1
00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:04,920
Speaker 1: All Zone Media.

2
00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:08,360
Speaker 2: Welcome back to It Could Happen here, the podcast that's

3
00:00:08,400 --> 00:00:11,520
Speaker 2: happening here in your ear. And one of the things

4
00:00:11,520 --> 00:00:16,320
Speaker 2: that we love talking about here is a critical ingredient

5
00:00:16,480 --> 00:00:22,000
Speaker 2: towards creeping authoritarianism, towards growing corporate control and surveillance over

6
00:00:22,040 --> 00:00:24,840
Speaker 2: all of our lives, which is of course technology that

7
00:00:24,920 --> 00:00:29,040
Speaker 2: makes it even easier to monitor you than it already is.

8
00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:32,760
Speaker 2: We're not talking primarily about like the government monitoring you,

9
00:00:32,800 --> 00:00:35,000
Speaker 2: because they can, you know, do stuff like just pull

10
00:00:35,040 --> 00:00:38,240
Speaker 2: your phone data from a you know which cell towers

11
00:00:38,320 --> 00:00:40,760
Speaker 2: is pinged. We're talking about the kind of stuff that

12
00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:45,000
Speaker 2: allows basically whoever can get an app on your phone

13
00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:48,880
Speaker 2: to track and stalk you. And Yeah, I'm going to

14
00:00:48,960 --> 00:00:52,360
Speaker 2: first introduce Mia Wong. Mia, welcome to the show that

15
00:00:52,400 --> 00:00:53,200
Speaker 2: you also host.

16
00:00:53,800 --> 00:00:55,520
Speaker 3: Yes, I'm here.

17
00:00:56,080 --> 00:00:57,800
Speaker 2: So what are we what are we talking about today?

18
00:00:57,800 --> 00:00:59,279
Speaker 2: And who are we talking with?

19
00:01:00,520 --> 00:01:03,040
Speaker 4: Yeah, so we are talking about stalker wear, which is

20
00:01:03,040 --> 00:01:05,960
Speaker 4: the sort of broad name for the category of software

21
00:01:05,959 --> 00:01:08,839
Speaker 4: that Robert's been talking about. And we are talking about

22
00:01:08,840 --> 00:01:11,480
Speaker 4: someone who hacked, well.

23
00:01:11,959 --> 00:01:13,319
Speaker 2: A stoker ware stalker.

24
00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:14,199
Speaker 5: Yeah.

25
00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:18,880
Speaker 4: One of the stockerware companies, my Aris and Crime, the

26
00:01:18,880 --> 00:01:22,479
Speaker 4: fame hacker, the no fly list. Yeah, returning guests, always

27
00:01:22,480 --> 00:01:23,320
Speaker 4: happy to have you on.

28
00:01:24,319 --> 00:01:29,199
Speaker 5: Yeah, always happy to be on. Yeah.

29
00:01:29,240 --> 00:01:33,479
Speaker 4: So I think I think, I don't know. I think

30
00:01:33,480 --> 00:01:37,280
Speaker 4: there's a real tendency among and I see this among

31
00:01:37,360 --> 00:01:40,240
Speaker 4: leftists a lot, for kind of good reasons and kind

32
00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:45,480
Speaker 4: of not good reasons to really only focus on state

33
00:01:45,600 --> 00:01:50,040
Speaker 4: and like large corporate actors in terms of surveillance. And

34
00:01:50,440 --> 00:01:51,360
Speaker 4: that's a mistake.

35
00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:53,000
Speaker 5: Yeah, totally.

36
00:01:54,440 --> 00:01:56,760
Speaker 4: Yeah, And so I guess I guess the place where

37
00:01:56,760 --> 00:01:58,640
Speaker 4: I want to start before we get into the specific

38
00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:02,040
Speaker 4: company that you do, is it still called owned?

39
00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:03,400
Speaker 1: I can't.

40
00:02:03,800 --> 00:02:07,280
Speaker 5: It's fine to call it owned or pond or whatever.

41
00:02:07,960 --> 00:02:10,280
Speaker 5: I still do that. Sometimes people get confused.

42
00:02:10,720 --> 00:02:13,320
Speaker 4: But yeah, yeah, But before we get into that, I

43
00:02:13,320 --> 00:02:15,160
Speaker 4: want to I want to ask you a bit because

44
00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:18,239
Speaker 4: you've done a lot of sort of I guess you

45
00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:22,200
Speaker 4: could call it research, both actual research wise and then

46
00:02:22,440 --> 00:02:25,800
Speaker 4: in terms of poking around their servers.

47
00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:30,440
Speaker 5: Research and journalism and whatever. Do you want to call it? Yeah, axic?

48
00:02:30,560 --> 00:02:34,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, So I wanted to just start off by asking

49
00:02:34,680 --> 00:02:37,000
Speaker 4: if you can give sort of like a brief summary

50
00:02:37,040 --> 00:02:38,320
Speaker 4: of what stalker ware is.

51
00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:43,440
Speaker 5: Yeah. So, so stalker ware like as a category, encompasses

52
00:02:43,560 --> 00:02:46,239
Speaker 5: like a number of different types of apps. Most of them,

53
00:02:46,360 --> 00:02:50,280
Speaker 5: like on the service, advertise themselves as like parental control software,

54
00:02:50,440 --> 00:02:53,960
Speaker 5: which is already bad enough. Just to be clear that

55
00:02:54,000 --> 00:02:56,919
Speaker 5: there's like advertised for like spying on your children's phone,

56
00:02:57,000 --> 00:03:00,000
Speaker 5: like seeing their location in real time, seeing their mass

57
00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:04,040
Speaker 5: such as that they receive any photo they take. Ostensibly

58
00:03:04,080 --> 00:03:07,320
Speaker 5: this is to prevent bullying and help with them when

59
00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:10,000
Speaker 5: they get depressed because they don't trust you and talk

60
00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:13,560
Speaker 5: to you for whatever reason. But obviously a lot of

61
00:03:13,639 --> 00:03:17,119
Speaker 5: these are then furthermore, because that's like that, sure, that's

62
00:03:17,120 --> 00:03:20,480
Speaker 5: a like target audience, that's a demographic you can advertise too.

63
00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:24,680
Speaker 5: But then there's this even bigger potential target demographic of

64
00:03:25,120 --> 00:03:28,480
Speaker 5: people who are insecure in their relationship, mostly men, not

65
00:03:28,600 --> 00:03:31,280
Speaker 5: only men, but who are then solved this idea that

66
00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:34,640
Speaker 5: they can use software like this for stalking their partner,

67
00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:37,200
Speaker 5: for finding out if they are cheating on you, things

68
00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:39,839
Speaker 5: like that, which is obviously an even bigger problem, which

69
00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:42,640
Speaker 5: once again not to discount the problems that's spying on

70
00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:45,640
Speaker 5: your children. It's already like bad enough, but yeah, lead

71
00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:48,920
Speaker 5: this leads to this whole big industry of these apps

72
00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:53,720
Speaker 5: being used by partners against each other like also just

73
00:03:53,760 --> 00:03:57,400
Speaker 5: by people, like against anyone in the in their surroundings

74
00:03:57,400 --> 00:04:00,960
Speaker 5: that they suspect might be doing something, might be like

75
00:04:01,920 --> 00:04:04,800
Speaker 5: talking behind their backs. It often kind of turns into

76
00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:07,960
Speaker 5: like it obviously turns into this obsessive thing, especially if

77
00:04:07,960 --> 00:04:10,880
Speaker 5: you're solved this idea that this this app can magically

78
00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,080
Speaker 5: solve like interpersonal issues, like with anything that sells you

79
00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:16,800
Speaker 5: this magic idea of being able to solve any problem.

80
00:04:17,120 --> 00:04:19,599
Speaker 5: That these people start kind of spying on everyone in

81
00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:23,839
Speaker 5: their like circles to some of them, like not everyone,

82
00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:25,760
Speaker 5: most like a lot of people on the spying like

83
00:04:25,800 --> 00:04:28,479
Speaker 5: their partner or like their child or whatever. But it

84
00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:31,760
Speaker 5: often like spirals out of control into this like controlling

85
00:04:31,839 --> 00:04:34,479
Speaker 5: everyone in their surroundings, knowing what everyone is up to

86
00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:37,320
Speaker 5: where they are, and spending like hundreds of dollars a

87
00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:40,680
Speaker 5: month on doing so. And yeah, that's pretty fucked up

88
00:04:40,720 --> 00:04:41,560
Speaker 5: if you ask me.

