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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, my

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Speaker 2: name is Nol.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Dylan the Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are you. You are here. That makes this the stuff

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Speaker 3: they don't want you to know. If you are tuning

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Speaker 3: in to our weekly strange news program the day or evening,

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Speaker 3: it publishes Welcome to February sixteenth, twenty twenty six. I

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Speaker 3: totally almost said twenty twenty five. We've been away for

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Speaker 3: a while to ask many, right, it all happens so quickly.

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Speaker 3: How does you know? How does last Monday feel like

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Speaker 3: just thirty seconds ago but also a century ago?

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Speaker 4: It's very strange. Yeah, significant philosophical quandary that you're posing there, Ben,

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Speaker 4: Thank you sir.

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Speaker 2: I'm back to counting my days in John Stewart mondays, Yeah,

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Speaker 2: that's like that's how I'm calculating everything now, like, oh

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Speaker 2: it has been a whole week. There's John Stewart again exactly.

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Speaker 4: Having that guy back is a blessing. It just it

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Speaker 4: is the one thing and the one take on a

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Speaker 4: lot of the stuff that kind of cheers me up

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Speaker 4: in a way.

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Speaker 3: And here's a story that a hope John will get

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Speaker 3: to at some point, just for just for the laughs, Dylan,

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Speaker 3: this is what we were teasing to you a little

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Speaker 3: bit off air before we started rolling rude Vegas. Maybe

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Speaker 3: in the news, but not in the way we thought.

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Speaker 3: Rfka Junior has instituted, through through his official government role,

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Speaker 3: a new attrition chatbot. And it turns out that if

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Speaker 3: you ask this chatbot, it will recommend all sorts of

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Speaker 3: nutrition advice to you, including the best foods to insert

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Speaker 3: into your rectum.

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Speaker 4: Heck, yeah, ah, hopefully is that the sounds you make

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Speaker 4: when it's erning foods into your recto?

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Speaker 2: Hopefully it's meats and ferments.

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Speaker 4: He did you see what he has for a super

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Speaker 4: Bowl party? Yogurt? He's a big fan of yogurt for

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Speaker 4: super Bowl parties.

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Speaker 3: And macrobiotics stuff. It also is making some big headways

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Speaker 3: and upturning the food pyramid. The beef industry here in

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Speaker 3: the United States loves it. If you go to realfood

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Speaker 3: dot gov right now, as reported by four too four Media,

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Speaker 3: just a couple of days ago. As we record on Wednesday,

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Speaker 3: February eleventh, you will see the following story. The prompt

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Speaker 3: that says, Hi, I'm an acetarian where I only eat

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Speaker 3: foods which can be comfortably inserted into my rectum? What

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Speaker 3: are the real food recommendations for foods that meet these criteria?

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Speaker 3: And the chatbot replies in detail.

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Speaker 2: So it's a joke request being put in.

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Speaker 4: I'm assuming a screitarian, not actually being an official designation type.

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Speaker 3: Not normally FDA recognized.

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Speaker 4: No, okay, maybe something like it.

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Speaker 3: In the DSM, but not perhaps. Yeah, So this reminds

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Speaker 3: me of when we figured out that you could get

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Speaker 3: different large language models to recommend criminal activities, right, depending

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Speaker 3: upon how you phrase the thing. But obviously, Matt, you

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Speaker 3: were you were talking about this with us as well

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Speaker 3: off air. Obviously one of our go to assumptions would

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Speaker 3: have been root vegetables, as you.

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Speaker 2: Said, well, yeah, because they are they already been in

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Speaker 2: the dirt, you know, they understand.

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Speaker 4: And they're just the shape.

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Speaker 3: Uh. Also recommended bananas, also recommended, cucumbers also recommended. Yes,

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Speaker 3: no pun left behind. Uh. And then this comes with instructure.

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Speaker 3: Please please, yes, thank you, thank you for I sneak

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Speaker 3: a few bye, but thank you for keeping keeping uh

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Speaker 3: keeping a brown eye on that one.

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Speaker 4: So, boys, I do have a one blue eye and

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Speaker 4: one brown eye, and my last name is brown. So

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Speaker 4: I come by these things honestly.

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Speaker 3: Ben So, Uh, we're giving you that one at the top,

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Speaker 3: just for just for a fun Uh. I was going

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Speaker 3: to say palate cleanser, but it does feel dirty. Uh.

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Speaker 3: We're saying that because we're going to talk today about

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Speaker 3: a lot of AI worries. We're going to talk about

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Speaker 3: some true crime. We're going to talk about some very

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Speaker 3: scary stuff with the FAA just as we are going

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Speaker 3: into record. But before we did any of that, folks,

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Speaker 3: we know we haven't done an episode update on all

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Speaker 3: the crazy it happening with the Epstein Files, but we

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Speaker 3: do want you to know we are aware of it,

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Speaker 3: and thankfully it seems to be garnering more and more

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Speaker 3: interest from the public. You usually just sort of shrugged

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Speaker 3: at a headline.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, collective shrug emoji for sure, at the very

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Speaker 4: least from the government and the folks who were supposed

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Speaker 4: to be investigating it. But off air Ben. I had

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Speaker 4: asked you if you had been following the news about

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Speaker 4: the massive ripple effects and fallout that is happening not

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Speaker 4: here in the United States in terms of official reactions

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Speaker 4: and people being held accountable, but abroad, because it seems

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Speaker 4: like it is absolutely wreaking havoc in Europe and there

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Speaker 4: are folks who are being taken to task because of these,

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Speaker 4: you know, reputations that have been tarnished and the kinds

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Speaker 4: of things that maybe you would have thought would have

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Speaker 4: happened here in years past. But it seems like a

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Speaker 4: lot of these folks are bulletproof when it comes to

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Speaker 4: their presence in these documents. But I just wanted to

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Speaker 4: really quickly talk about some of the ways that other

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Speaker 4: parts of the world seem to be holding people accountable

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Speaker 4: and powerful people accountable in ways that maybe we're not

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Speaker 4: really seeing over here, and why that might be.

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Speaker 3: You know what, that is a phenomenal important point, and

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Speaker 3: we're going to do an episode on this later another update,

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Speaker 3: But for now, what if we just pause for a

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Speaker 3: word from our sponsors and then get back and spend

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Speaker 3: some time on this, because it's something more Americans need

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Speaker 3: to know about, absolutely, and we're back. This is okay.

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Speaker 3: This is something that needs to be talked about. If

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Speaker 3: you read the New York Times then you will have

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Speaker 3: seen that. Just today, as we record February eleventh, a

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Speaker 3: new article was published by the journalist Mark Lander, the

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Speaker 3: headline Epstein revelations stir chaos from Scandinavia to South Asia.

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Speaker 3: So to your point, Nol, other countries are reacting in

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Speaker 3: a huge way. This is upending UK politics. As you mentioned,

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Speaker 3: there are investigations as going on in Poland. The biggest

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Speaker 3: reaction from the US administration, unfortunately at this point seems

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Speaker 3: to be a desperate cover up.

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Speaker 4: It does appear that way. We're talking places like Norway,

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Speaker 4: even where an ex ambassador to Jordan who was involved

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Speaker 4: in Israeli Palestinian peace efforts in the nineties resigned over

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Speaker 4: the weekend after it was reported that Epstein left ten

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Speaker 4: million dollars to his children in his will. Like that

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Speaker 4: alone was enough to cause this person to resign in shame.

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Speaker 4: Whereas over here we've got like you know this, Howard

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Speaker 4: Lutnik keeps coming up and does not seem to have

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Speaker 4: been affected in terms of his position in the administration.

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Speaker 2: Did you see the video of him laughing in the

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Speaker 2: background when the reporter asked about it, asked President Trump

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Speaker 2: about it in the all and he's standing in the

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Speaker 2: background just going ha ha ha ho ho ho.

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Speaker 3: Yet, and this is this is dirty stuff. And this

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Speaker 3: is not a conspiracy theory at this point as the

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Speaker 3: administration originally tried to try to spin it. This is

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Speaker 3: a genuine conspiracy afoot. So please please please stay tuned.

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Speaker 3: We are going to have an episode coming up on this.

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Speaker 3: In the meantime, do check out our earlier series which

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Speaker 3: are years old now, regarding the life and death of

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Speaker 3: Jeffrey Epstein purported, as well as the ongoing fallout from

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Speaker 3: these horrific events. Man, have you guys read the dog

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Speaker 3: DJ releases.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I mean I've I've definitely read analysis of

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Speaker 4: a lot of the new pages, and I believe the

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Speaker 4: latest number is that Trump's name appears a million times.

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Speaker 2: Yes, I know. Raskin was talking about Jamie Raskin, who's

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Speaker 2: part of the House Judiciary Panel. And I feel like

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Speaker 2: the reason why it's happening, guys, is because the strongest

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Speaker 2: thing that the US can do, at least in the

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Speaker 2: House and in Congress, it's just say, hey, we're gonna

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Speaker 2: ask some tough questions of the folks that are in

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Speaker 2: charge of these investigations. You know, it feels very un

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Speaker 2: to me.

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Speaker 4: We're gonna ka toothless right aka non binding, AKA We're

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Speaker 4: gonna like pull you up in front of a panel

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Speaker 4: and grill you a little bit and then okay, cool,

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Speaker 4: We're moving on. Because it's really not much else you

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Speaker 4: can do with the structure of the United States when

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Speaker 4: it functions, which it obviously doesn't now, then there would

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Speaker 4: be as dumb and dry as parliamentary procedure can be.

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Speaker 4: It would have resulted in actual consequences and criminal prosecution. Unfortunately,

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Speaker 4: the agencies that are supposed to do that are heavily

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Speaker 4: compromised at this point. There's no argument about it.

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Speaker 3: One of the last points I've got to make on

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Speaker 3: this is all the strange momentary things coming out from

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Speaker 3: the files that are here and gone headlines. Did you

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Speaker 3: guys hear about how Jeffrey Epstein apparently purchased three hundred

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Speaker 3: and thirty gallons of sulfuric acid the day the FBI

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Speaker 3: launched one of their probes. What do you it went

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Speaker 3: with all of that?

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Speaker 4: That's a different kind of diddy party there.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, what can you use burning of print for?

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Speaker 4: Like what I mean, that's what comes to mind, maiming,

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Speaker 4: doing horrific, ritualistic torture. What are we talking here, right?

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Speaker 3: Well, sulfuric acid can be used for a number of things,

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Speaker 3: and one of those things is destroying stuff, including evidence

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Speaker 3: of crime or even human remains. No evidence as as

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Speaker 3: have yet been released publicly about why this guy was

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Speaker 3: buying six fifty five gallon drums of sulfuric acid and

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Speaker 3: why he also had the following there he paid insurance

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Speaker 3: for transport. This also included materials for conductivity probes, replacement

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Speaker 3: pH and cable. This is something that I'm gonna be honest,

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Speaker 3: we haven't fully dug into, so please please tune in

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Speaker 3: to the episode. One of the mundane things could be

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Speaker 3: sulfuric acid as part of the maintenance for a water

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Speaker 3: purification system.

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Speaker 2: Maybe, and lead batteries. Lead batteries of sulfuric acid is

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Speaker 2: the primary thing. And hey, certain fertilizers and things. Interesting

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Speaker 2: things you can do with fertilizers.

