1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,240 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from how 2 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:15,280 Speaker 1: Stuff Works dot Com. Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff. 3 00:00:15,320 --> 00:00:19,800 Speaker 1: I'm Jonathan Strickland, and today we are going to start 4 00:00:19,840 --> 00:00:23,680 Speaker 1: a two part series and we may even go further 5 00:00:23,800 --> 00:00:27,520 Speaker 1: into this in the future about PRISM and the n 6 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:31,360 Speaker 1: s A and intelligence and intelligence gathering and how that 7 00:00:31,440 --> 00:00:36,199 Speaker 1: affects everybody, American citizens, people all around the world. And 8 00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:39,960 Speaker 1: what is all this this hubub about anyway, right, because 9 00:00:39,960 --> 00:00:42,600 Speaker 1: there's been quite a great deal of hubbub ever since 10 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:46,720 Speaker 1: a fellow named Edward Snowden uh leaked some information to 11 00:00:46,880 --> 00:00:50,360 Speaker 1: some to some press like The Guardian and the Washington Post. 12 00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:53,440 Speaker 1: Although to be fair, the hubb had really been going 13 00:00:53,440 --> 00:00:56,120 Speaker 1: on for much longer than that, and and and this 14 00:00:56,280 --> 00:00:58,720 Speaker 1: was just kind of one of those big things that 15 00:00:58,760 --> 00:01:02,000 Speaker 1: everyone has gone a minute, yeah, for good reasons. But 16 00:01:02,240 --> 00:01:07,880 Speaker 1: snow Din pushed the snowball that became the avalanche. That's 17 00:01:08,040 --> 00:01:11,160 Speaker 1: that's what happened. But you know, today, what we're going 18 00:01:11,200 --> 00:01:13,240 Speaker 1: to talk about in this episode is kind of laying 19 00:01:13,280 --> 00:01:18,240 Speaker 1: the groundwork so that our discussion about the PRISM program 20 00:01:18,319 --> 00:01:21,800 Speaker 1: and the related programs makes sense. So in order for 21 00:01:21,880 --> 00:01:24,000 Speaker 1: us to do that, we really wanted to talk more 22 00:01:24,120 --> 00:01:29,360 Speaker 1: about kind of the groundwork here, knowing the existing US policy, right, 23 00:01:29,600 --> 00:01:31,720 Speaker 1: knowing that some people, some of our listeners may not 24 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:34,039 Speaker 1: be familiar with the US policy. Some of our listeners 25 00:01:34,240 --> 00:01:37,959 Speaker 1: live in other countries and are therefore not exposed to 26 00:01:38,319 --> 00:01:41,280 Speaker 1: US law on a regular basis. And more we're brought 27 00:01:41,400 --> 00:01:43,920 Speaker 1: up within the American public school system and weren't exposed 28 00:01:43,959 --> 00:01:48,440 Speaker 1: to US law. Right. Sorry, that's a cheap shot vocal bomb, 29 00:01:48,600 --> 00:01:52,960 Speaker 1: but that's kind of a little bit accurate one. But anyway, Yeah, 30 00:01:52,960 --> 00:01:55,120 Speaker 1: it's it's there's there's a lot of stuff that we 31 00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:57,480 Speaker 1: need to be able to talk about, and so we're 32 00:01:57,520 --> 00:02:01,960 Speaker 1: gonna lay down some some basic truths. People come along 33 00:02:02,000 --> 00:02:05,680 Speaker 1: with us. So to begin with, one of the things 34 00:02:05,720 --> 00:02:10,360 Speaker 1: that this really concerns is one of the specific amendments 35 00:02:10,400 --> 00:02:12,799 Speaker 1: to the U. S Constitution. This is one from the 36 00:02:12,840 --> 00:02:15,080 Speaker 1: Bill of Rights. Yeah, Bill of Rights are the first 37 00:02:15,080 --> 00:02:18,120 Speaker 1: ten amendments to that Constitution. Now, the Constitution, of course, 38 00:02:18,560 --> 00:02:21,080 Speaker 1: is the document that established that the United States is 39 00:02:21,080 --> 00:02:23,760 Speaker 1: in fact a sovereign nation and it has its own 40 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: laws and its own way of governing the people. And 41 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:30,760 Speaker 1: the amendments are kind of the the ways of addressing 42 00:02:30,760 --> 00:02:36,600 Speaker 1: the Constitution to either expand or focus parts of US 43 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:41,240 Speaker 1: policy so that it has a broad application. And and 44 00:02:41,280 --> 00:02:43,400 Speaker 1: in terms of the Bill of Rights, it's specifically to 45 00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:48,400 Speaker 1: um protect the freedoms of the individual citizens right right. 46 00:02:48,440 --> 00:02:51,360 Speaker 1: So everyone's heard of. The first Amendment is the freedom 47 00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:53,359 Speaker 1: of speech. That's the one that a lot of people 48 00:02:53,720 --> 00:02:56,240 Speaker 1: will quote quite a bit. But the one we are 49 00:02:56,400 --> 00:03:00,760 Speaker 1: specifically concerned with is the fourth Amendment, which and I 50 00:03:00,760 --> 00:03:04,399 Speaker 1: will quote this, this is the actual amendment. The right 51 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:07,919 Speaker 1: of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 52 00:03:07,960 --> 00:03:12,880 Speaker 1: and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. 53 00:03:13,080 --> 00:03:16,799 Speaker 1: And no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 54 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 1: by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 55 00:03:20,480 --> 00:03:23,680 Speaker 1: be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 56 00:03:24,160 --> 00:03:28,920 Speaker 1: And now this was created in UM in nine, ratified 57 00:03:29,040 --> 00:03:33,600 Speaker 1: in sevente So the Internet wasn't a thing, no, but 58 00:03:33,800 --> 00:03:36,840 Speaker 1: this was. You know, you can see what the founding 59 00:03:36,840 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 1: fathers were thinking at the time that they they had 60 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 1: already experienced what they were calling tyranny under the British monarchy. 61 00:03:45,360 --> 00:03:48,120 Speaker 1: Those of us who are anglophiles and monarchists might sting 62 00:03:48,160 --> 00:03:50,880 Speaker 1: a little at that phrase. But at any rate, Uh, no, 63 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:54,920 Speaker 1: it was pretty accurate. Really. Uh. What this is essentially 64 00:03:54,920 --> 00:03:58,760 Speaker 1: saying is that in order for any one to be 65 00:03:58,920 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 1: able to search you or anything you own, whether that's 66 00:04:02,360 --> 00:04:05,840 Speaker 1: property or effects on your person, they have to have 67 00:04:06,000 --> 00:04:10,440 Speaker 1: authorization to do so. And further, in order to get authorization, 68 00:04:10,880 --> 00:04:14,240 Speaker 1: they have to have a good reason for it. There 69 00:04:14,280 --> 00:04:17,680 Speaker 1: can't just be a blanket. Yeah, you go out and 70 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:19,680 Speaker 1: do whatever you need to do to make sure that 71 00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:22,320 Speaker 1: that we get the bad guy. This is to protect 72 00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:27,080 Speaker 1: against that, so that people aren't subject to unreasonable searches. 73 00:04:27,640 --> 00:04:29,520 Speaker 1: And so that's what a lot of this fuss is 74 00:04:29,560 --> 00:04:31,559 Speaker 1: about is. And when I say fuss, I'm not trying 75 00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:34,160 Speaker 1: to diminish it. I'm just using a word because I 76 00:04:34,160 --> 00:04:36,560 Speaker 1: was brought up in the South and that's that's what happens. 77 00:04:36,920 --> 00:04:39,080 Speaker 1: But no, I'm not. I'm not suggesting that this is 78 00:04:39,320 --> 00:04:42,400 Speaker 1: a trivial matter at all. In fact, it's the very opposite. 79 00:04:42,400 --> 00:04:47,320 Speaker 1: This is fundamental to the freedoms that are considered to 80 00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:50,719 Speaker 1: be integral in American citizen Yeah. Yeah, and I would 81 00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:53,520 Speaker 1: say that that that modern ly internationally speaking, it's it's 82 00:04:53,560 --> 00:04:56,920 Speaker 1: a human rights, no, sure, Yeah, these are rights that 83 00:04:56,920 --> 00:04:59,880 Speaker 1: that organizations like the United Nations have said this is 84 00:05:00,040 --> 00:05:03,080 Speaker 1: this is a universal right. This is not something that 85 00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:07,839 Speaker 1: is is a peculiar to a particular government. This should 86 00:05:07,880 --> 00:05:10,960 Speaker 1: be something that everyone should expect. And in fact, that's 87 00:05:10,960 --> 00:05:13,440 Speaker 1: another good point just out of the gate, is to 88 00:05:13,480 --> 00:05:18,200 Speaker 1: say the Constitution is protecting American citizens rights, it does 89 00:05:18,240 --> 00:05:22,600 Speaker 1: not protect people who are not American citizens, right. So 90 00:05:22,720 --> 00:05:25,159 Speaker 1: in other words, uh, and that's that plays a huge 91 00:05:25,240 --> 00:05:29,720 Speaker 1: part in in the both PRISM and the related programs 92 00:05:29,720 --> 00:05:32,719 Speaker 1: that the n s A and other intelligence organizations are following. 93 00:05:33,440 --> 00:05:37,599 Speaker 1: So that's what the key of all of this is 94 00:05:37,640 --> 00:05:42,640 Speaker 1: about this this constitutional amendment. Uh. And we'll get into 95 00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:47,040 Speaker 1: detail in the second podcast about kind of what is 96 00:05:47,360 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 1: going on and why people are concerned and the arguments 97 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 1: on both sides, because both sides have presented their own 98 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:57,159 Speaker 1: arguments on this. Now, another thing we need to kind 99 00:05:57,200 --> 00:06:01,920 Speaker 1: of define are the different agencies within the United States 100 00:06:01,920 --> 00:06:07,400 Speaker 1: that are tasked with maintaining law and order, investigating crime, 101 00:06:07,640 --> 00:06:13,960 Speaker 1: and also gathering intelligence or or acting in counter intelligence roles. Right, 102 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:17,440 Speaker 1: Because although we will be talking mostly about the n Essay, 103 00:06:17,880 --> 00:06:21,120 Speaker 1: which is the program that's responsible for PRISM, there are 104 00:06:21,160 --> 00:06:26,000 Speaker 1: actually seventeen governmental bodies that have to do with intelligence gathering. Yeah, 105 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:28,400 Speaker 1: this is it's it's complicated stuff. So we're gonna actually 106 00:06:28,400 --> 00:06:32,120 Speaker 1: give you a lowdown on all seventeen offices and agencies 107 00:06:32,160 --> 00:06:35,839 Speaker 1: because it's good to know what these different organizations are. 108 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:38,679 Speaker 1: And it can be really confusing, right, I Mean, there's 109 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:40,560 Speaker 1: always that time where I get to something. It's like 110 00:06:40,600 --> 00:06:43,479 Speaker 1: a central intelligence agency does that? Is that domestic or 111 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:46,799 Speaker 1: is it foreign? Is it which one is? Federal Federal 112 00:06:46,880 --> 00:06:49,640 Speaker 1: Bureau of Investigation. That's certainly domestic, But what do you know? 113 00:06:49,720 --> 00:06:52,240 Speaker 1: And then you start you start going down this this 114 00:06:52,520 --> 00:06:55,640 Speaker 1: rabbit hole of all these different agencies. It really shows 115 00:06:55,640 --> 00:07:00,800 Speaker 1: how complex and gargantuan and bureaucratic our government this to 116 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: the point where you're thinking, there's there's probably some streamlining 117 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:07,840 Speaker 1: that could happen at some point um. And also keep 118 00:07:07,839 --> 00:07:10,000 Speaker 1: in mind that not all of these agencies and offices 119 00:07:10,480 --> 00:07:14,440 Speaker 1: have traditionally work together. Some of them are have been 120 00:07:14,480 --> 00:07:16,680 Speaker 1: at odds, very much so at the CIA and the 121 00:07:16,760 --> 00:07:19,240 Speaker 1: n s A in in particular have not always seen 122 00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:22,560 Speaker 1: ida I will partially because their their duties come very 123 00:07:22,560 --> 00:07:24,720 Speaker 1: close to overlapping in some cases. And I think the 124 00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:26,960 Speaker 1: CIA is tired of the n s A reading their emails. 