WEBVTT - PRISM Part One

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff Works dot Com. Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jonathan Strickland, and today we are going to start

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<v Speaker 1>a two part series and we may even go further

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<v Speaker 1>into this in the future about PRISM and the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A and intelligence and intelligence gathering and how that

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<v Speaker 1>affects everybody, American citizens, people all around the world. And

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<v Speaker 1>what is all this this hubub about anyway, right, because

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<v Speaker 1>there's been quite a great deal of hubbub ever since

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<v Speaker 1>a fellow named Edward Snowden uh leaked some information to

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<v Speaker 1>some to some press like The Guardian and the Washington Post.

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<v Speaker 1>Although to be fair, the hubb had really been going

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<v Speaker 1>on for much longer than that, and and and this

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<v Speaker 1>was just kind of one of those big things that

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<v Speaker 1>everyone has gone a minute, yeah, for good reasons. But

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<v Speaker 1>snow Din pushed the snowball that became the avalanche. That's

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<v Speaker 1>that's what happened. But you know, today, what we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about in this episode is kind of laying

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<v Speaker 1>the groundwork so that our discussion about the PRISM program

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<v Speaker 1>and the related programs makes sense. So in order for

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<v Speaker 1>us to do that, we really wanted to talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about kind of the groundwork here, knowing the existing US policy, right,

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<v Speaker 1>knowing that some people, some of our listeners may not

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<v Speaker 1>be familiar with the US policy. Some of our listeners

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<v Speaker 1>live in other countries and are therefore not exposed to

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<v Speaker 1>US law on a regular basis. And more we're brought

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<v Speaker 1>up within the American public school system and weren't exposed

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<v Speaker 1>to US law. Right. Sorry, that's a cheap shot vocal bomb,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's kind of a little bit accurate one. But anyway, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's there's there's a lot of stuff that we

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<v Speaker 1>need to be able to talk about, and so we're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna lay down some some basic truths. People come along

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<v Speaker 1>with us. So to begin with, one of the things

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<v Speaker 1>that this really concerns is one of the specific amendments

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<v Speaker 1>to the U. S Constitution. This is one from the

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<v Speaker 1>Bill of Rights. Yeah, Bill of Rights are the first

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<v Speaker 1>ten amendments to that Constitution. Now, the Constitution, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>is the document that established that the United States is

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<v Speaker 1>in fact a sovereign nation and it has its own

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<v Speaker 1>laws and its own way of governing the people. And

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<v Speaker 1>the amendments are kind of the the ways of addressing

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<v Speaker 1>the Constitution to either expand or focus parts of US

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<v Speaker 1>policy so that it has a broad application. And and

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<v Speaker 1>in terms of the Bill of Rights, it's specifically to

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<v Speaker 1>um protect the freedoms of the individual citizens right right.

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<v Speaker 1>So everyone's heard of. The first Amendment is the freedom

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<v Speaker 1>of speech. That's the one that a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>will quote quite a bit. But the one we are

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<v Speaker 1>specifically concerned with is the fourth Amendment, which and I

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<v Speaker 1>will quote this, this is the actual amendment. The right

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<v Speaker 1>of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

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<v Speaker 1>and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.

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<v Speaker 1>And no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported

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<v Speaker 1>by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to

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<v Speaker 1>be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

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<v Speaker 1>And now this was created in UM in nine, ratified

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<v Speaker 1>in sevente So the Internet wasn't a thing, no, but

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<v Speaker 1>this was. You know, you can see what the founding

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<v Speaker 1>fathers were thinking at the time that they they had

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<v Speaker 1>already experienced what they were calling tyranny under the British monarchy.

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<v Speaker 1>Those of us who are anglophiles and monarchists might sting

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<v Speaker 1>a little at that phrase. But at any rate, Uh, no,

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<v Speaker 1>it was pretty accurate. Really. Uh. What this is essentially

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<v Speaker 1>saying is that in order for any one to be

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<v Speaker 1>able to search you or anything you own, whether that's

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<v Speaker 1>property or effects on your person, they have to have

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<v Speaker 1>authorization to do so. And further, in order to get authorization,

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<v Speaker 1>they have to have a good reason for it. There

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<v Speaker 1>can't just be a blanket. Yeah, you go out and

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<v Speaker 1>do whatever you need to do to make sure that

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<v Speaker 1>that we get the bad guy. This is to protect

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<v Speaker 1>against that, so that people aren't subject to unreasonable searches.

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<v Speaker 1>And so that's what a lot of this fuss is

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<v Speaker 1>about is. And when I say fuss, I'm not trying

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<v Speaker 1>to diminish it. I'm just using a word because I

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<v Speaker 1>was brought up in the South and that's that's what happens.

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<v Speaker 1>But no, I'm not. I'm not suggesting that this is

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<v Speaker 1>a trivial matter at all. In fact, it's the very opposite.

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<v Speaker 1>This is fundamental to the freedoms that are considered to

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<v Speaker 1>be integral in American citizen Yeah. Yeah, and I would

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<v Speaker 1>say that that that modern ly internationally speaking, it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>a human rights, no, sure, Yeah, these are rights that

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<v Speaker 1>that organizations like the United Nations have said this is

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<v Speaker 1>this is a universal right. This is not something that

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<v Speaker 1>is is a peculiar to a particular government. This should

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<v Speaker 1>be something that everyone should expect. And in fact, that's

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<v Speaker 1>another good point just out of the gate, is to

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<v Speaker 1>say the Constitution is protecting American citizens rights, it does

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<v Speaker 1>not protect people who are not American citizens, right. So

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<v Speaker 1>in other words, uh, and that's that plays a huge

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<v Speaker 1>part in in the both PRISM and the related programs

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<v Speaker 1>that the n s A and other intelligence organizations are following.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's what the key of all of this is

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<v Speaker 1>about this this constitutional amendment. Uh. And we'll get into

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<v Speaker 1>detail in the second podcast about kind of what is

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<v Speaker 1>going on and why people are concerned and the arguments

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<v Speaker 1>on both sides, because both sides have presented their own

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<v Speaker 1>arguments on this. Now, another thing we need to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of define are the different agencies within the United States

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<v Speaker 1>that are tasked with maintaining law and order, investigating crime,

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<v Speaker 1>and also gathering intelligence or or acting in counter intelligence roles. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>Because although we will be talking mostly about the n Essay,

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<v Speaker 1>which is the program that's responsible for PRISM, there are

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<v Speaker 1>actually seventeen governmental bodies that have to do with intelligence gathering. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is it's it's complicated stuff. So we're gonna actually

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<v Speaker 1>give you a lowdown on all seventeen offices and agencies

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<v Speaker 1>because it's good to know what these different organizations are.

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<v Speaker 1>And it can be really confusing, right, I Mean, there's

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<v Speaker 1>always that time where I get to something. It's like

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<v Speaker 1>a central intelligence agency does that? Is that domestic or

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<v Speaker 1>is it foreign? Is it which one is? Federal Federal

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<v Speaker 1>Bureau of Investigation. That's certainly domestic, But what do you know?

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<v Speaker 1>And then you start you start going down this this

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<v Speaker 1>rabbit hole of all these different agencies. It really shows

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<v Speaker 1>how complex and gargantuan and bureaucratic our government this to

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<v Speaker 1>the point where you're thinking, there's there's probably some streamlining

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<v Speaker 1>that could happen at some point um. And also keep

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<v Speaker 1>in mind that not all of these agencies and offices

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<v Speaker 1>have traditionally work together. Some of them are have been

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<v Speaker 1>at odds, very much so at the CIA and the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A in in particular have not always seen

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<v Speaker 1>ida I will partially because their their duties come very

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<v Speaker 1>close to overlapping in some cases. And I think the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA is tired of the n s A reading their emails.

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<v Speaker 1>That's really what it comes down to. That's a joke.

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<v Speaker 1>It's kind of not too but anyway, Yeah, the CIA

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<v Speaker 1>and n s A have actually competed. There's a in

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<v Speaker 1>fact that there's a little aside. We can give a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit later, but let's talk about these basic definitions.

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<v Speaker 1>So we've got law enforcement, all right, law enforcement, that's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much what it sounds like. These are the agents

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<v Speaker 1>who are designated to protect citizens, to enforce laws, to

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<v Speaker 1>apprehend people who are violating laws. So this is essentially

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<v Speaker 1>your police, so of various levels, whether it's in the

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<v Speaker 1>United States, we have lots of different kinds of police.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a federal, state, county, municipal. Yeah, there's there's lots

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<v Speaker 1>of different police. You know, because you can you can

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<v Speaker 1>violate federal law, you can violate state law. I mean

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<v Speaker 1>you can't. Don't go do that. I'm just saying that

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<v Speaker 1>there are different agencies that are in charge of No

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<v Speaker 1>you may not. Well, I mean it's bad. We do

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<v Speaker 1>not condone that goes without saying, we're just we're both loopy.

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<v Speaker 1>Has been a very long day of lots of research.

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<v Speaker 1>You would be amazed at how much research we have

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<v Speaker 1>in front of us right now, But so so who

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<v Speaker 1>who Who oversees all of these? So the Department of

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<v Speaker 1>Justice oversees law enforcement, and this involves agencies beyond just

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<v Speaker 1>the police. We're talking about the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

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<v Speaker 1>the Drug Enforcement Agency or d e A UH, the

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<v Speaker 1>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also known as

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<v Speaker 1>a t F because they didn't have explosives in their

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<v Speaker 1>name for a long time, and the U. S. Marshals Service.

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<v Speaker 1>All of those fall under the Department of Justice and

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<v Speaker 1>its law enforcement. UH. Then you have investigation, which is

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<v Speaker 1>actually part of law enforcement. It's not like it's completely separate,

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<v Speaker 1>but investing. You know, law enforcement can be about enforcing

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<v Speaker 1>laws and apprehending people who are violating the law. Investigators

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<v Speaker 1>they are the ones who actually investigate crime to determine

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<v Speaker 1>who committed the crime and and and how to apprehend

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<v Speaker 1>that person. Sometimes detectives, right right, You can have investigators

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<v Speaker 1>or detectives. These are the type of names that you

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<v Speaker 1>tend to hear with investigators, and that can be with

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<v Speaker 1>agencies like the police, with the FBI. We also in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States have private investigators who can get a

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<v Speaker 1>private license to be uh to to investigate certain things. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>so that's that's another level. Then you've got intelligence. Now

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<v Speaker 1>this is different from law enforcement. It's different from an investigation. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>It involves some investigative work, but it's not an investigation role.

