Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to The Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly
Speaker 2: podcast where we talk about stuff related to money. I'm
Speaker 2: Matt Levin, all right, the Money Stuff Colm for Bloomberg.
Speaker 3: Opinion, And I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News
Speaker 3: and an anchor for Bloomberg Television.
Speaker 2: What are you at today, Katie?
Speaker 1: Death bets, death bets.
Speaker 3: We're going to talk about Apollo, and we're going to
Speaker 3: talk about a really interesting asset class.
Speaker 2: Death death, the final asset class.
Speaker 3: We're also going to talk about a messy merger. We're
Speaker 3: talking about Paramount and Sherry Redstone and what is going
Speaker 3: to happen there.
Speaker 2: And we're going to talk about Bill Wang and Archagis
Speaker 2: and how money.
Speaker 1: Failed him Money failed.
Speaker 2: And we might talk about reader mail.
Speaker 1: We have a lot of it.
Speaker 2: We have a certain amount of reader mail.
Speaker 1: Death bets.
Speaker 3: Specifically, you said that Apollo had some death bets, really
Speaker 3: interesting case. I'm going to need you to just give
Speaker 3: us a quick summary here.
Speaker 2: Okay, So you can buy life insurance. If you buy
Speaker 2: life insurance, you can sell that life insurance if you
Speaker 2: have like a twenty year life insurance policy, and after
Speaker 2: five years you're like, I don't need this life insurance
Speaker 2: policy anymore. They're investors who will buy it from you.
Speaker 2: One of the biggest investors that owns these policies is Apollo,
Speaker 2: or it's funds run by Apollo, and when you do this,
Speaker 2: then they take over the policy and then if you die,
Speaker 2: they get the money, but the estate the sun. I
Speaker 2: think of a woman who died well Apollo owned her
Speaker 2: life insurance policy, sued Apollo saying you shouldn't get that money,
Speaker 2: and he actually won, and now he's suing Apollo some more.
Speaker 1: Which is crazy. We're going to get into the specifics,
Speaker 1: all the bits of it occurred that case.
Speaker 3: I have to say before you even wrote about this,
Speaker 3: because I think the original story was from April twenty six,
Speaker 3: and there were a imediately so many memes on Twitter
Speaker 3: about like how this is the perfect money stuff story.
Speaker 3: There is a meme of Matt Levine reading this headline
Speaker 3: and it was like this cartoon guy like being reanimated.
Speaker 3: I really enjoyed it, and then you did write about it.
Speaker 2: I did write about it. There is a sense in
Speaker 2: which it is not news. This is a trade that
Speaker 2: happened in two thousand and six. The women died several
Speaker 2: years ago. The lawsuit they won against the polo last year,
Speaker 2: but it burbled up into consciousness this week when they
Speaker 2: filed this other lawsuit. And although it is not very newsy,
Speaker 2: it is very money stuff.
Speaker 3: It is very money stuff. And I'm going to need
Speaker 3: you to just explain to me what they're alleging that
Speaker 3: Apollo did wrong here, because, as you lay out in
Speaker 3: your column, you can sell your life insurance policy. If
Speaker 3: you have one, you can sell it. And it seems
Speaker 3: like that is somewhat common.
Speaker 2: Somewhat common, it's common. It's a very small fraction of
Speaker 2: the life insurance market, but it does happen a lot.
Speaker 2: So they're actually not saying Apolo did anything wrong. Weirdly,
Speaker 2: I mean they are because like they're trying to be inflammatory.
Speaker 2: But what happened here is that for a long time
Speaker 2: you could sell your life insurance policies, and at some
Speaker 2: point in the early two thousands, people realize, hey, this
Speaker 2: could be a big business, so they started funds so
Speaker 2: they'd raise money from investors saying we're going to go
Speaker 2: buy all these life insurance policies from people, and they
Speaker 2: raise all this money and then they're like, oh, we
Speaker 2: got to go find all this life insurance. It's actually
Speaker 2: not that easy. All these people have life insurance and
Speaker 2: they don't want to keep paying the premiums. It's hard
Speaker 2: to find them. Like they don't know that there's a
Speaker 2: secondary market where they can sell their life insurance. And
Speaker 2: so what happened in the early to mid two thousands
Speaker 2: is that there is a boom in insurance brokers saying,
Speaker 2: wait a minute, there's all these investors looking to buy
Speaker 2: life insurance policies. I'm trying to sell life insurance policies
Speaker 2: to people. There's a trade here where I sell a
Speaker 2: five million dollar life insurance policy to like an older person.
Speaker 2: I get my commission for selling the life insurance policy.
Speaker 2: She turns around and immediately sells the policy to an investor,
Speaker 2: and she gets cash for selling the policy. I get
Speaker 2: cash for originating the policy, and the investors get life
Speaker 2: insurance policies that they want to invest in. So this
Speaker 2: became a big business in the early mid two thousands.
Speaker 2: And it's called stolely, which is stranger originated life insurance.
Speaker 2: And so this policy came into being, like an insurance
Speaker 2: agent went to this woman and said, hey, I've got
Speaker 2: a trade for you. You can get paid one hundred
Speaker 2: and fifty thousand dollars to sign your name to some papers,
Speaker 2: and then I'll sell the life insurance to investors. The
Speaker 2: investors were not Apollo. Yeah, Apollo like several years later
Speaker 2: bought this policy in a big pool of policies from
Speaker 2: other investors. So Pollow didn't have anything to do with
Speaker 2: the apparently illegal origination of this policy. Because it turns
Speaker 2: out that if you're a person and you take out
Speaker 2: life insurance and you then change your mind years later
Speaker 2: and decide to sell it, you can do that. There's
Speaker 2: a secondary market. It's sometimes controversial, but basically it works
Speaker 2: and it's legal. But if you do this, if you
Speaker 2: do the thing where you just take out a policy,
Speaker 2: planning from day one to sell it to investors, and
Speaker 2: you're not paying the premium, the investors are sponsoring the
Speaker 2: premium from day one, then that doesn't work.
Speaker 4: Why not?
Speaker 1: Is it just because the insurance company doesn't like that?
Speaker 2: Because insurance companies don't like it, and so like states
Speaker 2: regulate it. I don't have a good answer to why not. Yeah,
Speaker 2: But the rough answer is that insurance is supposed to
Speaker 2: be insurance. You're supposed to be buying it for what
Speaker 2: they call insurance purposes, which is this kind of vague term,
Speaker 2: but it means like, you're trying to protect your family
Speaker 2: if you die, you're trying to do some estate planning,
Speaker 2: you have some sort of personal reason for buying the insurance.
