaker 1: cold water. That's another common thing tested here. So people

604
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:27,520
Speaker 1: who strongly wanted to avoid these outcomes mistakenly believed they

605
00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:31,080
Speaker 1: had more agency in the task that determined whether they

606
00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:31,839
Speaker 1: would have to do.

607
00:34:31,880 --> 00:34:32,319
Speaker 2: Them or not.

608
00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:34,400
Speaker 1: So it's just a flip side of the thing, like,

609
00:34:34,680 --> 00:34:37,160
Speaker 1: if you really want that hamburger, you have more illusion

610
00:34:37,200 --> 00:34:40,839
Speaker 1: of control over the chance process of getting it. If

611
00:34:40,880 --> 00:34:43,240
Speaker 1: you really want to avoid speaking in front of a group,

612
00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:47,960
Speaker 1: apparently you have more illusions of control in avoiding that fade.

613
00:34:48,280 --> 00:34:51,600
Speaker 1: Another interesting thing noted here is that some studies have

614
00:34:51,640 --> 00:34:55,919
Speaker 1: found a greater illusion of control when people are experiencing

615
00:34:56,000 --> 00:35:00,680
Speaker 1: heightened stress. I thought that was interesting. Fourth factor is mood.

616
00:35:01,880 --> 00:35:05,400
Speaker 1: This is pretty straightforward, But studies have found on average,

617
00:35:05,440 --> 00:35:09,560
Speaker 1: people experience more illusory control when they're in a better mood,

618
00:35:10,400 --> 00:35:13,799
Speaker 1: and people with a negative mood showed less illusions of

619
00:35:13,840 --> 00:35:16,880
Speaker 1: control on average. Of course, this is probably not a

620
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:19,880
Speaker 1: reason to try to be in a bad mood. But

621
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:24,200
Speaker 1: you know, one advantage if you're currently feeling down is

622
00:35:24,239 --> 00:35:26,279
Speaker 1: that in this state of being in a bad mood,

623
00:35:27,000 --> 00:35:29,240
Speaker 1: you might be less likely to think you can control

624
00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:29,920
Speaker 1: things you can.

625
00:35:30,680 --> 00:35:33,120
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, though, of course, like we've been saying, it's

626
00:35:33,200 --> 00:35:38,000
Speaker 2: complex anything human psyche's doing. So on the flip side,

627
00:35:38,040 --> 00:35:40,040
Speaker 2: you might find yourself more inclined to go after a

628
00:35:40,120 --> 00:35:43,400
Speaker 2: quick dopamine hit of initiating a gamble if you're in

629
00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:46,440
Speaker 2: a bad mood. So you know a lot going on there.

630
00:35:46,680 --> 00:35:49,640
Speaker 1: Okay, fifth factor We sort of already alluded to this one,

631
00:35:49,719 --> 00:35:53,480
Speaker 1: but this is what Thompson calls the intrusion of reality.

632
00:35:53,920 --> 00:35:57,560
Speaker 1: This basically means giving people a reality check. Illusion of

633
00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:00,920
Speaker 1: control is one type of cognitive illusion that seems pretty

634
00:36:00,920 --> 00:36:04,400
Speaker 1: easy to overcome in the moment by simply reminding people

635
00:36:04,800 --> 00:36:08,440
Speaker 1: what the probabilities actually are. So if you remind people

636
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:11,880
Speaker 1: of the objective probability of winning a gambling task before

637
00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:14,640
Speaker 1: they place their bets. The illusion of control can be

638
00:36:14,680 --> 00:36:17,320
Speaker 1: significantly reduced or neutralized completely.