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<v Speaker 1>So intelligence is all about gathering data, getting as much

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<v Speaker 1>information as possible. Generally speaking, it tends to be focused

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<v Speaker 1>on foreign entities. So foreign intelligence would be uh, information

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<v Speaker 1>about other nations, governments, their activities there, their motivations, what

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<v Speaker 1>you know, what they are doing, and the activities of

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<v Speaker 1>their agents, both within those foreign nations and abroad. So

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<v Speaker 1>this is the James Bond stuff, right, this is spy stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>And then uh, you've got two broad versions of intelligence.

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<v Speaker 1>You have human intelligence. That's specifically the James Bond type stuff,

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<v Speaker 1>because this is what you get when you have interpersonal contact,

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<v Speaker 1>when you have a spy meeting a double agent and

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<v Speaker 1>they're exchanging information so that the spy can bring the

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<v Speaker 1>information back home or uh it's a spy who has

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<v Speaker 1>infiltrated an agency or a government office or whatever to

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<v Speaker 1>gather information. That's human intelligence. That's the CEE I a's

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<v Speaker 1>job that they oversee human intelligence in the United States

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<v Speaker 1>for foreign intelligence, so CEE I A focused on the

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<v Speaker 1>foreign um intelligence, by the way, can also be domestic.

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<v Speaker 1>There's domestic intelligence where you've got especially with things like

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<v Speaker 1>homeland security. You have within the United States lots of

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<v Speaker 1>domestic intelligence UH officials as well, but we're mainly looking

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<v Speaker 1>at foreign in these podcasts. The other broad type of

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence you have your human intelligence. The other broad type

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<v Speaker 1>is signal intelligence. Now this is messages communication, right, so

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<v Speaker 1>this is the realm of anything digital or phones or yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is what the n s A looks at, right,

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is their department. So the signals Intelligence,

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<v Speaker 1>by the way, sometimes abbreviated I'm signed yeah yeah, which

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<v Speaker 1>I just love and n s A by the way,

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<v Speaker 1>in case we were using the acronymics National Security Agency M.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think we said that at the top, No,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's their actual full name, and they are in

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<v Speaker 1>charge are of intercepting and decrypting messages between entities, normally

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<v Speaker 1>foreign entities or foreign like a foreign government and its agents.

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<v Speaker 1>Agents can be located within the United States, which gives

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<v Speaker 1>rise to Yeah, that's that's one of the big reasons

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<v Speaker 1>why this whole mess has become you know, it's become

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<v Speaker 1>such a powder kig really because the potential for agents

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<v Speaker 1>to be in the United States means that the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A has to look at the broadest approach to

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<v Speaker 1>trying to gather information, but that then creeps in on

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<v Speaker 1>the individual liberties and the expectation of privacy that American

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<v Speaker 1>citizens have. That's the crux of this. So the signal

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence is really what we're looking at, though the human

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence is awesomely cool. And we have to do a

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<v Speaker 1>podcast about spy stuff at some point. Absolutely we haven't.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, we never did. Chris never did, you know.

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<v Speaker 1>I tried to convince Chris to do it, but then

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<v Speaker 1>he would just sort of glance around and say red

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<v Speaker 1>roses and then just run away. And I have no

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<v Speaker 1>idea what that means to this day. Um. He told

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<v Speaker 1>me that I was supposed to use my Captain decoder

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<v Speaker 1>encryption ring. I don't have one of those. Chris is

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<v Speaker 1>a little messed up. I love you, Mr Polettic wherever

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<v Speaker 1>you are. Um. Anyway, then there's counter intelligence. So counter

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence does not mean that you sit around, you know,

0:13:26.720 --> 0:13:32.679
<v Speaker 1>watching reality TV and about counterintelligence is about preventing other

0:13:32.840 --> 0:13:38.600
<v Speaker 1>entities from gaining information about your country, government, agency, whatever. Right.

0:13:38.600 --> 0:13:41.560
<v Speaker 1>This can also be called information assurance, Yes, that's the

0:13:41.600 --> 0:13:43.640
<v Speaker 1>other term for it. So really this is all about

0:13:43.720 --> 0:13:48.120
<v Speaker 1>protecting the information structures within whatever, whether it's a country

0:13:48.200 --> 0:13:51.520
<v Speaker 1>or whatever it's it's encrypting communications, you know, doing the

0:13:51.559 --> 0:13:55.440
<v Speaker 1>opposite of essentially intelligence. This is this is where you

0:13:55.559 --> 0:13:58.920
<v Speaker 1>end up hiring what are called white hat hackers who

0:13:58.960 --> 0:14:00.920
<v Speaker 1>try to break into a systems so that way you

0:14:00.960 --> 0:14:04.079
<v Speaker 1>can identify any vulnerabilities that your system has and address

0:14:04.120 --> 0:14:07.680
<v Speaker 1>it before real bad guys are able to get into

0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:12.319
<v Speaker 1>your systems. Um. So those are your basic terms. Now

0:14:12.360 --> 0:14:16.520
<v Speaker 1>we've defined that, which leads us to the intelligence community

0:14:16.640 --> 0:14:19.080
<v Speaker 1>of the United States. And I don't mean to suggest

0:14:19.640 --> 0:14:22.160
<v Speaker 1>that the intelligence community is a big old band of

0:14:22.320 --> 0:14:26.640
<v Speaker 1>happy spies who just sit around and chat spy stuff

0:14:26.640 --> 0:14:29.440
<v Speaker 1>all the time, because, uh, like we said, they can

0:14:29.520 --> 0:14:33.960
<v Speaker 1>sometimes be a little competitive. Now, there's quite a few

0:14:33.960 --> 0:14:36.480
<v Speaker 1>of them, and we're gonna go through and mention them.

0:14:36.560 --> 0:14:39.000
<v Speaker 1>I will go ahead, and I'm gonna lump in four

0:14:39.040 --> 0:14:41.200
<v Speaker 1>of them together, actually I think five of them together.

0:14:42.000 --> 0:14:48.760
<v Speaker 1>The military branches of intelligence, so Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marines,

0:14:48.880 --> 0:14:53.400
<v Speaker 1>and Navy all have their own offices of intelligence. Uh,

0:14:53.440 --> 0:14:55.960
<v Speaker 1>and they're all similar enough where I feel like I

0:14:55.960 --> 0:14:58.560
<v Speaker 1>can lump them in together in the sense that yeah,

0:14:58.640 --> 0:15:02.360
<v Speaker 1>because that way it cuts down the other like five down,

0:15:02.400 --> 0:15:06.760
<v Speaker 1>twelve to go um. But they essentially all concentrate on

0:15:06.880 --> 0:15:11.960
<v Speaker 1>gathering intelligence to support wartime efforts. So specifically, when the

0:15:12.040 --> 0:15:17.240
<v Speaker 1>United States is in some form of actual combat type

0:15:17.240 --> 0:15:20.360
<v Speaker 1>of situation, there's some sort of conflict, even if it

0:15:20.360 --> 0:15:23.600
<v Speaker 1>hasn't broken out into all out war, these offices are

0:15:23.680 --> 0:15:27.320
<v Speaker 1>gathering the information that gives the United States the best

0:15:27.680 --> 0:15:34.040
<v Speaker 1>chance to counteract anything that the various other parties could

0:15:34.040 --> 0:15:38.800
<v Speaker 1>be doing. But they also coordinate with other intelligence agencies

0:15:38.800 --> 0:15:42.920
<v Speaker 1>whenever they gather intelligence that could be key to national security.

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:45.640
<v Speaker 1>It's just not their main focus. Their main focus is

0:15:45.680 --> 0:15:48.920
<v Speaker 1>to support whatever branch of the military they happen to

0:15:48.960 --> 0:15:52.320
<v Speaker 1>be part of. So, but each one does have its

0:15:52.320 --> 0:15:56.720
<v Speaker 1>own intelligence agency. Then you've got the Central Intelligence Agency,

0:15:56.760 --> 0:15:59.560
<v Speaker 1>which we've already kind of alluded to. It gathers information

0:15:59.680 --> 0:16:03.120
<v Speaker 1>about foreign governments, corporations, and individuals in an effort to

0:16:03.160 --> 0:16:07.040
<v Speaker 1>provide intelligence that affects national security interests, and they report

0:16:07.080 --> 0:16:11.440
<v Speaker 1>directly to the the The CIA has its own structure,

0:16:11.480 --> 0:16:14.840
<v Speaker 1>but the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence,

0:16:15.280 --> 0:16:19.040
<v Speaker 1>which replaced and the CIA replaced the Office of Strategic Services.

0:16:19.160 --> 0:16:23.520
<v Speaker 1>Are the OSS back in? Here's a bit of trivia.

0:16:23.760 --> 0:16:27.840
<v Speaker 1>Do you know what pop culture character started in the

0:16:27.880 --> 0:16:31.520
<v Speaker 1>early eighties had a stint in the O s S.

0:16:31.600 --> 0:16:33.280
<v Speaker 1>But you only get to hear about it in a

0:16:33.320 --> 0:16:35.560
<v Speaker 1>little bit of a side dialogue and the most recent

0:16:35.680 --> 0:16:39.880
<v Speaker 1>version of his movies. He wears a fedora and carries

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:44.320
<v Speaker 1>a whip. Indiana Indiana Jones was part of well, he

0:16:44.360 --> 0:16:47.760
<v Speaker 1>at least worked with the OSS. According to India Jones

0:16:47.760 --> 0:16:49.920
<v Speaker 1>and Kingdom of the Crystal Skull, he has this one

0:16:50.000 --> 0:16:53.840
<v Speaker 1>little aside where he mentions the OSS. And as soon

0:16:53.880 --> 0:16:55.800
<v Speaker 1>as I heard that, I thought, this is the movie

0:16:55.840 --> 0:16:59.040
<v Speaker 1>I want to see, not the one that I'm currently watching.

0:17:00.160 --> 0:17:02.400
<v Speaker 1>That I would. I would, if anyone out there is listening,

0:17:02.640 --> 0:17:07.560
<v Speaker 1>I would watch that movie too. An audience of two, Yes, yeah,

0:17:07.600 --> 0:17:10.439
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know, I've done more for less, all right,

0:17:10.480 --> 0:17:13.680
<v Speaker 1>So then we've got skipping over the other military ones.

