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Speaker 1: And we have returned. Fellow conspiracy realists, we couldn't leave

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Speaker 1: you without a dope murder to step two. I guess

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Speaker 1: this is chapter two on the hidden history of assassinations.

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Speaker 1: And I would like to confirm for all of us

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Speaker 1: listening along at home that Noel, Matt and yours truly

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Speaker 1: have not murdered someone in between these classic episodes. Dylan,

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Speaker 1: can you confirm that you have not committed a homicide?

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Speaker 2: Well, the shadow will never tell. And how would we

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Speaker 2: confirm that the others have not done such things? That

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Speaker 2: is weird to think about.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's also weird per our earlier conversation that so

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Speaker 1: many global powers, including states, including corporations, including very wealth,

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Speaker 1: the individuals, they just killed people.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, scot any thing about James Earlreay again, guys,

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Speaker 2: listen to the MLK tapes.

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Speaker 1: And listen to this classic episode from UFOs to Psychic

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Speaker 1: Powers and government conspiracies. History is riddled with unexplained events.

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Speaker 1: You can turn back now or learn the stuff they

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Speaker 1: don't want you to know. A production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 3: My name is Matt, my name is Nola.

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Speaker 1: They call me Ben. We are joined as always with

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Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Mission Control decads. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this stuff

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Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. The hidden history of

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Speaker 1: Assassins Part two, The Modern Day. If you have, through

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Speaker 1: accident or design, not listen to the first part of

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Speaker 1: this two part series, please hold do your best not

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Speaker 1: to get assassinated. While you listen to part one, things

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Speaker 1: will make much more sense. So we'll give you a second.

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Speaker 2: Beware of the old man in the mountain as you

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Speaker 2: do so, No.

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Speaker 3: He's bad news.

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Speaker 1: Yep, And through the magic of editing, you just listened

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Speaker 1: to that episode, so as you know. In part one

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Speaker 1: of the series, we explored the truth, the fact, the myth,

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Speaker 1: the fiction about a strange, secretive group today known as

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Speaker 1: the Assassins. We also explored, more importantly, the bloody tactics

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Speaker 1: that made them infamous. They were not the first people

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Speaker 1: to use assassination tactics, and they weren't the last. But

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Speaker 1: today we have to ask how much of their strategy

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Speaker 1: has informed similar operations in the modern day. Spoiler, the

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Speaker 1: answer is a lot. It's its own genre of conspiracy.

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Speaker 1: These are active conspiracies that have existed since before you

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Speaker 1: were alive and continued on a regular basis at most

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Speaker 1: likely as you listen to the show today. So here

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Speaker 1: are the facts.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, as we said last episode, we discussed the fact

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Speaker 2: that assassinations did not begin or end with that sect

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Speaker 2: that existed for a time just outside of Tehran. Today,

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Speaker 2: assassinations definitely still occur, and they have been occurring since

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Speaker 2: the twelve hundreds when the group known as the Assassins

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Speaker 2: were taken down by Mongols. So it's crazy to think

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Speaker 2: about the assassinations that were taken out by that group

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Speaker 2: were mostly, if not all, very close to all done

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Speaker 2: with daggers in close combat, uh, in secret by usually

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Speaker 2: an individual person. And you would think about all the

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Speaker 2: technology that exists out there today that makes killing people easier.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, humanity, same old Dick's, brand new toys.

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Speaker 3: WHOA, that's a lot to unpacked there. Yeah, but what

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Speaker 3: do you talk about a couple episodes ago, fusion bombs,

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Speaker 3: you know, like the murderous wave of the future is

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Speaker 3: here boys, Yeah.

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Speaker 1: The uh, it's the Christmas Elmo of the intelligence community.

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Speaker 3: There's a really great scene in Toast of London which

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Speaker 3: we've talked. I think we're all fans of where toasts mistress,

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Speaker 3: he's cheating or she's cheating on her husband, who's toasts

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Speaker 3: Nemesis Ray purchase. She's been like she got hired like

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Speaker 3: as a subcontractor for the Department of Defense, and she's

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Speaker 3: controlling drones and basically taking out blocks in like some

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Speaker 3: you know, Middle Eastern country and she lets toast take

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Speaker 3: over for a minute, and she says, now, only blow

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Speaker 3: up the houses on the right side of the street.

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Speaker 3: And then he comes back. He's having a good old time.

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Speaker 3: He goes, oh, did I say the right side. I'm

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Speaker 3: at the left side.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Well, that joke, as we'll see, did not come from

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Speaker 1: whole cloth, right.

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Speaker 2: I know it did not, because you know, not only

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Speaker 2: are the weapons of war being enhanced in their technology,

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Speaker 2: so are the the communication abilities, right, which means well,

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Speaker 2: and also you know, economic trade expands across the globe

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Speaker 2: at this point, and all kinds of other possible conflicts

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Speaker 2: arise from that, and resource extraction across the world. So

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Speaker 2: I mean, you really imagine that there are all of

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Speaker 2: these world leaders with competing interests, and they can see

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Speaker 2: all the other world leaders out there, they can even

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Speaker 2: talk to them if they wanted to, or maybe someone

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Speaker 2: close to them, and maybe they think, you know, what

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Speaker 2: would be nice if we could take out leader X

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Speaker 2: in country Y so that we could get resource Z.

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Speaker 1: That's right, and you would assume that over the intervening centuries,

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Speaker 1: at some point during the construction of various world orders,

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Speaker 1: someone in one important room or another would have pitched

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Speaker 1: something against assassination. At some point, surely someone would have said, hey, guys,

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Speaker 1: you know, while I have you all here, I know

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Speaker 1: we're almost done with the meeting, but we should we

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Speaker 1: should make assassination illegal, right like, guys.

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Speaker 2: Oh, yeah, sure, let's make it illegal, which would prevent

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Speaker 2: all of those assassins from doing it. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Well, and that's a hard and long well that doesn't

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Speaker 1: seem to be entirely true. According to a guy named

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Speaker 1: Michael L. Gross in a paper called Assassination and Targeted Killing,

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Speaker 1: Law Enforcement, Execution, or Self Defense, which was published in

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Speaker 1: the Journal of Applied Philosophy, assassination, it turns out, can

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Speaker 1: be more or less perfectly legal, right, and he writes

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Speaker 1: he's got a nuanced take on it. We thought the

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Speaker 1: best way to do this would be to give you

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Speaker 1: an excerpt from this.

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Speaker 3: Paper and he writes, quote, international law does not ban

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Speaker 3: assassination unequivocally, but instead prohibits perfidy, which is the word

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Speaker 3: of the day. I think we can agree, or those

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Speaker 3: acts that abuse the protections that the laws of armed

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Speaker 3: conflict guarantee. Common examples of perfidy include attacking from under

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Speaker 3: the protection of a white flag or harming combatants who

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Speaker 3: lay down their arms. These protections are integral to modern

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Speaker 3: warfare and underlie the conventions of surrender. Without them, war

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Speaker 3: would end only in extermination or the erbial fight to

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Speaker 3: the death. Assassination is perfidious only insofar as it abuses

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Speaker 3: these or similar protections really quickly. But it's what to

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Speaker 3: add like this is basically just saying, Okay, you have

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Speaker 3: to follow some basic rules, but the only thing governing

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Speaker 3: following those rules is our agreement to follow those rules

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Speaker 3: both sides. Once that breaks down, then it's it's it's chaos,

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Speaker 3: and that A lot of that depends on who has

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Speaker 3: the upper hand in terms of weaponry, or are we

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Speaker 3: truly gentlemen when it comes down to achieving total dominance.

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Speaker 3: I don't know, I think probably not.

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Speaker 2: Or escaping our own death right. Oh yeah, of course,

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Speaker 2: of course, that's a fascinating concept. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So basically the world has agreed that assassination is it's fine.

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Speaker 1: You know what I mean, it's it's it's fine so

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Speaker 1: long as you obey certain rules.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, which is ridiculous. It's basically everyone say, look, look,

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Speaker 2: you can try and assassinate us. We're gonna try and

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Speaker 2: assassinate you. Cool, Okay, cool, Just don't just don't pretend

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Speaker 2: like you're not gonna assassinate us and then assassinate us.

