1 00:00:01,120 --> 00:00:05,040 Speaker 1: Hello, everyone, Happy Saturday. Chuck here with another Saturday Selects 2 00:00:05,040 --> 00:00:10,680 Speaker 1: pick this week, How the Deep Web Works January. This 3 00:00:10,760 --> 00:00:13,760 Speaker 1: is a good one. Everyone's deep Web is deep and 4 00:00:13,840 --> 00:00:15,720 Speaker 1: dark and scary, or at least it can be. And 5 00:00:15,760 --> 00:00:17,919 Speaker 1: we dove into that it's changed a lot over the 6 00:00:17,920 --> 00:00:20,600 Speaker 1: past six years. But this is a pretty good early 7 00:00:20,680 --> 00:00:22,319 Speaker 1: peak at the deep web. And I was proud of 8 00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:24,680 Speaker 1: this one. So give listen. I hope you enjoy it. 9 00:00:24,840 --> 00:00:30,960 Speaker 1: Have a great weekend. Welcome to Stuff You Should Know, 10 00:00:31,160 --> 00:00:39,760 Speaker 1: a production of My Heart Radios How Stuff Works. Hey, 11 00:00:39,800 --> 00:00:42,080 Speaker 1: and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark, and there's 12 00:00:42,120 --> 00:00:46,720 Speaker 1: Charles Depy, Chuck Bryant, yea Audie uh and it makes 13 00:00:46,760 --> 00:00:49,199 Speaker 1: the Stuff you should Know. That's right, mineus Jerry. But 14 00:00:49,240 --> 00:00:54,720 Speaker 1: with no that's right, we lose a Jerry gain a Knoll. Yeah. 15 00:00:54,800 --> 00:01:00,040 Speaker 1: One step forward and another step forward? Oh for you 16 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:02,360 Speaker 1: are you've just been wailing on it. I'm not gonna 17 00:01:02,400 --> 00:01:04,720 Speaker 1: say two steps back with Nol, sitt and five ft away, 18 00:01:05,000 --> 00:01:08,080 Speaker 1: but it could be one and one. One step foward 19 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:10,760 Speaker 1: with Nol, one step back for not having Jerry. You're 20 00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:13,400 Speaker 1: saying it's a step forward not having Jerry, and a 21 00:01:13,440 --> 00:01:16,639 Speaker 1: step forward having nol. I'm just trying to make everyone 22 00:01:16,680 --> 00:01:23,520 Speaker 1: like me doing a poor job of it. You do 23 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:26,880 Speaker 1: a great job of Everybody loves the chuck, not everybody 24 00:01:27,040 --> 00:01:31,200 Speaker 1: who doesn't. I have some mortal enemies. Mortal enemies. Yeah, 25 00:01:31,240 --> 00:01:33,760 Speaker 1: they want to kill them trying to kill you. H 26 00:01:34,400 --> 00:01:38,240 Speaker 1: we'll chuck. Yes, I will tell you what if they 27 00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 1: did want to kill you, they wanted to hire a 28 00:01:40,640 --> 00:01:43,559 Speaker 1: hit many. Yeah. The deep web is a good place 29 00:01:43,600 --> 00:01:46,960 Speaker 1: to start, looking quite a segway. It's been a while. 30 00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:50,600 Speaker 1: I t that one up. You did unintentionally. Yeah, I 31 00:01:50,640 --> 00:01:52,840 Speaker 1: spotted it and went after it. Yeah. This is about 32 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:56,760 Speaker 1: both the deep and dark web, which are two different things. 33 00:01:56,800 --> 00:01:59,160 Speaker 1: The dark web is part of the deep web, thank you. 34 00:01:59,200 --> 00:02:03,680 Speaker 1: But the deep web is necessarily dark, all dark. Yeah, 35 00:02:03,760 --> 00:02:06,280 Speaker 1: that's very well put. The dark web is the nefarious 36 00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:09,840 Speaker 1: things that go on in the deep web, not necessarily nefarious, 37 00:02:09,880 --> 00:02:12,920 Speaker 1: but the purposefully hidden. Yeah, that's true, because there are 38 00:02:12,960 --> 00:02:16,000 Speaker 1: some good things in the dark web. I totally misspoke. Yeah, 39 00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 1: well you know what. I think that it's great that 40 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 1: you confess to it. You feel better, I do. Man. 41 00:02:21,400 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 1: This is a really upfront kind of episode, isn't it. 42 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:30,359 Speaker 1: It's a very honest we're bearing it all. Uh so, 43 00:02:30,520 --> 00:02:33,040 Speaker 1: do you have a fancy intro story? No? You think 44 00:02:33,040 --> 00:02:37,160 Speaker 1: I would? Right, My intro gets buried later on. It's 45 00:02:37,200 --> 00:02:40,919 Speaker 1: a great intro, but it just I'll use it as 46 00:02:40,960 --> 00:02:47,320 Speaker 1: the intro. Okay, go ahead, okay, okay, Chuck. Yes, have 47 00:02:47,440 --> 00:02:50,919 Speaker 1: you heard of our favorite band, Iron Maiden? Ah? Yeah, 48 00:02:50,960 --> 00:02:55,960 Speaker 1: sure so. Iron Maiden is arguably the most awesome band 49 00:02:55,960 --> 00:03:00,840 Speaker 1: of all time. Oh dude, all right, not a huge fan, 50 00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:03,520 Speaker 1: but you you wouldn't be like I hate Iron Maiden. 51 00:03:03,880 --> 00:03:06,200 Speaker 1: They suck, of course. Not no, because it makes you crazy. 52 00:03:06,320 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: It's right. Iron Maid's been around for a while. They're 53 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:12,840 Speaker 1: pretty smart. They know what they're doing. Um and recently 54 00:03:13,440 --> 00:03:18,480 Speaker 1: they figured out a way to maximize their touring dollars 55 00:03:19,080 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: by flying their own plane. They well, Bruce Dickinson always did. 56 00:03:22,680 --> 00:03:25,960 Speaker 1: Yeah he was. He's a certified pilot. It's gotta be efficient. 57 00:03:26,440 --> 00:03:29,760 Speaker 1: I would imagine, plus fun unless Bruce was partying too 58 00:03:29,840 --> 00:03:31,680 Speaker 1: hard and then they got to fly to the next 59 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:33,920 Speaker 1: city that night. He wouldn't do that, I hope not, 60 00:03:34,400 --> 00:03:38,520 Speaker 1: because that's that's dangerous. I mean, driving drunk is bad enough, 61 00:03:38,600 --> 00:03:41,920 Speaker 1: but flying drunk I can only imagine. Sure. Uh, and 62 00:03:42,000 --> 00:03:45,000 Speaker 1: it's probably not just drunk, you know what I'm saying. No, no, no, 63 00:03:45,040 --> 00:03:49,000 Speaker 1: he's he's straight straight has he always been? I don't know. 64 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 1: I can't verify that well anyway, Um, Bruce and the 65 00:03:52,080 --> 00:03:56,200 Speaker 1: boys uh figured out that a good way to figure 66 00:03:56,200 --> 00:03:59,560 Speaker 1: out where to tour, where to decide to tour, um 67 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:04,120 Speaker 1: be to figure out where their music was getting pirated 68 00:04:04,160 --> 00:04:09,360 Speaker 1: the most. That sounds reasonable. It does sound reasonable. It's it. 69 00:04:09,360 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: It provides you with evidence of an established fan base 70 00:04:14,120 --> 00:04:17,680 Speaker 1: and a fan base that is unwilling to pay for 71 00:04:17,760 --> 00:04:21,920 Speaker 1: your record but would probably pay to see you live. 72 00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:26,719 Speaker 1: How does that reason? Well, they like your music, but 73 