WEBVTT - Sal Mercogliano on the Baltimore Bridge Collapse 0:00:02.480 --> 0:00:15.880 Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 0:00:17.880 --> 0:00:20.960 Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. 0:00:21.000 --> 0:00:22.279 I'm Tracy Alloway. 0:00:22.079 --> 0:00:23.240 And I'm Jill Wisenthal. 0:00:23.520 --> 0:00:26.880 So, Joe, this is an emergency episode of Odd Thoughts. 0:00:27.000 --> 0:00:30.480 Anyone waking up on Tuesday morning would have seen the 0:00:30.640 --> 0:00:33.120 very very dramatic news coming out of Baltimore. 0:00:33.280 --> 0:00:35.760 I slept in today and now I'm never going to 0:00:35.800 --> 0:00:38.839 make that mistake again, because then I walked into the 0:00:38.880 --> 0:00:41.440 office and I literally asked, Tracy, is there's some sort 0:00:41.440 --> 0:00:42.559 of huge port disaster? 0:00:42.760 --> 0:00:45.559 And so yes, And I thought you were trolling me initially, 0:00:45.560 --> 0:00:48.280 but it turned out you hadn't actually seen the news. 0:00:48.360 --> 0:00:51.960 So what happened this morning? We are recording on March 0:00:52.120 --> 0:00:56.639 twenty sixth, and a container ship called Dolly crashed into 0:00:56.920 --> 0:01:00.440 the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore. This is the 0:01:00.520 --> 0:01:03.800 Key Bridge in many senses of the word. It is 0:01:03.920 --> 0:01:08.160 a vital commuter lane and it is just outside the 0:01:08.200 --> 0:01:11.280 Port of Baltimore, which means ships go under it in 0:01:11.400 --> 0:01:13.800 order to get in and out of the port. What 0:01:13.880 --> 0:01:16.800 we know so far about the ship is it was 0:01:16.880 --> 0:01:21.640 a Singaporean flagship. It was chartered to Marisk the shipping giant, 0:01:21.959 --> 0:01:25.319 and it's kind of reminiscent a little bit of what 0:01:25.520 --> 0:01:29.679 happened in March twenty twenty two in the Chesapeake Bay 0:01:29.760 --> 0:01:32.959 with the ever forward. But it seems like the results 0:01:33.000 --> 0:01:35.240 of this are much more dramatic. So the bridge is 0:01:35.400 --> 0:01:38.720 entirely collapsed as we are recording this. The search and 0:01:38.800 --> 0:01:42.800 rescue mission is still underway. They're still looking for survivors 0:01:42.840 --> 0:01:46.240 of this tragedy. So clearly a loss of life there. 0:01:46.600 --> 0:01:49.520 But Joe, this opens up a whole bunch of questions 0:01:49.560 --> 0:01:53.320 about how exactly this happened, what it means for shipping 0:01:53.480 --> 0:01:55.880 and freight, what it means for the wider economy. 0:01:56.200 --> 0:01:57.200 Let's jump right into it. 0:01:57.240 --> 0:01:59.200 All right, we're gonna be speaking with one of our 0:01:59.240 --> 0:02:03.280 favorite all blaw guess. We're speaking with Salmur Coccliano, professor 0:02:03.320 --> 0:02:06.080 at Campbell University and the host of the What is 0:02:06.160 --> 0:02:10.040 going On with Shipping Show on YouTube. Sal you've become 0:02:10.160 --> 0:02:13.320 the person that everyone calls whenever there's a maritime disaster, it. 0:02:13.280 --> 0:02:16.840 Seems it does, and unfortunately that phone rings a little 0:02:16.840 --> 0:02:17.760 too often some days. 0:02:18.120 --> 0:02:20.280 Why don't we just start with, as of right now, 0:02:20.360 --> 0:02:22.200 the basics of what you understand happened. 0:02:22.720 --> 0:02:25.680 Yeah, So Dolly was just finishing up an East coast 0:02:25.800 --> 0:02:27.680 run and it hit a couple of East coast ports. 0:02:27.720 --> 0:02:30.440 It was leaving the port of Baltimore heading down to 0:02:30.440 --> 0:02:33.200 the Panama Canal and was heading over to Sri Lanka 0:02:33.240 --> 0:02:36.320 to the port of Colombo. The ship is owned by 0:02:36.360 --> 0:02:38.600 a company out of Singapore, which is not unusual, and 0:02:38.639 --> 0:02:42.520 it's actually at least an operated for Marisk Lines. The 0:02:42.560 --> 0:02:46.160 ship had on board two Maryland pilots, Chesapeake Bay pilots. 