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Speaker 2: Does that make sense? Cool? All right? Cool?

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Speaker 1: Right? Yeah, Being perfidious means being deceitful or untrustworthy. So

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Speaker 1: it's a very uh, it's a very difficult thing to enforce,

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Speaker 1: and that that's probably a big part of why modern

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Speaker 1: history is riddled with and to no small degree, shaped

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Speaker 1: by assassinations. Think about it, Like, in Russia alone, five

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Speaker 1: emperors were assassinated within less than two hundred years, and

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Speaker 1: I think in the case of Nicholas the Second his

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Speaker 1: family was assassinated too. That fundamentally altered the course of

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Speaker 1: Russian history, and therefore I would argue world history. The

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Speaker 1: most notable assassination victims in US history tend to be

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Speaker 1: civil rights activists, like Martin Luther King or city US presidents.

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Speaker 1: President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated. Three other US presidents also

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Speaker 1: died by assassins, James Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy.

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Speaker 1: That one is probably still the most controversial in recent history.

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Speaker 1: In Europe, as we mentioned in episode one, the assassination

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Speaker 1: of an archduke named Franz Ferdinand by the Black Hand,

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Speaker 1: which we also mentioned triggered World War One.

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Speaker 3: Isn't the Black Hand a Serbian group, nationalist Serb insurgents,

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Speaker 3: I believe right?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly exactly, And if you listen to or watch

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Speaker 1: one of our earlier episodes about the Black Hand, the

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Speaker 1: story is so amazing. History hinges on such small things.

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Speaker 1: The guy responsible for the assassination actually screwed it up

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Speaker 1: to the first time and only got to Frans Fernand

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Speaker 1: by accident.

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Speaker 3: Well, it's interesting we're seeing stuff like that, not not

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Speaker 3: with assassinations necessarily, but certainly in the moment. It's hard

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Speaker 3: to see what that match strike is that sets off

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Speaker 3: the series of events, but in the times that we're

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Speaker 3: living in, it could certainly be something like the killing

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Speaker 3: of George Floyd, you know, that could be looked back

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Speaker 3: on as that powder keg ignition point. You know, something

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Speaker 3: like that.

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Speaker 1: Exactly exactly, and it's tantalizing. And it is also tricky

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Speaker 1: to say how history would have played out if these

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Speaker 1: and other murders had not occurred. I mean, look at

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Speaker 1: World War One. The stage was already set for World

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Speaker 1: War One on multiple levels. So you could argue that

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Speaker 1: if Ferdinand had not been assassinated, another assassination or another

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Speaker 1: conflict could have sparked the flame. And Abraham Lincoln at

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Speaker 1: the time of his death watching my American cousin in

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Speaker 1: the Ford Theater, he had already made a lasting impact

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Speaker 1: on the United States, and so on and so on.

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Speaker 1: We'll never know what would have happened had these murder

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Speaker 1: victims been allowed to live out their natural lifespan.

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Speaker 2: Just add one sorry before you keep going. Yeah, John F.

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Speaker 2: Kennedy's brother. I feel like his assassination is one of

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Speaker 2: those things that, on the cusp of possibly becoming president,

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Speaker 2: could have actually changed the course of history more than

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Speaker 2: any sitting president being assassinated.

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Speaker 3: That's a really good point, Matt, because I was going

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Speaker 3: to ask Ben, what, in your opinion was the goal

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Speaker 3: in assassinating Kennedy and did we see results.

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Speaker 2: Oh jeezy, if.

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Speaker 3: We had to simplify it to a political endgame situation

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Speaker 3: for whatever grew well again, because we probably think it

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Speaker 3: was maybe the government itself. I mean, there's so many

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Speaker 3: that's such a can of worms. But I was wondering

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Speaker 3: what you think, I don't know, or what would be

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Speaker 3: one possible reason.

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Speaker 1: Oh man, this is this is one for all of

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Speaker 1: us and for those of us listening along at home.

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Speaker 1: We have we have gone back and forth in this

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Speaker 1: for years.

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Speaker 2: The I would say, go back and listen to like

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Speaker 2: four episodes we've done on JFK's assassination, or.

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Speaker 1: It just comes up, yeah, in episodes, or when when

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Speaker 1: we used to hang out in person there would be

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Speaker 1: there we would be talking about, you know, a film

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Speaker 1: we liked, and then twenty minutes later we're back to JFK.

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Speaker 2: Listen to the Harmon Town episode that we were on. Oh,

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Speaker 2: that's right, we have a great discussion about all that

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Speaker 2: was good.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. No, I guess I just mean in terms I'm

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Speaker 3: thinking about it more than in the framework of assassinations

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Speaker 3: as like a tool, you know, And there's obviously all

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Speaker 3: kinds of different in games. Some people might just assassinate

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Speaker 3: somebody because they don't like them, or they disagree with

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Speaker 3: their politics, or it could be more specific, like to

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Speaker 3: achieve something that they know is brewing in legislation. But

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Speaker 3: we also know that the president is not nearly as

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Speaker 3: powerful as one would like to think, So it's not

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Speaker 3: you know.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I mean that's an arguable thing.

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Speaker 3: I just mean in terms of like actually pushing through

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Speaker 3: legislation if if Congress is out of balance, like right now, it's.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, but who needs legislation when you've got the executive order?

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Speaker 3: That's true.

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Speaker 1: We'll see how effective those things are as well. Just

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Speaker 1: short answer the benefit of killing President Kennedy, it's it's

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Speaker 1: multiple because you could say some groups in the US government,

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Speaker 1: I'm like using them of doing it, but some groups

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Speaker 1: in the US government benefited of from losing one of

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Speaker 1: the most powerful opponents to their plans for Castro in Cuba.

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Speaker 1: You could also say Lyndon Johnson benefited by becoming president.

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Speaker 1: You could also say the USSR benefited by seeing a

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Speaker 1: powerful blow to the ideology of Western democracy and capitalism.

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Speaker 1: I'm very careful to say putin if you're listening, he's yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I still don't open the mail he sends though, which

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Speaker 1: I alway is like probably profiling handle.

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Speaker 3: It was one of those like grabber claus, you know, like.

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Speaker 2: Not polonium.

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Speaker 1: Right, Please send all complaints to our twenty four to

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Speaker 1: seven complaint department here, especially for you. That's Jonathan Strickland,

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Speaker 1: didiheartradio dot com. So we know that these we know

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Speaker 1: that these assassinations continue as a tool, as a mechanism.

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Speaker 1: It continues because it is effective. Right, We're in the

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Speaker 1: realm of practicality, no matter how it is sold to

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Speaker 1: a given public or a given audience. If something doesn't work,

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Speaker 1: then an intelligence apparatus, a corporation, or a government will

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Speaker 1: try to find a better method. There's not really a

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Speaker 1: better method than an assassination in certain cases. That's why

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Speaker 1: during the Cold War we see this massive increase in

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Speaker 1: the number of political assassinations specifically, and just like assassinations

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Speaker 1: of old, this was probably due to the stark ideological

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Speaker 1: differences between what we're called the First and second worlds.

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Speaker 1: Quick myth busting if we haven't talked about this before.

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Speaker 1: When you hear things like third world country or second

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Speaker 1: World country, first world that's a Cold War relic that's

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Speaker 1: not aut income or inequality. What the first world was

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Speaker 1: pitched as the world of democracy and capitalism, second world

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Speaker 1: being the world of communism, right, and the third world

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Speaker 1: was just a phrase that was used to describe unaligned countries,

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Speaker 1: and it transformed over time. So now when you hear

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Speaker 1: people say third world country in the West, they're not

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Speaker 1: talking about ideology, they're talking about developmental status. Anyway, These

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Speaker 1: people on either side of this ideological divide, the world's

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Speaker 1: superpowers were more than willing to not only put out

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Speaker 1: a successful assassination operations, they're also more than willing to

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Speaker 1: publicly justify these killings, to finance them and take care

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Speaker 1: of the people they sent out to do it. And

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Speaker 1: eventually both sides started to realize this practice may have

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Speaker 1: a diminishing return. That's why many modern countries nowadays, between

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Speaker 1: now and the age of the assassins, they have taken

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Speaker 1: legal steps, at least in theory, to ban this practice.