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:29,280 Speaker 1: they don't want to pay for your CD, so why 74 00:04:29,279 --> 00:04:31,680 Speaker 1: would they go to see live and pay? Because it's different, Like, 75 00:04:31,720 --> 00:04:34,640 Speaker 1: seeing a live show is way different than buying a CD. 76 00:04:34,720 --> 00:04:36,560 Speaker 1: You can't you can't get a live show. You could 77 00:04:36,600 --> 00:04:38,280 Speaker 1: get a video of a live show, it's still not 78 00:04:38,320 --> 00:04:40,679 Speaker 1: the same experience. A live show is a live show. Plus, 79 00:04:41,120 --> 00:04:45,920 Speaker 1: everybody always knows that anybody involved in the or entrenched 80 00:04:45,960 --> 00:04:49,560 Speaker 1: in the old guard music industry does any band doesn't 81 00:04:49,560 --> 00:04:52,520 Speaker 1: make any money on their records and make it on touring, 82 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 1: So going to see a band live also is kind 83 00:04:55,600 --> 00:04:59,040 Speaker 1: of a true act of fandom because you're really you're 84 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:03,080 Speaker 1: you're contributing directly to your band that you like. You know. Um, 85 00:05:03,120 --> 00:05:05,040 Speaker 1: So what they did was they hired a company to 86 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:09,719 Speaker 1: look at bit torrent sites and find the regions where 87 00:05:09,800 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 1: their music it was most pirate ID and they created 88 00:05:12,880 --> 00:05:15,040 Speaker 1: a tour map from it and went and played those regions. 89 00:05:15,120 --> 00:05:17,840 Speaker 1: Did you do you have the number one Iron Maiden 90 00:05:17,880 --> 00:05:23,880 Speaker 1: pirated region? But we're gonna say Rio, all right, they're 91 00:05:23,960 --> 00:05:26,960 Speaker 1: huge in South America. That's that's my guess. We'll look 92 00:05:26,960 --> 00:05:29,960 Speaker 1: it up afterward, I guess Rio. And so they were like, 93 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:32,160 Speaker 1: we're gonna start our tor and Rio. Yeah. And it 94 00:05:32,240 --> 00:05:35,120 Speaker 1: wasn't just that that one place, but it was basically 95 00:05:35,160 --> 00:05:38,360 Speaker 1: a tour that was built on the areas where the 96 00:05:38,480 --> 00:05:40,599 Speaker 1: music was most pirated. It was a Stroker genius, but 97 00:05:41,320 --> 00:05:45,560 Speaker 1: they couldn't have done it without harvesting the deep web 98 00:05:46,279 --> 00:05:49,800 Speaker 1: because bit torrent sites. When you search bit torrent, it 99 00:05:49,839 --> 00:05:54,279 Speaker 1: doesn't the average search engine doesn't respond with a list 100 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:57,600 Speaker 1: of bit torrent activity. It'll just send you to a 101 00:05:57,600 --> 00:06:00,360 Speaker 1: bit torrent site, which means that those pages is of 102 00:06:00,520 --> 00:06:03,839 Speaker 1: bit touring activity, which are web pages, and they do exist. 103 00:06:04,320 --> 00:06:07,080 Speaker 1: They're part of what's called the deep web. That's right, 104 00:06:07,279 --> 00:06:10,520 Speaker 1: the surface web as we know it, and search engines 105 00:06:10,560 --> 00:06:14,839 Speaker 1: that we all use like Google and being supposedly only 106 00:06:14,880 --> 00:06:18,279 Speaker 1: have access to about point zero three percent of what 107 00:06:18,440 --> 00:06:23,640 Speaker 1: is truly on the world wide Web. It's like scary 108 00:06:23,720 --> 00:06:26,960 Speaker 1: and weird and thrilling all at the same time. Point 109 00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:32,279 Speaker 1: three And anything else that's buried is the deep web. 110 00:06:32,360 --> 00:06:37,280 Speaker 1: And it's not necessarily the deep web is not is 111 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:39,400 Speaker 1: not when you're purposely trying to hide things. It just 112 00:06:39,480 --> 00:06:43,920 Speaker 1: may not be cataloged and index may a password. Sure, 113 00:06:44,040 --> 00:06:48,480 Speaker 1: maybe one of those timed sites that uh don't let 114 00:06:48,560 --> 00:06:51,719 Speaker 1: you access date after a certain amount of time, could 115 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 1: be anything with a captution involved, anything that's not hyperlinked. Uh, 116 00:06:56,480 --> 00:06:58,560 Speaker 1: there's lots of reasons that something could find it is 117 00:06:58,560 --> 00:07:01,440 Speaker 1: all buried in the deep web. And and you make 118 00:07:01,480 --> 00:07:04,280 Speaker 1: a good point to separate the deep web and the 119 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:06,279 Speaker 1: dark webs. Let me give you an example of deep 120 00:07:06,320 --> 00:07:09,760 Speaker 1: web aside from those bit torrent sites. Um, there's this 121 00:07:09,800 --> 00:07:12,120 Speaker 1: company called bright Planet and they had this price they 122 00:07:12,200 --> 00:07:14,720 Speaker 1: provide deep web harvesting, and they had this primer on 123 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:16,840 Speaker 1: you know, what is the deep web. One of the 124 00:07:16,840 --> 00:07:20,120 Speaker 1: examples they used was if you look up government grants 125 00:07:20,440 --> 00:07:24,080 Speaker 1: on a traditional search engine, it will probably provide you 126 00:07:24,160 --> 00:07:27,560 Speaker 1: with www. Dot grants dot gov as one of the 127 00:07:27,600 --> 00:07:31,400 Speaker 1: first returns right straight up. Um, when you go onto 128 00:07:31,440 --> 00:07:34,760 Speaker 1: grants dot CoV, you can then search and find pages 129 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:37,520 Speaker 1: of all these different government grants. You can search by keyword, 130 00:07:37,560 --> 00:07:40,160 Speaker 1: you can browse, but those pages aren't going to come 131 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:43,240 Speaker 1: up on your normal Google search. You have to go 132 00:07:43,280 --> 00:07:45,640 Speaker 1: to the site, which means that those pages of the 133 00:07:45,680 --> 00:07:49,000 Speaker 1: actual grants are part of the deep web. Yeah, your 134 00:07:49,040 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: bank account, you're checking account online, if you have mobile 135 00:07:52,960 --> 00:07:55,840 Speaker 1: banking or online banking, it has a web page all 136 00:07:55,840 --> 00:08:00,640 Speaker 1: to its own right now. And if I searched Chuck 137 00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:04,840 Speaker 1: Bryant's checking account, it would not come back. I would 138 00:08:04,920 --> 00:08:07,320 Speaker 1: not get that because it's behind a password. It's a 139 00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:10,800 Speaker 1: it's a website page. It's a web page, but it's 140 00:08:10,960 --> 00:08:15,040 Speaker 1: password encrypted. Therefore it's part of the deep web. Twitter 141 00:08:15,480 --> 00:08:19,280 Speaker 1: until it index tweets used to be you couldn't search 142 00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:23,800 Speaker 1: tweets individual tweets. Now you can, so that made them 143 00:08:23,840 --> 00:08:27,160 Speaker 1: formerly a part of the deep web. Actual tweets or 144 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:30,760 Speaker 1: every company on the planet has some sort of internal 145 