WEBVTT - How Your DNA Test Could Land a Relative in Jail

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<v Speaker 1>A warning this episode contains some graphic descriptions of crime

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<v Speaker 1>scenes which might not be suitable for all listeners. In

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<v Speaker 1>the fall of seven, Tanya van Kailenberg and Jay Cook

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<v Speaker 1>took a ferry from their home in British Columbia to

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<v Speaker 1>Washington State. They were planning to run an errand the

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<v Speaker 1>next morning for Jay's father. A few days later, Tanya's

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<v Speaker 1>body was found in a ditch seventy miles north of Seattle.

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<v Speaker 1>She'd been raped with her hands bound behind her, and

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<v Speaker 1>there was a bullet your head. Two days later, hunters

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<v Speaker 1>found Jay under a bridge one county over. He had

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<v Speaker 1>been strangled with a dog collar. A pack of cigarettes

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<v Speaker 1>was stuffed in his mouth. Police had a theory. They

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<v Speaker 1>suspected the couple had met the killer on the ferry

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<v Speaker 1>and offered him a ride, but the leads ran out

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<v Speaker 1>and the case went cold until a few months. H

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<v Speaker 1>good morning and thank you all for being here. Yesterday

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<v Speaker 1>we took into custody of fifty five year old Sea Technique,

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<v Speaker 1>who was suspected of the murders of j Cooke, An,

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<v Speaker 1>Tanya and Kylie Burke. William Earld Tabot the second has

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<v Speaker 1>been booked into Snowoman County Jail on one count of

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<v Speaker 1>first degree murder on a war. Thirty one years after

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<v Speaker 1>the murder, police finally arrested a suspect. A woman named c. C.

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<v Speaker 1>Moore helped crack the case using a new and controversial technology.

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<v Speaker 1>At the time, CECI was known for solving the mysteries

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<v Speaker 1>of people's family histories. Today, CECI hunt serial killers, Hi,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Pagat Kari and I'm Kristin Brown. And this week

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<v Speaker 1>on Decrypted works lauring the unintended consequences of consumer DNA tests.

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<v Speaker 1>These services are booming, with millions of people sending their

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<v Speaker 1>spit into companies like Ancestry and twenty three meets. They

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<v Speaker 1>promised to unite people with long lost family members, detect

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<v Speaker 1>risk of disease, and even suggests personalized dieting regiments, but

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<v Speaker 1>critics fear that our DNA could come to be used

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<v Speaker 1>in ways that would compromise our privacy and even potentially

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<v Speaker 1>land someone were related to in jail. Stay with us. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>It was a classically cold and gray Pacific Northwest day

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<v Speaker 1>when I picked cc more up at our hotel about

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<v Speaker 1>an hour and a half outside Seattle. Hey, do you

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<v Speaker 1>want to put that in the track. Yeah, I can

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<v Speaker 1>put it in there. There were just a few miles

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<v Speaker 1>from More the murder of Tanya van Kilemberg and Jay

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<v Speaker 1>Cook took place. So I was just gonna say, I

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<v Speaker 1>was just realizing this morning that this we're in the

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<v Speaker 1>county right now where you solved your first case, right

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<v Speaker 1>are we in Stahomish cool. I saw a sign that

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<v Speaker 1>said this way, and I was was going to ask somebody. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I realized Cecy was here in rural Washington State to

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<v Speaker 1>do what she has done for years, help people piece

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<v Speaker 1>together their family histories. She was speaking at the annual

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<v Speaker 1>Northwest Genealogical Conference. The day before, I had watched her

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<v Speaker 1>give a very technical talk about how to triangulate DNA

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<v Speaker 1>relatives to fill stubborn gaps and genealogies. Afterward, about two

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<v Speaker 1>dozen people rushed the stage to talk to her. One person,

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<v Speaker 1>apparently a distant cousin, even asked her to pose for

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<v Speaker 1>a picture. In this world, Cecymore is a star, but

