1 00:00:15,396 --> 00:00:24,556 Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background to show 2 00:00:24,596 --> 00:00:27,916 Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 3 00:00:28,316 --> 00:00:32,916 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. This week we're in the middle of 4 00:00:32,956 --> 00:00:37,636 Speaker 1: a Deep Background mini series on international power and the 5 00:00:37,676 --> 00:00:42,476 Speaker 1: people who shape it. In this episode, we're fortunate to 6 00:00:42,516 --> 00:00:45,956 Speaker 1: have one of the world's best known public intellectuals to 7 00:00:46,076 --> 00:00:51,636 Speaker 1: help us explore important aspects of these questions. Francis Fukuiyama 8 00:00:51,796 --> 00:00:54,796 Speaker 1: is a scholar based at Stanford University, where he's a 9 00:00:54,796 --> 00:00:57,436 Speaker 1: professor of political science and a Senior Fellow at the 10 00:00:57,476 --> 00:01:02,476 Speaker 1: Spoli Institute for International Studies. For thirty years now, he's 11 00:01:02,476 --> 00:01:08,716 Speaker 1: been writing fascinating, influential books about democracy, political order, how 12 00:01:08,716 --> 00:01:12,996 Speaker 1: it devel ellops, how it changes, and how it can decay. 13 00:01:13,156 --> 00:01:16,316 Speaker 1: He first came to global attention with an essay and book, 14 00:01:16,516 --> 00:01:19,436 Speaker 1: The End of History and the Last Man, published just 15 00:01:19,636 --> 00:01:22,476 Speaker 1: at the point that the Cold War was beginning to 16 00:01:22,476 --> 00:01:25,996 Speaker 1: come to an end. Since then, he's published, among other things, 17 00:01:26,356 --> 00:01:29,636 Speaker 1: two massive six hundred and fifty page books on the 18 00:01:29,756 --> 00:01:32,836 Speaker 1: nature of political order from pre human times to the 19 00:01:32,876 --> 00:01:36,596 Speaker 1: French Revolution, and then on political order and political decay 20 00:01:36,956 --> 00:01:40,996 Speaker 1: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy. Most 21 00:01:40,996 --> 00:01:47,076 Speaker 1: recently he published a fascinating book on identity and contemporary politics. Today, 22 00:01:47,076 --> 00:01:49,756 Speaker 1: we're going to delve deep into the question of what 23 00:01:49,836 --> 00:01:53,796 Speaker 1: decay is, whether the United States is entering a period 24 00:01:53,836 --> 00:01:56,916 Speaker 1: of decay that is going to effect its global standing, 25 00:01:57,196 --> 00:02:01,276 Speaker 1: its relationship with other countries in the world, and particularly China. 26 00:02:02,636 --> 00:02:09,076 Speaker 1: Sometimes controversial, always provocative, and frequently extraordinarily deep, Frank Fukuyama 27 00:02:09,356 --> 00:02:13,036 Speaker 1: is the perfect person with whom to discuss the trajectory 28 00:02:13,236 --> 00:02:17,756 Speaker 1: of democracy in the world and in the United States today. Frank, 29 00:02:17,956 --> 00:02:23,676 Speaker 1: thank you so much for being here. Frank, even before 30 00:02:23,756 --> 00:02:26,156 Speaker 1: Donald Trump was elected, in fact, a good deal before, 31 00:02:26,956 --> 00:02:30,716 Speaker 1: you published one of your big books called Political Order 32 00:02:30,716 --> 00:02:34,716 Speaker 1: and Political Decay, in which you introduced the idea of 33 00:02:35,116 --> 00:02:38,356 Speaker 1: a form of democratic decay and suggested that in a 34 00:02:38,476 --> 00:02:41,076 Speaker 1: range of ways, the United States was starting to enter 35 00:02:41,636 --> 00:02:44,356 Speaker 1: a period of such democratic decay, although not perhaps in 36 00:02:44,396 --> 00:02:48,156 Speaker 1: every way. I wonder if we could begin with the 37 00:02:48,276 --> 00:02:52,116 Speaker 1: concept of decay, and if we start with some definitions, 38 00:02:52,156 --> 00:02:55,516 Speaker 1: we might be able to jump start a deeper conversation 39 00:02:55,556 --> 00:02:58,676 Speaker 1: about what is and is not happening with respect to 40 00:02:58,956 --> 00:03:01,916 Speaker 1: decay in the United States and of democracy in other 41 00:03:01,956 --> 00:03:08,276 Speaker 1: democratic countries. Sure so, my teacher in graduate school. With 42 00:03:08,316 --> 00:03:12,796 Speaker 1: Sam Huntington and his famous nineteen sixty eight book Political 43 00:03:12,956 --> 00:03:16,836 Speaker 1: Order and Changing Societies, talked about the process of political 44 00:03:16,876 --> 00:03:22,676 Speaker 1: decay where society has developed faster than political institutions. People's 45 00:03:22,756 --> 00:03:27,756 Speaker 1: expectations rose, the political system didn't meet those expectations, and 46 00:03:27,836 --> 00:03:33,236 Speaker 1: that led to instability. My concept is based on that. 47 00:03:33,276 --> 00:03:35,996 Speaker 1: It's similar, but it goes off in a couple of 48 00:03:35,996 --> 00:03:39,956 Speaker 1: different directions. So I do think that the ability of 49 00:03:39,996 --> 00:03:44,956 Speaker 1: a political system to meet expectations is critical for stability. 50 00:03:44,996 --> 00:03:49,236 Speaker 1: But the reason that they don't meet expectations oftentimes has 51 00:03:49,276 --> 00:03:52,196 Speaker 1: to do with two factors. One of them is just 52 00:03:52,276 --> 00:03:56,716 Speaker 1: the excessive rigidity of the system. It's too hard to reform, 53 00:03:56,836 --> 00:04:00,436 Speaker 1: so that even though elites may recognize that the system 54 00:04:00,516 --> 00:04:03,876 Speaker 1: is not keeping up with the demands placed on it, 55 00:04:03,916 --> 00:04:07,436 Speaker 1: they can't do anything to fix it. But the other one, 56 00:04:07,916 --> 00:04:11,916 Speaker 1: which wasn't really similar Sam's framework, was this idea of 57 00:04:12,956 --> 00:04:17,596 Speaker 1: political capture by elites use their wealth and power to 58 00:04:17,796 --> 00:04:21,036 Speaker 1: basically grab hold of parts of the state and to 59 00:04:21,076 --> 00:04:25,156 Speaker 1: brend those parts to their own self interest. Both of 60 00:04:25,196 --> 00:04:28,236 Speaker 1: these things were things I saw happening in the United States. 61 00:04:28,956 --> 00:04:32,116 Speaker 1: We had obvious problems with our democracy that made it 62 00:04:32,236 --> 00:04:36,676 Speaker 1: less responsive to popular demands, but we couldn't change it 63 00:04:36,716 --> 00:04:39,836 Speaker 1: because we have a very rigid constitutional system that is 64 00:04:39,876 --> 00:04:44,196 Speaker 1: extremely hard to change. But we also had this process 65 00:04:44,276 --> 00:04:50,396 Speaker 1: by which very powerful organized interest groups were ensconcing themselves 66 00:04:50,396 --> 00:04:53,196 Speaker 1: in different parts of the state and burnding it to 67 00:04:53,276 --> 00:04:56,396 Speaker 1: their own wishes. And I think in many ways that 68 00:04:56,556 --> 00:04:59,316 Speaker 1: was one of the conditions that led to this upsurge 69 00:04:59,356 --> 00:05:04,676 Speaker 1: of populism represented by Donald Trump, that ordinary people felt 70 00:05:04,676 --> 00:05:07,196 Speaker 1: the system wasn't serving them. So those are the senses 71 00:05:07,196 --> 00:05:12,876 Speaker 1: in which I thought the system was. Hey, Frank, building 72 00:05:12,876 --> 00:05:15,836 Speaker 1: on what you just said about populist authoritarianism, which in 73 00:05:15,876 --> 00:05:17,996 Speaker 1: the US we had Donald Trump as our version, but 74 00:05:18,036 --> 00:05:20,996 Speaker 1: we got him out after one term. So in global terms, 75 00:05:21,036 --> 00:05:24,276 Speaker 1: that's actually a win in response to populist authoritarianism. If 76 00:05:24,276 --> 00:05:27,196 Speaker 1: you compare that to places like Hungry or Poland, where 77 00:05:27,236 --> 00:05:31,436 Speaker 1: populist authoritarians have so far been more durable, or certainly Russia. 