WEBVTT - Update: How Your DNA Test Could Solve a Murder

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, everyone is Zaki. Today we're re airing one of

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<v Speaker 1>my favorite episodes from last year. It's about a woman

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<v Speaker 1>called c. C. Moore who's helping the police self homicide

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<v Speaker 1>cases using these databases of consumer DNA test results. A

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<v Speaker 1>lot has happened since then, so keep listening till the end,

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<v Speaker 1>when reporter Christen Brown will update us on the recent

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<v Speaker 1>developments and warning that the story includes some graphic descriptions

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<v Speaker 1>of a crime scene. Okay, here's the episode. In the

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<v Speaker 1>fall of seven, Tanya van Kileenberg and j Cook took

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<v Speaker 1>a ferry from their home in British Columbia to Washington State.

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<v Speaker 1>They were planning to run an errand the next morning

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<v Speaker 1>for Jay's father. A few days later, Tanya's body was

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<v Speaker 1>found in a ditch seventy miles north of Seattle. She's

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<v Speaker 1>been raped with her hands bound behind her, and there

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<v Speaker 1>was a bullet your head. Two days later, hunters found

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<v Speaker 1>j under a bridge one county over. He had been

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<v Speaker 1>strangled with a dog collar. A pack of cigarettes was

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<v Speaker 1>stuffed in his mouth. Police had a theory. They suspected

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<v Speaker 1>the couple had met the killer on the ferry and

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<v Speaker 1>offered him a ride, but the leads ran out and

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<v Speaker 1>the case went cold until a few months ago. Good morning,

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<v Speaker 1>and thank you all for being here. Yesterday we took

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<v Speaker 1>into custody of fifty five year old sea technic who

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<v Speaker 1>was suspected of the murders of jacob In Tanya and

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<v Speaker 1>Kylie Burke. William Earld Tabot the second has been booked

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<v Speaker 1>into Snowman County Jail on one count of first degree

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<v Speaker 1>murder on a war. Thirty one years after the murder,

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<v Speaker 1>police finally arrested a suspect. A woman named Cecy Moore

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<v Speaker 1>helped crack the case using a new and controversial technology.

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<v Speaker 1>At the time, CECI was known for solving the mysteries

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<v Speaker 1>of people's family histories. Today, c s hunt serial killers. Hi,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Pia Gadkari and I'm Kristin Brown. And this week

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<v Speaker 1>on Decrypted, we're exploring the unintended consequences of consumer DNA tests.

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<v Speaker 1>These services are booming, with millions of people sending their

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<v Speaker 1>spit into companies like Ancestry and three met. They promised

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<v Speaker 1>to unite people with long lost family members, detect risk

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<v Speaker 1>of disease, and even suggests personalized dieting regimens, but critics

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<v Speaker 1>fear that our DNA could come to be used in

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<v Speaker 1>ways that would compromise our privacy and even potentially land

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<v Speaker 1>someone we're related to in jail. Stay with us, Okay.

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<v Speaker 1>It was a classically cold and gray Pacific Northwest day

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<v Speaker 1>when I picked CC More up at our hotel about

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<v Speaker 1>an hour and a half outside Seattle. Hey, do you

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<v Speaker 1>want to put that in the trunk? Yeah? There were

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<v Speaker 1>just a few miles from More the murder of Tanya

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<v Speaker 1>van Kilemberg and Jay Cook took place. So I was

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<v Speaker 1>just gonna say, I was just realizing this morning that

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<v Speaker 1>this We're in the county right now where you solved

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<v Speaker 1>your first case, right are we in Snahomas Cool? I

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<v Speaker 1>saw a sign that said this way, and I was

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<v Speaker 1>was going to ask somebody. Yeah, I realized Cecy was

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<v Speaker 1>here in rural Washington state to do what she has

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<v Speaker 1>done for years, help people piece together their family histories.

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<v Speaker 1>She was speaking at the annual Northwest Genealogical Conference. The

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<v Speaker 1>day before, I had watched her give a very technical

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<v Speaker 1>talk about how to triangulate DNA relatives to fill stubborn

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<v Speaker 1>gaps and genealogies. Afterward, about two dozen people rushed the

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<v Speaker 1>stage to talk to her. One person, apparently a distant cousin,

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<v Speaker 1>even asked her to pose for a picture. In this world,

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<v Speaker 1>Cecy Moore is a star, but she fell into it

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<v Speaker 1>by accident because until about twenty years ago, Cecy was

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<v Speaker 1>an actress. Once she told me she had a gig

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<v Speaker 1>where she had to pretend to be a barbeam. She

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<v Speaker 1>had come to our copy date joining a suitcase with

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<v Speaker 1>multiple outfit options for the big banquet keynote she was

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<v Speaker 1>giving later at the local country club. Because it wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>acting that made CC famous, it was genealogy. About twenty

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<v Speaker 1>years ago, my niece was getting married and I was

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<v Speaker 1>trying to think of a good wedding gift, and I thought, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>a family tree would be a cool wedding gift. I

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<v Speaker 1>think I'll try to put one together for her, and

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<v Speaker 1>got online and found ancestry dot com and started trying

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<v Speaker 1>to figure that out and became obsessed with in genealogy.

