1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:03,280 Speaker 1: The latest FDIC report tells us that the banks are 2 00:00:03,279 --> 00:00:06,240 Speaker 1: on the brink of collapse because they've just reported a 3 00:00:06,400 --> 00:00:10,440 Speaker 1: five hundred and seventeen billion dollars loss and unrealized losses, 4 00:00:10,520 --> 00:00:13,280 Speaker 1: and that's entire across the entire US banking system. And 5 00:00:13,400 --> 00:00:17,200 Speaker 1: the FDIC, who ensures our money at the banks, tells 6 00:00:17,239 --> 00:00:20,480 Speaker 1: us that sixty three lenders are on the brink of insolvency. 7 00:00:20,600 --> 00:00:23,439 Speaker 1: And everyone is thinking, here comes another two thousand and 8 00:00:23,480 --> 00:00:27,120 Speaker 1: eight bake collapse all over again. Even the most famous 9 00:00:27,120 --> 00:00:29,800 Speaker 1: hedge fund manager, Michael Berry, who got famous for shorting 10 00:00:29,840 --> 00:00:31,720 Speaker 1: the two thousand and eight crash, as shown in the 11 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:34,160 Speaker 1: movie You Know, the Big Short. He's out talking about 12 00:00:34,200 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 1: how bad this is, but is it really so? In 13 00:00:37,360 --> 00:00:40,880 Speaker 1: this video, I'm going to break down what the FDIC said, 14 00:00:41,080 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 1: just how bad this situation is, whether your money in 15 00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:46,520 Speaker 1: the bank is at risk or not, but most importantly, 16 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:49,760 Speaker 1: how this shows us what's coming from the FED next 17 00:00:50,000 --> 00:00:53,280 Speaker 1: and exactly how we should be positioning for this right now. 18 00:00:53,680 --> 00:00:56,960 Speaker 1: So let's go, all right, welcome to the channel. If 19 00:00:56,960 --> 00:00:58,520 Speaker 1: you're new, my name is Mark Moss, and I make 20 00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:01,240 Speaker 1: these videos, of course to change the you think about money. 21 00:01:01,440 --> 00:01:03,640 Speaker 1: And I'm here to talk about what's going on with 22 00:01:03,680 --> 00:01:06,480 Speaker 1: the banks now. I have been watching the banks like 23 00:01:06,520 --> 00:01:09,880 Speaker 1: a hawk for about the last fifteen years. Why is that, Well, 24 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:11,840 Speaker 1: if you know my story, I had a lot of 25 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:14,320 Speaker 1: success early on in my career, buying bank owned repos, 26 00:01:14,360 --> 00:01:16,840 Speaker 1: fixing and flipping real estate building from the ground up. 27 00:01:17,000 --> 00:01:19,199 Speaker 1: I started a couple different businesses. I had a few 28 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:22,000 Speaker 1: high value exits, fortune five hundred exits. I had it 29 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:24,240 Speaker 1: all on the line, I was retired, I had it made, 30 00:01:24,280 --> 00:01:27,040 Speaker 1: and then two thousand and eight came and changed all 31 00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:29,880 Speaker 1: of that for me. Why because of the great financial crash, 32 00:01:29,920 --> 00:01:32,560 Speaker 1: the bank collapse that happened. Now, I wasn't paying attention 33 00:01:32,600 --> 00:01:34,839 Speaker 1: to the financial system at the time, and I got 34 00:01:34,840 --> 00:01:37,280 Speaker 1: caught off guard, and I vowed to never let that 35 00:01:37,360 --> 00:01:39,480 Speaker 1: happen again. And so I've been watching the banks like 36 00:01:39,520 --> 00:01:42,600 Speaker 1: a hawk ever since. I've built up my portfolio. Again, 37 00:01:42,680 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: don't cry for me, and now I pay attention to 38 00:01:45,120 --> 00:01:47,960 Speaker 1: what's going on, so I don't just get caught off sides. 39 00:01:48,040 --> 00:01:50,280 Speaker 1: Definitely don't want that to happen. But I want to 40 00:01:50,440 --> 00:01:52,880 Speaker 1: profit from this and these moves that are made, and 41 00:01:52,880 --> 00:01:55,760 Speaker 1: that's exactly why I make these videos and it's exactly 42 00:01:55,840 --> 00:01:57,680 Speaker 1: what I'm going to break down for you right now. 43 00:01:57,800 --> 00:02:00,160 Speaker 1: So let's go ahead and dig in. Now. First of all, 44 00:02:00,240 --> 00:02:02,120 Speaker 1: the big news, you've probably seen it all over the 45 00:02:02,120 --> 00:02:04,240 Speaker 1: headlines already, and so I want to bring some reality 46 00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:08,480 Speaker 1: to you. The truth is, yes, the FDIC, the insurance 47 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:11,480 Speaker 1: company that insures your money in the bank, gave us 48 00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:13,640 Speaker 1: an ominous warning, a pretty big warning. As a matter 49 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:16,600 Speaker 1: of fact. They talked about a five hundred and seventeen 50 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:20,679 Speaker 1: billion dollar loss in just the first quarter of this 51 00:02:20,800 --> 00:02:23,440 Speaker 1: year for the banks. It's a pretty big deal. This 52 00:02:23,480 --> 00:02:24,880 Speaker 1: came out on the press release. You can go to 53 00:02:24,880 --> 00:02:27,600 Speaker 1: the FDIC website and read this. It was the quarterly 54 00:02:27,639 --> 00:02:29,760 Speaker 1: banking profile for the first quarter of twenty twenty