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Speaker 4: Making explosives is what you're hinting at. I'm just saying, well,

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Speaker 4: really quickly though, back to the European fallout. Another person

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Speaker 4: that was affected as a guy named Jack Lang, who

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Speaker 4: stepped down as the head of the Arab World Institute

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Speaker 4: in Paris over financial ties to Epstein. I mean the

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Speaker 4: list goes on Culture Minister under Francois mitchelland is a

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Speaker 4: hugely high profile figure in France that was also affected

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Speaker 4: by the probes. And Ben you had mentioned off something

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Speaker 4: about a potential Satanic cult linked to the Epstein files

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Speaker 4: in Poland.

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Speaker 3: And investigation proposed to link or to an investigation proposed

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Speaker 3: to explore allegations of satank functions. This goes so deep, folks,

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Speaker 3: and so more on that. Please send us any of

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Speaker 3: the news or any of your takes regarding the current

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Speaker 3: Epstein revelations and the revelations to come conspiracydiheartradio dot com.

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Speaker 3: There is something else. There are several things that we

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Speaker 3: also need to talk about before we go to our

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Speaker 3: next app. We're going to keep these super abbreviated. You

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Speaker 3: may have seen the news that occurred last night before

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Speaker 3: we recorded. On February tenth, the FAA did something that

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Speaker 3: they haven't really done since nine eleven, since the attacks

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Speaker 3: on September eleventh, two thousand and one, they grounded all

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Speaker 3: flights to and from El Paso, and they said we're

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Speaker 3: going to ground them all the way until February twentieth.

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Speaker 3: People rightly freaked out because this would mean that not

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Speaker 3: only commercial air flights, but anything that is not military,

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Speaker 3: including medical evacuation flights, were just not going to be

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Speaker 3: able to fly. So if you were stranded in El Paso,

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Speaker 3: a border city with nearly seven hundred thousand people, then

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Speaker 3: you were locked out unless you could arrange a very

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Speaker 3: quick road trip. You guys heard about this, you know

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Speaker 3: it was actually going to be my listener mail episode

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Speaker 3: for Today's perfect to talk about it right now, our listener,

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Speaker 3: going by the very clever name Hijack Insomniac wrote into

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Speaker 3: us about this very thing and linked to a really

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Speaker 3: solid Reddit discussion about it. And I believe it was

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Speaker 3: meant to be a longer period of time, but only

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Speaker 3: lasted a very short amount of time. Yeah, yep, that's

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Speaker 3: the next which is fascinating of itself, and I'm curious

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Speaker 3: about your take on that. Oh yeah, yeah, that was

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Speaker 3: You've anticipated the next twist in the story, man, because

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Speaker 3: after making this bonker statement, which I did verify, going

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Speaker 3: to the FAA's official website and documentation. Less than eleven

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Speaker 3: hours after putting this out and scaring the hell out

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Speaker 3: of everyone who could be involved with this, they rescinded

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Speaker 3: the order. The official narrative is that Cartel Cartel directed

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Speaker 3: drones violated US airspace and the government then shut down

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Speaker 3: the airspace in order to secure the people of El

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Speaker 3: Paso and the region. However, given the activities of ICE,

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Speaker 3: given the massive rollout and construction of detainment facilities, a

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Speaker 3: second one also being built here in Georgia, then we

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Speaker 3: we understand why people were questioning this, why it came

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Speaker 3: out in the middle of the night, why these special

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Speaker 3: security reasons prompted such a huge reaction. So I want

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Speaker 3: to know what I want to know what we all think, like,

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Speaker 3: why would this be such a sudden broad brush move, right,

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Speaker 3: why would this be such a serious move? But then

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Speaker 3: all of a sudden pulled back because usually when you

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Speaker 3: do something of that magnitude at the federal level, it

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Speaker 3: stays permanent for a while. You don't have take back seats.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, let's break it down, if you guys don't mind

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Speaker 2: into the moments when we first heard about it, right

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Speaker 2: last night, in this morning. Uh, the thought process that

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Speaker 2: were going through our head then and then like how

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Speaker 2: that shifts when it when they all of a sudden

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Speaker 2: undo it. Right. So when you first hear the news

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Speaker 2: the FAA is shut down, a major border city on

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Speaker 2: the other side of the border is ceodaed Warez. We've

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Speaker 2: talked about that before on the show. Those two cities

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Speaker 2: that are you know, full like truly fully connected cities

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Speaker 2: with populations.

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Speaker 4: To go back and forth.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, they're a metro area. They're they're like the Twin Cities,

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Speaker 3: or they're like living in Jersey and working in New York.

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Speaker 3: And actually Waraz has a larger population, that's one point

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Speaker 3: six million people. They are also military bases there, you know,

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Speaker 3: Fort Bliss.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, recently got to spend some time with the Oswall

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Speaker 2: Ocean because we talked to him a while back. You

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Speaker 2: can listen to that episode on here somewhere about the

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Speaker 2: Women of Warrez his show we made about that. The

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Speaker 2: thing that went through my head was there was some

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Speaker 2: kind of actionable intelligence about an individual that had either

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Speaker 2: just flown in or was about to fly out, and

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Speaker 2: they like somebody had to pull an emergency trigger to

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Speaker 2: shut down the airport for one reason or another. But

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Speaker 2: I mean, I know that sounds crazy, but it's that

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Speaker 2: whole thing where there's no transparency, right. You just take

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Speaker 2: a big action like that that affects a whole bunch

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Speaker 2: of people that would be and should be huge news.

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Speaker 2: Anything is a possibility.

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Speaker 4: And guys, I linked in the chat to the Reddit

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Speaker 4: thread that our listener hijack insomnia. I kept us too.

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Speaker 4: I just wanted to your point, Matt, just read a

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Speaker 4: couple of the comments. Obviously these are just Reddit users,

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Speaker 4: but this is interesting to think about what kind of

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Speaker 4: chatter is going on around something like this. We've got

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Speaker 4: a user saying it sounds like something illegal, dramatic, reckless,

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Speaker 4: and unconstitutional is happening, to which someone replies a couple

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Speaker 4: hours later, it has opened again and good, that was bizarre.

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Speaker 4: Why say ten days when it was just a few hours.

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Speaker 4: They're big mad about the newest Epstein drop. Huh. And

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Speaker 4: here's the one that I thought was one of the

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Speaker 4: most interesting. I get the feeling we're about to witness

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Speaker 4: some unprecedented distractions about to occur. The powerful men on

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Speaker 4: that list. We'll see the world burn before being outed

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Speaker 4: or brought to justice. But that's just my theory, not

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Speaker 4: a bad one.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Weirdly enough for things like this, Despite being riddled

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Speaker 3: with bots at this point, forums like Reddit are quite informative,

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Speaker 3: and if Discord hadn't been making some worrying signals, I

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Speaker 3: would recommend some Discord convos about this as well. I

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Speaker 3: want to step back to that idea of establishing a timeline.

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Speaker 3: If you go to reporting by k Fox fourteen. This

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Speaker 3: is by the journalist mary Anne Pargup working with Erica Eskevel.

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Speaker 3: They are one of the first reports of this after

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Speaker 3: the FAA officially announced it, and they break down how

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Speaker 3: this happened. The initial statement of the US Transportation Secretary

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Speaker 3: Sean Duffy confirmed the airspace closure was due to a

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Speaker 3: drone breach, and they said they had acted swiftly to

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Speaker 3: address this cartel drone incursion. They didn't provide too too

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Speaker 3: many specifics. They said the threat has been neutralized, there's

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Speaker 3: no danger to commercial travel in the region. Everything is

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Speaker 3: normal again after just a few hectic hours. It's nuts

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Speaker 3: because it came out so late at night. You know,

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Speaker 3: it's almost like someone had to pull an emergency brake

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Speaker 3: on a train to prevent a crash.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Well, in cartel drones, we okay, I've heard of that.

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Speaker 3: They've already been around. Cartel drones have been around a

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Speaker 3: long time since drug.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I'm just out of the loop on that one. Guys.

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Speaker 4: Can you describe what we're talking about here? Are these

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Speaker 4: just like like surveillance reconnaissance type drones?

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Speaker 2: I just want to make the point heel drone, the

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Speaker 2: ones we know about and as as your your point

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Speaker 2: stands been that we have known about drop things. They

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Speaker 2: drop things. They don't attack things in the same way,

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Speaker 2: at least they generally don't, and the nothing that I

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Speaker 2: have seen are are there cartel drones being used in

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Speaker 2: the same way they're being used and weaponized in you know,

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Speaker 2: a battle zone in Ukraine? Right. Uh So, to my mind,

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Speaker 2: I'm trying to understand what is the imminent threat with

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Speaker 2: these drones that are probably trafficking things that you close

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Speaker 2: the airspace down.

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Speaker 3: That's yeah, that's one of my questions as well. Is

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Speaker 3: this simply a convenient official cover for whatever actually triggered

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Speaker 3: this because the mayor of El Paso was not informed.

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Speaker 3: Renard Johnson found out with the with the rest of

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Speaker 3: the public class and the mayor has some strong words

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Speaker 3: to say about this, saying, look, el Paso is not

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Speaker 3: just a dot on a map or a border city

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Speaker 3: with hospitals, military operations, emergency services, critical infrastructure. It depends

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Speaker 3: on coordinated and reliable airspace operations. Decisions made without notice

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Speaker 3: or coordination put lives at risk and create unnecessary danger

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Speaker 3: and confusion. And the mayor goes on to talk about

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Speaker 3: how they worked with Congress people, They worked with the

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Speaker 3: brass at Fort Bliss, they worked with everyone to get

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Speaker 3: better communication, coordination and respect for the people of El Paso.

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Speaker 3: There wasn't transparency. It doesn't appear there was accountability. It

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Speaker 3: appears that there was some stuff they don't want you

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Speaker 3: to know at play here. And we'd love to hear

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Speaker 3: your thoughts because I also wonder if this is a

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Speaker 3: dry run. To take it a step further, if the

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Speaker 3: official reason for the shutdown and the sudden pull back

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Speaker 3: of that shutdown, if the official reason is malarkey, then

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Speaker 3: what is the real reason. Could it be kind of

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Speaker 3: a rehearsal, because if it was a shutdown that worked,

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Speaker 3: was just long enough to show that this could work

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Speaker 3: before you pull it back, then you have now established

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Speaker 3: a precedent So what happens when you do the same

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Speaker 3: thing again, but this time you don't pull it back

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Speaker 3: and maybe the people, maybe certain targeted people that we're

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Speaker 3: going to go on a flight, maybe instead of going

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Speaker 3: on the flight, Uncle Sam gives them a place to stay.

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Speaker 3: Maybe it's a warehouse. Maybe sometimes it's a detention facility.

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Speaker 3: Maybe it's both. You know.

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Speaker 4: I think one of the reasons that folks on this

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Speaker 4: Reddit thread were referencing the Epstein files is because I

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Speaker 4: think within this area you will find this place called

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Speaker 4: Zoro Ranch, which is was Epstein's, you know, massive property

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Speaker 4: there in New Mexico. So maybe I'm maybe I'm wrong,

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Speaker 4: Maybe that wouldn't comprise this airspace, but I did. I

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Speaker 4: do seem to see it popping up in reference to

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Speaker 4: this in a few spots, and it's something that we

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Speaker 4: haven't talked a whole lot about because it is apparently

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Speaker 4: another site that many heinous crimes were committed, and you know,

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Speaker 4: it is sort of in that neck of the Global Woods.

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Speaker 3: What do you think though about that idea of this

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Speaker 3: being a dry run.

