1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,240 Speaker 1: Hi, it's West Casova. We're taking a break this week, 2 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:10,760 Speaker 1: so here's an episode you might have missed. Thanks so 3 00:00:10,840 --> 00:00:13,640 Speaker 1: much for listening. We'll be back on Monday with a 4 00:00:13,680 --> 00:00:14,400 Speaker 1: new big take. 5 00:00:23,400 --> 00:00:28,240 Speaker 2: United States Space Force. Uh is it an arm of 6 00:00:28,360 --> 00:00:30,440 Speaker 2: NASA or is it a private corporation? 7 00:00:30,680 --> 00:00:35,000 Speaker 3: A space force? Gosh, I don't know. Are they guardians 8 00:00:35,120 --> 00:00:36,960 Speaker 3: or exploration? 9 00:00:37,200 --> 00:00:37,559 Speaker 1: I don't know. 10 00:00:37,640 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 4: Defend US against alleged space threats? I mean, I don't 11 00:00:41,680 --> 00:00:42,840 Speaker 4: know that. I think it does much. 12 00:00:43,040 --> 00:00:46,159 Speaker 1: I'm missing, like a branch of the army that's fights 13 00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:47,120 Speaker 1: crime and space. 14 00:00:47,400 --> 00:00:50,239 Speaker 4: Well, I think space Force they go in space with 15 00:00:50,440 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 4: like weapons for some reason. And I don't know why 16 00:00:54,600 --> 00:00:58,200 Speaker 4: you need weapons in space explore space to the moon 17 00:00:58,440 --> 00:00:59,800 Speaker 4: or fly to the moon. 18 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:03,240 Speaker 2: I don't know if it's public. I'm guessing it's some 19 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:07,760 Speaker 2: sort of military arm of NASA the space program that 20 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:11,240 Speaker 2: has to do with strategic defense or maybe settling Mars. 21 00:01:12,080 --> 00:01:15,039 Speaker 1: The almost nine hundred billion dollar defense spending bill that's 22 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: working its way through the Congress includes a thirty billion 23 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 1: dollar request for the newest and smallest branch of the 24 00:01:21,840 --> 00:01:26,280 Speaker 1: US military, the US Space Force. You may remember when 25 00:01:26,319 --> 00:01:29,160 Speaker 1: it was created in twenty nineteen, there were plenty of 26 00:01:29,360 --> 00:01:32,640 Speaker 1: star Trek in Space Cadet jokes, and even a Netflix 27 00:01:32,720 --> 00:01:36,440 Speaker 1: comedy starring Steve Carrell as a bumbling Space Force commander. 28 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,720 Speaker 5: Air Force is Space Force Space Force, Sir, you don't 29 00:01:40,760 --> 00:01:42,120 Speaker 5: like to use your full title. 30 00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:45,280 Speaker 2: Sorry, sir. Spaceman first class. 31 00:01:45,319 --> 00:01:49,720 Speaker 5: Nothing to be ashamed of. Air Forces airmen, Space Forces spacemen. 32 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:52,360 Speaker 5: Nothing embarrassing or comical about it. 33 00:01:53,600 --> 00:01:56,360 Speaker 1: But we haven't heard much about Space Force since then, 34 00:01:56,800 --> 00:01:59,520 Speaker 1: which made us wonder, now that it's up and running, 35 00:01:59,680 --> 00:02:02,120 Speaker 1: what the what does it actually do and how are 36 00:02:02,120 --> 00:02:06,080 Speaker 1: they spending all those billions to find out? I paid 37 00:02:06,080 --> 00:02:09,639 Speaker 1: a visit to the Pentagon to speak with General David Thompson. 38 00:02:09,919 --> 00:02:12,400 Speaker 3: Our job is to protect us interest in space. 39 00:02:12,880 --> 00:02:16,080 Speaker 1: He's the Vice Chief of Space Operations for all of 40 00:02:16,160 --> 00:02:16,800 Speaker 1: Space Force. 41 00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:19,360 Speaker 3: It is now incumbent on us to do two things. 42 00:02:19,400 --> 00:02:23,160 Speaker 3: First is to develop capabilities that will defend our satellites 43 00:02:23,160 --> 00:02:25,160 Speaker 3: in a whole host of ways, and it will become 44 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 3: our responsibility also to deny advisariusa space. 45 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:31,360 Speaker 1: And later in the show, I talked to Bloomberg cyber 46 00:02:31,480 --> 00:02:33,520 Speaker 1: security reporter Katrina Manson. 47 00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:35,919 Speaker 6: I think it's really fair to say the homes race 48 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:39,520 Speaker 6: is already on and certainly in terms of perception the 49 00:02:39,560 --> 00:02:41,760 Speaker 6: amount that you're seeing from the commercial well. Putting up 50 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:45,000 Speaker 6: into space also creates huge dilemmas for the US military 51 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:46,320 Speaker 6: and what they need to defend. 52 00:02:50,760 --> 00:02:53,959 Speaker 1: I'm wes Kasova today on the big take. Space Force 53 00:02:54,360 --> 00:03:06,320 Speaker 1: is no joke. General, I would imagine that some portion 54 00:03:06,400 --> 00:03:09,160 Speaker 1: of your job is just explaining to people you meet 55 00:03:09,560 --> 00:03:10,600 Speaker 1: what the Space Force is. 56 00:03:11,600 --> 00:03:13,519 Speaker 3: You're absolutely right, it really is. There are a whole 57 00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:15,440 Speaker 3: host of things that we do that many people don't 58 00:03:15,440 --> 00:03:18,639 Speaker 3: really understand. But I'll start with the things that people 59 00:03:18,720 --> 00:03:21,079 Speaker 3: probably see every day and may not realize it. Right, 60 00:03:21,600 --> 00:03:25,000 Speaker 3: people with smartphones, you know, billions all over the world 61 00:03:25,040 --> 00:03:27,600 Speaker 3: follow the blue dot on their smartphone every day. That's 62 00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:32,359 Speaker 3: Global Positioning System GPS. That constellation of thirty satellites is 63 00:03:32,400 --> 00:03:34,800 Speaker 3: brought to you by the United States Space Force. That 64 00:03:34,880 --> 00:03:39,280 Speaker 3: constellation also provides a timing signal that synchronizes the cellular 65 00:03:39,320 --> 00:03:42,200 Speaker 3: network they use, and financial networks and the Internet and 66 00:03:42,240 --> 00:03:45,320 Speaker 3: things like that. That's provided as a service for the world. 67 00:03:45,320 --> 00:03:48,240 Speaker 3: But the real reason it exists is US Air Force 68 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:51,560 Speaker 3: aircraft flying over the Arctic ice cap, Navy ships in 69 00:03:51,600 --> 00:03:54,720 Speaker 3: the Middle Pacific Ocean, Army units in the middle of 70 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:57,760 Speaker 3: the Arabian Desert. They follow the blue dot every day 71 00:03:57,800 --> 00:03:59,680 Speaker 3: as well, and that's really why it's there, so they 72 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:03,400 Speaker 3: can navigate effectively all over the globe, all over the world. 73 00:04:03,440 --> 00:04:07,440 Speaker 3: There's a whole host of missile and rocket activity. Rockets 74 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:09,600 Speaker 3: are launched all over the world every single day. We 75 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 3: operate a constellation of spacecraft that detect every single launch, 76 00:04:13,520 --> 00:04:16,719 Speaker 3: figure out where it is, where it's coming from, if 77 00:04:16,760 --> 00:04:18,960 Speaker 3: it poses a threat to the nation or our friends 78 00:04:19,040 --> 00:04:22,080 Speaker 3: or allies and forces, and provide warning. Those are the 79 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:23,760 Speaker 3: kinds of things that we do every day. I'm done 80 00:04:23,760 --> 00:04:27,279 Speaker 3: for decades, all the way up to including keeping track 81 00:04:27,279 --> 00:04:31,040 Speaker 3: of objects in space. Forty thousand plus objects in space 82 00:04:31,120 --> 00:04:33,960 Speaker 3: that we keep track of every single day. We figure 83 00:04:33,960 --> 00:04:36,039 Speaker 3: out where they are, We figure out where they're going, 84 00:04:36,120 --> 00:04:38,600 Speaker 3: and whether or not they op pose a hazard to themselves, 85 00:04:38,640 --> 00:04:41,760 Speaker 3: to others, Do they pose a hazard just to astronauts 86 00:04:41,760 --> 00:04:44,760 Speaker 3: on the International Space Station. We have a global array 87 00:04:44,839 --> 00:04:47,640 Speaker 3: of ground and space based sensors to keep track of 88 00:04:47,680 --> 00:04:48,040 Speaker 3: all that. 89 00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:50,360 Speaker 1: So you're keeping track of this stuff. Let's say you 90 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:54,200 Speaker 1: find an object, an old satellite, something else that does 91 00:04:54,240 --> 00:04:54,800 Speaker 1: pose a threat. 92 00:04:54,839 --> 00:04:58,680 Speaker 3: What do you do well, We provide warning to whomever 93 00:04:58,720 --> 00:05:01,920 Speaker 3: it poses a threat to. You know, obviously and most directly, 94 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:04,360 Speaker 3: we have a very close tie with NASA so that 95 00:05:04,400 --> 00:05:07,200 Speaker 3: we protect the International Space Station and the human beings 96 00:05:07,240 --> 00:05:12,040 Speaker 3: in orbit. We do the same for satellites operated by companies, 97 00:05:12,560 --> 00:05:18,600 Speaker 3: satellites operated by other nations. When the Chinese have astronauts 98 00:05:18,640 --> 00:05:21,840 Speaker 3: on board their space station, we provide warning to the Chinese. 