WEBVTT - Power and Nations: Francis Fukuyama 0:00:15.396 --> 0:00:24.556 Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background to show 0:00:24.596 --> 0:00:27.916 where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 0:00:28.316 --> 0:00:32.916 I'm Noah Feldman. This week we're in the middle of 0:00:32.956 --> 0:00:37.636 a Deep Background mini series on international power and the 0:00:37.676 --> 0:00:42.476 people who shape it. In this episode, we're fortunate to 0:00:42.516 --> 0:00:45.956 have one of the world's best known public intellectuals to 0:00:46.076 --> 0:00:51.636 help us explore important aspects of these questions. Francis Fukuiyama 0:00:51.796 --> 0:00:54.796 is a scholar based at Stanford University, where he's a 0:00:54.796 --> 0:00:57.436 professor of political science and a Senior Fellow at the 0:00:57.476 --> 0:01:02.476 Spoli Institute for International Studies. For thirty years now, he's 0:01:02.476 --> 0:01:08.716 been writing fascinating, influential books about democracy, political order, how 0:01:08.716 --> 0:01:12.996 it devel ellops, how it changes, and how it can decay. 0:01:13.156 --> 0:01:16.316 He first came to global attention with an essay and book, 0:01:16.516 --> 0:01:19.436 The End of History and the Last Man, published just 0:01:19.636 --> 0:01:22.476 at the point that the Cold War was beginning to 0:01:22.476 --> 0:01:25.996 come to an end. Since then, he's published, among other things, 0:01:26.356 --> 0:01:29.636 two massive six hundred and fifty page books on the 0:01:29.756 --> 0:01:32.836 nature of political order from pre human times to the 0:01:32.876 --> 0:01:36.596 French Revolution, and then on political order and political decay 0:01:36.956 --> 0:01:40.996 from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy. Most 0:01:40.996 --> 0:01:47.076 recently he published a fascinating book on identity and contemporary politics. Today, 0:01:47.076 --> 0:01:49.756 we're going to delve deep into the question of what 0:01:49.836 --> 0:01:53.796 decay is, whether the United States is entering a period 0:01:53.836 --> 0:01:56.916 of decay that is going to effect its global standing, 0:01:57.196 --> 0:02:01.276 its relationship with other countries in the world, and particularly China. 0:02:02.636 --> 0:02:09.076 Sometimes controversial, always provocative, and frequently extraordinarily deep, Frank Fukuyama 0:02:09.356 --> 0:02:13.036 is the perfect person with whom to discuss the trajectory 0:02:13.236 --> 0:02:17.756 of democracy in the world and in the United States today. Frank, 0:02:17.956 --> 0:02:23.676 thank you so much for being here. Frank, even before 0:02:23.756 --> 0:02:26.156 Donald Trump was elected, in fact, a good deal before, 0:02:26.956 --> 0:02:30.716 you published one of your big books called Political Order 0:02:30.716 --> 0:02:34.716 and Political Decay, in which you introduced the idea of 0:02:35.116 --> 0:02:38.356 a form of democratic decay and suggested that in a 0:02:38.476 --> 0:02:41.076 range of ways, the United States was starting to enter 0:02:41.636 --> 0:02:44.356 a period of such democratic decay, although not perhaps in 0:02:44.396 --> 0:02:48.156 every way. I wonder if we could begin with the 0:02:48.276 --> 0:02:52.116 concept of decay, and if we start with some definitions, 0:02:52.156 --> 0:02:55.516 we might be able to jump start a deeper conversation 0:02:55.556 --> 0:02:58.676 about what is and is not happening with respect to 0:02:58.956 --> 0:03:01.916 decay in the United States and of democracy in other 0:03:01.956 --> 0:03:08.276 democratic countries. Sure so, my teacher in graduate school. With 0:03:08.316 --> 0:03:12.796 Sam Huntington and his famous nineteen sixty eight book Political 0:03:12.956 --> 0:03:16.836 Order and Changing Societies, talked about the process of political 0:03:16.876 --> 0:03:22.676 decay where society has developed faster than political institutions. People's 0:03:22.756 --> 0:03:27.756 expectations rose, the political system didn't meet those expectations, and 0:03:27.836 --> 0:03:33.236 that led to instability. My concept is based on that. 0:03:33.276 --> 0:03:35.996 It's similar, but it goes off in a couple of 0:03:35.996 --> 0:03:39.956 different directions. So I do think that the ability of 0:03:39.996 --> 0:03:44.956 a political system to meet expectations is critical for stability. 