78 00:05:31,636 --> 00:05:35,116 Speaker 1: Do you see populist authoritarianism then as just a symptom 79 00:05:35,836 --> 00:05:40,236 Speaker 1: of decay that's actually caused by capture by elites, that is, 80 00:05:40,996 --> 00:05:43,356 Speaker 1: the public. A lot of members of the public feel 81 00:05:43,356 --> 00:05:45,596 Speaker 1: like they can't get access and so they give you, 82 00:05:45,636 --> 00:05:50,476 Speaker 1: in turn trump or a victor orbon or. Is it also, 83 00:05:50,916 --> 00:05:52,516 Speaker 1: that is to say, not just a symptom of the 84 00:05:52,556 --> 00:05:55,276 Speaker 1: other causes of decay, but also a contributor to the decay, 85 00:05:55,796 --> 00:05:58,556 Speaker 1: because at least in ordinary terms of the word decay, 86 00:05:58,996 --> 00:06:01,676 Speaker 1: you know, you have someone who's an authoritarian, they will 87 00:06:01,796 --> 00:06:06,436 Speaker 1: undercut democratic institutions even further and make them seem illegitimate 88 00:06:06,436 --> 00:06:10,876 Speaker 1: and even less responsive to popular demand. Well, yeah, it's 89 00:06:10,916 --> 00:06:15,716 Speaker 1: all of those things. So, first of all, the particular 90 00:06:15,796 --> 00:06:19,516 Speaker 1: form that decay took after twenty sixteen, with the rise 91 00:06:19,636 --> 00:06:24,476 Speaker 1: of populist nationalists, was not simply the result of rigid 92 00:06:24,476 --> 00:06:27,996 Speaker 1: political systems. I mean, Japan has a very rigid political system, 93 00:06:28,076 --> 00:06:30,476 Speaker 1: but I don't think it's really suffering from the kind 94 00:06:30,516 --> 00:06:34,396 Speaker 1: of decay that we're experiencing. So there was something else 95 00:06:34,436 --> 00:06:38,916 Speaker 1: going on in society, which, when combined with the rigidities 96 00:06:38,916 --> 00:06:42,636 Speaker 1: of the system, I think produced this populist upsurge. You know, 97 00:06:42,716 --> 00:06:45,596 Speaker 1: those changes in society I think had to do with 98 00:06:45,716 --> 00:06:51,636 Speaker 1: economics and society. The society was splintering into at least 99 00:06:51,676 --> 00:06:56,196 Speaker 1: two very distinct cultural groups, one of which was very 100 00:06:56,236 --> 00:07:02,716 Speaker 1: well educated, open to a cosmopolitan, globalized world doing quite well, 101 00:07:02,756 --> 00:07:07,036 Speaker 1: and the other part tended to live in smaller towns 102 00:07:07,076 --> 00:07:11,076 Speaker 1: and cities or in the countryside, felt disconnected from all 103 00:07:11,116 --> 00:07:17,276 Speaker 1: of the big socioeconomic and technological changes that had been happening. 104 00:07:17,756 --> 00:07:23,676 Speaker 1: And that explains the particular resentments that emerged. That meant 105 00:07:23,716 --> 00:07:27,556 Speaker 1: that the populace backlash when it came, wasn't just about economics. 106 00:07:27,596 --> 00:07:31,996 Speaker 1: It was also about culture. It was about people feeling 107 00:07:32,116 --> 00:07:36,956 Speaker 1: that the elites in the country had stolen the national identity, 108 00:07:37,116 --> 00:07:41,236 Speaker 1: transformed it into something that they weren't comfortable with. That 109 00:07:41,356 --> 00:07:46,156 Speaker 1: involved the downplaying of patriotism, of religion, of a lot 110 00:07:46,156 --> 00:07:50,036 Speaker 1: of traditional social values. And so I think it required 111 00:07:50,836 --> 00:07:55,596 Speaker 1: those sorts of social transformations mixed together with the rigidities 112 00:07:55,636 --> 00:07:58,476 Speaker 1: of the system and the elite capture that led to 113 00:07:58,516 --> 00:08:02,516 Speaker 1: our current situation. As your question about which way the 114 00:08:02,556 --> 00:08:05,916 Speaker 1: causality moves, I think, you know, as in many phenomena, 115 00:08:05,956 --> 00:08:10,116 Speaker 1: it moves in both directions. So I think the external 116 00:08:10,196 --> 00:08:14,276 Speaker 1: changes in the economy and technology promoted this kind of 117 00:08:14,316 --> 00:08:18,556 Speaker 1: social fracturing. But once the society fractured, it fed back 118 00:08:18,596 --> 00:08:23,436 Speaker 1: into the decay because you know, people felt that they 119 00:08:23,436 --> 00:08:28,436 Speaker 1: were trapped in this unreformable system. I want to go 120 00:08:28,516 --> 00:08:33,756 Speaker 1: deeper into the polarization component of what you're describing. Before 121 00:08:33,796 --> 00:08:36,876 Speaker 1: we do, let me just ask a further follow up 122 00:08:36,956 --> 00:08:40,556 Speaker 1: question about this broader picture of decay. The causes of 123 00:08:40,596 --> 00:08:45,196 Speaker 1: decay that you're describing are pretty country specific. Rigidity in 124 00:08:45,236 --> 00:08:48,076 Speaker 1: a system could vary from country to country, Capture by 125 00:08:48,116 --> 00:08:51,516 Speaker 1: elites could vary from country to country. Even polarization might 126 00:08:51,516 --> 00:08:54,996 Speaker 1: be different depending on where you are. Yet, the decay 127 00:08:55,236 --> 00:09:00,076 Speaker 1: of democracies constitutional democracies broadly speaking, is a phenomenon we're 128 00:09:00,076 --> 00:09:04,236 Speaker 1: seeing in lots of different countries with pretty different circumstances 129 00:09:04,316 --> 00:09:09,476 Speaker 1: over the last decade or so. Why this convergence among 130 00:09:09,516 --> 00:09:11,916 Speaker 1: countries that are pretty different from each other if the 131 00:09:11,996 --> 00:09:18,436 Speaker 1: core causes of decay are basically specific to the country, Well, 132 00:09:18,476 --> 00:09:21,836 Speaker 1: first of all, just a kind of social scientific caution. 133 00:09:21,916 --> 00:09:25,876 Speaker 1: I don't think we should overgeneralize, because you know, what's 134 00:09:25,876 --> 00:09:28,436 Speaker 1: going on in Russia is very different from India, is 135 00:09:28,476 --> 00:09:31,316 Speaker 1: different from Hungary, is different from the United States, and 136 00:09:31,356 --> 00:09:35,516 Speaker 1: so there are very specific characteristics. But I would say 137 00:09:35,516 --> 00:09:40,676 Speaker 1: that what's common is that sociological cleavage that I just 138 00:09:40,796 --> 00:09:44,676 Speaker 1: described that almost everywhere you look, people that vote for 139 00:09:44,796 --> 00:09:48,956 Speaker 1: liberal politicians tend to live in big cities or urban 140 00:09:48,996 --> 00:09:53,036 Speaker 1: agglomerations that are well connected to the global economy. The 141 00:09:53,156 --> 00:09:57,156 Speaker 1: people that vote for populous politicians tend to live in 142 00:09:57,236 --> 00:10:01,676 Speaker 1: second and third tier cities, towns, villages, or in the countryside. 