639
00:36:18,120 --> 00:36:20,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, and you see this a lot with coverage of

640
00:36:20,280 --> 00:36:24,880
Speaker 2: lottery odds, you know, the advertisements for the lottery and

641
00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:27,000
Speaker 2: like general buzz for the lottery make it seem like

642
00:36:27,040 --> 00:36:30,400
Speaker 2: anything is possible. You know, the winning ticket might be

643
00:36:30,840 --> 00:36:32,080
Speaker 2: you know, it might have been sold to the gas

644
00:36:32,120 --> 00:36:36,960
Speaker 2: station down the street. But then oftentimes news reporting on

645
00:36:37,040 --> 00:36:39,640
Speaker 2: these situations will often drive home like, no, you have

646
00:36:39,800 --> 00:36:43,000
Speaker 2: like this astronomically small chance of winning if you enter.

647
00:36:43,320 --> 00:36:45,759
Speaker 1: Yeah, here's your reality check. And it seems like with

648
00:36:45,840 --> 00:36:49,400
Speaker 1: illusions of control, a simple reality check is quite useful

649
00:36:49,440 --> 00:36:54,240
Speaker 1: to people. Next factor I thought was quite interesting Thompson

650
00:36:54,280 --> 00:36:59,759
Speaker 1: mentions power. Apparently, people in positions of power and authority.

651
00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:04,600
Speaker 1: Of course, they do have more actual control over many situations.

652
00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:08,839
Speaker 1: That's what power means. But it seems power also correlates

653
00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:13,279
Speaker 1: with increased illusions of control. So if you like, do

654
00:37:13,360 --> 00:37:16,880
Speaker 1: an experiment where you assign someone a position of power

655
00:37:16,920 --> 00:37:20,120
Speaker 1: over others in the experiment, or you prime them to

656
00:37:20,200 --> 00:37:22,319
Speaker 1: remember times in their life when they were in a

657
00:37:22,320 --> 00:37:25,880
Speaker 1: position of power, this seems to come with an increased

658
00:37:25,920 --> 00:37:30,200
Speaker 1: tendency toward the illusion of control. And that seemed very

659
00:37:30,200 --> 00:37:32,879
Speaker 1: interesting to me because you might imagine that it would

660
00:37:32,920 --> 00:37:34,880
Speaker 1: work the opposite way that you know, it's when you

661
00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:38,560
Speaker 1: feel disempowered that you dream of having more control. Maybe,

662
00:37:38,760 --> 00:37:41,200
Speaker 1: But the way this is framed actually does gel with

663
00:37:41,239 --> 00:37:44,720
Speaker 1: my experience. Like people who get to be the boss

664
00:37:44,960 --> 00:37:47,879
Speaker 1: or get to be the leader in some way seem

665
00:37:48,040 --> 00:37:51,880
Speaker 1: more susceptible than regular people to thinking they can, like

666
00:37:52,040 --> 00:37:54,239
Speaker 1: magically will a dice roll to come out the way

667
00:37:54,239 --> 00:37:54,720
Speaker 1: they wanted.

668
00:37:56,120 --> 00:37:58,799
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's easy to apply this to various like

669
00:37:59,560 --> 00:38:03,480
Speaker 2: you well known scenarios contemporary and historic. You know, you

670
00:38:03,520 --> 00:38:06,000
Speaker 2: look to some person in a position of power who

671
00:38:06,080 --> 00:38:08,880
Speaker 2: ends up in a situation where like clearly the odds

672
00:38:08,880 --> 00:38:12,920
Speaker 2: are stacked against them, but they they continue on with

673
00:38:13,400 --> 00:38:16,960
Speaker 2: like a seeming overconfidence that we we often just attribute

674
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:20,280
Speaker 2: to you just to pure ego and so forth. But yeah,

675
00:38:20,920 --> 00:38:23,480
Speaker 2: the illusion of control could also play a huge part

676
00:38:23,480 --> 00:38:23,680
Speaker 2: in it.