Speaker 2: If you're just doing it as a bet on your mortality,
Speaker 2: then it's frowned upon. And this trade where it's just
Speaker 2: an investor buying life insurance for you is just a
Speaker 2: pure bet on your mortality, and so they don't like it.
Speaker 2: It's kind of illegal, by which I mean not that
Speaker 2: you go to jail necessarily. But the result here is
Speaker 2: that the investors bought this policy for this one. They
Speaker 2: gave her money, They paid her like one hundred and
Speaker 2: fifty to sign the papers and do this thing. They
Speaker 2: paid all the premiums on the policy for her entire life,
Speaker 2: and then she died and the policy paid out five
Speaker 2: million dollars and the investors were like, Okay, that's the
Speaker 2: insurance we paid for, and her estate was like, no, no,
Speaker 2: we get that money because you weren't allowed to do
Speaker 2: this in the first place. And turns out the estate
Speaker 2: is right, and so the estate gets the money she
Speaker 2: got paid to take out the insurance, and then she
Speaker 2: got the proceeds of the insurance. It seems kind of unfair.
Speaker 3: I have two points to make here, the first being
Speaker 3: on like why insurance companies don't like this. I mean,
Speaker 3: you make the point that this is an insurance product,
Speaker 3: it's not necessarily supposed to be financialized in the way
Speaker 3: that it has been. But I was talking to someone
Speaker 3: in the insurance industry and they also said that these
Speaker 3: insurance companies count on there's going to be a certain
Speaker 3: percentage of people who let their life insurance laughs, like
Speaker 3: they're not going to pay the premiums, they can't keep
Speaker 3: up with it, and then obviously they don't have to
Speaker 3: pay it out the insurance company, and this whole model
Speaker 3: that we're talking about removes that.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's exactly right. That's sort of what it means
Speaker 2: to say, shouldn't be financialized. Like the insurance companies sell
Speaker 2: you the insurance understanding that you're a person, and like
Speaker 2: your circumstances can change. You might forget to pay the premiums,
Speaker 2: you might not be able to afford to pay the premiums.
Speaker 2: You might decide, actually, I don't need this life insurance
Speaker 2: anymore because my kids grew up or whatever. And if
Speaker 2: you do that, you will stop paying the premiums, and
Speaker 2: so they can price that and the insurance is cheaper
Speaker 2: because they know some people won't pay the premiums and
Speaker 2: will then die and won't get the death benefit. But
Speaker 2: if you sell your insurance to a financial investor, the
Speaker 2: financial investor is just going to make a rational calculation
Speaker 2: about what the expected value of the policy is and
Speaker 2: they're going to keep paying the premiums as long as
Speaker 2: it has positive expected value. And so the insurance company
Speaker 2: is underpricing its insurance. Like that's why this trade worked,
Speaker 2: because you could go to all these people and buy
Speaker 2: underpriced insurance because the insurance companies were pricing it expecting
Speaker 2: the policies with lapse. But they didn't know or they
Speaker 2: didn't think about the fact that they're selling it to
Speaker 2: financial investors.
Speaker 3: I have to say, from the investors, you seems like
Speaker 3: a great trade. I mean you thinking about uncorrelated returns,
Speaker 3: how much more uncorrelated can you get?
Speaker 2: That's how this worked. People were like realized that this
Speaker 2: was a asset class that first of all, there's tons
Speaker 2: of life insurance out there, and sandly it's uncorrelated, and
Speaker 2: so it's a great product to pitch to investors. I
Speaker 2: would say that my understanding is that the size of
Speaker 2: the market is limited by the fact that a lot
Speaker 2: of investors in a lot of investors everywhere, but particularly
Speaker 2: the United States, find this cross like, yeah, I don't
Speaker 2: want to buy life. I don't want to if you
Speaker 2: can grow up.
Speaker 4: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Well. The reason I use the word death bets is
Speaker 2: because like it's funny. Well, yeah, because it's funny, but
Speaker 2: also because the estate suing Apollo in their complaint they
Speaker 2: had a lot of rhetoric about how Apollo is secretly
Speaker 2: betting on people's deaths and people don't know who has
Speaker 2: an incentive to have them dead, and it's like, this
Speaker 2: is true. The reason for a lot of these like
Speaker 2: rules is it's called the insurable interest treament. It's like,
Speaker 2: you can only take out insurance on someone who you
Speaker 2: have some connection to, you have some incentive, you have
Speaker 2: some reason to want them to stay a lot. Right,
Speaker 2: So you're gonna have insurance on your parents because like
Speaker 2: hopefully you're not going to kill your parents, right, you
Speaker 2: get have insurance on your employee because like, you care
Speaker 2: about your employee's production, right, and if your employee dies,
Speaker 2: you'll be sad and the insurance will compensate you for that.
Speaker 2: But you can have insurance on a stranger because if
Speaker 2: you go and try to take out insurance on a stranger,
Speaker 2: why are you doing that? Is it because you're trying
Speaker 2: to kill them? The insurance law is really based in
Speaker 2: part in like not creating incentives to murder people. And
Speaker 2: as when Investor pointed out, there are no cases o
Speaker 2: case we know financial investors killing the insurance on their
Speaker 2: contracts to get the payout. There are many cases of husbands, wives,
Speaker 2: children killing their loved ones to get insurance parents, So like,
Speaker 2: really this is not that gross at all, Right, yeah,
Speaker 2: really this is like sure they're betting on depths, but
Speaker 2: they're like more more morell than the sort of tail
Speaker 2: end of the spouse distribution.
Speaker 3: I was wondering how quickly we would get to the
Speaker 3: fact that this does create incentive for murder.
Speaker 2: I mean, when I wrote about it, I think I
Speaker 2: got to it immediately. It's the most sense to talk
Speaker 2: about it insurance.
Speaker 3: I mean, I have the entire column in front of
Speaker 3: me and yeah, you're right, murder did get brought up
Speaker 3: pretty quickly.
Speaker 2: Did you not think about murder when you think about
Speaker 2: life insurance.
Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit though, about this actual case.
Speaker 1: Her name.
Speaker 3: I feel like we've referenced her a few different times,
Speaker 3: Martha Barotes. I'm saying it correctly. She died in twenty eighteen.
Speaker 3: Like you said, the estate wants.