99 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:26,520 Speaker 3: We provide warning to anybody and everybody who operates a spacecraft, 100 00:05:26,800 --> 00:05:30,160 Speaker 3: and then it becomes their responsibility to decide what they 101 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:33,200 Speaker 3: want to do with that information. Move their satellite, assume 102 00:05:33,240 --> 00:05:35,039 Speaker 3: the risk, and hope that it doesn't hit them. Those 103 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:35,680 Speaker 3: sorts of things. 104 00:05:38,440 --> 00:05:40,200 Speaker 1: What do you find when you talk to people about 105 00:05:40,240 --> 00:05:42,839 Speaker 1: Space Force? What do Americans think it does? 106 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:43,560 Speaker 5: Well? 107 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:45,800 Speaker 3: Yeah, great question, I mean, and you know, when we 108 00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:47,960 Speaker 3: were created three and a half years ago, there was 109 00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:52,159 Speaker 3: this line of conversation that said, now that we've created 110 00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:54,400 Speaker 3: a space Force, we have to find something for them 111 00:05:54,440 --> 00:05:57,279 Speaker 3: to do. Well. As I just described, there were a 112 00:05:57,360 --> 00:06:00,159 Speaker 3: whole host of things we were already doing. Most of us, 113 00:06:00,200 --> 00:06:03,040 Speaker 3: not all of us, but most of us were in 114 00:06:03,080 --> 00:06:06,560 Speaker 3: the United States Air Force doing those things. So the GPS, 115 00:06:06,600 --> 00:06:09,800 Speaker 3: the communication satellites, the missile warning, tracking all those objects 116 00:06:09,839 --> 00:06:12,920 Speaker 3: in space. We were already doing all that, and when 117 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,039 Speaker 3: we created the Space Force, we continued. The difference is 118 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:20,080 Speaker 3: and the reason we were created is other nations now, 119 00:06:20,200 --> 00:06:23,480 Speaker 3: especially those that wish us ill, who would seek to 120 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:27,240 Speaker 3: do as harm, are looking to deny us use of 121 00:06:27,279 --> 00:06:30,120 Speaker 3: those capabilities if in fact we're in conflict with them, 122 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:32,640 Speaker 3: And so one of the reasons we were created was 123 00:06:32,720 --> 00:06:35,960 Speaker 3: to help protect those satellites as well and make sure 124 00:06:36,080 --> 00:06:40,720 Speaker 3: those soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines get the 125 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:43,280 Speaker 3: things they need from GPS, have the communications they need, 126 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:46,440 Speaker 3: get the information they need from space, because other countries 127 00:06:46,440 --> 00:06:48,919 Speaker 3: have now said we're going to try and take that 128 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:50,520 Speaker 3: away from you if it comes to conflict. 129 00:06:50,640 --> 00:06:52,599 Speaker 1: Yea, And I want to talk a bit more about 130 00:06:52,640 --> 00:06:56,120 Speaker 1: that a little bit later. First, this new branch of 131 00:06:56,160 --> 00:06:58,560 Speaker 1: the military built up very quickly. Can you just talk 132 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:02,640 Speaker 1: about what happened been from twenty nineteen when it was 133 00:07:02,760 --> 00:07:03,960 Speaker 1: first announced till now. 134 00:07:04,960 --> 00:07:08,160 Speaker 3: Sure, Actually we had a little bit of advanced notice. 135 00:07:08,320 --> 00:07:12,240 Speaker 3: We started, as you said, when the legislation was signed 136 00:07:12,240 --> 00:07:16,920 Speaker 3: into law in December of twenty nineteen, about eight months previously. 137 00:07:17,000 --> 00:07:19,480 Speaker 3: We saw that this was very much a possibility so 138 00:07:19,560 --> 00:07:21,880 Speaker 3: we had established a planning team to decide how we 139 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:24,880 Speaker 3: would establish the force, so that the day the law 140 00:07:25,080 --> 00:07:27,520 Speaker 3: was created, we sort of had a running start. So 141 00:07:27,600 --> 00:07:30,760 Speaker 3: what we did was we took the foundational pieces that 142 00:07:30,880 --> 00:07:34,440 Speaker 3: existed already in the Air Force, already in the Army, 143 00:07:34,480 --> 00:07:37,480 Speaker 3: already in the Navy, and we began putting them together 144 00:07:38,280 --> 00:07:41,480 Speaker 3: and filling in pieces that weren't there. As an example, 145 00:07:41,640 --> 00:07:45,800 Speaker 3: you know, we had organizations that built satellites and deployed 146 00:07:45,840 --> 00:07:49,040 Speaker 3: satellites and operated satellites. What we didn't have was an 147 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:55,000 Speaker 3: effective intelligence enterprise right adversaries, how do they operate in space? 148 00:07:55,160 --> 00:07:57,840 Speaker 3: What are their capabilities, what sort of hostile behaviors? We 149 00:07:57,880 --> 00:08:01,200 Speaker 3: didn't have an effective enterprise network goinguard. So we had 150 00:08:01,200 --> 00:08:02,400 Speaker 3: to build that very quickly. 151 00:08:02,840 --> 00:08:04,640 Speaker 1: And how large is space Force now? 152 00:08:04,720 --> 00:08:08,160 Speaker 3: The Space Force today consists of about eighty five hundred 153 00:08:08,280 --> 00:08:12,840 Speaker 3: guardians in uniform and about five thousand more civilians, and 154 00:08:12,880 --> 00:08:17,120 Speaker 3: so all told, we're now approaching fourteen thousand people. Now. 155 00:08:17,200 --> 00:08:20,320 Speaker 3: One important point in that regard, though, is we also 156 00:08:20,400 --> 00:08:22,800 Speaker 3: rely heavily on the United States Air Force for a 157 00:08:22,800 --> 00:08:25,360 Speaker 3: lot of things that we need that we don't do ourselves. 158 00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:28,520 Speaker 3: And there are about five thousand airmen who are out 159 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,920 Speaker 3: there helping US operator installations. They're providing our medical care, 160 00:08:32,440 --> 00:08:36,440 Speaker 3: They're giving us logistical and security and legal support, and 161 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:38,199 Speaker 3: so a lot of the things that we need to 162 00:08:38,240 --> 00:08:41,480 Speaker 3: operate effectively we don't do for ourselves. It's a great 163 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:43,480 Speaker 3: partnership that we have with the US Air Force that 164 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:45,760 Speaker 3: allows us to execute all those functions as well. 165 00:08:47,360 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 1: So in a little over three years, really you built 166 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 1: space force up pretty quickly. 167 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,400 Speaker 7: How large will it be? Is there a final number 168 00:08:54,440 --> 00:08:55,400 Speaker 7: that you're building towards? 169 00:08:55,679 --> 00:08:58,120 Speaker 3: There is not, but I will tell you we're continuing 170 00:08:58,160 --> 00:09:01,120 Speaker 3: to grow. And the reason we're continuing goes. Missions that 171 00:09:01,160 --> 00:09:03,840 Speaker 3: we used to do in other domains are moving to space. 172 00:09:04,160 --> 00:09:07,840 Speaker 3: Right For example, something we call ground moving target indication 173 00:09:08,040 --> 00:09:10,880 Speaker 3: tracking ships as they move across the ocean, tracking large 174 00:09:10,920 --> 00:09:13,480 Speaker 3: vehicles on the ground and actually some of them in 175 00:09:13,520 --> 00:09:16,560 Speaker 3: the air as well. So that mission is moving to space, 176 00:09:16,920 --> 00:09:19,280 Speaker 3: and so we have to grow our number of people 177 00:09:19,280 --> 00:09:21,760 Speaker 3: in our systems to be able to do that. We're 178 00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:26,920 Speaker 3: creating a whole lot more connectivity for forces at sea, 179 00:09:27,160 --> 00:09:28,840 Speaker 3: on the ground, in the air, so that they can 180 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:32,040 Speaker 3: operate in a more integrated fashion. That requires a whole 181 00:09:32,080 --> 00:09:36,360 Speaker 3: lot more connectivity to move data and to communicate through space, 182 00:09:36,360 --> 00:09:38,440 Speaker 3: So we have to build that out. There's not a 183 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,720 Speaker 3: final number, but I would say in the next five 184 00:09:41,760 --> 00:09:44,680 Speaker 3: to ten years we will probably grow by about a 185 00:09:44,720 --> 00:09:47,600 Speaker 3: third just because of those new missions, and who knows 186 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:49,199 Speaker 3: what will happen in the future after that. 187 00:09:49,679 --> 00:09:51,640 Speaker 1: You said earlier that a lot of the functions that 188 