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<v Speaker 1>she fell into it by accident because until about twenty

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<v Speaker 1>years ago, Cecy was an actress. Once she told me

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<v Speaker 1>she had a gig where she had to pretend to

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<v Speaker 1>be a bar Beam. She had come to our copy

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<v Speaker 1>date joing a suitcase with multiple outfit options for the

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<v Speaker 1>big banquet keynote she was giving later at the local

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<v Speaker 1>country club. Because it wasn't acting that made cc famous,

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<v Speaker 1>it was genealogy. About twenty years ago, my niece was

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<v Speaker 1>getting married and I was trying to think of a

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<v Speaker 1>good wedding gift, and I thought, Oh, a family tree

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<v Speaker 1>would be a cool wedding gift. I think I'll try

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<v Speaker 1>to put one together for her, and got online and

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<v Speaker 1>found ancestry dot com and started trying to figure that

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<v Speaker 1>out and became obsessed with in genealogy. Genealogists are like detectives,

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<v Speaker 1>but for the family tree. They use things like marriage

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<v Speaker 1>records and obituaries to piece together how people are related,

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<v Speaker 1>and these days some of them, like Ceci, also used DNA.

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<v Speaker 1>CEC made her mark using DNA to crack tough to

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<v Speaker 1>solve mysteries like tracking down the birth parents of adopted children.

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<v Speaker 1>Then Ceci's life took a turn. In April, police arrested

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<v Speaker 1>a suspect in the long cold case of the Golden

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<v Speaker 1>State Killer, a notorious serial killer who terrorized California in

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<v Speaker 1>the nine seventies. And eighties. Huge break in a cold

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<v Speaker 1>case terrorizing California for decades. Police say they now have

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<v Speaker 1>a Golden State Killer in custody. Joseph D'Angelo is facing

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<v Speaker 1>new charges this morning, four counts of murder in Santa Barbara,

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<v Speaker 1>twelve murder charges now in all Cecy was gearing up

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<v Speaker 1>for attack at the genetic testing company three and when

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<v Speaker 1>news of the arrest happened. I woke up in a

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<v Speaker 1>hotel room in Mountain View and saw the headline that

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<v Speaker 1>the Golden State Killer had been arrested, and I knew

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<v Speaker 1>immediately that it was through genetic genealogy techniques. It didn't

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<v Speaker 1>come out immediately, but I knew that in the case

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<v Speaker 1>of the Golden State Killer, law enforcement had used a

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<v Speaker 1>genealogy website called jet match to find their suspect. Jet

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<v Speaker 1>Match is sort of like a big community pository for

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<v Speaker 1>DNA data. For example, I could upload my data from

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<v Speaker 1>say twenty three and me and find out whether I

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<v Speaker 1>might be related to someone else who uploaded data from

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<v Speaker 1>a different service like ancestry. What police did in this

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<v Speaker 1>case is they uploaded data from crime scene DNA and

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<v Speaker 1>then looked for potential suspects in the family trees of

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<v Speaker 1>other people who showed up as a genetic match, in

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<v Speaker 1>other words, people who shared the killer's DNA. We've reunited

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<v Speaker 1>tens of thousands of people with long lost family members,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's exactly the same technique. So if we can

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<v Speaker 1>do it there for adoptees, there's absolutely no reason we

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<v Speaker 1>can't do it in these law enforcement cases as well.

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<v Speaker 1>In the past, c C had been hesitant to go

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<v Speaker 1>snooping through people's profiles for a purpose they'd never intended,

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<v Speaker 1>but once the Golden State killer case was splashed across

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<v Speaker 1>the headlines, she figured it was open season. I didn't

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<v Speaker 1>want to do this until people knew that it was

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<v Speaker 1>possible and that it was happening that their DNA could

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<v Speaker 1>be used for this purpose. CC's work is possible in

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<v Speaker 1>part because of a small software company called Parabon Nano Labs.