Speaker 1: The payout back.
Speaker 3: They got it, and I don't know is that entirely
Speaker 3: fair because Martha knew what she was doing.
Speaker 2: Martha knew what she was doing. Yeah, she never paid
Speaker 2: a penny for this insurance. She got paid to fill
Speaker 2: out the forums, and then when she died, her children
Speaker 2: were like, hey, we'd like the money. I would think
Speaker 2: that if you decide that this policy is invalid because
Speaker 2: it was like a bad evil betting on lives, it
Speaker 2: didn't have an insurable interest whatever, I would think that
Speaker 2: you would say, well, then the insurance company doesn't have
Speaker 2: to pay. But in fact, the law seems to be
Speaker 2: that if the insurance company pays, the estate can get
Speaker 2: it back rather than giving it to the investors because
Speaker 2: they want Basically, the law wants to punish the investors
Speaker 2: so that the investors don't.
Speaker 3: Do this one more point on investing, what do this do?
Speaker 3: The thoughts I had while reading this and thinking about
Speaker 3: this was to the point that this has become an
Speaker 3: asset class. I feel like just the evolution of markets
Speaker 3: is that somehow this is gonna be an investable asset class.
Speaker 3: On robin Hood, retail will be involved in It'll trade
Speaker 3: twenty four to seven.
Speaker 2: So there I would worry more about murder.
Speaker 1: Murder, oh my god.
Speaker 2: Because it's like there's a limited number of investors in
Speaker 2: this asset class. They're all institutional, they have careers, they
Speaker 2: don't want to go to jail, they care about the
Speaker 2: reputation of the asset class, and they're doing it in scale,
Speaker 2: so that like murdering one person wouldn't change the returns
Speaker 2: that much.
Speaker 1: It I don't know, man, it have to be totally blind.
Speaker 2: If you invested in a big pool, then you wouldn't
Speaker 2: have much incentive together.
Speaker 1: Well, you'd want to diversify, obviously, but.
Speaker 2: Unless you're planning to do murder, than you wouldn't want
Speaker 2: a diverse Well.
Speaker 3: I feel like then it'd be easy to track, like
Speaker 3: who just has some really concentrated part of the playoffs
Speaker 3: a lot.
Speaker 2: Of insider trading is pretty easier to track, and people
Speaker 2: do it anyway, So if you had a lot of this,
Speaker 2: you'd have at least one murder, I think.
Speaker 3: I think it'd be a really interesting psychological and market
Speaker 3: structure experiment.
Speaker 4: So maybe someone will do it.
Speaker 3: Let's talk about a messy merger, potentially tricky, messy. I
Speaker 3: don't know what word do you want to use.
Speaker 2: It's a classic boardroom battle.
Speaker 1: That's a good one.
Speaker 2: Why don't you tell that?
Speaker 3: What we're talking about Paramount and the fact that it's
Speaker 3: in exclusive conversations with sky Dance, which is owned by
Speaker 3: David Ellison, but there's a lot of investors who would
Speaker 3: like them to consider also a deal coming from Apollo
Speaker 3: and Sony as well. So that's one tricky element. Then
Speaker 3: the other tricky element is, of course Sherry Redstone, who
Speaker 3: owns seventy seven percent of the Class A shares, which
Speaker 3: is what Skydance is after. And then you have the
Speaker 3: vast majority of outstanding shares or Class B shares that
Speaker 3: have no voting power.
Speaker 2: Yeah, so it's like this weird situation where Paramount is
Speaker 2: a big company with a lot of shares outstanding, most
Speaker 2: of which don't vote, and so basically Sharry Redstone controls
Speaker 2: about five percent of the stock, but that five percent
Speaker 2: of the stock has seventy seven percent of the voting power,
Speaker 2: which means that if you buy her five percent stake,
Speaker 2: you control the company, which creates a lot of incentives
Speaker 2: for mischief. The other weird thing is that share Redson
Speaker 2: doesn't actually own that stock, which she owns is a
Speaker 2: company called National Amusements. National Amusements is a chain of
Speaker 2: movie theaters that also owns this five percent one.
Speaker 1: Hundred and twenty four theaters on.
Speaker 2: Four theaters, but they also own this chunk of class
Speaker 2: A voting stock in Paramount. That company controls Paramount, and
Speaker 2: shire redsn controls that company. And so if you want
Speaker 2: to buy Paramount. One thing you could do is you
Speaker 2: can go to the board of directors and say we'll
Speaker 2: pay twelve dollars a share in cash for all the
Speaker 2: shares of Paramounts in a merger. And that's kind of
Speaker 2: more or less what Apolo seems to have offered. Another
Speaker 2: thing you can do is you get a share red
Speaker 2: Zone and say, hey, we'll take National Amusements off your
Speaker 2: hands for like two billion dollars, which is like a
Speaker 2: fraction of the price of Paramount. Paramount is equity value
Speaker 2: something like twelve billion dollars. This is what people seem
Speaker 2: to be talking about. If you could pay two billion
Speaker 2: dollars for National Amusements and then you control Paramount and
Speaker 2: then you can do what you want, and I don't
Speaker 2: know what they want, but the deal structure is very complicated. Basically,
Speaker 2: skid Ends wants to buy National Amusements and then have
Speaker 2: Paramount buy Skuidens for stock and then put their own
Speaker 2: people in charge of Paramount, and they're like, this is
Speaker 2: going to make Paramount be worth thirty dollars a share.
Speaker 2: But it's like a complicated merger structure. But step one
Speaker 2: of the structures, we're going to buy National Amusements and
Speaker 2: then we'll control Paramount.
Speaker 3: So that was a gorgeous explanation. I don't know why
Speaker 3: I had to try. So that's very tricky. And I
Speaker 3: have to say the disparity, the discrepancy in pricing between
Speaker 3: the Class A and the Class B is interesting.
Speaker 1: I mean, there's just a wide gap there.
Speaker 2: There's lots of companies that have dual class shares, but
Speaker 2: it's often like a founder compan where like Mark Zuckerberg
Speaker 2: isn't going to sell Facebook, right, Like here, you really
Speaker 2: can buy control of a twelve million dollar company by
Speaker 2: buying five percent of the stock. And it's like just
Speaker 2: an unusually sharp case of the difference in the value
Speaker 2: of the two types of shares.
Speaker 3: So that's tricky. That's one of the messy things. The
Speaker 3: other messy thing they fired the CEO. Now it's a
Speaker 3: CEO committee run.