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:56,280 Speaker 1: the Space Force now does was previously done by the 189 00:09:56,320 --> 00:09:59,160 Speaker 1: Air Force. Why did Space Force need to become its 190 00:09:59,200 --> 00:10:02,840 Speaker 1: own branch. Couldn't the Air Force have expanded to meet 191 00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:05,040 Speaker 1: the challenges of a changing time. 192 00:10:05,760 --> 00:10:08,720 Speaker 3: There's a couple reasons why. The first is really the 193 00:10:08,800 --> 00:10:10,880 Speaker 3: fact that we moved from what I will call a 194 00:10:10,960 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 3: relatively benign and domain into one where those space systems 195 00:10:15,760 --> 00:10:19,520 Speaker 3: are under threat, starting as far back as two thousand 196 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:24,440 Speaker 3: and seven, starting with the Chinese, they specifically started developing 197 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:28,520 Speaker 3: and fielding weapons to take our satellites and the services 198 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:30,960 Speaker 3: they provide away from missing conflict. They did that with 199 00:10:31,040 --> 00:10:33,280 Speaker 3: a test with a missile launched from the ground to 200 00:10:33,320 --> 00:10:36,880 Speaker 3: destroy a satellite space The Russians have followed suit. Both 201 00:10:37,000 --> 00:10:41,239 Speaker 3: have put offensive weapons in orbit to threaten our satellites, 202 00:10:41,559 --> 00:10:44,200 Speaker 3: and so now we're not talking about just providing that 203 00:10:44,280 --> 00:10:47,720 Speaker 3: GPS signal or the communications or the warning. We're now 204 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:50,439 Speaker 3: talking about the need to defend and protect those assets 205 00:10:50,480 --> 00:10:55,000 Speaker 3: as well, And so that requires a focused service who 206 00:10:55,080 --> 00:10:58,320 Speaker 3: thinks every day about what it takes to operate in 207 00:10:58,360 --> 00:11:03,319 Speaker 3: space and to do that effectively with soldier, sailors, airmen, 208 00:11:03,400 --> 00:11:06,840 Speaker 3: and marines. The second thing I'll say is the United 209 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:09,880 Speaker 3: States Air Force has a really full plate, and to 210 00:11:09,920 --> 00:11:12,640 Speaker 3: ask one service and one service chief and one staff 211 00:11:12,720 --> 00:11:15,120 Speaker 3: to do all that effectively in the air and then say, oh, 212 00:11:15,200 --> 00:11:17,800 Speaker 3: by the way, focus effectively on space as well, was 213 00:11:17,880 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 3: really too large of hispanic control. And so, just like 214 00:11:20,960 --> 00:11:23,080 Speaker 3: in nineteen forty seven, the last time we did this, 215 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:27,760 Speaker 3: the United States Army built the world's greatest air forces 216 00:11:27,840 --> 00:11:30,600 Speaker 3: as part of the army. But in nineteen forty seven 217 00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:33,080 Speaker 3: the nation decided we now need a separate service that 218 00:11:33,200 --> 00:11:36,080 Speaker 3: focuses every day on the air and interfaces directly with 219 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:38,480 Speaker 3: the Army. In the Navy, we reached the same point 220 00:11:38,480 --> 00:11:41,520 Speaker 3: in space to say, now, just like we need a 221 00:11:41,559 --> 00:11:43,760 Speaker 3: service to understand how to operate on the ground at 222 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:47,200 Speaker 3: sea in the air, we need a comparable service to 223 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:48,880 Speaker 3: be able to do that in space as well. 224 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:55,319 Speaker 1: I imagine since the military is very keen on drying boundaries 225 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:58,760 Speaker 1: and lines. And what's the difference between air and space? 226 00:11:58,920 --> 00:12:02,080 Speaker 3: Well, there's a lot of difference. In fact, it's actually 227 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:05,559 Speaker 3: pretty easy because it's a very thick and large boundary. 228 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:08,160 Speaker 3: You know, there's really you get up to about one 229 00:12:08,280 --> 00:12:11,400 Speaker 3: hundred thousand feet maybe one hundred and fifty thousand feet. 230 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 3: You can't really operate effectively in the air anymore above that, 231 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:18,640 Speaker 3: and then it's really about down to about one hundred 232 00:12:18,640 --> 00:12:21,480 Speaker 3: miles where you can operate effectively in space. And so 233 00:12:21,520 --> 00:12:24,360 Speaker 3: there's a there's a boundary there. We can draw one 234 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:26,880 Speaker 3: specific line, but there's really a large area in between 235 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:30,600 Speaker 3: air and space where you don't operate effectively. And the 236 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:34,440 Speaker 3: principles under which you operate are vastly different, and therefore 237 00:12:34,559 --> 00:12:37,079 Speaker 3: you need to understand it, act and think about them 238 00:12:37,080 --> 00:12:39,560 Speaker 3: differently to operate effectively in each kind of the same way. 239 00:12:39,880 --> 00:12:42,240 Speaker 3: The difference between operating and see and operated on the ground. 240 00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:42,920 Speaker 3: Same thing. 241 00:12:43,240 --> 00:12:46,600 Speaker 1: And what does training look like to become a member 242 00:12:46,679 --> 00:12:49,480 Speaker 1: of space for US, I imagine it's a lot different 243 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:51,680 Speaker 1: than it is for other branches in the un Up there, it. 244 00:12:51,640 --> 00:12:55,200 Speaker 3: Is the initial training is very similar. First of all. 245 00:12:55,240 --> 00:12:57,680 Speaker 3: You know, if you think about basic training, we just 246 00:12:57,880 --> 00:12:59,760 Speaker 3: first of all, I want you to teach you the 247 00:12:59,760 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 3: fun fundamentals of military service. But the second phase of training, 248 00:13:03,160 --> 00:13:06,760 Speaker 3: what we call technical training, immediately becomes different. We do 249 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:10,120 Speaker 3: that technical training out at VanderBurg Space Force Base in California, 250 00:13:10,440 --> 00:13:14,120 Speaker 3: and that's when we start talking about how is operating 251 00:13:14,120 --> 00:13:16,840 Speaker 3: in space different than operating in the air or land 252 00:13:16,920 --> 00:13:19,080 Speaker 3: or would see. What do we need to train you 253 00:13:19,160 --> 00:13:21,720 Speaker 3: and how do we need to train you to either 254 00:13:21,920 --> 00:13:26,360 Speaker 3: operate those satellites effectively or provide intelligence support or build 255 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:27,000 Speaker 3: and fly them. 256 00:13:27,360 --> 00:13:30,640 Speaker 1: What sort of training is needed when you're really pushing 257 00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:33,000 Speaker 1: up against the limits of technology to try to keep 258 00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:37,920 Speaker 1: up with both civilian technology and military adversaries. 259 00:13:38,440 --> 00:13:41,400 Speaker 3: We're now moving into an era where we have to 260 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:44,680 Speaker 3: move faster. You know, those potential adversaries out there like 261 00:13:44,760 --> 00:13:49,920 Speaker 3: China are moving very quickly. Technology lets us build satellites faster. 262 00:13:50,679 --> 00:13:53,520 Speaker 3: Technology allows us to build them a little more cheaply, 263 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:56,640 Speaker 3: and the way people are operating. Rather than building a 264 00:13:56,679 --> 00:14:00,960 Speaker 3: handful of very large, very capable, very expensive satellites, we're 265 00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:05,240 Speaker 3: now talking about building hundreds and perhaps thousands of smaller, 266 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:08,080 Speaker 3: cheaper satellites that can do the same thing. We saw 267 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,800 Speaker 3: that in the commercial space sector. We're now moving that 268 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:11,679 Speaker 3: direction as well. 269 00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:14,880 Speaker 1: And access to space, as you're saying, is really easy. 270 00:14:14,920 --> 00:14:16,480 Speaker 1: It used to be pretty hard. Now you can pay 271 00:14:16,480 --> 00:14:18,680 Speaker 1: you Long Musk to put a satellite up there for 272 00:14:19,080 --> 00:14:21,400 Speaker 1: an amount of money that a mid sized company can afford. 