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<v Speaker 1>A few years ago, Parabond created a program called Snapshot

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<v Speaker 1>that can use crime scene DNA to do basically what

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<v Speaker 1>a sketch artist does. It creates a vague picture of

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<v Speaker 1>what a suspect might look like. It does this by

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<v Speaker 1>processing crime scene DNA with the same kind of technology

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<v Speaker 1>that companies like twenty three and me and ancestry use

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<v Speaker 1>in the world of law enforcement. This hadn't really been

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<v Speaker 1>done before I actually visited Parabon along with Business Week

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<v Speaker 1>reporter Drake Bennett. Their technique provides a lot more data

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<v Speaker 1>than crime scene labs usually work with. One standard test,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, looks at just twenty three markers on the

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<v Speaker 1>Y chromosome. Markers are unique places on a person's genome,

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<v Speaker 1>but Parabon looks at thousands of markers and more data

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<v Speaker 1>means you can get a lot more detail about what

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<v Speaker 1>your suspect might be like and compare that data to

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<v Speaker 1>the consumer DNA tests that millions of people are doing

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<v Speaker 1>right now. And that's where CEC comes in. The data

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<v Speaker 1>that Parabond generates to create its DNA sketches is similar

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<v Speaker 1>to the data people upload to sites like jet match

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<v Speaker 1>when they're looking for relatives. Last year, CEC reached out

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<v Speaker 1>to Parabon to see if they could work together, and

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<v Speaker 1>eventually the company hired her to head up a new

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<v Speaker 1>unit devoted to forensic genetic genealogy. One of the first

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<v Speaker 1>cases to come in was from Snohomish County in Washington State.

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<v Speaker 1>It was the case of j Cook and Tanya Van

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<v Speaker 1>Kuilenberg that we heard about at the start, and it

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<v Speaker 1>was right after the Golden State killer arrest, so there

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<v Speaker 1>was a lot of enthusiasm from law enforcement around the

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<v Speaker 1>country about using this same technique. Cecy got to work

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<v Speaker 1>and I kept waiting for matches to populate, but they

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<v Speaker 1>didn't populate. That Friday night, I went to sleep, and

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<v Speaker 1>I woke up Saturday morning to a list of DNA

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<v Speaker 1>matches on jed match. She got really lucky. There in

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<v Speaker 1>the list of matches was the geneological equivalent of winning

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<v Speaker 1>the lottery. Two cousins who shared a lot of DNA

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<v Speaker 1>with the suspect, but who didn't seem to be related

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<v Speaker 1>to each other. So imagine a cousin on your dad's

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<v Speaker 1>side of the family and another cousin on your mom's

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<v Speaker 1>side of the family. Those two cousins aren't related to

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<v Speaker 1>each other, but they are related to you. So that

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<v Speaker 1>tells me I should be able to find a triangulation

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<v Speaker 1>between them, meaning a place where those two family trees

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<v Speaker 1>come together. From there, Cecy turned to all the traditional

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<v Speaker 1>tools of genealogy to build a family tree for each

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<v Speaker 1>of the people who showed up as a match. That

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<v Speaker 1>meant searching through Facebook, newspaper archives, and local records to

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<v Speaker 1>figure out who else these people were related to. Since

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<v Speaker 1>the two cousins of the suspect weren't related to each other,

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<v Speaker 1>cecy knew that somewhere there had to be a marriage

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<v Speaker 1>between the two family. Eventually she found an obituary for

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<v Speaker 1>a woman from one family who was carrying a last

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<v Speaker 1>name from the other. Perhaps this was it. Cecie told

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<v Speaker 1>me marriage records are pretty good in Washington State, so

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<v Speaker 1>she was able to confirm that this was indeed the

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<v Speaker 1>marriage she'd been looking for. And this resulted in four children,

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<v Speaker 1>three of which were female, and so we only had

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<v Speaker 1>one male. That one male was the only probable suspect.

