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Speaker 2: Taiwan's president or in president elect, Lijingda is to be
Speaker 2: sworn in as president today and that will put him
Speaker 2: right at the center of very difficult relations between the
Speaker 2: United States and China. And joining us for some discussion
Speaker 2: of this is Ron A Mitter, who is Professor of
Speaker 2: US Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, to get
Speaker 2: some insights on this. So, by most accounts, Leijingda is
Speaker 2: likely to make a speech today that would be one
Speaker 2: of continuity, but there's always the chance that there'll be
Speaker 2: some thing in there that rocks the boat. What are
Speaker 2: you expecting in terms of the tone.
Speaker 3: Well, I think Brian that he's going to try and
Speaker 3: pump up the volume a little bit when it comes
Speaker 3: to the question of Taiwan being separated from the mainland.
Speaker 3: His predecessor who's just leaving office president saying one was
Speaker 3: pretty careful to make sure that she didn't trigger that
Speaker 3: red line, which Beijing has always said is going to
Speaker 3: be the trigger for an all out opposition by them,
Speaker 3: and that is, of course, the decoration of independence by Taiwan. Now,
Speaker 3: I think it's highly unlikely that lightingder As the new president,
Speaker 3: is going to actually utter the I word of independence,
Speaker 3: but he may try and use language that's a bit
Speaker 3: more forceful than that of his predecessor. That having been said,
Speaker 3: I'm sure that there will have been extremely strong signals
Speaker 3: from the United States from the Biden administration, but he
Speaker 3: should not try and upset the current status quo, particularly
Speaker 3: since mainland mainland China's relations with the US have been
Speaker 3: getting better in the last year, and so while they're
Speaker 3: going to be stronger rhetoric, I don't expect to hear
Speaker 3: any difference in terms of Taiwan's policy.
Speaker 1: Mister Lai managed to get around forty percent of the
Speaker 1: popular vote, so there is not a strong mandate, is there.
Speaker 3: Well, forty percent is pretty strong. I think there are
Speaker 3: an awful lot of politicians who would like to have
Speaker 3: that In the context of Taiwan, which is three major
Speaker 3: candidates all coming together. It is certainly the case that
Speaker 3: if the two candidates who lost, Coen Jur and Ho
Speaker 3: Yui had actually managed to get together with their respective
Speaker 3: parties and run together against him, then it's possible he
Speaker 3: might have lost. But that having been said, he can
Speaker 3: certainly go back and say he actually does have the
Speaker 3: presidential mandate because he's got a lot more votes than
Speaker 3: either of the other two. His problem is a little
Speaker 3: bit similar to the one in the US at the moment,
Speaker 3: which is that even though he has the presidency, Congress
Speaker 3: is split. Essentially the opposition KMT Nationalist Party does have
Speaker 3: a very significant number of seats, pretty much actually slightly
Speaker 3: more I think one more than the ruling DPP in
Speaker 3: the presidency actually has, and that means that it may
Speaker 3: be hard to get legislation through Taiwan's Congress, even though
Speaker 3: lighting the does have the presidency in his hands.
Speaker 2: Professor, I'm curious about the nuanced line between declaring independence
Speaker 2: and stating that we already have independence, because that's basically
Speaker 2: what William Lai has been saying. He's pushing for the
Speaker 2: status quo. The status quo is de facto independence. So
Speaker 2: how nervous would China be if he starts talking about
Speaker 2: that in great detail? And even if it isn't a
Speaker 2: declaration officially, it's statement that we have it.
Speaker 3: Well, that phrasing of we don't need to declare independence
Speaker 3: because essentially we have it already was actually used in
Speaker 3: the form by saying one his predecessor as well, so
Speaker 3: it's not completely new in that sense. I think that
Speaker 3: Beijing is getting more and more nervous about the idea
Speaker 3: that there might be any kind of formal separation, and
Speaker 3: that's why we've seen, in fact, just today that there
Speaker 3: have been yet more sorties of fighter craft in the skies,
Speaker 3: not quite above the island, but certainly quite close to it.