0:17:13.720 --> 0:17:17.760
<v Speaker 1>We've got the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is a central

0:17:17.800 --> 0:17:21.359
<v Speaker 1>producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. It's part of

0:17:21.359 --> 0:17:24.560
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Defense. There's actually quite a few civilian

0:17:24.560 --> 0:17:27.800
<v Speaker 1>employees who work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. They're not

0:17:27.840 --> 0:17:31.560
<v Speaker 1>all military employees, and it includes a clandestine service that

0:17:31.600 --> 0:17:34.840
<v Speaker 1>conducts spy activities. So, in other words, a lot of

0:17:34.880 --> 0:17:38.280
<v Speaker 1>our spies report to the Defense Intelligence Agency UM. It

0:17:38.320 --> 0:17:40.680
<v Speaker 1>was established back in nineteen sixty one, and the director

0:17:40.880 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>of the d i A answers to the Director of

0:17:43.920 --> 0:17:47.240
<v Speaker 1>National Intelligence just like the CIA does, and also advises

0:17:47.280 --> 0:17:49.560
<v Speaker 1>the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

0:17:49.600 --> 0:17:53.760
<v Speaker 1>Chiefs of Staff, so important person in the role of

0:17:53.880 --> 0:17:56.880
<v Speaker 1>the United States government. Like I said, the one thing,

0:17:56.960 --> 0:17:59.800
<v Speaker 1>if you don't take anything else away from this podcast,

0:18:00.080 --> 0:18:01.840
<v Speaker 1>you will take away the fact that our government in

0:18:01.880 --> 0:18:07.600
<v Speaker 1>the United States is enormous and complicated. And then we've

0:18:07.600 --> 0:18:11.840
<v Speaker 1>got the Department of Energy, which has its own Office

0:18:11.840 --> 0:18:14.879
<v Speaker 1>of Intelligence and counter Intelligence, which might surprise you to

0:18:14.920 --> 0:18:17.239
<v Speaker 1>hear that the Department of Energy has one. But then

0:18:17.240 --> 0:18:19.239
<v Speaker 1>when you think how important energy is, yeah, yeah, it's

0:18:19.359 --> 0:18:22.120
<v Speaker 1>it's a huge part of our infrastructure. So yeah, so

0:18:22.280 --> 0:18:25.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, you remember hearing the news a couple of

0:18:25.160 --> 0:18:28.960
<v Speaker 1>years ago about how hackers had discovered not just hackers,

0:18:28.960 --> 0:18:33.120
<v Speaker 1>but people working in cybersecurity had discovered that uh, hackers

0:18:33.119 --> 0:18:36.119
<v Speaker 1>in in foreign countries had accessed certain parts of our

0:18:36.160 --> 0:18:43.240
<v Speaker 1>power grid and placed essentially little uh surveillance, Yeah, just

0:18:43.280 --> 0:18:45.679
<v Speaker 1>to keep an eye on what was going on with

0:18:45.760 --> 0:18:48.119
<v Speaker 1>the potential maybe down the road at some point to

0:18:48.119 --> 0:18:51.120
<v Speaker 1>commit sabotage. Although there was no evidence of sabotage being

0:18:51.119 --> 0:18:54.840
<v Speaker 1>committed at that time, the potential there was a big

0:18:55.320 --> 0:18:58.240
<v Speaker 1>you know that that that raised some huge alarms. Yeah,

0:18:58.280 --> 0:19:00.320
<v Speaker 1>and we have we have a whole um what one

0:19:00.400 --> 0:19:03.359
<v Speaker 1>or two part series on them on cybersecurity from a

0:19:03.400 --> 0:19:05.399
<v Speaker 1>few months back, if you care to go listen to that,

0:19:05.680 --> 0:19:08.440
<v Speaker 1>right exactly. And so the Department of Energy has its

0:19:08.440 --> 0:19:11.360
<v Speaker 1>own Office of Intelligence and counter Intelligence. They provide information

0:19:11.400 --> 0:19:14.679
<v Speaker 1>to the Secretary of Energy, and the expertise for this

0:19:14.800 --> 0:19:19.360
<v Speaker 1>office includes nuclear energy, radioactive waste, energy security. So these

0:19:19.359 --> 0:19:22.320
<v Speaker 1>are the people that you go to when you want

0:19:22.359 --> 0:19:26.200
<v Speaker 1>to be able to gather information about uh, not just

0:19:26.400 --> 0:19:29.080
<v Speaker 1>not just domestic but foreign activities as well that could

0:19:29.119 --> 0:19:34.879
<v Speaker 1>involve specifically things like nuclear power or even nuclear weapon capability. Uh.

0:19:34.920 --> 0:19:38.560
<v Speaker 1>The counterintelligence efforts are led by the Department's National Nuclear

0:19:38.640 --> 0:19:42.840
<v Speaker 1>Security Administration or in an essay. Then we've got the

0:19:42.840 --> 0:19:47.040
<v Speaker 1>Department of Homeland Security. This is a relatively young department

0:19:47.480 --> 0:19:51.399
<v Speaker 1>really was formed in response to the terrorist attacks on

0:19:51.440 --> 0:19:54.480
<v Speaker 1>September eleven, two thousand one, and it's responsible for the

0:19:54.480 --> 0:19:57.600
<v Speaker 1>protection of the US and its territories from terrorist attacks

0:19:57.880 --> 0:20:02.240
<v Speaker 1>as well as to respond to other events like natural disasters.

0:20:02.280 --> 0:20:05.520
<v Speaker 1>So it's it's supposed to be all about, you know,

0:20:06.240 --> 0:20:09.119
<v Speaker 1>it's in the name Homeland Security. It's the supposed to

0:20:09.119 --> 0:20:13.120
<v Speaker 1>be protecting the United States citizens. That particular department has

0:20:13.160 --> 0:20:17.879
<v Speaker 1>been the recipient of lots of criticism from various people

0:20:18.000 --> 0:20:23.680
<v Speaker 1>who think that the legislation that created that department may

0:20:23.680 --> 0:20:27.640
<v Speaker 1>have overstepped some constitutional bounds, and that's still a matter

0:20:27.680 --> 0:20:30.360
<v Speaker 1>of debate in the United States. A lot of these

0:20:30.400 --> 0:20:33.040
<v Speaker 1>policies that were formed very quickly after nine eleven um

0:20:33.080 --> 0:20:36.880
<v Speaker 1>are going to come back in the conversation because because

0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:39.800
<v Speaker 1>they were a bunch of them, and they were big, yeah, yes,

0:20:40.240 --> 0:20:46.280
<v Speaker 1>and rapid change was sometimes uh, sometimes led to concerns

0:20:46.400 --> 0:20:51.360
<v Speaker 1>after the fact, like everyone was so concerned about responding

0:20:51.400 --> 0:20:55.760
<v Speaker 1>to a particular horrible event in the United States history

0:20:55.840 --> 0:20:59.639
<v Speaker 1>that some would argue that that mistakes were made in

0:20:59.640 --> 0:21:02.320
<v Speaker 1>that process. Others would argue that it was exactly what

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:05.040
<v Speaker 1>was needed. So I don't mean to say that, you know,

0:21:05.080 --> 0:21:08.320
<v Speaker 1>it's a one sided debate. It really isn't. There's a

0:21:08.320 --> 0:21:11.879
<v Speaker 1>lot of absolutely cogent points being made on both sides.

0:21:12.680 --> 0:21:15.159
<v Speaker 1>Then you have the Department of State and they have

0:21:15.280 --> 0:21:19.240
<v Speaker 1>the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Their primary responsibility is

0:21:19.240 --> 0:21:23.399
<v Speaker 1>to analyze intelligence data. So this was originally part of

0:21:23.440 --> 0:21:26.359
<v Speaker 1>the os S, so it was part of what is

0:21:26.400 --> 0:21:29.240
<v Speaker 1>now the CIA, but it's its own separate department at

0:21:29.240 --> 0:21:31.400
<v Speaker 1>this point. So they are all about, you know, if

0:21:31.440 --> 0:21:34.919
<v Speaker 1>you they don't necessarily gather intelligence, but they analyze it.

0:21:35.359 --> 0:21:38.160
<v Speaker 1>So it's one of the departments that really focuses on

0:21:38.160 --> 0:21:40.960
<v Speaker 1>what does this intelligence actually mean. Then you have the

0:21:40.960 --> 0:21:43.920
<v Speaker 1>Department of the Treasury. They have an Office of Terrorism

0:21:43.960 --> 0:21:47.360
<v Speaker 1>and Financial Intelligence that's meant to guard the US financial

0:21:47.359 --> 0:21:51.040
<v Speaker 1>system against threats from rogue nations, terrorists, money launderers, and

0:21:51.680 --> 0:21:55.680
<v Speaker 1>et cetera. Then you've got the Drug Enforcement Administration, which,

0:21:55.720 --> 0:21:57.719
<v Speaker 1>as I mentioned before, was part of the Department of

0:21:57.760 --> 0:22:00.919
<v Speaker 1>Justice that was established in nineteen seventy and it's a

0:22:00.920 --> 0:22:04.240
<v Speaker 1>federal law enforcement agency and its main purposes to combat

0:22:04.320 --> 0:22:07.840
<v Speaker 1>drug smuggling and uh and within the United States. It

0:22:07.880 --> 0:22:11.360
<v Speaker 1>also has a responsibility for controlling and pursuing US drug investigations.

0:22:11.359 --> 0:22:16.480
<v Speaker 1>In foreign countries, which is tricky business. Anytime you have

0:22:16.600 --> 0:22:21.080
<v Speaker 1>a country performing an investigation in another country, you know,

0:22:21.200 --> 0:22:25.679
<v Speaker 1>you've got that's sticky, absolutely, especially with with you know,

0:22:25.760 --> 0:22:28.080
<v Speaker 1>something as sticky as drug laws, which are so different

0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:33.160
<v Speaker 1>in so many places, so so economically driven. Yes, yes, economically,

0:22:34.040 --> 0:22:37.359
<v Speaker 1>that's plays a huge role in it. Politically, it gets

0:22:37.359 --> 0:22:40.560
<v Speaker 1>really sticky. It's a tough situation. Then you've got your

0:22:40.560 --> 0:22:43.840
<v Speaker 1>Federal Bureau of Investigation the FBI. It's also part of

0:22:43.880 --> 0:22:46.560
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Justice. That's meant to be a federal

0:22:46.600 --> 0:22:51.280
<v Speaker 1>criminal investigative body and also an internal intelligence agency, and

0:22:51.359 --> 0:22:54.719
<v Speaker 1>that was established back in nine eight. Of course, uh

0:22:54.960 --> 0:22:57.320
<v Speaker 1>I would say that the most famous director of the

0:22:57.400 --> 0:23:02.480
<v Speaker 1>FBI would be j Edgar Hoover, known for, according to

0:23:02.520 --> 0:23:05.040
<v Speaker 1>the movie Clue, known for a cleaning up multiple murders

0:23:05.080 --> 0:23:08.879
<v Speaker 1>because his name is Hoover. But dump Bump. I just

0:23:08.920 --> 0:23:12.120
<v Speaker 1>saw a Clue like a couple of weeks ago. So again,

0:23:12.400 --> 0:23:14.480
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't my first time. I've seen it many times.