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<v Speaker 1>Within a few hours, ceci found herself staring at a name,

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<v Speaker 1>William Earl Talbot. The second police collected a new DNA

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<v Speaker 1>sample from him and confirmed it matched the DNA found

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<v Speaker 1>at the crime scene. Then, on May seventeen, police took

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<v Speaker 1>William Earl Talbot into custody. Of course, he hasn't been

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<v Speaker 1>found guilty yet, but my work certain points right at him.

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<v Speaker 1>William L. Talbot has been charged with both murders, but

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<v Speaker 1>he's pleaded not guilty. If he's convicted, he could face

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<v Speaker 1>the death penalty. The Snohomish case was just the first

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<v Speaker 1>murder case CECI tried to crack. To date, Parabon and

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<v Speaker 1>CC have solved more than a dozen cases, and they

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<v Speaker 1>have dozens more in the works. Parabon has added three

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<v Speaker 1>other full time genealogists to its stuff, with CCI heading

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<v Speaker 1>up that team. But when people ship their DNA after

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<v Speaker 1>or Ancestry to find out whether they're Italian or what

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<v Speaker 1>their genes say about their taste for cilantro, they probably

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<v Speaker 1>don't imagine it being used for a criminal investigation. The

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<v Speaker 1>Golden State killer case bren already bubbling conversation about DNA

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<v Speaker 1>and privacy. To a boy, all, when you send your

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<v Speaker 1>saliva off to a DNA testing company, you're handing over

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<v Speaker 1>x extremely sensitive, extremely personal information not just about yourself,

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<v Speaker 1>but about other people you're related to consumer genetic testing companies.

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<v Speaker 1>So companies like Ancestry and twenty three and me don't

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<v Speaker 1>in general share data with law enforcement unless they're legally

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<v Speaker 1>compelled to. But that data gets shared in lots of

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<v Speaker 1>other ways. For example, DNA testing companies are already using

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<v Speaker 1>the data for research. Over time, there could be other

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<v Speaker 1>uses for that data too. For example, what if advertisers

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<v Speaker 1>one day used it to Taylor adds to you, what

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<v Speaker 1>if authorities used it not just to hunt down serial killers,

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<v Speaker 1>but petty criminals. I got into some of this with

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<v Speaker 1>Aaron Murphy, she's a law professor, and yu, I mean

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<v Speaker 1>the police. You were able to use DNA to determine

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<v Speaker 1>something that probably people in the world do not know,

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<v Speaker 1>which is who is your six cousins? I mean, I

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<v Speaker 1>always say, now, I don't think people have fully internalized

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<v Speaker 1>that they may be the person who's the pivot. Aaron

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<v Speaker 1>thinks that if we fully grasped the scope of what

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement could learn about any of us by using

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<v Speaker 1>these new DNA technologies, we'd be truly shocked. Sometimes I

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<v Speaker 1>say like, okay, we'll go on twenty three and me

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<v Speaker 1>and look at the list of things that they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to tell you about, and then tell me if you

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<v Speaker 1>want to march down to your local precinct and and

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<v Speaker 1>give that list of those things so your shareff with

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<v Speaker 1>your name and the answers. To be clear, it is

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<v Speaker 1>highly unlikely that police would get hold of a whole

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<v Speaker 1>vial of saliva from a crime scene and send it

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<v Speaker 1>into a company like twenty three and me. Most of

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<v Speaker 1>the time there are just tiny bits of DNA left

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<v Speaker 1>behind at the scene of a crime. But the technology

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<v Speaker 1>has already advanced enough that these kinds of searchers are

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<v Speaker 1>actually possible through a pair bond nano labs and jet match,

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<v Speaker 1>and your information could be exposed even if you don't

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<v Speaker 1>take one of these spit tests yourself. The key thing

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<v Speaker 1>here is that it doesn't have to be you, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if they can find that information out through a relative

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<v Speaker 1>of you earth because we're looking at you know, enough

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<v Speaker 1>snips that we could make a prediction about what you