0:03:44.996 --> 0:03:49.236 But the reason that they don't meet expectations oftentimes has 0:03:49.276 --> 0:03:52.196 to do with two factors. One of them is just 0:03:52.276 --> 0:03:56.716 the excessive rigidity of the system. It's too hard to reform, 0:03:56.836 --> 0:04:00.436 so that even though elites may recognize that the system 0:04:00.516 --> 0:04:03.876 is not keeping up with the demands placed on it, 0:04:03.916 --> 0:04:07.436 they can't do anything to fix it. But the other one, 0:04:07.916 --> 0:04:11.916 which wasn't really similar Sam's framework, was this idea of 0:04:12.956 --> 0:04:17.596 political capture by elites use their wealth and power to 0:04:17.796 --> 0:04:21.036 basically grab hold of parts of the state and to 0:04:21.076 --> 0:04:25.156 brend those parts to their own self interest. Both of 0:04:25.196 --> 0:04:28.236 these things were things I saw happening in the United States. 0:04:28.956 --> 0:04:32.116 We had obvious problems with our democracy that made it 0:04:32.236 --> 0:04:36.676 less responsive to popular demands, but we couldn't change it 0:04:36.716 --> 0:04:39.836 because we have a very rigid constitutional system that is 0:04:39.876 --> 0:04:44.196 extremely hard to change. But we also had this process 0:04:44.276 --> 0:04:50.396 by which very powerful organized interest groups were ensconcing themselves 0:04:50.396 --> 0:04:53.196 in different parts of the state and burnding it to 0:04:53.276 --> 0:04:56.396 their own wishes. And I think in many ways that 0:04:56.556 --> 0:04:59.316 was one of the conditions that led to this upsurge 0:04:59.356 --> 0:05:04.676 of populism represented by Donald Trump, that ordinary people felt 0:05:04.676 --> 0:05:07.196 the system wasn't serving them. So those are the senses 0:05:07.196 --> 0:05:12.876 in which I thought the system was. Hey, Frank, building 0:05:12.876 --> 0:05:15.836 on what you just said about populist authoritarianism, which in 0:05:15.876 --> 0:05:17.996 the US we had Donald Trump as our version, but 0:05:18.036 --> 0:05:20.996 we got him out after one term. So in global terms, 0:05:21.036 --> 0:05:24.276 that's actually a win in response to populist authoritarianism. If 0:05:24.276 --> 0:05:27.196 you compare that to places like Hungry or Poland, where 0:05:27.236 --> 0:05:31.436 populist authoritarians have so far been more durable, or certainly Russia. 0:05:31.636 --> 0:05:35.116 Do you see populist authoritarianism then as just a symptom 0:05:35.836 --> 0:05:40.236 of decay that's actually caused by capture by elites, that is, 0:05:40.996 --> 0:05:43.356 the public. A lot of members of the public feel 0:05:43.356 --> 0:05:45.596 like they can't get access and so they give you, 0:05:45.636 --> 0:05:50.476 in turn trump or a victor orbon or. Is it also, 0:05:50.916 --> 0:05:52.516 that is to say, not just a symptom of the 0:05:52.556 --> 0:05:55.276 other causes of decay, but also a contributor to the decay, 0:05:55.796 --> 0:05:58.556 because at least in ordinary terms of the word decay, 0:05:58.996 --> 0:06:01.676 you know, you have someone who's an authoritarian, they will 0:06:01.796 --> 0:06:06.436 undercut democratic institutions even further and make them seem illegitimate 0:06:06.436 --> 0:06:10.876 and even less responsive to popular demand. Well, yeah, it's 0:06:10.916 --> 0:06:15.716 all of those things. So, first of all, the particular 0:06:15.796 --> 0:06:19.516 form that decay took after twenty sixteen, with the rise 0:06:19.636 --> 0:06:24.476 of populist nationalists, was not simply the result of rigid 0:06:24.476 --> 0:06:27.996 political systems. I mean, Japan has a very rigid political system, 0:06:28.076 --> 0:06:30.476 but I don't think it's really suffering from the kind 0:06:30.516 --> 0:06:34.396 of decay that we're experiencing. So there was something else 0:06:34.436 --> 0:06:38.916 going on in society, which, when combined with the rigidities 0:06:38.916 --> 0:06:42.636 of the system, I think produced this populist upsurge. You know, 0:06:42.716 --> 0:06:45.596 those changes in society I think had to do with 0:06:45.716 --> 0:06:51.636 economics and society. The society was splintering into at least 0:06:51.676 --> 0:06:56.196 two very distinct cultural groups, one of which was very 0:06:56.236 --> 0:07:02.716 well educated, open to a cosmopolitan, globalized world doing quite well, 0:07:02.756 --> 0:07:07.036 and the other part tended to live in smaller towns 0:07:07.076 --> 0:07:11.076 and cities or in the countryside, felt disconnected from all 0:07:11.116 --> 0:07:17.276 of the big socioeconomic and technological changes that had been happening. 