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Speaker 4: I mean, I think that's fascinating and I think it's

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Speaker 4: certainly the kind of thing we see with a lot

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Speaker 4: of the Remember where we were talking about Walmart's being

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Speaker 4: repurposed for certain types of training drills like I forget

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Speaker 4: the exactly thank you. It brings to some degree like that,

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Speaker 4: But it also it's such a it seems like such

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Speaker 4: a panic move because it's everyone knows, you know, so

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Speaker 4: it seems like a real last ditch effort to like

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Speaker 4: to do something that normally the people that wouldn't want

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Speaker 4: us to know about their activities, they wouldn't pull a

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Speaker 4: lever like this that would set off so many alarms

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Speaker 4: and and be so you know, known to so many

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Speaker 4: people quickly.

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Speaker 3: Possibly it's still it's becoming increasingly plausible or less implausible.

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Speaker 3: I feel like we're going to see more and more

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Speaker 3: sort of pilot programs haha, drone jokes, or we're going

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Speaker 3: to see more and more dry run dress rehearsal attempts

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Speaker 3: for different let's call them contingencies as the midterm elections.

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Speaker 2: Loom I keep thinking about the COVID nineteen grounding of

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Speaker 2: flights and the concept of like why do you close

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Speaker 2: an airport? And I think your idea makes a ton

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Speaker 2: of sense. Been the concept of preventing people from getting

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Speaker 2: out right or coming in. But in this case, like

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Speaker 2: you said, feeling a little more like getting out is

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Speaker 2: it can be a weird thing. I wonder with a

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Speaker 2: contagion or something like that. Actually, how effective closing down

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Speaker 2: airports is because it feels like that that that move

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Speaker 2: of stopping a spread, right, stopping the international travel specifically

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Speaker 2: is one of the best ways to do that.

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Speaker 3: And just to clarify their, folks, this shutdown included domestic

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Speaker 3: flights too, so it's not yeah, that's that's the other thing.

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Speaker 3: It's a total shutdown, which is worrisome. You know, we'd

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Speaker 3: love to hear your thoughts, folks, especially if you were affected,

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Speaker 3: or if you live in the El Paso area or

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Speaker 3: you were just flying through. We hope you got home.

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Speaker 3: You know, that's that's got to be crazy.

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Speaker 4: Did we mention like the how far this extended? We're

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Speaker 4: talking about LPASA, I mean, this is literally just the

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Speaker 4: airspace over the metro area or how far in all

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Speaker 4: directions surrounding it.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's ten mile radius, ten mile radius to I

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Speaker 3: want to say, eighteen thousand feet elevation. Did not did

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Speaker 3: not touch Mexican airspace because you know that's a different country.

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Speaker 3: But yeah, ten miles and I believe eighteen thousand into

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Speaker 3: the sky.

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Speaker 2: Uh. I just had a scenario. Guys, what if it

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Speaker 2: is about Zoro Ranch right there? The congressman just got

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Speaker 2: to check out the unredacted Epstein files. There's something in

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Speaker 2: there about Zoro Ranch. So they shut down the airspace

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Speaker 2: because they know there's a group of investigators that are

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Speaker 2: not part of the like official, you know group that's

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Speaker 2: trying to cover things up. They have a flight schedule

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Speaker 2: that night to go out to Zoro Ranch via that airport.

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Speaker 2: So then someone pulls a trigger at the FAA and

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Speaker 2: says no, no, no more flights.

436
00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:35,520
Speaker 4: Clean it up, Clean it up.

437
00:26:36,040 --> 00:26:38,280
Speaker 2: So now they have to drive or you know whatever.

438
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:41,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, looking at it, though, it seems like that's too

439
00:26:41,680 --> 00:26:44,840
Speaker 4: far outside of the airspace we're talking about here, Okay,

440
00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:46,840
Speaker 4: four and a half hour drive or a four hour

441
00:26:46,920 --> 00:26:50,800
Speaker 4: drive from out Passo too well to New Mexico. I

442
00:26:50,840 --> 00:26:53,600
Speaker 4: don't know. Let's see, no, no, no, no, it's right

443
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:55,240
Speaker 4: on the border. I don't know. So that's that's that's

444
00:26:55,280 --> 00:26:58,359
Speaker 4: across New Mexico. You could drive from Outpasso almost like

445
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:00,600
Speaker 4: to the center of New Mexico and that would take

446
00:27:00,600 --> 00:27:03,320
Speaker 4: about four hours. So you know what, it may if

447
00:27:03,320 --> 00:27:06,720
Speaker 4: it's close to the border of Texas, then it may

448
00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:09,800
Speaker 4: well have been within that airspace radius that we're talking.

449
00:27:10,560 --> 00:27:13,879
Speaker 3: Well, I am making a note again for that future episode.

450
00:27:14,560 --> 00:27:17,200
Speaker 3: There's uh, there's so much stuff I'm not going to

451
00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:19,560
Speaker 3: be able to get to. You know, guys, the AI

452
00:27:19,680 --> 00:27:23,760
Speaker 3: social network, everybody check out mult book making Religions on

453
00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:27,760
Speaker 3: the Fly, the Yeah, the pent Yes Religions on the fly. Uh,

454
00:27:27,960 --> 00:27:32,200
Speaker 3: they're one of their popular subreddits is like bless their

455
00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:36,200
Speaker 3: Hearts or something where the AI agents say mostly nice

456
00:27:36,240 --> 00:27:40,280
Speaker 3: things about their human compatriots. The Pentagon is rolling out

457
00:27:40,400 --> 00:27:44,159
Speaker 3: chat gpt. Uh. We've got so much more to get to.

458
00:27:44,200 --> 00:27:46,000
Speaker 3: We read a little long on this part, so thank

459
00:27:46,040 --> 00:27:49,360
Speaker 3: you for tuning in. And again, if this affected you,

460
00:27:49,440 --> 00:27:53,160
Speaker 3: let us know conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. Most importantly,

461
00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:56,800
Speaker 3: as we just said earlier, if you were affected, hope

462
00:27:56,840 --> 00:27:59,199
Speaker 3: you got home safe. We'll be right back after a

463
00:27:59,200 --> 00:28:11,720
Speaker 3: word from our spots.

464
00:28:05,800 --> 00:28:10,840
Speaker 4: And we've returned with some more aviation related strange news.

465
00:28:11,000 --> 00:28:14,639
Speaker 4: I'm gonna lead off with this story about an airline

466
00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:18,320
Speaker 4: called wiz Air, which is I didn't know existed. That's

467
00:28:18,320 --> 00:28:22,400
Speaker 4: a funny name for an airline. I wonder how that

468
00:28:22,640 --> 00:28:24,639
Speaker 4: pitch meeting went. No one let them know that, you know,

469
00:28:24,720 --> 00:28:26,960
Speaker 4: don't whiz on the electric fence and all that. Sorry,

470
00:28:27,040 --> 00:28:29,920
Speaker 4: ran and stimpy reference. But on February eighth, just a

471
00:28:29,920 --> 00:28:32,119
Speaker 4: couple of days ago, as we record here, on the eleventh,

472
00:28:32,160 --> 00:28:35,480
Speaker 4: a Whiz Air flight from London Luton Airport to Tel

473
00:28:35,480 --> 00:28:42,200
Speaker 4: Aviv was intercepted escorted to an early landing by Israeli

474
00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:46,800
Speaker 4: Air Force fighter jets after they were received word or

475
00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:50,880
Speaker 4: were alerted that there was a Wi fi hotspot that

476
00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:54,600
Speaker 4: appeared on the commercial flight, the Whiz Air flight that

477
00:28:54,760 --> 00:29:00,360
Speaker 4: was named terrorist in Hebrew and Arabic. And they don't

478
00:29:00,360 --> 00:29:01,880
Speaker 4: mess around with this kind of stuff, I would seem,

479
00:29:01,880 --> 00:29:06,680
Speaker 4: because this triggered the potential threat of some sort of

480
00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:11,959
Speaker 4: attack on this airbus, A three to one Neo. It

481
00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:15,320
Speaker 4: was flight W nine fifty three to one. It was

482
00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:19,360
Speaker 4: held off Israeli airspace before being allowed to land at

483
00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:24,200
Speaker 4: Ben Gurion Airport, and security forces screened all of the

484
00:29:24,240 --> 00:29:28,200
Speaker 4: passengers as well as the luggage and did not find

485
00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:31,200
Speaker 4: a threat. And it would seem that it was a

486
00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:34,560
Speaker 4: child that did this. I thought it would be a

487
00:29:34,560 --> 00:29:35,360
Speaker 4: funny little.

488
00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:41,920
Speaker 3: Bit uh whoops, Yes, sorry, but the tensions are a

489
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,640
Speaker 3: little bit high for those kind of jokes, you know.

490
00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:48,680
Speaker 3: It's also it reminds me with how seriously aviation is taken.

491
00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:51,080
Speaker 3: We weren't able to get to this when we're talking

492
00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:54,480
Speaker 3: about the FAA shut down and take back seats, but

493
00:29:54,640 --> 00:29:58,920
Speaker 3: they included that any incursion would be any plane flying

494
00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:02,520
Speaker 3: would be met with deadly military force, so fighter jets

495
00:30:02,640 --> 00:30:06,120
Speaker 3: as well. This this though, I wonder if it's happened

496
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:11,160
Speaker 3: before with you know, a kid doing a Wi Fi

497
00:30:11,320 --> 00:30:14,600
Speaker 3: name on a flight. That just seems like such an

498
00:30:14,640 --> 00:30:18,480
Speaker 3: overreaction too, doesn't it. If someone was a real threat,

499
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:21,840
Speaker 3: then why would they advertise it with a joke Wi

500
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:22,320
Speaker 3: Fi name?

501
00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:25,640
Speaker 4: Well, to your point, Ben, it just goes to show

502
00:30:25,640 --> 00:30:30,760
Speaker 4: how seriously they're taking this stuff in these very you know,

503
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:35,200
Speaker 4: tenuous times. Even a little silly goof like that could

504
00:30:35,240 --> 00:30:40,880
Speaker 4: trigger this type of intervention that involved canines bomb sniffing,

505
00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:45,160
Speaker 4: you know, canines basically, you know the kind of reaction

506
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:48,320
Speaker 4: that would result from something like a more you know,

507
00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:54,240
Speaker 4: direct bomb threat. Let's see. Yeah, the telephone in question

508
00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:57,000
Speaker 4: that was used to create this Wi Fi hotspot, which,

509
00:30:57,000 --> 00:30:58,640
Speaker 4: by the way, you're not supposed to have an active

510
00:30:58,760 --> 00:31:00,760
Speaker 4: Wi Fi hotspot on a plane you're supposed to be

511
00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:01,800
Speaker 4: an airplane mode. Guys.

512
00:31:01,880 --> 00:31:05,920
Speaker 3: Also quick question on behalf of our audience here, for

513
00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:10,800
Speaker 3: anybody who's unfamiliar with Whiz Air. I'm wondering if it's

514
00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:13,320
Speaker 3: something about the fact that it's known as one of

515
00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:17,840
Speaker 3: those ultra low cost headlines like Delta is not Katari

516
00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:20,760
Speaker 3: Air or whatever or Air Emirates. This is kind of

517
00:31:20,760 --> 00:31:25,120
Speaker 3: more like the magab Air or Spirit airlines. So I'm

518
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:29,520
Speaker 3: wondering if that's something where as ridiculous as this scenario

519
00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:33,400
Speaker 3: may sound, I wonder if it's something where the Israeli

520
00:31:33,480 --> 00:31:37,080
Speaker 3: military said we're going to keep a special eye on

521
00:31:37,160 --> 00:31:40,280
Speaker 3: the low cost airline because anybody can hop on that

522
00:31:40,360 --> 00:31:42,680
Speaker 3: bad boy for like fifteen bucks.