125 00:07:27,160 --> 00:07:29,360 Speaker 1: That's really what it comes down to. That's a joke. 126 00:07:30,040 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 1: It's kind of not too but anyway, Yeah, the CIA 127 00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:35,800 Speaker 1: and n s A have actually competed. There's a in 128 00:07:35,800 --> 00:07:37,520 Speaker 1: fact that there's a little aside. We can give a 129 00:07:37,520 --> 00:07:41,120 Speaker 1: little bit later, but let's talk about these basic definitions. 130 00:07:41,160 --> 00:07:44,880 Speaker 1: So we've got law enforcement, all right, law enforcement, that's 131 00:07:44,920 --> 00:07:47,000 Speaker 1: pretty much what it sounds like. These are the agents 132 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:52,680 Speaker 1: who are designated to protect citizens, to enforce laws, to 133 00:07:53,200 --> 00:07:56,640 Speaker 1: apprehend people who are violating laws. So this is essentially 134 00:07:56,640 --> 00:08:01,000 Speaker 1: your police, so of various levels, whether it's in the 135 00:08:01,080 --> 00:08:03,360 Speaker 1: United States, we have lots of different kinds of police. 136 00:08:04,240 --> 00:08:09,200 Speaker 1: There's a federal, state, county, municipal. Yeah, there's there's lots 137 00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 1: of different police. You know, because you can you can 138 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:13,480 Speaker 1: violate federal law, you can violate state law. I mean 139 00:08:13,560 --> 00:08:16,480 Speaker 1: you can't. Don't go do that. I'm just saying that 140 00:08:16,680 --> 00:08:20,600 Speaker 1: there are different agencies that are in charge of No 141 00:08:20,760 --> 00:08:24,320 Speaker 1: you may not. Well, I mean it's bad. We do 142 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:28,640 Speaker 1: not condone that goes without saying, we're just we're both loopy. 143 00:08:28,840 --> 00:08:30,960 Speaker 1: Has been a very long day of lots of research. 144 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:33,400 Speaker 1: You would be amazed at how much research we have 145 00:08:33,440 --> 00:08:36,000 Speaker 1: in front of us right now, But so so who 146 00:08:36,040 --> 00:08:39,400 Speaker 1: who Who oversees all of these? So the Department of 147 00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:43,880 Speaker 1: Justice oversees law enforcement, and this involves agencies beyond just 148 00:08:43,960 --> 00:08:46,559 Speaker 1: the police. We're talking about the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 149 00:08:46,600 --> 00:08:49,480 Speaker 1: the Drug Enforcement Agency or d e A UH, the 150 00:08:50,040 --> 00:08:53,280 Speaker 1: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also known as 151 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:55,880 Speaker 1: a t F because they didn't have explosives in their 152 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:59,439 Speaker 1: name for a long time, and the U. S. Marshals Service. 153 00:08:59,720 --> 00:09:02,160 Speaker 1: All of those fall under the Department of Justice and 154 00:09:02,240 --> 00:09:05,800 Speaker 1: its law enforcement. UH. Then you have investigation, which is 155 00:09:05,840 --> 00:09:09,560 Speaker 1: actually part of law enforcement. It's not like it's completely separate, 156 00:09:09,559 --> 00:09:12,200 Speaker 1: but investing. You know, law enforcement can be about enforcing 157 00:09:12,280 --> 00:09:16,120 Speaker 1: laws and apprehending people who are violating the law. Investigators 158 00:09:16,120 --> 00:09:18,839 Speaker 1: they are the ones who actually investigate crime to determine 159 00:09:19,240 --> 00:09:23,240 Speaker 1: who committed the crime and and and how to apprehend 160 00:09:23,280 --> 00:09:27,680 Speaker 1: that person. Sometimes detectives, right right, You can have investigators 161 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:29,720 Speaker 1: or detectives. These are the type of names that you 162 00:09:29,800 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: tend to hear with investigators, and that can be with 163 00:09:33,440 --> 00:09:36,240 Speaker 1: agencies like the police, with the FBI. We also in 164 00:09:36,280 --> 00:09:38,960 Speaker 1: the United States have private investigators who can get a 165 00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:44,000 Speaker 1: private license to be uh to to investigate certain things. Um, 166 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:48,600 Speaker 1: so that's that's another level. Then you've got intelligence. Now 167 00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:52,000 Speaker 1: this is different from law enforcement. It's different from an investigation. Uh. 168 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:57,080 Speaker 1: It involves some investigative work, but it's not an investigation role. 169 00:09:57,679 --> 00:10:01,960 Speaker 1: So intelligence is all about gathering data, getting as much 170 00:10:02,000 --> 00:10:06,079 Speaker 1: information as possible. Generally speaking, it tends to be focused 171 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:10,880 Speaker 1: on foreign entities. So foreign intelligence would be uh, information 172 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:16,400 Speaker 1: about other nations, governments, their activities there, their motivations, what 173 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:18,800 Speaker 1: you know, what they are doing, and the activities of 174 00:10:18,840 --> 00:10:23,600 Speaker 1: their agents, both within those foreign nations and abroad. So 175 00:10:24,240 --> 00:10:27,959 Speaker 1: this is the James Bond stuff, right, this is spy stuff. 176 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:34,440 Speaker 1: And then uh, you've got two broad versions of intelligence. 177 00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:37,959 Speaker 1: You have human intelligence. That's specifically the James Bond type stuff, 178 00:10:38,280 --> 00:10:41,840 Speaker 1: because this is what you get when you have interpersonal contact, 179 00:10:41,880 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 1: when you have a spy meeting a double agent and 180 00:10:45,600 --> 00:10:48,360 Speaker 1: they're exchanging information so that the spy can bring the 181 00:10:48,360 --> 00:10:51,679 Speaker 1: information back home or uh it's a spy who has 182 00:10:51,760 --> 00:10:56,640 Speaker 1: infiltrated an agency or a government office or whatever to 183 00:10:56,760 --> 00:11:00,760 Speaker 1: gather information. That's human intelligence. That's the CEE I a's 184 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:04,000 Speaker 1: job that they oversee human intelligence in the United States 185 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:07,880 Speaker 1: for foreign intelligence, so CEE I A focused on the 186 00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:10,840 Speaker 1: foreign um intelligence, by the way, can also be domestic. 187 00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:15,200 Speaker 1: There's domestic intelligence where you've got especially with things like 188 00:11:15,240 --> 00:11:18,400 Speaker 1: homeland security. You have within the United States lots of 189 00:11:18,400 --> 00:11:22,120 Speaker 1: domestic intelligence UH officials as well, but we're mainly looking 190 00:11:22,160 --> 00:11:25,760 Speaker 1: at foreign in these podcasts. The other broad type of 191 00:11:25,800 --> 00:11:28,440 Speaker 1: intelligence you have your human intelligence. The other broad type 192 00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:34,520 Speaker 1: is signal intelligence. Now this is messages communication, right, so 193 00:11:34,559 --> 00:11:39,000 Speaker 1: this is the realm of anything digital or phones or yeah, 194 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:41,360 Speaker 1: this is this is what the n s A looks at, right, 195 00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:44,640 Speaker 1: this is this is their department. So the signals Intelligence, 196 00:11:44,679 --> 00:11:48,680 Speaker 1: by the way, sometimes abbreviated I'm signed yeah yeah, which 197 00:11:48,760 --> 00:11:50,400 Speaker 1: I just love and n s A by the way, 198 00:11:50,400 --> 00:11:54,400 Speaker 1: in case we were using the acronymics National Security Agency M. 199 00:11:54,520 --> 00:11:55,960 Speaker 1: I don't think we said that at the top, No, 200 00:11:56,120 --> 00:11:59,680 Speaker 1: but that's their actual full name, and they are in 201 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:04,800 Speaker 1: charge are of intercepting and decrypting messages between entities, normally 202 00:12:04,880 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: foreign entities or foreign like a foreign government and its agents. 203 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:13,320 Speaker 1: Agents can be located within the United States, which gives 204 00:12:13,440 --> 00:12:17,600 Speaker 1: rise to Yeah, that's that's one of the big reasons 205 00:12:17,640 --> 00:12:22,960 Speaker 1: why this whole mess has become you know, it's become 206 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:27,600 Speaker 1: such a powder kig really because the potential for agents 207 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:29,640 Speaker 1: to be in the United States means that the n 208 00:12:29,760 --> 00:12:33,000 Speaker 1: s A has to look at the broadest approach to 209 00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:36,600 Speaker 1: trying to gather information, but that then creeps in on 210 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:41,160 Speaker 1: the individual liberties and the expectation of privacy that American 211 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:45,320 Speaker 1: citizens have. That's the crux of this. So the signal 212 00:12:45,360 --> 00:12:48,080 Speaker 1: intelligence is really what we're looking at, though the human 213 00:12:48,080 --> 00:12:51,480 Speaker 1: intelligence is awesomely cool. And we have to do a 214 00:12:51,520 --> 00:12:54,840 Speaker 1: podcast about spy stuff at some point. Absolutely we haven't. 215 00:12:54,960 --> 00:12:57,320 Speaker 1: You know, we never did. Chris never did, you know. 216 00:12:57,760 --> 00:12:59,400 Speaker 1: I tried to convince Chris to do it, but then 217 00:12:59,400 --> 00:13:02,240 Speaker 1: he would just sort of glance around and say red 218 00:13:02,480 --> 00:13:04,960 Speaker 1: roses and then just run away. And I have no 219 00:13:05,040 --> 00:13:07,680 Speaker 1: idea what that means to this day. Um. He told 220 00:13:07,679 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 1: me that I was supposed to use my Captain decoder 221 00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:13,600 Speaker 1: encryption ring. I don't have one of those. Chris is 222 00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:17,360 Speaker 1: a little messed up. I love you, Mr Polettic wherever 223 00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:22,360 Speaker 1: you are. Um. Anyway, then there's counter intelligence. So counter 224 00:13:22,440 --> 00:13:26,480 Speaker 1: intelligence does not mean that you sit around, you know, 225 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:32,679 Speaker 1: watching reality TV and about counterintelligence is about preventing other 226 00:13:32,840 --> 00:13:38,600 Speaker 1: entities from gaining information about your country, government, agency, whatever. Right. 