Speaker 3: And they've made it very clear again that they regard
Speaker 3: any statement that goes in the direction of independence to
Speaker 3: be one that they would consider a trigger warning from
Speaker 3: their point of view. That said, it is certainly the
Speaker 3: case that they've acknowledged for a long time that Taiwan
Speaker 3: has been autonomous. That might be a better word to
Speaker 3: use than independent. And the question now comes as to
Speaker 3: how long they're willing to tolerate something that looks genuinely
Speaker 3: like the status quo. In other words, that Taiwan will
Speaker 3: not get and probably won't move very hard to seek
Speaker 3: formal independence for its status, but rather seek to try
Speaker 3: and find, say, international organizations such as the WTO or
Speaker 3: sections of the United Nations, where it can have a
Speaker 3: sort of substate role. There are precedents for other entities
Speaker 3: which are not fully recognized states getting some sort of
Speaker 3: recognition in international organizations. The question is whether Beijing will
Speaker 3: consider that now part of its red line.
Speaker 1: So what does this mean for the United Sis dates,
Speaker 1: particularly in the context of a US presidential election at
Speaker 1: the end of this year that may say a change
Speaker 1: in administrations, but.
Speaker 3: The rest of this calendar year. My guess is that
Speaker 3: it's pretty much baked into the calculations on both the
Speaker 3: side of Beijing and of Washington. In other words, they
Speaker 3: know that both sides have known that this inauguration was
Speaker 3: going to happen. The election actually happened four months ago
Speaker 3: in January, and what's happened so far has not produced
Speaker 3: any great surprises since then. Also, both sides essentially don't
Speaker 3: have a great interest in raising the temperature on US
Speaker 3: China relations more broadly, in the run up to that
Speaker 3: presidential election. Essentially, the Chinese side know that if President
Speaker 3: Biden is re elected that at that point they're going
Speaker 3: to have to work out how they'll deal with the
Speaker 3: timeline question over the four years after that, in the
Speaker 3: face of an administration which has made it very clear that
Speaker 3: it does continue the consider the continued status quoa of
Speaker 3: Taiwan to be a core US interest. If President Trump
Speaker 3: is re elected, then I think the general sense from
Speaker 3: the Beijing side is that they're not sure what he
Speaker 3: might do, anything from actually doubling down on harsh words
Speaker 3: or actions with China to maybe being less involved as
Speaker 3: a sort of more isolationist position from the outside world.
Speaker 3: And so from that point of view, Beijing will speak
Speaker 3: strong language, it will send those fighter planes into the
Speaker 3: skies near Taiwan, but it's unlikely to want to trigger
Speaker 3: any kind of major confrontation now before it knows the
Speaker 3: result of that US presidential election.
Speaker 2: Everything we've seen in the past is that Taiwan people
Speaker 2: would not in any way support becoming a part of China.
Speaker 2: I mean, that's the sense of things. And you talked
Speaker 2: about autonomy. How much has what's happened to Hong Kong
Speaker 2: hurt China in the eyes of Taiwan people, losing its
Speaker 2: semi autonomous status here right, I.
Speaker 3: Mean the parting of the National Security Law in twenty
Speaker 3: twenty in Hong Kong had an extremely negative effect on
Speaker 3: impressions of getting closed to China in Taiwan, and in fact,
Speaker 3: in the previous presidential election back in twenty twenty, which
Speaker 3: was held in the kind of shadow of that Hong
Speaker 3: Kong National Security Law, Taiing Ian was essentially able to
Speaker 3: get reelection in large part by citing the example of
Speaker 3: Hong Kong. But there are other means of getting close.
Speaker 3: Political closeness, as you've said, is something that most Taiwanese
Speaker 3: people don't seem to want to have. They prefer a
Speaker 3: version of the status quo. But something like eighty percent
Speaker 3: of Taiwan's businesses are in some way tied to the mainland,
Speaker 3: and the mainland has shown certainly in the last few
Speaker 3: months that it's capable of operating partial boycotts or sanctions
Speaker 3: against Taiwanese goods. It could be pineapples, it could be chemicals.
Speaker 3: Both of those have been hit recently to show that
Speaker 3: if it wants to squeeze Taiwan's economy, then it has
Speaker 3: the capacity to do that. I would look to that
Speaker 3: sort of area, or for instance, companies like fox Conn,
Speaker 3: run by a Taiwan millionaire, Terry Gull, but operating largely
Speaker 3: in factories on the south coast of China, for where
Speaker 3: Beijing may choose to squeeze less on the military front,
Speaker 3: probably more on the economic front.
Speaker 1: Professor, what do we know about the cabinet of the
Speaker 1: incoming president? Who is he surrounding himself with.