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Speaker 1: And I think this is what you're getting to met

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Speaker 1: with executive orders, right.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, any executive order. Really it's just a handy

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Speaker 2: tool to have there in the oval office, and so

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Speaker 2: many presidents have wielded it well tear that ways.

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Speaker 3: Not to mention this antoly glossed over when I was

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Speaker 3: talking earlier, the ability to install lifetime lawmakers on the

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Speaker 3: Supreme Court, which is a pretty pretty serious power move.

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Speaker 2: Yeah it is. But however, we are not speaking of that.

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Speaker 2: We are speaking of a nineteen seventy six executive order

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Speaker 2: put forth by Gerald Ford. Old Gerald Ford. If you

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Speaker 2: were a fan of SNL back in the day, you

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Speaker 2: probably very much like Gerald Ford. I do. That was

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Speaker 2: just the impressions. That was fair, all right, No, when

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Speaker 2: I was watching it, it was not fairal uh, Hartman,

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Speaker 2: those of you, those of who, those of you who know, No,

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Speaker 2: it was Executive Order one two three three three. Isn't

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Speaker 2: that fun? Or twelve three thirty three. That's a fun

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Speaker 2: way to say it. And it says, or at least

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Speaker 2: in part, says, no person employed, buy, or acting on

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Speaker 2: behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or

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Speaker 2: conspire to engage in assassination. They're done. Haha, we won't

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Speaker 2: do it.

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Speaker 1: Really simple language too, Like that's very explicit and it

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Speaker 1: seems somewhat definitive. But okay, So the thing about Executive

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Speaker 1: Order twelve three hundred thirty three or one, two, three, three,

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Speaker 1: three is that it's not as altruistic as it sounds.

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Speaker 1: If you just hear that part where they say, okay,

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Speaker 1: no more, no more daggers in the dark. This is

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Speaker 1: the same executive order that authorized the expansion of data

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Speaker 1: collection and s valance. It's been it's been cited by

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Speaker 1: the NSA, the National Security Agency, as the legal foundation

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Speaker 1: for its work in collecting unencrypted information flowing through data

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Speaker 1: centers like that's. This order is why the NSA says

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Speaker 1: it's totally fine to intercept information from Google, Yahoo, and

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Speaker 1: so on. So we can't mistake it for one goody

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Speaker 1: two shoes stuff. But in any case, if you still think,

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Speaker 1: oh great, go uncle Sam, the more assassination, we do

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Speaker 1: need to point out that under George W. Bush's administration,

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Speaker 1: this executive order was a diplomatic way to say it relaxed.

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Speaker 1: When we say relaxed, you know, it's it's a situation

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Speaker 1: where they said, look, there are different kinds of good.

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Speaker 1: You know, there's the day to day good. No, yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's the individual good. Yeah, there's some things that are great,

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Speaker 1: and a greater good sometimes requires things that seem like

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Speaker 1: small evils. Anyway, guys, Remember we're doing this for you, you

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Speaker 1: know what I mean. That's how it went, and that's

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Speaker 1: the question for today. Has the world moved on from

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Speaker 1: this grizzly, perfidious, insidious practice. With so many countries officially

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Speaker 1: banning these activities to one degree or another, how do

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Speaker 1: we respond to those who allege assassinations continue in the

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Speaker 1: modern day. We'll tell you after word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. Okay, if we're responding to

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Speaker 1: someone who says, hey, I think assassinations continue in the

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Speaker 1: modern day, and if we're responding objectively and honestly, the

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Speaker 1: only thing we can do is agree, we can only

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Speaker 1: agree one percent. In fact, assassinations don't just continue apace.

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Speaker 1: They're a huge business. They are a vital piece of geopolitical, corporate,

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Speaker 1: and sometimes even religious networks. And they come in several

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Speaker 1: different types. But you'll you'll recognize these if you've listened

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Speaker 1: to episode one of this series.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, the stuff we talked about in episode one, all

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Speaker 2: of the motivations, the reasoning behind using assassination tactics, it

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Speaker 2: all applies to modern assassinations, all of it. There are

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Speaker 2: generally a few reasons. Let's let's outline them here of

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Speaker 2: why assassinations occur in the modern day. One, you're gonna

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Speaker 2: eliminate some kind of military commander from an opposing threat,

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Speaker 2: an opposing army, right, You're doing that to destabilize that military.

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Speaker 2: They lop the head off so that other generals or

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Speaker 2: whoever else exist there has to move up. And maybe

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Speaker 2: they don't know the strategies as well as that person

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Speaker 2: that you killed does. And yeah, we talked about the

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Speaker 2: assassination of the Iranian general rather recently, the United States

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Speaker 2: assassination of the Iranian general, and how even the use

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Speaker 2: of the term assassination was contentious at the time. Was

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Speaker 2: it just an active war, was it, you know, an

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Speaker 2: extra judicial killing. It's interesting it.

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Speaker 3: Sort of fizzled a little bit because there was a

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Speaker 3: while when that happened where an ambassador from Iran was

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Speaker 3: being very vocal about how this was an outright act

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Speaker 3: of war, an outright act of aggression, an assassination of

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Speaker 3: a beloved official, you know, And there were people interviews

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Speaker 3: on NPR and stuff, or people in the streets just

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Speaker 3: saying that America was overstepped and that it was absolutely,

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Speaker 3: you know, an outright active aggression. And then that story

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Speaker 3: kind of disappeared because I remember hearing it. It seemed

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Speaker 3: so intense. I was like, Oh God, have we done

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Speaker 3: a thing that we cannot go back from? Like have

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Speaker 3: we really let the badger out of the bag.

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Speaker 2: At this point?

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Speaker 3: Right?

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Speaker 2: Well, well, you know, you know what it could have

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Speaker 2: been instead of you know, anything else. It could have

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Speaker 2: been the US military sending a good old fashioned message.

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Speaker 1: Ah, yes, that's a that's another type of modern assassination.

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Speaker 1: This is the one, uh and Vlad, if you're listening,

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Speaker 1: I think you'll enjoy this. This is the one I

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Speaker 1: like to call from Russia with love, think of think

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Speaker 1: of the polonium murders. The Russian intelligence apparatus knew this

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Speaker 1: substance would be a clear indication of their involvement at

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Speaker 1: some level, or the involvement of someone who was involved

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Speaker 1: with them. But they also knew it would occur in

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Speaker 1: a way that was difficult to trace and very difficult

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Speaker 1: to publicly prosecute. Right, It's kind of a finger along

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Speaker 1: the nose wink, Right, Yeah, good luck with your journalism degree.

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Speaker 2: Buddy, don't do that.

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Speaker 1: No, So, okay, we could be more conspiratorial talking about

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Speaker 1: sending a message. Did everybody else forget I only knew

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Speaker 1: about this from doing Strange news daily. Did everybody else

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Speaker 1: forget that time a few months ago when Russian doctors

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Speaker 1: just kept falling out of windows?

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, oh, during the coronavirus scientist.

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Speaker 3: A new defenestration of Prague almost.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I mean scientists around the globe for the

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Speaker 2: past couple of decades have been dropping.

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Speaker 1: Off, which we still haven't done an episode on. That's right,

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Speaker 1: we should do that. A third type of modern assassination

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Speaker 1: is to eliminate internal competition. Tale as old as time.

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Speaker 1: Think of violent regimes that are inherently unstable, some pretty

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Speaker 1: often family led. North Korean leadership has assassinated internal competitors

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Speaker 1: that might have later proven to be challengers to the

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Speaker 1: throne or challengers to the line of secession in the

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Speaker 1: days of the Ottoman Empire, which I know is a

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Speaker 1: little old for this example, but in the days of

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Speaker 1: the Ottoman Empire was also common for people to kill

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Speaker 1: their siblings. There can only be one sultan, you know

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Speaker 1: what I mean? And we have to think about coups

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Speaker 1: so common in recent history don't get reported near as

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Speaker 1: often as they should. Definitely don't get reported as they're occurring.