677
00:38:24,520 --> 00:38:27,360
Speaker 1: I wonder if there's actually some overlap with the idea

678
00:38:27,360 --> 00:38:29,839
Speaker 1: of success emphasis here, because like, if you are in

679
00:38:29,880 --> 00:38:33,680
Speaker 1: a position of power, you've had some reinforcement already of

680
00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:36,600
Speaker 1: like in some scenario where you didn't know what the

681
00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:38,839
Speaker 1: outcome was like you got what you wanted, Like you've

682
00:38:38,880 --> 00:38:42,560
Speaker 1: got you know, promotion or increased status or whatever, and

683
00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,560
Speaker 1: you're in this position of power now, so you've sort

684
00:38:44,600 --> 00:38:46,839
Speaker 1: of been trained to think like, oh, yeah, I can

685
00:38:46,880 --> 00:38:49,200
Speaker 1: make things happen for me, and that could be that

686
00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:52,160
Speaker 1: could lead to illusions that you can do that in

687
00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:53,680
Speaker 1: scenarios when you can't.

688
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:55,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, okay.

689
00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:57,799
Speaker 1: Another thing Thompson mentions that can affect it is what

690
00:38:58,120 --> 00:39:02,720
Speaker 1: she calls regulatory focus. This basically hinges on a theory

691
00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:06,640
Speaker 1: of motivation that distinguishes between situations where you have a

692
00:39:06,719 --> 00:39:10,840
Speaker 1: focus on getting an outcome you do want, versus situations

693
00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:13,440
Speaker 1: where you have a focus on avoiding an outcome you

694
00:39:13,520 --> 00:39:18,360
Speaker 1: don't want. And research by Langans in two thousand and

695
00:39:18,360 --> 00:39:21,640
Speaker 1: seven found that when you're in the mindset of getting

696
00:39:21,640 --> 00:39:25,239
Speaker 1: an outcome you do want, that was more associated with

697
00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,440
Speaker 1: illusions of control than the other mindset.

698
00:39:28,480 --> 00:39:30,880
Speaker 2: That's interesting, But I guess, on the other hand, like

699
00:39:30,880 --> 00:39:34,440
Speaker 2: we shouldn't then desire a life where we're just focusing

700
00:39:34,520 --> 00:39:38,480
Speaker 2: on avoiding negative outcomes, because right that sounds pretty dreadful.

701
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:41,600
Speaker 2: I guess in reality, you'd want some sort of healthy

702
00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:46,000
Speaker 2: balance of the two without too much tendency towards either

703
00:39:46,040 --> 00:39:47,440
Speaker 2: illusion exactly.

704
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:49,600
Speaker 1: I mean in the same way that you might be

705
00:39:49,680 --> 00:39:51,960
Speaker 1: less prone to illusions of control if you're in a

706
00:39:51,960 --> 00:39:54,600
Speaker 1: negative mood, but that probably shouldn't make you want to

707
00:39:54,640 --> 00:39:58,120
Speaker 1: be in a negative mood. Another one I just happened

708
00:39:58,160 --> 00:40:00,560
Speaker 1: to come across. This is not on Thompson's list, but

709
00:40:01,000 --> 00:40:03,800
Speaker 1: another paper mentioned it, so I thought i'd take a look.

710
00:40:04,239 --> 00:40:08,880
Speaker 1: Is the idea of what's called deliberative versus implemental mindset.

711
00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:12,720
Speaker 1: So this is the effect of what kind of frame

712
00:40:12,760 --> 00:40:16,279
Speaker 1: of mind you're in when approaching a control judgment. So

713
00:40:16,360 --> 00:40:20,800
Speaker 1: this was a paper by Galwitzer and Kinney in nineteen

714
00:40:20,880 --> 00:40:24,640
Speaker 1: eighty nine called Effects of Deliberative and Implemental mindsets on

715
00:40:24,640 --> 00:40:28,600
Speaker 1: the Illusion of control. This is a paper that used

716
00:40:28,640 --> 00:40:31,360
Speaker 1: a light onset experiment like the kinds we've talked about before,