227 00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:41,560 Speaker 1: This can also be called information assurance, Yes, that's the 228 00:13:41,600 --> 00:13:43,640 Speaker 1: other term for it. So really this is all about 229 00:13:43,720 --> 00:13:48,120 Speaker 1: protecting the information structures within whatever, whether it's a country 230 00:13:48,200 --> 00:13:51,520 Speaker 1: or whatever it's it's encrypting communications, you know, doing the 231 00:13:51,559 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 1: opposite of essentially intelligence. This is this is where you 232 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:58,920 Speaker 1: end up hiring what are called white hat hackers who 233 00:13:58,960 --> 00:14:00,920 Speaker 1: try to break into a systems so that way you 234 00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:04,079 Speaker 1: can identify any vulnerabilities that your system has and address 235 00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:07,680 Speaker 1: it before real bad guys are able to get into 236 00:14:07,679 --> 00:14:12,319 Speaker 1: your systems. Um. So those are your basic terms. Now 237 00:14:12,360 --> 00:14:16,520 Speaker 1: we've defined that, which leads us to the intelligence community 238 00:14:16,640 --> 00:14:19,080 Speaker 1: of the United States. And I don't mean to suggest 239 00:14:19,640 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 1: that the intelligence community is a big old band of 240 00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:26,640 Speaker 1: happy spies who just sit around and chat spy stuff 241 00:14:26,640 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: all the time, because, uh, like we said, they can 242 00:14:29,520 --> 00:14:33,960 Speaker 1: sometimes be a little competitive. Now, there's quite a few 243 00:14:33,960 --> 00:14:36,480 Speaker 1: of them, and we're gonna go through and mention them. 244 00:14:36,560 --> 00:14:39,000 Speaker 1: I will go ahead, and I'm gonna lump in four 245 00:14:39,040 --> 00:14:41,200 Speaker 1: of them together, actually I think five of them together. 246 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:48,760 Speaker 1: The military branches of intelligence, so Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marines, 247 00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:53,400 Speaker 1: and Navy all have their own offices of intelligence. Uh, 248 00:14:53,440 --> 00:14:55,960 Speaker 1: and they're all similar enough where I feel like I 249 00:14:55,960 --> 00:14:58,560 Speaker 1: can lump them in together in the sense that yeah, 250 00:14:58,640 --> 00:15:02,360 Speaker 1: because that way it cuts down the other like five down, 251 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:06,760 Speaker 1: twelve to go um. But they essentially all concentrate on 252 00:15:06,880 --> 00:15:11,960 Speaker 1: gathering intelligence to support wartime efforts. So specifically, when the 253 00:15:12,040 --> 00:15:17,240 Speaker 1: United States is in some form of actual combat type 254 00:15:17,240 --> 00:15:20,360 Speaker 1: of situation, there's some sort of conflict, even if it 255 00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:23,600 Speaker 1: hasn't broken out into all out war, these offices are 256 00:15:23,680 --> 00:15:27,320 Speaker 1: gathering the information that gives the United States the best 257 00:15:27,680 --> 00:15:34,040 Speaker 1: chance to counteract anything that the various other parties could 258 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:38,800 Speaker 1: be doing. But they also coordinate with other intelligence agencies 259 00:15:38,800 --> 00:15:42,920 Speaker 1: whenever they gather intelligence that could be key to national security. 260 00:15:43,200 --> 00:15:45,640 Speaker 1: It's just not their main focus. Their main focus is 261 00:15:45,680 --> 00:15:48,920 Speaker 1: to support whatever branch of the military they happen to 262 00:15:48,960 --> 00:15:52,320 Speaker 1: be part of. So, but each one does have its 263 00:15:52,320 --> 00:15:56,720 Speaker 1: own intelligence agency. Then you've got the Central Intelligence Agency, 264 00:15:56,760 --> 00:15:59,560 Speaker 1: which we've already kind of alluded to. It gathers information 265 00:15:59,680 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 1: about foreign governments, corporations, and individuals in an effort to 266 00:16:03,160 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: provide intelligence that affects national security interests, and they report 267 00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:11,440 Speaker 1: directly to the the The CIA has its own structure, 268 00:16:11,480 --> 00:16:14,840 Speaker 1: but the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence, 269 00:16:15,280 --> 00:16:19,040 Speaker 1: which replaced and the CIA replaced the Office of Strategic Services. 270 00:16:19,160 --> 00:16:23,520 Speaker 1: Are the OSS back in? Here's a bit of trivia. 271 00:16:23,760 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 1: Do you know what pop culture character started in the 272 00:16:27,880 --> 00:16:31,520 Speaker 1: early eighties had a stint in the O s S. 273 00:16:31,600 --> 00:16:33,280 Speaker 1: But you only get to hear about it in a 274 00:16:33,320 --> 00:16:35,560 Speaker 1: little bit of a side dialogue and the most recent 275 00:16:35,680 --> 00:16:39,880 Speaker 1: version of his movies. He wears a fedora and carries 276 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:44,320 Speaker 1: a whip. Indiana Indiana Jones was part of well, he 277 00:16:44,360 --> 00:16:47,760 Speaker 1: at least worked with the OSS. According to India Jones 278 00:16:47,760 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: and Kingdom of the Crystal Skull, he has this one 279 00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:53,840 Speaker 1: little aside where he mentions the OSS. And as soon 280 00:16:53,880 --> 00:16:55,800 Speaker 1: as I heard that, I thought, this is the movie 281 00:16:55,840 --> 00:16:59,040 Speaker 1: I want to see, not the one that I'm currently watching. 282 00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:02,400 Speaker 1: That I would. I would, if anyone out there is listening, 283 00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:07,560 Speaker 1: I would watch that movie too. An audience of two, Yes, yeah, 284 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:10,439 Speaker 1: I mean, you know, I've done more for less, all right, 285 00:17:10,480 --> 00:17:13,680 Speaker 1: So then we've got skipping over the other military ones. 286 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:17,760 Speaker 1: We've got the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is a central 287 00:17:17,800 --> 00:17:21,359 Speaker 1: producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. It's part of 288 00:17:21,359 --> 00:17:24,560 Speaker 1: the Department of Defense. There's actually quite a few civilian 289 00:17:24,560 --> 00:17:27,800 Speaker 1: employees who work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. They're not 290 00:17:27,840 --> 00:17:31,560 Speaker 1: all military employees, and it includes a clandestine service that 291 00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:34,840 Speaker 1: conducts spy activities. So, in other words, a lot of 292 00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:38,280 Speaker 1: our spies report to the Defense Intelligence Agency UM. It 293 00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:40,680 Speaker 1: was established back in nineteen sixty one, and the director 294 00:17:40,880 --> 00:17:43,840 Speaker 1: of the d i A answers to the Director of 295 00:17:43,920 --> 00:17:47,240 Speaker 1: National Intelligence just like the CIA does, and also advises 296 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:49,560 Speaker 1: the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 297 00:17:49,600 --> 00:17:53,760 Speaker 1: Chiefs of Staff, so important person in the role of 298 00:17:53,880 --> 00:17:56,880 Speaker 1: the United States government. Like I said, the one thing, 299 00:17:56,960 --> 00:17:59,800 Speaker 1: if you don't take anything else away from this podcast, 300 00:18:00,080 --> 00:18:01,840 Speaker 1: you will take away the fact that our government in 301 00:18:01,880 --> 00:18:07,600 Speaker 1: the United States is enormous and complicated. And then we've 302 00:18:07,600 --> 00:18:11,840 Speaker 1: got the Department of Energy, which has its own Office 303 00:18:11,840 --> 00:18:14,879 Speaker 1: of Intelligence and counter Intelligence, which might surprise you to 304 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:17,239 Speaker 1: hear that the Department of Energy has one. But then 305 00:18:17,240 --> 00:18:19,239 Speaker 1: when you think how important energy is, yeah, yeah, it's 306 00:18:19,359 --> 00:18:22,120 Speaker 1: it's a huge part of our infrastructure. So yeah, so 307 00:18:22,280 --> 00:18:25,119 Speaker 1: you know, you remember hearing the news a couple of 308 00:18:25,160 --> 00:18:28,960 Speaker 1: years ago about how hackers had discovered not just hackers, 309 00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:33,120 Speaker 1: but people working in cybersecurity had discovered that uh, hackers 310 00:18:33,119 --> 00:18:36,119 Speaker 1: in in foreign countries had accessed certain parts of our 311 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:43,240 Speaker 1: power grid and placed essentially little uh surveillance, Yeah, just 312 00:18:43,280 --> 00:18:45,679 Speaker 1: to keep an eye on what was going on with 313 00:18:45,760 --> 00:18:48,119 Speaker 1: the potential maybe down the road at some point to 314 00:18:48,119 --> 00:18:51,120 Speaker 1: commit sabotage. Although there was no evidence of sabotage being 315 00:18:51,119 --> 00:18:54,840 Speaker 1: committed at that time, the potential there was a big 316 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:58,240 Speaker 1: you know that that that raised some huge alarms. Yeah, 317 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:00,320 Speaker 1: and we have we have a whole um what one 318 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:03,359 Speaker 1: or two part series on them on cybersecurity from a 319 00:19:03,400 --> 00:19:05,399 Speaker 1: few months back, if you care to go listen to that, 320 00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:08,440 Speaker 1: right exactly. And so the Department of Energy has its 321 00:19:08,440 --> 00:19:11,360 Speaker 1: own Office of Intelligence and counter Intelligence. They provide information 322 00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:14,679 Speaker 1: to the Secretary of Energy, and the expertise for this 323 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:19,360 Speaker 1: office includes nuclear energy, radioactive waste, energy security. So these 324 00:19:19,359 --> 00:19:22,320 Speaker 1: are the people that you go to when you want 325 00:19:22,359 --> 00:19:26,200 Speaker 1: to be able to gather information about uh, not just 326 00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:29,080 Speaker 1: not just domestic but foreign activities as well that could 327 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:34,879 Speaker 1: involve specifically things like nuclear power or even nuclear weapon capability. Uh. 328 00:19:34,920 --> 00:19:38,560 Speaker 1: The counterintelligence efforts are led by the Department's National Nuclear 329 00:19:38,640 --> 00:19:42,840 Speaker 1: Security Administration or in an essay. Then we've got the 330 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:47,040 Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security. This is a relatively young department 331 00:19:47,480 --> 00:19:51,399 Speaker 1: really was formed in response to the terrorist attacks on 332 00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 1: September eleven, two thousand one, and it's responsible for the 333 00:19:54,480 --> 00:19:57,600 Speaker 1: protection of the US and its territories from terrorist attacks 334 00:19:57,880 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 1: as well as to respond to other events like natural disasters. 