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<v Speaker 1>Genealogists are like detectives, but for the family tree, they

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<v Speaker 1>used things like Mary Dge records and obituaries to piece

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<v Speaker 1>together how people are related, and these days some of them,

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<v Speaker 1>like Ceci, also used DNA. Cecy made her mark using

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<v Speaker 1>DNA to crack tough to solve mysteries like tracking down

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<v Speaker 1>the birth parents of adopted children. Then Ceci's life took

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<v Speaker 1>a turn. In April, police arrested a suspect in the

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<v Speaker 1>long cold case of the Golden State Killer, a notorious

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<v Speaker 1>serial killer who terrorized California in the nineteen seventies and eighties.

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<v Speaker 1>Huge break in a cold case terrorizing California for decades,

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<v Speaker 1>police say they now have a Golden State Killer in custody.

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<v Speaker 1>Joseph de'angelo is facing new charges this morning, four counts

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<v Speaker 1>of murder in Santa Barbara, twelve murder charges now in all.

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<v Speaker 1>Cecie was gearing up for attack at the genetic testing

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<v Speaker 1>company twenty three and me when news of the arrest happened.

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<v Speaker 1>I woke up in a hotel room in Mountain View

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<v Speaker 1>and saw the headline that the Golden State Killer had

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<v Speaker 1>been rested, and I knew immediately that it was through

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<v Speaker 1>genetic genealogy techniques. It didn't come out immediately, but I

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<v Speaker 1>knew that in the case of the Golden State Killer,

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement had used a genealogy website called jet match

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<v Speaker 1>to find their suspect. Jet Match is sort of like

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<v Speaker 1>a big community repository for DNA data. For example, I

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<v Speaker 1>could upload my data from say twenty three and me

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<v Speaker 1>and find out whether I might be related to someone

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<v Speaker 1>else who uploaded data from a different service like ancestry.

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<v Speaker 1>What police did in this case is they uploaded data

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<v Speaker 1>from crime scene DNA and then looked for potential suspects

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<v Speaker 1>in the family trees of other people who showed up

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<v Speaker 1>as a genetic match, in other words, people who shared

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<v Speaker 1>the killer's DNA. We've reunited tens of thousands of people

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<v Speaker 1>with long lost family members, and it's exactly the same technique.

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<v Speaker 1>So if we can do it there for adoptees, there's

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<v Speaker 1>absolutely no reason we can't do it in these law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement cases as well. In the past, Cecy had been

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<v Speaker 1>hesitant to go snooping through people's profiles for a purpose

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<v Speaker 1>they'd never intended, but once the Golden State killer case

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<v Speaker 1>was splashed across the headlines, she figured it was open season.

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<v Speaker 1>I didn't want to do this until people knew that

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<v Speaker 1>it was possible and that it was happening that their

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<v Speaker 1>DNA could be used for this purpose. CC's work is

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<v Speaker 1>possible in part because of a small software company called

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<v Speaker 1>Parabond Nano Labs. A few years ago, Parabond created a

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<v Speaker 1>program called Snapshot that can use crime scene DNA to

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<v Speaker 1>do basically what a sketch artist does. It creates a

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<v Speaker 1>vague picture of what a suspect might look like. It

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<v Speaker 1>does this by processing crime scene DNA with the same

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<v Speaker 1>kind of technology that companies like twenty three and Me

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<v Speaker 1>and Ancestry use in the world of law enforcement. This

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<v Speaker 1>hadn't really been done before I actually visited Parabon along

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<v Speaker 1>with Business Week reporter Drake Bennett. Their technique provides a

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<v Speaker 1>lot more data than crime scene labs usually work with.

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<v Speaker 1>One standard test, for example, looks at just twenty three

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<v Speaker 1>markers on the Y chromosome. Markers are unique places on

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<v Speaker 1>a person's genome, but Parabon looks at thousands of markers,

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<v Speaker 1>and more data means you can get a lot more

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<v Speaker 1>detail about what your suspect might be like and compare

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<v Speaker 1>that data to the consumer DNA tests that millions of

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<v Speaker 1>people are doing right now. And that's where CC comes in.

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<v Speaker 1>The data that Parabond generates to create its DNA sketches

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<v Speaker 1>is similar to the data people upload to sites like

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<v Speaker 1>jet match when they're looking for relatives. Last year, cec

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<v Speaker 1>reached out to Parabon to see if they could work together,

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<v Speaker 1>and eventually the company hired her to head up a

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<v Speaker 1>new unit devoted to forensic genetic genealogy. One of the

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<v Speaker 1>first cases to come in was from Snowhomish County in

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<v Speaker 1>Washington State. It was the case of j Cook and

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<v Speaker 1>Tanya van Kuilemberg that we heard about at the start,

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<v Speaker 1>and it was right after the Golden State killer arrest,

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<v Speaker 1>so there was a lot of enthusiasm from law enforcement

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<v Speaker 1>around the country about using this same technique. Cecie got

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<v Speaker 1>to work and I kept waiting for matches to populate,

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<v Speaker 1>but they didn't populate. That Friday night, I went to

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<v Speaker 1>sleep and I woke up Saturday morning to a list

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<v Speaker 1>of DNA matches on JED match. She got really lucky.