0:14:05.400 --> 0:14:07.640
<v Speaker 1>look like based on your relative or whether your family

0:14:07.760 --> 0:14:11.640
<v Speaker 1>has certain dispositions, then the whole families could be cut

0:14:11.679 --> 0:14:15.319
<v Speaker 1>off because of one person's you know, cavalier approached to

0:14:15.400 --> 0:14:18.840
<v Speaker 1>another privacy. There actually is a precedent for what police

0:14:18.920 --> 0:14:21.800
<v Speaker 1>can and cannot do when it comes to locating criminal

0:14:21.880 --> 0:14:25.800
<v Speaker 1>suspects through their relatives. Police can upload crime scene data

0:14:26.000 --> 0:14:30.120
<v Speaker 1>to a government criminal DNA database called CODIS to see

0:14:30.160 --> 0:14:33.760
<v Speaker 1>if there's a match to anyone else. One major concern, though,

0:14:33.800 --> 0:14:36.880
<v Speaker 1>with using CODIS in this way, is that the database

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 1>exkews towards people of color, meaning that searching it for

0:14:40.280 --> 0:14:45.640
<v Speaker 1>family matches just continues to disproportionately imprisoned minority populations. But

0:14:45.760 --> 0:14:49.320
<v Speaker 1>privacy is a concern too, so in California, for example,

0:14:49.640 --> 0:14:52.880
<v Speaker 1>police can only use codeis after they've exhausted all other

0:14:53.000 --> 0:14:56.520
<v Speaker 1>search tools. It's called familial search. But some states have

0:14:56.680 --> 0:14:59.240
<v Speaker 1>strict laws governing when police are allowed to use it,

0:14:59.560 --> 0:15:02.240
<v Speaker 1>and at least to one state has actually forbid it altogether.

0:15:03.160 --> 0:15:07.200
<v Speaker 1>Those rules, though, only govern that federal database. Big open

0:15:07.280 --> 0:15:11.160
<v Speaker 1>platforms where people can voluntarily upload their data, services like

0:15:11.280 --> 0:15:15.240
<v Speaker 1>judd Match are private. That means CC's investigations are not

0:15:15.440 --> 0:15:18.800
<v Speaker 1>subject to those same strict rules that apply to government

0:15:18.880 --> 0:15:23.240
<v Speaker 1>DNA databases. In fact, she's already solved one case that

0:15:23.320 --> 0:15:26.720
<v Speaker 1>didn't meet California's rules for familial search. It was a

0:15:26.840 --> 0:15:34.160
<v Speaker 1>three month old rape case in Utah. But CC is

0:15:34.200 --> 0:15:38.400
<v Speaker 1>wary of her palace. She worries, for one, about genealogists

0:15:38.440 --> 0:15:40.720
<v Speaker 1>who don't know what they're doing leading police to the

0:15:40.800 --> 0:15:44.200
<v Speaker 1>wrong suspect. That's actually already sort of happened once a

0:15:44.320 --> 0:15:49.840
<v Speaker 1>few years back, using a slightly different technology. You know,

0:15:49.920 --> 0:15:51.960
<v Speaker 1>I don't like the idea of this being the wild

0:15:52.040 --> 0:15:56.080
<v Speaker 1>West where people that don't have any law enforcement experience,

0:15:56.120 --> 0:16:00.680
<v Speaker 1>are out there offering services to law enforcement, and there's

0:16:00.720 --> 0:16:03.720
<v Speaker 1>no quality control, you know, there's no checks and balances,

0:16:04.520 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>And I want to make sure that genetic genealogy is

0:16:07.360 --> 0:16:10.720
<v Speaker 1>shown in the best possible way through these cases with

0:16:10.840 --> 0:16:16.239
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement and that there aren't unnecessary missteps or negative outcomes.

0:16:17.040 --> 0:16:20.680
<v Speaker 1>But CC doesn't have the same concerns about people's privacy.