89
00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:42,880
Speaker 3: Yeah.

90
00:04:43,000 --> 00:04:43,240
Speaker 5: Yeah.

91
00:04:43,320 --> 00:04:45,599
Speaker 2: One of the things that's interesting too. It's also in

92
00:04:45,640 --> 00:04:48,040
Speaker 2: a lot of cases illegal. This is going to vary,

93
00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:50,000
Speaker 2: you know, from country to country, in state to state,

94
00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:52,520
Speaker 2: but in the US there are states like California, which

95
00:04:52,520 --> 00:04:55,240
Speaker 2: gets pointed out in the very good Tech Crunch investigation

96
00:04:55,480 --> 00:04:58,920
Speaker 2: on truth spy where there are really strict laws that

97
00:04:59,040 --> 00:05:00,919
Speaker 2: journalists like you have to a bias to win, you

98
00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:04,400
Speaker 2: can record someone that these these apps absolutely break.

99
00:05:04,960 --> 00:05:07,400
Speaker 5: Yes, it's specifically a thing that doesn't. Most of these

100
00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:09,440
Speaker 5: app will have like a disclaimer at the bond that

101
00:05:09,560 --> 00:05:12,400
Speaker 5: is like this might be illegal and your jurisdiction and

102
00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:15,520
Speaker 5: please ask for consent before doing this, and then they

103
00:05:15,560 --> 00:05:17,599
Speaker 5: have lots of tutorials on how to install this in

104
00:05:17,640 --> 00:05:21,400
Speaker 5: someone's device without their consent. Yeah, but it's like always

105
00:05:21,440 --> 00:05:23,680
Speaker 5: like a we do not take any like we we

106
00:05:23,960 --> 00:05:26,400
Speaker 5: it's not our fault if you break the law basically,

107
00:05:26,520 --> 00:05:29,560
Speaker 5: which obviously, like it's so far not a lot of

108
00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:31,920
Speaker 5: this has been challenged in court. But I don't think

109
00:05:31,960 --> 00:05:35,599
Speaker 5: this would hold up too long. I'm not, but I

110
00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:37,960
Speaker 5: don't think just saying we make a product to do

111
00:05:38,040 --> 00:05:39,960
Speaker 5: crimes with if you do crimes of it, it's not

112
00:05:40,080 --> 00:05:43,800
Speaker 5: I mean it works for the gun industry. So yeah.

113
00:05:44,240 --> 00:05:47,120
Speaker 2: The difference is that like the with the gun industry,

114
00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:49,560
Speaker 2: it's a product where there is a legal and an illegal,

115
00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:51,680
Speaker 2: like clear way to do it.

116
00:05:52,000 --> 00:05:54,279
Speaker 5: The thing with stocker were as well is that like

117
00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:56,440
Speaker 5: a lot of them will also explicitly say the only

118
00:05:56,520 --> 00:05:58,800
Speaker 5: real use of this we allow you to do to

119
00:05:59,080 --> 00:06:02,400
Speaker 5: use it for is to surveill or child, which unfortunately

120
00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:05,960
Speaker 5: is legal in most jurisdictions because children are property of

121
00:06:06,040 --> 00:06:09,360
Speaker 5: their parents. Yeah quotes because I do not agree with that, but.

122
00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:12,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's one of those things where people using it,

123
00:06:12,960 --> 00:06:15,760
Speaker 2: like someone installing an app on their axes or their

124
00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:20,480
Speaker 2: their partner's phone or whatever without consent, could very easily

125
00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:23,760
Speaker 2: would lose any court case, whether or not the company

126
00:06:23,800 --> 00:06:26,080
Speaker 2: would get in trouble. I think it's going to rely

127
00:06:26,160 --> 00:06:28,840
Speaker 2: a lot on the stuff the videos they're posting about,

128
00:06:28,839 --> 00:06:30,760
Speaker 2: like how to put how to get these apps on

129
00:06:30,800 --> 00:06:33,120
Speaker 2: people's phones without them knowing, but like they do have

130
00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:36,120
Speaker 2: that out with like no, it's just for surveilling children, which.

131
00:06:35,960 --> 00:06:38,760
Speaker 5: Is great, and for anyone else you need consent or whatever.

132
00:06:38,800 --> 00:06:40,560
Speaker 5: But I think it is important, yeah, to point this

133
00:06:40,680 --> 00:06:43,480
Speaker 5: out very early for anyone who's listening to this because

134
00:06:43,520 --> 00:06:46,400
Speaker 5: they think they might have stock aver on their phones,

135
00:06:46,440 --> 00:06:48,640
Speaker 5: or because they know they have stock averre on their phones.

136
00:06:48,920 --> 00:06:52,440
Speaker 5: You can use this in a domestic abuse case, well immediately,

137
00:06:52,440 --> 00:06:56,400
Speaker 5: this is explicit proof that abuse is happening, no matter

138
00:06:56,480 --> 00:06:59,480
Speaker 5: anything else, because like that's the thing generally with domestic

139
00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:03,840
Speaker 5: abuse case, it's really hard to prove abuses happening. Stalkerware

140
00:07:04,320 --> 00:07:07,200
Speaker 5: and any other type of spying device like also physical

141
00:07:07,240 --> 00:07:11,120
Speaker 5: GPS trackers and stuff that is immediate proof that there

142
00:07:11,160 --> 00:07:14,560
Speaker 5: is a there's controlling behavior going on, that you are

143
00:07:14,560 --> 00:07:17,800
Speaker 5: being spied on. This it cannot only be used and

144
00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:22,640
Speaker 5: there's explicit admissible evidence. This is also usually like makes

145
00:07:22,680 --> 00:07:26,120
Speaker 5: cases first like not for you like it just yeah,

146
00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:30,640
Speaker 5: it like can potentially add charges and make it more serious,

147
00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:33,520
Speaker 5: and that it can help making cops give a shit

148
00:07:33,720 --> 00:07:36,920
Speaker 5: about like abuse, which yeah, I hate that I need

149
00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:39,400
Speaker 5: to say that, but yeah, it's like it makes it

150
00:07:39,520 --> 00:07:42,360
Speaker 5: more serious because there's like spyware and whatever.

151
00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:44,800
Speaker 2: It's easy evidence first off, like you can prove they're

152
00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:46,760
Speaker 2: spying on you, and second, if you are in one

153
00:07:46,800 --> 00:07:49,160
Speaker 2: of the states where that violates the law, then you

154
00:07:49,200 --> 00:07:52,120
Speaker 2: can immediately say this person is breaking the law, like

155
00:07:52,640 --> 00:07:54,440
Speaker 2: this is we don't have to debate whether or not

156
00:07:54,560 --> 00:07:56,160
Speaker 2: they've they've crossed the line.

157
00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:59,520
Speaker 5: Yeah, And even if it doesn't directly break the law

158
00:07:59,600 --> 00:08:02,480
Speaker 5: to spy on someone on a partner like it, depending

159
00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:04,440
Speaker 5: on the on the on the region, it can be

160
00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:07,360
Speaker 5: kind of a hazy thing, especially if it's a device

161
00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:10,160
Speaker 5: you might co own if it's like a state where

162
00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:12,600
Speaker 5: you where with like code possession or whatever. In the US,

163
00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:14,880
Speaker 5: I do not know US law very much around this,

164
00:08:15,040 --> 00:08:18,040
Speaker 5: but yeah, there's like laws like that. But usually still

165
00:08:18,080 --> 00:08:20,200
Speaker 5: the fact that you're being spied on can be used

166
00:08:20,240 --> 00:08:23,440
Speaker 5: as proof for other abuse things you might be alleging,

167
00:08:23,760 --> 00:08:26,480
Speaker 5: because it's like hard proof that something is happening. And

168
00:08:26,560 --> 00:08:30,480
Speaker 5: also usually these companies will somewhat have to respond to

169
00:08:30,560 --> 00:08:32,280
Speaker 5: some point US, so they will have to give out

170
00:08:32,320 --> 00:08:35,360
Speaker 5: like who that account on there is behind like the

171
00:08:35,520 --> 00:08:37,760
Speaker 5: spying on your phone for some of them, we can

172
00:08:37,800 --> 00:08:40,200
Speaker 5: also there's also tools that help you find out who

173
00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:43,480
Speaker 5: is spying on you, or there's like someone with forensic

174
00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:44,400
Speaker 5: background can help.