Speaker 3: Well, he does have, amongst others, people who know the
Speaker 3: United States very well, including Vice President be Kim, who
Speaker 3: is of course someone who has American family and is
Speaker 3: very well known in Washington. In addition, it's fairly likely
Speaker 3: that he's going to push hard on domestic economic issues
Speaker 3: with his cabinet, one of the reasons being that although
Speaker 3: one of the factors that most analysts would say led
Speaker 3: to his reelection was the fear of the opposition parties
Speaker 3: getting too close to China, at least on the part
Speaker 3: of forty percent of the voters, there is a lot
Speaker 3: of dissatisfaction within Taiwan itself about the state of the economy,
Speaker 3: and because of that, issues such as youth unemployment, for instance,
Speaker 3: it's going to be important for Li's government to essentially
Speaker 3: come up with more economic growth. So figures like Selby
Speaker 3: Kim will be important in terms of US relations, but
Speaker 3: the domestic economy and domestic politics will probably be much
Speaker 3: more at the center of what happens in the next
Speaker 3: four years than it might appear on inauguration day itself,
Speaker 3: when obviously attention is much more on what Beijing is
Speaker 3: going to do.
Speaker 2: Excellent stuff. Thank you very much. Professor Professor Roni Mitter,
Speaker 2: Professor of US Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, joining
Speaker 2: us in our studios for a closer look at China
Speaker 2: and indeed the Asia Pacific is Fred Newman, Chief Asia
Speaker 2: Economist and co head of Global Research for Asia at HSBC.
Speaker 2: So Frederick, thank you very much for joining us here
Speaker 2: in our studios. As usual, let's start off with China,
Speaker 2: looking at some of the measures of late Again, we're
Speaker 2: hearing from economists that you know, it's a step in
Speaker 2: the right direction, but it may not be enough, and
Speaker 2: you know the chasm is huge and such. Your thoughts
Speaker 2: on the developments we saw at the end of last weekend,
Speaker 2: whether they might.
Speaker 4: Work well, it's not the magic bullet that we've been
Speaker 4: ho we'revoping for. But look, they're taking new measures. That is,
Speaker 4: they had rolled out new tools to actually address the
Speaker 4: housing problem. Now you could say the money they put
Speaker 4: behind is not large enough, but at least they're thinking
Speaker 4: a little bit outside the box. For example, they brought
Speaker 4: a new central bank tool. The Central Bank will provide
Speaker 4: money at very low interest rates to commercial banks to
Speaker 4: buy excess housing. We hadn't had that specific program before.
Speaker 4: And so the hope is here that look that at
Speaker 4: least they're opening the toolbox a little bit, and that
Speaker 4: would give them then the potential opening to add further
Speaker 4: funds in the future. But certainly in themselves, this is
Speaker 4: not going to solve the housing crisis. And once we fell, swoop.
Speaker 1: Okay, So let's say that we're going to get incremental
Speaker 1: steps over in the future, something of the same order
Speaker 1: of magnitude. How many years is going to take fred
Speaker 1: for China to get out from underneath this problem?
Speaker 4: Well, look, we already three years, three plus years into this,
Speaker 4: and you think that housing market corrections magnitude would take
Speaker 4: five six years with the economy to fully digest. So
Speaker 4: I would say we're looking another couple of years here
Speaker 4: at least before you really can say the housing crisis
Speaker 4: behind us, and that's you know, that's in the US.
Speaker 4: It took many years as well for this to be digested. That.
Speaker 4: The thing though, at the moment, is we yet need
Speaker 4: to stop the bleeding. We're not even talking about recovery.
Speaker 4: We still talking about prices falling, We're still talking about
Speaker 4: housing construction being under pressure, we still talk about demand falling.
Speaker 4: We just want to arrest those downward trends, stabilize things,
Speaker 4: and then it's going to take another couple of years
Speaker 4: before you see things really accelerate again.
Speaker 2: The ultra long sovereign bond sales, which you know is
Speaker 2: going to be done in several trenches, walk us through
Speaker 2: the mechanism for mean, because what it seems like is
Speaker 2: that it's the federal govern you know, raising money and
Speaker 2: enabling local provinces to buy up some of these unsold homes.
Speaker 2: What's the transmission mechanism? How does that money move from
Speaker 2: the federal to the provincial governments.