143 00:10:02,236 --> 00:10:06,436 Speaker 1: And that's very true almost universally. That's true in Hungary, 144 00:10:06,436 --> 00:10:09,356 Speaker 1: it's true in Turkey, it's true in Russia's true in 145 00:10:09,356 --> 00:10:12,276 Speaker 1: the United States, it's true in Britain. And so I 146 00:10:12,316 --> 00:10:16,876 Speaker 1: do think that there is a common sociology that connects 147 00:10:17,036 --> 00:10:21,076 Speaker 1: all of the new forms of populism with one another. 148 00:10:21,636 --> 00:10:25,436 Speaker 1: And probably the single biggest, you know cleavage there really 149 00:10:25,476 --> 00:10:30,716 Speaker 1: has to do with education, because education has pushed people. 150 00:10:31,236 --> 00:10:34,236 Speaker 1: First of all, it's affected very much their economic prospects, 151 00:10:34,276 --> 00:10:38,716 Speaker 1: but it's also pushed them in very cultural directions. And 152 00:10:38,756 --> 00:10:42,236 Speaker 1: so that's constant. But I think then you get into 153 00:10:42,436 --> 00:10:49,676 Speaker 1: country specific differences. So in India, the populism has taken 154 00:10:49,676 --> 00:10:52,236 Speaker 1: the form of religion rather than nationalism. I mean, the 155 00:10:52,356 --> 00:10:56,396 Speaker 1: two overlap, you know, considerably, but there's a very specific 156 00:10:56,596 --> 00:11:00,596 Speaker 1: desire to return India to its religious, you know, Hindu 157 00:11:00,836 --> 00:11:04,356 Speaker 1: religious roots. There are other countries that, you know, in 158 00:11:04,356 --> 00:11:07,396 Speaker 1: a way I've been able to mitigate the populism like Italy, 159 00:11:07,396 --> 00:11:10,636 Speaker 1: that you don't have this red blue cleavage that we 160 00:11:10,716 --> 00:11:14,676 Speaker 1: have in the United States, because you know, our winner 161 00:11:14,716 --> 00:11:18,756 Speaker 1: take all, first past the post electoral system really rewards 162 00:11:18,796 --> 00:11:22,596 Speaker 1: that kind of biarification into a two party system, whereas 163 00:11:22,636 --> 00:11:26,316 Speaker 1: Italy's system is always rewarded much greater splintering, and in 164 00:11:26,356 --> 00:11:29,396 Speaker 1: a way that's been a good thing because that's protected 165 00:11:29,436 --> 00:11:33,356 Speaker 1: them from a populous takeover. So I guess one further 166 00:11:33,436 --> 00:11:36,796 Speaker 1: thing to say is that we in the United States, 167 00:11:36,876 --> 00:11:41,956 Speaker 1: I think, have a particularly unhappy historical legacy, which is 168 00:11:41,996 --> 00:11:45,396 Speaker 1: a legacy of race. I do think that in the 169 00:11:45,476 --> 00:11:51,316 Speaker 1: United States that racial history is particularly important in explaining 170 00:11:51,636 --> 00:11:55,676 Speaker 1: a lot of the depth of the effective polarization, you know, 171 00:11:55,716 --> 00:11:59,636 Speaker 1: the emotional part of the polarization that we're experiencing, which 172 00:11:59,676 --> 00:12:04,756 Speaker 1: I think is much weaker in most European countries. That's 173 00:12:04,756 --> 00:12:07,316 Speaker 1: a fascinating point. I tend to agree with you that 174 00:12:07,716 --> 00:12:10,356 Speaker 1: there are very few powers in Europe to the kind 175 00:12:10,396 --> 00:12:13,876 Speaker 1: of systemic racism in the United States that emerged from 176 00:12:13,916 --> 00:12:17,956 Speaker 1: the history of slavery and then segregation in law, and 177 00:12:17,996 --> 00:12:22,436 Speaker 1: then subsequently segregation to some degree in practice. That said, 178 00:12:22,476 --> 00:12:23,956 Speaker 1: I do think if you look at a place like 179 00:12:24,036 --> 00:12:27,556 Speaker 1: France with a colonial legacy, at a large population of 180 00:12:27,636 --> 00:12:32,276 Speaker 1: people who are descendants of people who lived in colonies, 181 00:12:32,836 --> 00:12:38,876 Speaker 1: specifically in North Africa. There are certainly tendencies towards, let's say, 182 00:12:38,916 --> 00:12:43,116 Speaker 1: differential policing of different communities based on race, different economic 183 00:12:43,156 --> 00:12:46,476 Speaker 1: opportunities based on race. It's just that the French pretend 184 00:12:46,516 --> 00:12:49,556 Speaker 1: they can make that disappear by saying we don't see race. 185 00:12:50,836 --> 00:12:53,156 Speaker 1: So I hear the point. I think it's a very 186 00:12:53,196 --> 00:12:56,716 Speaker 1: interesting one. Let me ask about the identity issue that 187 00:12:56,716 --> 00:12:59,476 Speaker 1: you're pointing two now, and you address that in another 188 00:12:59,516 --> 00:13:02,316 Speaker 1: book on identity that was published a couple of years ago. 189 00:13:02,636 --> 00:13:05,276 Speaker 1: I want to begin by asking about the right left 190 00:13:05,436 --> 00:13:08,236 Speaker 1: politics around identity. You know, there was a long period 191 00:13:08,276 --> 00:13:11,236 Speaker 1: of time in which the left in the US was 192 00:13:11,276 --> 00:13:15,476 Speaker 1: gradually embracing the idea of identity politics, and the right 193 00:13:15,556 --> 00:13:19,636 Speaker 1: was pretty skeptical of it and was arguing against identity politics. 194 00:13:20,276 --> 00:13:23,076 Speaker 1: And yet, as you note in the book, one consequence 195 00:13:23,196 --> 00:13:25,676 Speaker 1: of the rise of Trump has been the emergence of 196 00:13:25,796 --> 00:13:30,116 Speaker 1: identity politics on the right. So how does it change 197 00:13:30,116 --> 00:13:33,236 Speaker 1: things that everyone, as it were, on the political spectrum 198 00:13:33,716 --> 00:13:39,516 Speaker 1: thinks that identity is crucial to human self expression. Well, 199 00:13:39,676 --> 00:13:45,236 Speaker 1: for for someone like me, who's basically an old fashioned liberal, 200 00:13:45,316 --> 00:13:49,716 Speaker 1: it makes liberal democracy extremely difficult. Let me just get 201 00:13:49,716 --> 00:13:53,036 Speaker 1: a couple of definitional things. Clear, identity is a very 202 00:13:53,076 --> 00:13:56,236 Speaker 1: broad concept, and it can be used for good purposes 203 00:13:56,276 --> 00:13:59,716 Speaker 1: and bad purposes. And you know, I argued in that 204 00:13:59,756 --> 00:14:03,076 Speaker 1: book Identity, that we actually need national identity. I mean, 205 00:14:03,076 --> 00:14:07,356 Speaker 1: we need a common set of historical references narratives that 206 00:14:07,436 --> 00:14:11,396 Speaker 1: bind us together as Americans. And each one of us 207 00:14:11,476 --> 00:14:16,156 Speaker 1: is carrying around multiple identities in our professional lives, in 208 00:14:16,276 --> 00:14:19,516 Speaker 1: our families, and our religion, you know, and so forth. 