Speaker 2: Office of COO. Right, it's like three guys. Yeah, yeah,
Speaker 2: I was looking at the announcement. They say the Office
Speaker 2: of the CEO is working with the board to develop
Speaker 2: a comprehensive long range plan to accelerate growth and develop
Speaker 2: popular content. But you know they don't mean that, right.
Speaker 2: You don't install three guys as your office of CEO
Speaker 2: if you're planning to like have them run the company
Speaker 2: for ten years and develop new content. Right. That's like,
Speaker 2: we are selling this company in the next two weeks.
Speaker 2: We don't really care he's running it for like two.
Speaker 1: Weeks, right, yeah.
Speaker 3: Yeah. As Blueberg Intelligence put it, the replacement of Bob
Speaker 3: Backish puts Paramount a step closer to a deal with
Speaker 3: Skydance Media. Backish obviously the acquisition it feels like, there's
Speaker 3: a lot of people who vocally oppose this.
Speaker 2: Yeah, well so shareholders, Yes, some shareholders oppose it. Backers
Speaker 2: seems to opposed that. Several directors step down last month
Speaker 2: because they seem to be not super comfortable with the deal.
Speaker 2: One person who really opposes it is h Marrigabelly, who
Speaker 2: runs GAM who's the biggest holder of Class A shares
Speaker 2: other than National Amusements. He's in this weird position where like,
Speaker 2: he has these shares that are like theoretically worth more
Speaker 2: than the Class B shares, except that like Skydence doesn't
Speaker 2: have to go buy up all the Class A shares,
Speaker 2: They don't have to pay a premium for the Class
Speaker 2: A shares. All they have to do is buy National
Speaker 2: Amusements and then they get a majority of the vote
Speaker 2: and they're done. So they don't have to pay him
Speaker 2: any premium. Right, they don't have to pay the other
Speaker 2: Class A holders of premium. They just have to pay
Speaker 2: Shary Redstone for National Amusements. So he's in this weird
Speaker 2: position where he's like, I think I have these super
Speaker 2: voting valuable shares, but actually they turn out not to
Speaker 2: be that valuable because they're a minority.
Speaker 1: I mean, where does this go from here? Is this
Speaker 1: like a done deal?
Speaker 3: Is there any way that some of these vocal people
Speaker 3: who don't like this deal could actually stop it?
Speaker 2: Oh? Yeah, I mean you can't literally buy the seventy
Speaker 2: seven percent voting stock, fire the board and say okay,
Speaker 2: we're like taking over this company and we're not going
Speaker 2: to give the public shareholders anything. There's a special committee
Speaker 2: of Paramount directors who have to approve any transaction. Now
Speaker 2: it's tricky because they don't have to approve any National
Speaker 2: Amusements transaction. Yeah, they don't run National Amusements. The Class
Speaker 2: A shares don't have to change hands, right Like National Amusements,
Speaker 2: which is its own company, could just be acquired and
Speaker 2: then National Amusements can come into the board meaning and say, okay,
Speaker 2: we're still we still have our seventy seven percent control.
Speaker 2: Nothing has changed except who owns National Amusements. It's also
Speaker 2: tricky because the Special Committee and thinking about paramount will
Speaker 2: think about how much value did share Redstone get for
Speaker 2: her Class A shares? How much value are the other
Speaker 2: shareholders getting for their Class P shares? But they don't
Speaker 2: know how much value she's getting for her Class A
Speaker 2: shares because Skydance will presumably right her a check for
Speaker 2: National amusements. And you know, her Class A shares have
Speaker 2: a market value seven hundred million dollars, and the check
Speaker 2: for National amusemance is like supposedly the reporting is going
Speaker 2: to be around two billion dollars. So that's a big premium.
Speaker 2: But there's all those movie theaters. We don't know how
Speaker 2: much they're worth.
Speaker 1: Right, all one hundred and twenty four of them.
Speaker 2: You can make like AMC memestock, like maybe movie theater
Speaker 2: companies are really valuable, right, maybe they're paying her the
Speaker 2: two billion for the movie theaters. So like the Special
Speaker 2: Committee of the Board has the job of making sure
Speaker 2: that whatever deal is done for paramount is fair to
Speaker 2: the Class P shareholders, to like the regular public shareholders.
Speaker 2: And so one thing you can do is say no
Speaker 2: to any acquisition of sky Dance, for instance, that it
Speaker 2: thinks is not fair to shareholders. But what it can't
Speaker 2: do is like say to share Redstone, you have to
Speaker 2: sell to the person we pick. Right if they like
Speaker 2: the Apollo deal and she doesn't like, they can't make
Speaker 2: her sell, and she can block the Apolo deal because
Speaker 2: she has seventy sum percent of the vote. So it
Speaker 2: seems likely there's going to be a deal because they
Speaker 2: have no CEO, and it seems like any deal would
Speaker 2: have to be one that's acceptable to share Redstones. You
Speaker 2: have to thread this needle of like, whoever's going to
Speaker 2: buy the company has to give Shy Redstone enough that
Speaker 2: she wants to take the deal, but it also has
Speaker 2: to be fair enough to the public shareholders that the
Speaker 2: Special Committee agrees to take the deal. And by the way,
Speaker 2: there's history here before it was Paramount, like the predecessor
Speaker 2: Viacom CBS was also the structure where a Shay Redstone
Speaker 2: and a majority of this voting stock through National Amusements,
Speaker 2: And at some point the board of Viacom CBS tried
Speaker 2: to take away her voting rights or like make it
Speaker 2: so that all the shares were voting to like block
Speaker 2: her from doing some merger that they thought was bad.
Speaker 2: Didn't work. They got in a lot of trouble for her,
Speaker 2: but they were like, we can't have this dynamic where
Speaker 2: like there's one shareholder who has a minority of the
Speaker 2: economic interest, but who has a controlling voting stake and
Speaker 2: who can like just force through a merger that we
Speaker 2: think is unfair to the shareolders. So they tried to
Speaker 2: take away her super voting rights. Didn't work.
Speaker 1: Now they are I crave that kind of power.
Speaker 2: Which kind of power the super voting rights or the
Speaker 2: super board.
Speaker 1: Tried to take away the super voting super voting right.
Speaker 2: I know, it's good, it's really it's so unusual. Yeah,
Speaker 2: it's so unusual. Like it's not that unusual to have
Speaker 2: super voting rights, but like usually people try to not
Speaker 2: have so little of the economics and have so much
Speaker 2: of the voting rights. Yeah, sort of looks weird. Many
Speaker 2: of the companies that you talk about it a lot.