175
00:08:45,000 --> 00:08:48,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think people. One thing we should note

176
00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:51,280
Speaker 2: is that if you're kind of curious, has my device

177
00:08:51,320 --> 00:08:54,079
Speaker 2: been infected by some of these tools, one the one

178
00:08:54,080 --> 00:08:56,840
Speaker 2: that we've been talking about most truth spy. If you

179
00:08:56,960 --> 00:08:59,880
Speaker 2: go to that tech Crunch article or to my art

180
00:09:00,240 --> 00:09:01,960
Speaker 2: it also has a link yet or to ye to

181
00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:05,040
Speaker 2: your article on your website. There's a tool you can

182
00:09:05,160 --> 00:09:06,959
Speaker 2: use where you it'll tell you how to get your

183
00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:11,520
Speaker 2: im SI I think I am I Yeah, which you

184
00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:13,600
Speaker 2: just dial a thing on your phone and it gives

185
00:09:13,640 --> 00:09:17,400
Speaker 2: you that number. It's basically how you identify specific bones

186
00:09:18,160 --> 00:09:20,000
Speaker 2: and you plug that in. It will let you know

187
00:09:20,040 --> 00:09:22,559
Speaker 2: if your device has been compromised.

188
00:09:22,520 --> 00:09:25,600
Speaker 5: Now like December last year up until there is the

189
00:09:25,679 --> 00:09:28,800
Speaker 5: data and if you yeah, it can pretty much tell

190
00:09:28,800 --> 00:09:31,520
Speaker 5: you if you've been spined on using this specific tool

191
00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:34,120
Speaker 5: until then. For other stuff, there's also guides, usually on

192
00:09:34,200 --> 00:09:37,720
Speaker 5: TechCrunch and otherwise also on Stop stockerbar dot ARC, which

193
00:09:37,760 --> 00:09:40,560
Speaker 5: is the US Coalition against stalker Bear, and also just

194
00:09:40,640 --> 00:09:45,120
Speaker 5: generally I think a lot of like more local anti stocking,

195
00:09:45,160 --> 00:09:47,760
Speaker 5: anti abuse works are not as informed yet as they

196
00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:50,680
Speaker 5: should be, but there's still a good point also to

197
00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:53,959
Speaker 5: reach out to or like yeah, yeah.

198
00:09:54,320 --> 00:09:56,800
Speaker 2: One of my questions about truth Spy that I'm hoping

199
00:09:56,840 --> 00:10:00,280
Speaker 2: you can answer is I know that you can like

200
00:10:00,360 --> 00:10:04,079
Speaker 2: text messages get transferred via it, your call records, all

201
00:10:04,080 --> 00:10:06,280
Speaker 2: that kind of stuff, get and who you were calling.

202
00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:09,840
Speaker 2: Does that include messages for like encrypted apps like Signal

203
00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:11,800
Speaker 2: or is that not accessible through this?

204
00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:14,800
Speaker 5: It depends, Like for some of these, it will like

205
00:10:14,960 --> 00:10:17,960
Speaker 5: get signal messages, what's the messages and everything generally by

206
00:10:17,960 --> 00:10:22,640
Speaker 5: reading the notification contents because like from notifications, you know,

207
00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:26,199
Speaker 5: like what messages are have been like received. Sometimes it

208
00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:28,320
Speaker 5: will only then have the received messages and not the

209
00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:31,040
Speaker 5: set messages. Often these also include like a key logger

210
00:10:31,400 --> 00:10:35,640
Speaker 5: component that maps messages then sent back as well. It

211
00:10:35,720 --> 00:10:39,400
Speaker 5: depends a lot what these apps collect, but for most

212
00:10:39,440 --> 00:10:42,000
Speaker 5: of them, also the collection for other texting apps is

213
00:10:42,080 --> 00:10:45,040
Speaker 5: usually kind of broken. None of these apps are really

214
00:10:45,040 --> 00:10:48,720
Speaker 5: well maintained. They're mostly just quick cash graps, yeah, are

215
00:10:48,720 --> 00:10:51,160
Speaker 5: there to maintain features usually don't really work.

216
00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:54,960
Speaker 2: And it seems like based on that, one thing people

217
00:10:55,000 --> 00:10:57,120
Speaker 2: can do outside of checking to see if their device

218
00:10:57,160 --> 00:11:02,559
Speaker 2: has been compromised, is do stuff like turn off notifications

219
00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:06,040
Speaker 2: for appsling Signal, Right, and that's that's actually just generally

220
00:11:06,080 --> 00:11:10,719
Speaker 2: good advice. Notifications are a compromise of the security that

221
00:11:11,320 --> 00:11:13,800
Speaker 2: Signal offers. Don't have them enabled, you know.

222
00:11:14,559 --> 00:11:16,680
Speaker 5: Yeah, or at the very least disabled them on the

223
00:11:16,720 --> 00:11:18,760
Speaker 5: lock screen on Android. Yeah, I don't know how. I

224
00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:21,440
Speaker 5: think that's also possible on iOS, but I think I

225
00:11:21,679 --> 00:11:24,120
Speaker 5: doesn't show message content on the lock screen anyways. I'm

226
00:11:24,160 --> 00:11:27,839
Speaker 5: not sure anymore. But yeah, it's just also small things

227
00:11:27,880 --> 00:11:30,439
Speaker 5: like that, And also like one of the key tells

228
00:11:30,440 --> 00:11:33,800
Speaker 5: that someone probably tampered with your phone, especially for Android,

229
00:11:33,880 --> 00:11:37,280
Speaker 5: is if Google play Protect is disabled and you do

230
00:11:37,320 --> 00:11:41,120
Speaker 5: not remember disabling it for something else, it was almost

231
00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:44,400
Speaker 5: definitely disabled because someone installed something on your phone. Just

232
00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:47,480
Speaker 5: try re enabling it. Then they will probably tell you something.

233
00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:49,400
Speaker 5: The thing also to keep in mind if you find

234
00:11:49,400 --> 00:11:52,880
Speaker 5: stockaware on your phone, please get professional help. Do not

235
00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:56,640
Speaker 5: just delete it. Do not like necessarily confront whoever you

236
00:11:56,760 --> 00:11:59,719
Speaker 5: think might be your abuser about it unless you're very

237
00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:03,480
Speaker 5: sure that that's the situation you can handle, because like, yeah,

238
00:12:03,559 --> 00:12:06,720
Speaker 5: that's one of those things that like bringing it up

239
00:12:06,840 --> 00:12:10,880
Speaker 5: or just deleting it can very quickly lead to like, yeah, yeah,

240
00:12:11,320 --> 00:12:13,160
Speaker 5: complicating the situation a lot.

241
00:12:13,960 --> 00:12:15,640
Speaker 4: You know what else complicates the situation.

242
00:12:16,360 --> 00:12:30,120
Speaker 3: These ads and we are back.

243
00:12:31,120 --> 00:12:34,319
Speaker 2: So when it comes to the actual fight against this stuff,

244
00:12:34,360 --> 00:12:36,839
Speaker 2: obviously what you're doing is a big part of it.

245
00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:41,360
Speaker 2: Getting inside these companies and finding out like what they're

246
00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:44,760
Speaker 2: doing and their capabilities is huge for in terms of

247
00:12:44,840 --> 00:12:47,520
Speaker 2: like what regular people are people who are interested in

248
00:12:47,559 --> 00:12:50,840
Speaker 2: becoming activists about this can do. What does the what

249
00:12:50,960 --> 00:12:53,680
Speaker 2: is the struggle to actually fight this stuff look like?