four, 55 00:02:30,080 --> 00:02:32,400 Speaker 1: and they talked about the performance and they talked about 56 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:35,839 Speaker 1: how there was a five hundred and seventeen billion dollar 57 00:02:35,960 --> 00:02:39,000 Speaker 1: loss in just the first quarter alone. Now, if we 58 00:02:39,080 --> 00:02:40,720 Speaker 1: dig this up, they kind of give us some of 59 00:02:40,720 --> 00:02:44,079 Speaker 1: the details into how big this was. It's soared by 60 00:02:44,280 --> 00:02:48,360 Speaker 1: thirty nine billion dollars. So the losses just keep piling up. 61 00:02:48,440 --> 00:02:51,079 Speaker 1: It's not getting better, it's getting worse. Five hundred and 62 00:02:51,080 --> 00:02:54,040 Speaker 1: seventeen billion dollar loss in the first quarter so that's 63 00:02:54,120 --> 00:02:56,480 Speaker 1: what's going on. Now. If we take a look at this, 64 00:02:56,880 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 1: like I said, without understanding, maybe that seems really bad, 65 00:03:00,160 --> 00:03:03,880 Speaker 1: and it certainly is. The FBIIC said these were unusually 66 00:03:04,360 --> 00:03:07,880 Speaker 1: high losses, unusually high, and of course they are now 67 00:03:07,880 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: if we take a look at it in more of 68 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:12,519 Speaker 1: a chart fashion, a graphical fashion, what we're seeing here 69 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:16,120 Speaker 1: is from two thousand and eight, during the Great Financial Crash, 70 00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:18,720 Speaker 1: it didn't look so bad, and yet here we are 71 00:03:18,760 --> 00:03:23,120 Speaker 1: today and you might say, yes, this looks actually way worse, 72 00:03:23,160 --> 00:03:24,280 Speaker 1: and you would, of course be right. 73 00:03:24,480 --> 00:03:24,600 Speaker 2: Now. 74 00:03:24,639 --> 00:03:26,679 Speaker 1: The difference that we have here is the red and 75 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:30,720 Speaker 1: the blue is The blue is what's available for sale. 76 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:33,520 Speaker 1: So this is the banks are holding US treasuries on 77 00:03:33,560 --> 00:03:36,480 Speaker 1: their books. This is their asset. You give them money 78 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:40,200 Speaker 1: and they buy US treasuries, the risk free assets. Now, 79 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:43,680 Speaker 1: these treasuries have different maturity levels. Some of them are 80 00:03:44,040 --> 00:03:48,280 Speaker 1: months to years, to decades, three decades, thirty years, and 81 00:03:48,640 --> 00:03:50,800 Speaker 1: some of them they're not a term. Some of them 82 00:03:50,840 --> 00:03:52,240 Speaker 1: they have to sell, some of them they don't. And 83 00:03:52,320 --> 00:03:53,960 Speaker 1: this is the problem I want to break down for 84 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:55,720 Speaker 1: you a little bit, but just so you can see 85 00:03:55,840 --> 00:03:59,520 Speaker 1: the graphical representation of this, these blue or treasuries are 86 00:03:59,520 --> 00:04:01,760 Speaker 1: the ones that are available for sale, and these red 87 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:03,880 Speaker 1: ones are what they're going to hold to maturities. They're 88 00:04:03,880 --> 00:04:06,440 Speaker 1: going to hold them for ten, twenty thirty years, and 89 00:04:06,480 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 1: so those aren't so much of a problem. It's what 90 00:04:08,880 --> 00:04:11,680 Speaker 1: they have to sell right now that they are underwater 91 00:04:11,760 --> 00:04:13,720 Speaker 1: in that's causing a problem. You can just see the 92 00:04:13,760 --> 00:04:16,120 Speaker 1: size of that move, and of course you can understand 93 00:04:16,120 --> 00:04:18,000 Speaker 1: which is why, of course the FDIC said that it's 94 00:04:18,360 --> 00:04:20,920 Speaker 1: usually high. Now this has been going on for nine 95 00:04:21,080 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 1: quarters in a row, now, nine quarters in a row 96 00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:27,320 Speaker 1: with no end in sight. Okay, so that's sort of 97 00:04:27,360 --> 00:04:29,680 Speaker 1: what's going on. But we want to dig into the details, 98 00:04:29,720 --> 00:04:32,279 Speaker 1: because the details are always in the details, right, Okay, 99 00:04:32,279 --> 00:04:33,880 Speaker 1: Before I jump it into the details real quick on 100 00:04:34,000 --> 00:04:36,279 Speaker 1: talk about the exact data. I want to let you 101 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:38,800 Speaker 1: know that I have a codex so way to decipher 102 00:04:39,000 --> 00:04:41,919 Speaker 1: what's really driving markets, and of course it's about the liquidity. 