209 00:14:20,156 --> 00:14:23,836 Speaker 1: The kind of identity that's really toxic for a democracy 210 00:14:24,356 --> 00:14:29,236 Speaker 1: are those that are related to fixed characteristics. But even 211 00:14:29,276 --> 00:14:32,756 Speaker 1: that is not so terrible, because you know, if you're female, 212 00:14:32,916 --> 00:14:36,876 Speaker 1: if you're African American, if you're gay, you know, you 213 00:14:36,996 --> 00:14:41,276 Speaker 1: have specific experiences that bind you to other people in 214 00:14:41,276 --> 00:14:45,116 Speaker 1: that category that make you different from others. But I 215 00:14:45,156 --> 00:14:50,516 Speaker 1: think that where identity politics becomes dangerous for democracy is 216 00:14:50,556 --> 00:14:55,196 Speaker 1: when people begin to regard those kinds of fixed identities 217 00:14:55,236 --> 00:14:59,916 Speaker 1: as essential to the way that they define themselves, such 218 00:14:59,996 --> 00:15:04,916 Speaker 1: that they trump you know, other economic interests or opinions 219 00:15:05,156 --> 00:15:09,836 Speaker 1: or things of that sort. And I think that's the 220 00:15:09,876 --> 00:15:14,036 Speaker 1: situation that unfortunately the country has slid into, you know, 221 00:15:14,156 --> 00:15:18,676 Speaker 1: the in the Halcyon nineteen eighties, we would argue over 222 00:15:18,796 --> 00:15:21,956 Speaker 1: policy issues like should taxes be higher or lower, or 223 00:15:21,996 --> 00:15:26,236 Speaker 1: should we have more or less you know, social welfare spending, 224 00:15:26,796 --> 00:15:30,676 Speaker 1: and those, you know, are ultimately issues that can be compromised. 225 00:15:30,716 --> 00:15:34,956 Speaker 1: But when you get into some of the extremes of 226 00:15:34,996 --> 00:15:40,236 Speaker 1: the identity debate today, you have people saying, well, you know, 227 00:15:40,356 --> 00:15:43,476 Speaker 1: on the extreme right, this is essentially a white, you know, 228 00:15:43,596 --> 00:15:47,796 Speaker 1: European country, and you have people on the left saying, 229 00:15:48,396 --> 00:15:51,516 Speaker 1: you know, this is a racist country of white patriarchy 230 00:15:51,636 --> 00:15:55,716 Speaker 1: that's also never going to change. And those kinds of 231 00:15:55,756 --> 00:16:01,276 Speaker 1: positions are really not negotiable, you know, in any meaningful way. 232 00:16:01,596 --> 00:16:06,036 Speaker 1: And that also prevents people experiencing kind of a common 233 00:16:06,076 --> 00:16:09,396 Speaker 1: sense of identity, which then allows them to compromise, wise, 234 00:16:09,516 --> 00:16:14,836 Speaker 1: to deliberate, to argue about things, but ultimately to believe 235 00:16:14,876 --> 00:16:19,036 Speaker 1: that they're part of a common political system in which 236 00:16:19,276 --> 00:16:21,716 Speaker 1: they don't get everything they want. But you know, because 237 00:16:21,716 --> 00:16:27,116 Speaker 1: it's basically a liberal democratic one, they also are represented 238 00:16:27,196 --> 00:16:31,316 Speaker 1: and their voices are heard in a perverse way, though 239 00:16:31,356 --> 00:16:35,156 Speaker 1: there's some overlap between the views of people who intensely 240 00:16:35,316 --> 00:16:37,836 Speaker 1: disagree with each other. There, I mean to the extent 241 00:16:37,916 --> 00:16:40,116 Speaker 1: that a kind of Afro pessimist view would say that 242 00:16:40,316 --> 00:16:42,516 Speaker 1: racism is baked into the structure of the United States 243 00:16:42,516 --> 00:16:45,396 Speaker 1: and cannot change, and to the extent that some white 244 00:16:45,396 --> 00:16:48,356 Speaker 1: supremacists who embrace white supremacy, they would say the same. 245 00:16:48,676 --> 00:16:51,596 Speaker 1: And so presumably, and you don't say this in the book, 246 00:16:51,636 --> 00:16:54,836 Speaker 1: but presumably a middle ground position which would give us 247 00:16:54,876 --> 00:17:00,796 Speaker 1: common cause, would give some acknowledgement to historical practices of racism, 248 00:17:01,076 --> 00:17:04,956 Speaker 1: while simultaneously talking about the capacity for change that the 249 00:17:05,036 --> 00:17:08,756 Speaker 1: United States needs to have, even if it were true 250 00:17:08,796 --> 00:17:10,476 Speaker 1: that it never done so in a meaningful way in 251 00:17:10,516 --> 00:17:13,516 Speaker 1: the past, and I think that's debatable. It needs to 252 00:17:13,596 --> 00:17:17,236 Speaker 1: change in order to in order to go forward. Well, 253 00:17:17,276 --> 00:17:21,036 Speaker 1: that's exactly right. You know. One of the ironies of 254 00:17:21,116 --> 00:17:23,476 Speaker 1: the present moment is that the left and the right 255 00:17:23,516 --> 00:17:26,916 Speaker 1: have in a way joined hands. On the left, you know, 256 00:17:27,116 --> 00:17:31,436 Speaker 1: a certain type of essentialist identity politics in the end 257 00:17:31,476 --> 00:17:35,876 Speaker 1: becomes indistinguishable from that kind of right wing nationalism that 258 00:17:35,916 --> 00:17:38,996 Speaker 1: we're all blown into. These groups. We have these lived 259 00:17:39,036 --> 00:17:42,356 Speaker 1: experiences that are shared only among those groups, and that 260 00:17:42,396 --> 00:17:46,556 Speaker 1: there's really no common experience that can bind us together. 261 00:17:46,916 --> 00:17:50,876 Speaker 1: I actually think that this is a wrong but also 262 00:17:51,036 --> 00:17:55,876 Speaker 1: very destructive, and it should be perfectly possible to come 263 00:17:55,956 --> 00:17:59,636 Speaker 1: up with a narrative that actually bridges the left and 264 00:17:59,756 --> 00:18:02,876 Speaker 1: right in this country where you say, yes, there was 265 00:18:02,916 --> 00:18:08,476 Speaker 1: an original sin of slavery that was continued shamefully well 266 00:18:08,516 --> 00:18:11,076 Speaker 1: into the twenty a century. But on the other hand, 267 00:18:11,156 --> 00:18:15,836 Speaker 1: the situation of African America as women, gays, and lesbians, 268 00:18:15,876 --> 00:18:18,836 Speaker 1: you know, all of these marginalized groups is better than 269 00:18:18,876 --> 00:18:21,036 Speaker 1: it was, and in many ways, I think we are 270 00:18:21,076 --> 00:18:25,796 Speaker 1: living in the kind of most equal and open society 271 00:18:25,916 --> 00:18:29,196 Speaker 1: that America has ever had. It's just that we have 272 00:18:29,356 --> 00:18:33,116 Speaker 1: problems at the extremes, and many people don't don't believe 273 00:18:33,196 --> 00:18:37,356 Speaker 1: that particular centrist narrative. But it is also true that 274 00:18:37,436 --> 00:18:42,916 Speaker 1: in January sixth, twenty twenty one mob of people actually 275 00:18:43,076 --> 00:18:46,436 Speaker 1: invaded the Capitol in what was, to my mind an 276 00:18:46,476 --> 00:18:51,316 Speaker 1: extraordinary symbol of democratic decay. The people who were doing 277 00:18:51,356 --> 00:18:55,676 Speaker 1: that were devoted to the idea that democracy hadn't functioned 278 00:18:55,676 --> 00:18:56,996 Speaker 1: the way it ought to have, and that they could 279 00:18:57,036 --> 00:18:58,796 Speaker 1: do something about it, and they could do something about 280 00:18:58,836 --> 00:19:01,596 Speaker 1: it by force, and they had encouragement that we can 281 00:19:01,716 --> 00:19:03,916 Speaker 1: argue about where there was incitement, but they had encouragement 282 00:19:03,996 --> 00:19:06,676 Speaker 1: from the person who had been president of the United States. 