0:07:17.756 --> 0:07:23.676 And that explains the particular resentments that emerged. That meant 0:07:23.716 --> 0:07:27.556 that the populace backlash when it came, wasn't just about economics. 0:07:27.596 --> 0:07:31.996 It was also about culture. It was about people feeling 0:07:32.116 --> 0:07:36.956 that the elites in the country had stolen the national identity, 0:07:37.116 --> 0:07:41.236 transformed it into something that they weren't comfortable with. That 0:07:41.356 --> 0:07:46.156 involved the downplaying of patriotism, of religion, of a lot 0:07:46.156 --> 0:07:50.036 of traditional social values. And so I think it required 0:07:50.836 --> 0:07:55.596 those sorts of social transformations mixed together with the rigidities 0:07:55.636 --> 0:07:58.476 of the system and the elite capture that led to 0:07:58.516 --> 0:08:02.516 our current situation. As your question about which way the 0:08:02.556 --> 0:08:05.916 causality moves, I think, you know, as in many phenomena, 0:08:05.956 --> 0:08:10.116 it moves in both directions. So I think the external 0:08:10.196 --> 0:08:14.276 changes in the economy and technology promoted this kind of 0:08:14.316 --> 0:08:18.556 social fracturing. But once the society fractured, it fed back 0:08:18.596 --> 0:08:23.436 into the decay because you know, people felt that they 0:08:23.436 --> 0:08:28.436 were trapped in this unreformable system. I want to go 0:08:28.516 --> 0:08:33.756 deeper into the polarization component of what you're describing. Before 0:08:33.796 --> 0:08:36.876 we do, let me just ask a further follow up 0:08:36.956 --> 0:08:40.556 question about this broader picture of decay. The causes of 0:08:40.596 --> 0:08:45.196 decay that you're describing are pretty country specific. Rigidity in 0:08:45.236 --> 0:08:48.076 a system could vary from country to country, Capture by 0:08:48.116 --> 0:08:51.516 elites could vary from country to country. Even polarization might 0:08:51.516 --> 0:08:54.996 be different depending on where you are. Yet, the decay 0:08:55.236 --> 0:09:00.076 of democracies constitutional democracies broadly speaking, is a phenomenon we're 0:09:00.076 --> 0:09:04.236 seeing in lots of different countries with pretty different circumstances 0:09:04.316 --> 0:09:09.476 over the last decade or so. Why this convergence among 0:09:09.516 --> 0:09:11.916 countries that are pretty different from each other if the 0:09:11.996 --> 0:09:18.436 core causes of decay are basically specific to the country, Well, 0:09:18.476 --> 0:09:21.836 first of all, just a kind of social scientific caution. 0:09:21.916 --> 0:09:25.876 I don't think we should overgeneralize, because you know, what's 0:09:25.876 --> 0:09:28.436 going on in Russia is very different from India, is 0:09:28.476 --> 0:09:31.316 different from Hungary, is different from the United States, and 0:09:31.356 --> 0:09:35.516 so there are very specific characteristics. But I would say 0:09:35.516 --> 0:09:40.676 that what's common is that sociological cleavage that I just 0:09:40.796 --> 0:09:44.676 described that almost everywhere you look, people that vote for 0:09:44.796 --> 0:09:48.956 liberal politicians tend to live in big cities or urban 0:09:48.996 --> 0:09:53.036 agglomerations that are well connected to the global economy. The 0:09:53.156 --> 0:09:57.156 people that vote for populous politicians tend to live in 0:09:57.236 --> 0:10:01.676 second and third tier cities, towns, villages, or in the countryside. 0:10:02.236 --> 0:10:06.436 And that's very true almost universally. That's true in Hungary, 0:10:06.436 --> 0:10:09.356 it's true in Turkey, it's true in Russia's true in 0:10:09.356 --> 0:10:12.276 the United States, it's true in Britain. And so I 0:10:12.316 --> 0:10:16.876 do think that there is a common sociology that connects 0:10:17.036 --> 0:10:21.076 all of the new forms of populism with one another. 