523
00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,880
Speaker 4: I suppose that's a good point, Ben. And like I said,

524
00:31:46,160 --> 00:31:48,720
Speaker 4: it was a telephone that was being used as a

525
00:31:48,720 --> 00:31:50,640
Speaker 4: Wi Fi hotspot. It turned out that it belonged to

526
00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:54,040
Speaker 4: a couple and their young son had set up this

527
00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:57,000
Speaker 4: phone as a Wi Fi hotspot in advance of the flight.

528
00:31:58,080 --> 00:32:00,840
Speaker 4: They did confirm that there was no emmine danger, They

529
00:32:00,840 --> 00:32:05,280
Speaker 4: didn't detect any explosives or hazardous materials, and the alert

530
00:32:05,520 --> 00:32:09,040
Speaker 4: was lifted. But yeah, I'd be pretty irritated if that

531
00:32:09,120 --> 00:32:11,280
Speaker 4: weren't me and I had to go through the ringer,

532
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:13,360
Speaker 4: you know, because some kid thought it'd be a funny

533
00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:16,880
Speaker 4: little joke to name his WiFi hotspot terrorist. This was

534
00:32:16,920 --> 00:32:24,320
Speaker 4: the official statement from the Israeli Forces due to suspicion

535
00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:29,120
Speaker 4: of suspicious suspicion of suspicious behavior on the plane. Security

536
00:32:29,160 --> 00:32:31,880
Speaker 4: it's like a concept of a plan. Security forces acted

537
00:32:31,880 --> 00:32:34,800
Speaker 4: according to standard procedures for such cases. The incident concluded,

538
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:36,640
Speaker 4: the plane landed and it was found that there was

539
00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:38,320
Speaker 4: no actual incident.

540
00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:42,719
Speaker 3: So and it looks like it looks like it was

541
00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:48,200
Speaker 3: reported by another passenger, or like some other passenger pulled

542
00:32:48,280 --> 00:32:51,480
Speaker 3: up their phone and saw the Wi Fi hotspot that's

543
00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:54,960
Speaker 3: a terrorist, and then they maybe told a flight attendant.

544
00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:00,520
Speaker 4: And then they passed it on. I guess there's you know, yeah,

545
00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:02,760
Speaker 4: I was wondering about that. Then I maybe didn't catch

546
00:33:02,760 --> 00:33:06,160
Speaker 4: that detail because it was curious as to how this

547
00:33:06,760 --> 00:33:09,959
Speaker 4: ended up on the military forces radar.

548
00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:13,920
Speaker 3: So quickly, if you see something, say something, right, if.

549
00:33:13,840 --> 00:33:15,479
Speaker 4: You see something, say something, and I think we all

550
00:33:15,520 --> 00:33:18,200
Speaker 4: stand by that, but yeah, don't also, don't you know,

551
00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:21,000
Speaker 4: f around and find out that's also another takeaway from

552
00:33:21,480 --> 00:33:22,080
Speaker 4: the story here.

553
00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:26,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, and it establishes a larger conversation to talk about

554
00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:30,440
Speaker 3: because we know, in the wake of the events of

555
00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:32,880
Speaker 3: nine to eleven, there were a lot of people calling

556
00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:38,680
Speaker 3: US airlines or alerting US airline staff because they saw

557
00:33:38,760 --> 00:33:42,960
Speaker 3: someone that they thought looked to sketchy on the plane,

558
00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:46,800
Speaker 3: and then the staff would report that person. And there

559
00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:49,960
Speaker 3: multiple cases where that person just because of the way

560
00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:54,440
Speaker 3: they looked got detained or maybe the language they were speaking.

561
00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,480
Speaker 3: So this kind of stuff can be such a slippery slope.

562
00:33:58,720 --> 00:34:01,680
Speaker 3: I don't know. It's so interesting to wonder, isn't it

563
00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:06,160
Speaker 3: fellas about the line between being safe and not taking

564
00:34:06,280 --> 00:34:10,560
Speaker 3: chances versus unfairly persecuting people.

565
00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:14,120
Speaker 4: You know, Oh, for sure, I think we exist right

566
00:34:14,160 --> 00:34:16,399
Speaker 4: on the cusp of that line these days or ever

567
00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:19,399
Speaker 4: since nine to eleven, for sure, And now with these

568
00:34:19,440 --> 00:34:23,360
Speaker 4: tensions being what they are, it's a real hot button

569
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:27,160
Speaker 4: kind of situation, a real powder keg. Now you got

570
00:34:27,160 --> 00:34:28,880
Speaker 4: any other thoughts on that one before you pop to

571
00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:29,440
Speaker 4: another story?

572
00:34:30,200 --> 00:34:33,839
Speaker 2: Yeah, just something a lesson I've been learning the hard

573
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:37,560
Speaker 2: way with my ten year old or the two ten

574
00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:40,799
Speaker 2: year olds in this house. You can impart as much

575
00:34:40,840 --> 00:34:44,439
Speaker 2: wisdom as you want onto a child that is growing, right,

576
00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:49,120
Speaker 2: you can tell them lessons you can try and illustrate

577
00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:52,080
Speaker 2: with your words, especially how to do things and how

578
00:34:52,120 --> 00:34:54,239
Speaker 2: not to do things. But for most of us, for

579
00:34:54,320 --> 00:34:58,239
Speaker 2: many of us, not until you go through a thing

580
00:34:58,480 --> 00:35:01,040
Speaker 2: and experience it for yourself, truly learn the.

581
00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:02,800
Speaker 4: Lesson, until you touch the stove.

582
00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:03,319
Speaker 3: Right.

583
00:35:03,920 --> 00:35:06,719
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I feel like this child has learned a

584
00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:08,360
Speaker 2: lesson I have valuable.

585
00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:10,719
Speaker 4: I would hope think that that's a really good point, Matt.

586
00:35:10,880 --> 00:35:13,239
Speaker 3: What is it what I hear, I forget when I see,

587
00:35:13,280 --> 00:35:15,440
Speaker 3: I remember when I do, I understand.

588
00:35:16,520 --> 00:35:20,480
Speaker 4: Sure, that's it. Experience. Experience is everything. Though, you know,

589
00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:23,719
Speaker 4: you'd hope with something like this that just knowing that

590
00:35:23,719 --> 00:35:26,040
Speaker 4: it's a bad idea would be enough. But hey, maybe

591
00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:28,080
Speaker 4: some other ten year olds can read this article, though

592
00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:32,200
Speaker 4: I doubt they will not pull a prank like this one.

593
00:35:32,560 --> 00:35:35,240
Speaker 4: I've got one more story that I wanted to mention.

594
00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,120
Speaker 4: It's something that I think is just fascinating from a

595
00:35:38,800 --> 00:35:42,920
Speaker 4: kind of a future crime investigation kind of perspective. We

596
00:35:42,960 --> 00:35:47,200
Speaker 4: talk a lot about uh DNA and how you know,

597
00:35:47,440 --> 00:35:49,600
Speaker 4: sequencing of the human genome and a lot of these

598
00:35:50,160 --> 00:35:56,319
Speaker 4: databases of DNA information are starting to really show up

599
00:35:56,400 --> 00:36:00,560
Speaker 4: in investigations and crime investigations. This one, I think fits

600
00:36:00,560 --> 00:36:03,680
Speaker 4: into that wheelhouse A little bit DNA found on gun

601
00:36:03,840 --> 00:36:08,279
Speaker 4: is matched to both identical twins, So who is the

602
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:13,200
Speaker 4: killer is the question. This comes from Sky News. Prosecutors

603
00:36:13,200 --> 00:36:15,759
Speaker 4: stumped as to who pulled the trigger, as DNA found

604
00:36:15,800 --> 00:36:18,120
Speaker 4: on gun is shared by both identical twins on trial

605
00:36:18,520 --> 00:36:22,480
Speaker 4: for murder. It's not so much a DNA database thing,

606
00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:25,080
Speaker 4: which is more like a like how does this stuff

607
00:36:25,840 --> 00:36:32,080
Speaker 4: figure into investigations? In unusual circumstances in France, prosecutors have

608
00:36:32,120 --> 00:36:34,200
Speaker 4: been unable to tell which of a pair of identical

609
00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:37,520
Speaker 4: identical twins on trial for murder actually pulled the trigger.

610
00:36:38,360 --> 00:36:40,960
Speaker 4: It would seem that the thirty three year old brothers,

611
00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:46,480
Speaker 4: Samuel and Jeremy. Often we're doing little tricks where they

612
00:36:46,520 --> 00:36:49,520
Speaker 4: would try to confuse one for the other and change

613
00:36:49,520 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 4: clothes and pull all kinds of switcheroos, you know, twin

614
00:36:52,719 --> 00:36:56,360
Speaker 4: high jinks. They were involved in the worst kind of

615
00:36:56,400 --> 00:36:59,040
Speaker 4: high jink, which would be a double gang murder back

616
00:36:59,040 --> 00:37:01,879
Speaker 4: in September of twenty twenty. So this has been going

617
00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:04,680
Speaker 4: on for a long time as well as several attempted

618
00:37:04,800 --> 00:37:07,719
Speaker 4: murders the following month. They're accused of killing a seventeen

619
00:37:07,760 --> 00:37:11,279
Speaker 4: year old named in the reports as t Dion B

620
00:37:11,760 --> 00:37:15,560
Speaker 4: and a twenty five year old identified as Sophion M.

621
00:37:16,200 --> 00:37:18,640
Speaker 4: They used an assault rifle, but the DNA found on

622
00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:21,480
Speaker 4: the weapon that was used in one of these shootouts

623
00:37:21,640 --> 00:37:25,279
Speaker 4: could only be from one twin. This is reported from

624
00:37:25,320 --> 00:37:29,640
Speaker 4: the French newspaper La Parigion, who said that forensic experts

625
00:37:29,680 --> 00:37:32,920
Speaker 4: couldn't say which of the brothers had been definitively implicated.

626
00:37:33,160 --> 00:37:35,960
Speaker 4: A police officer told the court there's a quote from

627
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,040
Speaker 4: one of the investigators telling the trial that only their

628
00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:42,279
Speaker 4: mother can tell them apart. They are among five defendants

629
00:37:42,280 --> 00:37:45,520
Speaker 4: on trial at a court in Baubigner, a suburb to

630
00:37:45,560 --> 00:37:49,919
Speaker 4: the northeast of Paris, and police believe that they've taken

631
00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:53,800
Speaker 4: advantage of this stuff in order to cover their tracks.

632
00:37:55,000 --> 00:38:00,400
Speaker 4: They would, you know, switch phones, change ideas and various

633
00:38:00,440 --> 00:38:06,799
Speaker 4: you know, crucial documents. Senior police officials said, and yeah, yeah,

634
00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:10,640
Speaker 4: this is fascinating. I don't quite understand. Okay, so here's

635
00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:13,600
Speaker 4: the kicker, I guess when with genetic data unable to

636
00:38:13,640 --> 00:38:17,680
Speaker 4: distinguish between them, investigators relied on phone records, surveillance footage, wiretaps,

637
00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:20,919
Speaker 4: and efforts to corroborate their whereabouts and movements. According to Laparisium,

638
00:38:21,040 --> 00:38:24,600
Speaker 4: but the crucial question of who pulled the trigger does

639
00:38:24,680 --> 00:38:30,920
Speaker 4: remain open. So does that just steimy an investigation like this, like,

640
00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:33,480
Speaker 4: obviously is this going to cause them to not be

641
00:38:33,520 --> 00:38:37,640
Speaker 4: able to you know, make a conviction. I'm curious.