335 00:20:02,280 --> 00:20:05,520 Speaker 1: So it's it's supposed to be all about, you know, 336 00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:09,119 Speaker 1: it's in the name Homeland Security. It's the supposed to 337 00:20:09,119 --> 00:20:13,120 Speaker 1: be protecting the United States citizens. That particular department has 338 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:17,879 Speaker 1: been the recipient of lots of criticism from various people 339 00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:23,680 Speaker 1: who think that the legislation that created that department may 340 00:20:23,680 --> 00:20:27,640 Speaker 1: have overstepped some constitutional bounds, and that's still a matter 341 00:20:27,680 --> 00:20:30,360 Speaker 1: of debate in the United States. A lot of these 342 00:20:30,400 --> 00:20:33,040 Speaker 1: policies that were formed very quickly after nine eleven um 343 00:20:33,080 --> 00:20:36,880 Speaker 1: are going to come back in the conversation because because 344 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:39,800 Speaker 1: they were a bunch of them, and they were big, yeah, yes, 345 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:46,280 Speaker 1: and rapid change was sometimes uh, sometimes led to concerns 346 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:51,360 Speaker 1: after the fact, like everyone was so concerned about responding 347 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:55,760 Speaker 1: to a particular horrible event in the United States history 348 00:20:55,840 --> 00:20:59,639 Speaker 1: that some would argue that that mistakes were made in 349 00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:02,320 Speaker 1: that process. Others would argue that it was exactly what 350 00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:05,040 Speaker 1: was needed. So I don't mean to say that, you know, 351 00:21:05,080 --> 00:21:08,320 Speaker 1: it's a one sided debate. It really isn't. There's a 352 00:21:08,320 --> 00:21:11,879 Speaker 1: lot of absolutely cogent points being made on both sides. 353 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:15,159 Speaker 1: Then you have the Department of State and they have 354 00:21:15,280 --> 00:21:19,240 Speaker 1: the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Their primary responsibility is 355 00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:23,399 Speaker 1: to analyze intelligence data. So this was originally part of 356 00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:26,359 Speaker 1: the os S, so it was part of what is 357 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,240 Speaker 1: now the CIA, but it's its own separate department at 358 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,400 Speaker 1: this point. So they are all about, you know, if 359 00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:34,919 Speaker 1: you they don't necessarily gather intelligence, but they analyze it. 360 00:21:35,359 --> 00:21:38,160 Speaker 1: So it's one of the departments that really focuses on 361 00:21:38,160 --> 00:21:40,960 Speaker 1: what does this intelligence actually mean. Then you have the 362 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:43,920 Speaker 1: Department of the Treasury. They have an Office of Terrorism 363 00:21:43,960 --> 00:21:47,360 Speaker 1: and Financial Intelligence that's meant to guard the US financial 364 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:51,040 Speaker 1: system against threats from rogue nations, terrorists, money launderers, and 365 00:21:51,680 --> 00:21:55,680 Speaker 1: et cetera. Then you've got the Drug Enforcement Administration, which, 366 00:21:55,720 --> 00:21:57,719 Speaker 1: as I mentioned before, was part of the Department of 367 00:21:57,760 --> 00:22:00,919 Speaker 1: Justice that was established in nineteen seventy and it's a 368 00:22:00,920 --> 00:22:04,240 Speaker 1: federal law enforcement agency and its main purposes to combat 369 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:07,840 Speaker 1: drug smuggling and uh and within the United States. It 370 00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:11,360 Speaker 1: also has a responsibility for controlling and pursuing US drug investigations. 371 00:22:11,359 --> 00:22:16,480 Speaker 1: In foreign countries, which is tricky business. Anytime you have 372 00:22:16,600 --> 00:22:21,080 Speaker 1: a country performing an investigation in another country, you know, 373 00:22:21,200 --> 00:22:25,679 Speaker 1: you've got that's sticky, absolutely, especially with with you know, 374 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:28,080 Speaker 1: something as sticky as drug laws, which are so different 375 00:22:28,080 --> 00:22:33,160 Speaker 1: in so many places, so so economically driven. Yes, yes, economically, 376 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:37,359 Speaker 1: that's plays a huge role in it. Politically, it gets 377 00:22:37,359 --> 00:22:40,560 Speaker 1: really sticky. It's a tough situation. Then you've got your 378 00:22:40,560 --> 00:22:43,840 Speaker 1: Federal Bureau of Investigation the FBI. It's also part of 379 00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:46,560 Speaker 1: the Department of Justice. That's meant to be a federal 380 00:22:46,600 --> 00:22:51,280 Speaker 1: criminal investigative body and also an internal intelligence agency, and 381 00:22:51,359 --> 00:22:54,719 Speaker 1: that was established back in nine eight. Of course, uh 382 00:22:54,960 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 1: I would say that the most famous director of the 383 00:22:57,400 --> 00:23:02,480 Speaker 1: FBI would be j Edgar Hoover, known for, according to 384 00:23:02,520 --> 00:23:05,040 Speaker 1: the movie Clue, known for a cleaning up multiple murders 385 00:23:05,080 --> 00:23:08,879 Speaker 1: because his name is Hoover. But dump Bump. I just 386 00:23:08,920 --> 00:23:12,120 Speaker 1: saw a Clue like a couple of weeks ago. So again, 387 00:23:12,400 --> 00:23:14,480 Speaker 1: it wasn't my first time. I've seen it many times. 388 00:23:14,480 --> 00:23:16,359 Speaker 1: I'm glad that you're pulling in puns from other storiess. 389 00:23:16,440 --> 00:23:20,520 Speaker 1: Now that's really I can't be the sole source of puns. 390 00:23:20,880 --> 00:23:25,120 Speaker 1: I'm only one man. Then, We've got the National Geospatial 391 00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:28,160 Speaker 1: Intelligence Agency, which I'm gonna be honest, I had never 392 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,520 Speaker 1: heard of until I did the research for this podcast. 393 00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:34,520 Speaker 1: I did not know this agency existed. Um, but they're 394 00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:37,159 Speaker 1: also known as the ng A, and they're part of 395 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 1: the Department of Defense, and they're an agency that plays 396 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,480 Speaker 1: a role in combat support, so it's kind of similar 397 00:23:42,480 --> 00:23:45,520 Speaker 1: to the military roles. They're primarily tasked with gathering and 398 00:23:45,560 --> 00:23:50,840 Speaker 1: analyzing geospatial intelligence to protect national security, and they were 399 00:23:50,880 --> 00:23:55,160 Speaker 1: formerly known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Then 400 00:23:55,200 --> 00:23:58,760 Speaker 1: you've got the National Reconnaissance Office, which is a spy 401 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:02,439 Speaker 1: organization and they create spy satellites and provide imagery and 402 00:24:02,520 --> 00:24:05,679 Speaker 1: signal intelligence to various agencies and military offices in the 403 00:24:05,720 --> 00:24:09,119 Speaker 1: United States. So this is the agency that's gathering lots 404 00:24:09,160 --> 00:24:12,879 Speaker 1: of data from electronic communications, but then they end up 405 00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:17,119 Speaker 1: funneling that data to other agencies. They're not necessarily um 406 00:24:17,160 --> 00:24:21,520 Speaker 1: analyzing the information themselves. Uh. And again they report to 407 00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:24,280 Speaker 1: the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. 408 00:24:25,200 --> 00:24:28,920 Speaker 1: Then we've got our our our darling are our buddies, 409 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:31,120 Speaker 1: the ones that will be talking about quite a bit. 410 00:24:31,160 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 1: We finally got to them and The only reason it's 411 00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:36,040 Speaker 1: taken so long is because I've been going in alphabetical order. 412 00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:41,600 Speaker 1: The National Security Agency the n S a centralized agency 413 00:24:41,600 --> 00:24:45,280 Speaker 1: that produces and manages signals intelligence for the United States, 414 00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:49,639 Speaker 1: gathers foreign intelligence through various means, including spying. Also in 415 00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:54,680 Speaker 1: charge of communication security. They are experts in cryptanalysis and cryptography, 416 00:24:54,720 --> 00:24:57,919 Speaker 1: meaning that codes and crypto, cryptograms, anything that has to 417 00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:01,320 Speaker 1: do with encoding information. They are experts at both doing 418 00:25:01,359 --> 00:25:04,360 Speaker 1: that to protect our information the United States is information 419 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:06,720 Speaker 1: and also undoing that, yes, also on doing that to 420 00:25:06,720 --> 00:25:09,159 Speaker 1: figure out what the heck people are talking about. And 421 00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:13,000 Speaker 1: they're experts, in fact, such experts that there's a famous 422 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:18,159 Speaker 1: there's a famous statue outside that has four sides, and 423 00:25:18,240 --> 00:25:23,080 Speaker 1: each side is encrypted in a different a different way, right, 424 00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:27,040 Speaker 1: So each cryptogram is is different, and each one, like 425 00:25:27,440 --> 00:25:29,639 Speaker 1: if you were to number the sides one through four, 426 00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:33,560 Speaker 1: one would be the quote unquote easiest to decrypt and 427 00:25:33,600 --> 00:25:36,560 Speaker 1: four would be