717
00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:33,160
Speaker 1: where you know you're trying to turn on a light

718
00:40:33,280 --> 00:40:35,760
Speaker 1: by figuring out, you know, if pressing a button turns

719
00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:39,440
Speaker 1: it on or not. And this experiment had two different

720
00:40:39,520 --> 00:40:42,839
Speaker 1: experimental groups doing the same task, but they were separated

721
00:40:42,880 --> 00:40:47,160
Speaker 1: by the independent variable of a mental exercise. Before making

722
00:40:47,200 --> 00:40:51,840
Speaker 1: their judgments, one group was asked to quote deliberate on

723
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:55,440
Speaker 1: an unresolved personal problem, so you know, thinking about a

724
00:40:55,480 --> 00:40:59,880
Speaker 1: problem considering various solutions. The other group was asked to

725
00:41:00,320 --> 00:41:04,799
Speaker 1: plan the implementation of a personal goal, so you come

726
00:41:04,880 --> 00:41:06,879
Speaker 1: up with the plan of action to get what you want.

727
00:41:08,000 --> 00:41:12,919
Speaker 1: And this study found that the deliberation group experienced less

728
00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:18,240
Speaker 1: illusory control on the unrelated light onset task. So quote

729
00:41:18,400 --> 00:41:20,960
Speaker 1: overall finding suggests that people who are trying to make

730
00:41:21,000 --> 00:41:25,279
Speaker 1: decisions develop a deliberative mindset that allows for a realistic

731
00:41:25,400 --> 00:41:29,160
Speaker 1: view of action outcome expectancies, whereas people who try to

732
00:41:29,239 --> 00:41:33,680
Speaker 1: act on a decision develop an implemental mindset that promotes

733
00:41:33,760 --> 00:41:37,920
Speaker 1: illusory optimism. And that was to the extent that this

734
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:41,520
Speaker 1: is a valid finding that that was illuminating to me

735
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:44,319
Speaker 1: because it's like, Okay, if you're more just sort of

736
00:41:44,920 --> 00:41:49,960
Speaker 1: exploring ideas, thinking about different contingencies and all that, you

737
00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:53,560
Speaker 1: apparently might be more realistic about how much control you have.

738
00:41:53,880 --> 00:41:56,840
Speaker 1: But once you get into thinking about how to get

739
00:41:56,920 --> 00:42:01,160
Speaker 1: something done, then you're more prone to illusions of control,

740
00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:04,359
Speaker 1: which might actually be useful even though it's just as

741
00:42:04,360 --> 00:42:06,600
Speaker 1: we said last time, the illusion of control could be

742
00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:11,160
Speaker 1: useful even though it generates false beliefs, because maybe it

743
00:42:11,200 --> 00:42:15,000
Speaker 1: maybe those false beliefs could be motivating, could help you,

744
00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:16,520
Speaker 1: you know, spur you to action.

745
00:42:17,560 --> 00:42:20,120
Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, I mean you're working on something that's going

746
00:42:20,160 --> 00:42:21,960
Speaker 2: to be entered in a contest. Let's say, you know,

747
00:42:22,680 --> 00:42:25,520
Speaker 2: your chances of actually winning that contest may be too

748
00:42:25,560 --> 00:42:28,799
Speaker 2: small due to you know, various various factors that have

749
00:42:28,840 --> 00:42:30,520
Speaker 2: nothing to do with the quality of the work. But

750
00:42:30,640 --> 00:42:33,440
Speaker 2: you may be inspired to put more work into that,

751
00:42:33,600 --> 00:42:37,040
Speaker 2: into into the quality, you know, to put more effort

752
00:42:37,080 --> 00:42:39,680
Speaker 2: into the creation of whatever it is you're making. And

753
00:42:39,880 --> 00:42:43,120
Speaker 2: you know, you know, we knew that that first prize ribbon,

754
00:42:43,880 --> 00:42:46,520
Speaker 2: but it could result in a better product overall.