250
00:12:53,679 --> 00:12:56,120
Speaker 2: Like how do we how do we put a bullet

251
00:12:56,120 --> 00:12:57,760
Speaker 2: in this industry's head, I.

252
00:12:57,720 --> 00:12:59,720
Speaker 5: Think one of the biggest things, and also like why

253
00:12:59,840 --> 00:13:01,600
Speaker 5: I do the work I do with like hacking it

254
00:13:01,640 --> 00:13:04,040
Speaker 5: with encouraging others to like send me data, be that

255
00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:07,280
Speaker 5: insiders from these companies sending it idea to me, or

256
00:13:07,320 --> 00:13:10,640
Speaker 5: like tech Crunch specifically currently because like me and tech

257
00:13:10,640 --> 00:13:13,920
Speaker 5: crunch are like the only people really doing like journalism

258
00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:17,880
Speaker 5: on this like regularly. And the important thing with like

259
00:13:17,960 --> 00:13:20,559
Speaker 5: journalism and all of this is like awareness. It's very

260
00:13:20,559 --> 00:13:22,800
Speaker 5: important to create awareness about this. That's also why I

261
00:13:22,840 --> 00:13:25,079
Speaker 5: do the media work with like being on this podcast

262
00:13:25,080 --> 00:13:28,040
Speaker 5: and things like that. I think the most important thing

263
00:13:28,280 --> 00:13:31,120
Speaker 5: is to make people aware, like talk about this in

264
00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:35,000
Speaker 5: your feminist circles or whatever. Things like that especially bring

265
00:13:35,040 --> 00:13:37,800
Speaker 5: it up just also in like general info things about

266
00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:40,360
Speaker 5: abuse or how to detect abuse. I think the most

267
00:13:40,360 --> 00:13:44,360
Speaker 5: important thing to do against stocker whereas demestify it, because

268
00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:46,440
Speaker 5: most people don't even know that this is a thing,

269
00:13:46,600 --> 00:13:49,839
Speaker 5: that this is, like that there's just commercially available spyware

270
00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:53,160
Speaker 5: anyone can install on your phone. It's as important to

271
00:13:53,160 --> 00:13:55,520
Speaker 5: not like give in to some sort of paranoia as

272
00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:58,760
Speaker 5: with any of these things. It's just important to like, yeah,

273
00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:03,760
Speaker 5: generate awareness about it and like spread these articles, let

274
00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:08,439
Speaker 5: friends know that this is a potential thing, and then yeah,

275
00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:11,160
Speaker 5: the hard thing with this is that like obviously it

276
00:14:11,200 --> 00:14:14,000
Speaker 5: should will probably help if there was some sort of

277
00:14:14,080 --> 00:14:16,760
Speaker 5: legislation against some of this, It's going to be very

278
00:14:16,800 --> 00:14:21,160
Speaker 5: hard to get any proper legislation that ends this industry

279
00:14:21,360 --> 00:14:24,000
Speaker 5: because in most Western countries, which are the only countries

280
00:14:24,040 --> 00:14:27,240
Speaker 5: which unfortunately would have enough power to like actually get

281
00:14:27,240 --> 00:14:30,760
Speaker 5: these apps shut down, because that's the world we live in.

282
00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:33,560
Speaker 5: But the problem there is usually that like this notion

283
00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:36,280
Speaker 5: that children are owned by their parents is too strong

284
00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:39,040
Speaker 5: to really make a full case against these apps. And

285
00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:41,640
Speaker 5: at the very best what I can, like the very

286
00:14:41,640 --> 00:14:47,160
Speaker 5: best time kind of hoping for from from legislators is

287
00:14:47,240 --> 00:14:50,600
Speaker 5: just a ban on advertising these apps on use against

288
00:14:50,640 --> 00:14:54,080
Speaker 5: other adults, which would be big already, But that doesn't

289
00:14:54,160 --> 00:14:56,480
Speaker 5: really solve the issue because there's still going to be

290
00:14:56,600 --> 00:14:59,280
Speaker 5: enough people who know of their use for use against

291
00:14:59,360 --> 00:15:01,160
Speaker 5: adults and their there's going to be enough people on

292
00:15:01,320 --> 00:15:05,240
Speaker 5: like Creddit threads talking about, hey, well yeah, you oh

293
00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:07,520
Speaker 5: you're not sure if your government is cheating on you, look,

294
00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:10,040
Speaker 5: you can just use this app, you know. That's also

295
00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:13,200
Speaker 5: how most of this marketing for this works. It's just yeah,

296
00:15:13,240 --> 00:15:15,240
Speaker 5: at the end of the day, this is like a

297
00:15:15,320 --> 00:15:19,960
Speaker 5: patriarchal issue. So yeah, I think that's also why, like

298
00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:22,720
Speaker 5: I am so focused on like the hacking and the

299
00:15:22,920 --> 00:15:26,120
Speaker 5: like blowing these companies up and showing like who's behind them.

300
00:15:26,240 --> 00:15:28,160
Speaker 5: It's because at the end of the day, the most

301
00:15:28,160 --> 00:15:31,320
Speaker 5: effective thing we have against these companies is like the

302
00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:34,080
Speaker 5: grassroots movement of making them too scared to run in

303
00:15:34,120 --> 00:15:37,320
Speaker 5: this business, making it not profitable enough, because as I said,

304
00:15:37,360 --> 00:15:40,240
Speaker 5: most of this is like quick cash grabs from like

305
00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:45,440
Speaker 5: web design studios and outsourcing companies. Yeah that a're just

306
00:15:45,880 --> 00:15:48,200
Speaker 5: making a quick buck from this because otherwise they don't

307
00:15:48,200 --> 00:15:50,480
Speaker 5: get paid enough. Like that's this sad thing really is

308
00:15:50,520 --> 00:15:53,800
Speaker 5: how much of this industry is in all of these countries.

309
00:15:54,160 --> 00:15:57,960
Speaker 5: Western companies outsource their IT too, because there's lots of

310
00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:01,240
Speaker 5: IT companies there and they are entirely reliant on like

311
00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:06,000
Speaker 5: Western companies giving them very underpaid tasks. And yeah, I

312
00:16:06,000 --> 00:16:07,840
Speaker 5: have this problem that you now have a bunch of

313
00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:10,880
Speaker 5: employees and not enough money to always pay them. And

314
00:16:10,960 --> 00:16:13,160
Speaker 5: what do you do you like find some weird niche

315
00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:16,440
Speaker 5: of like a tech product you can quickly build. Yeah,

316
00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:18,600
Speaker 5: and this is like one of those easy niches. It's

317
00:16:18,640 --> 00:16:23,040
Speaker 5: like always the scummy stuff and like yeah, it's that's

318
00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:25,160
Speaker 5: also why like so many of these companies are like

319
00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:27,720
Speaker 5: based out of Vietnam, out of Iran and whatever. It's

320
00:16:27,760 --> 00:16:31,000
Speaker 5: just companies that already have it hard enough to do

321
00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:35,480
Speaker 5: business globally, where the IT industry is like falling apart

322
00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:39,920
Speaker 5: because there's not enough like local customers and anything that's international.

323
00:16:40,480 --> 00:16:44,040
Speaker 5: You're just the cheap workforce, right, So yeah, it's it's

324
00:16:44,080 --> 00:16:46,840
Speaker 5: once again also like a class problem. I don't like

325
00:16:47,000 --> 00:16:49,720
Speaker 5: most people working in this industry know that they're working

326
00:16:49,760 --> 00:16:51,400
Speaker 5: in a like scummy industry.

327
00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:54,440
Speaker 2: Yeah of course, but like yeah, you got to get

328
00:16:54,440 --> 00:16:56,040
Speaker 2: paid and that's yeah.