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<v Speaker 1>There In the list of matches was the geneological equivalent

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<v Speaker 1>of winning the lottery. Two cousins who shared a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of DNA with the suspect, but who didn't seem to

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<v Speaker 1>be related to each other. So imagine a cousin on

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<v Speaker 1>your dad's side of the family and another cousin on

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<v Speaker 1>your mom's side of the family. Those two cousins aren't

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<v Speaker 1>related to each other, but they are related to you,

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<v Speaker 1>So that tells me I should be able to find

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<v Speaker 1>a triangulation between them, meaning a place where those two

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<v Speaker 1>family trees come together. From there, Cecie turned to all

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<v Speaker 1>the traditional tools of genealogy to build a family tree

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<v Speaker 1>for each of the people who showed up as a match.

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<v Speaker 1>That meant searching through Facebook, newspaper archives, and local records

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<v Speaker 1>to figure out who else these people were related to.

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<v Speaker 1>Since the two cousins of the suspect weren't related to

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<v Speaker 1>each other, ceci knew that somewhere there had to be

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<v Speaker 1>a marriage between the two families. Eventually, she found an

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<v Speaker 1>obituary for a woman from one family who was carrying

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<v Speaker 1>a last name from the other. Perhaps this was it,

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<v Speaker 1>Cecie told me. Marriage records are pretty good in Washington State,

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<v Speaker 1>so she was able to confirm that this was indeed

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<v Speaker 1>the marriage she'd been looking for. And this resulted in

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<v Speaker 1>four children, three of which were female, and so we

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<v Speaker 1>only had one male. That one male was the only

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<v Speaker 1>probable suspect. Within a few hours, cc found herself staring

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<v Speaker 1>at a name, William Earl Talbot. The second police collected

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<v Speaker 1>a new DNA sample from him and confirmed it matched

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<v Speaker 1>the DNA found at the crime scene. Then, on May seventeen,

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<v Speaker 1>police took William Earl Talbot into custody. Of course, he

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<v Speaker 1>hasn't been found guilty yet, but my work certainly points

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<v Speaker 1>right at him. William L. Talbot has been charged with

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<v Speaker 1>both murders, but he's pleaded not guilty. If he's convicted,

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<v Speaker 1>he could face the death penalty. The Snohomish case was

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<v Speaker 1>just the first murder case CCI tried to crack. To date,

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<v Speaker 1>Parabon and CC have solved more than a dozen cases,

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<v Speaker 1>and they have dozens more in the works. Parabon has

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<v Speaker 1>added three other full time genealogists to its staff, with

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<v Speaker 1>CC heading up that team. But when people ship their

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<v Speaker 1>DNA after me or ancestry to find out whether they're

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<v Speaker 1>Italian or what their g say about their taste for cilantro,

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<v Speaker 1>they probably don't imagine it being used for a criminal investigation.

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<v Speaker 1>The Golden State killer case bren already bubbling conversation about

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<v Speaker 1>DNA and privacy to a boil. When you send your

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<v Speaker 1>saliva off to a DNA testing company, you're handing over

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<v Speaker 1>extremely sensitive, extremely personal information, not just about yourself, but

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<v Speaker 1>about other people you're related to. Consumer genetic testing companies.

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<v Speaker 1>So companies like Ancestry and twenty three and me don't

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<v Speaker 1>in general share data with law enforcement unless they're legally

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<v Speaker 1>compelled to. But that data gets shared in lots of

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<v Speaker 1>other ways. For example, DNA testing companies are already using

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<v Speaker 1>the data for research over time. There could be other

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<v Speaker 1>uses for that data too. For example, what if advertisers

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<v Speaker 1>one day used it to Taylor adds to you. What

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<v Speaker 1>if authorities used it not just to down serial killers

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<v Speaker 1>but petty criminals. I got into some of this with

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<v Speaker 1>Aaron Murphy. She's a law professor, and yu, I mean

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<v Speaker 1>the police. You were able to use DNA to determine

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<v Speaker 1>something that probably people in the world do not know,

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<v Speaker 1>which is who is your six cousin? I mean, I

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<v Speaker 1>always say, now, I don't think people have fully internalized

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<v Speaker 1>that they may be the person who's the pivot. Aaron

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<v Speaker 1>thinks that if we fully grasped the scope of what

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement could learn about any of us by using

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<v Speaker 1>these new DNA technologies, we'd be truly shocked. Sometimes I

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<v Speaker 1>say like, okay, we'll go on twenty three and me