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Speaker 1: These assassination attempts are It's kind of like what we

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Speaker 1: talked about earlier with who owns the motivation for an action,

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Speaker 1: Who in their mind is pulling the trigger and turning

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Speaker 1: the assassin into just a tool. These assassination attempts in

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Speaker 1: kus they're often incited by a foreign power, and I

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Speaker 1: know that makes most of us think of the US

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Speaker 1: in South America or something. That's true. That's a great example,

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Speaker 1: but we need to also think of corporations, especially in

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Speaker 1: the great game of resource extraction. They're seeking to they

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Speaker 1: don't really care about the motivation of the individual assassin

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Speaker 1: or the people doing the coup. They just want a

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Speaker 1: government or a regime that is more appliable to their goals.

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Speaker 1: You see this in South America, you see it all

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Speaker 1: over the African continent, you see it in Central Asia.

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Speaker 1: The list goes on.

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Speaker 2: What was the banana company that we talking about, fruit fruit.

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Speaker 1: Man, nineteen fifty four, And that's I mean, it's a business.

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Speaker 1: I don't think it's unfair to refer to this as

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Speaker 1: the as an industry. So when we look at the

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Speaker 1: modern assassination industry, we see we see examples that clearly

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Speaker 1: prove assassination is ongoing. It exists on multiple levels in

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Speaker 1: the world, and a lot of people are involved. A

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Speaker 1: ton of people are involved.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and we have to caveat this a little bit

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Speaker 3: and use some swishy air quotes around the word terrorism

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Speaker 3: here because, as we know, it's a term of majorative term.

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Speaker 3: Oftentimes it's used in political rhetoric to brand an opposing

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Speaker 3: force as somehow like, you know, the bad guys. When

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Speaker 3: you know, one person's terrorists, another person's freedom fighter or

433
00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:25,160
Speaker 3: what have You've We've said this many times in the past.

434
00:28:25,160 --> 00:28:27,600
Speaker 3: It's all about which side of the conflict that you're ought.

435
00:28:28,680 --> 00:28:33,359
Speaker 3: But those referred to as terrorists, regardless of any ideology,

436
00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:37,800
Speaker 3: clearly and on a regular basis, deploy these kinds of tactics.

437
00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:42,640
Speaker 3: The date as far back as the Hashishim clan of

438
00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:44,720
Speaker 3: ancient times that we talked about in the first part

439
00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:50,920
Speaker 3: of this series. They have to elevate a powerful individual

440
00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:56,320
Speaker 3: leader again by merit insane idea, infiltrated network or attack

441
00:28:56,480 --> 00:29:01,000
Speaker 3: without regard to personal safety, be willing to die for

442
00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:06,080
Speaker 3: their cause, for their mark, disregard any possible collateral damage civilians,

443
00:29:06,120 --> 00:29:11,520
Speaker 3: non military structures, you know, infrastructure, gatherings, events all in

444
00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:15,160
Speaker 3: service of the target, and the attacks are often motivated

445
00:29:15,200 --> 00:29:18,600
Speaker 3: by strong personal beliefs. So this is a little bit

446
00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:20,640
Speaker 3: different than our idea of a hired gun.

447
00:29:21,080 --> 00:29:21,280
Speaker 2: You know.

448
00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:26,719
Speaker 3: These are very personal, personally motivated attacks based on ideology

449
00:29:26,840 --> 00:29:28,560
Speaker 3: a lot of oftentimes.

450
00:29:28,160 --> 00:29:31,239
Speaker 2: Even if they're just personally motivated by that leader what

451
00:29:31,320 --> 00:29:35,040
Speaker 2: whoever that powerful individual leader is, and then those beliefs

452
00:29:35,040 --> 00:29:35,720
Speaker 2: are in part.

453
00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:39,080
Speaker 3: It is almost in a cult like fashion at times,

454
00:29:39,120 --> 00:29:41,120
Speaker 3: you know what I mean, if someone has this magnetism.

455
00:29:41,480 --> 00:29:45,240
Speaker 3: We often see this with suicide bombers who perhaps aren't

456
00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:49,000
Speaker 3: really invested personally, but they've been either I don't know,

457
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,040
Speaker 3: I hate that term brainwashed. It seems so divisive, but

458
00:29:52,440 --> 00:29:56,080
Speaker 3: you know, you often hear stories of women who have

459
00:29:56,160 --> 00:29:59,960
Speaker 3: been forced to become suicide bombers by their husbands or

460
00:30:00,200 --> 00:30:03,120
Speaker 3: you know, because of this hierarchy of like an individual

461
00:30:03,200 --> 00:30:09,160
Speaker 3: wielding this kind of authority over people's very minds and actions.

462
00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:15,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, if you want to say indoctrinated or radicalize, those

463
00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:20,000
Speaker 1: those are similar terms, you know. But with that, with

464
00:30:20,080 --> 00:30:24,760
Speaker 1: that list of commonalities that you gave us here, let's

465
00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,160
Speaker 1: all pause for a second and think back on just

466
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:33,760
Speaker 1: how many international murders of notable journalists, activists, politicians, criminals,

467
00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:38,440
Speaker 1: and business tycoons fit the bill here, like this stuff is.

468
00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:42,680
Speaker 1: This stuff is happening, and it probably will happen again.

469
00:30:43,200 --> 00:30:48,560
Speaker 1: One quick example close to home here in Fort Benning, Georgia,

470
00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:51,120
Speaker 1: there's something that was once upon a time called the

471
00:30:51,160 --> 00:30:57,120
Speaker 1: School of the Americas. Its opponents called it the School

472
00:30:57,160 --> 00:31:00,320
Speaker 1: of Assassins, and they did so for a reason. It

473
00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:03,560
Speaker 1: was established in nineteen forty six in the US Control

474
00:31:03,640 --> 00:31:08,600
Speaker 1: Panama Canal Zone as the Latin American Center Ground Division.

475
00:31:09,120 --> 00:31:12,680
Speaker 1: Pretty innocuous name, but it's called the School of Assassins

476
00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:17,280
Speaker 1: in reference to their specific training programs which appear to

477
00:31:18,320 --> 00:31:23,200
Speaker 1: and we're being overly fair here, they appear to advocate

478
00:31:23,520 --> 00:31:27,520
Speaker 1: actions that are in direct violation of that executive order

479
00:31:27,720 --> 00:31:30,680
Speaker 1: we mentioned earlier one, two, three, three.

480
00:31:30,680 --> 00:31:34,080
Speaker 2: Three, Yeah, and again established in nineteen forty six. That

481
00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:37,920
Speaker 2: executive order went through in seventy six, So it's forty

482
00:31:37,960 --> 00:31:41,960
Speaker 2: six to seventy six, right, thirty years. It's really it's

483
00:31:42,040 --> 00:31:44,440
Speaker 2: really interesting stuff. We did a whole I can't remember

484
00:31:44,480 --> 00:31:46,360
Speaker 2: we did a whole podcast episode on it. I know

485
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:49,080
Speaker 2: we did a video on this, and we've done quite

486
00:31:49,080 --> 00:31:52,000
Speaker 2: a bit of research on the place. But School of

487
00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:58,280
Speaker 2: the America's fascinating. So let's go to Major Joseph Blair,

488
00:31:58,920 --> 00:32:01,680
Speaker 2: who was a former instructor at the school. He said,

489
00:32:01,760 --> 00:32:05,600
Speaker 2: quote the author of SOA, the School of Americas and

490
00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:10,280
Speaker 2: CIA torture manuals drew from intelligence materials used during the

491
00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:17,080
Speaker 2: Vietnam War that advocated assassination, torture, extortion, and other techniques.

492
00:32:18,720 --> 00:32:19,240
Speaker 1: Techniques.

493
00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:25,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, interesting stuff. How is that not illegal even

494
00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:25,960
Speaker 2: in forty six?

495
00:32:26,520 --> 00:32:30,760
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, that's oh man, that's the thing. So, so,

496
00:32:30,920 --> 00:32:33,520
Speaker 1: to put a fine point on it, the School of

497
00:32:33,560 --> 00:32:39,400
Speaker 1: America is taking people from other countries and training them

498
00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:44,120
Speaker 1: to be insurgents, right, to be direct action operatives.