0:16:21.400 --> 0:16:23.480
<v Speaker 1>She said it would be hard for jed match users

0:16:23.560 --> 0:16:26.000
<v Speaker 1>at this point to not know that she's creeping around

0:16:26.040 --> 0:16:28.320
<v Speaker 1>in there, and she thinks her work might prevent some

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:34.000
<v Speaker 1>innocent people from being wrongly suspected. Now, yes, some innocent

0:16:34.080 --> 0:16:38.720
<v Speaker 1>family members are going to get pulled into investigations, but

0:16:38.920 --> 0:16:43.720
<v Speaker 1>it's going to eliminate dozens or hundreds or sometimes even

0:16:43.840 --> 0:16:47.440
<v Speaker 1>thousands of innocent people that are completely unrelated to the

0:16:47.560 --> 0:16:54.360
<v Speaker 1>crime or the criminals being looked at. Okay, So, P

0:16:55.000 --> 0:16:57.760
<v Speaker 1>after hearing about all of this, I have to know,

0:16:58.080 --> 0:17:03.760
<v Speaker 1>have you ever taken a DNA test? You know I haven't,

0:17:03.960 --> 0:17:05.879
<v Speaker 1>and I guess at some level it's because I was

0:17:05.960 --> 0:17:09.280
<v Speaker 1>always a little creeped out about it. But actually quite

0:17:09.320 --> 0:17:11.639
<v Speaker 1>a few of my relatives have done these tests, and

0:17:11.760 --> 0:17:13.800
<v Speaker 1>so I know I'm exposed I just don't know how much.

0:17:14.440 --> 0:17:18.280
<v Speaker 1>So there was actually a very interesting study that just

0:17:18.600 --> 0:17:22.959
<v Speaker 1>came out that answers that question. So this researcher from

0:17:23.040 --> 0:17:27.840
<v Speaker 1>Colombia and another DNA testing company called my Heritage found

0:17:28.160 --> 0:17:32.000
<v Speaker 1>that if you are an American of European descent, there

0:17:32.160 --> 0:17:35.560
<v Speaker 1>is a sixty percent chance that you have a relative

0:17:35.720 --> 0:17:37.920
<v Speaker 1>that has done a DNA test that could expose you.

0:17:38.680 --> 0:17:43.040
<v Speaker 1>So basically, we're approaching all of us being exposed. And

0:17:43.200 --> 0:17:45.439
<v Speaker 1>that's basically what happened in the case of the Golden

0:17:45.480 --> 0:17:48.119
<v Speaker 1>State killer. He didn't actually take one of these DNA

0:17:48.240 --> 0:17:51.800
<v Speaker 1>tests himself, but obviously someone he's related to did, and

0:17:51.920 --> 0:17:55.000
<v Speaker 1>not just that, they then took the second step of

0:17:55.240 --> 0:17:59.920
<v Speaker 1>uploading their results to jet match, this open source community platform,

0:18:00.600 --> 0:18:03.359
<v Speaker 1>and without that second step, police would never have been

0:18:03.400 --> 0:18:05.920
<v Speaker 1>able to crack the case. I think when people take

0:18:05.960 --> 0:18:08.880
<v Speaker 1>these tests, even if they have, you know, maybe thought

0:18:09.359 --> 0:18:14.280
<v Speaker 1>about these consequences, it still seems unrealistic that anything really

0:18:14.400 --> 0:18:18.840
<v Speaker 1>bad would happen because of sharing their data. But actually,

0:18:19.359 --> 0:18:21.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, Aaron Murphy is one of the most cynical

0:18:21.760 --> 0:18:24.879
<v Speaker 1>people I've met when it comes to genetic privacy, and

0:18:24.960 --> 0:18:27.240
<v Speaker 1>she had a lot of thoughts about the kinds of

0:18:27.400 --> 0:18:31.760
<v Speaker 1>bad things that might happen. The whole purpose of insurers,