0:23:14.480 --> 0:23:16.359
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad that you're pulling in puns from other storiess.

0:23:16.440 --> 0:23:20.520
<v Speaker 1>Now that's really I can't be the sole source of puns.

0:23:20.880 --> 0:23:25.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm only one man. Then, We've got the National Geospatial

0:23:25.160 --> 0:23:28.160
<v Speaker 1>Intelligence Agency, which I'm gonna be honest, I had never

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:30.520
<v Speaker 1>heard of until I did the research for this podcast.

0:23:30.960 --> 0:23:34.520
<v Speaker 1>I did not know this agency existed. Um, but they're

0:23:34.640 --> 0:23:37.159
<v Speaker 1>also known as the ng A, and they're part of

0:23:37.200 --> 0:23:39.800
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Defense, and they're an agency that plays

0:23:39.800 --> 0:23:42.480
<v Speaker 1>a role in combat support, so it's kind of similar

0:23:42.480 --> 0:23:45.520
<v Speaker 1>to the military roles. They're primarily tasked with gathering and

0:23:45.560 --> 0:23:50.840
<v Speaker 1>analyzing geospatial intelligence to protect national security, and they were

0:23:50.880 --> 0:23:55.160
<v Speaker 1>formerly known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Then

0:23:55.200 --> 0:23:58.760
<v Speaker 1>you've got the National Reconnaissance Office, which is a spy

0:23:59.000 --> 0:24:02.439
<v Speaker 1>organization and they create spy satellites and provide imagery and

0:24:02.520 --> 0:24:05.679
<v Speaker 1>signal intelligence to various agencies and military offices in the

0:24:05.720 --> 0:24:09.119
<v Speaker 1>United States. So this is the agency that's gathering lots

0:24:09.160 --> 0:24:12.879
<v Speaker 1>of data from electronic communications, but then they end up

0:24:12.920 --> 0:24:17.119
<v Speaker 1>funneling that data to other agencies. They're not necessarily um

0:24:17.160 --> 0:24:21.520
<v Speaker 1>analyzing the information themselves. Uh. And again they report to

0:24:21.560 --> 0:24:24.280
<v Speaker 1>the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.

0:24:25.200 --> 0:24:28.920
<v Speaker 1>Then we've got our our our darling are our buddies,

0:24:29.040 --> 0:24:31.120
<v Speaker 1>the ones that will be talking about quite a bit.

0:24:31.160 --> 0:24:33.840
<v Speaker 1>We finally got to them and The only reason it's

0:24:33.840 --> 0:24:36.040
<v Speaker 1>taken so long is because I've been going in alphabetical order.

0:24:36.400 --> 0:24:41.600
<v Speaker 1>The National Security Agency the n S a centralized agency

0:24:41.600 --> 0:24:45.280
<v Speaker 1>that produces and manages signals intelligence for the United States,

0:24:45.320 --> 0:24:49.639
<v Speaker 1>gathers foreign intelligence through various means, including spying. Also in

0:24:49.720 --> 0:24:54.680
<v Speaker 1>charge of communication security. They are experts in cryptanalysis and cryptography,

0:24:54.720 --> 0:24:57.919
<v Speaker 1>meaning that codes and crypto, cryptograms, anything that has to

0:24:57.960 --> 0:25:01.320
<v Speaker 1>do with encoding information. They are experts at both doing

0:25:01.359 --> 0:25:04.360
<v Speaker 1>that to protect our information the United States is information

0:25:04.440 --> 0:25:06.720
<v Speaker 1>and also undoing that, yes, also on doing that to

0:25:06.720 --> 0:25:09.159
<v Speaker 1>figure out what the heck people are talking about. And

0:25:09.359 --> 0:25:13.000
<v Speaker 1>they're experts, in fact, such experts that there's a famous

0:25:13.560 --> 0:25:18.159
<v Speaker 1>there's a famous statue outside that has four sides, and

0:25:18.240 --> 0:25:23.080
<v Speaker 1>each side is encrypted in a different a different way, right,

0:25:23.160 --> 0:25:27.040
<v Speaker 1>So each cryptogram is is different, and each one, like

0:25:27.440 --> 0:25:29.639
<v Speaker 1>if you were to number the sides one through four,

0:25:30.200 --> 0:25:33.560
<v Speaker 1>one would be the quote unquote easiest to decrypt and

0:25:33.600 --> 0:25:36.560
<v Speaker 1>four would be the most difficult. Uh. And there was

0:25:36.840 --> 0:25:39.520
<v Speaker 1>sort of a challenge that was thrown down to both

0:25:39.640 --> 0:25:44.440
<v Speaker 1>the CIA and an essay to decrypt these sides, and

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:48.680
<v Speaker 1>the CIA decrypted the first three sides within a set

0:25:48.760 --> 0:25:50.480
<v Speaker 1>number of years. I can't remember exactly what it is.

0:25:50.520 --> 0:25:52.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm this is anecdotal. I didn't write them down in

0:25:52.480 --> 0:25:54.840
<v Speaker 1>my notes. So yeah, I think this was put up

0:25:54.840 --> 0:25:59.040
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen fifties or maybe the sixty which is

0:25:59.080 --> 0:26:04.879
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, so there was sometimes well that this was

0:26:04.960 --> 0:26:07.240
<v Speaker 1>this is just sort of an aside to everything else,

0:26:07.240 --> 0:26:08.680
<v Speaker 1>which is why we don't have all the data in

0:26:08.760 --> 0:26:10.879
<v Speaker 1>front of us. Uh, this would be its own kind

0:26:10.920 --> 0:26:14.600
<v Speaker 1>of fun podcast. But at any rate, the CIA went

0:26:14.680 --> 0:26:17.280
<v Speaker 1>to try and crack this. They really were taking this

0:26:17.359 --> 0:26:19.439
<v Speaker 1>to heart and saying this, we want to be the

0:26:19.440 --> 0:26:21.760
<v Speaker 1>ones to crack this information. And they started working on

0:26:21.800 --> 0:26:24.600
<v Speaker 1>and they were so proud when they announced it. And

0:26:24.640 --> 0:26:27.520
<v Speaker 1>then fairly recently it came to light that the n

0:26:27.600 --> 0:26:30.280
<v Speaker 1>s A had already done it about eight years before

0:26:30.320 --> 0:26:33.679
<v Speaker 1>the CIA did, just didn't bother telling them, And you

0:26:33.720 --> 0:26:36.479
<v Speaker 1>know that was apparently they the n s A director

0:26:36.880 --> 0:26:38.720
<v Speaker 1>Ted told people like, if you want to do this,

0:26:39.400 --> 0:26:42.200
<v Speaker 1>you should do it, and totally everybody else, but we're

0:26:42.240 --> 0:26:43.760
<v Speaker 1>not doing it. But if you want to do it,

0:26:43.800 --> 0:26:45.679
<v Speaker 1>you should totally go and do it. But you know,

0:26:45.840 --> 0:26:48.760
<v Speaker 1>officially we are not doing this, but go and do

0:26:48.800 --> 0:26:52.080
<v Speaker 1>that thing. So and that's what they did. So it

0:26:52.119 --> 0:26:55.480
<v Speaker 1>looks like they are really good at decrypting stuff, which

0:26:55.760 --> 0:26:57.320
<v Speaker 1>that should give anyone pause. I mean, there are a

0:26:57.359 --> 0:27:01.320
<v Speaker 1>lot of people who advocate that even just as a

0:27:01.359 --> 0:27:04.719
<v Speaker 1>personal choice, day to day kind of activity, that you

0:27:05.119 --> 0:27:08.200
<v Speaker 1>encrypt everything. Like you know, there are people who will

0:27:08.240 --> 0:27:10.439
<v Speaker 1>not communicate with you if you do not use an

0:27:10.480 --> 0:27:15.399
<v Speaker 1>emails service that allows you to encrypt your messages. UM.

0:27:15.440 --> 0:27:20.800
<v Speaker 1>But their decryption abilities show that they're really really good

0:27:20.800 --> 0:27:23.560
<v Speaker 1>at breaking those codes. It might take some time, but

0:27:23.680 --> 0:27:26.280
<v Speaker 1>they they have shown that they are capable of doing

0:27:26.320 --> 0:27:28.760
<v Speaker 1>such things absolutely. Now that they are officially a part

0:27:28.760 --> 0:27:31.359
<v Speaker 1>of the Department of Defense, yep. Yeah, they report to

0:27:31.359 --> 0:27:34.399
<v Speaker 1>the Director of National Intelligence as well. Uh. They formed

0:27:34.400 --> 0:27:37.800
<v Speaker 1>back in nineteen fifty one. They were originally a replacement

0:27:37.840 --> 0:27:42.000
<v Speaker 1>for the Armed Forces Security Agency or FSA. Right. They

0:27:42.040 --> 0:27:44.639
<v Speaker 1>were created specifically by the order of US President at

0:27:44.640 --> 0:27:47.320
<v Speaker 1>the time, Harry S. Truman UM and and began as

0:27:47.359 --> 0:27:51.200
<v Speaker 1>a group of only UM seven thousand, six hundred military

0:27:51.240 --> 0:27:57.720
<v Speaker 1>and civilian workers. Are there now, like, that's pretty big growth.

0:27:57.840 --> 0:27:59.680
<v Speaker 1>They've they've been grown a lot actually in the past

0:27:59.680 --> 0:28:02.879
<v Speaker 1>couple of years. Also, trivia question, was the S stand

0:28:02.880 --> 0:28:09.320
<v Speaker 1>for and Harry S. Truman nothing it's just sent Harry S. Truman.

0:28:09.359 --> 0:28:16.080
<v Speaker 1>The S stands for nothing, but Truman stood for a lot. Uh.