499
00:32:43,840 --> 00:32:45,480
Speaker 2: To be coup makers, to be.

500
00:32:45,520 --> 00:32:51,880
Speaker 1: Coup makers, yeah, or cookings. So the bunch of cooks, yeah, right,

501
00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:57,440
Speaker 1: a bunch of coups. So data aside, there is internal

502
00:32:57,520 --> 00:33:01,840
Speaker 1: reasoning here. And the internal reasoning on Uncle Sam's side

503
00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:07,920
Speaker 1: and for proponents of the School of Americas was something like, well, yeah, oversight,

504
00:33:08,120 --> 00:33:13,560
Speaker 1: regulations and prohibitions, those things are important. I get it,

505
00:33:13,840 --> 00:33:18,719
Speaker 1: you get it right. Those things are important for US personnel.

506
00:33:19,560 --> 00:33:22,960
Speaker 1: They don't apply to foreign officers. They're not part of

507
00:33:23,000 --> 00:33:25,000
Speaker 1: our government. We can't really tell them what to do

508
00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:29,840
Speaker 1: under US law. What that means is we are not

509
00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:37,280
Speaker 1: actually committing assassinations. Instead, we're just helping some friendly forces

510
00:33:37,320 --> 00:33:42,600
Speaker 1: from foreign lands figure out how to do the right thing,

511
00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:47,360
Speaker 1: you know, the right murders if something happens, right, if

512
00:33:47,440 --> 00:33:53,040
Speaker 1: something happens, or if something needs to happen. And so

513
00:33:53,080 --> 00:33:55,800
Speaker 1: that's the idea. It's kind of like five Eyes gets

514
00:33:55,880 --> 00:33:59,720
Speaker 1: around the laws against domestic surveillance. Right of your own

515
00:33:59,720 --> 00:34:05,960
Speaker 1: postulation because now it's not Uncle Sam telling on its citizens.

516
00:34:06,080 --> 00:34:09,359
Speaker 1: Now it's the UK. So now we're just getting mail

517
00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,359
Speaker 1: from some friends, you know what I mean. This also

518
00:34:12,400 --> 00:34:15,920
Speaker 1: gives us possible deniability in case one of those graduates

519
00:34:15,920 --> 00:34:19,080
Speaker 1: of the School of Americas goes rogue and commits human

520
00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:25,040
Speaker 1: rights atrocities. During his time as president, Jimmy Carter temporarily

521
00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:28,879
Speaker 1: suspended the use of those training manuals because the administration

522
00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:35,040
Speaker 1: was concerned over what they called, again, possible human rights violations.

523
00:34:36,080 --> 00:34:41,000
Speaker 1: And again we see the specter of the greater good.

524
00:34:41,200 --> 00:34:46,719
Speaker 2: No, not that, not that again. But yeah, you know

525
00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:50,920
Speaker 2: our Georgia boy, Jimmy Carter, he believed that the international

526
00:34:50,920 --> 00:34:54,120
Speaker 2: military education and training that was being provided there at

527
00:34:54,120 --> 00:34:57,799
Speaker 2: the School of the Americas and several other institutions, by

528
00:34:57,800 --> 00:35:01,799
Speaker 2: the way, several other places that were for training like that.

529
00:35:02,040 --> 00:35:06,400
Speaker 2: He thought it was critical to furthering quote, the national

530
00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,960
Speaker 2: interests of the United States, which in a way it

531
00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:14,480
Speaker 2: was and is. Having that kind of tool at your

532
00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:20,320
Speaker 2: disposal kind of is integral to national interests.

533
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:25,160
Speaker 1: Right, Uh, Like with the US actions in Libya leading

534
00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:29,399
Speaker 1: to the fall of Gaddafi, it was national interest, right.

535
00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:33,839
Speaker 1: So those training manuals which explicitly tell you how to

536
00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:36,920
Speaker 1: torture people, how to assassinate people, and so on.

537
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:39,400
Speaker 2: I think I've got them on my computer somewhere.

538
00:35:39,600 --> 00:35:44,640
Speaker 1: Yeah, from yeah, oh gosh, our search histories.

539
00:35:45,160 --> 00:35:45,840
Speaker 3: I'm telling you.

540
00:35:46,480 --> 00:35:50,480
Speaker 1: Yes. So those manuals, by the way, were reintroduced. That's

541
00:35:50,480 --> 00:35:53,319
Speaker 1: why I said they were temporarily suspended. They were reintroduced

542
00:35:53,320 --> 00:35:57,480
Speaker 1: to the School's training curriculum by the Reagan administration in

543
00:35:57,560 --> 00:36:02,080
Speaker 1: nineteen eighty two. Currently, the School of America still exists.

544
00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:05,960
Speaker 1: It just changed its name. It's win SEC under the

545
00:36:06,040 --> 00:36:11,920
Speaker 1: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. Don't worry though, everybody,

546
00:36:12,160 --> 00:36:15,080
Speaker 1: they say, they have a much more rigorous element of

547
00:36:15,200 --> 00:36:18,680
Speaker 1: human rights training in the program. So good on us,

548
00:36:18,760 --> 00:36:20,640
Speaker 1: you know, good hustle team.

549
00:36:21,120 --> 00:36:27,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, yep, good on us. And we have to point

550
00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:32,480
Speaker 2: out that there are a number of graduates from the

551
00:36:32,480 --> 00:36:34,239
Speaker 2: School of the Americas back in the day and now

552
00:36:34,400 --> 00:36:40,520
Speaker 2: win SEC that have been accused of doing things, really

553
00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:44,480
Speaker 2: bad things that they were trained to do in those places,

554
00:36:44,560 --> 00:36:48,040
Speaker 2: and they have even been sentenced for human rights violations

555
00:36:48,080 --> 00:36:51,520
Speaker 2: and criminal activity in their home countries. So come on

556
00:36:51,560 --> 00:36:54,440
Speaker 2: over and get some training. It'll be really fun. Here's

557
00:36:54,480 --> 00:36:56,279
Speaker 2: your manuals, and then go back.

558
00:36:56,200 --> 00:36:58,760
Speaker 3: To there's going to be we're gonna have craft services.

559
00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:00,720
Speaker 3: You guys will be all well taken care.

560
00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:05,319
Speaker 2: Of, sure, and then they're gonna do these crimes. And

561
00:37:05,360 --> 00:37:08,000
Speaker 2: you can even you can find online a couple of

562
00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:12,160
Speaker 2: places where there are lists of people who have graduated

563
00:37:12,200 --> 00:37:16,359
Speaker 2: from these schools and these training programs who you know,

564
00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:19,040
Speaker 2: who then did later crimes. You could see the crimes

565
00:37:19,040 --> 00:37:21,600
Speaker 2: that they're accused of later, both alleged by the way

566
00:37:21,640 --> 00:37:26,520
Speaker 2: and some proved, and they're they're even Yeah, there are

567
00:37:26,719 --> 00:37:29,160
Speaker 2: numerous databases where you can find this information.

568
00:37:29,239 --> 00:37:34,279
Speaker 1: Actually, yeah, check out the School of America's watch if

569
00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:38,759
Speaker 1: you want to see the prize. Bad Apples of this program.

570
00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:41,920
Speaker 1: And again, you know, this is not to say I

571
00:37:41,920 --> 00:37:43,759
Speaker 1: feel like we have to say this, not to say

572
00:37:43,760 --> 00:37:46,879
Speaker 1: that every graduate of the School of America's instantly went

573
00:37:46,920 --> 00:37:52,799
Speaker 1: off and became warlord, but several did, and to say

574
00:37:52,840 --> 00:38:00,239
Speaker 1: otherwise is equally disingenuous. So we have not only in

575
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:03,239
Speaker 1: this nation, we have not only taken lessons learned from

576
00:38:03,320 --> 00:38:08,720
Speaker 1: that ancient sect of assassins and from earlier assassin training

577
00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:12,920
Speaker 1: programs in Vietnam, in the USSR and so on, we

578
00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:16,000
Speaker 1: have built was often called a training program for this

579
00:38:16,080 --> 00:38:19,800
Speaker 1: sort of behavior, not too different from Alama Castle itself

580
00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:25,560
Speaker 1: all those years ago. And so that's just a very

581
00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:31,480
Speaker 1: high level look at the modern state of assassinations today.