103 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:44,840 Speaker 1: But how does liquidity drive the market and what's going 104 00:04:44,920 --> 00:04:47,760 Speaker 1: to happen and this whole banking situation is going to 105 00:04:48,120 --> 00:04:50,320 Speaker 1: affect liquidity, and so if you want to know the 106 00:04:50,360 --> 00:04:53,960 Speaker 1: exact codex of how we can map liquidity over to 107 00:04:54,080 --> 00:04:57,840 Speaker 1: asset prices and specifically which asset prices are going to 108 00:04:57,920 --> 00:05:01,839 Speaker 1: move based off sensitivity, and even more importantly, how liquidity 109 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:05,599 Speaker 1: moves in a repeating cycle. I got a break for you. 110 00:05:05,680 --> 00:05:07,200 Speaker 1: I want to have a live event were I'm gonna 111 00:05:07,240 --> 00:05:09,200 Speaker 1: break all of this down. I got all the charts 112 00:05:09,200 --> 00:05:12,159 Speaker 1: to show you how liquidy is moving, how different assets 113 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:14,520 Speaker 1: move at different rates, and like I said, warm specifically, 114 00:05:14,960 --> 00:05:18,080 Speaker 1: how we can time this by understanding the cycles. If 115 00:05:18,080 --> 00:05:19,600 Speaker 1: you want to come join me for free, we want 116 00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:21,960 Speaker 1: to break all this down. It's gonna blow your mind. 117 00:05:21,960 --> 00:05:24,760 Speaker 1: The Codex of Monetary Cycles. There's a link down below 118 00:05:24,839 --> 00:05:26,760 Speaker 1: or a QR code on the screen. It's all for free. 119 00:05:26,839 --> 00:05:28,120 Speaker 1: I'm gonna show you all the charts and then I 120 00:05:28,160 --> 00:05:30,360 Speaker 1: want to stick around and answer all your questions live. 121 00:05:30,640 --> 00:05:32,760 Speaker 1: But let's keep going with the video. So if we 122 00:05:32,839 --> 00:05:36,080 Speaker 1: dig into the data behind this, we see something maybe 123 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:37,880 Speaker 1: a little bit different. What am I talking about? We 124 00:05:37,920 --> 00:05:40,200 Speaker 1: know that the banks are sitting on about five and 125 00:05:40,200 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: a half trillion These numbers are so big we lose 126 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:47,040 Speaker 1: relation to them five and a half trillion dollars in securities. 127 00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:50,800 Speaker 1: Why Well, during the pandemic, when the FED and the 128 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:54,479 Speaker 1: US government pumped out trillions and trillions of dollars. Most 129 00:05:54,480 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 1: of that went into the banks, the pandemic money. Even 130 00:05:57,400 --> 00:05:59,520 Speaker 1: when you got your stimmy, you probably put that into 131 00:05:59,480 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 1: the bank. You bought something and then they put that 132 00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:03,160 Speaker 1: into the bank or so forth, and so all that 133 00:06:03,240 --> 00:06:05,120 Speaker 1: pandemic money went to the bank. So what did the 134 00:06:05,160 --> 00:06:07,440 Speaker 1: banks do with it? Well, they put it into US 135 00:06:07,520 --> 00:06:10,680 Speaker 1: treasuries again the risk free asset, and so all of 136 00:06:10,680 --> 00:06:11,880 Speaker 1: that went in there. As a matter of fact, we 137 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:15,960 Speaker 1: had six point two trillion dollars in treasuries at the 138 00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:17,880 Speaker 1: peak in Q one twenty two, So it's come down 139 00:06:17,880 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 1: a little bit from six point two to five point four. 140 00:06:20,400 --> 00:06:22,920 Speaker 1: I do want to point out just really quickly. Certainly 141 00:06:23,040 --> 00:06:25,159 Speaker 1: you know, five point four is less than six point two, 142 00:06:25,279 --> 00:06:27,760 Speaker 1: but it's not that much less. And it just goes 143 00:06:27,800 --> 00:06:30,720 Speaker 1: to show you how much money is still out there 144 00:06:30,760 --> 00:06:34,880 Speaker 1: slashing around on the system that wasn't there just pre pandemic. Okay, 145 00:06:35,000 --> 00:06:37,599 Speaker 1: now to kind of show you a graphicals representation. I 146 00:06:37,600 --> 00:06:39,080 Speaker 1: love to look at the charts because it shows us 147 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 1: sort of the size and the move of these things, 148 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: and this gives us all securities. Again, going back to 149 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:46,880 Speaker 1: two thousand and eight, the last great financial crash. Now, 150 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:50,320 Speaker 1: you know, there's a saying generals always fight the last war, 151 00:06:50,800 --> 00:06:53,120 Speaker 1: and so what happens is I was attacked here before. 152 00:06:53,200 --> 00:06:54,840 Speaker 1: I think that's where the attack is going to be again. 153 00:06:55,120 --> 00:06:58,240 Speaker 1: And so everybody is expecting a banking collapse because we 154 00:06:58,279 --> 00:07:00,360 Speaker 1: had a banking collapse. But it doesn't always work out 155 00:07:00,400 --> 00:07:02,560 Speaker 1: exactly the same way. What do they say, nature or 156 00:07:02,760 --> 00:07:05,280 Speaker 1: history doesn't repeat it rhyme something like that. Okay, So 157 00:07:05,279 --> 00:07:08,240 Speaker 1: what we can see here is the different types of securities, 158 00:07:08,240 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: the total securities which are the purple. We can see 159 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:13,040 Speaker 1: how high they were here, what's available for sealem, what's 160 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:14,920 Speaker 1: held from maturity. So we already looked at this and 161 00:07:14,960 --> 00:07:16,360 Speaker 1: so you kind of get to see it a different 162 00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:18,160 Speaker 1: way and you