0:02:46.400 --> 0:02:48.880 The ship was doing as it normally would do a 0:02:48.960 --> 0:02:51.520 ship just before it had come off the Secrit Terminal. 0:02:51.800 --> 0:02:54.519 This is the Terminal Container terminal just outside of Baltimore, 0:02:54.560 --> 0:02:57.240 but it's inside the harbor. There, the ship had gotten 0:02:57.240 --> 0:03:00.000 into the channel and was heading outbound at about eight 0:03:00.120 --> 0:03:02.960 knots and everything seemed to be normal. Now, there are 0:03:03.080 --> 0:03:05.840 reports that when the ship was coming up the bay, 0:03:05.919 --> 0:03:07.640 and even when the ship was peer side, that the 0:03:07.639 --> 0:03:10.800 ship suffered some engineering issues. There were some issues with 0:03:10.840 --> 0:03:13.240 black smoke, there was some issue with power loss. But 0:03:13.360 --> 0:03:15.840 before the ship ever would have thrown off lines, it 0:03:15.880 --> 0:03:18.360 would have done a series of tests at the dock 0:03:18.880 --> 0:03:22.320 to make sure that it had propulsion, it had rudder control, 0:03:22.720 --> 0:03:24.560 and it would have been cleared to leave. And a 0:03:24.560 --> 0:03:26.760 matter of fact, this ship was recently inspected by the 0:03:26.840 --> 0:03:30.640 US Coast Guard under a port state agreement. The ship 0:03:30.760 --> 0:03:34.040 headed southbound, and what we have is both the information 0:03:34.160 --> 0:03:38.400 from marine traffic and from video provided from the Port 0:03:38.400 --> 0:03:41.920 of Baltimore, and what we see in these two images 0:03:42.240 --> 0:03:44.880 is the ship as it was heading toward the Franciscott 0:03:44.960 --> 0:03:48.440 Key Bridge, lost power. The ship went dark. And as 0:03:48.480 --> 0:03:50.920 a form mariner, I could say this that the worst 0:03:50.960 --> 0:03:53.600 feeling I've ever had on a ship is when everything 0:03:53.600 --> 0:03:56.160 goes quiet. There's always noise. There's always you know, because 0:03:56.160 --> 0:03:58.400 that's a sign that you've dropped the plant. In other words, 0:03:58.440 --> 0:04:02.920 you've lost the engine. And silence is deadly. It just 0:04:03.000 --> 0:04:06.240 means everything has gone wrong. Now you have ae hundred 0:04:06.360 --> 0:04:10.400 thousand ton ship at eight knots roughly about ten miles 0:04:10.400 --> 0:04:15.000 an hour, with no control, and very quickly, within ten 0:04:15.080 --> 0:04:17.480 fifteen seconds we see lights come back on, but that's 0:04:17.560 --> 0:04:20.000 not clear that the ship's engines had come back on. 0:04:20.120 --> 0:04:23.919 That could be the emergency backup engines coming on to 0:04:23.960 --> 0:04:26.479 give you propulsion. We know, and I've talked to a 0:04:26.520 --> 0:04:29.760 tug operator in Baltimore. They heard the ship's pilot and 0:04:29.760 --> 0:04:33.080 then remember ships will have a crew on board. We 0:04:33.120 --> 0:04:35.200 believe this crew to be an Indian crew, So the 0:04:35.240 --> 0:04:38.679 ship's master is ultimately in control of the vessel. Masters 0:04:38.680 --> 0:04:41.880 are ultimately responsible. But there were two Maryland pilots on board. 0:04:41.960 --> 0:04:46.240 Pilots assist, they provide expertise, but they don't take command. 0:04:46.800 --> 0:04:49.320 But one of the pilots signaled in may day that 0:04:49.360 --> 0:04:52.080 they had lost propulsion. They were heading for the bridge 0:04:52.560 --> 0:04:55.400 and in the background alarms were sounding and that would 0:04:55.400 --> 0:04:58.360 have been the loss of power alarms up on the bridge. 