0:28:16.160 --> 0:28:18.600
<v Speaker 1>I have tiny little bits of historical trivia that I

0:28:18.640 --> 0:28:20.679
<v Speaker 1>never get to use because they never invite me on

0:28:20.840 --> 0:28:22.639
<v Speaker 1>stuff you missed in history class, So I have to

0:28:22.640 --> 0:28:25.679
<v Speaker 1>save it all up for episodes like this. UM. And

0:28:25.720 --> 0:28:28.480
<v Speaker 1>then we finally get to the Office of the Director

0:28:28.600 --> 0:28:33.479
<v Speaker 1>of National Intelligence. Yeah, the the n s A is

0:28:33.560 --> 0:28:35.320
<v Speaker 1>the important one that we'll be talking about for the

0:28:35.359 --> 0:28:39.080
<v Speaker 1>most part when we get into the actual particulars for PRISM.

0:28:39.120 --> 0:28:42.920
<v Speaker 1>But this is the office that we often will say,

0:28:42.920 --> 0:28:46.280
<v Speaker 1>there are sixteen agencies in the intelligence community, and this

0:28:46.360 --> 0:28:49.840
<v Speaker 1>is the seventeenth office. This is kind of the the head.

0:28:50.200 --> 0:28:53.960
<v Speaker 1>This is where everything funnels up. So the idea here

0:28:54.000 --> 0:28:57.200
<v Speaker 1>is that it oversees many other intelligence agents and offices,

0:28:57.240 --> 0:29:00.880
<v Speaker 1>including the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and its

0:29:00.880 --> 0:29:05.520
<v Speaker 1>mission is to exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed

0:29:05.560 --> 0:29:08.960
<v Speaker 1>against American interests, Protect the integrity of the U S

0:29:09.000 --> 0:29:13.360
<v Speaker 1>intelligence system, Provide incisive, actionable intelligence to the decision makers

0:29:13.400 --> 0:29:18.960
<v Speaker 1>at all levels, Protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities.

0:29:19.240 --> 0:29:24.880
<v Speaker 1>Neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces,

0:29:25.240 --> 0:29:28.360
<v Speaker 1>and the Director of National Intelligence reports to the President

0:29:28.560 --> 0:29:31.800
<v Speaker 1>of the United States. So this is the head of

0:29:31.840 --> 0:29:34.840
<v Speaker 1>the intelligence community. Keeping in mind that every single one

0:29:34.840 --> 0:29:37.880
<v Speaker 1>of these agencies we have mentioned has its own hierarchy,

0:29:38.280 --> 0:29:43.360
<v Speaker 1>has its own leadership, and they all have different requirements

0:29:43.400 --> 0:29:45.640
<v Speaker 1>for what that leader can be. In fact, the n

0:29:45.720 --> 0:29:47.320
<v Speaker 1>s A is is kind of cool, but we'll talk

0:29:47.360 --> 0:29:52.280
<v Speaker 1>about that probably in the second podcast. So there we've

0:29:52.360 --> 0:29:56.000
<v Speaker 1>laid it down, the Constitution, the different types of law

0:29:56.160 --> 0:29:59.560
<v Speaker 1>enforcement and intelligence, the various members of the intelligence community.

0:30:00.520 --> 0:30:03.240
<v Speaker 1>But we still have some more groundwork. From from here

0:30:03.280 --> 0:30:05.800
<v Speaker 1>in it gets sticky. Yeah, this is where this is

0:30:05.840 --> 0:30:09.160
<v Speaker 1>where we've That was the easy part, y'all. But before

0:30:09.160 --> 0:30:12.560
<v Speaker 1>we dive into the really tricky part, let's take a

0:30:12.640 --> 0:30:15.840
<v Speaker 1>quick break to thank our sponsored Jack Threads. Jack Threads

0:30:15.840 --> 0:30:19.239
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0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:33.280
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0:30:33.320 --> 0:30:37.040
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0:30:37.080 --> 0:30:41.640
<v Speaker 1>dot com slash tech stuff when you sign up today. Alright,

0:30:41.680 --> 0:30:44.280
<v Speaker 1>so we're back. We've laid out that that groundwork. Let's

0:30:44.320 --> 0:30:47.440
<v Speaker 1>talk specifically about the n s A for a little

0:30:47.440 --> 0:30:51.720
<v Speaker 1>bit because that's really what most of this this stuff involves. Right.

0:30:51.880 --> 0:30:54.680
<v Speaker 1>Um okay, So, so, like we said, as of today,

0:30:54.720 --> 0:30:58.000
<v Speaker 1>they have about thirty thousand employees. They're working out of Maryland,

0:30:58.320 --> 0:31:02.280
<v Speaker 1>um Fort Mead, Maryland specific and the NSA actually works

0:31:02.320 --> 0:31:06.480
<v Speaker 1>alongside an organization called the Central Security Service, which is

0:31:07.120 --> 0:31:09.960
<v Speaker 1>it's basically the n s A, but it's comprised of

0:31:10.000 --> 0:31:13.600
<v Speaker 1>active military members. Now, the director of both of these

0:31:13.680 --> 0:31:18.000
<v Speaker 1>organizations is appointed by the Secretary of Defense and approved

0:31:18.000 --> 0:31:21.120
<v Speaker 1>by the President, and he must be a or here

0:31:21.200 --> 0:31:23.640
<v Speaker 1>she I'm sorry, that was terrible. I'm a bad feminist. Um.

0:31:23.680 --> 0:31:26.240
<v Speaker 1>There must be a commissioned military officer with at least

0:31:26.280 --> 0:31:28.520
<v Speaker 1>a three star rank, right, So, now that that could

0:31:28.560 --> 0:31:31.080
<v Speaker 1>be of any of the branches of the military, doesn't

0:31:31.400 --> 0:31:33.400
<v Speaker 1>I always think three star general, but you could also

0:31:33.760 --> 0:31:37.000
<v Speaker 1>have an admiral or of course etcetera. Right this, uh,

0:31:37.240 --> 0:31:41.160
<v Speaker 1>this leader also heads what's called the US Cyber Command UM,

0:31:41.200 --> 0:31:43.640
<v Speaker 1>which was created in two thousand five and is a

0:31:43.680 --> 0:31:49.240
<v Speaker 1>network warfare unit that protects against terrorist data and network threats. Yeah.

0:31:49.680 --> 0:31:52.960
<v Speaker 1>So in our cybersecurity podcast where we were talking about

0:31:53.000 --> 0:31:57.840
<v Speaker 1>some of the reactions to cyber threats in the United States,

0:31:57.880 --> 0:32:01.800
<v Speaker 1>that's really the organization that is adding that for in

0:32:01.960 --> 0:32:06.360
<v Speaker 1>large part. There. Keep in mind they're also multiple organizations

0:32:06.400 --> 0:32:10.720
<v Speaker 1>within other agencies that also investigate and tried to prevent cybercrime.

0:32:11.040 --> 0:32:12.920
<v Speaker 1>But this is one of the big ones right here,

0:32:13.480 --> 0:32:16.800
<v Speaker 1>right especially or I mean you know, yes, kind of

0:32:16.880 --> 0:32:19.040
<v Speaker 1>kind of during all of that panic that happened a

0:32:19.040 --> 0:32:21.800
<v Speaker 1>few years back, this this one sort of floated to

0:32:21.800 --> 0:32:24.440
<v Speaker 1>the top. UM So, so the n s A and

0:32:24.480 --> 0:32:29.160
<v Speaker 1>the CSS, like we said earlier, work in UM information

0:32:29.200 --> 0:32:33.960
<v Speaker 1>assurance or counter intelligence, and also in signals intelligence or

0:32:34.000 --> 0:32:42.520
<v Speaker 1>signat so intercepting signet ring I don't know, I don't

0:32:42.600 --> 0:32:45.800
<v Speaker 1>know signals intelligence at the n s A. And they

0:32:45.840 --> 0:32:48.120
<v Speaker 1>just kind of looked at me and then they just

0:32:48.160 --> 0:32:52.080
<v Speaker 1>slowly shook their head and tapped your phone. Um, well,

0:32:52.120 --> 0:32:55.760
<v Speaker 1>they I have no illusions they're already doing that. If

0:32:55.800 --> 0:32:58.200
<v Speaker 1>I wasn't on a list before we started this podcast,

0:32:58.280 --> 0:33:02.360
<v Speaker 1>I sure am on one now. Anyway intercepting the messages

0:33:02.560 --> 0:33:06.000
<v Speaker 1>and decrypting them. You know. That's that's easy to say. Uh,

0:33:06.200 --> 0:33:08.160
<v Speaker 1>when it gets down to how they actually do that,

0:33:08.280 --> 0:33:11.320
<v Speaker 1>it gets a little more tricky because you're wondering, all right, well,

0:33:11.920 --> 0:33:13.640
<v Speaker 1>when I'm sending a message, if I were to send

0:33:13.640 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>a message from myself to Lauren, then the way that

0:33:17.760 --> 0:33:19.600
<v Speaker 1>would work, assuming that we were not on the same

0:33:19.640 --> 0:33:22.360
<v Speaker 1>email server, that was kind of a bad example. Let's

0:33:22.360 --> 0:33:24.080
<v Speaker 1>say I'm sending a message to Chris who was not

0:33:24.160 --> 0:33:27.200
<v Speaker 1>on our email server, and I was just saying, hey,

0:33:27.560 --> 0:33:30.160
<v Speaker 1>what up, and what's would that red Roses comment you

0:33:30.240 --> 0:33:32.719
<v Speaker 1>used to make and then walk away. The way this

0:33:32.760 --> 0:33:35.280
<v Speaker 1>works is my message would get broken up into packets,

0:33:35.520 --> 0:33:37.720
<v Speaker 1>and each packet has a little bit of information in

0:33:37.760 --> 0:33:42.400
<v Speaker 1>the header and footer that tell essentially computers one where

0:33:42.440 --> 0:33:44.640
<v Speaker 1>that information is supposed to go and to how it

0:33:44.640 --> 0:33:47.520
<v Speaker 1>fits together with the other packets, so that when all

0:33:47.560 --> 0:33:49.640
<v Speaker 1>the packets get to their destination, they get put back

0:33:49.680 --> 0:33:52.240
<v Speaker 1>together and then Chris can read the email or get

0:33:52.280 --> 0:33:53.880
<v Speaker 1>the file or whatever it is that I'm trying to

0:33:53.880 --> 0:33:57.280
<v Speaker 1>send to him. So, Uh, the interesting thing about the

0:33:57.280 --> 0:33:59.680
<v Speaker 1>Internet is it's designed in such a way so that

0:34:00.200 --> 0:34:03.440
<v Speaker 1>this pathway can be. You know, there are multiple routes

0:34:03.560 --> 0:34:06.680
<v Speaker 1>that this information could take, and that's a good thing

0:34:06.720 --> 0:34:09.200
<v Speaker 1>because if one of the routes ends up being compromised,

0:34:09.239 --> 0:34:11.880
<v Speaker 1>if something happens like a server goes down, then this

0:34:11.920 --> 0:34:14.680
<v Speaker 1>information can go a different route to get to Chris.