755
00:42:47,040 --> 00:42:49,160
Speaker 1: Okay, so the last thing I want to talk about

756
00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:51,560
Speaker 1: in this part of our series is I mentioned there

757
00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:57,640
Speaker 1: are some criticisms of the concept of the illusion of control. Uh.

758
00:42:57,680 --> 00:43:02,360
Speaker 1: There is one really interesting compleating result I found concerning

759
00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:04,960
Speaker 1: when the illusion of control manifests, and that was in

760
00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:08,920
Speaker 1: a paper by Francesca Gino, Zachariah Sharrek, and Don A.

761
00:43:09,160 --> 00:43:13,880
Speaker 1: Moore published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes in

762
00:43:13,920 --> 00:43:17,080
Speaker 1: twenty eleven. The paper was called keeping the Illusion of

763
00:43:17,120 --> 00:43:23,360
Speaker 1: control under control, Ceilings, floors and imperfect Calibration and So

764
00:43:23,560 --> 00:43:27,680
Speaker 1: this paper offers a critique of illusion of control research

765
00:43:27,760 --> 00:43:31,920
Speaker 1: by suggesting that maybe it's better to think about this

766
00:43:32,160 --> 00:43:37,640
Speaker 1: as a general tendency to make incorrect estimates of our

767
00:43:37,760 --> 00:43:41,680
Speaker 1: level of control over things, and this would include both

768
00:43:42,120 --> 00:43:48,000
Speaker 1: overestimating and underestimating our level of control in situations where

769
00:43:48,040 --> 00:43:52,400
Speaker 1: the evidence is somewhat ambiguous. So, according to these authors,

770
00:43:52,480 --> 00:43:57,640
Speaker 1: the literature appears to support a general overestimation of control

771
00:43:58,320 --> 00:44:02,320
Speaker 1: merely because so many of these studies focus on games

772
00:44:02,360 --> 00:44:06,200
Speaker 1: of chance and other purely random outcomes, things that we

773
00:44:06,280 --> 00:44:10,280
Speaker 1: have zero control over, and thus belief in any amount

774
00:44:10,280 --> 00:44:14,600
Speaker 1: of control in these experiments will be factually mistaken. But

775
00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:18,320
Speaker 1: the authors of this paper basically they accept that pattern

776
00:44:18,400 --> 00:44:21,480
Speaker 1: is valid. But they also say, if you give people

777
00:44:21,560 --> 00:44:25,440
Speaker 1: tasks where they have a high level of control, sometimes

778
00:44:25,440 --> 00:44:29,640
Speaker 1: you should expect to see subjects systematically underestimate how much

779
00:44:29,680 --> 00:44:33,080
Speaker 1: control they have on those things. So the authors performed

780
00:44:33,080 --> 00:44:37,000
Speaker 1: several experiments to test this, and they found that across

781
00:44:37,040 --> 00:44:42,120
Speaker 1: three experiments, indeed, there is a corresponding illusory lack of

782
00:44:42,200 --> 00:44:45,960
Speaker 1: control in some cases where people have a high degree

783
00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:49,440
Speaker 1: of control over outcomes. So I want to describe just

784
00:44:49,520 --> 00:44:53,160
Speaker 1: one example of the kinds of experiments they did. Subjects

785
00:44:53,160 --> 00:44:55,800
Speaker 1: would be asked to do a kind of word search

786
00:44:55,840 --> 00:44:58,759
Speaker 1: puzzle on computer screens. They're looking for like patterns of

787
00:44:58,800 --> 00:45:03,080
Speaker 1: repeating letters in a jumble of letters, and occasionally, at

788
00:45:03,200 --> 00:45:07,279
Speaker 1: random time intervals, the background of the screens they're looking

789
00:45:07,280 --> 00:45:10,480
Speaker 1: at would change color, maybe making it harder to pick