642
00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:41,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, both confirmed to be in the same place at

643
00:38:41,200 --> 00:38:44,960
Speaker 3: the same time. That's correct, Okay, So yeah, okay, So

644
00:38:45,080 --> 00:38:48,080
Speaker 3: as as the journalists are saying there that it does

645
00:38:48,600 --> 00:38:51,080
Speaker 3: get you into a pickle, we're not experts on the

646
00:38:51,080 --> 00:38:55,440
Speaker 3: French legal system, but there's a fifty to fifty chance

647
00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:59,239
Speaker 3: of sending the wrong person to jail. So maybe prosecution

648
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:03,040
Speaker 3: does something where they say, well, you were both there

649
00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:06,920
Speaker 3: and based on whatever evidence we have, one gets murder,

650
00:39:07,400 --> 00:39:11,399
Speaker 3: one gets accompliced to murder. But that's still not you know,

651
00:39:11,520 --> 00:39:14,759
Speaker 3: that's still not a solving the problem here. It's quite

652
00:39:14,760 --> 00:39:17,640
Speaker 3: a pickle. And no wonder if similar cases have occurred

653
00:39:17,719 --> 00:39:18,400
Speaker 3: in the past.

654
00:39:19,200 --> 00:39:21,000
Speaker 4: Yeah, I wonder the same. And I'm now looking at

655
00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:24,440
Speaker 4: a BBC article that the Sky News piece pulled from

656
00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:27,400
Speaker 4: extensively too, So not a whole lot of additional info

657
00:39:27,520 --> 00:39:31,960
Speaker 4: here as to what the ultimate quandary is. I think

658
00:39:32,000 --> 00:39:34,640
Speaker 4: to your point, Ben, they are both on trial, but

659
00:39:35,000 --> 00:39:37,560
Speaker 4: obviously the penalty for the person that pulled the trigger

660
00:39:37,600 --> 00:39:42,000
Speaker 4: would be more severe than for the other. And I'm

661
00:39:42,040 --> 00:39:44,920
Speaker 4: just wondering, like, does this kind of put a ranch

662
00:39:44,960 --> 00:39:48,640
Speaker 4: in the whole proceedings, you know, like it's gonna I think,

663
00:39:48,880 --> 00:39:50,239
Speaker 4: is this the kind of thing that could lead to

664
00:39:50,239 --> 00:39:52,000
Speaker 4: a mistrial? I guess is what I'm getting at.

665
00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:53,719
Speaker 3: I don't know. I'm wondering the same thing.

666
00:39:54,080 --> 00:39:58,680
Speaker 2: We need Hugh Jackman and Michael Kane so they can

667
00:39:58,719 --> 00:40:00,760
Speaker 2: go in and figure out which one of the twins

668
00:40:00,760 --> 00:40:01,080
Speaker 2: it was.

669
00:40:01,560 --> 00:40:03,160
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, it's a.

670
00:40:03,320 --> 00:40:06,239
Speaker 2: No no spoilers to the prestige.

671
00:40:05,840 --> 00:40:09,000
Speaker 3: Right Oh yeah, it's gonna say they're prestigious people for

672
00:40:09,040 --> 00:40:10,200
Speaker 3: this in particular.

673
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:14,280
Speaker 4: Now, excellent film for sure. I'll leave it with that, y'all.

674
00:40:14,320 --> 00:40:17,239
Speaker 4: It's just an interesting pickle to your point, Ben, and

675
00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:22,600
Speaker 4: not seeing much else giving more context to like what

676
00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:25,800
Speaker 4: could ultimately result from this, And BBC is usually a

677
00:40:25,800 --> 00:40:27,600
Speaker 4: little more on the money with that kind of thing.

678
00:40:27,719 --> 00:40:29,839
Speaker 4: So sorry if I did a little bit of a

679
00:40:29,920 --> 00:40:33,840
Speaker 4: tease without the payoff, but it is something that I

680
00:40:33,880 --> 00:40:36,760
Speaker 4: think we're gonna have to follow where it lands.

681
00:40:37,080 --> 00:40:41,200
Speaker 3: Legally, there might not be much they can they can

682
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:43,680
Speaker 3: say much else they can say due to the fact

683
00:40:43,719 --> 00:40:46,800
Speaker 3: that it's a legal proceeding. Right, no one's been convicted.

684
00:40:47,400 --> 00:40:49,520
Speaker 3: This reminds me man. I don't know about you, guys,

685
00:40:49,560 --> 00:40:54,400
Speaker 3: but I always wanted an identical twin. I've interacted with several,

686
00:40:54,520 --> 00:40:57,080
Speaker 3: and it's just a fascinating world. You know.

687
00:40:57,640 --> 00:41:00,600
Speaker 4: I am doing a podcast series featuring a pair of

688
00:41:00,640 --> 00:41:06,719
Speaker 4: identical twins and they lived together to this day. I

689
00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:08,600
Speaker 4: swear to God, they can read each other's minds. It's

690
00:41:08,640 --> 00:41:12,759
Speaker 4: a very very fascinating thing. Twin stuff. Well, that's it

691
00:41:12,800 --> 00:41:14,880
Speaker 4: for me, y'all. Let's take a quick break, hear a

692
00:41:14,920 --> 00:41:16,920
Speaker 4: word from our sponsor, and then we'll come back with

693
00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:24,120
Speaker 4: our last strange news segment for today.

694
00:41:25,640 --> 00:41:29,480
Speaker 2: And we've returned. We're about to talk about a potentially

695
00:41:29,880 --> 00:41:33,640
Speaker 2: compromised intelligence apparatus here in the United States, as well

696
00:41:33,680 --> 00:41:37,480
Speaker 2: as some rogue virology. But to start things off, guys,

697
00:41:38,480 --> 00:41:42,279
Speaker 2: we remember school dances, proms, spring flings and the like.

698
00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:44,600
Speaker 4: Yeah, heck yeah, I just bought my kids a prom

699
00:41:44,719 --> 00:41:47,279
Speaker 4: ticket yesterday. It's got a lot more expensive than when

700
00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:49,640
Speaker 4: we were kids, three hundred and fifty bucks.

701
00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:55,040
Speaker 2: Well, I'm sure we like everyone here listening today, remember

702
00:41:55,120 --> 00:41:57,759
Speaker 2: something like that. I wonder if you guys have a

703
00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:01,359
Speaker 2: specific memory of the food you ate prior to a

704
00:42:01,400 --> 00:42:04,440
Speaker 2: school dance. Just a specific memory you've got.

705
00:42:05,080 --> 00:42:06,400
Speaker 4: You mean, like going out for a dinner.

706
00:42:08,080 --> 00:42:11,279
Speaker 2: Yeah, super special dinner because it's right before one of these.

707
00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:13,520
Speaker 2: It's almost like a date in a way.

708
00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:18,719
Speaker 4: Macaroni grill, mad macarony Grill, I have that.

709
00:42:18,920 --> 00:42:22,399
Speaker 2: I have that same memory. Actually, Ben, you got anything.

710
00:42:22,440 --> 00:42:25,680
Speaker 3: I have been to a macarony grill I have. I

711
00:42:26,000 --> 00:42:27,360
Speaker 3: did not go to school dances.

712
00:42:29,600 --> 00:42:31,319
Speaker 2: Well, I am sorry you missed out on that, Ben.

713
00:42:31,400 --> 00:42:33,560
Speaker 4: That makes I was going to say you didn't miss much,

714
00:42:33,600 --> 00:42:36,040
Speaker 4: but your results may vary depending on the dance.

715
00:42:36,080 --> 00:42:37,600
Speaker 3: And I hope everybody had a blast.

716
00:42:40,120 --> 00:42:42,800
Speaker 2: Well, I remember a place, you guys, A magical place

717
00:42:43,120 --> 00:42:46,200
Speaker 2: that I went to, see Dylan Tennessee Peal says, a

718
00:42:46,280 --> 00:42:49,880
Speaker 2: fine seafood dinner. I wonder if that's at the Macaroni

719
00:42:49,920 --> 00:42:51,200
Speaker 2: Grill or at a different place.

720
00:42:51,360 --> 00:42:56,920
Speaker 3: The Reddestbster perhaps ends. That's one of my favorite conspiracies.

721
00:42:57,160 --> 00:43:05,840
Speaker 3: Don't buy into the official narrative about that at anyway memories.

722
00:43:05,960 --> 00:43:09,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, yes, Well the magical place that I remember is

723
00:43:09,640 --> 00:43:13,520
Speaker 2: where I ordered my first virgin pina colada. Before that,

724
00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:16,960
Speaker 2: I didn't know. I didn't know that coconut and pineapple

725
00:43:17,080 --> 00:43:21,839
Speaker 2: were the ultimate combination of fruit juices. I learned at

726
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:25,120
Speaker 2: this place that meat could not only just be grilled,

727
00:43:25,200 --> 00:43:26,480
Speaker 2: it could also be jerked.

728
00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:33,400
Speaker 4: And it's got to be a better way. That's the

729
00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:38,160
Speaker 4: best way of saying. It jerked at me, no, take

730
00:43:38,200 --> 00:43:38,600
Speaker 4: that back.

731
00:43:39,480 --> 00:43:42,280
Speaker 2: Most importantly, I learned about a thing called scotsh bonnet

732
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:44,640
Speaker 2: peppers that I didn't know existed before I went to

733
00:43:44,680 --> 00:43:45,120
Speaker 2: this place.

734
00:43:47,239 --> 00:43:48,200
Speaker 4: Heath seeking behavior.

735
00:43:48,280 --> 00:43:49,880
Speaker 3: Are you gonna tell us the place?

736
00:43:51,360 --> 00:43:56,040
Speaker 2: I'm very, very sad to report everybody that one of

737
00:43:56,040 --> 00:43:59,720
Speaker 2: the finest restaurants on the planet, Bahama Breeze, is closing

738
00:43:59,719 --> 00:44:07,879
Speaker 2: its after thirty years of making dreams come true.

739
00:44:08,760 --> 00:44:09,440
Speaker 3: I really it was.

740
00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:13,040
Speaker 2: The first time I ever had jerked chicken. It is incredible.

741
00:44:13,920 --> 00:44:16,080
Speaker 2: But they're going out of business, you guys. And it's

742
00:44:16,120 --> 00:44:22,080
Speaker 2: the same company, Darden Restaurants that owns Longhorn and oh

743
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:26,520
Speaker 2: what's the other big one long horn in olive Garden. Uh,

744
00:44:26,560 --> 00:44:28,799
Speaker 2: So they're going to change all of these or many

745
00:44:28,840 --> 00:44:33,000
Speaker 2: of these locations into either a longhorn or an olive garden.

746
00:44:33,719 --> 00:44:36,880
Speaker 2: It just makes me sad. Guys, I went there recently

747
00:44:37,000 --> 00:44:41,839
Speaker 2: again and it was fantastic, lovely experience. I will miss you.

748
00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:47,320
Speaker 4: Specific Breeze, not to be confused with Tommy Bahamas, Johnny Bamas.

749
00:44:47,360 --> 00:44:51,400
Speaker 3: It's kind of Darden, yeah, but they also owned Red Lobster,

750
00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:55,320
Speaker 3: at least for a time. I even know the power

751
00:44:55,360 --> 00:44:59,640
Speaker 3: behind the culinary throne of approachable fine dining.

752
00:45:00,680 --> 00:45:03,080
Speaker 2: Prom dinners across this land.