0:34:14.680 --> 0:34:17.759
<v Speaker 1>And each packet can even take different routes so that

0:34:17.800 --> 0:34:20.280
<v Speaker 1>they're not all going in a line down one roadway.

0:34:20.320 --> 0:34:21.960
<v Speaker 1>They've kind of split up and they're all trying to

0:34:21.960 --> 0:34:24.359
<v Speaker 1>get to the same destination. So that kind of leads

0:34:24.360 --> 0:34:26.080
<v Speaker 1>to the question how does the n s A do this?

0:34:26.480 --> 0:34:28.560
<v Speaker 1>And that In fact, we'll we'll go into more about

0:34:28.560 --> 0:34:30.759
<v Speaker 1>that in the second podcast. But that's another one of

0:34:30.760 --> 0:34:33.000
<v Speaker 1>those things that has people scratching their heads, like not

0:34:33.080 --> 0:34:36.160
<v Speaker 1>just that you're intercepting and decrypting messages, but how are

0:34:36.160 --> 0:34:40.680
<v Speaker 1>you actually doing this without getting help from entities like

0:34:40.719 --> 0:34:45.759
<v Speaker 1>internet service providers. More on that later, because it turns

0:34:45.760 --> 0:34:48.719
<v Speaker 1>out they are spoiler alert, they are getting help from

0:34:48.760 --> 0:34:52.960
<v Speaker 1>Internet service providers. Um. Not that there's necessarily anything the

0:34:53.000 --> 0:34:56.680
<v Speaker 1>Internet service providers can do about it, but but but

0:34:56.800 --> 0:34:59.239
<v Speaker 1>lots of that probably in the second podcast that we

0:34:59.280 --> 0:35:01.279
<v Speaker 1>are going to do. Um. But but let's let's talk

0:35:01.280 --> 0:35:05.200
<v Speaker 1>a little bit about the different legislation that has come

0:35:05.239 --> 0:35:09.440
<v Speaker 1>out that regulates and defines what they can and can't do. Sure,

0:35:09.640 --> 0:35:11.640
<v Speaker 1>So one of the earliest things we want to talk

0:35:11.680 --> 0:35:16.239
<v Speaker 1>about is the Wire Tap Act of nineteen sixty eight. Now,

0:35:16.280 --> 0:35:20.120
<v Speaker 1>this regulates the collection of actual content of wire and

0:35:20.160 --> 0:35:24.080
<v Speaker 1>electronic communications. And it was first passed as Title three

0:35:24.600 --> 0:35:28.239
<v Speaker 1>of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

0:35:28.400 --> 0:35:31.160
<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixty eight, So we generally refer to it as

0:35:31.160 --> 0:35:33.399
<v Speaker 1>Title three, although a lot of people will just refer

0:35:33.440 --> 0:35:37.160
<v Speaker 1>to as Act. And originally it only covered wire and

0:35:37.320 --> 0:35:40.760
<v Speaker 1>oral communications. In other words, if you were sending something

0:35:40.920 --> 0:35:43.920
<v Speaker 1>via some sort of like if you're using like a

0:35:43.920 --> 0:35:46.640
<v Speaker 1>telegraph or if you're using a telephone, that's what it

0:35:46.840 --> 0:35:50.520
<v Speaker 1>was covering. But Title one of the Electronic Communication Privacy

0:35:50.560 --> 0:35:54.799
<v Speaker 1>Act of nineteen eight six extended this protection to electronic

0:35:54.840 --> 0:35:58.880
<v Speaker 1>communications in general, so it went beyond just verbal communication

0:35:58.920 --> 0:36:02.279
<v Speaker 1>over the phone to everything from email, instant messaging. All

0:36:02.320 --> 0:36:06.480
<v Speaker 1>of that was covered under this Act. Now, what this

0:36:06.520 --> 0:36:10.120
<v Speaker 1>Act would do was it it created some broad prohibitions

0:36:10.200 --> 0:36:15.200
<v Speaker 1>against international interception, use, or disclosure of wire and electronic

0:36:15.239 --> 0:36:19.640
<v Speaker 1>communications without a statutory exception. So you were supposed to

0:36:19.840 --> 0:36:22.120
<v Speaker 1>if you wanted to get access to something, if if

0:36:22.160 --> 0:36:26.120
<v Speaker 1>you had identified a target as being either if if

0:36:26.120 --> 0:36:29.200
<v Speaker 1>you're intelligence and you're identifying the target as being of

0:36:29.280 --> 0:36:33.160
<v Speaker 1>interest because they are, for some dangerous reason right there,

0:36:33.200 --> 0:36:35.200
<v Speaker 1>an agent of a foreign government and you need to

0:36:35.200 --> 0:36:39.359
<v Speaker 1>get information, or if you've identified them as someone who

0:36:39.360 --> 0:36:42.440
<v Speaker 1>has committed a crime, then you needed to receive a

0:36:42.520 --> 0:36:45.160
<v Speaker 1>court order from the Department of Justice. It had to

0:36:45.160 --> 0:36:47.720
<v Speaker 1>be signed by a US district court or a Court

0:36:47.760 --> 0:36:51.160
<v Speaker 1>of Appeals judge, and that would authorize wire tapping for

0:36:51.360 --> 0:36:55.520
<v Speaker 1>that specific target for up to thirty days. Agents had

0:36:55.600 --> 0:36:58.600
<v Speaker 1>to meet some pretty tough requirements in order to get

0:36:58.640 --> 0:37:01.440
<v Speaker 1>this authorization. It was and just go up to a

0:37:01.520 --> 0:37:03.759
<v Speaker 1>judge and say, hey, can you sign this for me?

0:37:04.040 --> 0:37:05.759
<v Speaker 1>I know you're busy, Just write it down here and

0:37:05.920 --> 0:37:08.840
<v Speaker 1>I'll get out of your hair. They had to actually

0:37:09.760 --> 0:37:15.320
<v Speaker 1>show probable cause, meaning that it means different things. Within crime,

0:37:15.400 --> 0:37:20.000
<v Speaker 1>probable cause means that you have a valid reason why

0:37:20.040 --> 0:37:23.840
<v Speaker 1>you suspect that person to be involved in committing a crime,

0:37:24.160 --> 0:37:28.959
<v Speaker 1>and intelligence it's that you have a reasonable suspicion that

0:37:28.960 --> 0:37:31.719
<v Speaker 1>that person is an agent of a foreign government. So

0:37:31.760 --> 0:37:34.960
<v Speaker 1>it's two separate things. The foreign agent part doesn't have

0:37:35.000 --> 0:37:37.319
<v Speaker 1>to be involved in any crime whatsoever when it comes

0:37:37.360 --> 0:37:40.200
<v Speaker 1>to intelligence gathering and wire tap if they are merely

0:37:40.320 --> 0:37:43.200
<v Speaker 1>an agent. Yeah. And in fact, that old that will

0:37:43.239 --> 0:37:44.919
<v Speaker 1>come into play more when we get into a little

0:37:44.920 --> 0:37:46.560
<v Speaker 1>bit later on one of the other acts, in fact,

0:37:46.600 --> 0:37:48.719
<v Speaker 1>the next act. But um, I want to make sure

0:37:48.840 --> 0:37:50.000
<v Speaker 1>do you have anything else you want to say about

0:37:50.000 --> 0:37:52.239
<v Speaker 1>the wire tap before I jump on? Well, um, you

0:37:52.239 --> 0:37:55.320
<v Speaker 1>know this, this was enacted in by the early seventies,

0:37:55.480 --> 0:37:59.120
<v Speaker 1>n s A was tapping um, foreign cables under the oceans.

0:37:59.400 --> 0:38:01.480
<v Speaker 1>As as you may or may not know, there is

0:38:01.560 --> 0:38:04.839
<v Speaker 1>a lot of information that is zipping right along in

0:38:05.040 --> 0:38:08.520
<v Speaker 1>in in cables that are going across the Atlantic. And

0:38:08.719 --> 0:38:12.960
<v Speaker 1>it turns out most of those messages say things like darling,

0:38:13.040 --> 0:38:17.359
<v Speaker 1>it's better downwards weather under the sea, or are these

0:38:17.400 --> 0:38:20.480
<v Speaker 1>days are just just videos of people's cats? But um,

0:38:20.520 --> 0:38:25.120
<v Speaker 1>But but also it can contain very sensitive international information

0:38:25.400 --> 0:38:29.240
<v Speaker 1>to um, that's another thing that can contain. And so before,

0:38:29.320 --> 0:38:31.919
<v Speaker 1>by the way, before the Wiretap Act was passed, there

0:38:31.920 --> 0:38:35.600
<v Speaker 1>weren't that many prohibitions about tapping phones or anything else

0:38:35.640 --> 0:38:38.320
<v Speaker 1>at all. I mean, it all depended upon the particular

0:38:38.400 --> 0:38:42.600
<v Speaker 1>era and the particular area. So I think that part

0:38:42.600 --> 0:38:44.319
<v Speaker 1>of this was in I think that part of the

0:38:44.320 --> 0:38:46.800
<v Speaker 1>Act was in fact in response to folks like Hoover

0:38:46.920 --> 0:38:50.759
<v Speaker 1>who were perhaps overstepping their bounds in terms of of

0:38:50.920 --> 0:38:55.560
<v Speaker 1>surveillance and gathering. Yeah, the FBI had become infamous for

0:38:55.760 --> 0:39:01.359
<v Speaker 1>gathering huge files on citizens and maintaining them, and uh,

0:39:01.680 --> 0:39:03.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, then you had things like the House of

0:39:03.320 --> 0:39:07.520
<v Speaker 1>American Activities. Uh that all kinds of creepy post war stuff. Yeah,

0:39:07.560 --> 0:39:09.400
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of stuff that was going on that

0:39:09.600 --> 0:39:13.400
<v Speaker 1>was it was definitely creeping up on people's freedoms, and

0:39:13.440 --> 0:39:15.680
<v Speaker 1>in some cases more than creeping up, but just denying

0:39:15.719 --> 0:39:18.440
<v Speaker 1>people their freedoms. So these kind of acts were a

0:39:18.480 --> 0:39:21.080
<v Speaker 1>response to that to try and correct some wrongs and

0:39:21.080 --> 0:39:24.480
<v Speaker 1>to prevent it from happening again. So so in nineteen

0:39:24.560 --> 0:39:27.440
<v Speaker 1>seventy eight, another big one that that is going to

0:39:27.440 --> 0:39:30.440
<v Speaker 1>be coming back, especially amendments to it, the Foreign Intelligence

0:39:30.480 --> 0:39:34.520
<v Speaker 1>Surveillance Act or UM Yeah FISA, nineteen seventy eight, that

0:39:34.640 --> 0:39:38.080
<v Speaker 1>was introduced by Ted Kennedy and it was signed into

0:39:38.239 --> 0:39:43.480
<v Speaker 1>law by Jimmy Carter. Yeah. So, uh, both of them Democrats,

0:39:43.640 --> 0:39:46.440
<v Speaker 1>both of them known as being liberal, which might surprise

0:39:46.480 --> 0:39:49.200
<v Speaker 1>people when they're sitting there thinking about FISA and they've

0:39:49.200 --> 0:39:52.920
<v Speaker 1>heard these other amendments to FISA, and how how the

0:39:53.000 --> 0:39:55.840
<v Speaker 1>n s A is using that to um to gather

0:39:55.920 --> 0:39:59.640
<v Speaker 1>all this information that has come to light. Uh. But

0:40:00.120 --> 0:40:02.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, you could also argue that when this Act

0:40:02.400 --> 0:40:06.680
<v Speaker 1>was introduced that was not the intent necessarily. However, it

0:40:06.719 --> 0:40:09.759
<v Speaker 1>did establish the procedures or surveillance in an effort to

0:40:09.760 --> 0:40:13.040
<v Speaker 1>collect foreign intelligence between foreign powers and their agents. Right.