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<v Speaker 1>and look at the list of things that they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to tell you about, and then tell me if you

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<v Speaker 1>want to march down to your local prestinct and give

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<v Speaker 1>that list of those things, so your sheariff with your

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<v Speaker 1>name and the answers to be clear. It is highly

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<v Speaker 1>unlikely that police would get hold of a whole vial

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<v Speaker 1>of saliva from a crime scene and send it into

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<v Speaker 1>a company like twenty three and me. Most of the

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<v Speaker 1>time there are just tiny bit of DNA left behind

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<v Speaker 1>at the scene of a crime. But the technology has

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<v Speaker 1>already advanced enough that these kinds of searchers are actually

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<v Speaker 1>possible through a pair bond nano labs and jet match,

0:14:10.960 --> 0:14:13.520
<v Speaker 1>and your information could be exposed even if you don't

0:14:13.559 --> 0:14:16.480
<v Speaker 1>take one of these spit tests yourself. The key thing

0:14:16.520 --> 0:14:18.200
<v Speaker 1>here is that it doesn't have to be you, you know,

0:14:18.280 --> 0:14:20.960
<v Speaker 1>if they can find that information out through a relative

0:14:21.000 --> 0:14:24.960
<v Speaker 1>of yours, because we're looking at you know, enough snips

0:14:24.960 --> 0:14:26.920
<v Speaker 1>that we could make a prediction about what you look

0:14:26.960 --> 0:14:29.160
<v Speaker 1>like based on your relative or whether your family has

0:14:29.200 --> 0:14:33.200
<v Speaker 1>certain dispositions. Then the whole families could be cut off

0:14:33.280 --> 0:14:36.960
<v Speaker 1>because of one person's you know, cavalier approached to another

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:40.120
<v Speaker 1>private day. There actually is a precedent for what police

0:14:40.200 --> 0:14:43.120
<v Speaker 1>can and cannot do when it comes to locating criminal

0:14:43.160 --> 0:14:47.120
<v Speaker 1>suspects through their relatives. Police can upload crime scene data

0:14:47.280 --> 0:14:51.440
<v Speaker 1>to a government criminal DNA database called CODIS to see

0:14:51.440 --> 0:14:55.080
<v Speaker 1>if there's a match to anyone else. One major concern, though,

0:14:55.080 --> 0:14:58.160
<v Speaker 1>with using CODIS in this way, is that the database

0:14:58.280 --> 0:15:01.520
<v Speaker 1>excuse towards people of color, meaning that searching it for

0:15:01.560 --> 0:15:06.960
<v Speaker 1>family matches just continues to disproportionately imprisoned minority populations. But

0:15:07.040 --> 0:15:10.600
<v Speaker 1>privacy is a concern too, so in California, for example,

0:15:10.920 --> 0:15:14.200
<v Speaker 1>police can only use codeis after they've exhausted all other

0:15:14.280 --> 0:15:17.840
<v Speaker 1>search tools. It's called familial search. But some states have

0:15:17.960 --> 0:15:20.600
<v Speaker 1>strict laws governing when police are allowed to use it,

0:15:20.840 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 1>and at least one state has actually forbid it altogether.

0:15:24.440 --> 0:15:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Those rules, though, only govern that federal database. Big open

0:15:28.560 --> 0:15:32.480
<v Speaker 1>platforms where people can voluntarily upload their data, services like

0:15:32.560 --> 0:15:36.560
<v Speaker 1>judd match are private. That means CC's investigations are not

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:40.080
<v Speaker 1>subject to those same strict rules that apply to government

0:15:40.160 --> 0:15:44.560
<v Speaker 1>DNA databases. In fact, she's already solved one case that

0:15:44.600 --> 0:15:48.040
<v Speaker 1>didn't meet California's rules for familial search. It was a

0:15:48.120 --> 0:15:55.440
<v Speaker 1>three month old rape case in Utah, but CC is

0:15:55.480 --> 0:15:59.680
<v Speaker 1>wary of her powers. She worries, for one, about genealogists

0:15:59.680 --> 0:16:02.080
<v Speaker 1>who don't know what they're doing, leading police to the

0:16:02.080 --> 0:16:05.560
<v Speaker 1>wrong suspect. That's actually already sort of happened once a

0:16:05.560 --> 0:16:11.120
<v Speaker 1>few years back, using a slightly different technology. You know,

0:16:11.200 --> 0:16:13.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't like the idea of this being the wild West,

0:16:14.160 --> 0:16:17.520
<v Speaker 1>where people that don't have any law enforcement experience are

0:16:17.520 --> 0:16:22.120
<v Speaker 1>out there offering services to law enforcement and there's no

0:16:22.320 --> 0:16:26.000
<v Speaker 1>quality control, you know, there's no checks and balances, And

0:16:26.080 --> 0:16:28.920
<v Speaker 1>I want to make sure that genetic genealogy is shown

0:16:28.920 --> 0:16:32.240
<v Speaker 1>in the best possible way through these cases with law

0:16:32.360 --> 0:16:37.560
<v Speaker 1>enforcement and if there aren't unnecessary missteps or negative outcomes.