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:36,559 Speaker 1: employee pages like internal dot discovery that only we can 146 00:08:36,600 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 1: access and you can't Google search any of that stuff, right, 147 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:44,680 Speaker 1: or somebody could conceivably access it. Maybe it depends on 148 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:47,040 Speaker 1: the page, but you have to know the exact u 149 00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:51,400 Speaker 1: r L. So the idea is, if it's blind, if 150 00:08:51,440 --> 00:08:53,880 Speaker 1: if search engines are blind to it, it's part of 151 00:08:53,880 --> 00:08:57,360 Speaker 1: the deep web. If search engines can index it and 152 00:08:57,400 --> 00:09:01,920 Speaker 1: bring it back as a return results search results, Um, 153 00:09:01,960 --> 00:09:04,400 Speaker 1: it's part of the surface web. Yeah, because that's all 154 00:09:04,400 --> 00:09:07,520 Speaker 1: the search engine is doing. They are We might should 155 00:09:07,559 --> 00:09:09,680 Speaker 1: do a full podcast on search engines at some point, 156 00:09:10,160 --> 00:09:12,600 Speaker 1: but the general thing is that there is an index 157 00:09:12,640 --> 00:09:17,120 Speaker 1: of data, and they use spiders or crawlers because it 158 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:20,959 Speaker 1: is a web, to crawl around and locate domain names 159 00:09:20,960 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: and hyperlinks and basically index all that in what they 160 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:28,960 Speaker 1: think will be most helpful to what you're looking for. Right, 161 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:32,000 Speaker 1: So chuck Brian's bank account. Yeah, there are some web 162 00:09:32,040 --> 00:09:37,120 Speaker 1: pages out there that contain information related to that keyword search. Yes, 163 00:09:37,480 --> 00:09:40,480 Speaker 1: so a search engine will keep an index with that 164 00:09:40,559 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 1: keyword search with the u r L s, the locations, 165 00:09:44,200 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 1: the page content, some of the page content, the meta 166 00:09:47,200 --> 00:09:53,480 Speaker 1: tags are the metadata, and other very brief sketch information 167 00:09:53,520 --> 00:09:57,280 Speaker 1: about those pages associated with the keyword for an index, 168 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:00,160 Speaker 1: which means that when you type in Chuck Brian, it's 169 00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:02,439 Speaker 1: bank account. You got a quit saying that. Sorry, I 170 00:10:03,120 --> 00:10:05,000 Speaker 1: thought about it as I was saying it that last time. 171 00:10:05,280 --> 00:10:10,000 Speaker 1: But when you type in um Birds of Paradise bank account, 172 00:10:10,320 --> 00:10:14,400 Speaker 1: bank account, um, it will the search engine goes and 173 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:17,599 Speaker 1: accesses the index. It doesn't have to go all the 174 00:10:17,640 --> 00:10:20,160 Speaker 1: way across every page on the web that it can find. 175 00:10:20,520 --> 00:10:23,720 Speaker 1: It just goes to its indices, and that's how search 176 00:10:23,800 --> 00:10:26,680 Speaker 1: results are returned so quickly. It's not going across the internet. 177 00:10:26,800 --> 00:10:31,920 Speaker 1: It's already got the spider crawlers, the bots doing that constantly. 178 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:34,640 Speaker 1: The search engine is just going to the index is 179 00:10:34,720 --> 00:10:37,560 Speaker 1: that the bots have created from their searches. Yeah, and 180 00:10:37,600 --> 00:10:39,959 Speaker 1: it is super shallow. I mean, we said point zero 181 00:10:40,120 --> 00:10:42,440 Speaker 1: three percent. We do. We do our whole job as 182 00:10:42,520 --> 00:10:46,440 Speaker 1: researching online mainly, and we run into this all the 183 00:10:46,480 --> 00:10:49,800 Speaker 1: time where you feel like you're getting a very slim 184 00:10:49,920 --> 00:10:52,959 Speaker 1: portion of what you're trying to find out because so 185 00:10:53,000 --> 00:10:56,800 Speaker 1: many of the best uh, medical journals and things like 186 00:10:56,880 --> 00:11:00,439 Speaker 1: this don't just pop up as you know, it's more 187 00:11:00,480 --> 00:11:04,040 Speaker 1: likely to be some headline from CNN dot com and 188 00:11:04,120 --> 00:11:06,880 Speaker 1: not like a Harvard Medical Journal paper that could really 189 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:08,679 Speaker 1: help you out. Yeah, And I mean, like you can 190 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:13,400 Speaker 1: get deeper and deeper with your keyword skills and your 191 00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:17,200 Speaker 1: search skills, but for the most part that Yeah, the 192 00:11:17,240 --> 00:11:20,160 Speaker 1: first returns of first results, depending on what you search for, 193 00:11:20,640 --> 00:11:23,319 Speaker 1: are going to be, like you said, superficial. Yeah. But 194 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:27,400 Speaker 1: even if you're super a super sleuth, a Google master 195 00:11:27,880 --> 00:11:29,880 Speaker 1: like we all think we are, I mean, how can 196 00:11:29,920 --> 00:11:32,839 Speaker 1: how much can that be bumping it up point one? Yeah, Well, 197 00:11:32,880 --> 00:11:34,800 Speaker 1: a lot of the problem, to the chuck is the 198 00:11:35,840 --> 00:11:38,400 Speaker 1: so much of science is behind a paywall. Yeah, yeah, 199 00:11:38,800 --> 00:11:42,920 Speaker 1: really really really expensive paywalls. To um, which is like, 200 00:11:42,960 --> 00:11:45,360 Speaker 1: here's the first eight lines of this awesome medical research 201 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:49,640 Speaker 1: paper exactly if you want it, give us. Yeah, which 202 00:11:49,640 --> 00:11:52,000 Speaker 1: is a problem in and of itself, not necessarily related 203 00:11:52,040 --> 00:11:55,960 Speaker 1: to this, but with current search engine technology, you have, 204 00:11:56,520 --> 00:12:01,480 Speaker 1: like you said, a superficial result from a core um 205 00:12:01,559 --> 00:12:03,280 Speaker 1: on the other end of the spectrum, And this is 206 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:06,599 Speaker 1: kind of what search instances are dealing with now, Um, 207 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:09,160 Speaker 1: the deeper you go into the deep web. Again, the 208 00:12:09,200 --> 00:12:12,000 Speaker 1: surface web is point zero three percent of all of 209 00:12:12,040 --> 00:12:15,000 Speaker 1: the web pages on the entire Internet, So the further 210 00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:18,080 Speaker 1: you go into it, the more data you have, and 211 00:12:18,120 --> 00:12:20,360 Speaker 1: you eventually can run into the problem of what's called 212 00:12:20,360 --> 00:12:24,760 Speaker 1: big data, which not capitalized B or D, which refers 213 00:12:24,800 --> 00:12:28,720 Speaker 1: to like companies like Google and and that that can 214 00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:32,680 Speaker 1: dig and harvest and maintain a large amount of data. 215 00:12:32,920 --> 00:12:35,439 Speaker 1: It's just it's basically data that's so much and so 216 00:12:35,520 --> 00:12:40,000 Speaker 1: unwieldy you can't even uh process and search it. It's 217 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:42,880 Speaker 1: like not even helpful. It's yeah, it's like a really 218 00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:47,360 Speaker 1: bad Internet search. Yeah. Um, so the the the current 219 00:12:47,880 --> 00:12:53,920 Speaker 1: state of search engine design or creation is balancing that 220 00:12:54,160 --> 00:12:58,520 Speaker 1: figuring out how to get less superficial without running into 221 00:12:58,600 --> 00:13:02,920 Speaker 1: the big data problem of of incoherent data due to 222 00:13:03,000 --> 00:13:06,480 Speaker 1: just massive amounts of returns. And you might think that 223 00:13:07,040 --> 00:13:09,400 Speaker 1: these search engines do a great job because I can 224 00:13:09,400 --> 00:13:11,480 Speaker 1: always find out what I need, But you don't know 225 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:14,840 Speaker 1: what you're missing, you know, right, So it's it's sort 226 00:13:14,880 --> 00:13:18,120 Speaker 1: of not even correct to say that I always find 227 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:19,680 Speaker 1: out what I need because you may even know you 228 00:13:19,720 --> 00:13:22,439 Speaker 1: need it because it's hidden. That's true, And I mean 229 00:13:22,520 --> 00:13:48,000 Speaker 1: you're you're missing quite a bit. Okay. There's apparently fifty 230 00:13:48,120 --> 00:13:53,320 Speaker 1: million registered domains on the Internet. Yeah, and that's I 231 00:13:53,400 --> 00:13:55,800 Speaker 1: looked at like just in two thousand twelve. I think 232 00:13:55,800 --> 00:13:58,199 Speaker 1: there're only like two hundred and fifty or something. I mean, 233 00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:00,640 Speaker 1: it seems like it's doubled in the last couple years. Right, 234 00:14:00,679 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 1: So there's five million domains, for example, a lot of 235 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:06,360 Speaker 1: more garbage, yes, but how stuff Works dot Com is 236 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 1: one domain, And I asked Tracy Wilson, who's the site 237 00:14:10,280 --> 00:14:13,480 Speaker 1: director and runs stuff you missed in history class. It's 238 00:14:13,520 --> 00:14:16,480 Speaker 1: one of the co hosts. How many pages there are 239 00:14:16,600 --> 00:14:21,720 Speaker 1: how stuff Works? She said roughly at least, so one 240 00:14:21,760 --> 00:14:27,040 Speaker 1: domain out of five fifty million has fifty pages itself. Right, 241 00:14:27,280 --> 00:14:29,000 Speaker 1: so you kind of get an idea of the scope. 242 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:32,920 Speaker 1: Deep web is anywhere from four hundred to five hundred 243 00:14:32,960 --> 00:14:37,080 Speaker 1: times bigger than the surface web. And like you said, 244 00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:39,320 Speaker 1: you don't know what you're missing because you don't know 245 00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: what's out there because your search returns aren't bringing you 246 00:14:42,680 --> 00:14:44,840 Speaker 1: back anything. Yeah, I mean there's a lot of important 247 00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,600 Speaker 1: stuff out there. We talked about medical papers. Um, apparently 248 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:52,360 Speaker 1: there's engineering databases, financial financial information, a lot of things 249 00:14:52,360 --> 00:14:56,360 Speaker 1: that could really help research. Uh, but you just can't 250 00:14:56,360 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 1: find it, right. Um. Unpublished blog posts or just basically 251 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:05,640 Speaker 1: anything that a person creates on the Internet. Yeah, Um, 252 00:15:06,320 --> 00:15:09,440 Speaker 1: is if a page is created, it's part of the 253 00:15:09,520 --> 00:15:12,600 Speaker 1: deep web. Yeah, unless you take this stuff down, it's 254 00:15:12,640 --> 00:15:16,400 Speaker 1: living there forever, just gathering dust exactly. So. Um, and 255 00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 1: it's not just necessarily engineering databases or medical information. Um. 256 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:25,880 Speaker 1: There's also a lot of shady stuff too. The dark web. 257 00:15:26,080 --> 00:15:28,320 Speaker 1: That's the that's the dark web. Yeah, that is the 258 00:15:28,400 --> 00:15:33,320 Speaker 1: dark web. Is when is um the sites intentionally uh 259 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,120 Speaker 1: reroute you. Well, we'll get to how they do it, 260 00:15:36,160 --> 00:15:41,280 Speaker 1: but basically it's a it's an intentional anonymity. Um, it's not. Oh, 261 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:42,760 Speaker 1: it just happens to be buried on the deep web 262 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:45,920 Speaker 1: because it's not index it's it is purposely hidden from 263 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:51,520 Speaker 1: the surface web, so people can't track the person searching 264 00:15:51,560 --> 00:15:56,080 Speaker 1: for something or the the end uh website. I guess 265 00:15:56,960 --> 00:16:00,720 Speaker 1: like those are all just private essentially, right, and privacy 266 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:04,760 Speaker 1: advocates are way into it. You're not necessarily a child pornographer, 267 00:16:05,360 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: although there is a lot of that kind of stuff 268 00:16:07,320 --> 00:16:09,600 Speaker 1: on the dark web. Um, there's also a lot of 269 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:12,160 Speaker 1: good that happens on the dark web. Yeah. The the 270 00:16:12,280 --> 00:16:15,560 Speaker 1: anonymity and privacy and the desire for it isn't in 271 00:16:15,640 --> 00:16:18,120 Speaker 1: and of itself proof of wrongdoing, of course, not no, 272 00:16:18,320 --> 00:16:22,480 Speaker 1: which is frequently it's frequently pointed out as that but incorrectly. Yeah, 273 00:16:22,760 --> 00:16:23,840 Speaker 1: I like, I don't want the n s A. And 274 00:16:23,920 --> 00:16:25,840 Speaker 1: my business people like, well, what are you doing right? 275 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:28,120 Speaker 1: Exactly nothing. Yeah, I just don't want them in my 276 00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:32,120 Speaker 1: business precisely. Yeah. Um, that's an answer. That's good enough. 