Speaker 4: Well, we're not quite clear exactly how much of that
Speaker 4: money will be put towards housing purchases, right, so it's
Speaker 4: a bit of a black box. Nevertheless, we know that
Speaker 4: the government's saying we need to raise more money. We
Speaker 4: need to essentially put more money into the economy, be
Speaker 4: it in housing or be it in other infrastructure projects
Speaker 4: for example. So by putting out long term bonds, you
Speaker 4: really try to raise money essentially for the long term.
Speaker 4: You're not going to attack short term money markets. It
Speaker 4: aims at a different class of investors, and it's really
Speaker 4: trying to establish long term funding mechanisms that local governments
Speaker 4: and ultimately could use as well. So that's the idea.
Speaker 4: It's going to building a long term funding market. It's
Speaker 4: less so that the money is all going to be
Speaker 4: available for housing purchases.
Speaker 1: So let's say maybe we're at the halfway point in
Speaker 1: terms of the recovery for the property market in China,
Speaker 1: and then once we get, you know, fully through this
Speaker 1: period of recovery, maybe we can talk about kind of
Speaker 1: a recovery in the broader economy. But I'd like to
Speaker 1: talk a little bit about what's going on in Taiwan.
Speaker 1: The installation of a new president will happen later today.
Speaker 1: One of the things that we were talking about over
Speaker 1: the weekend, Brian and myself, we know that semiconductor manufacturing
Speaker 1: is very, very concentrated in Taiwan. TSMC obviously the largest
Speaker 1: player globally. I think ninety percent of the chips in
Speaker 1: the world come out of out of that manufacturing facility.
Speaker 1: But as countries like the US and maybe countries in
Speaker 1: Europe seek to diversify, so it's not so concentrated. What
Speaker 1: is the economic future for Taiwan if companies like TSMC
Speaker 1: begin to lose their heft.
Speaker 4: Well, it's certainly a big headwind for the Taiwanese economy
Speaker 4: because of course semiconductor advanced semiconductor manufacturing is you write,
Speaker 4: is the driving force of the Taiwanese economy, and so
Speaker 4: losing those fabs to other countries would certainly be a setback.
Speaker 4: But make no mistake, the Taiwanese economy is much larger
Speaker 4: than this. Yes, they have spectacular advances in high end chips,
Speaker 4: but it's very concentrated to one company, a couple of factories.
Speaker 4: It's not like thousands of workers work there. It's a
Speaker 4: big profit driver, but it doesn't really employ that many people.
Speaker 4: So if you just talk about overall economic growth, the
Speaker 4: direct significance isn't that large. It's more significant because it
Speaker 4: gives other companies in Taiwan access to advanced semiconductors. But
Speaker 4: I would argue that ultimately Taiwan has a fairly diversified economy.
Speaker 4: We always talk about chips, but there's petrochemicals, there's electronics,
Speaker 4: there's other types of manufacturing, and you know, ultimately it
Speaker 4: is a very small island's only twenty million people. They
Speaker 4: need to if their companies want to grow, they have
Speaker 4: to grow overseas. They can't just grow domestically, right, So
Speaker 4: there's a limit to which you can actually expand capacity
Speaker 4: Taiwan anyway, So it's not necessarily deathnel here to the
Speaker 4: Tawanese economy.
Speaker 2: Well, I'm curious though, whether or not you think that
Speaker 2: Taiwan plays a bigger role in between China and the
Speaker 2: United States, or whether or not it continues to be
Speaker 2: sort of there in the background, a potential danger, but
Speaker 2: not playing such an active role. So that's the first
Speaker 2: part of the question. The second part is in China's
Speaker 2: response to the US so far, it's been more words
Speaker 2: than actions. Do you expect more in terms of.
Speaker 4: Actions, maybe in terms of the protection on the trade side, Yeah, yes,
Speaker 4: some of those things. Yeah, Well on that first, so
Speaker 4: we have seen actually the Chinese so far actually not
Speaker 4: taken much action against the US lying low and they're
Speaker 4: just taking on the Chin and they're still open for
Speaker 4: US companies to do business in China. But visa of
Speaker 4: a Europe, we've actually seen the Chinese start to say,
Speaker 4: if you start to impose these measures, we may have
Speaker 4: to retaliate. So they're a bit more aggressive visa of
Speaker 4: a Europe because they don't want Europe to follow the United States.