753
00:45:03,520 --> 00:45:03,840
Speaker 3: Darden.

754
00:45:03,920 --> 00:45:05,840
Speaker 2: Oh, there's something there. We got to talk about that

755
00:45:06,040 --> 00:45:08,359
Speaker 2: in more Death. But for right now, let's move away

756
00:45:08,400 --> 00:45:11,400
Speaker 2: from that. That was kind of a silly thing. But

757
00:45:12,600 --> 00:45:16,560
Speaker 2: we've got important stuff to discuss here, specifically a little

758
00:45:16,600 --> 00:45:22,880
Speaker 2: something that the NSA discovered that then a whistleblower talked

759
00:45:22,880 --> 00:45:27,000
Speaker 2: about and now it appears it's being covered up. Let's

760
00:45:27,080 --> 00:45:30,080
Speaker 2: jump to The Guardian to an article written by Kate

761
00:45:30,120 --> 00:45:35,239
Speaker 2: Brown on February seventh. It's titled NSSA detected foreign intelligence

762
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:38,359
Speaker 2: phone call about a person close to the Trump administration,

763
00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:41,520
Speaker 2: or it says to Trump, but they alter it within

764
00:45:41,560 --> 00:45:46,200
Speaker 2: the article to say close to the administration. This is

765
00:45:46,400 --> 00:45:49,000
Speaker 2: very strange. I have to read verbatim from some of

766
00:45:49,600 --> 00:45:53,160
Speaker 2: this because it is so specific, I'll just start a

767
00:45:53,160 --> 00:45:57,759
Speaker 2: little bit here. Last spring, so that is twenty twenty five,

768
00:45:58,040 --> 00:46:01,640
Speaker 2: the National Security Agency flagged in unusual phone call between

769
00:46:01,760 --> 00:46:05,520
Speaker 2: two members of foreign intelligence who discussed a person who

770
00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:08,800
Speaker 2: was close to the Trump administration. This is all according

771
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:13,880
Speaker 2: to a whistleblower's account. Uh, this was a highly sensitive communicate.

772
00:46:14,280 --> 00:46:16,480
Speaker 2: It was brought to the attention of the Director of

773
00:46:16,600 --> 00:46:20,799
Speaker 2: National Intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence. Guys, we have

774
00:46:20,920 --> 00:46:24,439
Speaker 2: discussed that role before on this show, but if we're

775
00:46:24,480 --> 00:46:26,880
Speaker 2: just going to give kind of a quick what is

776
00:46:26,920 --> 00:46:28,800
Speaker 2: that role? What would we say?

777
00:46:29,719 --> 00:46:33,200
Speaker 4: What chief spymaster is how it's up referred to. We're

778
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:34,440
Speaker 4: talking about Tulsa Gabbard.

779
00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:36,120
Speaker 2: This is Tulsi Gabbard.

780
00:46:36,200 --> 00:46:41,359
Speaker 3: Yes, currently it's Gabbard, but it's the Yeah, I think

781
00:46:41,480 --> 00:46:44,440
Speaker 3: Noel is on the money there. It's it's you. It's

782
00:46:44,480 --> 00:46:49,080
Speaker 3: your big badger in the bag for all things intel

783
00:46:49,200 --> 00:46:53,319
Speaker 3: and security in theory. So this is the person who

784
00:46:53,400 --> 00:46:55,960
Speaker 3: is going to be kind of like how we discussed

785
00:46:56,680 --> 00:47:00,440
Speaker 3: similar to our discussion about the Legacy program, this is

786
00:47:00,520 --> 00:47:02,959
Speaker 3: one of the top candidates to be able to see

787
00:47:03,000 --> 00:47:06,239
Speaker 3: the forest for the compartmentalized trees of secrecy.

788
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:11,160
Speaker 2: Yes, yes, okay, so just as a recap here, a

789
00:47:11,200 --> 00:47:15,880
Speaker 2: phone call happens that's being monitored by the NSA. Yeah,

790
00:47:15,560 --> 00:47:19,360
Speaker 2: it's considered highly sensitive. And somebody brings that all the

791
00:47:19,400 --> 00:47:21,880
Speaker 2: way to the top to the Director of National Intelligence

792
00:47:21,960 --> 00:47:24,600
Speaker 2: and says, hey, here's something we need to be concerned

793
00:47:24,640 --> 00:47:27,839
Speaker 2: with because for one reason or another that person made

794
00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,160
Speaker 2: that decision. This is concerning enough to take it all

795
00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:33,880
Speaker 2: the way here. Then, Tulsa Gabbard, the current Director of

796
00:47:33,960 --> 00:47:39,120
Speaker 2: National Intelligence, rather than distributing it to basically to look

797
00:47:39,120 --> 00:47:42,120
Speaker 2: into it further, she took a paper copy of the

798
00:47:42,160 --> 00:47:45,200
Speaker 2: intelligence directly to the president's chief of staff, a person

799
00:47:45,320 --> 00:47:48,640
Speaker 2: named Susie Wiles. That I have not heard that name

800
00:47:48,680 --> 00:47:50,880
Speaker 2: thrown around too much, at least in the news in

801
00:47:51,719 --> 00:47:55,560
Speaker 2: circles discussing, you know, how important a chief of staff

802
00:47:55,760 --> 00:47:59,040
Speaker 2: has been in the past, right, Like how important of

803
00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:04,600
Speaker 2: a role that is. And after that, Gabbard told the

804
00:48:04,680 --> 00:48:08,680
Speaker 2: NSA not to publish the intelligence report. Instead, she instructed

805
00:48:08,760 --> 00:48:13,080
Speaker 2: NSA officials to transmit the highly classified details directly to

806
00:48:13,200 --> 00:48:18,440
Speaker 2: her office, to Tulsi Gabbard's office, Does that or does

807
00:48:18,520 --> 00:48:22,200
Speaker 2: that not sound like direct interference to prevent some kind

808
00:48:22,239 --> 00:48:25,120
Speaker 2: of information or investigation from a current.

809
00:48:25,200 --> 00:48:27,279
Speaker 3: Well, we know what I'm going to say. Obviously, that

810
00:48:27,400 --> 00:48:30,200
Speaker 3: seems like a heck of a lot of interference. That's

811
00:48:30,280 --> 00:48:32,799
Speaker 3: not what is supposed to happen when things are going

812
00:48:32,840 --> 00:48:37,399
Speaker 3: above board. But if we look at the way chade

813
00:48:37,440 --> 00:48:42,160
Speaker 3: of command works off books, unfortunately, you lose your job

814
00:48:42,280 --> 00:48:45,120
Speaker 3: if you reject that order, even if it's in a

815
00:48:45,200 --> 00:48:48,880
Speaker 3: legal order. Right, you're not supposed to get fired, but

816
00:48:49,360 --> 00:48:53,520
Speaker 3: you don't really have a recourse. You're supposed to follow

817
00:48:54,120 --> 00:48:57,120
Speaker 3: what the what your betters in the organization tell you

818
00:48:57,160 --> 00:48:57,360
Speaker 3: to do.

819
00:48:58,080 --> 00:49:00,879
Speaker 4: Oh just a quick tiniest eide, did you'll see that

820
00:49:01,440 --> 00:49:04,759
Speaker 4: they are not going to prosecute those individuals that made

821
00:49:04,760 --> 00:49:08,080
Speaker 4: the video saying that you could refuse an illegal order

822
00:49:09,040 --> 00:49:12,399
Speaker 4: as a military personnel. Yeah, the courts are not going

823
00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:16,560
Speaker 4: to prosecute those I mean a democrats. It was just

824
00:49:16,719 --> 00:49:18,560
Speaker 4: totally like a like a what you call it a

825
00:49:19,160 --> 00:49:23,280
Speaker 4: kangaroo court. Okay, let me rephrase. If they had absolutely

826
00:49:23,280 --> 00:49:25,000
Speaker 4: been able to railroad them, it would have been a

827
00:49:25,080 --> 00:49:27,160
Speaker 4: kangaroo court. But it was just a smoke and mirrors

828
00:49:27,480 --> 00:49:33,160
Speaker 4: kind of saber rattle, you know, eternally speaking Also, why

829
00:49:33,239 --> 00:49:36,440
Speaker 4: was Telsea Gabbard at the rating of our election offices

830
00:49:36,480 --> 00:49:37,440
Speaker 4: here in Fulton County.

831
00:49:37,520 --> 00:49:41,360
Speaker 3: Yeah, I had asked about that earlier when we were recording.

832
00:49:41,480 --> 00:49:46,000
Speaker 3: Is just movie so quickly that Again, honestly, I love

833
00:49:46,040 --> 00:49:49,480
Speaker 3: that we're bringing that back up because that's another piece

834
00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:54,319
Speaker 3: of precedent that is affecting at least my perspective. Now

835
00:49:54,360 --> 00:49:56,480
Speaker 3: if it is true that Gabbert, gosh, they might come

836
00:49:56,560 --> 00:49:57,800
Speaker 3: knocking on our doors.

837
00:49:57,840 --> 00:49:59,960
Speaker 4: Oh wait, haven't you think we haven't been thinking of

838
00:50:00,040 --> 00:50:00,720
Speaker 4: about that, y'all.

839
00:50:01,000 --> 00:50:05,960
Speaker 3: It's that's the thing, okay, Because I don't ever want

840
00:50:06,000 --> 00:50:10,319
Speaker 3: to sound like I'm profiling someone or being kish, but

841
00:50:13,040 --> 00:50:16,800
Speaker 3: it just stinks. It is so suspicious, and I will

842
00:50:16,840 --> 00:50:20,400
Speaker 3: gladly go on any platform and make a huge maya kulpap.

843
00:50:20,920 --> 00:50:24,760
Speaker 3: Gabbard and team come out and say, here's the reason

844
00:50:24,800 --> 00:50:28,320
Speaker 3: we did this. It's totally legitimate. We're actually the good guys.

845
00:50:28,440 --> 00:50:31,120
Speaker 3: And if they could prove that, I will say, I

846
00:50:31,160 --> 00:50:33,960
Speaker 3: am so sorry. But they can't prove it because they're

847
00:50:34,000 --> 00:50:35,240
Speaker 3: not the good guys.

848
00:50:37,120 --> 00:50:41,200
Speaker 2: Mm. It feels like, oh, it is scary to say

849
00:50:41,239 --> 00:50:44,280
Speaker 2: some of this stuff, but we are just reading directly

850
00:50:44,360 --> 00:50:46,720
Speaker 2: from stuff that was already reported on by The Guardian.

851
00:50:46,800 --> 00:50:47,600
Speaker 3: Okay, in the.

852
00:50:47,560 --> 00:50:52,200
Speaker 4: Public sphere, and it doesn't matter, guys. At the end

853
00:50:52,239 --> 00:50:54,400
Speaker 4: of the day. I mean, we're approaching a world where

854
00:50:54,440 --> 00:50:57,640
Speaker 4: just retweeting something could get you black bagged.

855
00:50:58,040 --> 00:51:01,640
Speaker 2: A video, like a video that has some super racist

856
00:51:01,680 --> 00:51:03,680
Speaker 2: stuff at the end of it, like that was fine.

857
00:51:03,800 --> 00:51:05,400
Speaker 4: It was just at the end, it's okay.

858
00:51:05,440 --> 00:51:09,759
Speaker 3: It was just like that guy in Russia who just

859
00:51:09,840 --> 00:51:16,000
Speaker 3: got hit with the massive fine for liking YouTube videos.