0:16:38.320 --> 0:16:42.000
<v Speaker 1>But CC doesn't have the same concerns about people's privacy.

0:16:42.680 --> 0:16:44.800
<v Speaker 1>She said it would be hard for jed match users

0:16:44.840 --> 0:16:47.320
<v Speaker 1>at this point to not know that she's creeping around

0:16:47.320 --> 0:16:49.680
<v Speaker 1>in there, and she thinks her work might prevent some

0:16:49.760 --> 0:16:55.320
<v Speaker 1>innocent people from being wrongly suspected. Now, yes, some innocent

0:16:55.360 --> 0:17:00.120
<v Speaker 1>family members are going to get pulled into investigations, but

0:17:00.200 --> 0:17:05.040
<v Speaker 1>it's going to eliminate dozens or hundreds, or sometimes even

0:17:05.119 --> 0:17:08.760
<v Speaker 1>thousands of innocent people that are completely unrelated to the

0:17:08.800 --> 0:17:15.879
<v Speaker 1>crime or the criminal being looked at. Okay, so, PA,

0:17:16.280 --> 0:17:19.119
<v Speaker 1>after hearing about all of this, I have to know,

0:17:19.359 --> 0:17:25.080
<v Speaker 1>have you ever taken a DNA test? You know? I haven't,

0:17:25.240 --> 0:17:27.159
<v Speaker 1>and I guess at some level it's because I was

0:17:27.240 --> 0:17:30.600
<v Speaker 1>always a little creeped out about it. But actually quite

0:17:30.600 --> 0:17:33.000
<v Speaker 1>a few of my relatives have done these tests, and

0:17:33.040 --> 0:17:35.120
<v Speaker 1>so I know I'm exposed. I just don't know how much.

0:17:35.720 --> 0:17:39.680
<v Speaker 1>So there was actually a very interesting study that just

0:17:39.880 --> 0:17:44.320
<v Speaker 1>came out that answers that question. So this researcher from

0:17:44.320 --> 0:17:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Colombia and another DNA testing company called my Heritage found

0:17:49.440 --> 0:17:53.320
<v Speaker 1>that if you are an American of European descent, there

0:17:53.440 --> 0:17:56.879
<v Speaker 1>is a sixty percent chance that you have a relative

0:17:57.000 --> 0:17:59.240
<v Speaker 1>that has done a DNA test that could expose you.

0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:04.440
<v Speaker 1>So basically, we're approaching all of us being exposed. And

0:18:04.480 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 1>that's basically what happened in the case of the Golden

0:18:06.760 --> 0:18:09.439
<v Speaker 1>State killer. He didn't actually take one of these DNA

0:18:09.520 --> 0:18:13.159
<v Speaker 1>tests himself, but obviously someone he's related to did, and

0:18:13.200 --> 0:18:16.320
<v Speaker 1>not just that, they then took the second step of

0:18:16.520 --> 0:18:21.840
<v Speaker 1>uploading their results to jet match, this open source community platform,

0:18:21.880 --> 0:18:24.639
<v Speaker 1>and without that second step police would never have been

0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:27.200
<v Speaker 1>able to crack the case. I think when people take

0:18:27.240 --> 0:18:30.200
<v Speaker 1>these tests, even if they have, you know, maybe thought

0:18:30.640 --> 0:18:35.600
<v Speaker 1>about these consequences, it still seems unrealistic that anything really

0:18:35.680 --> 0:18:40.160
<v Speaker 1>bad would happen because of sharing their data. But actually,

0:18:40.640 --> 0:18:42.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, Aaron Murphy is one of the most cynical

0:18:43.040 --> 0:18:46.199
<v Speaker 1>people I've met when it comes to genetic privacy, and

0:18:46.240 --> 0:18:48.640
<v Speaker 1>she had a lot of thoughts about the kinds of

0:18:48.680 --> 0:18:53.040
<v Speaker 1>bad things that might happen. The whole purpose of insurers,

0:18:53.040 --> 0:18:56.040
<v Speaker 1>whether a health insurer or a life insure or a

0:18:56.160 --> 0:18:59.840
<v Speaker 1>long term disability insure, is to predict whether people are

0:19:00.000 --> 0:19:02.200
<v Speaker 1>in neither services or not, because the model was premised

0:19:02.240 --> 0:19:06.000
<v Speaker 1>on people not needing the services. And if an insurer

0:19:06.200 --> 0:19:08.680
<v Speaker 1>could find out through a Google search if they might

0:19:08.720 --> 0:19:11.000
<v Speaker 1>have to pay out an Alzheimer's claim on you, or

0:19:11.040 --> 0:19:12.720
<v Speaker 1>they have to pay out at Parkinson's claim on you,

0:19:12.800 --> 0:19:13.960
<v Speaker 1>or they're going to have to support you through the