277 00:16:32,280 --> 00:16:35,600 Speaker 1: That answer is good enough. And for a lot of people, um, 278 00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:37,400 Speaker 1: they say, well, then I need to go to the 279 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:42,000 Speaker 1: dark web to maintain anonymity, um or higher hit man 280 00:16:42,280 --> 00:16:46,960 Speaker 1: right to kill Chuck Bryant. That you could do. That's crazy, Um, 281 00:16:47,240 --> 00:16:49,760 Speaker 1: you could do. There was a site for a while. Um, 282 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:50,960 Speaker 1: I don't know if you've heard of it or not. 283 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 1: It's called the Silk Road, Yeah, which got shut down, 284 00:16:54,640 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 1: and I teach Chuck, I know you've heard of it. 285 00:16:56,800 --> 00:16:59,560 Speaker 1: It's like the most famous dark website of all time. 286 00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:03,680 Speaker 1: The the Feds busted um ross Albrick, who may or 287 00:17:03,760 --> 00:17:07,160 Speaker 1: may not be dread Pirate Roberts, which was the online 288 00:17:07,240 --> 00:17:09,960 Speaker 1: name that they said he's the guy running this, and 289 00:17:10,040 --> 00:17:13,439 Speaker 1: he is now saying, actually that's not me. Um, but 290 00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:17,959 Speaker 1: all those bitcoins are mine, so you can't seize those bitcoins. 291 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:20,800 Speaker 1: And there it's in courts now they're trying to determine 292 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:23,960 Speaker 1: whether or not it's it counts as something that you 293 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:27,200 Speaker 1: can seize as an asset from a criminal. And they're 294 00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:29,920 Speaker 1: saying that this is literally a case that no court 295 00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:33,520 Speaker 1: has ever heard before. Yeah, they they it's never been 296 00:17:34,160 --> 00:17:38,080 Speaker 1: questioned whether you could seize cryptocurrency. Yeah, and you should 297 00:17:38,160 --> 00:17:40,760 Speaker 1: listen to our podcast on bitcoins by the way, from 298 00:17:40,840 --> 00:17:44,080 Speaker 1: not too many months ago. But it's essentially just yeah, 299 00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:47,600 Speaker 1: encrypted digital currency. And they have a really really fascinating, 300 00:17:48,040 --> 00:17:52,800 Speaker 1: circumstantial case against a brick Um, not just for operating 301 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:56,960 Speaker 1: the Silk Road site. Yeah. Um, that's where you could 302 00:17:56,960 --> 00:17:59,160 Speaker 1: buy drugs and things, by the way, right, which being 303 00:17:59,200 --> 00:18:01,359 Speaker 1: the operator of that in and of itself shouldn't be 304 00:18:01,400 --> 00:18:03,560 Speaker 1: a crime. I'm sure that they would have prosecuted him 305 00:18:03,640 --> 00:18:05,760 Speaker 1: for that if they'd been able to get their hands 306 00:18:05,760 --> 00:18:09,119 Speaker 1: on him for just that. But apparently they also have 307 00:18:09,280 --> 00:18:14,560 Speaker 1: him for at least two hired contract killings. One he 308 00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:21,120 Speaker 1: he um, I guess hired an undercover cop to do it, 309 00:18:21,240 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 1: and the guy went to the person who he was 310 00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:26,800 Speaker 1: taking the hit out on and said, this guy's trying 311 00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:29,199 Speaker 1: to kill you. I need you to cooperate, and I'm 312 00:18:29,240 --> 00:18:31,919 Speaker 1: going to take pictures of you dead and send them 313 00:18:31,960 --> 00:18:34,600 Speaker 1: to this guy, and Old Brick apparently gave him like 314 00:18:34,640 --> 00:18:38,680 Speaker 1: forty grand up front, another forty after he saw the photos. 315 00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:42,840 Speaker 1: So like in bitcoins, No, I think in cash, although no, 316 00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:45,120 Speaker 1: it would have been in bitcoins. You're right, yeah, yeah, 317 00:18:45,600 --> 00:18:47,479 Speaker 1: so who knows? It could have been two bitcoins at 318 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:50,720 Speaker 1: the time or five thousand. Well, silk Row two point 319 00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:53,440 Speaker 1: oh launched in November? Is it out? Now? It's out? 320 00:18:53,600 --> 00:18:57,560 Speaker 1: And um there are other copycatters, like the black Market 321 00:18:57,640 --> 00:19:00,760 Speaker 1: reloaded and which that one down for a little while 322 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:03,000 Speaker 1: after silk Road went down, but then it went back up. 323 00:19:03,040 --> 00:19:05,080 Speaker 1: I think, yeah, Like, I don't know, man, I hate 324 00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:08,160 Speaker 1: to say you shouldn't try and fight crime, but you're 325 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:10,399 Speaker 1: not going to stop the stuff when one, you know, 326 00:19:10,480 --> 00:19:12,280 Speaker 1: you cut off the head of one and another grows 327 00:19:12,359 --> 00:19:15,200 Speaker 1: right out of it in its place. You know, it's 328 00:19:15,280 --> 00:19:20,400 Speaker 1: true if the structure that's allowing for the anonymity can 329 00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:25,400 Speaker 1: remain intact, which is the dark web, right, But it's 330 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:27,880 Speaker 1: not just the dark web, it's like how you traverse 331 00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:30,320 Speaker 1: the dark web, like using tour Yeah, I guess we 332 00:19:30,320 --> 00:19:33,800 Speaker 1: haven't explained. Um, the Onion Router t o R is 333 00:19:33,840 --> 00:19:36,480 Speaker 1: what it's called and it is software that you use 334 00:19:36,560 --> 00:19:39,600 Speaker 1: to access the deep web and the dark web if 335 00:19:39,640 --> 00:19:44,520 Speaker 1: you choose to UM and it searches for these anonymous 336 00:19:44,520 --> 00:19:46,880 Speaker 1: sites for you, like a search engine, but instead of 337 00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:49,760 Speaker 1: dot com or dot org or dot net, they end 338 00:19:49,800 --> 00:19:52,879 Speaker 1: in dot onion the idea and onion has many layers 339 00:19:53,600 --> 00:19:57,440 Speaker 1: and UM that's that's how you access it through tour. 340 00:19:57,520 --> 00:19:59,080 Speaker 1: You have to buy it and install it on your computer. 341 00:19:59,640 --> 00:20:04,040 Speaker 1: It makes it for free. Yeah, Firefox had UM something 342 00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:06,639 Speaker 1: that it was basically a tour bundle. It was the 343 00:20:06,680 --> 00:20:08,879 Speaker 1: most popular one and you could download it for free. 344 00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:12,160 Speaker 1: But it's not a web browser itself. It's like an 345 00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:15,600 Speaker 1: add on to a web browser that allows anonymity. And 346 00:20:15,680 --> 00:20:19,040 Speaker 1: it does two things. One, it bounces your trail all 347 00:20:19,119 --> 00:20:21,480 Speaker 1: over the world from server to server, so it makes 348 00:20:21,480 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 1: you and your activity extraordinarily difficult to track. It's not 349 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 1: just like this computer went to this site, right, It's 350 00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:31,080 Speaker 1: like that's that whole Onion thing. There's so many layers. 