582
00:38:32,040 --> 00:38:34,000
Speaker 1: We're going to pause for a word from our sponsors,

583
00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:36,160
Speaker 1: and when we come back, we're going to talk about

584
00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:51,239
Speaker 1: the future of assassination, and we're back drones, baby.

585
00:38:51,520 --> 00:38:54,360
Speaker 2: Yo, yo, Look, we're going to talk about drones, and

586
00:38:54,520 --> 00:38:59,400
Speaker 2: drones are the scariest part of this assassination business that

587
00:38:59,480 --> 00:39:03,080
Speaker 2: exists out there. But I think we should just quickly

588
00:39:03,200 --> 00:39:09,919
Speaker 2: mention that militaries across the world have elite soldiers and operators.

589
00:39:10,080 --> 00:39:14,720
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, and I'm thinking of something like the Navy

590
00:39:14,760 --> 00:39:21,960
Speaker 2: seals or exactly so, people who are teams that go

591
00:39:22,080 --> 00:39:25,480
Speaker 2: out early, right, and if there's going to be a

592
00:39:25,480 --> 00:39:29,840
Speaker 2: conflict or if there's something perhaps going to arise somewhere,

593
00:39:30,320 --> 00:39:32,759
Speaker 2: teams will go out there and that have the ability,

594
00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:35,120
Speaker 2: or at least are trained, I would say, with the

595
00:39:35,160 --> 00:39:38,280
Speaker 2: ability to take out someone the way an assassin would.

596
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,120
Speaker 2: Of course, I've never been in either of those, and

597
00:39:42,440 --> 00:39:44,480
Speaker 2: correct me if I'm completely wrong. I just feel like

598
00:39:44,520 --> 00:39:47,759
Speaker 2: that would be a very smart thing to have in,

599
00:39:48,120 --> 00:39:50,719
Speaker 2: you know, in the tool belt of anyone who is

600
00:39:51,600 --> 00:39:53,799
Speaker 2: you know, a seal or a Green Beret or one

601
00:39:53,800 --> 00:39:56,160
Speaker 2: of those elite and maybe even a ranger. I don't know.

602
00:39:56,280 --> 00:39:59,160
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's a great point. That's a great point. Multiple

603
00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:02,040
Speaker 1: the US gets beat up on for this lot or

604
00:40:02,080 --> 00:40:04,960
Speaker 1: singled out for it, because the US has multiple versions

605
00:40:04,960 --> 00:40:05,200
Speaker 1: of this.

606
00:40:05,880 --> 00:40:06,240
Speaker 3: Uh.

607
00:40:06,320 --> 00:40:11,759
Speaker 1: These operators are highly trained professionals, and it is openly

608
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:16,640
Speaker 1: admitted that they use they use their training in what

609
00:40:16,680 --> 00:40:21,560
Speaker 1: are called targeted killings or extraction missions as well from

610
00:40:21,680 --> 00:40:26,839
Speaker 1: unfriendly territory. But a ton of other nations have them too,

611
00:40:27,160 --> 00:40:28,600
Speaker 1: you know what I mean. It's the kind of thing

612
00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:32,920
Speaker 1: where if you're a superpower and someone has that capacity

613
00:40:32,960 --> 00:40:36,440
Speaker 1: and you do not, then there is a defense gap.

614
00:40:36,600 --> 00:40:40,080
Speaker 1: You have to have something like this. That's why there's

615
00:40:40,239 --> 00:40:44,839
Speaker 1: that's not that's why MASAD exists. I mean pretty much

616
00:40:45,200 --> 00:40:49,319
Speaker 1: any Yeah, any any country that has international reach or

617
00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:54,000
Speaker 1: global interest is going to have some sort of analog

618
00:40:54,280 --> 00:40:56,360
Speaker 1: to those things, and they're maybe we should do an

619
00:40:56,400 --> 00:40:58,919
Speaker 1: episode on those because they are fascinating.

620
00:41:00,239 --> 00:41:03,840
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'd love to just to pause here for what

621
00:41:03,960 --> 00:41:06,439
Speaker 2: I'd love to hear from anyone out there who can

622
00:41:06,520 --> 00:41:09,760
Speaker 2: talk to us who has experience as essentially an elite

623
00:41:09,880 --> 00:41:13,920
Speaker 2: military operator, just to know, even if that's maybe that's

624
00:41:13,920 --> 00:41:17,640
Speaker 2: a completely wrong thing to say, just a unit within

625
00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:19,920
Speaker 2: a team that would be considered elite.

626
00:41:20,280 --> 00:41:22,400
Speaker 1: Yeah, and they do a lot of we know, of

627
00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:26,000
Speaker 1: course it's not all cloak and dagger assassination. As we said,

628
00:41:26,000 --> 00:41:29,840
Speaker 1: they are extraction missions, they're also protection and escort missions.

629
00:41:30,920 --> 00:41:34,320
Speaker 1: But yeah, there's a wealth of stuff out there. We

630
00:41:35,000 --> 00:41:37,239
Speaker 1: need to do this episode, and we would love to

631
00:41:37,239 --> 00:41:39,680
Speaker 1: hear from you if you have firsthand experience in this

632
00:41:39,719 --> 00:41:44,560
Speaker 1: regard a lot of those special forces also, I'm so

633
00:41:44,640 --> 00:41:46,520
Speaker 1: glad you're pointing that out, Matt. A lot of special

634
00:41:46,520 --> 00:41:52,560
Speaker 1: forces also collaborate with drawn technology. Yeah, sure, which is

635
00:41:52,600 --> 00:41:58,680
Speaker 1: the Skynet elephant in the room. And again, Matt, thank

636
00:41:58,719 --> 00:42:01,480
Speaker 1: you for putting in that important piece we missed because

637
00:42:01,520 --> 00:42:05,360
Speaker 1: as you can tell, both Nolan and I are always

638
00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:11,040
Speaker 1: excited to talk drones. Modern governments are super into the

639
00:42:11,120 --> 00:42:16,080
Speaker 1: strategy of changing names and terms to avoid controversial language

640
00:42:16,080 --> 00:42:20,760
Speaker 1: and public statements. That's why Blackwater became Academi or whatever.

641
00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:23,759
Speaker 1: That's why Comcast became Exfinity.

642
00:42:23,920 --> 00:42:27,080
Speaker 3: That's why clear Channel became iHeart, That's why George Carlin

643
00:42:27,160 --> 00:42:30,560
Speaker 3: was such a successful comedian because of euphemisms.

644
00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:31,840
Speaker 2: It's true.

645
00:42:32,960 --> 00:42:36,080
Speaker 1: And so we see a name change there with assassination,

646
00:42:36,560 --> 00:42:38,800
Speaker 1: targeted killing, named killing.

647
00:42:39,640 --> 00:42:42,840
Speaker 3: Even drones they refer to more as UAVs now right,

648
00:42:42,880 --> 00:42:46,600
Speaker 3: because that's a little more innocuous than drones. Drones sounds

649
00:42:46,719 --> 00:42:49,760
Speaker 3: very futury and sinister. When I think of a drone,

650
00:42:49,760 --> 00:42:53,040
Speaker 3: I think of something scary coming to kill me. Right.

651
00:42:53,239 --> 00:42:56,080
Speaker 1: You can hide a lot a lot of evil behind

652
00:42:56,120 --> 00:43:00,480
Speaker 1: some acronyms or initialisms. UAV just means on mandarial vehicle.

653
00:43:00,960 --> 00:43:06,759
Speaker 1: A kite is a UAV, that's right, yes, kind of

654
00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:07,520
Speaker 1: is it?

655
00:43:08,040 --> 00:43:08,279
Speaker 3: Yeah?

656
00:43:08,719 --> 00:43:11,000
Speaker 1: There's no one driving, it's unmanned.

657
00:43:11,040 --> 00:43:12,880
Speaker 3: You're right. The string is the same thing. It's just

658
00:43:12,920 --> 00:43:16,000
Speaker 3: a physical version of the connection between the drone and

659
00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 3: the controller. Yeah.