0:19:14.080 --> 0:19:17.880
<v Speaker 1>stabilitating diseases or MS. Right, you know, don't you think

0:19:17.880 --> 0:19:20.720
<v Speaker 1>you're not going to get that protection? So there is

0:19:20.840 --> 0:19:24.480
<v Speaker 1>one law. It's called the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. It

0:19:24.560 --> 0:19:27.159
<v Speaker 1>was passed in two tho eight, and it does offer

0:19:27.440 --> 0:19:32.719
<v Speaker 1>some limited protection of how your data can be used,

0:19:33.440 --> 0:19:36.960
<v Speaker 1>but it has a lot of loopholes, like, for example,

0:19:37.160 --> 0:19:39.880
<v Speaker 1>it does not apply to life insurance, so a life

0:19:39.960 --> 0:19:44.359
<v Speaker 1>ensure could potentially just ask you like, hey, have you

0:19:44.440 --> 0:19:47.159
<v Speaker 1>taken a DNA test? And if you have, you have

0:19:47.280 --> 0:19:50.640
<v Speaker 1>to give them that information and maybe they could decide

0:19:50.640 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 1>whether or not to give you life insurance coverage based

0:19:53.040 --> 0:19:55.600
<v Speaker 1>on it. I also think that because the Golden State

0:19:55.680 --> 0:19:59.200
<v Speaker 1>killer was such a brutal and violent case, there was

0:19:59.240 --> 0:20:01.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot of public septance behind the idea that finally

0:20:02.040 --> 0:20:05.840
<v Speaker 1>this technique had allowed us to identify a suspect. And

0:20:05.840 --> 0:20:07.800
<v Speaker 1>I think a lot of people think that because they

0:20:07.920 --> 0:20:11.520
<v Speaker 1>are not violent criminals, using this kind of technique to

0:20:11.600 --> 0:20:16.639
<v Speaker 1>hunt down very rare, very violent people won't affect them.

0:20:16.680 --> 0:20:20.239
<v Speaker 1>And the unintended consequences of this technology are only just

0:20:20.280 --> 0:20:23.440
<v Speaker 1>beginning to unfold. Denying someone life insurance is just one

0:20:23.440 --> 0:20:26.560
<v Speaker 1>example of how this technology might be used, and we

0:20:26.600 --> 0:20:28.800
<v Speaker 1>don't really know at this stage how far it could go.

0:20:29.880 --> 0:20:32.560
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's the scariest part of this, right.

0:20:32.680 --> 0:20:35.800
<v Speaker 1>This is a technology that is kind of in its infancy.

0:20:35.840 --> 0:20:38.360
<v Speaker 1>You know, when cell phones first starting to be a thing,

0:20:38.600 --> 0:20:41.439
<v Speaker 1>I don't think anybody ever imagined that we would be

0:20:41.520 --> 0:20:46.040
<v Speaker 1>using them for everything besides actually making phone calls. And

0:20:46.160 --> 0:20:48.679
<v Speaker 1>you know, now I carry my iPhone around with me

0:20:48.840 --> 0:20:52.719
<v Speaker 1>all the time and it tracks my location. And to

0:20:52.760 --> 0:20:55.640
<v Speaker 1>your point, cell phone data is only one type of

0:20:55.680 --> 0:20:58.880
<v Speaker 1>personal data that we're entrusting to a third party company.

0:20:58.960 --> 0:21:01.359
<v Speaker 1>So that repository of data is sitting in one place

0:21:01.400 --> 0:21:04.639
<v Speaker 1>with your provider like Apple or Google um, which is

0:21:04.680 --> 0:21:07.480
<v Speaker 1>separate from the data that a company like twenty three

0:21:07.480 --> 0:21:09.320
<v Speaker 1>and me would have on you if you complete one

0:21:09.359 --> 0:21:12.879
<v Speaker 1>of these DNA tests, right. I think a really important

0:21:13.080 --> 0:21:16.240
<v Speaker 1>part of this story is you know that it's not

0:21:16.359 --> 0:21:19.960
<v Speaker 1>just the DNA data that CC is using to solve

0:21:20.000 --> 0:21:22.480
<v Speaker 1>these crimes. She's getting that data and then she's going

0:21:22.480 --> 0:21:25.199
<v Speaker 1>on Facebook and looking at all the information people have

0:21:25.320 --> 0:21:28.520
<v Speaker 1>shared there. And we're just sharing all of this data

0:21:28.680 --> 0:21:32.840
<v Speaker 1>and not thinking about the consequences, and it's really hard

0:21:32.840 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>to know where that will leave us in the future.