Speaker 2: The founders are still around. They're still running things, you
Speaker 2: know you think about like Facebook, they're huge companies are
Speaker 2: unlikely to sell right. Like here it's like share Edstone
Speaker 2: is an air to like the sort of mogul who
Speaker 2: ran it. She's interested in cashing out. You know, Usually
Speaker 2: the super voting shares people are like that's designed to
Speaker 2: keep control with the people who care the most about
Speaker 2: the company, even if they have a minority economic interest.
Speaker 2: But here that's not what it's doing. Here, it's like
Speaker 2: just the cash benefit for someone who wants to get
Speaker 2: rid of the company.
Speaker 3: What I find amusing about this episode is that we're
Speaker 3: all so interested in sort of the theater and the
Speaker 3: drama of what this merger is actually going to be
Speaker 3: that there hasn't, at least in my circle, has been
Speaker 3: a lot of discussion on Okay, but what about the
Speaker 3: future of Paramount, What about the actual business? Because they're
Speaker 3: in a very tough industry, and it's funny that they
Speaker 3: reported earnings this week paramounted and it was a total
Speaker 3: non event. It was a complete afterthought the actual numbers.
Speaker 2: Because the stock is not going to train on earnings, right. Yeah,
Speaker 2: if you look at like the two bids, like it's unclear,
Speaker 2: like what businesses stay with businesses go like, Yeah, it's
Speaker 2: in a bit of a limbo about what it's actually
Speaker 2: going forward.
Speaker 4: Business is going to be.
Speaker 1: Speaking of Viacom CBS, Bill Wang, what was that transition our.
Speaker 3: Chade goos okay, one of their physicians, was that.
Speaker 2: What brought him down? I had forgotten about that. I
Speaker 2: made a gorgeous That was a great transition. I am sorry,
Speaker 2: Bill Wang brought down by Viacom CBS. Go on, Bill Lang,
Speaker 2: he's a guy, he's a former Tiger Cub hedge fund
Speaker 2: manager who then left headge fund managing after an insider
Speaker 2: trading incident and then ran his own family office called
Speaker 2: our Kego's Capital Management. That briefly became like a thirty
Speaker 2: billion dollar portfolio because he bought like twelve stocks on
Speaker 2: which is ViacomCBS. He bought them with like huge amounts
Speaker 2: of bargin borrowing or like total return swaps from like
Speaker 2: a collection of banks. All these banks learned up lots
Speaker 2: of money to buy stock. He bought all the stock.
Speaker 2: The stock went up because he was buying so much
Speaker 2: of it. Then he had a profit. He was able
Speaker 2: to borrow more money against the profit from the banks
Speaker 2: to buy more stock, and this kept going in like
Speaker 2: a sort of like virtuous cycle where the stocks went
Speaker 2: up and up and up, and he got to buy
Speaker 2: more and more until Viacom CBS was like, car stock
Speaker 2: price has gone in this incredible run, we should sell
Speaker 2: some stock. So they sold some stock. The stock gap down.
Speaker 2: He had a loss. His banks issued margin calls. He's like,
Speaker 2: I don't have any money. I put every penny I
Speaker 2: have into these twelve stocks, and they've let the stocks
Speaker 2: all went down. He lost everything, and then he was
Speaker 2: arrested and he's going on trial next week for market manipulation.
Speaker 3: I am so interested in this trial. I feel like
Speaker 3: that's going to be so interesting to follow. We also
Speaker 3: have to talk about his charity as well. One of
Speaker 3: the things actually that I was going to use to
Speaker 3: lead into this was I have a new name for
Speaker 3: your newsletter.
Speaker 2: Oh, money fail, Yeah, which is.
Speaker 1: A biblical reference. That's Genesis forty seven. Money failed, money failed.
Speaker 2: Right. It's a biblical reference, but also not what you
Speaker 2: want when you're a headsprend manager or a family office manager.
Speaker 2: That was your job was to not have money fail. Yeah,
Speaker 2: money that fail.
Speaker 3: Okay, money failed, but the word of God doesn't fail.
Speaker 3: That is a quote that was used to describe the situation,
Speaker 3: which we don't have to get into but the trial itself.
Speaker 3: So the trial going on trial next week. I wanted
Speaker 3: to talk a little bit about the judge, Judge Alvin
Speaker 3: held Stein. He oversaw lawsuits arising from the nine to
Speaker 3: eleven attacks. He's also ninety years old, which I found
Speaker 3: extremely impressive. You know what I won't be doing at
Speaker 3: ninety years old.
Speaker 2: I feel like this is tying back to the life insurance.
Speaker 1: Right, but I will be selling my life insurance to Apollo.
Speaker 2: I'll be doing at ninety years old, not podcasting.
Speaker 4: Mm hmmm.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 3: And I definitely won't be presiding over criminal trials. Yeah,
Speaker 3: I mean this is going to be a big one.
Speaker 3: Do you think about some of the charges that have
Speaker 3: been brought against him, including RICO charges.
Speaker 2: There's two sort of types of charges against them. There's
Speaker 2: market manipulation charges, which I think is fascinating because his
Speaker 2: defense it seems like, is I just like these stocks.
Speaker 2: I thought they were undervalued, so I bought as much
Speaker 2: as I could of them, and then the stocks shot up,
Speaker 2: and then that all blew up. But they don't have
Speaker 2: a lot of as far as I've seen so far
Speaker 2: from like the charging documents, they don't seem to have
Speaker 2: a lot of evidence against It's like a crime of intent, right,
Speaker 2: Like if he bought these stocks because he thought they
Speaker 2: were undervalued, then that's not market manipulation. If he bought
Speaker 2: them because he wanted to push their prices up in
Speaker 2: order to like get some benefit elsewhere, then it is
Speaker 2: market manipulation. He didn't go around saying I'm going to
Speaker 2: buy the stocks so I can push their prices up.
Speaker 2: What would be the point of the market manipulation. I
Speaker 2: think we talked on this podcast about the Mango markets guy.
Speaker 1: It was hard first, oh yeah.