790
00:45:10,480 --> 00:45:13,640
Speaker 1: out the letters and solve the puzzle. Participants could press

791
00:45:13,640 --> 00:45:16,880
Speaker 1: a button to make the background revert to its original

792
00:45:16,920 --> 00:45:20,279
Speaker 1: color and make the game easier again. And so the

793
00:45:20,360 --> 00:45:25,200
Speaker 1: independent variable here was how responsive the background was to

794
00:45:25,280 --> 00:45:28,000
Speaker 1: presses of the button. The button could be set to

795
00:45:28,360 --> 00:45:33,800
Speaker 1: zero percent control, fifteen percent, fifty percent, and eighty five percent.

796
00:45:34,320 --> 00:45:37,600
Speaker 1: And then after this puzzle search game was over, subjects

797
00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:40,720
Speaker 1: were asked what level of control they thought they had

798
00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:44,719
Speaker 1: over the background color with the button, And as predicted

799
00:45:44,800 --> 00:45:49,759
Speaker 1: in this experiment, the authors found in the low control conditions,

800
00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:52,520
Speaker 1: like if you have zero percent or fifteen percent of

801
00:45:52,760 --> 00:45:56,200
Speaker 1: control over the background, there was an illusion of control,

802
00:45:56,360 --> 00:45:58,640
Speaker 1: same kind of thing you would expect based on these

803
00:45:58,640 --> 00:46:02,680
Speaker 1: previous experiments. But in the high control conditions, where players

804
00:46:02,719 --> 00:46:06,080
Speaker 1: had like eighty five percent control over the background, they

805
00:46:06,160 --> 00:46:09,759
Speaker 1: thought they had less control than they actually did, so

806
00:46:09,800 --> 00:46:12,120
Speaker 1: they did three experiments in total, and in the end,

807
00:46:12,239 --> 00:46:15,600
Speaker 1: the authors here say that this raises doubts about whether

808
00:46:15,680 --> 00:46:21,560
Speaker 1: people actually do systematically overestimate their control, and instead, what

809
00:46:21,719 --> 00:46:25,000
Speaker 1: might be more accurate to say is that people overestimate

810
00:46:25,040 --> 00:46:28,960
Speaker 1: their control when they have little and underestimate their control

811
00:46:29,040 --> 00:46:31,839
Speaker 1: when they have much. And so they they offer this

812
00:46:31,880 --> 00:46:34,960
Speaker 1: as a critique of the sort of theoretical framework of

813
00:46:34,960 --> 00:46:38,200
Speaker 1: the illusion of control, because they say, really that that's

814
00:46:38,239 --> 00:46:41,000
Speaker 1: only half of the picture, and that it's more accurate

815
00:46:41,040 --> 00:46:44,360
Speaker 1: probably to say that we have a general tendency to

816
00:46:44,400 --> 00:46:47,920
Speaker 1: make mistaken judgments about the level of control we have

817
00:46:48,040 --> 00:46:50,080
Speaker 1: over events, and that goes both ways.

818
00:46:50,640 --> 00:46:52,960
Speaker 2: Interesting, Yeah, I mean, it reminds me of various discussions

819
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:57,360
Speaker 2: we've had about occasional, occasionally beneficial errors in cognition. You know,

820
00:46:57,440 --> 00:47:01,279
Speaker 2: sometimes overconfidence pays off, like we were just saying, sometimes

821
00:47:01,320 --> 00:47:05,240
Speaker 2: overconfidence just gives you confidence you need to do something,

822
00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:09,640
Speaker 2: and sometimes an abundance of caution pays off. And then,

823
00:47:09,719 --> 00:47:12,080
Speaker 2: of course, in either case, sometimes it doesn't work out

824
00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:16,440
Speaker 2: well for the individual. Either. Overconfidence can screw you up,

825
00:47:16,480 --> 00:47:19,640
Speaker 2: and so can being too cautious, And I guess you

826
00:47:19,680 --> 00:47:21,200
Speaker 2: need to some degree a little bit of both to

827
00:47:21,200 --> 00:47:24,600
Speaker 2: sort of balance out these illusions.