0:18:31.760 --> 0:18:34.760
<v Speaker 1>whether a health insurer or a life insure or a

0:18:34.880 --> 0:18:38.560
<v Speaker 1>long term disability insure, is to predict whether people are

0:18:38.600 --> 0:18:40.359
<v Speaker 1>going to need their services or not, because the model

0:18:40.440 --> 0:18:44.120
<v Speaker 1>is premised on people not needing the services. And if

0:18:44.200 --> 0:18:46.840
<v Speaker 1>an insurer could find out through a Google search if

0:18:47.040 --> 0:18:49.399
<v Speaker 1>they might have to pay out an Alzheimer's claim on you,

0:18:49.680 --> 0:18:51.399
<v Speaker 1>or they have to pay out at Parkinson's claim on you,

0:18:51.520 --> 0:18:53.320
<v Speaker 1>or they're going to have to support you through thoseabilitating

0:18:53.400 --> 0:18:56.600
<v Speaker 1>diseases or MS. Right, you know, I don't e think

0:18:56.600 --> 0:18:59.720
<v Speaker 1>you're not going to get that protection. So there is one.

0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:03.639
<v Speaker 1>It's called the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. It was passed

0:19:03.680 --> 0:19:07.879
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand and it does offer some limited protection

0:19:08.720 --> 0:19:13.600
<v Speaker 1>of how your data can be used, but it has

0:19:13.640 --> 0:19:16.399
<v Speaker 1>a lot of loopholes, like, for example, it does not

0:19:16.520 --> 0:19:20.800
<v Speaker 1>apply to life insurance, so life ensure could potentially just

0:19:21.080 --> 0:19:24.320
<v Speaker 1>ask you like, hey, have you taken a DNA test?

0:19:24.640 --> 0:19:26.840
<v Speaker 1>And if you have, you have to give them that

0:19:26.960 --> 0:19:30.000
<v Speaker 1>information and maybe they could decide whether or not to

0:19:30.080 --> 0:19:32.800
<v Speaker 1>give you life insurance coverage based on it. I also

0:19:32.880 --> 0:19:35.080
<v Speaker 1>think that because the Golden state killer was such a

0:19:35.160 --> 0:19:38.560
<v Speaker 1>brutal and violent case, there was a lot of public

0:19:38.600 --> 0:19:42.040
<v Speaker 1>acceptance behind the idea that finally, this technique had allowed

0:19:42.119 --> 0:19:45.040
<v Speaker 1>us to identify a suspect. And I think a lot

0:19:45.080 --> 0:19:47.960
<v Speaker 1>of people think that because they are not violent criminals,

0:19:48.840 --> 0:19:51.840
<v Speaker 1>using this kind of technique to hunt down very rare,

0:19:52.119 --> 0:19:57.000
<v Speaker 1>very violent people won't affect them. And the unintended consequences

0:19:57.640 --> 0:20:00.399
<v Speaker 1>of this technology are only just beginning to unfold. Denying

0:20:00.480 --> 0:20:03.159
<v Speaker 1>someone life insurance is just one example of how this

0:20:03.280 --> 0:20:06.040
<v Speaker 1>technology might be used, and we don't really know at

0:20:06.080 --> 0:20:09.040
<v Speaker 1>this stage how far it could go, and I think

0:20:09.160 --> 0:20:11.960
<v Speaker 1>that's the scariest part of this, right. This is a

0:20:12.080 --> 0:20:14.720
<v Speaker 1>technology that is kind of in its infancy. You know,

0:20:15.200 --> 0:20:17.359
<v Speaker 1>when cell phones first starting to be a thing, I

0:20:17.400 --> 0:20:20.480
<v Speaker 1>don't think anybody ever imagined that we would be using

0:20:20.560 --> 0:20:25.040
<v Speaker 1>them for everything besides actually making phone calls. And you know,

0:20:25.320 --> 0:20:27.800
<v Speaker 1>now I carry my iPhone around with me all the