the most difficult. Uh. And there was 428 00:25:36,840 --> 00:25:39,520 Speaker 1: sort of a challenge that was thrown down to both 429 00:25:39,640 --> 00:25:44,440 Speaker 1: the CIA and an essay to decrypt these sides, and 430 00:25:44,520 --> 00:25:48,680 Speaker 1: the CIA decrypted the first three sides within a set 431 00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:50,480 Speaker 1: number of years. I can't remember exactly what it is. 432 00:25:50,520 --> 00:25:52,480 Speaker 1: I'm this is anecdotal. I didn't write them down in 433 00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:54,840 Speaker 1: my notes. So yeah, I think this was put up 434 00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:59,040 Speaker 1: in the nineteen fifties or maybe the sixty which is 435 00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:04,879 Speaker 1: I'm like, so there was sometimes well that this was 436 00:26:04,960 --> 00:26:07,240 Speaker 1: this is just sort of an aside to everything else, 437 00:26:07,240 --> 00:26:08,680 Speaker 1: which is why we don't have all the data in 438 00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:10,879 Speaker 1: front of us. Uh, this would be its own kind 439 00:26:10,920 --> 00:26:14,600 Speaker 1: of fun podcast. But at any rate, the CIA went 440 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:17,280 Speaker 1: to try and crack this. They really were taking this 441 00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:19,439 Speaker 1: to heart and saying this, we want to be the 442 00:26:19,440 --> 00:26:21,760 Speaker 1: ones to crack this information. And they started working on 443 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:24,600 Speaker 1: and they were so proud when they announced it. And 444 00:26:24,640 --> 00:26:27,520 Speaker 1: then fairly recently it came to light that the n 445 00:26:27,600 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 1: s A had already done it about eight years before 446 00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:33,679 Speaker 1: the CIA did, just didn't bother telling them, And you 447 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,479 Speaker 1: know that was apparently they the n s A director 448 00:26:36,880 --> 00:26:38,720 Speaker 1: Ted told people like, if you want to do this, 449 00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:42,200 Speaker 1: you should do it, and totally everybody else, but we're 450 00:26:42,240 --> 00:26:43,760 Speaker 1: not doing it. But if you want to do it, 451 00:26:43,800 --> 00:26:45,679 Speaker 1: you should totally go and do it. But you know, 452 00:26:45,840 --> 00:26:48,760 Speaker 1: officially we are not doing this, but go and do 453 00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:52,080 Speaker 1: that thing. So and that's what they did. So it 454 00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:55,480 Speaker 1: looks like they are really good at decrypting stuff, which 455 00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:57,320 Speaker 1: that should give anyone pause. I mean, there are a 456 00:26:57,359 --> 00:27:01,320 Speaker 1: lot of people who advocate that even just as a 457 00:27:01,359 --> 00:27:04,719 Speaker 1: personal choice, day to day kind of activity, that you 458 00:27:05,119 --> 00:27:08,200 Speaker 1: encrypt everything. Like you know, there are people who will 459 00:27:08,240 --> 00:27:10,439 Speaker 1: not communicate with you if you do not use an 460 00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:15,399 Speaker 1: emails service that allows you to encrypt your messages. UM. 461 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:20,800 Speaker 1: But their decryption abilities show that they're really really good 462 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:23,560 Speaker 1: at breaking those codes. It might take some time, but 463 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:26,280 Speaker 1: they they have shown that they are capable of doing 464 00:27:26,320 --> 00:27:28,760 Speaker 1: such things absolutely. Now that they are officially a part 465 00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:31,359 Speaker 1: of the Department of Defense, yep. Yeah, they report to 466 00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:34,399 Speaker 1: the Director of National Intelligence as well. Uh. They formed 467 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:37,800 Speaker 1: back in nineteen fifty one. They were originally a replacement 468 00:27:37,840 --> 00:27:42,000 Speaker 1: for the Armed Forces Security Agency or FSA. Right. They 469 00:27:42,040 --> 00:27:44,639 Speaker 1: were created specifically by the order of US President at 470 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:47,320 Speaker 1: the time, Harry S. Truman UM and and began as 471 00:27:47,359 --> 00:27:51,200 Speaker 1: a group of only UM seven thousand, six hundred military 472 00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:57,720 Speaker 1: and civilian workers. Are there now, like, that's pretty big growth. 473 00:27:57,840 --> 00:27:59,680 Speaker 1: They've they've been grown a lot actually in the past 474 00:27:59,680 --> 00:28:02,879 Speaker 1: couple of years. Also, trivia question, was the S stand 475 00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:09,320 Speaker 1: for and Harry S. Truman nothing it's just sent Harry S. Truman. 476 00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 1: The S stands for nothing, but Truman stood for a lot. Uh. 477 00:28:16,160 --> 00:28:18,600 Speaker 1: I have tiny little bits of historical trivia that I 478 00:28:18,640 --> 00:28:20,679 Speaker 1: never get to use because they never invite me on 479 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:22,639 Speaker 1: stuff you missed in history class, So I have to 480 00:28:22,640 --> 00:28:25,679 Speaker 1: save it all up for episodes like this. UM. And 481 00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:28,480 Speaker 1: then we finally get to the Office of the Director 482 00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:33,479 Speaker 1: of National Intelligence. Yeah, the the n s A is 483 00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:35,320 Speaker 1: the important one that we'll be talking about for the 484 00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:39,080 Speaker 1: most part when we get into the actual particulars for PRISM. 485 00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:42,920 Speaker 1: But this is the office that we often will say, 486 00:28:42,920 --> 00:28:46,280 Speaker 1: there are sixteen agencies in the intelligence community, and this 487 00:28:46,360 --> 00:28:49,840 Speaker 1: is the seventeenth office. This is kind of the the head. 488 00:28:50,200 --> 00:28:53,960 Speaker 1: This is where everything funnels up. So the idea here 489 00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:57,200 Speaker 1: is that it oversees many other intelligence agents and offices, 490 00:28:57,240 --> 00:29:00,880 Speaker 1: including the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and its 491 00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:05,520 Speaker 1: mission is to exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed 492 00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,960 Speaker 1: against American interests, Protect the integrity of the U S 493 00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:13,360 Speaker 1: intelligence system, Provide incisive, actionable intelligence to the decision makers 494 00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:18,960 Speaker 1: at all levels, Protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities. 495 00:29:19,240 --> 00:29:24,880 Speaker 1: Neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces, 496 00:29:25,240 --> 00:29:28,360 Speaker 1: and the Director of National Intelligence reports to the President 497 00:29:28,560 --> 00:29:31,800 Speaker 1: of the United States. So this is the head of 498 00:29:31,840 --> 00:29:34,840 Speaker 1: the intelligence community. Keeping in mind that every single one 499 00:29:34,840 --> 00:29:37,880 Speaker 1: of these agencies we have mentioned has its own hierarchy, 500 00:29:38,280 --> 00:29:43,360 Speaker 1: has its own leadership, and they all have different requirements 501 00:29:43,400 --> 00:29:45,640 Speaker 1: for what that leader can be. In fact, the n 502 00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:47,320 Speaker 1: s A is is kind of cool, but we'll talk 503 00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:52,280 Speaker 1: about that probably in the second podcast. So there we've 504 00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:56,000 Speaker 1: laid it down, the Constitution, the different types of law 505 00:29:56,160 --> 00:29:59,560 Speaker 1: enforcement and intelligence, the various members of the intelligence community. 506 00:30:00,520 --> 00:30:03,240 Speaker 1: But we still have some more groundwork. From from here 507 00:30:03,280 --> 00:30:05,800 Speaker 1: in it gets sticky. Yeah, this is where this is 508 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:09,160 Speaker 1: where we've That was the easy part, y'all. But before 509 00:30:09,160 --> 00:30:12,560 Speaker 1: we dive into the really tricky part, let's take a 510 00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:15,840 Speaker 1: quick break to thank our sponsored Jack Threads. Jack Threads 511 00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:19,239 Speaker 1: has quickly become the online shopping destination for guys. And 512 00:30:19,280 --> 00:30:22,200 Speaker 1: here's why. They have awesome apparel, they have accessories, and 513 00:30:22,200 --> 00:30:25,480 Speaker 1: they have gadgets from brands like Converse, Penguin, and Busted Teas, 514 00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:28,640 Speaker 1: and they're all up to eight off. That's right, everything 515 00:30:28,640 --> 00:30:30,880 Speaker 1: on the site is up to eight percent off. As 516 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:33,280 Speaker 1: a listener of tech stuff, you can skip the membership 517 00:30:33,320 --> 00:30:37,040 Speaker 1: waitlist and get instant access at www dot jack threads 518 00:30:37,080 --> 00:30:41,640 Speaker 1: dot com slash tech stuff when you sign up today. Alright, 519 00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:44,280 Speaker 1: so we're back. We've laid out that that groundwork. Let's 520 00:30:44,320 --> 00:30:47,440 Speaker 1: talk specifically about the n s A for a little 521 00:30:47,440 --> 00:30:51,720 Speaker 1: bit because that's really what most of this this stuff involves. Right. 522 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:54,680 Speaker 1: Um okay, So, so, like we said, as of today, 523 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:58,000 Speaker 1: they have about thirty thousand employees. They're working out of Maryland, 524 00:30:58,320 --> 00:31:02,280 Speaker 1: um Fort Mead, Maryland specific and the NSA actually works 525 00:31:02,320 --> 00:31:06,480 Speaker 1: alongside an organization called the Central Security Service, which is 526 00:31:07,120 --> 00:31:09,960 Speaker 1: it's basically the n s A, but it's comprised of 527 00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:13,600 Speaker 1: active military members. Now, the director of both of these 528 00:31:13,680 --> 00:31:18,000 Speaker 1: organizations is appointed by the Secretary of Defense and approved 529 00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 1: by the President, and he must be a or here 530 00:31:21,200 --> 00:31:23,640 Speaker 1: she I'm sorry, that was terrible. I'm a bad feminist. Um. 531 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 1: There must be a commissioned military officer with at least 532 00:31:26,280 --> 00:31:28,520 Speaker 1: a three star rank, right, So, now that that could 533 00:31:28,560 --> 00:31:31,080 Speaker 1: be of any of the branches of the military, doesn't 534 00:31:31,400 --> 00:31:33,400 Speaker 1: I always think three star general, but you could also 535 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:37,000 Speaker 1: have an admiral or of course etcetera. Right this, uh, 536 00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:41,160 Speaker 1: this leader also heads what's called the US Cyber Command UM, 537 00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: which was created in two thousand five and is a 538 00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:49,240 Speaker 1: network warfare unit that protects against terrorist data and network threats. Yeah. 539 00:31:49,680 --> 00:31:52,960 Speaker 1: So in our cybersecurity podcast where we were talking about 540 00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:57,840 Speaker 1: some of the reactions to cyber threats in the United States, 541 00:31:57,880 --> 00:32:01,800 Speaker 1: that's really the organization that is adding that for in 542 00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:06,360 Speaker 1: large part. There. Keep in mind they're also multiple organizations 543 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:10,720 Speaker 1: within other agencies that also investigate and tried to prevent cybercrime. 