660
00:43:17,880 --> 00:43:20,120
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's the argument I would make. But let's so

661
00:43:20,560 --> 00:43:25,680
Speaker 1: targeted killing is euphemism. Is a form of assassination carried

662
00:43:25,719 --> 00:43:31,160
Speaker 1: out by governments against their perceived enemies. So it's important

663
00:43:31,200 --> 00:43:35,239
Speaker 1: here to note that this is seen as a subgenre

664
00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:40,239
Speaker 1: of assassination applicable only to governments. So you can't go

665
00:43:40,320 --> 00:43:43,399
Speaker 1: into court as an individual, or you shouldn't be able

666
00:43:43,400 --> 00:43:46,239
Speaker 1: to go into court as like an individual or a

667
00:43:46,280 --> 00:43:52,160
Speaker 1: representative of a religious institution or corporation and say, you know, yes,

668
00:43:53,120 --> 00:43:58,399
Speaker 1: I am the in and out Burger assassin and this

669
00:43:58,680 --> 00:44:03,560
Speaker 1: was a targeted kill at an Arbi's and that was

670
00:44:03,640 --> 00:44:06,520
Speaker 1: for the greater good. They are enemies of in and

671
00:44:06,560 --> 00:44:08,920
Speaker 1: out Burger. You can't say stuff like that. You can

672
00:44:08,960 --> 00:44:11,279
Speaker 1: only do it if you're a government, because then you

673
00:44:11,320 --> 00:44:13,480
Speaker 1: can argue there's a greater good. I mean, think of

674
00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:18,600
Speaker 1: weaponized drones as the robo version of those ancient assassins.

675
00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:21,439
Speaker 1: They have a lot in common. The two big things

676
00:44:21,440 --> 00:44:24,879
Speaker 1: they have in common they're relentless and they don't care

677
00:44:24,920 --> 00:44:26,080
Speaker 1: about self preservation.

678
00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:32,280
Speaker 2: Ooh, and there's an old man in a mountain controlling

679
00:44:32,360 --> 00:44:37,240
Speaker 2: them somewhere and now yeah, it's.

680
00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:39,839
Speaker 1: Not really no, but yeah, I love that. Like, they're

681
00:44:39,840 --> 00:44:45,880
Speaker 1: also very effective at killing, but they're probably less so weird,

682
00:44:46,040 --> 00:44:49,440
Speaker 1: they're probably less precise. Oh, the assassins of Old.

683
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:52,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, the assassin of Old used a blade up close

684
00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:57,640
Speaker 2: to take someone out. This sends a missile generally a

685
00:44:57,680 --> 00:45:02,359
Speaker 2: missile that causes collateral damage almost every time it's used.

686
00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:06,239
Speaker 1: Well, uh, not in a frequent number of times. I mean

687
00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:10,640
Speaker 1: the scary thing about the toast of London, uh scene

688
00:45:10,760 --> 00:45:13,719
Speaker 1: that you alluded to earlier in no is Again, it's

689
00:45:13,719 --> 00:45:16,319
Speaker 1: not it doesn't come out a whole cloth, or there

690
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:19,480
Speaker 1: wasn't just some clever person in the writer's room. According

691
00:45:19,520 --> 00:45:26,280
Speaker 1: to statistical analyzes by some nonprofits, including nonprofit organization called Reprieve,

692
00:45:26,760 --> 00:45:31,480
Speaker 1: which is composed of international lawyers and investigators, uh nine children.

693
00:45:32,560 --> 00:45:36,480
Speaker 1: Nine children have been killed for every targeted adult the

694
00:45:36,640 --> 00:45:40,600
Speaker 1: United States has tried to assassinate since programs like this began.

695
00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:45,360
Speaker 3: Oh cool, I'm okay with that. No, I'm not okay

696
00:45:45,400 --> 00:45:50,080
Speaker 3: with that, and say it's unforgivable. That's but it's what.

697
00:45:50,400 --> 00:45:53,480
Speaker 3: There's a there's a there's a non offensive sounding term

698
00:45:53,520 --> 00:45:56,319
Speaker 3: for that. It's collateral damage. It takes the humanity out

699
00:45:56,360 --> 00:45:58,320
Speaker 3: of the equation. When you're not actually having to wield

700
00:45:58,360 --> 00:46:01,600
Speaker 3: the knife yourself, you know, you're doing it from such

701
00:46:01,600 --> 00:46:02,120
Speaker 3: a remove.

702
00:46:02,960 --> 00:46:08,160
Speaker 1: Mistakes were made, Right, what's the what's the common complaint

703
00:46:08,239 --> 00:46:11,759
Speaker 1: for people in online gaming? It's not me, you messed up.

704
00:46:11,800 --> 00:46:13,839
Speaker 1: It's the lag time, it's the lag action.

705
00:46:14,160 --> 00:46:14,560
Speaker 3: Right.

706
00:46:14,600 --> 00:46:17,839
Speaker 1: So maybe as someone who's blamed collateral damage on that

707
00:46:17,880 --> 00:46:19,880
Speaker 1: in the past, but it doesn't make these people, it

708
00:46:19,920 --> 00:46:25,760
Speaker 1: doesn't make these civilians magically resurrected, you know. Like Reprieve

709
00:46:25,800 --> 00:46:29,919
Speaker 1: also found that in the course of attempting to kill

710
00:46:29,960 --> 00:46:35,440
Speaker 1: one Iman al Zawahiri, the US specifically, the CIA is

711
00:46:35,480 --> 00:46:38,680
Speaker 1: believed to have killed seventy six children and twenty nine

712
00:46:38,680 --> 00:46:40,520
Speaker 1: adult bystanders and ben.

713
00:46:40,760 --> 00:46:43,560
Speaker 3: You know, this would have been under the Obama administration,

714
00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:46,160
Speaker 3: wouldn't it correct. That's I mean, you know, he gets

715
00:46:46,200 --> 00:46:48,600
Speaker 3: such a he's so lauded and held up as this

716
00:46:48,680 --> 00:46:51,880
Speaker 3: like shining example of like a great president. There's obviously

717
00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:53,520
Speaker 3: a lot of great things about it. First of all,

718
00:46:53,719 --> 00:46:56,640
Speaker 3: he could speak in complete sentences, which was pretty dope.

719
00:46:56,920 --> 00:47:02,600
Speaker 3: But he was oversaw massive amounts of these kinds of attacks,

720
00:47:02,680 --> 00:47:06,000
Speaker 3: that resulted in this sort of collateral damage, and people

721
00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:08,719
Speaker 3: don't gloss over that entirely, but it certainly doesn't seem

722
00:47:08,760 --> 00:47:10,760
Speaker 3: to be the first bullet point in his resume.

723
00:47:10,960 --> 00:47:16,840
Speaker 2: Right, Well, it increased the use of UAVs and drones

724
00:47:17,000 --> 00:47:23,000
Speaker 2: increased so much under under President Obama. It's really disturbing

725
00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:28,440
Speaker 2: considering we entered what was called the War on Terror

726
00:47:28,840 --> 00:47:32,640
Speaker 2: from the previous administration when we were actively you know,

727
00:47:32,760 --> 00:47:37,320
Speaker 2: starting wars, and then it only increased. And it's likely

728
00:47:37,520 --> 00:47:42,279
Speaker 2: a function of the technology improving, right, I mean, and

729
00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:46,239
Speaker 2: it has by leaps and bounds, and even now as

730
00:47:46,280 --> 00:47:51,759
Speaker 2: they have been for gosh two decades now, scholars and

731
00:47:51,800 --> 00:47:56,640
Speaker 2: military officials, politicians people like you and me, everyone else

732
00:47:56,880 --> 00:48:03,560
Speaker 2: were divided on the use of drones, ins and targeted killings,

733
00:48:03,719 --> 00:48:06,840
Speaker 2: named killings whatever you want to refer to them as,

734
00:48:07,520 --> 00:48:11,360
Speaker 2: because I mean, it is complicated, right, Some supporters of

735
00:48:11,719 --> 00:48:15,040
Speaker 2: using drones would say that it's actually more humane to

736
00:48:15,120 --> 00:48:19,920
Speaker 2: do this. It's safer for military personnel on whichever side