Speaker 2: Last day of our lives. The Mango markets guy, he
Speaker 2: like did some stuff in crypto where basically he pushed
Speaker 2: up the price of this token and then extracted like
Speaker 2: one hundred million dollars from the token exchange and then
Speaker 2: ran away laughing right, Bill Wang pushed up the price
Speaker 2: of these stocks and like borrowed more money against them
Speaker 2: to push up the price of the stocks more and
Speaker 2: then at the end it all collapsed and he ran
Speaker 2: away with nothing more or less. He ran away with something.
Speaker 2: But we'll get it to that. But the thing that
Speaker 2: you do in market manipulation is one you push up
Speaker 2: the price of the stock and then two you take
Speaker 2: the money out. And he didn't take the money out.
Speaker 2: What was the market manipulation. It's a very strange case.
Speaker 2: He's got a real defensive. I wasn't manipulating the market.
Speaker 2: And the way you do that is because I didn't
Speaker 2: make any money. Now, to be fair, he gave this
Speaker 2: talk about how money failed with this incredible slide. The
Speaker 2: Bloomberg story about this. There's a picture of him standing
Speaker 2: in front of his charity talking about how money failed
Speaker 2: at the slide behind him, saying money failed.
Speaker 1: Explanation but beauty and simplicity.
Speaker 2: It's so good. It's like the level of PowerPoint that
Speaker 2: I aspire to. He gave that talk at his charitable foundation,
Speaker 2: which runs five hundred million dollars of assets, which is like,
Speaker 2: it's a lot. He didn't walk away from Archagos with
Speaker 2: no money. You worked away with five hundred million dollars
Speaker 2: in this charitable foundation. And in fact, the Bloomberg Sorry
Speaker 2: mentions that like several of the old traders from Archagos
Speaker 2: are now working as traders at the charity foundation. So
Speaker 2: it's like a little bit he like scrolled away part
Speaker 2: of the hedge fund into the child of foundation.
Speaker 3: Yeah, and apparently it's assets screws significantly in twenty twenty three.
Speaker 2: Just is it it's run by some hedge fund traders.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I want to know what they're doing.
Speaker 2: Probably buying a concentrated portfolio stocks that are going up.
Speaker 1: There you go.
Speaker 2: I would say. The other charges against him, though, are
Speaker 2: like about lying to banks, and that's much worse because
Speaker 2: there's like an email chain and it's mostly not from him.
Speaker 2: It's mostly from his Like it's like underlings, but like
Speaker 2: it's you know, saying, oh, no, we don't have a
Speaker 2: concentrated portfolio of twelve stocks that we couldn't sell that
Speaker 2: oft we're very diversified. And then like that's not true.
Speaker 2: So there's some bad stuff there and the bad stuff
Speaker 2: it's one like that's a crime, and lining to a
Speaker 2: bank is a crime. You can get a jail for
Speaker 2: a long time. But then also just like if you're
Speaker 2: asking the question of was he manipulating the stock market?
Speaker 2: Was he manipulating these stocks? Like just by the shape
Speaker 2: of his trades, you'd be like maybe not, maybe just
Speaker 2: like the stocks because he didn't throw any money. But
Speaker 2: then you're like, oh, and I'll see he was lying
Speaker 2: to the banks. It's like, okay, I was probably doing something.
Speaker 3: And just to put some numbers on it when it
Speaker 3: comes to how much the bank's actually lost, we're talking
Speaker 3: about how Viacom CBS brought down our Chagos.
Speaker 2: Well brought down see credit.
Speaker 3: Yeah, it was one of the things that brought down
Speaker 3: Credit Sweee or in the chain of dominoes, it was
Speaker 3: somewhere in there because Credit Sweee lost five and a
Speaker 3: half billion dollars. No Mirror lost three billion dollars. Morgan
Speaker 3: Stanley more than nine million dollars. So I mean it's
Speaker 3: not chump change that we're talking about. This caused really
Speaker 3: widespread damage.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean he had like a thirty six billion
Speaker 2: dollar portfolio that went poof, and like he lost whatever
Speaker 2: equity he had, but like a lot of banks lost
Speaker 2: a lot of money too.
Speaker 3: That was a wild moment in time. I mean it
Speaker 3: was also what was that twenty twenty one, Yeah, March
Speaker 3: twenty twenty one. That was just a very upside down
Speaker 3: time for everyone.
Speaker 2: It was a wild time that was like, hey, this
Speaker 2: thing you've never heard of called Archagos is like the
Speaker 2: biggest Dutch front in the world.
Speaker 3: For like a week, no one knew how to pronounce it.
Speaker 3: I remember I would have to go on and do
Speaker 3: like telephone phoners for television and trying to be googling
Speaker 3: and youtubing. How do I pronounce this? Archigos was something
Speaker 3: I'm pretty sure I said a few different times.
Speaker 2: I will understandable. Yeah, yeah, Like I'm always sort of
Speaker 2: allergic to the financial trip of like this company you've
Speaker 2: never heard of, controls the world right, because it's now
Speaker 2: you've heard of Jane Street, you've heard of whatever, Like yeah,
Speaker 2: I feel like really people had not heard of Archagos
Speaker 2: because it really was like one guy's family office. And
Speaker 2: then it was a gigantic hedge fund that or family office.
Speaker 2: By the way, I would call it a hedge fund.
Speaker 2: People from the hedge fund industry would be like, you're
Speaker 2: slandering us. Okay, it's a hedge fund. It is not
Speaker 2: a hedge fund. It is just a family office. It
Speaker 2: is not.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I can tell that you've been chewing on that,
Speaker 3: like what to call it? Just in this conversation.
Speaker 2: It's a thirty six billion dollar fund run by a
Speaker 2: hedgehund manager. It feels like a hedge fund, even though
Speaker 2: it was only his money.
Speaker 1: It was only his money.
Speaker 2: Mail bag, mail bag, we need we need a musical cube.
Speaker 1: We should just both sing.
Speaker 2: Perhaps only you should sing.
Speaker 1: No, it could be cute if we harmonize.
Speaker 2: It would it would be less cute if I harmon.
Speaker 1: You go high, I'll go low. You did get a
Speaker 1: lot of that's a mail this week.
Speaker 2: We got emails at the money pod at Bloomberg dot
Speaker 2: net email address. And now we will read some of them.
Speaker 2: If you want your emails we read, send it to
Speaker 2: money Pod at Bloomberg dot net and we'll see what
Speaker 2: we can do.
Speaker 1: Phil the Jeweler had some facts for us.
Speaker 2: I don't think he signed his name Phil the Jeweler's.