can see that they've been coming down 163 00:07:18,200 --> 00:07:21,360 Speaker 1: a little bit, but they're still super high compared to 164 00:07:21,400 --> 00:07:23,960 Speaker 1: where we were in two thousand and eight. But the 165 00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:27,600 Speaker 1: thing is here is that these are unrealized losses. What 166 00:07:27,600 --> 00:07:30,520 Speaker 1: does that mean. Well, the assets on their books have 167 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:33,040 Speaker 1: gone down to where they if they sell them today, 168 00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:34,800 Speaker 1: they're going to lose a lot of money. But to 169 00:07:34,880 --> 00:07:36,640 Speaker 1: the point that I showed you, not all of them 170 00:07:36,680 --> 00:07:38,560 Speaker 1: have to be sold today. Most of them will be 171 00:07:38,600 --> 00:07:41,320 Speaker 1: held to maturity and as long as they can, and 172 00:07:41,320 --> 00:07:43,960 Speaker 1: that's the question. As long as they can hold them 173 00:07:43,960 --> 00:07:47,400 Speaker 1: to maturity twenty thirty years, then should be no problem. 174 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:49,560 Speaker 1: They'll sell them. And that is the problem. That is 175 00:07:49,600 --> 00:07:53,200 Speaker 1: the theory versus reality. Now, you might remember in March 176 00:07:53,240 --> 00:07:55,200 Speaker 1: of twenty twenty three I made some videos about it 177 00:07:55,240 --> 00:07:57,960 Speaker 1: when we had banks collapse. So we had Silicon Valley Bank, 178 00:07:58,440 --> 00:08:01,560 Speaker 1: the First Republic Bank, et cetera, go bust. Why well, 179 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:04,640 Speaker 1: because they had unrealized losses on their books. The problem 180 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:07,960 Speaker 1: was those unrealized losses. The theory not a big deal, 181 00:08:08,120 --> 00:08:12,640 Speaker 1: became reality when depositors, you and I decided there's too 182 00:08:12,720 --> 00:08:14,240 Speaker 1: much risk there. I think I'm going to pull some 183 00:08:14,320 --> 00:08:15,720 Speaker 1: of my money out of the bank. And when you 184 00:08:15,760 --> 00:08:17,640 Speaker 1: went to get when people went to get their money 185 00:08:17,680 --> 00:08:19,920 Speaker 1: out of the bank, guess what the bank didn't have it. 186 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:22,320 Speaker 1: Why because it was parked in treasuries that were at 187 00:08:22,320 --> 00:08:24,600 Speaker 1: a losses. So then they were forced to sell the 188 00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:28,280 Speaker 1: treasuries at a loss. And the theory, the unrealized losses 189 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,880 Speaker 1: became reality, which became real losses. So the thing is, 190 00:08:32,160 --> 00:08:33,800 Speaker 1: in theory, it shouldn't be a big deal to have 191 00:08:33,800 --> 00:08:36,520 Speaker 1: the unrealized losses. But the reality is it's not a 192 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:39,480 Speaker 1: problem until it is, and then it's a problem, really 193 00:08:39,520 --> 00:08:42,360 Speaker 1: really quickly. Okay, but really, let's get back to this. 194 00:08:42,440 --> 00:08:45,080 Speaker 1: Really is this really a problem, and if so, how 195 00:08:45,120 --> 00:08:46,719 Speaker 1: big of a problem? More importantly, at the end of 196 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:47,719 Speaker 1: the day, what does it mean to us and what 197 00:08:47,880 --> 00:08:50,480 Speaker 1: we do about it? Really, what we have here is 198 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:53,920 Speaker 1: interest rate risk, not credit risk. Now it's important to 199 00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:56,640 Speaker 1: understand what that means. You see, right now, what we're 200 00:08:56,679 --> 00:08:59,720 Speaker 1: facing is interest rate risk, meaning because the FED has 201 00:08:59,800 --> 00:09:02,679 Speaker 1: raised the rates, it caused the value of those treasuries 202 00:09:02,679 --> 00:09:05,240 Speaker 1: to go down, which means the banks holding those assets 203 00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:08,760 Speaker 1: have lost value in those right, So it's intrast rate 204 00:09:08,880 --> 00:09:10,680 Speaker 1: risk because of what the FED is done. Now, the 205 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:14,120 Speaker 1: FED could lower rates again, which would push those assets 206 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:16,920 Speaker 1: back up, and they'd be back in maybe clear close 207 00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:20,079 Speaker 1: to positive territory. It's important to understand what this risk 208 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:23,280 Speaker 1: is with the banks because this time is different. Meaning 209 00:09:23,360 --> 00:09:25,560 Speaker 1: in two thousand and eight, it was credit risk. You see, 210 00:09:25,640 --> 00:09:29,440 Speaker 1: homeowners were defaulting on their loans. The credit was losing 211 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:32,520 Speaker 1: value because people were defaulting. But that's not happening today. 