273 00:14:21,480 --> 00:14:23,560 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's it. I would say it's getting easier. It's 274 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:27,120 Speaker 3: still very complicated, but you're right compared to the past 275 00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:30,520 Speaker 3: when it took superpowers to gain access to space and 276 00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:33,920 Speaker 3: then countries, but you're right. Now the ability to do it, 277 00:14:33,960 --> 00:14:35,600 Speaker 3: do it quickly, do it easily, and do it at 278 00:14:35,600 --> 00:14:40,640 Speaker 3: reasonable cost is absolutely there. And so you know, a university, 279 00:14:40,680 --> 00:14:45,239 Speaker 3: a small company, folks that don't really have tremendous expertise 280 00:14:45,400 --> 00:14:49,760 Speaker 3: or a huge infrastructure could build and design and fly 281 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:52,200 Speaker 3: their own spacecraft or pay somebody to do it for them. 282 00:14:52,200 --> 00:14:55,360 Speaker 3: And you're right, it's really unleashing. I think a new 283 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:57,040 Speaker 3: way of thinking about space. 284 00:14:57,880 --> 00:15:00,840 Speaker 1: After the break have space force to diff ns us 285 00:15:00,840 --> 00:15:13,360 Speaker 1: interests in orbit. One of the things you talked about earlier, 286 00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:17,920 Speaker 1: which is very important, is the militarization of space and 287 00:15:18,160 --> 00:15:21,800 Speaker 1: those concerns who are the adversaries. The US is most 288 00:15:21,880 --> 00:15:23,520 Speaker 1: concerned about in this realm. 289 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:28,000 Speaker 3: Yeah, today the most concerning adversaries are to Russia and China. 290 00:15:28,840 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 3: China for two reasons. One is they have very clearly 291 00:15:33,400 --> 00:15:36,560 Speaker 3: demonstrated by their actions and by what they're developing, fielding 292 00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 3: and testing, their desire to attack our spacecraft, our satellites 293 00:15:41,560 --> 00:15:43,400 Speaker 3: and deny our use of them in conflict. 294 00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:45,520 Speaker 1: When you say attack, what do you mean by it? 295 00:15:46,760 --> 00:15:49,560 Speaker 3: So attack in any number of ways. In two thousand 296 00:15:49,560 --> 00:15:52,960 Speaker 3: and seven, as I had said earlier, they launched a 297 00:15:52,960 --> 00:15:55,440 Speaker 3: missile from the ground to destroy one of their satellites, 298 00:15:55,440 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 3: physically attack it and destroyed. They also now have spacecraft 299 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:03,240 Speaker 3: in orbit that can maneuver right up next to one 300 00:16:03,280 --> 00:16:07,800 Speaker 3: of our satellites and block it, collide with it. Either. 301 00:16:07,920 --> 00:16:10,840 Speaker 3: They've actually demonstrated the ability to throw a net over 302 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:13,920 Speaker 3: one of their satellites and drag it to another orbit, 303 00:16:14,240 --> 00:16:17,760 Speaker 3: so to physically attack in orbit. They have the capability 304 00:16:17,760 --> 00:16:20,760 Speaker 3: to interfere with the communications links of our satellites jam 305 00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:24,960 Speaker 3: those links. They've demonstrated the ability to use lasers to 306 00:16:25,080 --> 00:16:27,760 Speaker 3: either dazzle our sensors so that the sensors don't work, 307 00:16:28,280 --> 00:16:32,160 Speaker 3: or to cause physical damage on them. So basically, whether 308 00:16:32,200 --> 00:16:36,800 Speaker 3: it's direct attack, kinetic attack, reversible jamming attack. In addition 309 00:16:36,920 --> 00:16:40,840 Speaker 3: to attack through cyberspace, physical attack of ground infrastructure. They 310 00:16:40,880 --> 00:16:45,800 Speaker 3: have developed means to attack our satellites directly, indirectly, kinetically 311 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:48,640 Speaker 3: and non kinetically pretty much in any orbit we operate in. 312 00:16:48,720 --> 00:16:50,800 Speaker 3: So they have a vast array of offensive forces. 313 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:54,480 Speaker 7: Does the US have the same capabilities? The US does not, 314 00:16:54,920 --> 00:16:57,960 Speaker 7: And what is the reason for that. Well, for a 315 00:16:58,000 --> 00:17:00,320 Speaker 7: couple of reasons. One is we have been very loath 316 00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:04,240 Speaker 7: to pursue capabilities like that in the past because we 317 00:17:04,320 --> 00:17:07,280 Speaker 7: believe in preserving the domain and using it effectively for 318 00:17:07,320 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 7: a broad range of purposes. I will say, however, that 319 00:17:11,040 --> 00:17:15,679 Speaker 7: we are We have been developing capabilities for electronic interference 320 00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:17,879 Speaker 7: for several years and been using those, but at this 321 00:17:17,960 --> 00:17:20,199 Speaker 7: point in time, it is now incumbent on us to 322 00:17:20,240 --> 00:17:23,760 Speaker 7: do two things. First is to develop capabilities that will 323 00:17:23,760 --> 00:17:26,080 Speaker 7: defend our satellites in a whole host of ways. And 324 00:17:26,119 --> 00:17:29,280 Speaker 7: it will become our responsibility also to deny adversary use 325 00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:32,640 Speaker 7: of space. And so what I'll say today is, as 326 00:17:32,680 --> 00:17:36,320 Speaker 7: a result of the activities of others, we are looking 327 00:17:36,359 --> 00:17:38,600 Speaker 7: at and preparing for a whole host of ways to 328 00:17:38,640 --> 00:17:41,760 Speaker 7: both defend and protect our capabilities, but also potentially deny 329 00:17:42,760 --> 00:17:44,680 Speaker 7: adversary's use of space and conflict. 330 00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:49,080 Speaker 1: If you think back to the nuclear age, the concept 331 00:17:49,119 --> 00:17:51,159 Speaker 1: of deterrence is maybe you didn't want to use it, 332 00:17:51,200 --> 00:17:54,520 Speaker 1: but just the adversary knowing that you could deterred them. 333 00:17:54,640 --> 00:17:55,679 Speaker 1: Is that the idea. 334 00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:59,080 Speaker 3: So that is absolutely our approach, especially our approach to 335 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:03,280 Speaker 3: new contentstallations what we call proliferated. 336 00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:05,240 Speaker 7: Constellations A constellations. 337 00:18:04,720 --> 00:18:08,120 Speaker 3: Sorry, a whole bunch of satellites, right, constellation of satellites. Right. 338 00:18:08,280 --> 00:18:11,240 Speaker 3: Most of the satellites we've developed in the past, relatively 339 00:18:11,280 --> 00:18:15,000 Speaker 3: small in number GPS satellites about thirty provide all that 340 00:18:15,040 --> 00:18:19,399 Speaker 3: global coverage communication satellites depends on specifically what they're for, 341 00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:22,920 Speaker 3: but usually from about six to a dozen satellites to 342 00:18:22,960 --> 00:18:26,680 Speaker 3: provide those communications, our mister warning constellations about the same size. 343 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:30,600 Speaker 3: What we're moving to now is as opposed to tens, 344 00:18:31,040 --> 00:18:33,520 Speaker 3: maybe tens of satellites to conduct missions, we're now talking 345 00:18:33,520 --> 00:18:36,960 Speaker 3: about one hundreds and thousands. And so the first thing 346 00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:39,879 Speaker 3: you say is, Okay, if my goal is to attack 347 00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:43,760 Speaker 3: ten satellites, that's a manageable problem. If now the goal 348 00:18:43,880 --> 00:18:45,359 Speaker 3: is I got to take out one hundred or a 349 00:18:45,400 --> 00:18:47,920 Speaker 3: thousand satellites. That's much harder, and so there's a detern 350 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:51,840 Speaker 3: effect there because it is very hard to do something 351 00:18:51,920 --> 00:18:54,639 Speaker 3: like that. And so that's the first part. The second 352 00:18:54,640 --> 00:18:57,639 Speaker 3: part is if an adversary looks into space and either 353 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:02,679 Speaker 3: sees through desire to deny US use of space, or 354 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:05,000 Speaker 3: US knowing that we can take their space capabilities away, 355 00:19:05,040 --> 00:19:07,040 Speaker 3: if they look into space and say, I will not 356 00:19:07,119 --> 00:19:08,800 Speaker 3: be able to do what I intend to do. I'm 357 00:19:08,840 --> 00:19:12,560 Speaker 3: not going to go to conflict today, That's exactly what 358 00:19:12,640 --> 00:19:14,840 Speaker 3: the intent is. We do not want to see, especially 359 00:19:14,880 --> 00:19:17,600 Speaker 3: members of the US Space Force, but the United States America 360 00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:19,840 Speaker 3: and our leaders don't want to see conflict in space. 