737
00:48:20,000 --> 00:48:24,479
Speaker 2: is doing the killing or attacking. And you know, you're

738
00:48:24,480 --> 00:48:29,239
Speaker 2: not just sending in a bunch of troops, let's say,

739
00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:32,279
Speaker 2: to try and kill a group of people or even

740
00:48:32,280 --> 00:48:34,360
Speaker 2: a team of people. Then where you're going to have

741
00:48:34,440 --> 00:48:37,960
Speaker 2: multiple people firing, you've got maybe one, maybe two a

742
00:48:38,000 --> 00:48:40,960
Speaker 2: maximum a handful of drones that are going in to

743
00:48:41,080 --> 00:48:43,960
Speaker 2: kill someone. Generally it's one that is literally going in

744
00:48:44,520 --> 00:48:47,200
Speaker 2: to kill someone, you know. The other thing that would

745
00:48:47,239 --> 00:48:49,680
Speaker 2: be stated, I think by someone who supports this, is

746
00:48:49,719 --> 00:48:53,080
Speaker 2: that these drone attacks aren't going to be done in

747
00:48:53,120 --> 00:48:56,000
Speaker 2: a time of peace against any nation that we're not

748
00:48:56,080 --> 00:48:56,600
Speaker 2: at war with.

749
00:48:56,760 --> 00:49:02,319
Speaker 1: Right See, that's the thing. It's true. Supporters do say that,

750
00:49:02,400 --> 00:49:05,400
Speaker 1: but recent events have conclusively proven this not to be

751
00:49:05,480 --> 00:49:08,160
Speaker 1: the case. That's where we come up with another euphemism

752
00:49:08,200 --> 00:49:12,920
Speaker 1: for assassinations, extra judicial killings right outside of the law,

753
00:49:13,680 --> 00:49:19,759
Speaker 1: which are technically banned by the US Military Code. This

754
00:49:19,840 --> 00:49:23,759
Speaker 1: leads us to this leads us to a troubling conclusion.

755
00:49:23,920 --> 00:49:27,960
Speaker 1: We have to explore the future of assassination. What we've

756
00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:31,560
Speaker 1: sadly proven here is the following. It appears it does

757
00:49:31,640 --> 00:49:35,600
Speaker 1: not matter what laws are written. Write as many as

758
00:49:35,600 --> 00:49:39,319
Speaker 1: you want, say whatever you want, as explicitly or as

759
00:49:39,360 --> 00:49:43,520
Speaker 1: obliquely as you please. These laws do not matter if

760
00:49:43,520 --> 00:49:47,560
Speaker 1: they are not continually enforced. And the truth of the

761
00:49:47,600 --> 00:49:51,640
Speaker 1: matter is that they are not continually enforced assassination is effective.

762
00:49:51,840 --> 00:49:54,880
Speaker 1: It may not be effective in terms of counter terrorism,

763
00:49:54,960 --> 00:49:59,480
Speaker 1: it's arguably terrible pr but it works for what people

764
00:49:59,600 --> 00:50:02,200
Speaker 1: want it to do. And in the future, we're only

765
00:50:02,239 --> 00:50:08,040
Speaker 1: going to see more increasingly sophisticated uses of these tactics, newer,

766
00:50:08,239 --> 00:50:17,040
Speaker 1: more advanced drones, increasingly effective poisoning delivery systems and substances. Importantly,

767
00:50:17,440 --> 00:50:19,359
Speaker 1: and this is what we should all think about, They're

768
00:50:19,400 --> 00:50:25,879
Speaker 1: also going to be increasingly sophisticated, nuanced rationalizations for assassination,

769
00:50:26,360 --> 00:50:32,320
Speaker 1: increasingly sophisticated ways of hiding the hand that ultimately triggered

770
00:50:32,320 --> 00:50:37,040
Speaker 1: the thing. Right, So the front organizations are going to

771
00:50:37,040 --> 00:50:40,520
Speaker 1: be tough. The war of information and narrative will only

772
00:50:40,560 --> 00:50:46,080
Speaker 1: continue to evolve, and as always, one thing will remain

773
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:50,400
Speaker 1: the same. Both the assassins and their masters will argue

774
00:50:50,480 --> 00:50:55,320
Speaker 1: this is necessary for you guessed it the greater good.

775
00:50:55,719 --> 00:50:59,920
Speaker 1: And so today we end our episode with questions for you,

776
00:51:00,800 --> 00:51:04,840
Speaker 1: what do you think the future of assassination holds?

777
00:51:05,239 --> 00:51:09,239
Speaker 2: Yeah, Well, the killings continue, specifically in any of the

778
00:51:09,239 --> 00:51:11,320
Speaker 2: ways we've described.

779
00:51:11,360 --> 00:51:12,600
Speaker 3: Will they increase?

780
00:51:13,600 --> 00:51:19,200
Speaker 1: Well, Corporate, political, and religious actors be held accountable for

781
00:51:19,280 --> 00:51:20,680
Speaker 1: their actions.

782
00:51:20,560 --> 00:51:25,239
Speaker 2: And if so, by whom some international group, Yeah, maybe corp.

783
00:51:26,040 --> 00:51:30,319
Speaker 3: Let us know, are you one of these puppeteers, you know,

784
00:51:30,440 --> 00:51:33,080
Speaker 3: pulling the strings of all of these you know, hidden

785
00:51:33,120 --> 00:51:37,200
Speaker 3: assassins in our midst Let us know you can. We'll

786
00:51:37,239 --> 00:51:40,680
Speaker 3: keep your secrets, buddy, that we promise right to us.

787
00:51:41,160 --> 00:51:45,680
Speaker 3: You can reach us on the social media channels of note, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter,

788
00:51:45,960 --> 00:51:48,600
Speaker 3: all that stuff. Our preferred means is our Facebook group.

789
00:51:48,600 --> 00:51:51,200
Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy, where you can be part

790
00:51:51,239 --> 00:51:53,719
Speaker 3: of the conversation with your fellow conspiracy realists.

791
00:51:54,000 --> 00:51:57,200
Speaker 2: That's right. If you don't want to do that, you

792
00:51:57,200 --> 00:52:00,640
Speaker 2: can find us on Twitter and Facebook the other side

793
00:52:01,120 --> 00:52:05,200
Speaker 2: at conspiracy stuff and on Instagram. We are conspiracy Stuff show.

794
00:52:05,680 --> 00:52:09,520
Speaker 1: Of course, visit us on YouTube, YouTube dot com slash

795
00:52:09,560 --> 00:52:13,719
Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff. If you are not given to sip the

796
00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:17,400
Speaker 1: social needs no worries. We have a phone number for you.

797
00:52:17,400 --> 00:52:21,880
Speaker 1: You can call us at one eight three three STDWYTK.

798
00:52:22,560 --> 00:52:25,719
Speaker 1: You'll have three minutes on your call. Let us know

799
00:52:25,960 --> 00:52:28,160
Speaker 1: what's on your mind, let us know your experience, give

800
00:52:28,239 --> 00:52:32,600
Speaker 1: us your feedback on this series or suggestions for topics

801
00:52:32,640 --> 00:52:34,920
Speaker 1: you think you are fellow listeners will find of interest.

802
00:52:35,360 --> 00:52:38,040
Speaker 1: Most importantly, let us know If it's okay to use

803
00:52:38,080 --> 00:52:40,640
Speaker 1: your voice and your name on air, that's right.

804
00:52:41,160 --> 00:52:43,640
Speaker 2: If you don't want to do any of those things,

805
00:52:43,920 --> 00:52:46,759
Speaker 2: you can still write to us. You can contact us

806
00:52:47,080 --> 00:52:48,520
Speaker 2: Ben nol and I and Paul.

807
00:52:48,560 --> 00:52:49,040
Speaker 3: We'll see you.

808
00:52:49,880 --> 00:52:51,480
Speaker 2: Send us a good old fashioned email.

809
00:52:51,560 --> 00:53:12,879
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810
00:53:13,040 --> 00:53:15,120
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

811
00:53:15,200 --> 00:53:19,760
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812
00:53:19,840 --> 00:53:22,680
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