212 00:09:32,640 --> 00:09:34,960 Speaker 1: It's not about homes being default as a matter of fact, 213 00:09:34,960 --> 00:09:38,320 Speaker 1: homes are at all time highs. It's intrastrates risks, So 214 00:09:38,600 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 1: you have to understand what the risk is. A lot 215 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:41,920 Speaker 1: of times people ask me what should I do, and 216 00:09:41,960 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 1: it's like, well, what problem I'm trying to solve? What's 217 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:45,320 Speaker 1: the risk that we're trying to solve for? And so 218 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:47,880 Speaker 1: you want to understand that's different. But what I do 219 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:50,600 Speaker 1: want to bring out is that is it really different? 220 00:09:50,800 --> 00:09:54,000 Speaker 1: You see? Is this really a big deal? Five hundred 221 00:09:54,040 --> 00:09:57,040 Speaker 1: billion sounds like a big deal, but compared to what 222 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:00,439 Speaker 1: you see, humans are brains, if anything else. Who were 223 00:10:00,440 --> 00:10:03,120 Speaker 1: comparing mechanisms. If I were to ask you, is this 224 00:10:03,200 --> 00:10:06,040 Speaker 1: pen heavy? You would say, well't compared to what? So 225 00:10:06,080 --> 00:10:08,200 Speaker 1: we want to understand this in comparison. So let me 226 00:10:08,200 --> 00:10:10,680 Speaker 1: show you a chart. Here. This is a comparison of 227 00:10:10,720 --> 00:10:13,880 Speaker 1: how bad things are today or in twenty twenty three 228 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:16,520 Speaker 1: versus two thousand and eight. So here in two thousand 229 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:19,040 Speaker 1: and eight you can see all of these banks that 230 00:10:19,120 --> 00:10:22,800 Speaker 1: went bust, Washington Mutual being the biggest one, Indie MAC 231 00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:25,360 Speaker 1: being pretty big, Colonial Bank being pretty big, et cetera. 232 00:10:25,679 --> 00:10:28,800 Speaker 1: Of course, banks have continued to collapse. Banks always collapse, 233 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:31,160 Speaker 1: by the way, they're always collapsing all the time because 234 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:33,880 Speaker 1: guess what, what is it? Eighty ninety percent of businesses fail, 235 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:37,280 Speaker 1: so they're always going out of business. But these three 236 00:10:37,360 --> 00:10:39,400 Speaker 1: banks that we saw in March of twenty twenty three 237 00:10:39,840 --> 00:10:42,400 Speaker 1: were worse than anything that we had seen any of 238 00:10:42,440 --> 00:10:44,200 Speaker 1: the big banks that we saw in two thousand and eight. 239 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:46,640 Speaker 1: So just compared to what we can see the size 240 00:10:46,679 --> 00:10:49,720 Speaker 1: of this move. But what about right now, because five 241 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:53,199 Speaker 1: hundred billion sounds pretty bad. The FDIC says sixty three 242 00:10:53,320 --> 00:10:56,560 Speaker 1: banks could be going bust on the brink. So is 243 00:10:56,600 --> 00:10:59,319 Speaker 1: sixty three banks a lot? Is this something that we 244 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:01,439 Speaker 1: should be worried about? Because it certainly gets me clicks 245 00:11:01,440 --> 00:11:02,880 Speaker 1: on this video, But we want to bring this to 246 00:11:02,920 --> 00:11:05,560 Speaker 1: reality so we can front run this if we can. So, 247 00:11:05,600 --> 00:11:07,679 Speaker 1: the FDIC says that the health of the US banking 248 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:12,200 Speaker 1: system is not an imminent risk. Not eminent okay, doesn't 249 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:14,360 Speaker 1: mean there's not a risk, but it's not an imminent risk. 250 00:11:14,600 --> 00:11:17,640 Speaker 1: It says that it could cause credit quality, earnings and 251 00:11:17,720 --> 00:11:21,440 Speaker 1: liquidity challenges. So the quidity challenge is meaning that there 252 00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:25,200 Speaker 1: could be deterioration in certain loan portfolio. So potentially we 253 00:11:25,240 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 1: could see a tightening in the markets. Maybe you can't 254 00:11:27,120 --> 00:11:29,120 Speaker 1: get as many loans as you want, Maybe intertrates go 255 00:11:29,200 --> 00:11:31,640 Speaker 1: back up, so there could be volatility, It could be 256 00:11:31,640 --> 00:11:34,040 Speaker 1: some problems. Of course, if businesses can't get loans, they 257 00:11:34,040 --> 00:11:37,800 Speaker 1: don't have expansion sort of starts to have this downward spiral. 258 00:11:38,160 --> 00:11:40,600 Speaker 1: But to put this into perspective, just to put your 259 00:11:40,840 --> 00:11:43,000 Speaker 1: mind at ease just a second. Here we can see 260 00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:45,400 Speaker 1: the number of banks, the problem banks that we have 261 00:11:45,679 --> 00:11:49,160 Speaker 1: the problem banks list those with Camels composite rating to 262 00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:52,280 Speaker 1: force the bad ones. We can see that it's increased 263 00:11:52,320 --> 00:11:54,160 Speaker 1: from fifty two to the fourth quarter to twenty twenty three, 264 00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:56,160 Speaker 1: to sixty three in the first quarter twenty twenty four, 265 00:11:56,280 --> 00:11:58,800 Speaker 1: so it's going up. So the direction is not good. However, 266 00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:03,040 