329
00:16:55,880 --> 00:16:58,760
Speaker 5: And that's like why I think making it more scary

330
00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:01,480
Speaker 5: to operate in this industry is like yes, the wait

331
00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:04,399
Speaker 5: to go because like with just like these like four

332
00:17:04,920 --> 00:17:07,720
Speaker 5: hacks that have happened against these companies over the last

333
00:17:07,760 --> 00:17:11,320
Speaker 5: like half a year or so, two of them, three

334
00:17:11,359 --> 00:17:15,359
Speaker 5: of them, three of them have shut down completely. Others

335
00:17:15,520 --> 00:17:20,359
Speaker 5: seem to be slowly moving towards just building other software primarily. Yeah,

336
00:17:20,720 --> 00:17:24,840
Speaker 5: it's just like, yeah, it's like with any other like

337
00:17:24,880 --> 00:17:27,080
Speaker 5: shady industry that the best we can do is just

338
00:17:27,119 --> 00:17:30,359
Speaker 5: to not make it profitable to run the software, because

339
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:33,760
Speaker 5: at the very best, anything else we will get it's

340
00:17:33,800 --> 00:17:36,040
Speaker 5: just pushing them more into the shadows, which is not

341
00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:37,560
Speaker 5: going to solve the issue at all.

342
00:17:38,119 --> 00:17:42,800
Speaker 2: Yeah. I think a lot about like strategic thinking, which

343
00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:45,000
Speaker 2: I do believe is kind of often in part because

344
00:17:45,040 --> 00:17:48,400
Speaker 2: of how rightfully negative most people on the left think

345
00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:52,080
Speaker 2: about the military. There's a tendency to ignore some of

346
00:17:52,240 --> 00:17:55,480
Speaker 2: like the theory around how to actually win a conflict

347
00:17:56,000 --> 00:17:59,480
Speaker 2: and all of it all all strategy really, when you're

348
00:17:59,480 --> 00:18:03,320
Speaker 2: talking about like defeating an opponent, revolves around denying and

349
00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:06,879
Speaker 2: taking operational area from them, right, Yeah, And that's what

350
00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:08,560
Speaker 2: you're talking about when you talk about, well we need

351
00:18:08,560 --> 00:18:10,359
Speaker 2: to stop this. You know, one of the first things

352
00:18:10,359 --> 00:18:12,399
Speaker 2: we can do as part of fighting this is to

353
00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:15,280
Speaker 2: stop them from being able to advertise certain places.

354
00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:15,600
Speaker 1: Right.

355
00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:19,200
Speaker 2: It's making sure that they're not able to operate without

356
00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:23,479
Speaker 2: being seen. It's basically cutting down their area, their space

357
00:18:23,520 --> 00:18:27,160
Speaker 2: to maneuver, their ability to profit, which cuts down their money,

358
00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:31,200
Speaker 2: their access to people, their ability to actually like operate.

359
00:18:31,320 --> 00:18:31,480
Speaker 5: Right.

360
00:18:31,560 --> 00:18:33,959
Speaker 2: Like, that's what we're looking at in terms of how

361
00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:36,120
Speaker 2: do you kill this stuff? It's not one single really.

362
00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:38,800
Speaker 2: I use the comparison of like a bullet, but it's

363
00:18:38,800 --> 00:18:41,399
Speaker 2: never going to be one bullet. These things are too durable.

364
00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:43,119
Speaker 2: There's too many countries in the lay to do that.

365
00:18:43,800 --> 00:18:46,800
Speaker 5: Yeah, that's also why I put so much emphasis on

366
00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:49,639
Speaker 5: doing media work about this and getting more people to

367
00:18:49,720 --> 00:18:53,000
Speaker 5: talk about this and getting more awareness of this out there,

368
00:18:53,480 --> 00:18:55,160
Speaker 5: to the point where I'm willing to work with more

369
00:18:55,160 --> 00:18:58,679
Speaker 5: conservative newspapers on this because everyone needs to know about this.

370
00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:00,479
Speaker 5: At the end of the day. This is how we

371
00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:03,840
Speaker 5: like stop people from falling victims to this. Most people

372
00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:06,800
Speaker 5: who are a victim of stocker apps have never heard

373
00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:10,120
Speaker 5: of stocker apps before, and I think that's like one

374
00:19:10,119 --> 00:19:12,000
Speaker 5: of the biggest ways to tackle this. And on the

375
00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:14,919
Speaker 5: other hand, we also have I think another big leverage

376
00:19:14,960 --> 00:19:17,359
Speaker 5: point with how many of these are getting hacked because

377
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,080
Speaker 5: none of these apps are very secure. That's another thing

378
00:19:20,520 --> 00:19:24,119
Speaker 5: is this can also be leveraged against like the abusers

379
00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:26,640
Speaker 5: in this scenario. I think just pointing out to them

380
00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:29,000
Speaker 5: that all of these apps get hacked all the time

381
00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:31,000
Speaker 5: and that this is how they get found out, that

382
00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:34,040
Speaker 5: that this is how their data of them as abusers

383
00:19:34,200 --> 00:19:36,920
Speaker 5: ends up landing on the Internet. I think it's also

384
00:19:37,119 --> 00:19:39,440
Speaker 5: like a very important angle at the end of the day,

385
00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:41,679
Speaker 5: is just to make it clear like yeah, no, not

386
00:19:41,720 --> 00:19:46,320
Speaker 5: even you are like secure from this having consequences for

387
00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:50,320
Speaker 5: your life, like beyond like direct interpersonal or legal consequences.

388
00:19:50,480 --> 00:19:54,080
Speaker 5: This can and in the past has result in like

389
00:19:54,160 --> 00:19:56,359
Speaker 5: your email adders being on a list of people who

390
00:19:56,440 --> 00:19:59,720
Speaker 5: have do abuse to people online. You don't want to

391
00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:02,320
Speaker 5: be on such a list. I think that's also important

392
00:20:02,520 --> 00:20:06,040
Speaker 5: just to like point out there isn't one stockover app

393
00:20:06,080 --> 00:20:08,200
Speaker 5: that's not eventually going to get hacked. There is a

394
00:20:08,240 --> 00:20:11,080
Speaker 5: big war against these apps. They're all like there's so

395
00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:14,240
Speaker 5: many different hacking groups that keep sending me data from

396
00:20:14,280 --> 00:20:17,680
Speaker 5: these like I'm already working on another article that already

397
00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:21,080
Speaker 5: once again affects like the data of like I think

398
00:20:21,119 --> 00:20:24,760
Speaker 5: like eighty thousand more like abusers, and it's just the

399
00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:27,119
Speaker 5: abuser data this time. But I'm still going to report

400
00:20:27,160 --> 00:20:30,119
Speaker 5: on it, like it's it's it's this is not going

401
00:20:30,240 --> 00:20:33,120
Speaker 5: to stop. It's even also not going to stop when

402
00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:37,000
Speaker 5: I stop reporting on this myself, like I've there's been

403
00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:39,680
Speaker 5: work before me down on this. I also the first

404
00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,320
Speaker 5: time I got involved in finding stock over was back

405
00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:45,560
Speaker 5: in twenty twenty. People have been hacking these apps forever

406
00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:47,840
Speaker 5: and will keep hacking them, Like just look at the

407
00:20:47,880 --> 00:20:51,520
Speaker 5: Wikipedia page for stock over. There's an ever growing list

408
00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:53,800
Speaker 5: of these apps that have been hacked. And I think

409
00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:56,960
Speaker 5: at this point that like official count being kept by

410
00:20:57,000 --> 00:21:00,520
Speaker 5: one of the people at TechCrunch is at like thirty apps,

411
00:21:01,160 --> 00:21:05,040
Speaker 5: a few of which have been hacked two or three times. Yeah,

412
00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:09,159
Speaker 5: these are not These are not secure apps for any.

413
00:21:09,080 --> 00:21:12,840
Speaker 2: No, no, no, of course not. Yeah, and they yeah,

414
00:21:12,880 --> 00:21:16,119
Speaker 2: I mean it makes sense that like an app dedicated

415
00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:20,560
Speaker 2: to violating people's privacy for money would also basically violate

416
00:21:20,640 --> 00:21:22,680
Speaker 2: the privacy of the people using it.