0:04:58.480 --> 0:05:01.480 After the ships lights came back on, we see a 0:05:01.560 --> 0:05:04.280 distinct pail of black smoke come out of one of 0:05:04.320 --> 0:05:07.920 the ship's smokestacks. That's usually an indication that not only 0:05:08.000 --> 0:05:10.480 is the engine coming back online, but they're probably trying 0:05:10.480 --> 0:05:13.880 to back down with the engine. They're forcing fuel into 0:05:13.920 --> 0:05:17.080 the engine to get it to go into reverse, and 0:05:17.800 --> 0:05:19.719 looks like what they were trying to do was slow 0:05:19.839 --> 0:05:23.960 down the vessel. Unfortunately, that was not sufficient. There'd be 0:05:23.960 --> 0:05:26.880 a big question during the investigation, which will probably be 0:05:26.960 --> 0:05:29.880 led by the Coast Guard and NTSB, what was the 0:05:30.000 --> 0:05:32.279 orders given up on the bridge. There's a vessel data 0:05:32.320 --> 0:05:35.599 recorder that is independently powered. It has a battery backup, 0:05:35.640 --> 0:05:38.560 so we will get this. It'll have the information from 0:05:38.560 --> 0:05:41.240 the ship like a plane's black box, but also the 0:05:41.279 --> 0:05:45.280 recordings from the bridge. Did they order a stern move 0:05:45.640 --> 0:05:47.919 that they tried to steer the vessel. One of the 0:05:47.960 --> 0:05:50.160 things I worry about is they tried to back down, 0:05:50.200 --> 0:05:52.240 and when you try to back down a vessel that 0:05:52.360 --> 0:05:55.799 big at that speed, you start to lose helm control 0:05:55.839 --> 0:05:58.640 because you create this disturbance in the water around the propeller. 0:05:59.279 --> 0:06:02.560 And what we do know is the ship then continued 0:06:02.680 --> 0:06:05.000 it's kind of slant to the south. It was being 0:06:05.080 --> 0:06:07.159 pushed by both the wind coming out of the north 0:06:07.760 --> 0:06:10.800 and also the torque of the propeller, and it impaled 0:06:10.839 --> 0:06:15.240 itself up against the southern pilon of the Francis Scott 0:06:15.279 --> 0:06:18.160 Key Bridge, and that resulted in the collapse of the 0:06:18.200 --> 0:06:20.400 bridge actually onto the bow of the vessel. We know 0:06:20.480 --> 0:06:23.120 the ship dropped its port anchor because you can see 0:06:23.120 --> 0:06:25.719 it down and it's streaming aft. So they try to 0:06:25.760 --> 0:06:28.440 do it, but an anchor at eight knots is just 0:06:28.520 --> 0:06:30.599 going to drag the bottom. It's not going to stop. 0:06:31.120 --> 0:06:34.120 So the collapse of the bridge is clearly a dramatic 0:06:34.160 --> 0:06:38.360 development and makes this particular incident very different to things 0:06:38.440 --> 0:06:41.800 like the ever forward running aground. But I guess one 0:06:41.880 --> 0:06:46.839 question I have is what's a reasonable expectation here for vulnerability? 0:06:46.960 --> 0:06:49.760 And what I mean by that is is the expectation 0:06:49.960 --> 0:06:55.159 that container ships just don't ever go into bridges, which 0:06:55.160 --> 0:06:57.520 would seem like a good thing. Or should bridges be 0:06:57.680 --> 0:07:01.400 able to withstand ships running into them? Like are there 0:07:01.440 --> 0:07:06.119 particular protections around bridges? I've seen concrete barriers and things 0:07:06.160 --> 0:07:08.560 like that. I guess in general, it just seems kind 0:07:08.560 --> 0:07:11.960 of crazy to think that you have thousands of ships 0:07:12.120 --> 0:07:15.520 going under these giant structures on a day to day 0:07:15.560 --> 0:07:18.800 basis around the world, and if something goes wrong with 0:07:18.840 --> 0:07:21.200 one of them, then the entire bridge can collapse. 0:07:21.720 --> 0:07:24.120 Right, So I mean, you really come into I say it, 0:07:24.200 --> 0:07:27.160 but it's almost a cost benefit analysis. How much protection 0:07:27.320 --> 0:07:30.480 do you want to put around the pillars of a bridge. 