Speaker 1: that being said, the number of problem banks represented just 267 00:12:03,280 --> 00:12:07,280 Speaker 1: one point four percent of total banks. Only one point 268 00:12:07,360 --> 00:12:10,080 Speaker 1: four percent of total banks are at risk, so it 269 00:12:10,120 --> 00:12:12,199 Speaker 1: certainly gets headlines, certainly got you to watch this video, 270 00:12:12,360 --> 00:12:16,040 Speaker 1: but again it's a very small percentage, I will say. However, though, 271 00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:17,439 Speaker 1: you know, we can look back to two thousand and 272 00:12:17,440 --> 00:12:18,760 Speaker 1: eight and see it was a couple of banks that 273 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 1: really dragged this whole system down, So it's certainly not 274 00:12:22,000 --> 00:12:24,880 Speaker 1: something to not pay attention to. But it's not an 275 00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:27,920 Speaker 1: imminent collapse. And I would just say overall that the 276 00:12:28,000 --> 00:12:30,400 Speaker 1: money in the bank that you have there right now, 277 00:12:30,520 --> 00:12:33,000 Speaker 1: I do not believe is at imminent risk for me anyway. 278 00:12:33,120 --> 00:12:35,280 Speaker 1: I'm not panicking over the money I have in the bank. 279 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:37,800 Speaker 1: I know a lot of you are. So if that's 280 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:40,000 Speaker 1: the case, then why am I making this video. What 281 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:43,280 Speaker 1: am I telling you for? Well, because I think there's 282 00:12:43,320 --> 00:12:46,360 Speaker 1: something that we need to be paying attention to. Because 283 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:49,560 Speaker 1: this presents a massive opportunity if we're paying attention, and 284 00:12:49,600 --> 00:12:51,240 Speaker 1: if you're not paying attention, it's going to be a 285 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:52,920 Speaker 1: big problem for you. So what am I talking about 286 00:12:53,080 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 1: Not losing your money in the bank. I'm talking about 287 00:12:55,559 --> 00:12:58,480 Speaker 1: maybe losing the value of your money in the bank 288 00:12:58,720 --> 00:13:01,679 Speaker 1: and lost opportunity cost. Let me break that down, Okay, 289 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:04,959 Speaker 1: let me first talk about the Powell preview. Powell went 290 00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:07,520 Speaker 1: on sixty minutes. I did a whole video breaking down 291 00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:11,200 Speaker 1: Powell's entire interview on sixty minutes, and in this clip, 292 00:13:11,360 --> 00:13:14,360 Speaker 1: he was asked specifically about the banking collapse in twenty 293 00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,440 Speaker 1: twenty three. If they got caught off guard. Well, let's 294 00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:18,160 Speaker 1: just play the clip. 295 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:22,319 Speaker 2: You seem confident in the banks, and yet the Silicon 296 00:13:22,400 --> 00:13:25,840 Speaker 2: Valley Bank, second largest failure in US history. 297 00:13:25,880 --> 00:13:26,840 Speaker 1: Did the FED miss that? 298 00:13:28,240 --> 00:13:36,200 Speaker 2: So, yes, we did, and we forthrightly saw that we 299 00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:38,360 Speaker 2: needed to do better. So we've spent a lot of 300 00:13:38,400 --> 00:13:41,960 Speaker 2: time working on ways to make supervision more effective and 301 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:47,439 Speaker 2: also to adapt regulation to a more to a modern context. 302 00:13:47,520 --> 00:13:49,800 Speaker 1: Okay, so there you had it directly from FED char 303 00:13:49,960 --> 00:13:52,960 Speaker 1: Dromee Powell's mouth. He said, yes, you know, we're sort 304 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:56,480 Speaker 1: of caught off sides in that banking collapse, But don't 305 00:13:56,520 --> 00:13:59,439 Speaker 1: you worry. We got it under control. Now. You see, 306 00:13:59,520 --> 00:14:01,679 Speaker 1: they have all all types of measures and things in 307 00:14:01,720 --> 00:14:04,360 Speaker 1: place to make sure that doesn't happen again. Now, what 308 00:14:04,360 --> 00:14:07,240 Speaker 1: did they do after the two thousand and three collapse? 309 00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:09,719 Speaker 1: This is the important piece to understand. Of course, they 310 00:14:09,720 --> 00:14:13,079 Speaker 1: bail them out. That goes without saying they cannot. When 311 00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:14,720 Speaker 1: I say they, I mean the FED and I mean 312 00:14:14,840 --> 00:14:18,040 Speaker 1: basically the government. They cannot allow depositors in the bank 313 00:14:18,080 --> 00:14:21,600 Speaker 1: to lose money. Why well, if one bank collapses and 314 00:14:21,640 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: people don't get their money out, guess what's going to 315 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:25,880 Speaker 1: happen to all the other deposits in the system. People 316 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:27,640 Speaker 1: are going to say, well, shoot, I can't trust my 317 00:14:27,720 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: money in the bank. I'm going to take all my 318 00:14:29,480 --> 00:14:31,560 Speaker 