Speaker 4: The other thing that the Chinese could alter do is
Speaker 4: they could make a life for US companies in China
Speaker 4: much much harder. That's not on the cards yet, and
Speaker 4: so far they want US companies to be involved. But
Speaker 4: of course if there is a you know, if there's
Speaker 4: an opportunity then to kind of pay back the US
Speaker 4: by shutting out US companies, I think that might be
Speaker 4: sort of the next way to do it. In terms
Speaker 4: of Taiwan, I think it's going to play more of
Speaker 4: a backstory here. The temperature has declined, you know, around Taiwan,
Speaker 4: and so we'll have to see how the US election
Speaker 4: shapes up. That's of course always a point where you
Speaker 4: could see escalating tensions. But I think broadly speaking, things
Speaker 4: are not quite as acute as some of the headlines suggests.
Speaker 1: You know you read the news. I mean China preparing
Speaker 1: to take countermeasures against the European Union if it continues
Speaker 1: a series of investigations around subsidies. We were talking a
Speaker 1: moment ago about the Canadian Trade Minister looking at the
Speaker 1: possibility of tariffs on Chinese evs. We know what we
Speaker 1: heard last week from the Bike administration when it came
Speaker 1: to new tariffs on Chinese goods. Do you are you
Speaker 1: worried about a new trade war, or at least a
Speaker 1: hotter trade war.
Speaker 5: Yes.
Speaker 4: I think the worrying trend here is that if the
Speaker 4: US imposes restrictions, other countries will start to follow. And
Speaker 4: there's a certain logic to this, because if the US
Speaker 4: says no thank you to Chinese electric vehicles, and these
Speaker 4: vehicles are being redirected into other markets and they necessarily
Speaker 4: get overwhelmed, and then they start to pose restrictions as well,
Speaker 4: And so the risk is that you have a cascading
Speaker 4: effect here with the European Union, in Canada and everybody
Speaker 4: else it's following the US. And that's not necessarily good
Speaker 4: for the world economy. It's not necessarily good for consumers,
Speaker 4: and so we want to kind of contain trade restrictions
Speaker 4: to a bare minimum. It doesn't say that they're not
Speaker 4: justifications in some instances, but remember, any disruption to trade
Speaker 4: is ultimately a negative for the world economies, a negative
Speaker 4: for consumer for consumer choice, and so the hope is
Speaker 4: that other countries will become a bit more judicious in
Speaker 4: terms of their application of these measures than kind of
Speaker 4: using brute force.
Speaker 2: Are we about to see the yen play a more
Speaker 2: important role in the global economy and are you expecting
Speaker 2: to see weakness in the dollar anytime soon?
Speaker 4: So yen is unlikely to play a stronger role. It's
Speaker 4: so much pressure at the moment. I don't think it
Speaker 4: will re establish itself as a reserve currency necessarily anytime soon.
Speaker 4: And there's pressures on the en remain quite severe. That's
Speaker 4: because US interest rates are sky high and Japanese interest
Speaker 4: rates are what they are, and so there is probably
Speaker 4: ongoing pressure in the Japanese end. The Japanese Center Bank
Speaker 4: is trying to push back against this, allowing yields to
Speaker 4: rise to kind of slow down to this end of
Speaker 4: the Japanese end. But remember a weaker Japanese end plays
Speaker 4: a functional role in Japan's reflation. It raises inflation, it
Speaker 4: raises competitiveness, and that's ultimately good for Japan.
Speaker 2: All right, Frederick, thank you for coming into our studios
Speaker 2: and joining us here on a Monday morning. We do
Speaker 2: appreciate it. Fred Newman, Chief Asia Economist and co head
Speaker 2: of Global Research for Asia at HSBC.
Speaker 1: Let's take a closer look at the President of Iran
Speaker 1: at this helicopter crash. Michael Heath joins us Bloomberg ecogov editor,
Speaker 1: joining us from our studios in Sydney. Michael, I know
Speaker 1: it's still early in this event. We have information kind
Speaker 1: of trickling in even before the announcement of this crash, though,
Speaker 1: I think it's fair to say that relations between Tehran
Speaker 1: and Washington were very, very strained. Do we know anything
Speaker 1: about what's happening in Iran right now? Irrespective of the
Speaker 1: search for the crash site.