0:40:13.080 --> 0:40:16.040
<v Speaker 1>It was hypothetically designed to ensure that the that the

0:40:16.120 --> 0:40:19.320
<v Speaker 1>n s A and other federal intelligence agencies couldn't monitor

0:40:19.400 --> 0:40:23.960
<v Speaker 1>American citizens electronic communications without obtaining a warrant based on

0:40:24.040 --> 0:40:27.280
<v Speaker 1>probable cause first, right, Yeah, this was this was essentially

0:40:27.280 --> 0:40:29.840
<v Speaker 1>saying that you can only do this kind of crazy

0:40:29.880 --> 0:40:33.680
<v Speaker 1>spy stuff if you're talking about non people who are

0:40:33.719 --> 0:40:35.759
<v Speaker 1>not American citizens and people who are not in the

0:40:35.880 --> 0:40:38.840
<v Speaker 1>United States. It was supposed to cover activity that occurred

0:40:38.920 --> 0:40:42.520
<v Speaker 1>outside the US. Now, as we've seen, that's getting trickier

0:40:42.560 --> 0:40:45.920
<v Speaker 1>and trickier because the way the world works now, and

0:40:45.960 --> 0:40:48.040
<v Speaker 1>the way that the Internet works and and and our

0:40:48.160 --> 0:40:52.719
<v Speaker 1>various communication systems work, it's global entity and sometimes that

0:40:53.000 --> 0:40:57.720
<v Speaker 1>involves communications passing through the US sometimes involved passing between

0:40:57.760 --> 0:41:01.080
<v Speaker 1>people in the US, but the pathway may actually go

0:41:01.200 --> 0:41:06.400
<v Speaker 1>outside the US, and so that's caused some blurring of

0:41:06.440 --> 0:41:10.280
<v Speaker 1>lines as well. Absolutely. UM. This this act also created

0:41:10.440 --> 0:41:14.880
<v Speaker 1>UM an independent court called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,

0:41:14.960 --> 0:41:17.839
<v Speaker 1>and this was made up of eleven federal judges UM

0:41:17.920 --> 0:41:21.919
<v Speaker 1>tasked with reviewing these warrant applications that would come in. Yeah,

0:41:21.960 --> 0:41:24.160
<v Speaker 1>and we will talk more about that court in the

0:41:24.280 --> 0:41:27.239
<v Speaker 1>next episode, because there's a lot to say about how

0:41:27.280 --> 0:41:30.960
<v Speaker 1>that court is formed, what they do, and how much

0:41:31.000 --> 0:41:32.759
<v Speaker 1>we know about it, which, by the way, that last

0:41:32.760 --> 0:41:34.719
<v Speaker 1>a little bit I'll go ahead and spoil it, not

0:41:34.880 --> 0:41:39.359
<v Speaker 1>a whole lot. Yeah, the whole thing classified is a thing,

0:41:39.480 --> 0:41:42.400
<v Speaker 1>and you know we are getting some leaked stuff. But

0:41:42.400 --> 0:41:44.839
<v Speaker 1>but when it comes down to details, we only I mean,

0:41:44.880 --> 0:41:46.759
<v Speaker 1>we know it exists, we know what it does, we

0:41:46.840 --> 0:41:49.000
<v Speaker 1>know who is on it, and we know how they

0:41:49.040 --> 0:41:51.839
<v Speaker 1>got there. That's about it, right, But a quick, quick

0:41:51.840 --> 0:41:55.480
<v Speaker 1>fun teaser. UM. Supposedly, the court has denied only eleven

0:41:55.520 --> 0:41:59.560
<v Speaker 1>of the nearly thirty four thousand warrant applications it's reviewed,

0:41:59.600 --> 0:42:03.280
<v Speaker 1>between inteen sent right. They have said that they don't

0:42:03.320 --> 0:42:07.480
<v Speaker 1>just rubber stamp approval for these requests. But when you

0:42:07.480 --> 0:42:12.160
<v Speaker 1>only have eleven denied requests, that causes me to wonder

0:42:12.400 --> 0:42:15.239
<v Speaker 1>suspect rubber stamping, well, or at least wonder what they're

0:42:15.239 --> 0:42:17.560
<v Speaker 1>sort of standards. Is that it can be either either

0:42:17.680 --> 0:42:21.719
<v Speaker 1>that either their standards are incredibly low and then they

0:42:21.760 --> 0:42:26.160
<v Speaker 1>approve pretty much everything, or all the warrants are extremely warranted. Right,

0:42:26.280 --> 0:42:29.480
<v Speaker 1>that's quite possible. That's the other possibility, right, So I

0:42:29.800 --> 0:42:34.240
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't just say as a blanket statement that they approve anything.

0:42:34.320 --> 0:42:36.520
<v Speaker 1>It may very well be that the the by the

0:42:36.520 --> 0:42:40.680
<v Speaker 1>time the application gets to them, it's actually a valid application.

0:42:41.239 --> 0:42:46.120
<v Speaker 1>I don't know because their secret. But anyway, so, yeah,

0:42:46.200 --> 0:42:49.320
<v Speaker 1>the FISA requires the government to get search warrants and

0:42:49.360 --> 0:42:52.840
<v Speaker 1>wire tap orders from a court even when investigating foreign

0:42:52.840 --> 0:42:56.520
<v Speaker 1>threats to national security. So it can't just go out

0:42:56.560 --> 0:42:59.799
<v Speaker 1>and act on its own without court approval. But that

0:43:00.120 --> 0:43:02.480
<v Speaker 1>or it is, like we said, a secret court and

0:43:02.520 --> 0:43:05.080
<v Speaker 1>we'll we'll go into more detail. Also, by the way,

0:43:05.160 --> 0:43:09.120
<v Speaker 1>if if you are served with a wire tap order

0:43:09.239 --> 0:43:11.279
<v Speaker 1>or a warrant from FISA, it also comes with a

0:43:11.320 --> 0:43:14.320
<v Speaker 1>gag order saying that you can never discuss the fact

0:43:14.360 --> 0:43:16.600
<v Speaker 1>that you were served. Yeah, you can't talk about it

0:43:16.680 --> 0:43:19.000
<v Speaker 1>at all. You can't indicate that it was served to you.

0:43:19.000 --> 0:43:22.160
<v Speaker 1>You cannot indicate that you whether you gave information that

0:43:22.239 --> 0:43:25.880
<v Speaker 1>was relevant or not. You you have to just disavow

0:43:25.960 --> 0:43:29.279
<v Speaker 1>that even existed. So that's kind of interesting. And then

0:43:29.320 --> 0:43:32.920
<v Speaker 1>we have the last of our major points of legislation

0:43:33.000 --> 0:43:34.799
<v Speaker 1>we wanted to touch on in this podcast, which is

0:43:35.400 --> 0:43:38.440
<v Speaker 1>which is the US Patriot Active two thou one. Now, now,

0:43:38.440 --> 0:43:42.200
<v Speaker 1>of course, to two thousand one was was when the

0:43:42.239 --> 0:43:45.279
<v Speaker 1>attacks of Septemper and leventh happened. Um. The n s

0:43:45.320 --> 0:43:47.840
<v Speaker 1>A came up under a huge fire for failing to

0:43:47.920 --> 0:43:52.040
<v Speaker 1>catch this plot and UM and they have said that

0:43:52.840 --> 0:43:56.200
<v Speaker 1>they had intercepted two messages that something major was going

0:43:56.239 --> 0:43:59.080
<v Speaker 1>to happen on that date, but had no information on

0:44:00.040 --> 0:44:02.560
<v Speaker 1>what or where that action would be happening. Right, And

0:44:02.600 --> 0:44:05.440
<v Speaker 1>you have to keep in mind again that traditionally a

0:44:05.480 --> 0:44:09.560
<v Speaker 1>lot of these agencies UH work very much independently of

0:44:09.600 --> 0:44:12.560
<v Speaker 1>one another. So there's been a lot of criticism that

0:44:12.680 --> 0:44:16.440
<v Speaker 1>said that if if there was more UH collaborative work,

0:44:17.000 --> 0:44:20.680
<v Speaker 1>that we would catch more of this these potential attacks

0:44:20.719 --> 0:44:23.400
<v Speaker 1>and stop them. And in fact, there there are plenty

0:44:23.480 --> 0:44:26.000
<v Speaker 1>of people who have said, you don't even realize how

0:44:26.000 --> 0:44:29.719
<v Speaker 1>many incidents have been prevented because of the changes that

0:44:29.800 --> 0:44:32.440
<v Speaker 1>have happened. Uh. And the reason why you don't know

0:44:32.480 --> 0:44:36.160
<v Speaker 1>about them is because they never never happened. Um, which

0:44:36.280 --> 0:44:38.080
<v Speaker 1>is you know that could be that could be a

0:44:38.160 --> 0:44:40.560
<v Speaker 1>valid argument. It's hard to say because again, you know,

0:44:40.680 --> 0:44:43.560
<v Speaker 1>we don't didn't happen, so we don't know. Lack of

0:44:43.560 --> 0:44:46.600
<v Speaker 1>results is hard to uh, hard to prove a negative. Right.