0:10:21.636 --> 0:10:25.436 And probably the single biggest, you know cleavage there really 0:10:25.476 --> 0:10:30.716 has to do with education, because education has pushed people. 0:10:31.236 --> 0:10:34.236 First of all, it's affected very much their economic prospects, 0:10:34.276 --> 0:10:38.716 but it's also pushed them in very cultural directions. And 0:10:38.756 --> 0:10:42.236 so that's constant. But I think then you get into 0:10:42.436 --> 0:10:49.676 country specific differences. So in India, the populism has taken 0:10:49.676 --> 0:10:52.236 the form of religion rather than nationalism. I mean, the 0:10:52.356 --> 0:10:56.396 two overlap, you know, considerably, but there's a very specific 0:10:56.596 --> 0:11:00.596 desire to return India to its religious, you know, Hindu 0:11:00.836 --> 0:11:04.356 religious roots. There are other countries that, you know, in 0:11:04.356 --> 0:11:07.396 a way I've been able to mitigate the populism like Italy, 0:11:07.396 --> 0:11:10.636 that you don't have this red blue cleavage that we 0:11:10.716 --> 0:11:14.676 have in the United States, because you know, our winner 0:11:14.716 --> 0:11:18.756 take all, first past the post electoral system really rewards 0:11:18.796 --> 0:11:22.596 that kind of biarification into a two party system, whereas 0:11:22.636 --> 0:11:26.316 Italy's system is always rewarded much greater splintering, and in 0:11:26.356 --> 0:11:29.396 a way that's been a good thing because that's protected 0:11:29.436 --> 0:11:33.356 them from a populous takeover. So I guess one further 0:11:33.436 --> 0:11:36.796 thing to say is that we in the United States, 0:11:36.876 --> 0:11:41.956 I think, have a particularly unhappy historical legacy, which is 0:11:41.996 --> 0:11:45.396 a legacy of race. I do think that in the 0:11:45.476 --> 0:11:51.316 United States that racial history is particularly important in explaining 0:11:51.636 --> 0:11:55.676 a lot of the depth of the effective polarization, you know, 0:11:55.716 --> 0:11:59.636 the emotional part of the polarization that we're experiencing, which 0:11:59.676 --> 0:12:04.756 I think is much weaker in most European countries. That's 0:12:04.756 --> 0:12:07.316 a fascinating point. I tend to agree with you that 0:12:07.716 --> 0:12:10.356 there are very few powers in Europe to the kind 0:12:10.396 --> 0:12:13.876 of systemic racism in the United States that emerged from 0:12:13.916 --> 0:12:17.956 the history of slavery and then segregation in law, and 0:12:17.996 --> 0:12:22.436 then subsequently segregation to some degree in practice. That said, 0:12:22.476 --> 0:12:23.956 I do think if you look at a place like 0:12:24.036 --> 0:12:27.556 France with a colonial legacy, at a large population of 0:12:27.636 --> 0:12:32.276 people who are descendants of people who lived in colonies, 0:12:32.836 --> 0:12:38.876 specifically in North Africa. There are certainly tendencies towards, let's say, 0:12:38.916 --> 0:12:43.116 differential policing of different communities based on race, different economic 0:12:43.156 --> 0:12:46.476 opportunities based on race. It's just that the French pretend 0:12:46.516 --> 0:12:49.556 they can make that disappear by saying we don't see race. 0:12:50.836 --> 0:12:53.156 So I hear the point. I think it's a very 0:12:53.196 --> 0:12:56.716 interesting one. Let me ask about the identity issue that 0:12:56.716 --> 0:12:59.476 you're pointing two now, and you address that in another 0:12:59.516 --> 0:13:02.316 book on identity that was published a couple of years ago. 0:13:02.636 --> 0:13:05.276 I want to begin by asking about the right left 0:13:05.436 --> 0:13:08.236 politics around identity. You know, there was a long period 0:13:08.276 --> 0:13:11.236 of time in which the left in the US was 0:13:11.276 --> 0:13:15.476 gradually embracing the idea of identity politics, and the right 0:13:15.556 --> 0:13:19.636 was pretty skeptical of it and was arguing against identity politics. 