361 00:19:20,280 --> 00:19:23,359 Speaker 3: And so our first goal is to deter any adversary 362 00:19:23,400 --> 00:19:27,080 Speaker 3: action in space, but make it clear to everybody and 363 00:19:27,119 --> 00:19:29,639 Speaker 3: anybody if it comes to that, we are preparing to 364 00:19:29,680 --> 00:19:32,879 Speaker 3: win in space. So the second piece of China is 365 00:19:32,880 --> 00:19:35,720 Speaker 3: not just offensive capabilities. The second piece of China is 366 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:39,040 Speaker 3: they've watched how effective we are in space with GPS, 367 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:43,200 Speaker 3: with communication satellites, with monitoring and detecting activities. They're building 368 00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:45,480 Speaker 3: out a similar constellation to do the same thing that 369 00:19:45,480 --> 00:19:48,840 Speaker 3: we've been doing for decades. On the Russia side, they 370 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:52,879 Speaker 3: are not as focused on that second piece, but they 371 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:56,400 Speaker 3: are very much focused on offensive capabilities, just like the Chinese. 372 00:19:56,400 --> 00:20:00,560 Speaker 3: And while they're not moving as aggressively and as broddly 373 00:20:01,119 --> 00:20:04,000 Speaker 3: to develop offensive weapons for space, they're doing the same things. 374 00:20:04,359 --> 00:20:08,000 Speaker 3: Just recently, they conducted a kinetic attack, launched a missile 375 00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:10,080 Speaker 3: from the ground, destroyed one of their satellites in space. 376 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:14,080 Speaker 3: The fall of twenty twenty, they launched objects into space 377 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:17,840 Speaker 3: maneuved them very close to some of our most capable satellites, 378 00:20:17,880 --> 00:20:21,639 Speaker 3: demonstrating that they're prepared to attack them in space. Same 379 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:25,960 Speaker 3: thing with attacks through cyberspace, interference, jamming, on the ground, 380 00:20:26,080 --> 00:20:31,800 Speaker 3: laser dazzling. They are as aggressively pursuing offensive capabilities, deny 381 00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:34,119 Speaker 3: or use of space as the Chinese. 382 00:20:34,880 --> 00:20:38,440 Speaker 7: And satellites have played a really important role in the 383 00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:43,199 Speaker 7: war in Ukraine, especially on the side of Ukraine the 384 00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:46,560 Speaker 7: USSEU in helping support the war. 385 00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:49,880 Speaker 3: They absolutely have and in fact, in many cases those 386 00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:52,359 Speaker 3: are commercial companies doing that, which has opened up a 387 00:20:52,400 --> 00:20:56,320 Speaker 3: whole new area of interest and exploration and work required 388 00:20:56,480 --> 00:21:00,480 Speaker 3: from a policy standpoint is what's the relationship between commercial 389 00:21:00,520 --> 00:21:04,080 Speaker 3: companies and commercial services from space as it applies to conflict. 390 00:21:04,560 --> 00:21:10,840 Speaker 3: A lot of companies monitor see sense collect information from space, 391 00:21:10,880 --> 00:21:13,760 Speaker 3: and they've been able to provide that to Ukrainians. Companies 392 00:21:13,760 --> 00:21:18,200 Speaker 3: have provided the ability to communicate where both through the 393 00:21:18,760 --> 00:21:21,040 Speaker 3: physical attacks on the ground and some of the Russian 394 00:21:21,040 --> 00:21:25,040 Speaker 3: cyberspace attacks, and the Russians have been working hard to 395 00:21:25,080 --> 00:21:28,040 Speaker 3: deny them those that use and it has proven to 396 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:29,200 Speaker 3: be quite a challenge. 397 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:33,600 Speaker 7: Do you worry that an arms race in space is 398 00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:34,960 Speaker 7: ultimately inevitable? 399 00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:37,960 Speaker 3: I guess I am concerned. I'm concerned about that just 400 00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:40,640 Speaker 3: like any other domain. And I would say a couple 401 00:21:40,680 --> 00:21:44,080 Speaker 3: of things. One is, from my perspective, our job is 402 00:21:44,119 --> 00:21:48,360 Speaker 3: to ensure that both our forces and our national leaders 403 00:21:49,280 --> 00:21:52,239 Speaker 3: have the capabilities that they need and the options that 404 00:21:52,280 --> 00:21:56,040 Speaker 3: they need to operate effectively in the diplomatic space, in 405 00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:59,560 Speaker 3: the military space, and count on those folks to help 406 00:21:59,640 --> 00:22:01,280 Speaker 3: us work through the issues of how do we do 407 00:22:01,320 --> 00:22:03,680 Speaker 3: that responsibly, how do we do that as a community 408 00:22:03,720 --> 00:22:07,320 Speaker 3: of nations. And so while I'm concerned about how we're 409 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:09,800 Speaker 3: growing in space, I would say, to some extent it 410 00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:13,359 Speaker 3: is sort of inevitable. Unfortunately, that's a nature of the 411 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:18,600 Speaker 3: human race. Our job is provide those capabilities, help to 412 00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:22,119 Speaker 3: ensure that we use them effectively but also responsibly, and 413 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,160 Speaker 3: then work hard on the deterrens piece so that hopefully 414 00:22:25,200 --> 00:22:26,719 Speaker 3: it never comes to actual conflict. 415 00:22:26,880 --> 00:22:28,920 Speaker 1: And again, if you think back to the Cold War, 416 00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:32,280 Speaker 1: there were all of these deconfliction lines that if something 417 00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:35,639 Speaker 1: looked bad you could quickly call and say, hey, it's okay. 418 00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:39,000 Speaker 1: Are there those kinds of lines of communication with China, 419 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:42,320 Speaker 1: with Russia specifically with regards to space. 420 00:22:42,520 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 3: No, not really today, and that's not different than a 421 00:22:46,840 --> 00:22:50,600 Speaker 3: lot of our communications these days. However, there is a 422 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:55,480 Speaker 3: body in the UN that's focused on developing responsible behaviors 423 00:22:55,480 --> 00:22:58,080 Speaker 3: in space and trying to get the community of nations 424 00:22:58,119 --> 00:23:02,080 Speaker 3: to agree to them. That effort is led for the 425 00:23:02,160 --> 00:23:05,040 Speaker 3: US by the State Department. But just a couple of 426 00:23:05,119 --> 00:23:07,680 Speaker 3: years ago, the Secretary of Defense Secretary of Austin put 427 00:23:07,720 --> 00:23:12,560 Speaker 3: out what we believe are tenants for responsible behavior in 428 00:23:12,640 --> 00:23:16,439 Speaker 3: space that we the Department of Defense will follow. Things 429 00:23:16,600 --> 00:23:19,760 Speaker 3: like communicating our tension with respect to what we're doing 430 00:23:19,800 --> 00:23:24,440 Speaker 3: in space, not conducting activities that create large amounts of 431 00:23:24,480 --> 00:23:28,080 Speaker 3: debris like Connecticut SAT tests. Those are the sorts of 432 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:32,119 Speaker 3: things that we believe are foundational to responsible behavior in 433 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:37,439 Speaker 3: space and hope that that spurs additional negotiations and agreements 434 00:23:37,800 --> 00:23:41,320 Speaker 3: in the United Nations and with others to really operate 435 00:23:41,520 --> 00:23:42,679 Speaker 3: responsibly in space. 436 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:47,080 Speaker 1: So you said in the next five ten years, maybe 437 00:23:47,119 --> 00:23:50,000 Speaker 1: space for US grows about thirty percent. That means you're recruiting. 438 00:23:50,040 --> 00:23:52,080 Speaker 1: What's the recruitment pitch for space for us, Like we 439 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:53,960 Speaker 1: know what it is for Army and Navy. You know 440 00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:55,240 Speaker 1: what's your pitch today? 