417
00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:25,600
Speaker 5: Yeah, and also they don't care. Like I said, of

418
00:21:25,600 --> 00:21:28,960
Speaker 5: course it's a cash grap. It's nothing else. There's a

419
00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:31,080
Speaker 5: few apps that are like a little more than a

420
00:21:31,080 --> 00:21:33,679
Speaker 5: cash crap, but it's usually just because they're made, Like

421
00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:36,520
Speaker 5: there's still a cash grap, but they're like more well made,

422
00:21:36,520 --> 00:21:38,880
Speaker 5: But it's because they're a cash graph from a company

423
00:21:38,920 --> 00:21:42,560
Speaker 5: that has better developers or more money to do the

424
00:21:42,840 --> 00:21:45,920
Speaker 5: initial investment. The thing is also like most of these

425
00:21:45,920 --> 00:21:48,159
Speaker 5: companies don't have a lot of initial investment, And I

426
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:50,800
Speaker 5: think the important thing to consider as well, here is

427
00:21:51,560 --> 00:21:54,280
Speaker 5: one big area of this that I have not yet

428
00:21:54,320 --> 00:21:56,680
Speaker 5: started tackling, but I do want to like look into

429
00:21:56,720 --> 00:22:00,880
Speaker 5: more sometimes. Is a big reason this industry is and

430
00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:04,240
Speaker 5: most of these apps have a lot of users despite

431
00:22:04,240 --> 00:22:08,400
Speaker 5: there being so many of them, is the affiliate marketing industry.

432
00:22:08,480 --> 00:22:12,280
Speaker 5: Once again, our very beloved friend. Yeah, all of these

433
00:22:12,320 --> 00:22:15,679
Speaker 5: apps are parts of various affiliate marketing networks, some of

434
00:22:15,720 --> 00:22:19,359
Speaker 5: them started by stock Aware company, and some of them

435
00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:23,240
Speaker 5: just other like things to advertise all the shady things

436
00:22:23,280 --> 00:22:25,840
Speaker 5: like all those phone number locator apps or whatever, that's

437
00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:29,120
Speaker 5: also part of those same affiliate marketing networks. And there's

438
00:22:29,200 --> 00:22:31,520
Speaker 5: lots of money flowing here, and there's lots of money

439
00:22:31,640 --> 00:22:35,080
Speaker 5: flowing to very big tech YouTube channels, and I might

440
00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:37,960
Speaker 5: soon have some proof for some of that. But that's

441
00:22:38,000 --> 00:22:41,639
Speaker 5: how these are advertised. It's everyone who advertises stock Aware

442
00:22:41,680 --> 00:22:44,040
Speaker 5: to you, who has a big platform, is doing that

443
00:22:44,119 --> 00:22:47,320
Speaker 5: because they're getting money, not for any other reason.

444
00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:50,600
Speaker 3: We need to do more ads.

445
00:22:50,880 --> 00:23:05,840
Speaker 4: We will be back shortly, and we are back.

446
00:23:06,760 --> 00:23:09,080
Speaker 2: Well that's all I had, Miya, what do you got?

447
00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:12,480
Speaker 4: Yeah, I guess there's there's another thing I wanted to

448
00:23:12,560 --> 00:23:15,480
Speaker 4: ask a little bit about, which Zach Whitaker, who's been

449
00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:17,639
Speaker 4: one of the journal journalists that tech Crunch doing a

450
00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:21,040
Speaker 4: lot of the research was great. One of the things

451
00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:24,040
Speaker 4: that he brings up that I think is another I

452
00:23:24,040 --> 00:23:26,680
Speaker 4: don't know, it's kind of a plane with fire angle

453
00:23:26,760 --> 00:23:29,520
Speaker 4: on them. But one of the issues that these companies

454
00:23:29,560 --> 00:23:34,879
Speaker 4: seem to have is payment platforms, because a lot of

455
00:23:34,920 --> 00:23:38,280
Speaker 4: payment platforms look at this and go wait, hold.

456
00:23:38,040 --> 00:23:39,840
Speaker 5: On, yeah, so that's yeah.

457
00:23:39,920 --> 00:23:40,919
Speaker 4: We've talked about that a little bit.

458
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:43,400
Speaker 5: That's an angle. We've also been a fighting on a lot.

459
00:23:43,480 --> 00:23:45,560
Speaker 5: Like me and sign we work on most of these

460
00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:49,120
Speaker 5: stories together. Like it's kind of funny. We both got

461
00:23:49,160 --> 00:23:51,919
Speaker 5: each other into the stockover thing back in twenty twenty.

462
00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:54,560
Speaker 5: As I mentioned, that was the first time I stumbled

463
00:23:54,600 --> 00:23:57,280
Speaker 5: into a stock cover app with a security issue. I

464
00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:00,480
Speaker 5: reached out to some random journalists that tech Crunch about it,

465
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:02,840
Speaker 5: and now he is the only one talking about this

466
00:24:03,040 --> 00:24:05,600
Speaker 5: forever because I reached out to him that one time

467
00:24:06,080 --> 00:24:10,040
Speaker 5: and he got sucked into this horrible, horrible world of spying.

468
00:24:10,480 --> 00:24:13,040
Speaker 5: But yeah, like, one of the things we focus on

469
00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:16,400
Speaker 5: a lot is reporting these companies to their payment providers,

470
00:24:16,440 --> 00:24:19,639
Speaker 5: to their server hosters, to the point where sometimes like

471
00:24:19,720 --> 00:24:22,240
Speaker 5: for weeks sack will just wait for them to switch

472
00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:24,320
Speaker 5: to a new provider after we got them taken them

473
00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:27,080
Speaker 5: from like PayPal, and then from their other PayPal account

474
00:24:27,080 --> 00:24:30,000
Speaker 5: where they're just using like the checkout experience from one

475
00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:33,400
Speaker 5: of their completely unrelated software projects which they will later

476
00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:36,159
Speaker 5: claim is not related at all and there are different

477
00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:39,440
Speaker 5: companies and whatever. But then like eventually they get taken

478
00:24:39,480 --> 00:24:41,800
Speaker 5: down from that as well, and usually we can get

479
00:24:41,800 --> 00:24:44,560
Speaker 5: them taken them from most like Western hosters, like especially

480
00:24:44,640 --> 00:24:46,920
Speaker 5: US housters, will immediately take them down. You do not

481
00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:52,960
Speaker 5: want to risk being the company hosting spuywire on US grounds. Yeah. Yeah,

482
00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:56,320
Speaker 5: it's just like same with EU hosters, Like the few

483
00:24:56,320 --> 00:24:59,560
Speaker 5: companies that we've seen that were on Headsnerd, they immediately

484
00:24:59,600 --> 00:25:03,439
Speaker 5: react because it's like yeah, no, like under EULO, you

485
00:25:03,440 --> 00:25:05,840
Speaker 5: don't want to like risk that. And also just because

486
00:25:05,880 --> 00:25:07,800
Speaker 5: you don't want to host that, like there's no reason

487
00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:10,639
Speaker 5: for you to host shit like that. It will have

488
00:25:10,760 --> 00:25:15,520
Speaker 5: like image consequences, and that's an important thing that is

489
00:25:15,720 --> 00:25:17,840
Speaker 5: maybe also something you can do as more like a

490
00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,480
Speaker 5: grassroots thing. It's also like if you find one of

491
00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:22,760
Speaker 5: these apps and if you see, oh, they're using like

492
00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:26,879
Speaker 5: PayPal or whatever. Just reach out. I think paper is

493
00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:29,560
Speaker 5: even harder to reach is like just an average lay person.