0:07:30.560 --> 0:07:34.080 This ship hit the southern pillar almost head on at 0:07:34.080 --> 0:07:37.080 eight knots to probably about seven knots one hundred thousand tons. 0:07:37.280 --> 0:07:39.239 That's a lot of force. I mean, I'm not sure. 0:07:39.360 --> 0:07:41.480 I'm not an engineer when it comes to building bridges, 0:07:41.920 --> 0:07:45.320 but I'm not exactly sure how much force and area 0:07:45.360 --> 0:07:48.560 you have to build around a bridge for that. The 0:07:48.640 --> 0:07:50.960 pilings were not, you know, right up against the side 0:07:50.960 --> 0:07:52.760 of the channel. This ship came out of the channel, 0:07:52.840 --> 0:07:56.840 so it maneuvered out of what is then the normal channel. 0:07:57.000 --> 0:07:59.840 You know, when we had discussions about ever given for example, 0:08:00.040 --> 0:08:02.800 when it grounded in the Suez or ever forward, when 0:08:02.800 --> 0:08:05.040 it came out of Baltimore, you know, one of the 0:08:05.120 --> 0:08:07.320 questions was, well, maybe it should have tugboats with it 0:08:07.360 --> 0:08:09.600 at all times. It's not exactly clear that even if 0:08:09.640 --> 0:08:13.040 you had tugs it would have prevented this from happening. Plus, 0:08:13.160 --> 0:08:16.240 tugs incur a big cost. Because there are dozens of 0:08:16.240 --> 0:08:18.640 ships a day coming in and out of port at times, 0:08:19.200 --> 0:08:21.000 you would need a lot of assets to do it. 0:08:21.000 --> 0:08:24.520 It would raise costs for it. It's hard to harden 0:08:24.560 --> 0:08:28.000 your infrastructure to the point where everything would be safe 0:08:28.120 --> 0:08:31.480 from every eventuality. If the ship had dropped its plant 0:08:31.800 --> 0:08:34.400 a minute earlier, a minute later, this never happens. The 0:08:34.440 --> 0:08:37.079 ship may have you know, lost propulsion, it may have anchored, 0:08:37.200 --> 0:08:40.120 and we probably wouldn't even be talking about this. But 0:08:40.440 --> 0:08:42.760 because it happened at this key moment. And one of 0:08:42.800 --> 0:08:45.240 the things we've talked about in the past is one 0:08:45.280 --> 0:08:47.200 of the things we've done with global shipping is not 0:08:47.280 --> 0:08:50.360 just increase the volume of cargo that's moving around the world, 0:08:50.440 --> 0:08:53.440 but the velocity of it, and so that leaves very 0:08:53.480 --> 0:08:57.880 little time for what is usually needed for you know, 0:08:58.080 --> 0:09:01.280 you know, repairs and upkeep and all all that aspect. 0:09:01.360 --> 0:09:04.720 We are moving cargo at an ever greater rate, and 0:09:04.800 --> 0:09:07.760 so there's a very small margin of error right now 0:09:07.800 --> 0:09:10.800 that we have, and unfortunately, we're seeing these accidents take place. 0:09:11.600 --> 0:09:15.640 When you think in your mental encyclopedia about past disasters, 0:09:15.720 --> 0:09:18.360 obviously our mind goes to the ever forward because it 0:09:18.400 --> 0:09:21.600 was in Baltimore. But are there other incidents that this 0:09:21.679 --> 0:09:22.280 reminds you of. 0:09:22.679 --> 0:09:24.920 Oh yeah, go back to the eighties to the Tampa 0:09:25.000 --> 0:09:27.560 bridge incident, where you had a collapse of the bridge 0:09:27.559 --> 0:09:30.679 almost a very similar thing. Vessel was much smaller at 0:09:30.720 --> 0:09:32.960 the time, but you had a vessel out of control 0:09:33.440 --> 0:09:36.160 hit the bridge and cause a collapse of the bridge 0:09:36.720 --> 0:09:39.079 in Tampa. We saw it in San Francisco in the 0:09:39.120 --> 0:09:42.400 early twenty tens where we had a a hit, but 0:09:42.520 --> 0:09:45.720 that was a glancing hit up against the pilings didn't 0:09:45.720 --> 0:09:48.480 really get to the bridge structure. Where we've seen it 0:09:48.559 --> 0:09:51.400 more than anything else is actually in coastal waters, in 0:09:51.400 --> 0:09:53.880 inland waters where we've seen this on the Mississippi and 0:09:53.880 --> 0:09:57.320 the Ohio River, where we've seen these incidents take place 0:09:57.960 --> 0:10:00.400 in other places. But again, Baltimore is it is not 0:10:00.440 --> 0:10:02.480 a big port in terms of the United States. It's 0:10:02.520 --> 0:10:04.839 not even in the top ten of ports. But it's 0:10:04.840 --> 0:10:08.160 a port that does seventy four billion dollars of business 0:10:08.280 --> 0:10:11.559 a year. It moves forty three million tons of cargo, 0:10:12.200 --> 0:10:14.560 so there's a lot of cargo moving in and out. 0:10:14.679 --> 0:10:17.599 And you know, we've talked about the idea about infrastructure 0:10:17.880 --> 0:10:20.439 and how much we need to kind of improve infrastructure. 