283 00:19:07,436 --> 00:19:09,916 Speaker 1: I want to use all of what you've been saying, 284 00:19:09,916 --> 00:19:14,156 Speaker 1: and it's extremely helpful and clarifying to shift to the 285 00:19:14,316 --> 00:19:18,276 Speaker 1: question of what this means for the power of democracies 286 00:19:18,316 --> 00:19:22,996 Speaker 1: in the world, especially the US, relative to the emerging 287 00:19:23,556 --> 00:19:29,196 Speaker 1: alternate models, and particularly the model of China. And to 288 00:19:29,276 --> 00:19:32,316 Speaker 1: frame that question, I just want to begin by saying, 289 00:19:32,636 --> 00:19:36,716 Speaker 1: it does seem really clear, at a distance of nearly 290 00:19:36,756 --> 00:19:39,836 Speaker 1: thirty years since the end of the Cold War, that 291 00:19:39,916 --> 00:19:43,556 Speaker 1: while liberal democracy did not definitively win a victory overall 292 00:19:43,596 --> 00:19:49,076 Speaker 1: alternative systems, some form of market capitalism did. So, you know, 293 00:19:49,236 --> 00:19:53,276 Speaker 1: the Chinese model is one that it's a state directed capitalism, 294 00:19:53,276 --> 00:19:57,636 Speaker 1: but it's clearly market driven, and it's clearly capitalist. And 295 00:19:57,756 --> 00:20:01,036 Speaker 1: at the same time as we're seeing decay and democracy, 296 00:20:01,476 --> 00:20:06,556 Speaker 1: we're seeing innovation and variation on the Chinese side. I 297 00:20:06,596 --> 00:20:09,316 Speaker 1: don't think that means that China's government has solved all 298 00:20:09,316 --> 00:20:11,076 Speaker 1: of the problems that a government that wants to be 299 00:20:11,156 --> 00:20:13,756 Speaker 1: legitimate has to be solved by a long shot. But 300 00:20:13,796 --> 00:20:15,476 Speaker 1: they are offering a model that has brought a lot 301 00:20:15,516 --> 00:20:19,916 Speaker 1: of people out of poverty, that seems stable, that seems functional, 302 00:20:20,156 --> 00:20:23,876 Speaker 1: and that seems to be legitimate to a very large 303 00:20:23,956 --> 00:20:28,916 Speaker 1: number of its citizens. So I wonder whether you think 304 00:20:28,996 --> 00:20:33,276 Speaker 1: that the US's decay is really going to contribute to 305 00:20:33,316 --> 00:20:37,636 Speaker 1: the process of its decline in global power and influence 306 00:20:38,396 --> 00:20:42,916 Speaker 1: relative to China, because it's coming at just a moment 307 00:20:43,196 --> 00:20:48,996 Speaker 1: when the Chinese system seems to be doing fairly well. Well, yes, 308 00:20:49,196 --> 00:20:51,996 Speaker 1: I think that that's already happened. I think that our 309 00:20:52,036 --> 00:20:56,036 Speaker 1: ability to respond to China has been very much weakened 310 00:20:56,076 --> 00:21:00,676 Speaker 1: by our internal divisions, not to speak of Russia, where 311 00:21:01,436 --> 00:21:06,156 Speaker 1: many Republicans have openly said that they dislike the Democrats 312 00:21:06,236 --> 00:21:09,356 Speaker 1: more than they dislike you know, Vladimir Putin's Russia. So 313 00:21:09,436 --> 00:21:11,876 Speaker 1: if there is ever a case of, you know, a 314 00:21:11,916 --> 00:21:15,876 Speaker 1: great power being weakened by internal dissension, this is it. 315 00:21:16,556 --> 00:21:19,316 Speaker 1: You know, I would say that we need to be 316 00:21:19,356 --> 00:21:25,876 Speaker 1: a little bit cautious about projecting China's current status forward 317 00:21:25,996 --> 00:21:30,196 Speaker 1: in history. It's true that they have done extraordinarily well 318 00:21:30,196 --> 00:21:34,396 Speaker 1: over the last forty years in bringing their country up 319 00:21:34,396 --> 00:21:38,596 Speaker 1: out of poverty, but you know, there are big problems 320 00:21:38,596 --> 00:21:41,956 Speaker 1: in that system that have to do with what they 321 00:21:41,996 --> 00:21:45,476 Speaker 1: themselves call the bad emperor problem. That is to say, 322 00:21:45,596 --> 00:21:50,516 Speaker 1: any system with checks and balances on executive power, like 323 00:21:50,716 --> 00:21:54,396 Speaker 1: our system is going to do worse than an authoritarian 324 00:21:54,476 --> 00:21:58,796 Speaker 1: system in many circumstances, because an authoritarian system can turn 325 00:21:58,836 --> 00:22:02,276 Speaker 1: on a diamond. If you've got a competent, wise leader 326 00:22:02,836 --> 00:22:05,396 Speaker 1: at the top of the hierarchy, they can make a 327 00:22:05,516 --> 00:22:08,436 Speaker 1: very very rapid shift. But you know what's happened in 328 00:22:08,516 --> 00:22:12,076 Speaker 1: Chinese tree is you get a bad leader without saying, 329 00:22:12,156 --> 00:22:15,916 Speaker 1: kind of unchecked power, and that becomes very dangerous and 330 00:22:15,956 --> 00:22:20,636 Speaker 1: it was hugely destructive during a cultural revolution when Mao 331 00:22:20,796 --> 00:22:24,316 Speaker 1: is really the last bad emperor that they had. Whether 332 00:22:24,356 --> 00:22:28,836 Speaker 1: Shijimping goes down that path, I don't know, but he 333 00:22:28,956 --> 00:22:32,436 Speaker 1: looks like he wants to. But you know, at this 334 00:22:32,516 --> 00:22:36,076 Speaker 1: point you have to admit that they're doing relatively a 335 00:22:36,076 --> 00:22:38,716 Speaker 1: lot better than we are, because they do seem to 336 00:22:38,716 --> 00:22:50,396 Speaker 1: be quite purposeful and we do not. We'll be right back, Frank, 337 00:22:50,756 --> 00:22:52,836 Speaker 1: may I push back just ever so gently on the 338 00:22:53,236 --> 00:22:57,596 Speaker 1: bad emperor problem formulation. I mean from roughly nineteen ninety 339 00:22:57,636 --> 00:23:01,436 Speaker 1: two when Dung Shoping stepped down till say twenty and 340 00:23:01,516 --> 00:23:05,076 Speaker 1: twelve when it became clear that Shijinping was when he 341 00:23:05,076 --> 00:23:07,316 Speaker 1: took over, going to do things differently. So for a 342 00:23:07,316 --> 00:23:11,036 Speaker 1: twenty year period in between, the Chinese had a couple 343 00:23:11,036 --> 00:23:14,716 Speaker 1: of rounds where there was no real emperor, where power 344 00:23:14,876 --> 00:23:20,796 Speaker 1: was shared collectively among a group of pretty senior Communist 345 00:23:20,876 --> 00:23:25,396 Speaker 1: party leaders, and they actually agreed amongst themselves to do 346 00:23:25,436 --> 00:23:29,516 Speaker 1: ten year terms and then rotate and step down, and 347 00:23:29,556 --> 00:23:33,036 Speaker 1: they actually did it. Now, I myself was I think 348 00:23:33,436 --> 00:23:37,196 Speaker 1: inappropriately optimistic that that would be institutionalized, that that would 349 00:23:37,196 --> 00:23:40,396 Speaker 1: continue over time. And it also had a big flaw, 350 00:23:40,436 --> 00:23:42,276 Speaker 1: which was once you were only going to serve ten years, 351 00:23:42,276 --> 00:23:44,036 Speaker 1: you had a lot of incentive to be as corrupt 352 00:23:44,036 --> 00:23:46,676 Speaker 1: as possible, so you would still have money and influence 353 00:23:46,676 --> 00:23:48,436 Speaker 1: for your family once your ten years was up. So 354 00:23:48,476 --> 00:23:51,436 Speaker 1: they hadn't solved the transitions problem, but they had made 355 00:23:51,476 --> 00:23:55,076 Speaker 1: progress towards solving it, and in that period they seemed 356 00:23:55,116 --> 00:23:57,236 Speaker 1: to have to some degree come to terms with the 357 00:23:57,236 --> 00:24:01,556 Speaker 1: bad emperor problem by a kind of balanced collective government. 