1: money out. And so that's why I don't think your 319 00:14:31,560 --> 00:14:33,760 Speaker 1: money in the bank is at risk, but the value 320 00:14:33,800 --> 00:14:36,600 Speaker 1: of your money is why. Because when they bailed out 321 00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:40,560 Speaker 1: the banks, they created something called the BTFP. The BTFP 322 00:14:40,720 --> 00:14:44,400 Speaker 1: is a bank turn funding program and so basically they 323 00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:47,040 Speaker 1: created a credit facility and they put about one hundred 324 00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:49,280 Speaker 1: billion and went up more than that, about one hundred 325 00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:52,800 Speaker 1: billion dollars to the banks, so they didn't go bust. 326 00:14:52,880 --> 00:14:54,400 Speaker 1: And I want to break down the details because I've 327 00:14:54,400 --> 00:14:56,960 Speaker 1: done several videos on this. Here's the important thing to 328 00:14:57,000 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 1: realize though this all happened in a matter of days. 329 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:01,920 Speaker 1: Matter of fact, it was six days from the time 330 00:15:01,960 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 1: the banks collapsed to the time that the government, the 331 00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:07,440 Speaker 1: FED put the BTFP program. There the bellout, one hundred 332 00:15:07,440 --> 00:15:10,600 Speaker 1: billion dollar bellout. And it's important to understand this because 333 00:15:10,800 --> 00:15:13,720 Speaker 1: what did that do. This is where we want to 334 00:15:13,880 --> 00:15:17,480 Speaker 1: think about as investors. When that money went in, when 335 00:15:17,560 --> 00:15:20,600 Speaker 1: the government bailed out the banks, when the world realized 336 00:15:20,840 --> 00:15:22,720 Speaker 1: that the FED is going to bail them out, the 337 00:15:22,760 --> 00:15:25,000 Speaker 1: FED put is in place, and more importantly, one hundred 338 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:27,760 Speaker 1: billion dollars got injected into the system. When that happened, 339 00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:30,880 Speaker 1: we see as homes were starting to sell off, they 340 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:32,440 Speaker 1: went back to new all time high. As a matter 341 00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:35,120 Speaker 1: of facturs last week, US homes across the United States 342 00:15:35,360 --> 00:15:38,040 Speaker 1: made a new all time high. But it wasn't just 343 00:15:38,200 --> 00:15:40,880 Speaker 1: homes that did that. The S and P five hundred, 344 00:15:41,400 --> 00:15:44,040 Speaker 1: you can see, had been trending down down, down, down, 345 00:15:44,080 --> 00:15:48,200 Speaker 1: down down down, and then right here that BTFP program happened. 346 00:15:48,280 --> 00:15:50,280 Speaker 1: And look at what happened to the S and P 347 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:52,720 Speaker 1: five hundred. Looks like a v doesn't it. Now that's 348 00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:55,000 Speaker 1: the SMP five hundred, which is not near as sensitive. 349 00:15:55,240 --> 00:15:57,840 Speaker 1: It pushed it up twenty seven percent. Now, I made 350 00:15:57,880 --> 00:16:00,760 Speaker 1: a bunch of videos all through twenty twenty three saying 351 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 1: I'm putting my money into the market. I'm buying there's 352 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:05,760 Speaker 1: no collapse coming. Why did I make all those videos? 353 00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:08,440 Speaker 1: Because of this? So twenty seven percent on the S 354 00:16:08,480 --> 00:16:10,880 Speaker 1: and P five hundred. It's not as sensitive to liquidity. 355 00:16:11,080 --> 00:16:14,000 Speaker 1: But you know what is more sensitive to liquidity? Of course, 356 00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: that would be the NASDAK, that would be tech stocks, 357 00:16:16,840 --> 00:16:19,440 Speaker 1: and we can see a very similar pattern. They had 358 00:16:19,440 --> 00:16:21,720 Speaker 1: been going down, down, down, down, down, down, down, down 359 00:16:21,760 --> 00:16:25,560 Speaker 1: down down, down, and then right here the BTFP program 360 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 1: happened and boom right back up again. As a matter 361 00:16:28,720 --> 00:16:31,720 Speaker 1: of fact, the Nasdaq went up by fifty percent, so 362 00:16:31,760 --> 00:16:33,680 Speaker 1: it doubled the gains that the S and P five 363 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,040 Speaker 1: hundred did. Now what's even more sensitive to liquidity than 364 00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 1: the NASDAC, Well, go ahead and drop it in the 365 00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:42,240 Speaker 1: comments if you already know, and of course that would 366 00:16:42,280 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 1: be Bitcoin, which we saw a very similar pattern. It 367 00:16:44,960 --> 00:16:47,480 Speaker 1: had been trending down, down, down, down down. We had 368 00:16:47,520 --> 00:16:51,440 Speaker 1: the BTFP enter the market right here and it went 369 00:16:51,640 --> 00:16:54,240 Speaker 1: right back up. And this went up for two hundred 370 00:16:54,280 --> 00:16:57,240 Speaker 1: and fifteen percent. So you could have made like