0:20:27.880 --> 0:20:31.960
<v Speaker 1>time and it tracks my location. And to your point,

0:20:32.400 --> 0:20:35.240
<v Speaker 1>cell phone data is only one type of personal data

0:20:35.280 --> 0:20:37.920
<v Speaker 1>that we're entrusting to a third party company. So that

0:20:38.000 --> 0:20:40.520
<v Speaker 1>repository of data is sitting in one place with your

0:20:40.560 --> 0:20:44.000
<v Speaker 1>provider like Apple or Google, um, which is separate from

0:20:44.400 --> 0:20:46.359
<v Speaker 1>the data that a company like twenty three and me

0:20:46.440 --> 0:20:48.320
<v Speaker 1>would have on you if you complete one of these

0:20:48.400 --> 0:20:52.159
<v Speaker 1>DNA tests, right. I think a really important part of

0:20:52.240 --> 0:20:55.840
<v Speaker 1>this story is you know that it's not just the

0:20:56.000 --> 0:20:59.320
<v Speaker 1>DNA data that CC is using to solve these crimes.

0:20:59.560 --> 0:21:01.920
<v Speaker 1>She's going that data and then she's going on Facebook

0:21:01.960 --> 0:21:04.920
<v Speaker 1>and looking at all the information people have shared there.

0:21:05.119 --> 0:21:07.600
<v Speaker 1>And we're just sharing all of this data and not

0:21:07.800 --> 0:21:11.760
<v Speaker 1>thinking about the consequences, And it's really hard to know

0:21:12.320 --> 0:21:14.720
<v Speaker 1>where that will leave us in the future. So it

0:21:14.840 --> 0:21:17.080
<v Speaker 1>makes me think that as a society, we're really just

0:21:17.200 --> 0:21:20.000
<v Speaker 1>at the very beginning of understanding how much our data

0:21:20.119 --> 0:21:22.240
<v Speaker 1>is worth and how to take care of it properly.

0:21:22.520 --> 0:21:25.000
<v Speaker 1>Perhaps in the coming years regulators will have to step

0:21:25.080 --> 0:21:27.359
<v Speaker 1>in and tell us what they think is a responsible

0:21:27.400 --> 0:21:39.360
<v Speaker 1>way for companies to use our genetic information. And that's

0:21:39.400 --> 0:21:42.480
<v Speaker 1>it for this week's Decrypted. Thanks for listening. Have you

0:21:42.600 --> 0:21:45.440
<v Speaker 1>tried genetic testing? We want to hear your story. You

0:21:45.520 --> 0:21:49.119
<v Speaker 1>can email us at decrypted at Bloomberg dot net or

0:21:49.359 --> 0:21:52.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm on Twitter at Kristin V. Brown and I'm at

0:21:52.960 --> 0:21:55.840
<v Speaker 1>pgat Cary. If you're a fan of the show, please

0:21:55.880 --> 0:21:58.680
<v Speaker 1>consider leaving us a rating and a review. It really

0:21:58.760 --> 0:22:02.200
<v Speaker 1>helps new listeners find the oh. This episode was produced

0:22:02.280 --> 0:22:05.440
<v Speaker 1>by Pa Good, Kari and Liz Smith. Our story editor

0:22:05.600 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 1>was Aki Edo. A big shout out to Drake Bennett.

0:22:08.760 --> 0:22:11.439
<v Speaker 1>We've got a more in depth look at genetic genealogy

0:22:11.560 --> 0:22:14.800
<v Speaker 1>and ccmore that will appear in Bloomberg Business Week shortly,

0:22:15.040 --> 0:22:17.399
<v Speaker 1>so keep an eye out for that. Thanks also to

0:22:17.440 --> 0:22:22.000
<v Speaker 1>Ann Vandermay, Emily Buso, and Magnus Henrikson. Francesco Levie is

0:22:22.040 --> 0:22:24.400
<v Speaker 1>head of Bloomberg Podcasts. We'll see you next week.