0:44:46.960 --> 0:44:49.399
<v Speaker 1>So the US Patriot Act is is the an Act

0:44:49.400 --> 0:44:52.480
<v Speaker 1>of Congress as signed the law by President George W. Bush,

0:44:52.520 --> 0:44:55.719
<v Speaker 1>And it's meant to detect, prevent, and combat terrorism by

0:44:55.719 --> 0:44:59.360
<v Speaker 1>broadening the powers of intelligence gathering agencies. And it actually

0:44:59.360 --> 0:45:03.520
<v Speaker 1>reduced quite a few restrictions that were placed on intelligence gathering.

0:45:04.040 --> 0:45:09.600
<v Speaker 1>Title five removes obstacles to investigating terrorism. It expanded FISA

0:45:09.680 --> 0:45:13.799
<v Speaker 1>counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records, which will

0:45:13.840 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 1>come into play in our next episode. And it requires

0:45:17.680 --> 0:45:22.600
<v Speaker 1>national security letters. What are national security letters their secret subpoenas.

0:45:22.640 --> 0:45:26.200
<v Speaker 1>They're issued directly by the FBI without the involvement of

0:45:26.239 --> 0:45:29.000
<v Speaker 1>a court, So the FBI does not have to go

0:45:29.160 --> 0:45:31.920
<v Speaker 1>to a court judge in order to get a national

0:45:31.960 --> 0:45:36.359
<v Speaker 1>security led letter to h to submit to someone. They

0:45:36.360 --> 0:45:39.480
<v Speaker 1>can actually demand an entity like an Internet service provider,

0:45:40.280 --> 0:45:43.640
<v Speaker 1>that that entity must hand over information about customers as

0:45:43.640 --> 0:45:46.240
<v Speaker 1>long as the FBI delivers to the entity a document

0:45:46.320 --> 0:45:49.959
<v Speaker 1>stating that such information is part of an authorized investigation.

0:45:50.040 --> 0:45:53.680
<v Speaker 1>But there's no court oversight, So really it just means

0:45:53.719 --> 0:45:57.400
<v Speaker 1>that the FBI kind of has free reign to to

0:45:57.640 --> 0:46:01.680
<v Speaker 1>issue these orders. Now, people in the FBI say that

0:46:01.760 --> 0:46:04.680
<v Speaker 1>there is a very strict process that must be followed

0:46:05.000 --> 0:46:07.000
<v Speaker 1>and that it's not just that. Again, it's not like

0:46:07.080 --> 0:46:11.640
<v Speaker 1>some low level FBI administrative person can rubber stamp one

0:46:11.640 --> 0:46:14.960
<v Speaker 1>of these letters. But um, but it also has this

0:46:15.040 --> 0:46:17.840
<v Speaker 1>gag order part to it where you can't talk about

0:46:17.840 --> 0:46:20.560
<v Speaker 1>it if you get one. Uh, then you've also got

0:46:20.560 --> 0:46:23.520
<v Speaker 1>the Right to Financial Privacy Act of nineteen seventy eight,

0:46:23.560 --> 0:46:26.880
<v Speaker 1>which gave the FBI authority to require financial institutions to

0:46:26.920 --> 0:46:31.360
<v Speaker 1>provide information about their customers or any entities financial records,

0:46:31.880 --> 0:46:34.480
<v Speaker 1>and um, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which requires a

0:46:34.480 --> 0:46:37.120
<v Speaker 1>consumer reporting agency to provide the FBI the names and

0:46:37.160 --> 0:46:40.200
<v Speaker 1>addresses of all financial institutions at which a customer maintains

0:46:40.280 --> 0:46:43.160
<v Speaker 1>or has maintained an account. Now that of course they

0:46:43.200 --> 0:46:46.440
<v Speaker 1>have to have the justification to do that. But um,

0:46:46.520 --> 0:46:48.879
<v Speaker 1>these are all the things that play into to this

0:46:48.920 --> 0:46:55.080
<v Speaker 1>whole idea of privacy, data security, national security and spying

0:46:55.160 --> 0:46:58.800
<v Speaker 1>and intelligence and counter intelligence. And now this Act received

0:46:59.120 --> 0:47:02.680
<v Speaker 1>sweeping bipartisan support in Congress, and no one was really

0:47:02.719 --> 0:47:05.360
<v Speaker 1>willing to argue with it after the events of nine eleven,

0:47:05.360 --> 0:47:08.239
<v Speaker 1>which is understandable. But but also you know, I I

0:47:08.600 --> 0:47:09.960
<v Speaker 1>think it I think it did get pushed through a

0:47:10.000 --> 0:47:12.480
<v Speaker 1>little bit too quickly, um, and a little bit too unanimously.

0:47:13.040 --> 0:47:15.359
<v Speaker 1>There quite a few people who because because people were

0:47:15.440 --> 0:47:17.759
<v Speaker 1>understandably upset, right, And there have been a lot of

0:47:17.760 --> 0:47:21.040
<v Speaker 1>critics who have who have said that the changes uh

0:47:21.239 --> 0:47:24.279
<v Speaker 1>in the with the Patriot Act were too great. They

0:47:24.320 --> 0:47:26.839
<v Speaker 1>gave the government too much power, it took too much

0:47:27.200 --> 0:47:31.320
<v Speaker 1>away from individual citizens. Uh. And you know that again,

0:47:31.360 --> 0:47:33.640
<v Speaker 1>that's a debate that continues to this day. And in fact,

0:47:34.000 --> 0:47:36.439
<v Speaker 1>the Patriot Act is not something that was meant to

0:47:36.480 --> 0:47:39.920
<v Speaker 1>exist in perpetuity. It has to be renewed every few years. Now.

0:47:40.000 --> 0:47:42.719
<v Speaker 1>So far Congress has been renewing it. Yeah, but there

0:47:42.760 --> 0:47:46.279
<v Speaker 1>are certain titles under the Patriot Act that may not

0:47:46.360 --> 0:47:52.200
<v Speaker 1>be renewed. According to people who are now responding to

0:47:52.280 --> 0:47:57.200
<v Speaker 1>the the controversy that has happened since the information was

0:47:57.239 --> 0:48:00.160
<v Speaker 1>leaked to the public about the n Essays activities. And

0:48:00.200 --> 0:48:03.600
<v Speaker 1>in fact, one interesting thing that we should point out,

0:48:03.640 --> 0:48:05.640
<v Speaker 1>and we will talk about it more in the next podcast,

0:48:06.200 --> 0:48:09.359
<v Speaker 1>is that one of the architects for the Patriot Act

0:48:09.640 --> 0:48:13.040
<v Speaker 1>has gone on record as saying this goes too far.

0:48:13.760 --> 0:48:16.440
<v Speaker 1>So if the person who authored the act that gave

0:48:16.520 --> 0:48:22.520
<v Speaker 1>the government broad uh release of restrictions says, hey, that's

0:48:22.560 --> 0:48:25.239
<v Speaker 1>going too far, it's time to at least have a

0:48:25.239 --> 0:48:29.000
<v Speaker 1>conversation about it. If not, you know, make some really

0:48:29.040 --> 0:48:31.440
<v Speaker 1>tough decisions. But we're going to save that for our

0:48:31.520 --> 0:48:34.200
<v Speaker 1>next episode, right. I think that we've set the stage

0:48:34.280 --> 0:48:37.560
<v Speaker 1>for everything that um that has happened in the past

0:48:37.880 --> 0:48:40.719
<v Speaker 1>uh ten, ten eleven years. Yeah, and you and we

0:48:40.840 --> 0:48:44.000
<v Speaker 1>understand this episode is not really tech heavy. Obviously, this

0:48:44.040 --> 0:48:46.920
<v Speaker 1>is more like government stuff than tech stuff. But it

0:48:47.160 --> 0:48:50.799
<v Speaker 1>really have a conversation about the tech stuff you have

0:48:50.920 --> 0:48:54.000
<v Speaker 1>to understand all of this other stuff that's going on.

0:48:54.840 --> 0:48:56.520
<v Speaker 1>And also, I mean, you know, these these are all

0:48:56.600 --> 0:48:58.759
<v Speaker 1>issues that that affect all of us and all of

0:48:58.760 --> 0:49:02.120
<v Speaker 1>our our internet you said in Communications and Privacy every day.

0:49:02.200 --> 0:49:05.439
<v Speaker 1>So yep, it's important so all right, so we're gonna

0:49:05.480 --> 0:49:08.440
<v Speaker 1>wrap this one up, and we're gonna Lauren and I

0:49:08.480 --> 0:49:10.239
<v Speaker 1>are going to take a quick break and take some

0:49:10.560 --> 0:49:12.800
<v Speaker 1>time to drink some tea, and then we're gonna dive

0:49:12.880 --> 0:49:15.719
<v Speaker 1>into the next episode, which you guys get to hear

0:49:15.719 --> 0:49:17.839
<v Speaker 1>in a couple of days, unless you just save these

0:49:17.840 --> 0:49:20.719
<v Speaker 1>all up at once, in which case enjoy. So, if

0:49:20.719 --> 0:49:23.040
<v Speaker 1>you guys have any suggestions for topics we should tackle

0:49:23.080 --> 0:49:25.920
<v Speaker 1>in future episodes of tech Stuff, I've got a great

0:49:25.920 --> 0:49:28.359
<v Speaker 1>suggestion for you. What is it, Jonathan? Let us know,

0:49:28.560 --> 0:49:31.759
<v Speaker 1>because we can't read your mind or your email, we're

0:49:31.800 --> 0:49:35.040
<v Speaker 1>not the n s A. Send us a message, uh

0:49:35.200 --> 0:49:38.360
<v Speaker 1>encrypted it you like? Send us a message. Our email

0:49:38.520 --> 0:49:41.680
<v Speaker 1>is tex Stuff at Discovery dot com, or drop us

0:49:41.680 --> 0:49:44.279
<v Speaker 1>a line on Twitter or Facebook. I warn you if

0:49:44.320 --> 0:49:47.640
<v Speaker 1>you do use code, we may never know what you said,

0:49:48.160 --> 0:49:50.160
<v Speaker 1>but you can find us with a handle tech Stuff

0:49:50.280 --> 0:49:52.160
<v Speaker 1>hs W and Lauren and I will talk to you

0:49:52.200 --> 0:50:03.400
<v Speaker 1>again really soon. For more on this and thousands of

0:50:03.400 --> 0:50:15.400
<v Speaker 1>other topics, visit how staff works dot com.