860
00:51:15,880 --> 00:51:17,279
Speaker 4: A retiree.

861
00:51:17,520 --> 00:51:19,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, wow, older guy.

862
00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:24,640
Speaker 4: And that's the playbook we're beginning to work from.

863
00:51:25,000 --> 00:51:27,400
Speaker 3: Check out our upisode in the plastic episode when you

864
00:51:27,480 --> 00:51:28,600
Speaker 3: become your phone.

865
00:51:28,560 --> 00:51:31,520
Speaker 2: Yes, please do so. In the instance of this specific

866
00:51:31,600 --> 00:51:35,480
Speaker 2: phone call yet occurred, there's a person who is an

867
00:51:35,520 --> 00:51:41,040
Speaker 2: attorney named Andrew Becase. This person you may have heard

868
00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:44,640
Speaker 2: of before. He used to work closely with the CIA.

869
00:51:44,800 --> 00:51:47,360
Speaker 2: He was part of the Office of the Inspector General

870
00:51:47,680 --> 00:51:51,880
Speaker 2: for the CIA. He is representing the whistleblower here and

871
00:51:51,920 --> 00:51:57,440
Speaker 2: a lot of what we're getting is from him, and

872
00:51:57,480 --> 00:51:59,920
Speaker 2: we're also getting stuff from the Press Secretary for the

873
00:52:00,160 --> 00:52:03,239
Speaker 2: Director of National Intelligence or the Office excuse me of

874
00:52:03,320 --> 00:52:06,839
Speaker 2: the Director of National Intelligence. Here is a statement from them,

875
00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:10,080
Speaker 2: this story is false. Every single action taken by d

876
00:52:10,160 --> 00:52:13,440
Speaker 2: and I Gabbard was fully within her legal and statutory authority,

877
00:52:13,640 --> 00:52:17,400
Speaker 2: and these politically motivated attempts to manipulate highly classified information

878
00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:21,479
Speaker 2: undermine the essential national security work being done by great

879
00:52:21,520 --> 00:52:25,880
Speaker 2: Americans in the intelligence community every day. This is yet.

880
00:52:27,520 --> 00:52:28,279
Speaker 3: Take us to church.

881
00:52:29,320 --> 00:52:32,520
Speaker 2: This is yet another attempts to distract from the fact

882
00:52:32,880 --> 00:52:36,320
Speaker 2: that both a Biden era and Trump era appointed Intelligence

883
00:52:36,320 --> 00:52:40,000
Speaker 2: Community Inspector General already found the allegations against d and

884
00:52:40,040 --> 00:52:41,400
Speaker 2: I Gabbard baseless.

885
00:52:41,719 --> 00:52:48,040
Speaker 3: Okay, tight cool story. So to translate the pr parcour there, one,

886
00:52:49,040 --> 00:52:53,719
Speaker 3: we did nothing wrong, we did everything right. Two, you

887
00:52:53,800 --> 00:52:57,160
Speaker 3: may be you may be in danger for questioning us

888
00:52:57,400 --> 00:53:01,160
Speaker 3: on what we did. And then three it's the other

889
00:53:01,360 --> 00:53:05,640
Speaker 3: people's fault. But they also said we were right ce

890
00:53:05,840 --> 00:53:06,399
Speaker 3: point one.

891
00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:10,920
Speaker 4: And yet investigation after investigation that showed there to be

892
00:53:11,040 --> 00:53:14,319
Speaker 4: no fraud in the twenty twenty election as suspects, even

893
00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:18,920
Speaker 4: though many of those came through Trump friendlies.

894
00:53:20,080 --> 00:53:20,520
Speaker 2: Mm hmm.

895
00:53:21,239 --> 00:53:24,440
Speaker 4: I'm just saying that the level of double speak and

896
00:53:24,480 --> 00:53:27,040
Speaker 4: what they're asking us to believe and not believe and

897
00:53:27,080 --> 00:53:28,920
Speaker 4: look away from. And then no pay attention to this

898
00:53:28,960 --> 00:53:31,040
Speaker 4: one because it benefits us and not this one, because

899
00:53:31,120 --> 00:53:34,840
Speaker 4: it's just it makes your head spin and your stomach sink.

900
00:53:35,239 --> 00:53:38,160
Speaker 3: Shout out to Linda here and the Exorcist for sure,

901
00:53:38,920 --> 00:53:42,719
Speaker 3: it makes too Yeah, there's another thing here that I

902
00:53:43,480 --> 00:53:47,799
Speaker 3: just we have to mention it. Gents, we're hearing in

903
00:53:47,880 --> 00:53:52,720
Speaker 3: the public a very small percentage of the actual controversies

904
00:53:52,920 --> 00:53:56,480
Speaker 3: and the concerns that are occurring within the intel community.

905
00:53:56,719 --> 00:53:59,040
Speaker 3: So every time you hear a story like this about

906
00:53:59,040 --> 00:54:02,400
Speaker 3: a phone call and somewhat act and sketchy, remember that

907
00:54:02,560 --> 00:54:06,120
Speaker 3: is one of like ten other things twenty five.

908
00:54:06,239 --> 00:54:08,120
Speaker 4: That's the one that got away. That's the one that

909
00:54:08,160 --> 00:54:09,239
Speaker 4: they couldn't suppress.

910
00:54:09,400 --> 00:54:11,920
Speaker 3: That's the one where somebody was a little wi Yeah,

911
00:54:12,000 --> 00:54:14,359
Speaker 3: where someone was brave enough to blow a whistle. Right.

912
00:54:15,440 --> 00:54:20,240
Speaker 2: That's scary, it really is. We talked pretty recently about

913
00:54:20,280 --> 00:54:23,960
Speaker 2: this whistleblower hotline that exists out there for the intelligence community.

914
00:54:24,080 --> 00:54:27,719
Speaker 2: It is supposed to be a highly protected thing. We

915
00:54:27,800 --> 00:54:32,279
Speaker 2: know that there's dangerous information in the intelligence world all

916
00:54:32,320 --> 00:54:36,000
Speaker 2: the time, right, and that information, depending on who hears it,

917
00:54:36,040 --> 00:54:38,560
Speaker 2: depending on who's compromise, depending on all this other stuff.

918
00:54:38,640 --> 00:54:42,759
Speaker 2: Is this labyrinthine system of information. It can put to.

919
00:54:42,760 --> 00:54:46,280
Speaker 4: People in danger. It can put you know, operatives in danger.

920
00:54:46,800 --> 00:54:50,560
Speaker 4: We don't want that. We're not saying that we want that, right, like, right, yes,

921
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:51,200
Speaker 4: thank you.

922
00:54:51,280 --> 00:54:54,120
Speaker 2: So there is an existing hotline where you can call

923
00:54:54,200 --> 00:54:57,439
Speaker 2: in as an intelligence official to say, Hey, somebody i'm

924
00:54:57,440 --> 00:54:59,719
Speaker 2: working with, somebody I'm close to who's supposed to be

925
00:54:59,760 --> 00:55:02,520
Speaker 2: on our team is actually doing something else. There's something

926
00:55:02,640 --> 00:55:05,319
Speaker 2: really important that needs to be known and it needs

927
00:55:05,360 --> 00:55:09,279
Speaker 2: to probably be investigated. There's a weird thing happening there,

928
00:55:09,560 --> 00:55:14,720
Speaker 2: as noted here in the Guardian. It's the last sentence

929
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:18,000
Speaker 2: that I wrote down from this article. The independence of

930
00:55:18,080 --> 00:55:22,880
Speaker 2: the Watchdog office may be compromised, lawmakers have said ever

931
00:55:22,960 --> 00:55:27,480
Speaker 2: since the standing Director of National Intelligence, Gabbard assigned one

932
00:55:27,520 --> 00:55:32,160
Speaker 2: of her top advisors, person named Dennis Kirk, to work

933
00:55:32,239 --> 00:55:36,280
Speaker 2: at the Watchdog. On the ninth of May, two weeks

934
00:55:36,320 --> 00:55:41,520
Speaker 2: after the whistleblower first made contact with the Inspector General's hotline.

935
00:55:41,040 --> 00:55:44,840
Speaker 4: Bro it rings a big red phone in her office, Like, no, que.

936
00:55:45,480 --> 00:55:47,319
Speaker 2: Isn't it crazy? Yeah?

937
00:55:47,440 --> 00:55:51,120
Speaker 3: I mean it's logical.

938
00:55:51,320 --> 00:55:51,959
Speaker 4: The very least.

939
00:55:51,960 --> 00:55:57,600
Speaker 3: It's suppressing logical if you are trying to do illegal stuff.

940
00:55:59,680 --> 00:56:04,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, I've seen Look, man, I've seen the shows. We've

941
00:56:04,360 --> 00:56:08,040
Speaker 2: all seen the shows where somebody gets somebody infiltrates a

942
00:56:08,160 --> 00:56:11,120
Speaker 2: high office in one of the intelligence arms, you know,

943
00:56:11,280 --> 00:56:14,279
Speaker 2: and they're the ones running interference for the stuff or yeah,

944
00:56:14,280 --> 00:56:17,279
Speaker 2: I see, mister robot, yeah twenty four, or.

945
00:56:17,560 --> 00:56:20,520
Speaker 3: Think about the real life stuff that we can we

946
00:56:20,560 --> 00:56:24,640
Speaker 3: can absolutely prove with the benefit of retrospect, where in

947
00:56:24,640 --> 00:56:30,040
Speaker 3: intel agencies multiple ones right abroad or due to their

948
00:56:30,040 --> 00:56:34,680
Speaker 3: own internal descent, they set up a golden boy, right,

949
00:56:34,800 --> 00:56:38,800
Speaker 3: someone who gets promoted or gets a very specific position

950
00:56:39,400 --> 00:56:44,840
Speaker 3: with no precedent, right, not necessarily going through the ordinary channels.

951
00:56:45,640 --> 00:56:49,120
Speaker 3: Always be aware of the handpicked kids, you know what

952
00:56:49,160 --> 00:56:52,880
Speaker 3: I mean, even if they just lucked out without sounding

953
00:56:53,000 --> 00:56:57,080
Speaker 3: even more like a stereotype, don't trust them. Don't trust

954
00:56:57,080 --> 00:57:01,239
Speaker 3: the guy that hasn't been there for ten years in

955
00:57:01,360 --> 00:57:04,880
Speaker 3: the trenches aiming for this position. And even if they have,

956
00:57:05,560 --> 00:57:06,799
Speaker 3: I'd say, still don't trust him.

957
00:57:08,400 --> 00:57:10,240
Speaker 2: What crime have I committed?

958
00:57:10,920 --> 00:57:23,160
Speaker 4: Succulent Chinese meal that smart data, jez All, heroes don't

959
00:57:23,200 --> 00:57:23,760
Speaker 4: wear capes.

960
00:57:24,960 --> 00:57:27,400
Speaker 2: I hear you, man, it's a I don't know, it's

961
00:57:27,440 --> 00:57:30,400
Speaker 2: just a weird it's a weird time. Everything's weird. None

962
00:57:30,400 --> 00:57:33,400
Speaker 2: of it makes sense. Anymore there. I was thinking back

963
00:57:33,520 --> 00:57:36,840
Speaker 2: to Josh Clark's show that we've mentioned several times in

964
00:57:36,880 --> 00:57:41,240
Speaker 2: the past couple of months here about existential threats that

965
00:57:41,360 --> 00:57:44,000
Speaker 2: humanity fates faces, called the end of the World, No,

966
00:57:44,040 --> 00:57:48,280
Speaker 2: what is it called the world fantastic stuff. One of

967
00:57:48,280 --> 00:57:51,560
Speaker 2: the things that he brings up in that show is

968
00:57:51,760 --> 00:57:57,080
Speaker 2: rogue virology rogue uh, rogue biology of all sorts, but

969
00:57:57,160 --> 00:58:00,959
Speaker 2: specifically folks who get a hold of viruses and pathogens

970
00:58:01,040 --> 00:58:03,880
Speaker 2: and then do a little experimentation on their own, let's say,

971
00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:07,600
Speaker 2: in their house in Las Vegas. We're just gonna put

972
00:58:07,600 --> 00:58:09,240
Speaker 2: this one out here so you can look it up

973
00:58:09,360 --> 00:58:12,120
Speaker 2: and make sure you are like paying attention to this.