358 00:24:02,156 --> 00:24:05,636 Speaker 1: Then came Shi Jinping, who on the one hand, has 359 00:24:05,676 --> 00:24:09,636 Speaker 1: made real strides against the corruption problem thereby legitimating the 360 00:24:09,636 --> 00:24:12,956 Speaker 1: power of a communist party, but Obviously, when you're that 361 00:24:13,076 --> 00:24:15,596 Speaker 1: much of a dictator, you do run into the bad 362 00:24:15,636 --> 00:24:18,436 Speaker 1: emperor problem, right, what if someone in his position didn't 363 00:24:18,516 --> 00:24:21,436 Speaker 1: didn't do well. It seems at least possible to me 364 00:24:21,636 --> 00:24:25,036 Speaker 1: that they could rotate between these models that, you know, 365 00:24:25,076 --> 00:24:30,156 Speaker 1: following Shijinping, they might go back to something more collective again. 366 00:24:31,036 --> 00:24:33,956 Speaker 1: And while that doesn't have the clear predictability of the 367 00:24:34,076 --> 00:24:36,756 Speaker 1: rule of a monarchy where you know that the eldest 368 00:24:36,796 --> 00:24:39,476 Speaker 1: will inherit or a democracy where at least in principle 369 00:24:39,476 --> 00:24:41,476 Speaker 1: you're supposed to have an election and the person with 370 00:24:41,476 --> 00:24:44,476 Speaker 1: the most votes is supposed to win, it might actually 371 00:24:44,516 --> 00:24:49,076 Speaker 1: be a way of maintaining a degree of stability for them. Well, 372 00:24:49,116 --> 00:24:54,076 Speaker 1: that's looks that's all possible. I think that, however, the 373 00:24:54,116 --> 00:24:57,836 Speaker 1: temptation to hold on to power, whether it's Hijinping or 374 00:24:58,036 --> 00:25:01,396 Speaker 1: a successor, is going to be very, very great. The 375 00:25:01,436 --> 00:25:06,676 Speaker 1: only reason that party secretaries gave up power after nineteen 376 00:25:06,756 --> 00:25:10,596 Speaker 1: seventy nine was that they were all so traumatized by 377 00:25:10,636 --> 00:25:13,436 Speaker 1: what had happened during the Cultural Revolution that they said, 378 00:25:13,476 --> 00:25:16,316 Speaker 1: never again are we going to allow one guide to 379 00:25:17,036 --> 00:25:19,596 Speaker 1: be able to hold that kind of power over us. 380 00:25:20,196 --> 00:25:22,396 Speaker 1: They had to be really scared, you know, by that. 381 00:25:23,116 --> 00:25:26,836 Speaker 1: But I do think that it's not clear that you 382 00:25:26,876 --> 00:25:31,716 Speaker 1: can just alternate between these different unconstrained power periods and 383 00:25:31,756 --> 00:25:35,836 Speaker 1: then constrained power periods, and that that could happen according 384 00:25:35,836 --> 00:25:39,596 Speaker 1: to some nice, you know, peaceful institutional schedule. I do 385 00:25:39,716 --> 00:25:43,436 Speaker 1: think that, you know, what drives the distribution of power 386 00:25:43,636 --> 00:25:46,356 Speaker 1: is the experience of the abuse of power. And if 387 00:25:46,396 --> 00:25:49,076 Speaker 1: you don't have that abuse, you know, firmly in your mind, 388 00:25:49,276 --> 00:25:52,596 Speaker 1: you're probably not going to be willing to distribute power 389 00:25:52,676 --> 00:25:54,476 Speaker 1: in the manner that they did, you know, in the 390 00:25:54,556 --> 00:25:58,756 Speaker 1: nineteen nineties. But I you know, the two big questions 391 00:25:58,796 --> 00:26:04,676 Speaker 1: are whether the United States can regain its mojo, you know, 392 00:26:05,076 --> 00:26:08,916 Speaker 1: whether it can overcome the current I think really crippling 393 00:26:09,276 --> 00:26:14,756 Speaker 1: of partizanship and polarization, restore something of a kind of 394 00:26:14,836 --> 00:26:17,916 Speaker 1: national identity and national vision that would allow it to 395 00:26:17,916 --> 00:26:22,156 Speaker 1: be effective in projecting a model out into the world. 396 00:26:22,636 --> 00:26:24,956 Speaker 1: And conversely, you know, what's going to happen to the 397 00:26:25,036 --> 00:26:28,716 Speaker 1: Chinese model, because I think if we continue to bump 398 00:26:28,756 --> 00:26:31,556 Speaker 1: along the way we have, being as divided as we 399 00:26:31,596 --> 00:26:34,316 Speaker 1: are for the next twenty years, and the Chinese keep growing, 400 00:26:34,356 --> 00:26:36,716 Speaker 1: then yeah, it's going to be a world that's really 401 00:26:36,756 --> 00:26:40,436 Speaker 1: dominated by China, or would be China's that want to 402 00:26:40,436 --> 00:26:44,436 Speaker 1: share in some of that authoritarian glory. Are you saying, though, 403 00:26:44,476 --> 00:26:47,436 Speaker 1: in that sense, that some decline on the part of 404 00:26:47,596 --> 00:26:51,516 Speaker 1: us is probably inevitable and it maybe that's not such 405 00:26:51,516 --> 00:26:55,156 Speaker 1: a terrible thing, or do you see that as actually 406 00:26:55,196 --> 00:26:58,396 Speaker 1: pretty devastating thing, especially if the decline comes relative to 407 00:26:59,356 --> 00:27:01,796 Speaker 1: undemocratic governments. I mean, I suppose I'm asking you to 408 00:27:01,796 --> 00:27:04,396 Speaker 1: balance two different hats that you wear. One is the 409 00:27:04,396 --> 00:27:08,116 Speaker 1: theorist who explains political development at a broad level. The 410 00:27:08,196 --> 00:27:10,836 Speaker 1: other is as some who's committed, as I take it 411 00:27:10,876 --> 00:27:14,716 Speaker 1: to the values of liberal democracy as actually the right values, 412 00:27:14,716 --> 00:27:19,316 Speaker 1: the best values to have. You know, I preferred living 413 00:27:19,436 --> 00:27:22,356 Speaker 1: in a world where the United States set the standard 414 00:27:22,436 --> 00:27:27,956 Speaker 1: for global political institutions, and I don't look forward to 415 00:27:28,156 --> 00:27:33,036 Speaker 1: going into a world dominated by a competent but overbearing 416 00:27:33,556 --> 00:27:38,676 Speaker 1: and tyrannical China. But I do think that a world 417 00:27:38,836 --> 00:27:42,836 Speaker 1: that was more genuinely multipolar, in which there were different 418 00:27:42,836 --> 00:27:47,196 Speaker 1: approaches to doing things, and in which the United States 419 00:27:47,236 --> 00:27:51,236 Speaker 1: didn't have that same degree of arrogance about itself and 420 00:27:51,316 --> 00:27:55,356 Speaker 1: its own institutions, would probably be a better world. And 421 00:27:55,436 --> 00:27:59,156 Speaker 1: it would probably lead to a kind of American foreign policy. 422 00:27:59,836 --> 00:28:02,956 Speaker 1: So it's very equivocal answer to your question. So on 423 00:28:02,996 --> 00:28:06,196 Speaker 1: the one hand, yeah, I don't look forward to a 424 00:28:06,316 --> 00:28:09,796 Speaker 1: Chinese dominated world. But on the other hand, when we 425 00:28:09,836 --> 00:28:12,276 Speaker 1: had the power, we didn't use it all that wisely. 