441 00:23:55,240 --> 00:23:57,120 Speaker 3: Well, and I will say, I know that the other 442 00:23:57,200 --> 00:24:00,879 Speaker 3: services are facing some recruiting chain lengers right now. We 443 00:24:00,920 --> 00:24:03,919 Speaker 3: are not, but ours is. I mean, it feels like 444 00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 3: back to the future. Right when I was young, space 445 00:24:06,240 --> 00:24:09,479 Speaker 3: was cool. There was this grand vision and idea of 446 00:24:09,520 --> 00:24:12,240 Speaker 3: moving out into the galaxy and things are going on. Well, 447 00:24:12,359 --> 00:24:15,640 Speaker 3: that's not exactly our pitch, but we are certainly leveraging 448 00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:18,399 Speaker 3: that desire and that interest. If you want to do 449 00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:20,840 Speaker 3: something that matters, if you want to serve the nation, 450 00:24:20,960 --> 00:24:24,000 Speaker 3: if you want to work with advanced technology and really 451 00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:27,800 Speaker 3: operate in and deal with activities and what is still 452 00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:32,639 Speaker 3: my opinion, the final frontier, not just today focused on 453 00:24:32,720 --> 00:24:34,800 Speaker 3: what we do on Earth, but in the future, as 454 00:24:34,800 --> 00:24:36,840 Speaker 3: we move out towards the Moon in Mars. You can 455 00:24:36,880 --> 00:24:39,080 Speaker 3: go to commercial industry, you can go to NASA, but 456 00:24:39,160 --> 00:24:41,080 Speaker 3: absolutely there's a role for you in the Space force 457 00:24:41,119 --> 00:24:41,520 Speaker 3: as well. 458 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:44,840 Speaker 1: And what are the top three positions say that you 459 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:46,480 Speaker 1: would be recruiting for it of yours, like, this is 460 00:24:46,480 --> 00:24:46,960 Speaker 1: what we need? 461 00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:49,880 Speaker 3: Yeah, Well, we only really do four things, so they 462 00:24:49,880 --> 00:24:53,400 Speaker 3: are all important. The first is we build and then 463 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:55,720 Speaker 3: launch those space systems in thework, but that's one thing 464 00:24:55,760 --> 00:24:58,280 Speaker 3: you can do. You can be an engineer, a program manager. 465 00:24:58,680 --> 00:25:00,600 Speaker 3: The second thing we do is we opt them, so 466 00:25:00,680 --> 00:25:03,440 Speaker 3: you're no kidding sitting there in the operations center managing 467 00:25:03,480 --> 00:25:06,280 Speaker 3: the activities and fly and the things you need to 468 00:25:06,320 --> 00:25:08,240 Speaker 3: do every single day. If you want to be an 469 00:25:08,240 --> 00:25:11,040 Speaker 3: intelligence specialist like you might be in the air, on 470 00:25:11,080 --> 00:25:14,320 Speaker 3: the ground, at sea. We need folks who deeply understand 471 00:25:14,400 --> 00:25:17,560 Speaker 3: what's going on in the domain, what other capabilities exist 472 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:20,119 Speaker 3: out there, how people operate, so we need those. And 473 00:25:20,160 --> 00:25:27,800 Speaker 3: then lastly, space capabilities today don't really produce except through cyberspace. 474 00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:30,440 Speaker 3: That information it's collectors from those satellites has to get 475 00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:33,119 Speaker 3: to the ground. It has to be disseminated. We have 476 00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:36,720 Speaker 3: to operate networks and IT systems to operate them, to 477 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:38,560 Speaker 3: connect them and get that data that people need them. 478 00:25:38,560 --> 00:25:42,760 Speaker 3: So we need cyberspace operators and cyberspace defenders. And because 479 00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:46,640 Speaker 3: we're small our numbers, we only need several hundred people 480 00:25:46,680 --> 00:25:48,639 Speaker 3: a year. And so right now we don't really have 481 00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:52,600 Speaker 3: a recruiting challenge. We have the opportunity to accept applicants 482 00:25:52,600 --> 00:25:55,560 Speaker 3: and from those applicants choose the absolute best to come 483 00:25:55,560 --> 00:25:57,520 Speaker 3: into the space for So it's a pretty easy sell. 484 00:25:57,960 --> 00:25:59,560 Speaker 1: Do you ever get to premise and they're going to 485 00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:00,280 Speaker 1: get to go to space? 486 00:26:02,600 --> 00:26:06,080 Speaker 3: So I would say I hope someday that can guardians 487 00:26:06,119 --> 00:26:08,720 Speaker 3: go to space? Yes, today we have two guardians who 488 00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:13,560 Speaker 3: go to space. They are astronauts in NASA's Astronaut Core. 489 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:18,040 Speaker 3: Most of our works on the ground as the human race, 490 00:26:18,080 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 3: as the nation and the human race goes back to 491 00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:23,280 Speaker 3: the Moon, goes to Mars, goes beyond that. Will there 492 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:27,080 Speaker 3: be a place for guardians in space? Absolutely in the future, 493 00:26:27,119 --> 00:26:29,800 Speaker 3: and we are you know, Ana as NASA returns to 494 00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:32,359 Speaker 3: the Moon, we talk about how do you navigate near 495 00:26:32,400 --> 00:26:34,200 Speaker 3: the moon, how do you communicate near the moon, how 496 00:26:34,200 --> 00:26:37,639 Speaker 3: do you understand what's happening in the lunar space, and 497 00:26:37,680 --> 00:26:40,800 Speaker 3: whether it's a hazard or a threat. Guardians are doing 498 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:43,280 Speaker 3: all of that today, side by side with NASA. We're 499 00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:45,359 Speaker 3: just doing it from the ground. We're not doing it 500 00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:48,280 Speaker 3: in space yet, but one day somewhere out there in 501 00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:48,720 Speaker 3: the future. 502 00:26:48,720 --> 00:26:50,560 Speaker 1: Absolutely, do you have to suffer through a lot of 503 00:26:50,640 --> 00:26:52,080 Speaker 1: guardians at the galaxy jokes? 504 00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:56,200 Speaker 3: Ah, we do. But you know what, humor is part 505 00:26:56,240 --> 00:26:58,520 Speaker 3: of the American psyche and culture. And if you can't 506 00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:00,560 Speaker 3: take a joke, you know what you really have to 507 00:27:00,560 --> 00:27:02,760 Speaker 3: do is just embrace it. Like I said, you know, 508 00:27:02,920 --> 00:27:06,399 Speaker 3: my people are nerds, and today nerd is cool. 509 00:27:06,960 --> 00:27:09,080 Speaker 7: General Thompson, thanks so much for speaking with me. 510 00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:10,639 Speaker 3: Absolutely, it's been a real pleasure. 511 00:27:12,600 --> 00:27:14,760 Speaker 1: When we come back. What the US is doing to 512 00:27:14,840 --> 00:27:27,840 Speaker 1: prepare for an escalation of tensions in space. If the 513 00:27:27,960 --> 00:27:30,760 Speaker 1: kind of conflict in space that General Thompson talked about 514 00:27:30,800 --> 00:27:34,640 Speaker 1: did happen, that's when the US Space Command would take charge, 515 00:27:34,760 --> 00:27:38,080 Speaker 1: with Space Force and other branches of the US military 516 00:27:38,240 --> 00:27:44,000 Speaker 1: pitching in personnel and resources. Bloomberg's Katrina Manson covers cyber 517 00:27:44,080 --> 00:27:47,880 Speaker 1: and emerging tech. I asked her about Space Command and 518 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:51,199 Speaker 1: what exactly the US is doing to prepare for a 519 00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:57,080 Speaker 1: potential military confrontation high above the Earth, Katrina, you've been 520 00:27:57,080 --> 00:28:01,480 Speaker 1: out to Space Command in Colorado, I think twice now, right, Yeah. 521 00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:01,800 Speaker 4: That's right. 522 00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:06,240 Speaker 6: I went in twenty eighteen and then again in twenty twenty, 523 00:28:06,440 --> 00:28:07,679 Speaker 6: so a while ago. 524 00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:10,000 Speaker 4: What really struck me. 525 00:28:10,400 --> 00:28:15,320 Speaker 6: Is it's kind of a low slung building and obviously 526 00:28:15,560 --> 00:28:19,119 Speaker 6: one's looking for one's fill of Star Trek analogies and 527 00:28:19,160 --> 00:28:22,760 Speaker 6: a bit of Battlestar Galactica. I think you get it 528 00:28:22,800 --> 00:28:26,360 Speaker 6: more and more now from Space Force, but Space Command 529 00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:28,760 Speaker 6: looked to me a little bit like a sort of 530 00:28:29,040 --> 00:28:32,800 Speaker 6: rudimentary rocket combined with a crossed with a sardine can. 531 00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:36,480 Speaker 6: And inside it's a little bit like visiting a smaller 532 00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:39,200 Speaker 6: version of the National Air and Space Museum. 533 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 4: There are lots of wrapped boxes. 534 00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:46,640 Speaker 6: In the sky hanging down from the ceilings, and their satellites, 535 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,560 Speaker 6: their models of satellites. And the thing that really struck 536 00:28:49,600 --> 00:28:53,200 Speaker 6: me is the early satellites are big and the newer 537 00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:56,720 Speaker 6: satellites are small, and it's just a really clear demonstration 538 00:28:56,840 --> 00:29:00,160 Speaker 6: of the way the whole entire approach to space is 539 00:29:00,160 --> 00:29:00,760 Speaker 6: is changing. 