0:13:20.276 --> 0:13:23.076 And yet, as you note in the book, one consequence 0:13:23.196 --> 0:13:25.676 of the rise of Trump has been the emergence of 0:13:25.796 --> 0:13:30.116 identity politics on the right. So how does it change 0:13:30.116 --> 0:13:33.236 things that everyone, as it were, on the political spectrum 0:13:33.716 --> 0:13:39.516 thinks that identity is crucial to human self expression. Well, 0:13:39.676 --> 0:13:45.236 for for someone like me, who's basically an old fashioned liberal, 0:13:45.316 --> 0:13:49.716 it makes liberal democracy extremely difficult. Let me just get 0:13:49.716 --> 0:13:53.036 a couple of definitional things. Clear, identity is a very 0:13:53.076 --> 0:13:56.236 broad concept, and it can be used for good purposes 0:13:56.276 --> 0:13:59.716 and bad purposes. And you know, I argued in that 0:13:59.756 --> 0:14:03.076 book Identity, that we actually need national identity. I mean, 0:14:03.076 --> 0:14:07.356 we need a common set of historical references narratives that 0:14:07.436 --> 0:14:11.396 bind us together as Americans. And each one of us 0:14:11.476 --> 0:14:16.156 is carrying around multiple identities in our professional lives, in 0:14:16.276 --> 0:14:19.516 our families, and our religion, you know, and so forth. 0:14:20.156 --> 0:14:23.836 The kind of identity that's really toxic for a democracy 0:14:24.356 --> 0:14:29.236 are those that are related to fixed characteristics. But even 0:14:29.276 --> 0:14:32.756 that is not so terrible, because you know, if you're female, 0:14:32.916 --> 0:14:36.876 if you're African American, if you're gay, you know, you 0:14:36.996 --> 0:14:41.276 have specific experiences that bind you to other people in 0:14:41.276 --> 0:14:45.116 that category that make you different from others. But I 0:14:45.156 --> 0:14:50.516 think that where identity politics becomes dangerous for democracy is 0:14:50.556 --> 0:14:55.196 when people begin to regard those kinds of fixed identities 0:14:55.236 --> 0:14:59.916 as essential to the way that they define themselves, such 0:14:59.996 --> 0:15:04.916 that they trump you know, other economic interests or opinions 0:15:05.156 --> 0:15:09.836 or things of that sort. And I think that's the 0:15:09.876 --> 0:15:14.036 situation that unfortunately the country has slid into, you know, 0:15:14.156 --> 0:15:18.676 the in the Halcyon nineteen eighties, we would argue over 0:15:18.796 --> 0:15:21.956 policy issues like should taxes be higher or lower, or 0:15:21.996 --> 0:15:26.236 should we have more or less you know, social welfare spending, 0:15:26.796 --> 0:15:30.676 and those, you know, are ultimately issues that can be compromised. 0:15:30.716 --> 0:15:34.956 But when you get into some of the extremes of 0:15:34.996 --> 0:15:40.236 the identity debate today, you have people saying, well, you know, 0:15:40.356 --> 0:15:43.476 on the extreme right, this is essentially a white, you know, 0:15:43.596 --> 0:15:47.796 European country, and you have people on the left saying, 0:15:48.396 --> 0:15:51.516 you know, this is a racist country of white patriarchy 0:15:51.636 --> 0:15:55.716 that's also never going to change. And those kinds of 0:15:55.756 --> 0:16:01.276 positions are really not negotiable, you know, in any meaningful way. 0:16:01.596 --> 0:16:06.036 And that also prevents people experiencing kind of a common 0:16:06.076 --> 0:16:09.396 sense of identity, which then allows them to compromise, wise, 0:16:09.516 --> 0:16:14.836 to deliberate, to argue about things, but ultimately to believe 0:16:14.876 --> 0:16:19.036 that they're part of a common political system in which 0:16:19.276 --> 0:16:21.716 they don't get everything they want. But you know, because 0:16:21.716 --> 0:16:27.116 it's basically a liberal democratic one, they also are represented 0:16:27.196 --> 0:16:31.316 and their voices are heard in a perverse way, though 0:16:31.356 --> 0:16:35.156 there's some overlap between the views of people who intensely 0:16:35.316 --> 0:16:37.836 disagree with each other. There, I mean to the extent 0:16:37.916 --> 0:16:40.116 that a kind of Afro pessimist view would say that 0:16:40.316 --> 0:16:42.516 racism is baked into the structure of the United States 0:16:42.516 --> 0:16:45.396 and cannot change, and to the extent that some white 0:16:45.396 --> 0:16:48.356 supremacists who embrace white supremacy, they would say the same. 0:16:48.676 --> 0:16:51.596 And so presumably, and you don't say this in the book, 0:16:51.636 --> 0:16:54.836 but presumably a middle ground position which would give us 0:16:54.876 --> 0:17:00.796 common cause, would give some acknowledgement