426 00:28:12,916 --> 00:28:14,796 Speaker 1: And I think that, you know, a little bit more 427 00:28:14,836 --> 00:28:20,516 Speaker 1: modesty is probably befitting in a way that's almost in 428 00:28:20,636 --> 00:28:23,716 Speaker 1: the deep sense of the word an ironic stance, you know, 429 00:28:23,756 --> 00:28:25,516 Speaker 1: not irony in the cheap sense of the term, but 430 00:28:25,556 --> 00:28:28,436 Speaker 1: in the deep sense of the term, that you're taking 431 00:28:28,476 --> 00:28:32,556 Speaker 1: on board that alongside your commitment to the values that 432 00:28:32,796 --> 00:28:34,836 Speaker 1: you believe in that I believe into the values of 433 00:28:34,956 --> 00:28:38,596 Speaker 1: constitutional liberal democracy, we have to admit that in global 434 00:28:38,636 --> 00:28:43,316 Speaker 1: affairs we made a lot of serious errors, and they 435 00:28:43,356 --> 00:28:45,996 Speaker 1: weren't just random errors. They were errors associated with our 436 00:28:46,156 --> 00:28:49,996 Speaker 1: faith in the constitutional liberal democracy that we're still committed to. 437 00:28:50,476 --> 00:28:52,996 Speaker 1: I think there's something kind of profound about that position 438 00:28:52,996 --> 00:28:55,916 Speaker 1: that you're taking. Well, you know, during the debate on 439 00:28:56,036 --> 00:28:59,556 Speaker 1: the Iraq War, I remember this very well. The Bush 440 00:28:59,556 --> 00:29:04,076 Speaker 1: administration was basically saying, just trust us, we're the dominant 441 00:29:04,076 --> 00:29:07,076 Speaker 1: power and we're going to do the right thing. And 442 00:29:07,396 --> 00:29:11,156 Speaker 1: I just remember arguing with someone my conservative pro Iraq 443 00:29:11,236 --> 00:29:15,236 Speaker 1: war friends. You know, when I said, we don't believe 444 00:29:15,276 --> 00:29:20,036 Speaker 1: that in our domestic politics, in American politics, we've never said, oh, 445 00:29:20,156 --> 00:29:23,636 Speaker 1: George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, they're good guys. Just trust them 446 00:29:23,676 --> 00:29:25,356 Speaker 1: to do the right thing. We don't need all this 447 00:29:25,956 --> 00:29:29,956 Speaker 1: structure of constitutional checks and balances because they'll make the 448 00:29:30,036 --> 00:29:32,276 Speaker 1: right decisions. You know. In the end, we just don't 449 00:29:32,276 --> 00:29:35,916 Speaker 1: believe that. We believe that power is dangerous no matter 450 00:29:35,956 --> 00:29:38,076 Speaker 1: who wields it, and just because you like the person 451 00:29:38,156 --> 00:29:41,356 Speaker 1: that happens to be wielding power doesn't mean that that's 452 00:29:41,396 --> 00:29:44,036 Speaker 1: a good long term solution. And that's why we build 453 00:29:44,036 --> 00:29:49,116 Speaker 1: institutions to constrain power, because when the powerholder changes, maybe 454 00:29:49,116 --> 00:29:51,396 Speaker 1: the next guy isn't going to be so great. And 455 00:29:51,476 --> 00:29:54,756 Speaker 1: it seemed to me that at that time we should 456 00:29:54,836 --> 00:29:58,876 Speaker 1: have been applying some of our principles of constitutional government 457 00:29:59,516 --> 00:30:02,676 Speaker 1: to international affairs and not just said, yeah, well we're 458 00:30:02,716 --> 00:30:05,556 Speaker 1: the United States. We're good guys, so just trust us 459 00:30:05,596 --> 00:30:09,836 Speaker 1: to do the right thing. That's a potentially in conclusion. 460 00:30:09,916 --> 00:30:12,436 Speaker 1: Then the conclusion there would be that we should have 461 00:30:12,476 --> 00:30:16,996 Speaker 1: done a better job of understanding our own constitutional values 462 00:30:16,996 --> 00:30:20,116 Speaker 1: and practices and if we had done, we wouldn't have 463 00:30:20,116 --> 00:30:24,316 Speaker 1: been so naive about the possibility of exporting them and 464 00:30:24,396 --> 00:30:28,196 Speaker 1: exporting them in a very superficial way. I mean, that's 465 00:30:28,276 --> 00:30:31,476 Speaker 1: that view says more like we should be doubling down, 466 00:30:31,676 --> 00:30:34,716 Speaker 1: but in the correct way on our own values and 467 00:30:35,276 --> 00:30:37,876 Speaker 1: our commitment to it, and that would have led us 468 00:30:37,876 --> 00:30:40,356 Speaker 1: to recognize that invading a country and deciding we're going 469 00:30:40,396 --> 00:30:43,276 Speaker 1: to put in place of conscertutional democracy is rather absurd 470 00:30:43,436 --> 00:30:46,836 Speaker 1: aspiration to hold. Well, you know, if you really want 471 00:30:46,876 --> 00:30:48,716 Speaker 1: to go down the road of this kind of debate, 472 00:30:48,796 --> 00:30:52,796 Speaker 1: it's a complicated one. It goes back to Machia Valerie 473 00:30:52,916 --> 00:30:55,716 Speaker 1: and Carl Schmidt and a lot of other people who 474 00:30:57,036 --> 00:31:03,476 Speaker 1: have made an argument over the years that actually constitutional 475 00:31:03,716 --> 00:31:10,956 Speaker 1: law based government is sometimes problematic because sometimes executive power 476 00:31:11,756 --> 00:31:14,436 Speaker 1: is actually necessary and sometimes you actually do have to 477 00:31:14,476 --> 00:31:17,156 Speaker 1: just trust the executive to do the right thing because 478 00:31:17,756 --> 00:31:21,516 Speaker 1: you know, the constitutional rules don't allow you to act appropriately. 479 00:31:21,796 --> 00:31:24,756 Speaker 1: And you know, that's an argument that I think is 480 00:31:24,796 --> 00:31:28,516 Speaker 1: probably not taken seriously enough by many Americans that are 481 00:31:28,556 --> 00:31:32,676 Speaker 1: so imbued with this idea that we have to constrain power, 482 00:31:32,796 --> 00:31:37,076 Speaker 1: that they don't see cases where the use of powers 483 00:31:37,196 --> 00:31:40,916 Speaker 1: is also necessary. You know, it leads to a political 484 00:31:40,956 --> 00:31:44,596 Speaker 1: system that is I think actually fairly risk averse. You 485 00:31:44,636 --> 00:31:46,876 Speaker 1: can see it right now with Joe Bowden right that 486 00:31:47,396 --> 00:31:50,116 Speaker 1: we're all glad we had all these checks and balances 487 00:31:50,156 --> 00:31:53,756 Speaker 1: on the presidency that kept Donald Trump from building his 488 00:31:53,916 --> 00:31:56,516 Speaker 1: border wall and doing all these terrible things that he 489 00:31:57,276 --> 00:32:00,996 Speaker 1: wanted to do. But those same checks and balances now 490 00:32:01,036 --> 00:32:04,796 Speaker 1: prevent Joe Bowden from building the kind of welfare state 491 00:32:04,836 --> 00:32:08,356 Speaker 1: and social protections that he wants to create. And so 492 00:32:08,396 --> 00:32:11,916 Speaker 1: we've you know, we've settled for a relatively risk averse 493 00:32:11,996 --> 00:32:15,716 Speaker 1: political system that puts a floor under bad stuff, but 494 00:32:15,756 --> 00:32:18,036 Speaker 1: it also kind of puts a ceiling on top of 495 00:32:18,076 --> 00:32:20,996 Speaker 1: good stuff. Whether it would be better to shift the 496 00:32:21,036 --> 00:32:24,836 Speaker 1: floor and ceiling maybe worries both of them a little bit. 497 00:32:24,956 --> 00:32:28,796 Speaker 1: That's an interesting question. Well, I look forward to discussing 498 00:32:28,836 --> 00:32:30,596 Speaker 1: that with you in the future. I just want to 499 00:32:30,636 --> 00:32:34,076 Speaker 