828
00:47:25,120 --> 00:47:27,480
Speaker 1: Yeah, is it all right to have one type of

829
00:47:27,800 --> 00:47:31,640
Speaker 1: illusion pretty consistently if you have like a compensating illusion

830
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:33,480
Speaker 1: that sort of like steers you toward the middle.

831
00:47:34,200 --> 00:47:35,680
Speaker 2: I don't know, maybe. I mean I feel like a

832
00:47:35,680 --> 00:47:38,759
Speaker 2: lot of our world views are kind of arranged like this.

833
00:47:38,880 --> 00:47:42,120
Speaker 2: There are the things that we are unreasonably anxious about

834
00:47:42,600 --> 00:47:46,319
Speaker 2: and unreasonably cautious about perhaps or at least have a

835
00:47:46,320 --> 00:47:48,480
Speaker 2: heightened level of caution, and then there are other areas

836
00:47:48,520 --> 00:47:50,680
Speaker 2: where we may kind of have blinders on and we're

837
00:47:50,719 --> 00:47:52,680
Speaker 2: just kind of like babes in the woods with those

838
00:47:52,719 --> 00:47:56,120
Speaker 2: particular threats. And yeah, at the end of the day,

839
00:47:56,200 --> 00:48:00,200
Speaker 2: like you can't be over confident about everything. You can

840
00:48:00,320 --> 00:48:02,480
Speaker 2: get plowed over on the butt. You've got to do

841
00:48:02,560 --> 00:48:06,520
Speaker 2: things like leave the house, So you have to have

842
00:48:06,920 --> 00:48:10,480
Speaker 2: some level of confidence, even in cases where the confidence

843
00:48:10,719 --> 00:48:16,560
Speaker 2: is outpacing the actual chances a little bit.

844
00:48:17,040 --> 00:48:19,000
Speaker 1: All right, Well, I think maybe we should call it

845
00:48:19,040 --> 00:48:21,520
Speaker 1: there for part two on the illusion of control.

846
00:48:22,080 --> 00:48:24,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, obviously we'd love to hear from everyone out there

847
00:48:24,520 --> 00:48:28,000
Speaker 2: if you have feedback personal experience on anything we discussed here.

848
00:48:28,560 --> 00:48:31,760
Speaker 2: As usual, remind everybody that's Seftable Your Mind is primarily

849
00:48:31,800 --> 00:48:34,719
Speaker 2: a science podcast, with core episodes on Tuesdays and Thursdays,

850
00:48:35,239 --> 00:48:38,279
Speaker 2: we have listener mail. On Mondays, we have one of

851
00:48:38,680 --> 00:48:42,120
Speaker 2: about three different varieties of short form episodes on Wednesday,

852
00:48:42,360 --> 00:48:44,680
Speaker 2: and then on Friday, we set aside most serious concerns

853
00:48:44,680 --> 00:48:48,080
Speaker 2: to just talk about a weird movie on Weird House Cinema.

854
00:48:48,320 --> 00:48:51,960
Speaker 1: Huge thanks as always to our excellent audio producer JJ Posway.

855
00:48:52,040 --> 00:48:53,640
Speaker 1: If you would like to get in touch with us

856
00:48:53,680 --> 00:48:56,440
Speaker 1: with feedback on this episode or any other, to suggest

857
00:48:56,440 --> 00:48:58,479
Speaker 1: a topic for the future, or just to say hello,

858
00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:00,920
Speaker 1: you can email us at con tact at Stuff to

859
00:49:01,000 --> 00:49:10,080
Speaker 1: Blow your Mind dot com.

860
00:49:10,080 --> 00:49:13,040
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861
00:49:13,120 --> 00:49:16,960
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862
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