544 00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:12,920 Speaker 1: But this is one of the big ones right here, 545 00:32:13,480 --> 00:32:16,800 Speaker 1: right especially or I mean you know, yes, kind of 546 00:32:16,880 --> 00:32:19,040 Speaker 1: kind of during all of that panic that happened a 547 00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:21,800 Speaker 1: few years back, this this one sort of floated to 548 00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:24,440 Speaker 1: the top. UM So, so the n s A and 549 00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:29,160 Speaker 1: the CSS, like we said earlier, work in UM information 550 00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:33,960 Speaker 1: assurance or counter intelligence, and also in signals intelligence or 551 00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:42,520 Speaker 1: signat so intercepting signet ring I don't know, I don't 552 00:32:42,600 --> 00:32:45,800 Speaker 1: know signals intelligence at the n s A. And they 553 00:32:45,840 --> 00:32:48,120 Speaker 1: just kind of looked at me and then they just 554 00:32:48,160 --> 00:32:52,080 Speaker 1: slowly shook their head and tapped your phone. Um, well, 555 00:32:52,120 --> 00:32:55,760 Speaker 1: they I have no illusions they're already doing that. If 556 00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:58,200 Speaker 1: I wasn't on a list before we started this podcast, 557 00:32:58,280 --> 00:33:02,360 Speaker 1: I sure am on one now. Anyway intercepting the messages 558 00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:06,000 Speaker 1: and decrypting them. You know. That's that's easy to say. Uh, 559 00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:08,160 Speaker 1: when it gets down to how they actually do that, 560 00:33:08,280 --> 00:33:11,320 Speaker 1: it gets a little more tricky because you're wondering, all right, well, 561 00:33:11,920 --> 00:33:13,640 Speaker 1: when I'm sending a message, if I were to send 562 00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:17,760 Speaker 1: a message from myself to Lauren, then the way that 563 00:33:17,760 --> 00:33:19,600 Speaker 1: would work, assuming that we were not on the same 564 00:33:19,640 --> 00:33:22,360 Speaker 1: email server, that was kind of a bad example. Let's 565 00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:24,080 Speaker 1: say I'm sending a message to Chris who was not 566 00:33:24,160 --> 00:33:27,200 Speaker 1: on our email server, and I was just saying, hey, 567 00:33:27,560 --> 00:33:30,160 Speaker 1: what up, and what's would that red Roses comment you 568 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:32,719 Speaker 1: used to make and then walk away. The way this 569 00:33:32,760 --> 00:33:35,280 Speaker 1: works is my message would get broken up into packets, 570 00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:37,720 Speaker 1: and each packet has a little bit of information in 571 00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:42,400 Speaker 1: the header and footer that tell essentially computers one where 572 00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:44,640 Speaker 1: that information is supposed to go and to how it 573 00:33:44,640 --> 00:33:47,520 Speaker 1: fits together with the other packets, so that when all 574 00:33:47,560 --> 00:33:49,640 Speaker 1: the packets get to their destination, they get put back 575 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:52,240 Speaker 1: together and then Chris can read the email or get 576 00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:53,880 Speaker 1: the file or whatever it is that I'm trying to 577 00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,280 Speaker 1: send to him. So, Uh, the interesting thing about the 578 00:33:57,280 --> 00:33:59,680 Speaker 1: Internet is it's designed in such a way so that 579 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:03,440 Speaker 1: this pathway can be. You know, there are multiple routes 580 00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:06,680 Speaker 1: that this information could take, and that's a good thing 581 00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:09,200 Speaker 1: because if one of the routes ends up being compromised, 582 00:34:09,239 --> 00:34:11,880 Speaker 1: if something happens like a server goes down, then this 583 00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,680 Speaker 1: information can go a different route to get to Chris. 584 00:34:14,680 --> 00:34:17,759 Speaker 1: And each packet can even take different routes so that 585 00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:20,280 Speaker 1: they're not all going in a line down one roadway. 586 00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:21,960 Speaker 1: They've kind of split up and they're all trying to 587 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:24,359 Speaker 1: get to the same destination. So that kind of leads 588 00:34:24,360 --> 00:34:26,080 Speaker 1: to the question how does the n s A do this? 589 00:34:26,480 --> 00:34:28,560 Speaker 1: And that In fact, we'll we'll go into more about 590 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:30,759 Speaker 1: that in the second podcast. But that's another one of 591 00:34:30,760 --> 00:34:33,000 Speaker 1: those things that has people scratching their heads, like not 592 00:34:33,080 --> 00:34:36,160 Speaker 1: just that you're intercepting and decrypting messages, but how are 593 00:34:36,160 --> 00:34:40,680 Speaker 1: you actually doing this without getting help from entities like 594 00:34:40,719 --> 00:34:45,759 Speaker 1: internet service providers. More on that later, because it turns 595 00:34:45,760 --> 00:34:48,719 Speaker 1: out they are spoiler alert, they are getting help from 596 00:34:48,760 --> 00:34:52,960 Speaker 1: Internet service providers. Um. Not that there's necessarily anything the 597 00:34:53,000 --> 00:34:56,680 Speaker 1: Internet service providers can do about it, but but but 598 00:34:56,800 --> 00:34:59,239 Speaker 1: lots of that probably in the second podcast that we 599 00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:01,279 Speaker 1: are going to do. Um. But but let's let's talk 600 00:35:01,280 --> 00:35:05,200 Speaker 1: a little bit about the different legislation that has come 601 00:35:05,239 --> 00:35:09,440 Speaker 1: out that regulates and defines what they can and can't do. Sure, 602 00:35:09,640 --> 00:35:11,640 Speaker 1: So one of the earliest things we want to talk 603 00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:16,239 Speaker 1: about is the Wire Tap Act of nineteen sixty eight. Now, 604 00:35:16,280 --> 00:35:20,120 Speaker 1: this regulates the collection of actual content of wire and 605 00:35:20,160 --> 00:35:24,080 Speaker 1: electronic communications. And it was first passed as Title three 606 00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:28,239 Speaker 1: of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 607 00:35:28,400 --> 00:35:31,160 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty eight, So we generally refer to it as 608 00:35:31,160 --> 00:35:33,399 Speaker 1: Title three, although a lot of people will just refer 609 00:35:33,440 --> 00:35:37,160 Speaker 1: to as Act. And originally it only covered wire and 610 00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:40,760 Speaker 1: oral communications. In other words, if you were sending something 611 00:35:40,920 --> 00:35:43,920 Speaker 1: via some sort of like if you're using like a 612 00:35:43,920 --> 00:35:46,640 Speaker 1: telegraph or if you're using a telephone, that's what it 613 00:35:46,840 --> 00:35:50,520 Speaker 1: was covering. But Title one of the Electronic Communication Privacy 614 00:35:50,560 --> 00:35:54,799 Speaker 1: Act of nineteen eight six extended this protection to electronic 615 00:35:54,840 --> 00:35:58,880 Speaker 1: communications in general, so it went beyond just verbal communication 616 00:35:58,920 --> 00:36:02,279 Speaker 1: over the phone to everything from email, instant messaging. All 617 00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:06,480 Speaker 1: of that was covered under this Act. Now, what this 618 00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:10,120 Speaker 1: Act would do was it it created some broad prohibitions 619 00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:15,200 Speaker 1: against international interception, use, or disclosure of wire and electronic 620 00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:19,640 Speaker 1: communications without a statutory exception. So you were supposed to 621 00:36:19,840 --> 00:36:22,120 Speaker 1: if you wanted to get access to something, if if 622 00:36:22,160 --> 00:36:26,120 Speaker 1: you had identified a target as being either if if 623 00:36:26,120 --> 00:36:29,200 Speaker 1: you're intelligence and you're identifying the target as being of 624 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:33,160 Speaker 1: interest because they are, for some dangerous reason right there, 625 00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:35,200 Speaker 1: an agent of a foreign government and you need to 626 00:36:35,200 --> 00:36:39,359 Speaker 1: get information, or if you've identified them as someone who 627 00:36:39,360 --> 00:36:42,440 Speaker 1: has committed a crime, then you needed to receive a 628 00:36:42,520 --> 00:36:45,160 Speaker 1: court order from the Department of Justice. It had to 629 00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:47,720 Speaker 1: be signed by a US district court or a Court 630 00:36:47,760 --> 00:36:51,160 Speaker 1: of Appeals judge, and that would authorize wire tapping for 631 00:36:51,360 --> 00:36:55,520 Speaker 1: that specific target for up to thirty days. Agents had 632 00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:58,600 Speaker 1: to meet some pretty tough requirements in order to get 633 00:36:58,640 --> 00:37:01,440 Speaker 1: this authorization. It was and just go up to a 634 00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:03,759 Speaker 1: judge and say, hey, can you sign this for me? 635 00:37:04,040 --> 00:37:05,759 Speaker 1: I know you're busy, Just write it down here and 636 00:37:05,920 --> 00:37:08,840 Speaker 1: I'll get out of your hair. They had to actually 637 00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:15,320 Speaker 1: show probable cause, meaning that it means different things. Within crime, 638 00:37:15,400 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: probable cause means that you have a valid reason why 639 00:37:20,040 --> 00:37:23,840 Speaker 1: you suspect that person to be involved in committing a crime, 640 00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:28,959 Speaker 1: and intelligence it's that you have a reasonable suspicion that 641 00:37:28,960 --> 00:37:31,719 Speaker 1: that person is an agent of a foreign government. So 642 00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:34,960 Speaker 1: it's two separate things. The foreign agent part doesn't have 643 00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:37,319 Speaker 1: to be involved in any crime whatsoever when it comes 644 00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:40,200 Speaker 1: to intelligence gathering and wire tap if they are merely 645 00:37:40,320 --> 00:37:43,200 Speaker 1: an agent. Yeah. And in fact, that old that will 646 00:37:43,239 --> 00:37:44,919 Speaker 1: come into play more when we get into a little 647 00:37:44,920 --> 00:37:46,560 Speaker 1: bit later on one of the other acts, in fact, 648 00:37:46,600 --> 00:37:48,719 Speaker 1: the next act. But um, I want to make sure 649 00:37:48,840 --> 00:37:50,000 Speaker 1: do you have anything else you want to say about 650 00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,239 Speaker 1: the wire tap before I jump on? Well, um, you 651 00:37:52,239 --> 00:37:55,320 Speaker 1: know this, this was enacted in by the early seventies, 652 00:37:55,480 --> 00:37:59,120 Speaker 1: n s A was tapping um, foreign cables under the oceans. 