540 00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:03,600 Speaker 1: And of course that's what we're talking about today. And 541 00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:08,760 Speaker 1: you visited Space Command, and there's that distinction between Space 542 00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:10,560 Speaker 1: Command and Space Force. 543 00:29:11,520 --> 00:29:13,680 Speaker 6: The simplest way to think about it is Space Force 544 00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:17,280 Speaker 6: provides the people, and Space Command does the fighting, and 545 00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:20,720 Speaker 6: in this case in peace, does the operations. Space Command 546 00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:25,640 Speaker 6: existed a long time ago, it got disestablished and then 547 00:29:25,920 --> 00:29:29,640 Speaker 6: got set up again in full in twenty nineteen, and 548 00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:32,400 Speaker 6: the whole point of that really is about saying spaces 549 00:29:32,800 --> 00:29:36,120 Speaker 6: in the US jargon of the thing, a war fighting domain, 550 00:29:36,640 --> 00:29:41,640 Speaker 6: and the whole effort of creating, re establishing Space Command, 551 00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:44,320 Speaker 6: and then establishing Space Force for the first time. As 552 00:29:44,360 --> 00:29:46,760 Speaker 6: much as it was sort of accompanied by mirth, and 553 00:29:46,760 --> 00:29:49,000 Speaker 6: there are lots of detractors, I think the fact that 554 00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:51,920 Speaker 6: it has stuck it out is so much about this 555 00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:57,280 Speaker 6: US focus on what it sees as the threat from China, 556 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:01,600 Speaker 6: and the fact that they've noticed China really develop its 557 00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:05,200 Speaker 6: own space architecture really propel what it's trying to do. 558 00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:08,040 Speaker 6: I think China itself has said it wants to overtake 559 00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:12,440 Speaker 6: globally in space by twenty forty five, and the US 560 00:30:12,480 --> 00:30:14,360 Speaker 6: has said they think China really will be a world 561 00:30:14,400 --> 00:30:17,640 Speaker 6: class player by twenty thirty. But of course China already 562 00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:21,640 Speaker 6: in the US estimation, has many different types of weapons 563 00:30:21,680 --> 00:30:25,880 Speaker 6: in space and focused on space that has concerned the US, 564 00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:29,520 Speaker 6: and I think when you speak to senior US military 565 00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:32,680 Speaker 6: officials they talk a lot about developing to terrans in space. 566 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:35,760 Speaker 6: That's already an admission that the US is not quite 567 00:30:35,800 --> 00:30:39,360 Speaker 6: clear what level of space superiority it has, and of 568 00:30:39,360 --> 00:30:43,560 Speaker 6: course to terrance means being able to win and then letting. 569 00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:45,480 Speaker 6: In this case, the Chinese know that. 570 00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:51,800 Speaker 1: What is the current capability of the US in defending 571 00:30:52,360 --> 00:30:53,240 Speaker 1: those satellites. 572 00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:56,440 Speaker 6: I think they're really clear not enough. When I visited 573 00:30:56,480 --> 00:30:59,479 Speaker 6: in twenty twenty, I spoke to a general Space Command 574 00:30:59,480 --> 00:31:02,200 Speaker 6: who said the US really needed to start thinking about 575 00:31:02,520 --> 00:31:04,880 Speaker 6: offensive weapons in space, and of course that triggers all 576 00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:08,920 Speaker 6: sorts of questions in Congress, in the American public, and 577 00:31:08,960 --> 00:31:11,600 Speaker 6: indeed the A. Biden administration, which has not set out 578 00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:15,000 Speaker 6: this aim. But I think Space Command, Space Force, and 579 00:31:15,080 --> 00:31:17,720 Speaker 6: its supporters are really leaning into this idea that the 580 00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:20,640 Speaker 6: US needs much more capability. The US says that it 581 00:31:20,720 --> 00:31:24,840 Speaker 6: has communications jamming equipment that could jam a satellite, but 582 00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:28,280 Speaker 6: that it doesn't have any space based weaponry, and several 583 00:31:28,320 --> 00:31:30,560 Speaker 6: other of the different types of weapons that you could 584 00:31:30,680 --> 00:31:33,840 Speaker 6: use from ground to space, from space to space, and 585 00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:34,960 Speaker 6: from space back. 586 00:31:34,800 --> 00:31:36,440 Speaker 4: Down to the ground. There's a whole array. 587 00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:39,360 Speaker 6: I think the thing that really triggered US concerns was 588 00:31:39,360 --> 00:31:41,600 Speaker 6: back in two thousand and seven when the Chinese launched 589 00:31:41,800 --> 00:31:46,400 Speaker 6: an anti satellite test that did explode a decaying Chinese satellite, 590 00:31:46,600 --> 00:31:48,840 Speaker 6: and that's really when the US started saying, oh, China 591 00:31:48,880 --> 00:31:53,400 Speaker 6: is serious about this. That test was criticized as irresponsible. 592 00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:56,400 Speaker 6: It put I think more than twenty thousand pieces of 593 00:31:56,440 --> 00:31:59,040 Speaker 6: debris into circulation, and a couple of thousands of those 594 00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:01,040 Speaker 6: prices are still circulating today. 595 00:32:01,240 --> 00:32:02,720 Speaker 4: But of course the US has done the same. It 596 00:32:02,720 --> 00:32:03,600 Speaker 4: did it before. 597 00:32:03,440 --> 00:32:06,800 Speaker 6: China, and it's done it since China in two thousand 598 00:32:06,840 --> 00:32:07,240 Speaker 6: and eight. 599 00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:08,680 Speaker 4: India's also done it. 600 00:32:09,000 --> 00:32:11,600 Speaker 6: Russia did it in twenty twenty one, just on the 601 00:32:11,640 --> 00:32:15,760 Speaker 6: eve of the invasion of Ukraine. And this kind of 602 00:32:15,840 --> 00:32:19,720 Speaker 6: mounting concern has seen the US really want to develop things. 603 00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:23,200 Speaker 6: And what the US is worried about is when they 604 00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:26,480 Speaker 6: do these wargames that involve global scenarios over Taiwan, it 605 00:32:26,480 --> 00:32:29,640 Speaker 6: tends to very quickly escalate to space. The US is 606 00:32:29,680 --> 00:32:31,960 Speaker 6: worried that China will fire the first shots of any 607 00:32:32,000 --> 00:32:35,719 Speaker 6: war in Taiwan in space, degrading US space capabilities that 608 00:32:36,040 --> 00:32:39,440 Speaker 6: enable the US to communicate with its own military forces 609 00:32:39,520 --> 00:32:42,320 Speaker 6: and to move its own weapons around the world. 610 00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:47,080 Speaker 1: You talked about these shootdowns of satellites that China did 611 00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:51,240 Speaker 1: and Russia did. Is some of the thinking that those 612 00:32:51,360 --> 00:32:55,360 Speaker 1: were in part just to show the US the capability 613 00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:58,440 Speaker 1: that they had. That the shooting down of the satellite 614 00:32:58,480 --> 00:33:00,000 Speaker 1: wasn't really the main point. 615 00:33:00,240 --> 00:33:00,920 Speaker 4: In China's case. 616 00:33:00,920 --> 00:33:02,640 Speaker 6: They said they just needed to get an old weather 617 00:33:02,760 --> 00:33:05,080 Speaker 6: satellite out of the way, and that's not really how 618 00:33:05,120 --> 00:33:06,880 Speaker 6: you need to remove an old weather satellite. So I 619 00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:09,800 Speaker 6: think the US certainly really saw that as their wake 620 00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:11,960 Speaker 6: up call and used it as their wake up call. 621 00:33:12,040 --> 00:33:15,040 Speaker 6: They did their own anti satellite test the next year. 622 00:33:15,320 --> 00:33:18,000 Speaker 6: India did theirs in twenty nineteen. I think there is 623 00:33:18,080 --> 00:33:20,800 Speaker 6: so much signaling going on in space and no one's 624 00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:23,680 Speaker 6: really figured out their doctrine yet. So in the same 625 00:33:23,720 --> 00:33:26,320 Speaker 6: way that you hear about a cyber pearl harbor, the 626 00:33:26,360 --> 00:33:30,600 Speaker 6: original pearl harbor, there is a scenario that some US 627 00:33:30,680 --> 00:33:33,200 Speaker 6: thinkers on this talk about as a space pearl harbor 628 00:33:33,760 --> 00:33:38,080 Speaker 6: where China might destroy US capabilities in space to say 629 00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:40,240 Speaker 6: that's it, we really mean business, leave us alone. 