351 00:20:31,160 --> 00:20:32,920 Speaker 1: It's like we can't we don't know who this is 352 00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:34,879 Speaker 1: or where they're, where they are, what they're doing, or 353 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:37,439 Speaker 1: anything like that. We just know right now that this 354 00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:40,159 Speaker 1: particular person happens to be it. There's a user on 355 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 1: silk Road, but we don't know who it is or anything. 356 00:20:42,920 --> 00:20:45,400 Speaker 1: You can't track them because they're using Tour. The other 357 00:20:45,440 --> 00:20:48,959 Speaker 1: thing is you can't get into dot onion domain sites, 358 00:20:49,359 --> 00:20:52,840 Speaker 1: dark websites unless you're using tour, Like they won't let 359 00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:56,160 Speaker 1: you in unless you're an anonymous user. Um So, tour 360 00:20:56,240 --> 00:20:59,280 Speaker 1: has this kind of twofold thing, but there was recently 361 00:20:59,280 --> 00:21:01,320 Speaker 1: a breach in it and it turned out the FBI 362 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:05,800 Speaker 1: was using malware to break through the anonymity of tour users. 363 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:08,280 Speaker 1: And yeah, and found out a lot of people on 364 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,240 Speaker 1: some sites that are that were hosted by something called 365 00:21:11,280 --> 00:21:15,880 Speaker 1: Freedom Hosting, which apparently had a horrible reputation for being 366 00:21:16,280 --> 00:21:18,840 Speaker 1: the repository on the web, on the dark web for 367 00:21:18,920 --> 00:21:23,119 Speaker 1: child pornography and knowingly like basically just not doing anything 368 00:21:23,119 --> 00:21:29,680 Speaker 1: about it. Um So, the FBI had a They hacked 369 00:21:30,480 --> 00:21:34,959 Speaker 1: the Freedom Hosting servers and inserted this malware. So if 370 00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:37,120 Speaker 1: you went to a Freedom Hosting site, any of them, 371 00:21:37,119 --> 00:21:39,840 Speaker 1: not just necessarily a child pornography but any site hosted 372 00:21:39,840 --> 00:21:42,479 Speaker 1: by Freedom Hosting, which is like say go Daddy for 373 00:21:42,880 --> 00:21:47,680 Speaker 1: the dark web, um you would get this malware package 374 00:21:48,040 --> 00:21:53,760 Speaker 1: that exploited a key hole in Firefox's tore bundle. It 375 00:21:53,840 --> 00:21:57,200 Speaker 1: went into your computer, said hey, give me your mac address, 376 00:21:57,520 --> 00:22:02,800 Speaker 1: which is basically like your computer hardware, like serial numbers 377 00:22:02,840 --> 00:22:07,200 Speaker 1: your computers and your computers alans tracking number, and then 378 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:10,119 Speaker 1: also tell me where the computer is, and it sent 379 00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:14,120 Speaker 1: it back to a server, a mystery server in McLean, Virginia. 380 00:22:14,359 --> 00:22:16,680 Speaker 1: And finally, after like a month, FBI was like, yeah, 381 00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:18,679 Speaker 1: that was us. We got We have everybody who went 382 00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:22,240 Speaker 1: on that site's name and address and everything on them. 383 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:26,000 Speaker 1: So that's been a huge ripple and Firefox fixed this loophole. 384 00:22:26,440 --> 00:22:29,359 Speaker 1: But it's a huge ripple through you know, the dark web, 385 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:33,879 Speaker 1: deep web community saying like whoa, whoa. We were anonymous before, 386 00:22:33,960 --> 00:22:37,840 Speaker 1: but you know now it's it's been shown definitively that 387 00:22:38,359 --> 00:22:41,679 Speaker 1: the FEDS can find out who we are. So the 388 00:22:41,880 --> 00:22:45,399 Speaker 1: anonymity is reduced, if not taken away, which defeats the 389 00:22:45,400 --> 00:22:47,720 Speaker 1: whole purpose. Yeah, so if you don't have that, then 390 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:49,760 Speaker 1: you can keep lopping the heads off of these things, 391 00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:52,320 Speaker 1: and they're not going to grow back because people are afraid. 392 00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:55,360 Speaker 1: People will be afraid because they won't feel like they're 393 00:22:55,359 --> 00:22:59,520 Speaker 1: anonymous any longer. Well tour has a sort of an 394 00:22:59,520 --> 00:23:02,199 Speaker 1: ironic background, which we will get to right after this 395 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:21,320 Speaker 1: message break. All right, so we're back and we left 396 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:24,320 Speaker 1: you with the the nugget that tour has an interesting background, 397 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:28,119 Speaker 1: and the background of tours Actually, the US Naval Research 398 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:32,120 Speaker 1: Laboratory in two thousand three launched this program for political 399 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:35,760 Speaker 1: dissidents and whistleblowers so they can get their message out 400 00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:38,480 Speaker 1: without fear of reprisal. Right, and this is still a 401 00:23:38,640 --> 00:23:41,359 Speaker 1: use of tour Like the New York Times, Wiki Leaks, 402 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:47,440 Speaker 1: some other news agencies have um tour sites that if 403 00:23:47,440 --> 00:23:49,800 Speaker 1: you want to go and contact the New York Times 404 00:23:49,840 --> 00:23:52,960 Speaker 1: or Wiki Leaks anonymously, like you can go to their 405 00:23:52,960 --> 00:23:57,880 Speaker 1: tour their onion site and UM upload documents or say hey, 406 00:23:57,920 --> 00:24:00,520 Speaker 1: I have some information I want to share, right, and 407 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: you can do it anonymously. So the government, though, is 408 00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:07,400 Speaker 1: basically law enforcements trying to track down criminals using the 409 00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:10,040 Speaker 1: software that the government created to begin with. So it's 410 00:24:10,040 --> 00:24:13,639 Speaker 1: an interesting loop. Um. But like we said, it's not 411 00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:19,240 Speaker 1: all badness. Um. If you live in a country where 412 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:21,520 Speaker 1: bad things are going on and you don't feel safe 413 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,800 Speaker 1: getting on the regular web as a political dissident, you 414 00:24:24,840 --> 00:24:27,720 Speaker 1: can do so on the dark web. It offers a 415 00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: virtual meeting place for sometimes people are trying to, you know, 416 00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:37,160 Speaker 1: combat these oppressive regimes in their countries, and they can't 417 00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:40,680 Speaker 1: just hop on Facebook and organize a meeting because they'll 418 00:24:40,720 --> 00:24:44,119 Speaker 1: get smacked down. Right, if you're a person who values 419 00:24:44,160 --> 00:24:47,879 Speaker 1: privacy for whatever reason or no reason at all. UM, 420 00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 1: the deep web and the dark web offer file sharing services. 