494
00:25:29,880 --> 00:25:32,640
Speaker 5: I don't expect them to reply. They might still take action,

495
00:25:32,760 --> 00:25:35,840
Speaker 5: you will have to manually check. PayPal doesn't really reply

496
00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:39,480
Speaker 5: to things ever. But yeah, same as like hosting company,

497
00:25:39,520 --> 00:25:41,960
Speaker 5: if it's either hosted on like a European or American

498
00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:44,680
Speaker 5: hosting company, I just just reach out, be like, hey,

499
00:25:44,680 --> 00:25:48,240
Speaker 5: there's someone running spyware on your thing. Also used the

500
00:25:48,280 --> 00:25:50,480
Speaker 5: word spyware, not stocker, where they will not know what

501
00:25:50,480 --> 00:25:54,679
Speaker 5: that is, and it is spyware. So yeah, and that

502
00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:58,080
Speaker 5: can usually get them taken down. And often they don't

503
00:25:58,080 --> 00:26:00,560
Speaker 5: have proper backups and will have a few months of

504
00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:03,440
Speaker 5: data missing, and it's like, yeah, that's how you slowly

505
00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:07,440
Speaker 5: grind them to a halt. Yeah. And also once again

506
00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:10,359
Speaker 5: like if you have tips about any of these companies,

507
00:26:10,400 --> 00:26:14,040
Speaker 5: be it having found a vulnerability just or insider info

508
00:26:14,119 --> 00:26:16,800
Speaker 5: especially I'm always very happy about the insider info. You

509
00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:19,560
Speaker 5: can reach out to either me or Sakudak. We're both

510
00:26:19,680 --> 00:26:23,040
Speaker 5: very happy to talk about this. Yeah.

511
00:26:23,119 --> 00:26:26,240
Speaker 4: Yeah, that's something that's been used really effectively by right

512
00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:29,960
Speaker 4: wingers to target sex workers. It's been a huge thing.

513
00:26:30,040 --> 00:26:33,800
Speaker 4: There's been a bunch of campaigns to get platform companies.

514
00:26:34,040 --> 00:26:36,399
Speaker 4: And yeah, so it's.

515
00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:39,320
Speaker 5: It's interesting that for once we can use the very

516
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:43,680
Speaker 5: restrictive and conservative rules of payment providers for our good.

517
00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:44,639
Speaker 3: Yeah.

518
00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:47,280
Speaker 5: But yeah, basically any of the big payment providers will

519
00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:50,280
Speaker 5: not respect something like this. Some of the small regional

520
00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:53,240
Speaker 5: odd ones probably won't really give a shit. They have

521
00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:57,159
Speaker 5: no reason to. It's like revenue for them. But yeah,

522
00:26:57,600 --> 00:27:00,720
Speaker 5: it's generally worth trying. And I'm always glad like if

523
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:03,240
Speaker 5: someone just reaches out to these companies and we don't

524
00:27:03,240 --> 00:27:06,560
Speaker 5: have to do that ourselves. I think me and second,

525
00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:09,440
Speaker 5: a few other people like actively working in this are

526
00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:12,520
Speaker 5: doing more than enough work currently. But yeah, like just

527
00:27:12,520 --> 00:27:14,399
Speaker 5: if you find one of these things that don't go

528
00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:17,080
Speaker 5: digging too deep. It's a depressing world. But if you

529
00:27:17,119 --> 00:27:20,919
Speaker 5: stumble upon one of these somewhere or whatever, just just

530
00:27:21,040 --> 00:27:24,439
Speaker 5: report them. It's it's it's gonna disrupt their operations and

531
00:27:24,520 --> 00:27:28,040
Speaker 5: if it happens often enough, they might just give up. Yeah,

532
00:27:28,280 --> 00:27:30,720
Speaker 5: And I mean, like in cases like the truth Spy,

533
00:27:30,760 --> 00:27:34,280
Speaker 5: they are willing to do extreme amounts of fraud to

534
00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:39,159
Speaker 5: get to money easily because they like started with like

535
00:27:39,240 --> 00:27:42,520
Speaker 5: mostly just in like with the market, they could get

536
00:27:42,520 --> 00:27:46,120
Speaker 5: with their Vietnamese payment providers. Right. Eventually they realized, well,

537
00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:48,800
Speaker 5: the US is like this really big market, right, but

538
00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:51,560
Speaker 5: for really easy like US stuff, we need like a

539
00:27:51,600 --> 00:27:55,320
Speaker 5: PayPal thing, right, So they made like over twelve fake

540
00:27:55,359 --> 00:27:59,600
Speaker 5: American identities with fake passports and fake addresses and sign

541
00:27:59,720 --> 00:28:01,960
Speaker 5: up to pay Paul a whole bunch of times, and

542
00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:05,440
Speaker 5: had various employees that the company move money around. Yeah,

543
00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:10,119
Speaker 5: that's obviously not a thing the US government will like

544
00:28:10,280 --> 00:28:14,400
Speaker 5: if you do that. Generally speaking, they moved like millions

545
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:19,159
Speaker 5: like that, so yeah, which is pretty crazy like that.

546
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:22,840
Speaker 5: The amount of money that's moving in this industry is crazy.

547
00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:26,200
Speaker 5: Like yeah, actually, like most of these app apps will

548
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:29,240
Speaker 5: be half broken, which no one ever complains about because

549
00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:31,760
Speaker 5: like it's shady, ye, Like you don't expect like if

550
00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:33,919
Speaker 5: you go online and you search for something shady like

551
00:28:33,960 --> 00:28:37,000
Speaker 5: anything like be it piracy or whatever, you don't expect

552
00:28:37,040 --> 00:28:39,080
Speaker 5: it to be the best experience ever. Like you know,

553
00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:41,440
Speaker 5: you're getting some weird service and it's probably going to

554
00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:43,960
Speaker 5: be half broken. But yeah, like most of these talkob

555
00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:47,680
Speaker 5: apps start at like forty dollars a month and more

556
00:28:48,200 --> 00:28:50,360
Speaker 5: and then some days for more features, you pay like

557
00:28:50,440 --> 00:28:53,320
Speaker 5: up to sixty or seventy or so, and then all

558
00:28:53,360 --> 00:28:56,080
Speaker 5: of these have like tens of thousands of users, sometimes

559
00:28:56,160 --> 00:29:00,400
Speaker 5: hundreds of thousands of users. Yeah, you can do themself.

560
00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:04,480
Speaker 5: It's crazy. This is a really big industry, which makes

561
00:29:04,480 --> 00:29:06,320
Speaker 5: it so crazy to me that it's like not a

562
00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:09,880
Speaker 5: thing that's talked about more, especially in like feminist spaces

563
00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:12,360
Speaker 5: and things like that, because this is such a like

564
00:29:12,520 --> 00:29:16,120
Speaker 5: big angle of like modern tech enabled abuse that they

565
00:29:16,440 --> 00:29:19,760
Speaker 5: really think should should be more of a topic, especially

566
00:29:19,800 --> 00:29:21,640
Speaker 5: on the left, Like this is this is bad?

567
00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:25,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, no, this is like critically bad. I agree entirely.

568
00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:27,719
Speaker 5: And also like that the whole thing with like all

569
00:29:27,760 --> 00:29:30,280
Speaker 5: of this data being so easily accept your data can

570
00:29:30,560 --> 00:29:33,320
Speaker 5: end up getting sold on some dark web forum. You're

571
00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:36,760
Speaker 5: both asked the abuse around that's the target, right, and

572
00:29:36,880 --> 00:29:39,720
Speaker 5: the government can find these like I have no like

573
00:29:39,800 --> 00:29:42,160
Speaker 5: this is this is not me making a statement of

574
00:29:42,240 --> 00:29:46,320
Speaker 5: that's a thing that's happening, but there's nothing preventing it

575
00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:49,960
Speaker 5: from hacking these companies and getting like like I sometimes

576
00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:52,680
Speaker 5: like when whenever I get these data sets, and it's

577
00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:55,080
Speaker 5: always hard to work with data sets that include like

578
00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:59,080
Speaker 5: non consent essentially collected data of people, right, Yes, but

579
00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:01,600
Speaker 5: like I do want like do some due diligence checks,

580
00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:03,960
Speaker 5: like mostly trying to find if the government is using

581
00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:07,520
Speaker 5: a specific app. Sometimes yes, there's always like the odd

582
00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:10,120
Speaker 5: correction law of some of the officer who has signed

583
00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:12,920
Speaker 5: up for one or two of these apps or like

584
00:30:13,160 --> 00:30:16,240
Speaker 5: education people and whatever. But then I also some of

585
00:30:16,240 --> 00:30:18,520
Speaker 5: the search through the text message just for just some

586
00:30:18,560 --> 00:30:21,480
Speaker 5: code words and the amount of people moving drugs have

587
00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:24,800
Speaker 5: Stocker were on their phones. It's you know.