630 00:33:40,440 --> 00:33:41,920 Speaker 4: Where the US would see that. 631 00:33:41,840 --> 00:33:45,400 Speaker 6: As the first shot of all out war, and so 632 00:33:45,520 --> 00:33:49,280 Speaker 6: that kind of messaging, that kind of escalatory tension is 633 00:33:49,400 --> 00:33:52,920 Speaker 6: so carefully done. It's meant to be modulated very carefully, 634 00:33:52,920 --> 00:33:54,880 Speaker 6: but no one quite knows the rules of the discussion. 635 00:33:55,120 --> 00:33:57,240 Speaker 6: And what you see from Space Command and Space Force 636 00:33:57,320 --> 00:34:00,000 Speaker 6: is saying no, no, no. China is putting so much 637 00:34:00,120 --> 00:34:04,480 Speaker 6: much military hardware now into space. It did more military 638 00:34:04,520 --> 00:34:07,719 Speaker 6: launches in space last year than the US, and that 639 00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:10,680 Speaker 6: trajectory really scares the US. And whether you sort of 640 00:34:10,840 --> 00:34:13,040 Speaker 6: look away and say we won't compete, or you say 641 00:34:13,120 --> 00:34:16,360 Speaker 6: we will match you, that's the very difficult balancing it 642 00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:18,759 Speaker 6: that the US is facing, because it's clear that the 643 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:22,279 Speaker 6: US isn't prepared to let China have that capability. The 644 00:34:22,440 --> 00:34:25,560 Speaker 6: US wants to be able to have superiority, because that's 645 00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,760 Speaker 6: what it sees as the deterrent effect. 646 00:34:29,239 --> 00:34:33,160 Speaker 1: When you're talking to your sources, how concerned are they 647 00:34:33,280 --> 00:34:35,520 Speaker 1: that we could have an arms race in space? 648 00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:38,319 Speaker 6: I think it's really fair to say the arms race 649 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:41,920 Speaker 6: is already on, And certainly in terms of perception, the 650 00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:44,120 Speaker 6: amount that you're seeing from the commercial world putting up 651 00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:47,400 Speaker 6: into space also creates huge dilemmas for the US military 652 00:34:47,400 --> 00:34:49,560 Speaker 6: and what they need to defend, and a lot of 653 00:34:49,560 --> 00:34:52,480 Speaker 6: that hasn't been ironed out yet. The US at the 654 00:34:52,520 --> 00:34:54,640 Speaker 6: moment is trying to work out if they should make 655 00:34:54,680 --> 00:34:59,640 Speaker 6: space critical infrastructure, should they specifically designate things in space's 656 00:34:59,640 --> 00:35:03,160 Speaker 6: critical infrastructure. There are a number of different elements that 657 00:35:03,239 --> 00:35:06,719 Speaker 6: are label critical infrastructure, which means that any attack on 658 00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:10,400 Speaker 6: them is seen as an attack on national security and 659 00:35:10,560 --> 00:35:12,720 Speaker 6: the US needs to defend. And in fact, when President 660 00:35:12,719 --> 00:35:16,560 Speaker 6: Biden went to meet Vladimir Putin some time ago, he said, hey, 661 00:35:16,640 --> 00:35:17,360 Speaker 6: don't touch. 662 00:35:17,160 --> 00:35:19,439 Speaker 4: Our critical infrastructure. This is what it is now. 663 00:35:19,480 --> 00:35:22,680 Speaker 6: A lot of that critical infrastructure depends on space, and 664 00:35:22,719 --> 00:35:25,040 Speaker 6: there's a discussion right now in the US about whether 665 00:35:25,440 --> 00:35:28,280 Speaker 6: that is sufficient. Does the fact that these things depend 666 00:35:28,320 --> 00:35:33,240 Speaker 6: on space mean that space is indirectly preserved and clearly 667 00:35:33,320 --> 00:35:35,319 Speaker 6: off limits, or does the US need to take a 668 00:35:35,320 --> 00:35:38,839 Speaker 6: step extra and say, actually, anything in space counts as 669 00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:42,000 Speaker 6: critical infrastructure, which would then require all sorts of different 670 00:35:42,080 --> 00:35:44,319 Speaker 6: defensive means. And of course, a lot of US food 671 00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,799 Speaker 6: supply now depends on space, our mobile phones depend more 672 00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:52,040 Speaker 6: and more on space. Every single element of US national economy, 673 00:35:52,040 --> 00:35:55,840 Speaker 6: which is increasingly tied to national security, relies on space 674 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:59,240 Speaker 6: in part and will only rely more on space in future. 675 00:36:00,080 --> 00:36:03,040 Speaker 6: Looking at exactly how you defend that and putting more 676 00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:05,680 Speaker 6: things up in space to defend that, of course, begins 677 00:36:05,680 --> 00:36:09,360 Speaker 6: to create huge anxiety on both sides. I think you 678 00:36:09,360 --> 00:36:11,439 Speaker 6: could speak to a number of people today who would 679 00:36:11,480 --> 00:36:14,680 Speaker 6: say the space race is already. 680 00:36:14,239 --> 00:36:17,920 Speaker 1: On, Katrina. One of the reasons we're doing this episode 681 00:36:18,200 --> 00:36:20,319 Speaker 1: is because all the things we're talking about here, I 682 00:36:20,320 --> 00:36:23,480 Speaker 1: think most people just don't even know is something that 683 00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:27,480 Speaker 1: Space Force does. What do you think people get wrong 684 00:36:27,520 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 1: about Space Force? 685 00:36:29,880 --> 00:36:32,920 Speaker 6: Well, of course there's this TV show all about Space 686 00:36:32,960 --> 00:36:35,759 Speaker 6: Force with Steve Carell, and that became a kind of 687 00:36:35,840 --> 00:36:39,600 Speaker 6: very clear parody of Space Force, and they've been a 688 00:36:39,640 --> 00:36:42,600 Speaker 6: little health hostage to some of that themselves. They've spent 689 00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:44,560 Speaker 6: a lot of time on uniforms. All of this always 690 00:36:44,560 --> 00:36:46,799 Speaker 6: happens in the military services, and they're only getting going. 691 00:36:46,880 --> 00:36:50,920 Speaker 6: So I think they defend that quite clearly. But obviously, 692 00:36:50,960 --> 00:36:55,759 Speaker 6: the entire corpus of sci fi and our popular understanding 693 00:36:55,800 --> 00:36:59,200 Speaker 6: of space is sort of fun and quirky, and so 694 00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:01,960 Speaker 6: they have to with that fun and quirky feeling at 695 00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:04,160 Speaker 6: the same time as thinking, hold on, can we just 696 00:37:04,200 --> 00:37:06,920 Speaker 6: put our hands up. Everything we have depends on space. 697 00:37:07,000 --> 00:37:10,239 Speaker 6: This is far more vulnerable than people realize, and I 698 00:37:10,239 --> 00:37:13,160 Speaker 6: think the popular conception is that it's a bit of 699 00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:15,399 Speaker 6: a joke. And when I did speak to a general 700 00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:17,440 Speaker 6: at Space Command, I asked him if you'd watched the 701 00:37:17,480 --> 00:37:19,160 Speaker 6: TV show and he binge watched it in a night. 702 00:37:19,239 --> 00:37:21,440 Speaker 6: And they're very good natured about it. They say anything 703 00:37:21,480 --> 00:37:24,680 Speaker 6: that brings attention to space force and anything to do 704 00:37:24,719 --> 00:37:26,520 Speaker 6: with space is good by us. I think they took 705 00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:29,560 Speaker 6: a sort of sanguine view that they couldn't start fighting 706 00:37:29,600 --> 00:37:32,279 Speaker 6: it before they'd even established their own reputation. But this 707 00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:35,719 Speaker 6: is a reputation that is developing in the public consciousness now, 708 00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:38,200 Speaker 6: so it really depends and I think the language around 709 00:37:38,239 --> 00:37:41,160 Speaker 6: it matters so much for trying to get public support 710 00:37:41,239 --> 00:37:41,720 Speaker 6: on board. 711 00:37:42,400 --> 00:37:45,279 Speaker 1: Katrina, thanks so much for speaking with me today, Thanks 712 00:37:45,320 --> 00:37:48,120 Speaker 1: for having me, Thanks for listening to us here at 713 00:37:48,120 --> 00:37:51,440 Speaker 1: the Big Day. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. 714 00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:56,440 Speaker 1: For more shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 715 00:37:56,600 --> 00:37:59,520 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen, and we'd love to hear from you. 716 00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:03,799 Speaker 1: Email questions or comments to Big Take at Bloomberg dot Net. 717 00:38:04,640 --> 00:38:07,560 Speaker 1: The supervising producer of the Big Take and the producer 718 00:38:07,600 --> 00:38:11,560 Speaker 1: of this episode is Vicky Virgalina. Our senior producer is 719 00:38:11,719 --> 00:38:16,320 Speaker 1: Katherine Fink. Raphae alm Sei is our engineer, with additional 720 00:38:16,360 --> 00:38:21,400 Speaker 1: production support from Nielli, Haramio Plata and Abrea Ruffin. Our 721 00:38:21,440 --> 00:38:25,520 Speaker 1: original music was composed by Leo Sidrin. I'm west Kosova. 722 00:38:25,840 --> 00:38:28,319 Speaker 1: We'll be back tomorrow with another Big Take.