to historical practices of racism, 0:17:01.076 --> 0:17:04.956 while simultaneously talking about the capacity for change that the 0:17:05.036 --> 0:17:08.756 United States needs to have, even if it were true 0:17:08.796 --> 0:17:10.476 that it never done so in a meaningful way in 0:17:10.516 --> 0:17:13.516 the past, and I think that's debatable. It needs to 0:17:13.596 --> 0:17:17.236 change in order to in order to go forward. Well, 0:17:17.276 --> 0:17:21.036 that's exactly right. You know. One of the ironies of 0:17:21.116 --> 0:17:23.476 the present moment is that the left and the right 0:17:23.516 --> 0:17:26.916 have in a way joined hands. On the left, you know, 0:17:27.116 --> 0:17:31.436 a certain type of essentialist identity politics in the end 0:17:31.476 --> 0:17:35.876 becomes indistinguishable from that kind of right wing nationalism that 0:17:35.916 --> 0:17:38.996 we're all blown into. These groups. We have these lived 0:17:39.036 --> 0:17:42.356 experiences that are shared only among those groups, and that 0:17:42.396 --> 0:17:46.556 there's really no common experience that can bind us together. 0:17:46.916 --> 0:17:50.876 I actually think that this is a wrong but also 0:17:51.036 --> 0:17:55.876 very destructive, and it should be perfectly possible to come 0:17:55.956 --> 0:17:59.636 up with a narrative that actually bridges the left and 0:17:59.756 --> 0:18:02.876 right in this country where you say, yes, there was 0:18:02.916 --> 0:18:08.476 an original sin of slavery that was continued shamefully well 0:18:08.516 --> 0:18:11.076 into the twenty a century. But on the other hand, 0:18:11.156 --> 0:18:15.836 the situation of African America as women, gays, and lesbians, 0:18:15.876 --> 0:18:18.836 you know, all of these marginalized groups is better than 0:18:18.876 --> 0:18:21.036 it was, and in many ways, I think we are 0:18:21.076 --> 0:18:25.796 living in the kind of most equal and open society 0:18:25.916 --> 0:18:29.196 that America has ever had. It's just that we have 0:18:29.356 --> 0:18:33.116 problems at the extremes, and many people don't don't believe 0:18:33.196 --> 0:18:37.356 that particular centrist narrative. But it is also true that 0:18:37.436 --> 0:18:42.916 in January sixth, twenty twenty one mob of people actually 0:18:43.076 --> 0:18:46.436 invaded the Capitol in what was, to my mind an 0:18:46.476 --> 0:18:51.316 extraordinary symbol of democratic decay. The people who were doing 0:18:51.356 --> 0:18:55.676 that were devoted to the idea that democracy hadn't functioned 0:18:55.676 --> 0:18:56.996 the way it ought to have, and that they could 0:18:57.036 --> 0:18:58.796 do something about it, and they could do something about 0:18:58.836 --> 0:19:01.596 it by force, and they had encouragement that we can 0:19:01.716 --> 0:19:03.916 argue about where there was incitement, but they had encouragement 0:19:03.996 --> 0:19:06.676 from the person who had been president of the United States. 0:19:07.436 --> 0:19:09.916 I want to use all of what you've been saying, 0:19:09.916 --> 0:19:14.156 and it's extremely helpful and clarifying to shift to the 0:19:14.316 --> 0:19:18.276 question of what this means for the power of democracies 0:19:18.316 --> 0:19:22.996 in the world, especially the US, relative to the emerging 0:19:23.556 --> 0:19:29.196 alternate models, and particularly the model of China. And to 0:19:29.276 --> 0:19:32.316 frame that question, I just want to begin by saying, 0:19:32.636 --> 0:19:36.716 it does seem really clear, at a distance of nearly 0:19:36.756 --> 0:19:39.836 thirty years since the end of the Cold War, that 0:19:39.916 --> 0:19:43.556 while liberal democracy did not definitively win a victory overall 0:19:43.596 --> 0:19:49.076 alternative systems, some form of market capitalism did. So, you know, 0:19:49.236 --> 0:19:53.276 the Chinese model is one that it's a state directed capitalism, 0:19:53.276 --> 0:19:57.636 but it's clearly market driven, and it's clearly capitalist. And 0:19:57.756 --> 0:20:01.036 at the same time as we're seeing decay and democracy, 0:20:01.476 --> 0:20:06.556 we're seeing innovation and variation on the Chinese side. I 0:20:06.596 --> 0:20:09.316 don't think that means that China's government has solved all 0:20:09.316 --> 0:20:11.076 of the problems that a