588
00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:29,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, and it's it's one of those things where there

589
00:30:29,680 --> 00:30:33,400
Speaker 2: are laws, like technically, if my understanding of the laws

590
00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:36,000
Speaker 2: around this are correct, it is illegal for an organization

591
00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:38,479
Speaker 2: like the FBI to utilize these apps.

592
00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:42,640
Speaker 5: But yes, but we have an organized and called the

593
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:44,000
Speaker 5: NSA who.

594
00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:48,080
Speaker 2: And it is it is on paper illegal for them

595
00:30:48,120 --> 00:30:50,720
Speaker 2: to do this with a third party app. But one

596
00:30:50,760 --> 00:30:54,440
Speaker 2: thing that often gets done, particularly by the FBI, but

597
00:30:54,800 --> 00:30:57,480
Speaker 2: you know, not just by them, is it's not illegal

598
00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:02,479
Speaker 2: for law enforcement agencies to tracked with private agencies. And

599
00:31:02,520 --> 00:31:05,400
Speaker 2: if those agencies you don't you just don't check in

600
00:31:05,480 --> 00:31:08,360
Speaker 2: on what they're doing, you know, what they're using.

601
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:10,800
Speaker 5: But like yeah, or like if an inform or like

602
00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:13,800
Speaker 5: if an informant like sends you the data, like you're

603
00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:14,760
Speaker 5: not gonna say.

604
00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:16,200
Speaker 2: No exactly exactly.

605
00:31:16,200 --> 00:31:18,520
Speaker 5: And also you don't really need to disclose that because

606
00:31:18,520 --> 00:31:20,880
Speaker 5: it's information and got froment informant. You do not need

607
00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:24,040
Speaker 5: to disclose that informant in court ever. So yeah, it's

608
00:31:25,680 --> 00:31:26,600
Speaker 5: it's it's there.

609
00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:28,720
Speaker 2: There are there are ways around, you know, the laws

610
00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:31,160
Speaker 2: that we put up, not that we shouldn't continue to

611
00:31:31,280 --> 00:31:34,880
Speaker 2: extend those laws, but you shouldn't like just because well

612
00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:37,120
Speaker 2: they're not allowed to use this doesn't mean they can't

613
00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:38,360
Speaker 2: get access to the info.

614
00:31:38,560 --> 00:31:41,360
Speaker 5: Yeah. Yeah, And also there's all this important thing like

615
00:31:41,400 --> 00:31:44,360
Speaker 5: there's more like also globally, like there's other governments that

616
00:31:44,400 --> 00:31:46,040
Speaker 5: can just be using this. Like for one of the

617
00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:46,520
Speaker 5: apps I.

618
00:31:46,440 --> 00:31:49,600
Speaker 2: Got the government, the Russian government doesn't give a ship.

619
00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:53,000
Speaker 5: That was also like another thing where I's like for

620
00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:54,840
Speaker 5: one of the apps I got data for. There was

621
00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:57,840
Speaker 5: some indication that at some point the Colombian National Police

622
00:31:57,880 --> 00:32:03,840
Speaker 5: did a bigger evaluation of using commercials spyware for their use.

623
00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:06,280
Speaker 5: Because you're in the country with not that big of

624
00:32:06,320 --> 00:32:09,240
Speaker 5: a like police budget in comparison, you cannot afford like

625
00:32:09,280 --> 00:32:12,440
Speaker 5: all the Coolestraeli tools everyone else has. So what do

626
00:32:12,560 --> 00:32:15,120
Speaker 5: you do? You just look for random apps you can

627
00:32:15,160 --> 00:32:15,760
Speaker 5: find you know.

628
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:18,520
Speaker 2: Yeah you find the Walmart, the Kirklin.

629
00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:20,760
Speaker 5: The Wish to the conversion I guess.

630
00:32:20,880 --> 00:32:24,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah yeah Ali Baba spywear right. Yeah.

631
00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:27,560
Speaker 5: I don't think most of them moved forward with this

632
00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:30,400
Speaker 5: because these apps fucking suck. Like they're bad, Like that's

633
00:32:30,520 --> 00:32:32,560
Speaker 5: that's the other thing, Like they don't even really do

634
00:32:32,640 --> 00:32:35,200
Speaker 5: their jump. Well, they're bad and you don't know who

635
00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:37,320
Speaker 5: is behind them. You cannot even go up to someone

636
00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:39,760
Speaker 5: and be like, yo, don't do this. You also cannot

637
00:32:39,800 --> 00:32:41,680
Speaker 5: go to the cops and be like, this company is

638
00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:46,360
Speaker 5: scamming me, because yeah, I assume some people have probably

639
00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:49,560
Speaker 5: done that before, but it does involve admitting to a crime.

640
00:32:49,720 --> 00:32:54,200
Speaker 5: So yeah, it's like, yeah, these companies just get away

641
00:32:54,280 --> 00:32:56,760
Speaker 5: with not giving a shit about their product because like.

642
00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:01,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, well I think that's that's all we had.

643
00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:05,320
Speaker 2: Thank you Maya for both the work you're doing and

644
00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:07,440
Speaker 2: for talking to us. Yeah always, is there anything you

645
00:33:07,480 --> 00:33:09,760
Speaker 2: wanted to plug before we roll out here?

646
00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:10,760
Speaker 3: Just my just my.

647
00:33:10,760 --> 00:33:13,360
Speaker 5: Blog, I think where we're like, I do this journalistic

648
00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:15,720
Speaker 5: work and also more, there's about to be another cool

649
00:33:15,760 --> 00:33:20,840
Speaker 5: investigative piece out soon, which tincantually involves more tracking and whatever,

650
00:33:21,440 --> 00:33:24,200
Speaker 5: and also involves like Hollywood and more. It's it's, it's

651
00:33:24,280 --> 00:33:27,760
Speaker 5: it's a crazy big story. I promise that will be

652
00:33:27,800 --> 00:33:30,400
Speaker 5: out like hopefully in a month or so. But yeah,

653
00:33:30,640 --> 00:33:34,080
Speaker 5: my blog at Maya dot CRIMEU dot gay crime, you

654
00:33:34,240 --> 00:33:37,640
Speaker 5: as in crime, w yeah, and k as in gay

655
00:33:40,120 --> 00:33:42,920
Speaker 5: yeah yeah. Just check out my blog at the bottom

656
00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:44,840
Speaker 5: of the blog. There's all my links to my social

657
00:33:44,880 --> 00:33:47,480
Speaker 5: media For anyone who's like listening to this and has

658
00:33:47,560 --> 00:33:49,760
Speaker 5: been wondering where I am. I am back on Twitter

659
00:33:49,840 --> 00:33:50,280
Speaker 5: as well.

660
00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:54,560
Speaker 2: Yeah for now, for now, that's for for all of

661
00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:58,640
Speaker 2: us these days, that's always like yeah.

662
00:33:57,880 --> 00:34:00,360
Speaker 5: Point, but yeah, I am back on Twitter. I'm I'm

663
00:34:00,400 --> 00:34:03,320
Speaker 5: posting there sometimes. Yeah.

664
00:34:04,640 --> 00:34:08,000
Speaker 2: All right, Well, thank you and thank you all for listening.

665
00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:10,640
Speaker 2: We will be back tomorrow, unless this comes out on

666
00:34:10,640 --> 00:34:13,319
Speaker 2: a Friday, in which case we'll be back at some

667
00:34:13,440 --> 00:34:14,759
Speaker 2: other point, but soon.

668
00:34:20,680 --> 00:34:23,040
Speaker 1: It could happen here as a production of cool Zone Media.

669
00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:25,920
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

670
00:34:25,960 --> 00:34:29,080
Speaker 1: Coolzonemedia dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app,

671
00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:32,279
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can

672
00:34:32,320 --> 00:34:35,040
Speaker 1: find sources for it could happen here updated monthly at

673
00:34:35,040 --> 00:34:38,280
Speaker 1: coolzonemedia dot com. Slash Sources thanks for listening.