Speaker 5: The pictures that are being broadcast on I run in
Speaker 5: safe TV and mainly of people either either praying for
Speaker 5: the health of the president or obviously emergency vehicles heading
Speaker 5: up to the area. As to the higher level politics
Speaker 5: of it, it doesn't seem to have been a great
Speaker 5: deal said. The US has announced that President Biden has
Speaker 5: been briefed on it, but it's very very unclear sort
Speaker 5: of the status of it. Was it just a hard landing,
Speaker 5: is it something more serious, It's just unknown at the moment.
Speaker 5: That's a particularly mountainous part of Iran, and obviously the
Speaker 5: pictures have shown very very thick fog there as well
Speaker 5: in rain. So really we're just as you say, the
Speaker 5: little bits and bobs of information are trickling out, but
Speaker 5: until we get something official, it's really just speculation. At
Speaker 5: this stage.
Speaker 2: We understand that Iran asked Turkey to send a rescue
Speaker 2: helicopter and one with night vision capabilities. It looks to
Speaker 2: be very close to the border. Do we know whether
Speaker 2: this crashes on the Iranian side or on the Turkysh side.
Speaker 5: It seems to be on the Iran inside. I mean
Speaker 5: that area is actually also known as Azerbaijan. It's said
Speaker 5: to have crashed in East Azerbaijan. So you've got the
Speaker 5: Republic of Azerbaijan former Soviet republic, and then you've got
Speaker 5: in northwest Iran, you've got another region called Azerbaijan, and
Speaker 5: there's west and East and so it does seem to
Speaker 5: have happened just over the border inside Iran, but the
Speaker 5: area is known as Azerbaijan. But he was flying back
Speaker 5: that those three helicopters involved in the three helicopters, one
Speaker 5: of the which was containing the president, was flying back
Speaker 5: after the opening of a dam between Azerbaijan and Iran
Speaker 5: as they sort of try and warm relations between the
Speaker 5: two sides. As well.
Speaker 1: In terms of the person of mister Raisi, I think
Speaker 1: he's an ultra conservative cleric. He's obviously the president of
Speaker 1: the country, and many analysts believe that he was being
Speaker 1: groomed to become the next supreme leader of Iran. So
Speaker 1: obviously with his absence, I mean that that would lead
Speaker 1: a huge void.
Speaker 4: It would it would.
Speaker 5: I mean, look, in the worst case scenario, it does
Speaker 5: really open up a lot of questions because obviously the
Speaker 5: Supreme Leader, who is the ultimate authority in Iran. Unlike
Speaker 5: other countries where the presidents sort of head of state,
Speaker 5: in Iran, it's the supreme leader, you know, sort of
Speaker 5: the religious leader of this theocracy. But as you say,
Speaker 5: race he was being he was well known to be groomed,
Speaker 5: being groomed potentially to take over a Supreme Leader at
Speaker 5: some point, so yes, that that would rule will him
Speaker 5: out and then of course you under the constitution at
Speaker 5: this stage you'd have the first vice President who would
Speaker 5: step into his role, and then there would be a
Speaker 5: group of guardians who would come together and within fifty
Speaker 5: days they'd be they'd be expected to hold elections. But
Speaker 5: you're right, I mean, if if if he's he's sort
Speaker 5: of had quite a meteoric assent through the through the
Speaker 5: ranks in Iran, and if that was the ultimate goal
Speaker 5: for him, it really would open up a gap avoid
Speaker 5: in terms of the succession planning there.
Speaker 2: In addition to Ibrahim Raisi. Do we know much about
Speaker 2: who else was board the flight?
Speaker 5: Yeah, we know the Foreign minister was on there, and
Speaker 5: then there was there were some guards, There was a
Speaker 5: representative of the Supreme Leader from the region where they
Speaker 5: were they were flying over, and the governor there is
Speaker 5: my understanding as well. That's about all the detail that
Speaker 5: we have, but yeah, it was it was a three
Speaker 5: three helicopter convoy and as you were reported in the news,
Speaker 5: it seems that it's the President's the president's helicopter that's
Speaker 5: had the hard landing there. But Yeah, we're really really
Speaker 5: fed on information or detail at this stage.
Speaker 1: We appreciate it nonetheless, Michael for your insight and perspective.
Speaker 1: Michael Heath, Bloomberg ecogov editor, joining us from Sydney, talking
Speaker 1: about the helicopter crash. The flight carrying Iranian President Raisi
Speaker 1: and his foreign minister which crashed on Sunday in the
Speaker 1: Mountainous Area North in the northwest portion of Iran.
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