421 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:56,040 Speaker 1: Email is a big one too, Like, I know, I 422 00:24:56,040 --> 00:24:58,080 Speaker 1: can't remember the name of the one Edwards Snowden has 423 00:24:58,080 --> 00:25:00,280 Speaker 1: been using, but I think it got shut down, like 424 00:25:00,359 --> 00:25:02,840 Speaker 1: just the whole company shutdown. Sorry, you're out of business 425 00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:06,160 Speaker 1: now because you're helping Edward Snowden. UM. But there are 426 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:12,479 Speaker 1: other email UM email services basically everything you have on 427 00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:15,720 Speaker 1: the web. If you want to do it anonymously, you 428 00:25:15,800 --> 00:25:17,919 Speaker 1: have to go to a company that operates on the 429 00:25:18,000 --> 00:25:21,440 Speaker 1: dark web, right, that uses tour to to route its 430 00:25:21,520 --> 00:25:27,280 Speaker 1: information or your information. Yeah. The University of Luxembourg did 431 00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:29,439 Speaker 1: a study where they tried to rank the most commonly 432 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:34,119 Speaker 1: accessed stuff on the dark Web, and sadly what they 433 00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:36,320 Speaker 1: did find a lot of things like child pornography. There 434 00:25:36,359 --> 00:25:40,520 Speaker 1: were also a lot of uh sites and chat rooms 435 00:25:40,560 --> 00:25:44,000 Speaker 1: for human rights and freedom of information and just people 436 00:25:44,040 --> 00:25:48,960 Speaker 1: that don't want to type in a search for, uh, 437 00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:52,639 Speaker 1: how to grow marijuana? And then the next time they 438 00:25:52,640 --> 00:25:55,159 Speaker 1: go to their Gmail account, they're a bunch of ads 439 00:25:55,240 --> 00:25:59,399 Speaker 1: for grow lights and you're going, huh, how that happened? 440 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:04,000 Speaker 1: Well to happen because you're searching the surface web with 441 00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:06,760 Speaker 1: an IP that can be traced back to you, and 442 00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:09,199 Speaker 1: not even even illegal activities like that. You know, you 443 00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:13,600 Speaker 1: want to research a fitbit bracelet and then you go 444 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:16,680 Speaker 1: and they say, hey, Chuck, are you fat? You want 445 00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:20,600 Speaker 1: to lose weight? WHI else? You want to fitbit? Alrightaddy, 446 00:26:21,240 --> 00:26:24,280 Speaker 1: why would you want to fit? And yeah, you're definitely creepy. 447 00:26:24,359 --> 00:26:26,959 Speaker 1: You know, there's the big brother effect. I think everyone 448 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:30,240 Speaker 1: feels it. Uh. There's all there, the existence of the 449 00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:32,280 Speaker 1: deep web, not necessarily the dark web, but just the 450 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:35,719 Speaker 1: deep web, all of those pages of information that are 451 00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:38,479 Speaker 1: out there. Some companies have figured out how to exploit it, 452 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:43,119 Speaker 1: or the fact that search engines, normal search engines, aren't 453 00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:45,520 Speaker 1: doing a good job of looking into the deep web. 454 00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:48,600 Speaker 1: There that company, bright Planet I mentioned they have a 455 00:26:48,640 --> 00:26:53,280 Speaker 1: deep Web Harvester, which is basically a proprietary search engine 456 00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:59,200 Speaker 1: algorithm that goes into websites and gets everything like, it's 457 00:26:59,240 --> 00:27:01,720 Speaker 1: not that doesn't them an index. It grabs every bit 458 00:27:01,760 --> 00:27:05,359 Speaker 1: of text off of every site associated with a u 459 00:27:05,480 --> 00:27:08,879 Speaker 1: r L. That sounds like big data. It is, but 460 00:27:08,920 --> 00:27:13,200 Speaker 1: they're doing it for companies like big pharma, big government 461 00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:16,239 Speaker 1: and saying like, oh, you want to know what your 462 00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:20,639 Speaker 1: competitors up to, Well, here's every letter of every word 463 00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:24,320 Speaker 1: of every strip of text on your competitor's website, including 464 00:27:24,359 --> 00:27:29,119 Speaker 1: all internal stuff everything. Please give us ten million dollars 465 00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:33,200 Speaker 1: for that search. Um. There's also this site called Vocative 466 00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:37,639 Speaker 1: which uses something like bright Planets deep web harvesting, but 467 00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:41,480 Speaker 1: it does it for journalism purposes, and it's basically, rather 468 00:27:41,520 --> 00:27:44,560 Speaker 1: than searching using Google you or I would for a 469 00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:48,480 Speaker 1: story idea, they're um searching using a deep web harvester 470 00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:51,560 Speaker 1: to find all this other information that we wouldn't be 471 00:27:51,600 --> 00:27:53,200 Speaker 1: able to find because we don't know how to search 472 00:27:53,240 --> 00:27:55,680 Speaker 1: the deep web and writing stories like that. And there's 473 00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:59,119 Speaker 1: some pretty interesting stuff that that sites put together already. Well, 474 00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:00,960 Speaker 1: when you think about if you're only getting if you 475 00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:03,480 Speaker 1: think the Internet is cool and you're only getting point 476 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:07,199 Speaker 1: three of it, yeah, yeah, not bad. And you know 477 00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:09,919 Speaker 1: this is the webs the surface web is getting deeper. 478 00:28:10,320 --> 00:28:13,879 Speaker 1: The deep web is getting deeper. Search engines are searching deeper. 479 00:28:14,000 --> 00:28:19,840 Speaker 1: It's it's all like and they're trying to anonymize more effectively. 