0:21:41.920 --> 0:21:44.120
<v Speaker 1>So it makes me think that as a society, we're

0:21:44.119 --> 0:21:46.920
<v Speaker 1>really just at the very beginning of understanding how much

0:21:46.920 --> 0:21:49.080
<v Speaker 1>our data is worth and how to take care of

0:21:49.119 --> 0:21:52.000
<v Speaker 1>it properly. Perhaps in the coming years, regulators will have

0:21:52.080 --> 0:21:54.080
<v Speaker 1>to step in and tell us what they think is

0:21:54.119 --> 0:22:04.160
<v Speaker 1>a responsible way for companies to use our genetic information. Hey,

0:22:04.240 --> 0:22:07.680
<v Speaker 1>Kersten's going good. So we're now in the present day.

0:22:07.840 --> 0:22:12.960
<v Speaker 1>It's October, almost exactly a year after we first published

0:22:13.000 --> 0:22:17.840
<v Speaker 1>your story. A lot's happened since then. Give us the lowdown. Yeah,

0:22:17.920 --> 0:22:21.120
<v Speaker 1>so a lot has happened. I think the biggest thing

0:22:22.000 --> 0:22:24.960
<v Speaker 1>for me is that it's become very clear that forensic

0:22:25.080 --> 0:22:29.800
<v Speaker 1>genetic genealogy it's a tool, a technology that is not

0:22:29.920 --> 0:22:33.560
<v Speaker 1>going away anytime soon. This has now been used to

0:22:33.680 --> 0:22:37.600
<v Speaker 1>solve dozens and dozens and dozens of cold cases and

0:22:37.680 --> 0:22:41.240
<v Speaker 1>now also a lot of active cases. The Department of

0:22:41.320 --> 0:22:46.639
<v Speaker 1>Justice actually issued this really interesting preliminary policy report on

0:22:46.800 --> 0:22:50.080
<v Speaker 1>it as an investigative tool. But it was interesting because

0:22:50.080 --> 0:22:53.679
<v Speaker 1>there was also a cautionary note in that policy report.

0:22:53.720 --> 0:22:57.119
<v Speaker 1>They said this tool should be used as a last

0:22:57.119 --> 0:23:01.919
<v Speaker 1>resort because it is invasive, and they recognize that. Interesting.

0:23:02.160 --> 0:23:04.720
<v Speaker 1>What else is new? Yeah, so, I think one of

0:23:04.760 --> 0:23:08.040
<v Speaker 1>the most interesting things that has happened is we've started

0:23:08.080 --> 0:23:11.720
<v Speaker 1>to see this technology used for different kinds of cases.

0:23:12.040 --> 0:23:15.880
<v Speaker 1>There was one really controversial case just this year in

0:23:15.920 --> 0:23:20.240
<v Speaker 1>which jed match allowed police in Utah to use it

0:23:20.320 --> 0:23:23.920
<v Speaker 1>for a violent assault. Previously, it had mainly been used

0:23:23.960 --> 0:23:27.600
<v Speaker 1>for murders. I think there had been a few rapes

0:23:27.680 --> 0:23:32.280
<v Speaker 1>even but for some reason, this really upset users. They

0:23:32.320 --> 0:23:35.440
<v Speaker 1>felt like this was a violation of their privacy. They

0:23:35.480 --> 0:23:40.120
<v Speaker 1>had not consented to their information being used for this

0:23:40.320 --> 0:23:43.440
<v Speaker 1>kind of criminal investigation. That it was just too far

0:23:43.800 --> 0:23:47.320
<v Speaker 1>down the slippery slope. You know what's next using it

0:23:47.400 --> 0:23:51.560
<v Speaker 1>to prosecute shoplifters. And because of that backlash, jed match

0:23:51.600 --> 0:23:55.520
<v Speaker 1>actually had to make their site opt in instead of

0:23:55.560 --> 0:23:59.680
<v Speaker 1>opt out, which means that overnight it went from every

0:23:59.760 --> 0:24:03.439
<v Speaker 1>jed match user being automatically available to the police to

0:24:03.520 --> 0:24:05.760
<v Speaker 1>search unless they said they didn't want to do that,

0:24:06.080 --> 0:24:09.320
<v Speaker 1>to the opposite. And so their database went from having

0:24:09.840 --> 0:24:14.000
<v Speaker 1>more than a million people whose profiles the police could

0:24:14.440 --> 0:24:19.240
<v Speaker 1>access in order to do these investigations to having last

0:24:19.320 --> 0:24:20.959
<v Speaker 1>Night checked in with them. A few weeks ago, they

0:24:21.000 --> 0:24:24.480
<v Speaker 1>had just a hundred and thirty thousand people in their database,

0:24:24.520 --> 0:24:28.480
<v Speaker 1>which makes it almost useless to investigators. So what are

0:24:28.520 --> 0:24:31.959
<v Speaker 1>investigators using now? So there's one of their site, family

0:24:32.000 --> 0:24:35.520
<v Speaker 1>tree DNA, that has opened itself up to these kinds

0:24:35.520 --> 0:24:40.360
<v Speaker 1>of investigations. I think that jud match has been adding users.