government that wants to be 0:20:11.156 --> 0:20:13.756 legitimate has to be solved by a long shot. But 0:20:13.796 --> 0:20:15.476 they are offering a model that has brought a lot 0:20:15.516 --> 0:20:19.916 of people out of poverty, that seems stable, that seems functional, 0:20:20.156 --> 0:20:23.876 and that seems to be legitimate to a very large 0:20:23.956 --> 0:20:28.916 number of its citizens. So I wonder whether you think 0:20:28.996 --> 0:20:33.276 that the US's decay is really going to contribute to 0:20:33.316 --> 0:20:37.636 the process of its decline in global power and influence 0:20:38.396 --> 0:20:42.916 relative to China, because it's coming at just a moment 0:20:43.196 --> 0:20:48.996 when the Chinese system seems to be doing fairly well. Well, yes, 0:20:49.196 --> 0:20:51.996 I think that that's already happened. I think that our 0:20:52.036 --> 0:20:56.036 ability to respond to China has been very much weakened 0:20:56.076 --> 0:21:00.676 by our internal divisions, not to speak of Russia, where 0:21:01.436 --> 0:21:06.156 many Republicans have openly said that they dislike the Democrats 0:21:06.236 --> 0:21:09.356 more than they dislike you know, Vladimir Putin's Russia. So 0:21:09.436 --> 0:21:11.876 if there is ever a case of, you know, a 0:21:11.916 --> 0:21:15.876 great power being weakened by internal dissension, this is it. 0:21:16.556 --> 0:21:19.316 You know, I would say that we need to be 0:21:19.356 --> 0:21:25.876 a little bit cautious about projecting China's current status forward 0:21:25.996 --> 0:21:30.196 in history. It's true that they have done extraordinarily well 0:21:30.196 --> 0:21:34.396 over the last forty years in bringing their country up 0:21:34.396 --> 0:21:38.596 out of poverty, but you know, there are big problems 0:21:38.596 --> 0:21:41.956 in that system that have to do with what they 0:21:41.996 --> 0:21:45.476 themselves call the bad emperor problem. That is to say, 0:21:45.596 --> 0:21:50.516 any system with checks and balances on executive power, like 0:21:50.716 --> 0:21:54.396 our system is going to do worse than an authoritarian 0:21:54.476 --> 0:21:58.796 system in many circumstances, because an authoritarian system can turn 0:21:58.836 --> 0:22:02.276 on a diamond. If you've got a competent, wise leader 0:22:02.836 --> 0:22:05.396 at the top of the hierarchy, they can make a 0:22:05.516 --> 0:22:08.436 very very rapid shift. But you know what's happened in 0:22:08.516 --> 0:22:12.076 Chinese tree is you get a bad leader without saying, 0:22:12.156 --> 0:22:15.916 kind of unchecked power, and that becomes very dangerous and 0:22:15.956 --> 0:22:20.636 it was hugely destructive during a cultural revolution when Mao 0:22:20.796 --> 0:22:24.316 is really the last bad emperor that they had. Whether 0:22:24.356 --> 0:22:28.836 Shijimping goes down that path, I don't know, but he 0:22:28.956 --> 0:22:32.436 looks like he wants to. But you know, at this 0:22:32.516 --> 0:22:36.076 point you have to admit that they're doing relatively a 0:22:36.076 --> 0:22:38.716 lot better than we are, because they do seem to 0:22:38.716 --> 0:22:50.396 be quite purposeful and we do not. We'll be right back, Frank, 0:22:50.756 --> 0:22:52.836 may I push back just ever so gently on the 0:22:53.236 --> 0:22:57.596 bad emperor problem formulation. I mean from roughly nineteen ninety 0:22:57.636 --> 0:23:01.436 two when Dung Shoping stepped down till say twenty and 0:23:01.516 --> 0:23:05.076 twelve when it became clear that Shijinping was when he 0:23:05.076 --> 0:23:07.316 took over, going to do things differently. So for a 0:23:07.316 --> 0:23:11.036 twenty year period in between, the Chinese had a couple 0:23:11.036 --> 0:23:14.716 of rounds where there was no real emperor, where power 0:23:14.876 --> 0:23:20.796 was shared collectively among a group of pretty senior Communist 0:23:20.876 --> 0:23:25.396 party leaders, and they actually agreed amongst themselves to do 0:23:25.436 --> 0:23:29.516 ten year terms and then rotate and step down, and 0:23:29.556 --> 0:23:33.036 they actually did it. Now, I myself was I think 0:23:33.436 --> 0:23:37.196 inappropriately optimistic that that would be institutionalized, that that would 0:23:37.196 --> 0:23:40.396 continue over time. And it also had a big flaw, 0:23:40.436 --> 0:23:42.276 which was once you were only going to serve ten years, 0:23:42.276 --> 0:23:44.036 you had a lot of incentive to be as corrupt 0:23:44.036 --> 0:23:46.676 as possible, so you would still have money and influence 0:23:46.676 --> 0:23:48.436 for your family once your ten years was up. So 0:23:48.476 --> 0:23:51.436 they hadn't solved the transitions problem, but they had made 0:23:51.476 --> 0:23:55.076 progress towards solving it, and in that period they seemed 0:23:55.116 --> 0:23:57.236 to have to some degree come to terms with the 0:23:57.236 --> 0:24:01.556 bad emperor problem by a kind of balanced collective government. 