480 00:28:19,920 --> 00:28:23,520 Speaker 1: So it's it's like this cyber war is going on. Oh, yes, 481 00:28:23,760 --> 00:28:26,080 Speaker 1: you know, that was another good one we did. What 482 00:28:26,080 --> 00:28:28,360 Speaker 1: do we do cyber war one? On cyber war you? Yeah, 483 00:28:28,400 --> 00:28:31,880 Speaker 1: I knew I've heard that before, so there you go. 484 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:33,679 Speaker 1: I would have to say that this is one of 485 00:28:33,720 --> 00:28:39,760 Speaker 1: those episodes where we did it, but it is not done. No, no, 486 00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 1: Sometimes we do them and it's like, that's it. There's 487 00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:44,840 Speaker 1: nothing more to say about this topic. Yeah, I'm interested 488 00:28:44,880 --> 00:28:47,560 Speaker 1: to see what happens with uh with old Brick for sure. 489 00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:51,760 Speaker 1: That's that's gonna be a monument landmark case. You know. Uh. 490 00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:53,680 Speaker 1: If you want to know more about the deep web, 491 00:28:53,720 --> 00:28:56,880 Speaker 1: you can type deep web into the search engine and 492 00:28:56,960 --> 00:29:00,440 Speaker 1: how stuff works. It'll bring back superficial results only how 493 00:29:00,480 --> 00:29:04,360 Speaker 1: stuff works stuff. But it's pretty good, so you'll be happy. 494 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:07,240 Speaker 1: And since I said search bar, that means it's time 495 00:29:07,280 --> 00:29:11,400 Speaker 1: for listener maw All right, Josh, I'm gonna call this 496 00:29:11,560 --> 00:29:16,320 Speaker 1: uh birthday shout out that we rarely do. Okay, hey, guys, 497 00:29:16,360 --> 00:29:18,520 Speaker 1: I'm a longtime listener, shamelessly writing to ask for a 498 00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:21,800 Speaker 1: huge favor. Here's the sitch. I first became aware of 499 00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:26,320 Speaker 1: your podcast with my last girlfriend, Natalie. David introduced me 500 00:29:26,360 --> 00:29:28,000 Speaker 1: to it when we started dating, and i've heard it. 501 00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:29,920 Speaker 1: Thank for getting me hooked, as we spent a lot 502 00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:32,240 Speaker 1: of time listening to your show and learning together. As 503 00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:34,560 Speaker 1: huge supporters of your podcast, we were compelled last year 504 00:29:34,560 --> 00:29:36,680 Speaker 1: to make the trip up from Virginia to New York 505 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:39,680 Speaker 1: when you were putting on your trivia night. And Natalie 506 00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:41,880 Speaker 1: is the one who gave us the mics on pants 507 00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:45,520 Speaker 1: off T shirts and David her boyfriend. They were super cool, 508 00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:48,520 Speaker 1: super nice. They sat at the table right near us, 509 00:29:48,640 --> 00:29:50,840 Speaker 1: so I, uh, you know, got to know him a 510 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:55,360 Speaker 1: little bit. And um, he says. Anyhow, here's where the 511 00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:58,440 Speaker 1: favor comes in. She moved to Shanghai, China to teach 512 00:29:58,920 --> 00:30:02,920 Speaker 1: and she's teaching little kids English, and sadly they you know, 513 00:30:03,200 --> 00:30:06,880 Speaker 1: separated when she moved over there, which to me are 514 00:30:06,880 --> 00:30:11,640 Speaker 1: always like the saddest breakups, right like, there's nothing wrong 515 00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:15,160 Speaker 1: to China. So they just thought it was probably the 516 00:30:15,200 --> 00:30:18,000 Speaker 1: thing to do, but they, um, because I inquired back 517 00:30:18,040 --> 00:30:19,800 Speaker 1: to David emailed him about this, and it's like, oh no, 518 00:30:19,920 --> 00:30:21,920 Speaker 1: you guys broke up and said, yeah, but we still 519 00:30:21,960 --> 00:30:23,800 Speaker 1: really support each other and care about each other, and 520 00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:27,280 Speaker 1: hopefully our pass across again one day. So anyway, Natalie 521 00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:30,080 Speaker 1: David is in China, and because of this distance, I 522 00:30:30,120 --> 00:30:31,719 Speaker 1: was at a loss when considering what to get her. 523 00:30:32,320 --> 00:30:35,680 Speaker 1: He made a donation to Cooperative for Education in her name. 524 00:30:36,200 --> 00:30:37,600 Speaker 1: And I know you guys like to read those names 525 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:39,800 Speaker 1: of people who contribute, but in this case, I was 526 00:30:39,840 --> 00:30:41,960 Speaker 1: hoping you would just do a little something more special 527 00:30:42,240 --> 00:30:45,640 Speaker 1: by wishing her happy birthday. So on January, which I 528 00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:49,560 Speaker 1: think should be very soon, Natalie, Happy birthday. Yeah, happy birthday. 529 00:30:49,640 --> 00:30:51,320 Speaker 1: We remember you. I wear that shirt all the time. 530 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:55,280 Speaker 1: My wife thinks it's funny. And uh, I hope you're 531 00:30:55,280 --> 00:30:58,120 Speaker 1: doing well in China, and don't give up on David 532 00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: just because here in the stupid United States. Her new 533 00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:06,520 Speaker 1: Chinese boyfriends like what that guy? She's like nothing, but wait, 534 00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:09,640 Speaker 1: rewind that. So um, anyway, I hope you're doing well 535 00:31:09,640 --> 00:31:11,760 Speaker 1: over there in China, and thanks again for all the support, 536 00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:13,960 Speaker 1: and I hope you guys, I hope your paths across 537 00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 1: again one day. That it was very nice that is 538 00:31:15,640 --> 00:31:20,480 Speaker 1: from David Austin Bury. If you have a special request 539 00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:24,680 Speaker 1: for Chucker, Me or US, you can tweet to us 540 00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:27,239 Speaker 1: at s y s K podcast. You can join us 541 00:31:27,240 --> 00:31:29,720 Speaker 1: on Facebook dot com slash stuff you Should Know, and 542 00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:32,240 Speaker 1: if you want to send an email to Chuck, Jerry 543 00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:35,840 Speaker 1: and Me, you can address it to Stuff podcast at 544 00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:41,120 Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com. Stuff you Should Know is 545 00:31:41,120 --> 00:31:43,760 Speaker 1: a production of iHeart Radio's How Stuff Works. For more 546 00:31:43,800 --> 00:31:46,240 Speaker 1: podcasts for my heart Radio, visit the iHeart Radio app, 547 00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:48,959 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.