0:24:40.560 --> 0:24:43.080
<v Speaker 1>They told me seven or eight hundred every week, so

0:24:43.160 --> 0:24:45.960
<v Speaker 1>they're hoping they get those numbers back up. But yeah,

0:24:46.000 --> 0:24:49.639
<v Speaker 1>it's definitely this technology took a hit when that happened.

0:24:50.119 --> 0:24:53.080
<v Speaker 1>And it's still the case that the major DNA testing

0:24:53.080 --> 0:24:57.480
<v Speaker 1>companies like twenty three and me don't cooperate with law enforcement,

0:24:57.560 --> 0:25:01.560
<v Speaker 1>right right, and ME and S three have made very

0:25:01.560 --> 0:25:05.600
<v Speaker 1>clear that unless they are subpoenat, unless they are legally compelled,

0:25:05.640 --> 0:25:07.880
<v Speaker 1>if they are not going to let law enforcement look

0:25:07.880 --> 0:25:11.840
<v Speaker 1>at their records. Now that you know, we've known about

0:25:11.880 --> 0:25:16.480
<v Speaker 1>this use of DNA testing for I guess a little

0:25:16.560 --> 0:25:18.840
<v Speaker 1>over a year, do you get the sense that people

0:25:18.880 --> 0:25:22.959
<v Speaker 1>are more accepting of this technology. I think people are

0:25:22.960 --> 0:25:26.920
<v Speaker 1>actually less accepting of it. You know, people are really

0:25:26.960 --> 0:25:30.879
<v Speaker 1>conscious now of the ways their data is used, you know,

0:25:30.960 --> 0:25:35.480
<v Speaker 1>not just by DNA testing companies, but by Facebook, by Instagram. Right.

0:25:35.760 --> 0:25:41.040
<v Speaker 1>So we see this increasing sensitivity to violations of people's privacy,

0:25:41.320 --> 0:25:44.880
<v Speaker 1>including in this space. But I think that that might

0:25:45.040 --> 0:25:48.960
<v Speaker 1>change as we see different use cases of this technology.

0:25:49.119 --> 0:25:52.680
<v Speaker 1>There was one recent instance that really started to change

0:25:52.720 --> 0:25:56.119
<v Speaker 1>my mind about this. Maybe. There was this rape case,

0:25:56.320 --> 0:26:02.000
<v Speaker 1>Angie Dodd rape case. For a long time, the wrong

0:26:02.080 --> 0:26:05.280
<v Speaker 1>person was in prison for her rape and murder. This

0:26:05.320 --> 0:26:10.359
<v Speaker 1>guy named Christopher Tap and the victim's mother pushed to

0:26:10.520 --> 0:26:14.000
<v Speaker 1>use genealogy to try and figure out who actually did this,

0:26:14.080 --> 0:26:17.440
<v Speaker 1>and they found another potential suspect, and Christopher Tap was

0:26:17.480 --> 0:26:21.920
<v Speaker 1>exonerated after being wrongfully imprisoned for more than two decades.

0:26:22.080 --> 0:26:26.639
<v Speaker 1>So I think that showed me that there's all different

0:26:26.720 --> 0:26:29.840
<v Speaker 1>kinds of powers this technology has, and it makes me

0:26:29.920 --> 0:26:33.159
<v Speaker 1>wonder what other ways this technology will be used that

0:26:33.200 --> 0:26:36.520
<v Speaker 1>we haven't thought about yet. Maybe. And what's our protagonist

0:26:36.760 --> 0:26:39.400
<v Speaker 1>cc More up to these days? Oh my gosh, cecy More.

0:26:40.280 --> 0:26:42.760
<v Speaker 1>She's so busy. Usually I have to email her like

0:26:42.800 --> 0:26:46.760
<v Speaker 1>seven times before she emails you back. Now, CC has

0:26:46.760 --> 0:26:49.640
<v Speaker 1>solved more of these cases than anybody else. She now

0:26:49.680 --> 0:26:53.560
<v Speaker 1>has this whole team that works with her solving these crimes.

0:26:53.560 --> 0:26:56.719
<v Speaker 1>She's definitely solved more than fifty of these cases. At

0:26:56.720 --> 0:27:00.040
<v Speaker 1>this point. She's just you know, working away, sitting on

0:27:00.119 --> 0:27:07.439
<v Speaker 1>our couch doing her DNA sleeping. Well, thanks for this

0:27:07.520 --> 0:27:23.199
<v Speaker 1>update today, You're welcome. This episode was originally produced by

0:27:23.200 --> 0:27:26.040
<v Speaker 1>p I get Cary and Liz Smith. The update was

0:27:26.080 --> 0:27:28.720
<v Speaker 1>produced by me Aki Ito and Ethan Brooks with help

0:27:28.720 --> 0:27:32.200
<v Speaker 1>from Toe for Foreheads. Our story editors are Anne vander May.

0:27:32.280 --> 0:27:36.320
<v Speaker 1>And Emily Busso. Francesca Levi is ahead of Bloomberg Podcasts.

0:27:36.560 --> 0:28:00.480
<v Speaker 1>We'll see you next week.