five 371 00:16:57,360 --> 00:16:59,800 Speaker 1: or seven percent on real estate, could have made twenty 372 00:16:59,800 --> 00:17:01,640 Speaker 1: five five percent on the S and P five hundred, 373 00:17:01,680 --> 00:17:04,280 Speaker 1: could have made fifty percent on the NASDAK, and you 374 00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:07,879 Speaker 1: could have made two hundred percent in bitcoin if you 375 00:17:07,920 --> 00:17:10,600 Speaker 1: just watch this channel. Well, not just that, if you're 376 00:17:10,640 --> 00:17:14,040 Speaker 1: paying attention to the liquidity flows, and if you're not, 377 00:17:14,560 --> 00:17:16,560 Speaker 1: you are going to be completely missing out. As a 378 00:17:16,600 --> 00:17:19,240 Speaker 1: matter of fact, I've broken down this monetary codex the 379 00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:21,639 Speaker 1: way to decide for the markets that shows it's the 380 00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:25,760 Speaker 1: liquidity that's driving asset prices higher. That's why all assets 381 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:28,240 Speaker 1: are making highs at the same time, regardless of what 382 00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:31,520 Speaker 1: the economy is doing. But even more importantly, it's not 383 00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:35,800 Speaker 1: just knowing how the monetary supply changes the asset prices. 384 00:17:35,920 --> 00:17:39,439 Speaker 1: More importantly, how different asset prices move based off sensitivity, 385 00:17:39,600 --> 00:17:42,119 Speaker 1: And even more importantly, the codex I've figured out the 386 00:17:42,119 --> 00:17:44,840 Speaker 1: monetary codex is the cycle, so we can see the 387 00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:48,560 Speaker 1: timing of how liquidity moves the asset prices. If you 388 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:50,199 Speaker 1: want to see all this, I'm going to have a 389 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:52,240 Speaker 1: live presentation next week. You can come hang out with me. 390 00:17:52,440 --> 00:17:54,480 Speaker 1: I have I don't know, twenty thirty charts. I'll break 391 00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:56,480 Speaker 1: this down so you can understand how to use this 392 00:17:56,520 --> 00:17:58,400 Speaker 1: in your own investments. And I'm even going to stick 393 00:17:58,400 --> 00:18:00,640 Speaker 1: around live so you can answer or all you can 394 00:18:00,680 --> 00:18:02,720 Speaker 1: ask any questions you have. I'll answer them all live. 395 00:18:02,880 --> 00:18:04,760 Speaker 1: There's a link down below. There's a QR code here 396 00:18:04,760 --> 00:18:06,639 Speaker 1: on the screen if you want to come hang out 397 00:18:06,720 --> 00:18:09,280 Speaker 1: with me. It's all free, it's all live. You don't 398 00:18:09,280 --> 00:18:11,960 Speaker 1: want to miss this. This is the code X Okay now, 399 00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:14,320 Speaker 1: But what I'm saying is I don't think your money 400 00:18:14,440 --> 00:18:16,560 Speaker 1: in the bank is at risk. You're not going to 401 00:18:16,680 --> 00:18:20,040 Speaker 1: lose it, but you will lose the value. Why because 402 00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:21,679 Speaker 1: the government and the FED are going to print more 403 00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:24,920 Speaker 1: money to keep the banks propped up, so the value 404 00:18:24,920 --> 00:18:26,840 Speaker 1: of that dollars will go down. And more importantly, the 405 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:29,720 Speaker 1: missed opportunity, the lost opportunity of not being in assets, 406 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:33,000 Speaker 1: which assets well, as I just showed you, the more 407 00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:36,800 Speaker 1: scarce the assets, specifically with a tech narrative, the better 408 00:18:36,800 --> 00:18:38,880 Speaker 1: you're going to do. So, as I always say, hard 409 00:18:38,880 --> 00:18:41,040 Speaker 1: scarce assets. So hopefully that's that's your mind at ease. 410 00:18:41,280 --> 00:18:43,720 Speaker 1: This is a big deal, but not for what most 411 00:18:43,720 --> 00:18:46,000 Speaker 1: people think, not because you're going to lose your money, 412 00:18:46,119 --> 00:18:48,680 Speaker 1: but because you'll lose the value and because you'll miss 413 00:18:48,680 --> 00:18:50,880 Speaker 1: out on the gains. If you're sitting on the sideline 414 00:18:50,960 --> 00:18:53,959 Speaker 1: scared like the headlines are trying to make you, Hopefully 415 00:18:53,960 --> 00:18:55,639 Speaker 1: that makes sense for you. Let me know what you 416 00:18:55,680 --> 00:18:57,639 Speaker 1: think in the comments. Does that make you feel more 417 00:18:57,640 --> 00:18:59,400 Speaker 1: at ease? Are you ready to go make some money 418 00:18:59,480 --> 00:19:01,040 Speaker 1: or are you still? Let me know in the comments 419 00:19:01,040 --> 00:19:02,960 Speaker 1: down below. Of course, as always, give me thumbs up 420 00:19:02,960 --> 00:19:04,040 Speaker 1: on this video if you like it. If you don't, 421 00:19:04,080 --> 00:19:05,600 Speaker 1: you can give me thumbs down. That's okay, but at 422 00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:07,920 Speaker 1: least tell me why in the comments down below. Oh 423 00:19:07,960 --> 00:19:09,919 Speaker 1: and hit subscribe while you're at it. That's what I 424 00:19:09,920 --> 00:19:11,880 Speaker 1: got to your success. I'm out.