1: thank you so much, Frank for your characteristically thoughtful and 500 00:32:34,276 --> 00:32:39,396 Speaker 1: balanced insight, and for your extraordinary and still growing a 501 00:32:39,476 --> 00:32:43,036 Speaker 1: body of work exploring the nature of political development and 502 00:32:43,076 --> 00:32:45,356 Speaker 1: the nature of political order, which is so good to 503 00:32:45,356 --> 00:32:49,116 Speaker 1: think with. Thank you. Sure, it's been fun talking with you. Noah, 504 00:32:49,196 --> 00:32:58,276 Speaker 1: Thanks very much for having me on the podcast. Listening 505 00:32:58,316 --> 00:33:02,076 Speaker 1: to Francis Fukuyama talk about his extraordinary body of work 506 00:33:02,556 --> 00:33:06,876 Speaker 1: accrued over years and years made me realize that the 507 00:33:06,996 --> 00:33:11,436 Speaker 1: problems that American democracy faces today are not entirely new. 508 00:33:12,236 --> 00:33:14,956 Speaker 1: They go back before the election of Donald Trump, and 509 00:33:15,036 --> 00:33:18,196 Speaker 1: even into the period when Barack Obama was president, when 510 00:33:18,276 --> 00:33:21,596 Speaker 1: many liberals like me were a bit too self congratulatory 511 00:33:21,796 --> 00:33:24,836 Speaker 1: about the trajectory of democracy in the United States. They 512 00:33:24,836 --> 00:33:28,516 Speaker 1: can be seen clearly in the administration of George W. Bush, 513 00:33:28,556 --> 00:33:31,756 Speaker 1: when the United States invaded Iraq and tried to create 514 00:33:31,796 --> 00:33:36,276 Speaker 1: democracy there and in Afghanistan to little avail, and indeed, 515 00:33:36,316 --> 00:33:39,476 Speaker 1: they can even be traced back further to the presidencies 516 00:33:39,516 --> 00:33:42,716 Speaker 1: of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, in which 517 00:33:42,956 --> 00:33:47,436 Speaker 1: many political elites suffered from an over enthusiasm about the 518 00:33:47,516 --> 00:33:50,396 Speaker 1: prospect of democracy and how it seemed to have won 519 00:33:50,436 --> 00:33:54,076 Speaker 1: the Cold War, when in fact it was market capitalism 520 00:33:54,116 --> 00:33:57,316 Speaker 1: that had won the battle, and democracy was rising and spreading, 521 00:33:57,556 --> 00:34:01,476 Speaker 1: at least in part as a piggyback on the successes 522 00:34:01,836 --> 00:34:06,796 Speaker 1: of capitalism. In Frank's view, the sources of decay include 523 00:34:06,836 --> 00:34:11,316 Speaker 1: excessive rigidity in our democratic system as well as capture 524 00:34:11,396 --> 00:34:14,756 Speaker 1: by political elites, which in turn has led to a 525 00:34:14,876 --> 00:34:18,956 Speaker 1: rise of populist authoritarianism. He sees these problems not only 526 00:34:18,956 --> 00:34:21,436 Speaker 1: in the United States, but in a range of places 527 00:34:21,476 --> 00:34:25,156 Speaker 1: in the democratic world, and he recognizes that they are 528 00:34:25,236 --> 00:34:28,996 Speaker 1: leading to a genuine decline in the nature of democracy. 529 00:34:29,996 --> 00:34:34,276 Speaker 1: From this, Frank notices arise in identity politics not merely 530 00:34:34,316 --> 00:34:37,196 Speaker 1: on the left, but equally on the right, that in 531 00:34:37,236 --> 00:34:40,876 Speaker 1: turn makes it extremely difficult, in his view, for our 532 00:34:40,916 --> 00:34:44,476 Speaker 1: democracy to achieve the kinds of political consensus that are 533 00:34:44,556 --> 00:34:50,556 Speaker 1: necessary to make change. Although Frank is rightfully cautious about 534 00:34:50,596 --> 00:34:53,756 Speaker 1: assuming that the Chinese system of government has solved the 535 00:34:53,836 --> 00:34:57,996 Speaker 1: problems that democracy is good at solving, he nevertheless acknowledges 536 00:34:58,236 --> 00:35:00,956 Speaker 1: that the Chinese model has become a powerful one, and 537 00:35:00,996 --> 00:35:04,836 Speaker 1: a significant one, and centrally the model with which democracy 538 00:35:04,996 --> 00:35:08,476 Speaker 1: now has to grapple. The upshot, for Frank, is a 539 00:35:08,636 --> 00:35:13,076 Speaker 1: reality of decay and decline, which he says, we don't 540 00:35:13,076 --> 00:35:15,836 Speaker 1: necessarily need to treat as the end of the world. 541 00:35:16,476 --> 00:35:18,556 Speaker 1: On the one hand, we should continue to believe in 542 00:35:18,596 --> 00:35:21,356 Speaker 1: constitutional liberal democracy and try to make it better and 543 00:35:21,476 --> 00:35:23,596 Speaker 1: to update it and make it work in the world 544 00:35:23,596 --> 00:35:26,076 Speaker 1: that we have. On the other hand, we should admit 545 00:35:26,316 --> 00:35:28,756 Speaker 1: that part of the reason we've gotten here is because 546 00:35:28,796 --> 00:35:34,876 Speaker 1: of internal difficulties and conflicts within liberal democracy that need 547 00:35:34,956 --> 00:35:39,436 Speaker 1: to be updated and that have resulted in serious mistakes 548 00:35:39,516 --> 00:35:42,596 Speaker 1: that the United States has made in the world. In 549 00:35:42,636 --> 00:35:46,116 Speaker 1: that sense, and only in that sense, he offers modesty 550 00:35:46,476 --> 00:35:49,876 Speaker 1: as a model for thinking about what democracy is capable 551 00:35:49,916 --> 00:35:55,916 Speaker 1: of accomplishing. The problems we discussed this week are enormous, structural, 552 00:35:56,236 --> 00:36:00,236 Speaker 1: and complicated. My primary takeaway is that there are no 553 00:36:00,396 --> 00:36:04,556 Speaker 1: clear or correct answers when discussing such important issues. What 554 00:36:04,756 --> 00:36:08,996 Speaker 1: is needed is thoughtfulness, comparison, a little bit of irony, 555 00:36:09,436 --> 00:36:13,116 Speaker 1: and a lot of realism about the world in which 556 00:36:13,156 --> 00:36:16,676 Speaker 1: we live. Until the next time I speak to you, Bewell, 557 00:36:17,076 --> 00:36:22,316 Speaker 1: think deep thoughts and have a little fun. Deep Background 558 00:36:22,396 --> 00:36:25,196 Speaker 1: is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer is 559 00:36:25,236 --> 00:36:28,996 Speaker 1: Mola Board, our engineer is ben Toalliday, and our showrunner 560 00:36:29,076 --> 00:36:33,916 Speaker 1: is Sophie Crane mckibbon. Editorial support from noahm Osband. Theme 561 00:36:33,996 --> 00:36:37,116 Speaker 1: music by Luis Gara at Pushkin. Thanks to Mia Lobell, 562 00:36:37,316 --> 00:36:42,116 Speaker 1: Julia Barton, Lydia Jeancott, Heather Faine, Carlie Migliori, Maggie Taylor, 563 00:36:42,236 --> 00:36:45,796 Speaker 1: Eric Sandler, and Jacob Weisberg. You can find me on 564 00:36:45,836 --> 00:36:48,596 Speaker 1: Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. I also write a column 565 00:36:48,636 --> 00:36:51,316 Speaker 1: for Bloomberg Opinion, which you can find at bloomberg dot 566 00:36:51,356 --> 00:36:55,916 Speaker 1: com slash Feldman. To discover Bloomberg's original Slater podcasts, go 567 00:36:56,036 --> 00:36:59,236 Speaker 1: to Bloomberg dot com Slash podcasts, and if you like 568 00:36:59,396 --> 00:37:02,076 Speaker 1: what you heard today, please write a review or tell 569 00:37:02,116 --> 00:37:04,876 Speaker 1: a friend. This is deep background