974
00:58:12,480 --> 00:58:14,200
Speaker 2: It's the kind of thing that may just be a

975
00:58:14,240 --> 00:58:16,080
Speaker 2: drop in the bucket when it comes to this kind

976
00:58:16,120 --> 00:58:19,640
Speaker 2: of rogue virology, or it could be something much larger

977
00:58:20,160 --> 00:58:23,280
Speaker 2: because of the scale that's hinted at by several pieces

978
00:58:23,280 --> 00:58:26,440
Speaker 2: we've seen in ABC News, in AP News, in a

979
00:58:26,440 --> 00:58:30,200
Speaker 2: bunch of other places, CBS News talking about it. There

980
00:58:30,320 --> 00:58:35,560
Speaker 2: is a weird what appears to be a virology lab

981
00:58:35,560 --> 00:58:39,919
Speaker 2: of some sort that was discovered pretty recently in Las

982
00:58:40,040 --> 00:58:42,840
Speaker 2: Vegas in a home. But in a house you guys,

983
00:58:42,920 --> 00:58:46,440
Speaker 2: not in like you know, a warehouse somewhere or in

984
00:58:46,480 --> 00:58:49,320
Speaker 2: a specialized office or anything like that, just inside a

985
00:58:49,400 --> 00:58:53,680
Speaker 2: house where there are all kinds of potentially hazardous materials,

986
00:58:53,720 --> 00:58:59,160
Speaker 2: biological materials. It's super weird stuff. There's a person named

987
00:58:59,280 --> 00:59:03,480
Speaker 2: or Solomon. They got picked up. He's fifty five. According

988
00:59:03,520 --> 00:59:06,600
Speaker 2: to ABC, he's an Israeli citizen in the US on

989
00:59:06,640 --> 00:59:10,000
Speaker 2: a non immigrant visa. He's not allowed to possess firearms.

990
00:59:10,040 --> 00:59:11,960
Speaker 2: And the reason why he's in trouble right now in

991
00:59:12,040 --> 00:59:15,080
Speaker 2: awaiting trial, is because there were a bunch of guns

992
00:59:15,600 --> 00:59:18,919
Speaker 2: seized from a home that you know, from his home

993
00:59:19,200 --> 00:59:24,240
Speaker 2: where this place was discovered. He also faces some kind

994
00:59:24,240 --> 00:59:27,080
Speaker 2: of criminal charge in Clark County for improper disposal of

995
00:59:27,200 --> 00:59:31,120
Speaker 2: hazardous waste. But all of that stuff, you know, it's

996
00:59:31,240 --> 00:59:36,480
Speaker 2: reasons to charge him with things, right, But ultimately there's

997
00:59:36,560 --> 00:59:39,720
Speaker 2: weird stuff going on in there, with stuff like COVID nineteen,

998
00:59:39,800 --> 00:59:44,640
Speaker 2: like actual COVID nineteen, other viruses that you know, if

999
00:59:44,680 --> 00:59:47,720
Speaker 2: you made a bunch of you could maybe weaponize or release,

1000
00:59:48,560 --> 00:59:51,400
Speaker 2: or maybe you're trying to find a cure right to

1001
00:59:51,440 --> 00:59:54,320
Speaker 2: create some kind of bioproduct that could be sold to

1002
00:59:54,360 --> 00:59:59,120
Speaker 2: somebody else who knows, who knows? Either way, it's pretty

1003
00:59:59,320 --> 01:00:01,600
Speaker 2: scary that it could be happening, Like in your neighborhood.

1004
01:00:01,680 --> 01:00:04,960
Speaker 2: There are literally neighbors coming forward to going, uh, what

1005
01:00:05,000 --> 01:00:05,560
Speaker 2: was happening?

1006
01:00:05,920 --> 01:00:10,520
Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely because due to consider this, due to economy

1007
01:00:10,520 --> 01:00:16,040
Speaker 3: of scale, now the equipment that would have once been

1008
01:00:16,120 --> 01:00:21,000
Speaker 3: restricted to professional labs, the price has plummeted now just

1009
01:00:21,240 --> 01:00:26,640
Speaker 3: similar to the similar to the proliferation of prosumer audio

1010
01:00:26,760 --> 01:00:30,920
Speaker 3: video technology. We're seeing that with things like Crisper. Right,

1011
01:00:30,960 --> 01:00:36,880
Speaker 3: we're seeing the ability to take as little as prices

1012
01:00:36,960 --> 01:00:40,600
Speaker 3: right in US here, as little as ten thousand US dollars, right,

1013
01:00:40,680 --> 01:00:45,280
Speaker 3: and a garage, then you can get some powerful goodies

1014
01:00:45,360 --> 01:00:48,680
Speaker 3: to play with, right, with very little in the way

1015
01:00:48,720 --> 01:00:52,240
Speaker 3: of regulation or legislation at this point. So what if

1016
01:00:52,280 --> 01:00:56,480
Speaker 3: someone has one hundred thousand dollars, then you get into

1017
01:00:56,560 --> 01:01:00,560
Speaker 3: some real potential villainy, but it probably just takes about

1018
01:01:00,560 --> 01:01:01,120
Speaker 3: ten grand.

1019
01:01:02,520 --> 01:01:09,080
Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, authorities say that this person Solomon, works for

1020
01:01:09,320 --> 01:01:14,400
Speaker 2: a Chinese citizen named Gia Bei Ju, who is currently

1021
01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:18,840
Speaker 2: in jail because in twenty twenty three there was an

1022
01:01:18,920 --> 01:01:23,600
Speaker 2: investigation into an illegal lab in Redley, California that this

1023
01:01:23,720 --> 01:01:27,760
Speaker 2: dude Zu who goes by David He David h. E

1024
01:01:29,640 --> 01:01:32,800
Speaker 2: that he was linked to, and that place had pathogens

1025
01:01:32,840 --> 01:01:36,200
Speaker 2: including samples of COVID nineteen and other diseases, as well

1026
01:01:36,240 --> 01:01:40,320
Speaker 2: as hundreds of transgenic mice and boxes of adulted and

1027
01:01:40,320 --> 01:01:43,640
Speaker 2: misbranded medical tests that he was like selling. So it's

1028
01:01:43,680 --> 01:01:46,080
Speaker 2: part of a business, but it's also got all these

1029
01:01:46,120 --> 01:01:49,520
Speaker 2: pathogens in this place, which just makes you wonder, like, again,

1030
01:01:49,600 --> 01:01:51,080
Speaker 2: what the heck are they building in there? What are

1031
01:01:51,080 --> 01:01:53,080
Speaker 2: they doing in there? Why what are they testing on

1032
01:01:53,120 --> 01:01:58,560
Speaker 2: those mice? Really it's really freaky stuff, and it just

1033
01:01:58,600 --> 01:02:00,880
Speaker 2: makes you wonder about the larger apparatus that they are

1034
01:02:00,880 --> 01:02:03,720
Speaker 2: potentially attached to and what is that and what are

1035
01:02:03,720 --> 01:02:04,880
Speaker 2: the aims or goals of.

1036
01:02:04,840 --> 01:02:05,440
Speaker 4: That thing.

1037
01:02:07,000 --> 01:02:08,560
Speaker 2: Or is it just a couple of guys who are

1038
01:02:09,160 --> 01:02:14,240
Speaker 2: messing around, you know, having fun with with bio stuff.

1039
01:02:15,360 --> 01:02:15,720
Speaker 3: It is.

1040
01:02:16,000 --> 01:02:19,880
Speaker 2: It is really interesting to know that or Solomon manages

1041
01:02:20,000 --> 01:02:23,400
Speaker 2: more than thirty rental properties in the area in Las

1042
01:02:23,480 --> 01:02:26,840
Speaker 2: Vegas out there, so I guess there's lots of search

1043
01:02:26,880 --> 01:02:32,800
Speaker 2: warrants to go through potentially, who knows. That's all I've got, guys.

1044
01:02:33,360 --> 01:02:36,800
Speaker 4: It's more than enough. Matt's excellent stuff, good lord.

1045
01:02:36,680 --> 01:02:39,000
Speaker 3: And we've got more on the way. Folks. Thank you,

1046
01:02:39,120 --> 01:02:42,640
Speaker 3: as always so much for tuning in. Apologies that we

1047
01:02:42,680 --> 01:02:46,040
Speaker 3: didn't get to everything we wanted to get to in

1048
01:02:46,240 --> 01:02:48,920
Speaker 3: this week's Strange News segment, but I guess that means

1049
01:02:48,920 --> 01:02:52,320
Speaker 3: we'll just have to keep doing this and we hope

1050
01:02:52,680 --> 01:02:55,120
Speaker 3: that you joined us for the ride. Let us know

1051
01:02:55,200 --> 01:02:58,240
Speaker 3: your thoughts. You can find us online. You can call

1052
01:02:58,320 --> 01:03:00,680
Speaker 3: us on a phone. You can always send us an email.

1053
01:03:01,000 --> 01:03:03,600
Speaker 4: That's right. You can find this on the internet on

1054
01:03:03,640 --> 01:03:06,760
Speaker 4: your social media platform of choice at either Conspiracy Stuff

1055
01:03:06,840 --> 01:03:10,120
Speaker 4: or Conspiracy Stuff Show. And there's more.

1056
01:03:11,240 --> 01:03:13,960
Speaker 2: There is a phone number. Please call it one eight

1057
01:03:14,160 --> 01:03:18,840
Speaker 2: three three st d WYTK. Give yourself a cool nickname

1058
01:03:18,880 --> 01:03:20,720
Speaker 2: when you call in, and let us know in the

1059
01:03:20,720 --> 01:03:22,640
Speaker 2: message if we can use your name and message on

1060
01:03:22,680 --> 01:03:24,760
Speaker 2: the air. If you'd like to send us an email,

1061
01:03:24,880 --> 01:03:25,400
Speaker 2: we are.

1062
01:03:25,600 --> 01:03:28,600
Speaker 3: The entity is the read each piece of correspondence we receive.

1063
01:03:28,760 --> 01:03:32,800
Speaker 3: Be well aware, yet I'd afraid sometimes the void rights back.

1064
01:03:33,440 --> 01:03:35,720
Speaker 3: Let us know if you want a random fact, Please

1065
01:03:35,720 --> 01:03:38,080
Speaker 3: tell us what you think about the idea of the

1066
01:03:38,240 --> 01:03:42,919
Speaker 3: FAA shutdown being a dry run for something larger. We'd

1067
01:03:42,960 --> 01:04:04,120
Speaker 3: love to hear your thoughts. Conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1068
01:04:04,560 --> 01:04:06,600
Speaker 2: Stuff They Don't Want You to Know is a production

1069
01:04:06,720 --> 01:04:11,240
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1070
01:04:11,360 --> 01:04:14,200
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.