0:24:02.156 --> 0:24:05.636 Then came Shi Jinping, who on the one hand, has 0:24:05.676 --> 0:24:09.636 made real strides against the corruption problem thereby legitimating the 0:24:09.636 --> 0:24:12.956 power of a communist party, but Obviously, when you're that 0:24:13.076 --> 0:24:15.596 much of a dictator, you do run into the bad 0:24:15.636 --> 0:24:18.436 emperor problem, right, what if someone in his position didn't 0:24:18.516 --> 0:24:21.436 didn't do well. It seems at least possible to me 0:24:21.636 --> 0:24:25.036 that they could rotate between these models that, you know, 0:24:25.076 --> 0:24:30.156 following Shijinping, they might go back to something more collective again. 0:24:31.036 --> 0:24:33.956 And while that doesn't have the clear predictability of the 0:24:34.076 --> 0:24:36.756 rule of a monarchy where you know that the eldest 0:24:36.796 --> 0:24:39.476 will inherit or a democracy where at least in principle 0:24:39.476 --> 0:24:41.476 you're supposed to have an election and the person with 0:24:41.476 --> 0:24:44.476 the most votes is supposed to win, it might actually 0:24:44.516 --> 0:24:49.076 be a way of maintaining a degree of stability for them. Well, 0:24:49.116 --> 0:24:54.076 that's looks that's all possible. I think that, however, the 0:24:54.116 --> 0:24:57.836 temptation to hold on to power, whether it's Hijinping or 0:24:58.036 --> 0:25:01.396 a successor, is going to be very, very great. The 0:25:01.436 --> 0:25:06.676 only reason that party secretaries gave up power after nineteen 0:25:06.756 --> 0:25:10.596 seventy nine was that they were all so traumatized by 0:25:10.636 --> 0:25:13.436 what had happened during the Cultural Revolution that they said, 0:25:13.476 --> 0:25:16.316 never again are we going to allow one guide to 0:25:17.036 --> 0:25:19.596 be able to hold that kind of power over us. 0:25:20.196 --> 0:25:22.396 They had to be really scared, you know, by that. 0:25:23.116 --> 0:25:26.836 But I do think that it's not clear that you 0:25:26.876 --> 0:25:31.716 can just alternate between these different unconstrained power periods and 0:25:31.756 --> 0:25:35.836 then constrained power periods, and that that could happen according 0:25:35.836 --> 0:25:39.596 to some nice, you know, peaceful institutional schedule. I do 0:25:39.716 --> 0:25:43.436 think that, you know, what drives the distribution of power 0:25:43.636 --> 0:25:46.356 is the experience of the abuse of power. And if 0:25:46.396 --> 0:25:49.076 you don't have that abuse, you know, firmly in your mind, 0:25:49.276 --> 0:25:52.596 you're probably not going to be willing to distribute power 0:25:52.676 --> 0:25:54.476 in the manner that they did, you know, in the 0:25:54.556 --> 0:25:58.756 nineteen nineties. But I you know, the two big questions 0:25:58.796 --> 0:26:04.676 are whether the United States can regain its mojo, you know, 0:26:05.076 --> 0:26:08.916 whether it can overcome the current I think really crippling 0:26:09.276 --> 0:26:14.756 of partizanship and polarization, restore something of a kind of 0:26:14.836 --> 0:26:17.916 national identity and national vision that would allow it to 0:26:17.916 --> 0:26:22.156 be effective in projecting a model out into the world. 0:26:22.636 --> 0:26:24.956 And conversely, you know, what's going to happen to the 0:26:25.036 --> 0:26:28.716 Chinese model, because I think if we continue to bump 0:26:28.756 --> 0:26:31.556 along the way we have, being as divided as we 0:26:31.596 --> 0:26:34.316 are for the next twenty years, and the Chinese keep growing, 0:26:34.356 --> 0:26:36.716 then yeah, it's going to be a world that's really 0:26:36.756 --> 0:26:40.436