Speaker 3: But his name is Phil and he is a metals
Speaker 3: and jewelry design professor. Okay, so Phil writes, I'm going
Speaker 3: to imagine that you are going to get a lot
Speaker 3: of this. But an ounce of gold does not weigh
Speaker 3: an ounce, or more specifically, gold is typically described and
Speaker 3: sold in Troy ounces and not the normal ounce we
Speaker 3: were used to. I can't pronounce that word avoir dupois ounce.
Speaker 1: I don't know.
Speaker 2: This is pretty good.
Speaker 3: So an ounce of gold weighs almost one point one ounces.
Speaker 3: I'm guessing you probably already know this, but just because
Speaker 3: you mentioned that an ounce of gold weight an ounce,
Speaker 3: I thought I would just send it in case. So
Speaker 3: I can't remember remember exactly how this originated.
Speaker 2: Okay, So you were talking about how gold is heavy, yeah,
Speaker 2: and you were like, it costs like forty dollars to
Speaker 2: mail an ounce of gold, and I was like, that's
Speaker 2: not that heavy, Like it's dense, but an ounce of
Speaker 2: gold weighs an ounce, And now we have received a
Speaker 2: reader correction pointing out that anounce of gold does not
Speaker 2: weigh an ounce, which is really wild.
Speaker 3: Let me clarify what I'm What I was trying to
Speaker 3: say is that it's expensive to mail gold.
Speaker 1: I know, do you want to talk about old fashions.
Speaker 2: A little bit? So getting a correction from a reader
Speaker 2: that announce of gold does not weigh announces one of
Speaker 2: my better corrections. But it reminds me of my very
Speaker 2: favorite probably reader mail bag of all time, which is it?
Speaker 2: Years ago I was writing about some article that described
Speaker 2: like a quantity of sugar and they were like, that's
Speaker 2: enough to fill three thousand Olympic sized swimming pools. And
Speaker 2: I was like, how is that a helpful description?
Speaker 3: Yeah?
Speaker 2: Who puts sugar in swimming pools? And so I wrote
Speaker 2: jokingly like, if you combine three thousand Olympic sized swimming
Speaker 2: pools of sugar with three thousand swimming pools of to
Speaker 2: form six thousand Olympics sized swimming pools of simple syrup,
Speaker 2: having Katie that ike, you swim through them and then
Speaker 2: use the syrup to make three trillion old fashioned cocktails.
Speaker 2: And I got so many emails.
Speaker 1: I mean, that's just bait.
Speaker 2: I got emails that were like, actually, if you combine
Speaker 2: three thousand pools of sugar with three thousand pools of water,
Speaker 2: you wouldn't get six thousand pools because the sugar dissolves
Speaker 2: in the water. The syrup that it makes is denser
Speaker 2: than the water, So you'd only be able to fill
Speaker 2: about forty five hundred pools with the combination of those
Speaker 2: three thousand.
Speaker 1: And kind of shocked that you would make such an
Speaker 1: error like that.
Speaker 2: In retrospect, it seemed obvious and I was embarrassed. I
Speaker 2: also got to read your emails. It was around the
Speaker 2: time of the Olympics. Kitty that Ichi was in the news.
Speaker 2: I read about her swimming through these pools of syrup,
Speaker 2: and I said something like it would probably take her
Speaker 2: longer than her usual time to swim through a pool
Speaker 2: of syrup because it's.
Speaker 1: Thick and gooey, And you were kind of wrong on that.
Speaker 2: I was wrong on that too. Apparently Isaac Newton wrote
Speaker 2: about this because it's like it's harder to get through
Speaker 2: the pools. I'm making swimming motions that you can't see
Speaker 2: on this audio.
Speaker 1: On the podcast they're very convincing.
Speaker 2: It's hard. It's harder to move through the pool because
Speaker 2: it's thick, but you also get more forced because you're
Speaker 2: pushing off on thicker stuff and they cancel out. And
Speaker 2: actually professors had done experiments and it turns out to
Speaker 2: be true. You can serve just as fast and syrup
Speaker 2: as you can in water.
Speaker 3: So one of my like rich person fantasies is a
Speaker 3: sort of uh is to fill up a pool with
Speaker 3: pudding or jell o and see what that would be like.
Speaker 3: But a little worried about suffocating, right, I.
Speaker 2: Don't want to give you any advice. Yeah, but it
Speaker 2: does seem like you could swim as fast through putting
Speaker 2: as you could through water. But I don't know what
Speaker 2: the sinking situation that is. We're going to get email
Speaker 2: about that too good.
Speaker 3: No, please someone write in about that, because obviously in
Speaker 3: water you float. I don't think you float and pudding.
Speaker 2: I'm not trying to speculate, but our readers will.
Speaker 3: On one, you learned your lessons, Okay, moving swiftly along,
Speaker 3: so Alex writes in a version of the Great Consumer
Speaker 3: Financial Arbitrage I've heard goes as follow one get a
Speaker 3: no limit credit card from a bank, two using that
Speaker 3: card by the three have the bank forgive your credit
Speaker 3: card debt for profit question mark you own a bank now,
Speaker 3: can't be that hard.
Speaker 2: So why can't you buy a bank of a credit card?
Speaker 2: Because merchants have to agree to accept credit cards, right,
Speaker 2: because it costs money to accept the credit card. Right,
Speaker 2: every time you do a credit card transaction, you have
Speaker 2: to pay the credit card company like one and a
Speaker 2: half percent or two percent of the transaction. So a
Speaker 2: lot of businesses want to accept credit cards so they
Speaker 2: can increase their seals. But M and A bankers are
Speaker 2: not one of those businesses, right, They're like not going
Speaker 2: to pay two percent to the credit card company. And also,
Speaker 2: like if you get a credit card to buy a bank,
Speaker 2: the credit card is not going to have a sufficient
Speaker 2: limit to buy the bank. You're not going to have
Speaker 2: like a one hundred million dollar ten billion dollar credit
Speaker 2: limit on your credit card. That said, the basic idea
Speaker 2: of like step one, borrow money, step two, buy a bank,
Speaker 2: step three forgive the loan is like kind of a
Speaker 2: really deep one. A lot of finance, a lot of
Speaker 2: financial companies work this way where you have a giant
Speaker 2: pool of assets that is very levered. So at bank
Speaker 2: with ten billion dollars of ho assets will probably have
Speaker 2: stock that's worth one billion dollars or less. Right, it
Speaker 2: will be like ten to oneish ratio of assets to stock.