653 00:37:59,400 --> 00:38:01,480 Speaker 1: As as you may or may not know, there is 654 00:38:01,560 --> 00:38:04,839 Speaker 1: a lot of information that is zipping right along in 655 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:08,520 Speaker 1: in in cables that are going across the Atlantic. And 656 00:38:08,719 --> 00:38:12,960 Speaker 1: it turns out most of those messages say things like darling, 657 00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:17,359 Speaker 1: it's better downwards weather under the sea, or are these 658 00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:20,480 Speaker 1: days are just just videos of people's cats? But um, 659 00:38:20,520 --> 00:38:25,120 Speaker 1: But but also it can contain very sensitive international information 660 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:29,240 Speaker 1: to um, that's another thing that can contain. And so before, 661 00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:31,919 Speaker 1: by the way, before the Wiretap Act was passed, there 662 00:38:31,920 --> 00:38:35,600 Speaker 1: weren't that many prohibitions about tapping phones or anything else 663 00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:38,320 Speaker 1: at all. I mean, it all depended upon the particular 664 00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:42,600 Speaker 1: era and the particular area. So I think that part 665 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,319 Speaker 1: of this was in I think that part of the 666 00:38:44,320 --> 00:38:46,800 Speaker 1: Act was in fact in response to folks like Hoover 667 00:38:46,920 --> 00:38:50,759 Speaker 1: who were perhaps overstepping their bounds in terms of of 668 00:38:50,920 --> 00:38:55,560 Speaker 1: surveillance and gathering. Yeah, the FBI had become infamous for 669 00:38:55,760 --> 00:39:01,359 Speaker 1: gathering huge files on citizens and maintaining them, and uh, 670 00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:03,279 Speaker 1: you know, then you had things like the House of 671 00:39:03,320 --> 00:39:07,520 Speaker 1: American Activities. Uh that all kinds of creepy post war stuff. Yeah, 672 00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:09,400 Speaker 1: there's a lot of stuff that was going on that 673 00:39:09,600 --> 00:39:13,400 Speaker 1: was it was definitely creeping up on people's freedoms, and 674 00:39:13,440 --> 00:39:15,680 Speaker 1: in some cases more than creeping up, but just denying 675 00:39:15,719 --> 00:39:18,440 Speaker 1: people their freedoms. So these kind of acts were a 676 00:39:18,480 --> 00:39:21,080 Speaker 1: response to that to try and correct some wrongs and 677 00:39:21,080 --> 00:39:24,480 Speaker 1: to prevent it from happening again. So so in nineteen 678 00:39:24,560 --> 00:39:27,440 Speaker 1: seventy eight, another big one that that is going to 679 00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:30,440 Speaker 1: be coming back, especially amendments to it, the Foreign Intelligence 680 00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:34,520 Speaker 1: Surveillance Act or UM Yeah FISA, nineteen seventy eight, that 681 00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:38,080 Speaker 1: was introduced by Ted Kennedy and it was signed into 682 00:39:38,239 --> 00:39:43,480 Speaker 1: law by Jimmy Carter. Yeah. So, uh, both of them Democrats, 683 00:39:43,640 --> 00:39:46,440 Speaker 1: both of them known as being liberal, which might surprise 684 00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:49,200 Speaker 1: people when they're sitting there thinking about FISA and they've 685 00:39:49,200 --> 00:39:52,920 Speaker 1: heard these other amendments to FISA, and how how the 686 00:39:53,000 --> 00:39:55,840 Speaker 1: n s A is using that to um to gather 687 00:39:55,920 --> 00:39:59,640 Speaker 1: all this information that has come to light. Uh. But 688 00:40:00,120 --> 00:40:02,240 Speaker 1: you know, you could also argue that when this Act 689 00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:06,680 Speaker 1: was introduced that was not the intent necessarily. However, it 690 00:40:06,719 --> 00:40:09,759 Speaker 1: did establish the procedures or surveillance in an effort to 691 00:40:09,760 --> 00:40:13,040 Speaker 1: collect foreign intelligence between foreign powers and their agents. Right. 692 00:40:13,080 --> 00:40:16,040 Speaker 1: It was hypothetically designed to ensure that the that the 693 00:40:16,120 --> 00:40:19,320 Speaker 1: n s A and other federal intelligence agencies couldn't monitor 694 00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:23,960 Speaker 1: American citizens electronic communications without obtaining a warrant based on 695 00:40:24,040 --> 00:40:27,280 Speaker 1: probable cause first, right, Yeah, this was this was essentially 696 00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:29,840 Speaker 1: saying that you can only do this kind of crazy 697 00:40:29,880 --> 00:40:33,680 Speaker 1: spy stuff if you're talking about non people who are 698 00:40:33,719 --> 00:40:35,759 Speaker 1: not American citizens and people who are not in the 699 00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:38,840 Speaker 1: United States. It was supposed to cover activity that occurred 700 00:40:38,920 --> 00:40:42,520 Speaker 1: outside the US. Now, as we've seen, that's getting trickier 701 00:40:42,560 --> 00:40:45,920 Speaker 1: and trickier because the way the world works now, and 702 00:40:45,960 --> 00:40:48,040 Speaker 1: the way that the Internet works and and and our 703 00:40:48,160 --> 00:40:52,719 Speaker 1: various communication systems work, it's global entity and sometimes that 704 00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:57,720 Speaker 1: involves communications passing through the US sometimes involved passing between 705 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:01,080 Speaker 1: people in the US, but the pathway may actually go 706 00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:06,400 Speaker 1: outside the US, and so that's caused some blurring of 707 00:41:06,440 --> 00:41:10,280 Speaker 1: lines as well. Absolutely. UM. This this act also created 708 00:41:10,440 --> 00:41:14,880 Speaker 1: UM an independent court called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 709 00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:17,839 Speaker 1: and this was made up of eleven federal judges UM 710 00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:21,919 Speaker 1: tasked with reviewing these warrant applications that would come in. Yeah, 711 00:41:21,960 --> 00:41:24,160 Speaker 1: and we will talk more about that court in the 712 00:41:24,280 --> 00:41:27,239 Speaker 1: next episode, because there's a lot to say about how 713 00:41:27,280 --> 00:41:30,960 Speaker 1: that court is formed, what they do, and how much 714 00:41:31,000 --> 00:41:32,759 Speaker 1: we know about it, which, by the way, that last 715 00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:34,719 Speaker 1: a little bit I'll go ahead and spoil it, not 716 00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:39,359 Speaker 1: a whole lot. Yeah, the whole thing classified is a thing, 717 00:41:39,480 --> 00:41:42,400 Speaker 1: and you know we are getting some leaked stuff. But 718 00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:44,839 Speaker 1: but when it comes down to details, we only I mean, 719 00:41:44,880 --> 00:41:46,759 Speaker 1: we know it exists, we know what it does, we 720 00:41:46,840 --> 00:41:49,000 Speaker 1: know who is on it, and we know how they 721 00:41:49,040 --> 00:41:51,839 Speaker 1: got there. That's about it, right, But a quick, quick 722 00:41:51,840 --> 00:41:55,480 Speaker 1: fun teaser. UM. Supposedly, the court has denied only eleven 723 00:41:55,520 --> 00:41:59,560 Speaker 1: of the nearly thirty four thousand warrant applications it's reviewed, 724 00:41:59,600 --> 00:42:03,280 Speaker 1: between inteen sent right. They have said that they don't 725 00:42:03,320 --> 00:42:07,480 Speaker 1: just rubber stamp approval for these requests. But when you 726 00:42:07,480 --> 00:42:12,160 Speaker 1: only have eleven denied requests, that causes me to wonder 727 00:42:12,400 --> 00:42:15,239 Speaker 1: suspect rubber stamping, well, or at least wonder what they're 728 00:42:15,239 --> 00:42:17,560 Speaker 1: sort of standards. Is that it can be either either 729 00:42:17,680 --> 00:42:21,719 Speaker 1: that either their standards are incredibly low and then they 730 00:42:21,760 --> 00:42:26,160 Speaker 1: approve pretty much everything, or all the warrants are extremely warranted. Right, 731 00:42:26,280 --> 00:42:29,480 Speaker 1: that's quite possible. That's the other possibility, right, So I 732 00:42:29,800 --> 00:42:34,240 Speaker 1: shouldn't just say as a blanket statement that they approve anything. 733 00:42:34,320 --> 00:42:36,520 Speaker 1: It may very well be that the the by the 734 00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:40,680 Speaker 1: time the application gets to them, it's actually a valid application. 