Speaker 2: If you could get a billion dollars and buy the stock,
Speaker 2: then you would control ten billion dollars of assets. Then
Speaker 2: you could just lend it all to yourself and forgive
Speaker 2: the loan, and then you have a huge profit. This
Speaker 2: works financially. It's a good idea, except that it's like
Speaker 2: wildly illegal because you're stealing the money from the bank's customers.
Speaker 2: But like much of bank regulation is cured around preventing
Speaker 2: people from doing that, right, like the rules regulating related
Speaker 2: party loans, so that the president of a bank who
Speaker 2: controls the one billion dollars of bank stock doesn't lend
Speaker 2: himself ten billion dollars and then forgive it. There's rules
Speaker 2: around that. Because it is a good idea, you don't
Speaker 2: see it that much in banking, but you see it
Speaker 2: a lot in insurance, where smart investors will.
Speaker 1: Say, let's buy life insurance policies so that but.
Speaker 2: No, what I was thinking of is smart investors will
Speaker 2: say I have a million dollars. I would like to
Speaker 2: make investments. I'm really good at making investments. I'd like
Speaker 2: to make ten million dollars of investments. How can I
Speaker 2: do that? I only have one million dollars. Will buy
Speaker 2: a life insurance company for one million dollars, and then
Speaker 2: I will have the life insurance comp You know, life
Speaker 2: insurance also a very levered company, right, it has all
Speaker 2: this policyholder assets that it can invest. I will buy
Speaker 2: the life insurance company stock for a million dollars. I'll
Speaker 2: take over the life insurance company, and then I'll have
Speaker 2: ten million dollars to invest in all my other good ideas. Right.
Speaker 2: Sometimes people get arrested for this when like they're good ideas,
Speaker 2: are like they're other weird companies that they are making
Speaker 2: concentrated risky bets that sort of run a foul of
Speaker 2: life insurance standards. Other times, people who do this are
Speaker 2: Warren Buffett, Like Warren Buffett, right, Like buy a life
Speaker 2: insurance company and now he like controls a life insurance
Speaker 2: company and gets to make investments. And everyone's like, oh,
Speaker 2: he's so good at making investments. It's good that he
Speaker 2: has this giant pool of life insurance money to invest
Speaker 2: and that's true, But like taking over a levered financial
Speaker 2: institution in order to control the money of that levered
Speaker 2: financial institution is a great idea, and people do it sometimes.
Speaker 1: So Alex sounds like you're on the right.
Speaker 2: Track, except for the illegality, right.
Speaker 3: For sure, keep thinking, so, Steve writes in with some
Speaker 3: stern words for you. He says, from time to time
Speaker 3: you mentioned dentists in your commentaries, certainly with more frequency
Speaker 3: than one would expect from a financial writer. Sometimes use
Speaker 3: dentists as the archetypal rubes getting scammed for an unsophisticated
Speaker 3: financial crime. I want to be shocked and offended by
Speaker 3: such a portrayal, perhaps having the American Dental Association brand
Speaker 3: you as an anti dentype. My discussions with colleagues seem
Speaker 3: to bear that out, that sure enough, dentists are greater
Speaker 3: rubes than the average well educated professional. Could you comment
Speaker 3: on what you think uniquely qualifies dentists to be such rubes,
Speaker 3: and more generally, what makes a good target for financial criminals.
Speaker 2: I'm sorry to the dentists. I don't think I ever
Speaker 2: really thought about it much as like dentists specifically. In fact,
Speaker 2: I think I once wrote that The general rule of
Speaker 2: US securities law is that you're not allowed to invest
Speaker 2: in risky, weird private companies unless you're a dentist. But
Speaker 2: then I qualified it and said or a radiologist or
Speaker 2: a retired professional football player. I mean. The point is
Speaker 2: that there are rules that say only qualified investors, any
Speaker 2: accredited investors they called, can invest in certain private offerings. Right.
Speaker 2: Private offerings typically have less disclosure, weirder financials, more fees,
Speaker 2: more hidden fees than like public market investments. And so
Speaker 2: there are a lot of people in the world whose
Speaker 2: job it is to find people to invest in not
Speaker 2: very good privately marketed investments. And so those people are
Speaker 2: looking for accredited investors. Right. They're looking for people who
Speaker 2: make more than a certain amount of money, and dentists
Speaker 2: are a nice target because they all pretty much make
Speaker 2: more than the accredited investor threshold, which I think is
Speaker 2: like two hundred thousand dollars a year. But they're not
Speaker 2: typically millionaires, so they don't have like a family office
Speaker 2: that devets investments for them. They're not like tech startup
Speaker 2: people who've exited Tech startups are good targets for private investments,
Speaker 2: but they're like connected to venture capitalists. It's a good
Speaker 2: venture capital investments. If you're just like a dentist in
Speaker 2: the middle of the country, you have no like necessary
Speaker 2: like connections to high finance, but you have enough money
Speaker 2: to be put into really bad investment decisions. So people
Speaker 2: are targeting you. It's not that you're bad, it's that
Speaker 2: you're in that like narrow band of rich enough to
Speaker 2: have access to like the worst possible investments, but also
Speaker 2: not so rich that you have access to the best
Speaker 2: possible investments. So I think that's the main reason.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you for that.
Speaker 2: Sorry dentists, no bad. Yeah, you can send you know
Speaker 2: through money pot at Bloomberg dot net if you want
Speaker 2: to be a participant in a future mail bag segments.
Speaker 3: So you did sing, We're going to get that out there,
Speaker 3: mash them together like the harmonize.
Speaker 1: You did go high, So that was perfect. Should I
Speaker 1: go low? Anyway?
Speaker 2: That was the Many Stuff podcasts.
Speaker 1: I'm Matt Levin and I'm Katie Greefeld.
Speaker 2: You can find my work by subscribing to the Money
Speaker 2: Stuff newsletter on.
Speaker 3: Bloomberg dot com, and you can find me on Bloomberg
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Speaker 2: You can send an email to Moneypod at bloomberg dot net,
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Speaker 2: The Money Stuff Podcast is produced by Ana Mazerakus and
Speaker 2: Roses adam Our.
Speaker 1: Theme music was composed by Blake Maples.
Speaker 2: Brandon Francis Newnham is our executive producer.
Speaker 1: And Sage Bauman is Bloomberg's head of Podcasts.
Speaker 2: Thanks for listening to The Money Stuff Podcast. We'll be
Speaker 2: back next week with more stuff.