735 00:42:41,239 --> 00:42:46,120 Speaker 1: I don't know because their secret. But anyway, so, yeah, 736 00:42:46,200 --> 00:42:49,320 Speaker 1: the FISA requires the government to get search warrants and 737 00:42:49,360 --> 00:42:52,840 Speaker 1: wire tap orders from a court even when investigating foreign 738 00:42:52,840 --> 00:42:56,520 Speaker 1: threats to national security. So it can't just go out 739 00:42:56,560 --> 00:42:59,799 Speaker 1: and act on its own without court approval. But that 740 00:43:00,120 --> 00:43:02,480 Speaker 1: or it is, like we said, a secret court and 741 00:43:02,520 --> 00:43:05,080 Speaker 1: we'll we'll go into more detail. Also, by the way, 742 00:43:05,160 --> 00:43:09,120 Speaker 1: if if you are served with a wire tap order 743 00:43:09,239 --> 00:43:11,279 Speaker 1: or a warrant from FISA, it also comes with a 744 00:43:11,320 --> 00:43:14,320 Speaker 1: gag order saying that you can never discuss the fact 745 00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:16,600 Speaker 1: that you were served. Yeah, you can't talk about it 746 00:43:16,680 --> 00:43:19,000 Speaker 1: at all. You can't indicate that it was served to you. 747 00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:22,160 Speaker 1: You cannot indicate that you whether you gave information that 748 00:43:22,239 --> 00:43:25,880 Speaker 1: was relevant or not. You you have to just disavow 749 00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:29,279 Speaker 1: that even existed. So that's kind of interesting. And then 750 00:43:29,320 --> 00:43:32,920 Speaker 1: we have the last of our major points of legislation 751 00:43:33,000 --> 00:43:34,799 Speaker 1: we wanted to touch on in this podcast, which is 752 00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,440 Speaker 1: which is the US Patriot Active two thou one. Now, now, 753 00:43:38,440 --> 00:43:42,200 Speaker 1: of course, to two thousand one was was when the 754 00:43:42,239 --> 00:43:45,279 Speaker 1: attacks of Septemper and leventh happened. Um. The n s 755 00:43:45,320 --> 00:43:47,840 Speaker 1: A came up under a huge fire for failing to 756 00:43:47,920 --> 00:43:52,040 Speaker 1: catch this plot and UM and they have said that 757 00:43:52,840 --> 00:43:56,200 Speaker 1: they had intercepted two messages that something major was going 758 00:43:56,239 --> 00:43:59,080 Speaker 1: to happen on that date, but had no information on 759 00:44:00,040 --> 00:44:02,560 Speaker 1: what or where that action would be happening. Right, And 760 00:44:02,600 --> 00:44:05,440 Speaker 1: you have to keep in mind again that traditionally a 761 00:44:05,480 --> 00:44:09,560 Speaker 1: lot of these agencies UH work very much independently of 762 00:44:09,600 --> 00:44:12,560 Speaker 1: one another. So there's been a lot of criticism that 763 00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:16,440 Speaker 1: said that if if there was more UH collaborative work, 764 00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:20,680 Speaker 1: that we would catch more of this these potential attacks 765 00:44:20,719 --> 00:44:23,400 Speaker 1: and stop them. And in fact, there there are plenty 766 00:44:23,480 --> 00:44:26,000 Speaker 1: of people who have said, you don't even realize how 767 00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:29,719 Speaker 1: many incidents have been prevented because of the changes that 768 00:44:29,800 --> 00:44:32,440 Speaker 1: have happened. Uh. And the reason why you don't know 769 00:44:32,480 --> 00:44:36,160 Speaker 1: about them is because they never never happened. Um, which 770 00:44:36,280 --> 00:44:38,080 Speaker 1: is you know that could be that could be a 771 00:44:38,160 --> 00:44:40,560 Speaker 1: valid argument. It's hard to say because again, you know, 772 00:44:40,680 --> 00:44:43,560 Speaker 1: we don't didn't happen, so we don't know. Lack of 773 00:44:43,560 --> 00:44:46,600 Speaker 1: results is hard to uh, hard to prove a negative. Right. 774 00:44:46,960 --> 00:44:49,399 Speaker 1: So the US Patriot Act is is the an Act 775 00:44:49,400 --> 00:44:52,480 Speaker 1: of Congress as signed the law by President George W. Bush, 776 00:44:52,520 --> 00:44:55,719 Speaker 1: And it's meant to detect, prevent, and combat terrorism by 777 00:44:55,719 --> 00:44:59,360 Speaker 1: broadening the powers of intelligence gathering agencies. And it actually 778 00:44:59,360 --> 00:45:03,520 Speaker 1: reduced quite a few restrictions that were placed on intelligence gathering. 779 00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:09,600 Speaker 1: Title five removes obstacles to investigating terrorism. It expanded FISA 780 00:45:09,680 --> 00:45:13,799 Speaker 1: counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records, which will 781 00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:17,440 Speaker 1: come into play in our next episode. And it requires 782 00:45:17,680 --> 00:45:22,600 Speaker 1: national security letters. What are national security letters their secret subpoenas. 783 00:45:22,640 --> 00:45:26,200 Speaker 1: They're issued directly by the FBI without the involvement of 784 00:45:26,239 --> 00:45:29,000 Speaker 1: a court, So the FBI does not have to go 785 00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:31,920 Speaker 1: to a court judge in order to get a national 786 00:45:31,960 --> 00:45:36,359 Speaker 1: security led letter to h to submit to someone. They 787 00:45:36,360 --> 00:45:39,480 Speaker 1: can actually demand an entity like an Internet service provider, 788 00:45:40,280 --> 00:45:43,640 Speaker 1: that that entity must hand over information about customers as 789 00:45:43,640 --> 00:45:46,240 Speaker 1: long as the FBI delivers to the entity a document 790 00:45:46,320 --> 00:45:49,959 Speaker 1: stating that such information is part of an authorized investigation. 791 00:45:50,040 --> 00:45:53,680 Speaker 1: But there's no court oversight, So really it just means 792 00:45:53,719 --> 00:45:57,400 Speaker 1: that the FBI kind of has free reign to to 793 00:45:57,640 --> 00:46:01,680 Speaker 1: issue these orders. Now, people in the FBI say that 794 00:46:01,760 --> 00:46:04,680 Speaker 1: there is a very strict process that must be followed 795 00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:07,000 Speaker 1: and that it's not just that. Again, it's not like 796 00:46:07,080 --> 00:46:11,640 Speaker 1: some low level FBI administrative person can rubber stamp one 797 00:46:11,640 --> 00:46:14,960 Speaker 1: of these letters. But um, but it also has this 798 00:46:15,040 --> 00:46:17,840 Speaker 1: gag order part to it where you can't talk about 799 00:46:17,840 --> 00:46:20,560 Speaker 1: it if you get one. Uh, then you've also got 800 00:46:20,560 --> 00:46:23,520 Speaker 1: the Right to Financial Privacy Act of nineteen seventy eight, 801 00:46:23,560 --> 00:46:26,880 Speaker 1: which gave the FBI authority to require financial institutions to 802 00:46:26,920 --> 00:46:31,360 Speaker 1: provide information about their customers or any entities financial records, 803 00:46:31,880 --> 00:46:34,480 Speaker 1: and um, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which requires a 804 00:46:34,480 --> 00:46:37,120 Speaker 1: consumer reporting agency to provide the FBI the names and 805 00:46:37,160 --> 00:46:40,200 Speaker 1: addresses of all financial institutions at which a customer maintains 806 00:46:40,280 --> 00:46:43,160 Speaker 1: or has maintained an account. Now that of course they 807 00:46:43,200 --> 00:46:46,440 Speaker 1: have to have the justification to do that. But um, 808 00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:48,879 Speaker 1: these are all the things that play into to this 809 00:46:48,920 --> 00:46:55,080 Speaker 1: whole idea of privacy, data security, national security and spying 810 00:46:55,160 --> 00:46:58,800 Speaker 1: and intelligence and counter intelligence. And now this Act received 811 00:46:59,120 --> 00:47:02,680 Speaker 1: sweeping bipartisan support in Congress, and no one was really 812 00:47:02,719 --> 00:47:05,360 Speaker 1: willing to argue with it after the events of nine eleven, 813 00:47:05,360 --> 00:47:08,239 Speaker 1: which is understandable. But but also you know, I I 814 00:47:08,600 --> 00:47:09,960 Speaker 1: think it I think it did get pushed through a 815 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,480 Speaker 1: little bit too quickly, um, and a little bit too unanimously. 816 00:47:13,040 --> 00:47:15,359 Speaker 1: There quite a few people who because because people were 817 00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:17,759 Speaker 1: understandably upset, right, And there have been a lot of 818 00:47:17,760 --> 00:47:21,040 Speaker 1: critics who have who have said that the changes uh 819 00:47:21,239 --> 00:47:24,279 Speaker 1: in the with the Patriot Act were too great. They 820 00:47:24,320 --> 00:47:26,839 Speaker 1: gave the government too much power, it took too much 821 00:47:27,200 --> 00:47:31,320 Speaker 1: away from individual citizens. Uh. And you know that again, 822 00:47:31,360 --> 00:47:33,640 Speaker 1: that's a debate that continues to this day. And in fact, 823 00:47:34,000 --> 00:47:36,439 Speaker 1: the Patriot Act is not something that was meant to 824 00:47:36,480 --> 00:47:39,920 Speaker 1: exist in perpetuity. It has to be renewed every few years. Now. 825 00:47:40,000 --> 00:47:42,719 Speaker 1: So far Congress has been renewing it. Yeah, but there 826 00:47:42,760 --> 00:47:46,279 Speaker 1: are certain titles under the Patriot Act that may not 827 00:47:46,360 --> 00:47:52,200 Speaker 1: be renewed. According to people who are now responding to 828 00:47:52,280 --> 00:47:57,200 Speaker 1: the the controversy that has happened since the information was 829 00:47:57,239 --> 00:48:00,160 Speaker 1: leaked to the public about the n Essays activities. And 830 00:48:00,200 --> 00:48:03,600 Speaker 1: in fact, one interesting thing that we should point out, 831 00:48:03,640 --> 00:48:05,640 Speaker 1: and we will talk about it more in the next podcast, 832 00:48:06,200 --> 00:48:09,359 Speaker 1: is that one of the architects for the Patriot Act 833 00:48:09,640 --> 00:48:13,040 Speaker 1: has gone on record as saying this goes too far. 834 00:48:13,760 --> 00:48:16,440 Speaker 1: So if the person who authored the act that gave 835 00:48:16,520 --> 00:48:22,520 Speaker 1: the government broad uh release of restrictions says, hey, that's 836 00:48:22,560 --> 00:48:25,239 Speaker 1: going too far, it's time to at least have a 837 00:48:25,239 --> 00:48:29,000 Speaker 1: conversation about it. If not, you know, make some really 838 00:48:29,040 --> 00:48:31,440 Speaker 1: tough decisions. But we're going to save that for our 839 00:48:31,520 --> 00:48:34,200 Speaker 1: next episode, right. I think that we've set the stage 840 00:48:34,280 --> 00:48:37,560 Speaker 1: for everything that um that has happened in the past 841 00:48:37,880 --> 00:48:40,719 Speaker 1: uh ten, ten eleven years. Yeah, and you and we 842 00:48:40,840 --> 00:48:44,000 Speaker 1: understand this episode is not really tech heavy. Obviously, this 843 00:48:44,040 --> 00:48:46,920 Speaker 1: is more like government stuff than tech stuff. But it 844 00:48:47,160 --> 00:48:50,799 Speaker 1: really have a conversation about the tech stuff you have 845 00:48:50,920 --> 00:48:54,000 Speaker 1: to understand all of this other stuff that's going on. 846 00:48:54,840 --> 00:48:56,520 Speaker 1: And also, I mean, you know, these these are all 847 00:48:56,600 --> 00:48:58,759 Speaker 1: issues that that affect all of us and all of 848 00:48:58,760 --> 00:49:02,120 Speaker 1: our our internet you said in Communications and Privacy every day. 849 00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:05,439 Speaker 1: So yep, it's important so all right, so we're gonna 850 00:49:05,480 --> 00:49:08,440 Speaker 1: wrap this one up, and we're gonna Lauren and I 851 00:49:08,480 --> 00:49:10,239 Speaker 1: are going to take a quick break and take some 852 00:49:10,560 --> 00:49:12,800 Speaker 1: time to drink some tea, and then we're gonna dive 853 00:49:12,880 --> 00:49:15,719 Speaker 1: into the next episode, which you guys get to hear 854 00:49:15,719 --> 00:49:17,839 Speaker 1: in a couple of days, unless you just save these 855 00:49:17,840 --> 00:49:20,719 Speaker 1: all up at once, in which case enjoy. So, if 856 00:49:20,719 --> 00:49:23,040 Speaker 1: you guys have any suggestions for topics we should tackle 857 00:49:23,080 --> 00:49:25,920 Speaker 1: in future episodes of tech Stuff, I've got a great 858 00:49:25,920 --> 00:49:28,359 Speaker 1: suggestion for you. What is it, Jonathan? Let us know, 859 00:49:28,560 --> 00:49:31,759 Speaker 1: because we can't read your mind or your email, we're 860 00:49:31,800 --> 00:49:35,040 Speaker 1: not the n s A. Send us a message, uh 861 00:49:35,200 --> 00:49:38,360 Speaker 1: encrypted it you like? Send us a message. Our email 862 00:49:38,520 --> 00:49:41,680 Speaker 1: is tex Stuff at Discovery dot com, or drop us 863 00:49:41,680 --> 00:49:44,279 Speaker 1: a line on Twitter or Facebook. I warn you if 864 00:49:44,320 --> 00:49:47,640 Speaker 1: you do use code, we may never know what you said, 865 00:49:48,160 --> 00:49:50,160 Speaker 1: but you can find us with a handle tech Stuff 866 00:49:50,280 --> 00:49:52,160 Speaker 1: hs W and Lauren and I will talk to you 867 00:49:52,200 --> 00:50:03,400 Speaker 1: again really soon. For more on this and thousands of 868 00:50:03,400 --> 00:50:15,400 Speaker 1: other topics, visit how staff works dot com.