0:10:20.480 --> 0:10:22.640 One of the limitations on the Port of Baltimore has 0:10:22.640 --> 0:10:25.280 been the Francis Scott Key Bridge because of its height 0:10:25.640 --> 0:10:28.199 and the nature of the bridge. So you know, we 0:10:28.360 --> 0:10:32.720 don't unfortunately spend enough on hardening and improving our infrastructure, 0:10:32.800 --> 0:10:34.680 especially in the maritime environment. 0:10:35.280 --> 0:10:39.280 What's the media impact on shipping? So the Dolly is 0:10:39.400 --> 0:10:43.080 still there under the wreckage of the bridge. A bridge 0:10:43.080 --> 0:10:46.720 wreckage itself is obviously absolutely massive and it's going to 0:10:46.760 --> 0:10:50.040 take some time to move that we know there are 0:10:50.080 --> 0:10:53.400 ships still stuck in the Port of Baltimore. What about 0:10:53.400 --> 0:10:56.240 other ships? Do they just get rerouted to New York 0:10:56.400 --> 0:10:59.360 or Norfolk? And how much of a disruption is that? 0:10:59.760 --> 0:11:00.240 Yeah? 0:11:00.040 --> 0:11:02.199 Yeah, I mean so Port of Baltimore will be closed 0:11:02.240 --> 0:11:05.000 for the foreseeable future. I mean, even once Dolly is 0:11:05.080 --> 0:11:08.439 removed from it. You've got to remove the entire structure 0:11:08.520 --> 0:11:11.080 of the bridge from the main shipping channel, so it 0:11:11.160 --> 0:11:14.280 is effectively closed. So whoever's in Baltimore is staying in Baltimore. 0:11:14.800 --> 0:11:17.360 The ship's going into Baltimore. You can re route some 0:11:17.400 --> 0:11:19.240 of them, But the problem is Baltimore is a very 0:11:19.240 --> 0:11:21.120 well rounded port. It does a little bit of everything. 0:11:21.200 --> 0:11:24.680 So you can offload containers in other facilities, that's not 0:11:24.720 --> 0:11:27.440 really a big issue, but it's a big car terminal. 0:11:27.520 --> 0:11:30.080 So you're talking about having to offload cars in other 0:11:30.120 --> 0:11:32.760 facilities maybe up in New Jersey or up in New England, 0:11:33.200 --> 0:11:36.280 or down in Savannah or Brunswick and Georgia. But then 0:11:36.280 --> 0:11:38.520 you're gonna have to move those cars up to the 0:11:38.600 --> 0:11:41.520 region of Baltimore. The biggest issue here is going to 0:11:41.559 --> 0:11:45.040 be the export of coal. Baltimore is a major port 0:11:45.200 --> 0:11:47.720 for export of coal. And it's not like you can 0:11:47.840 --> 0:11:50.760 just move the coal to another facility, because you need 0:11:50.800 --> 0:11:53.800 specialized facilities for that, and the facilities that do exist 0:11:53.880 --> 0:11:56.880 are largely at capacity. So this is going to be 0:11:56.920 --> 0:11:59.240 a big problem. If you look at imagery of marine 0:11:59.280 --> 0:12:02.080 traffic or any other ais, you'll see just south of 0:12:02.120 --> 0:12:05.560 the Bay Bridge a fleet of vessels waiting to get 0:12:05.559 --> 0:12:08.760 into Baltimore, and then another one larger down to Chesapeake. 0:12:09.240 --> 0:12:11.480 So this shutting down to the port of Baltimore is 0:12:11.520 --> 0:12:15.520 going to have a major impact on the transportation of 0:12:15.720 --> 0:12:17.800 energy out of the United States, in this case coal. 0:12:18.480 --> 0:12:20.480 So I remember when we you know, when we talked 0:12:20.480 --> 0:12:24.360 about the situation in the Suez several years ago. You 0:12:24.400 --> 0:12:29.040 know this idea of specialized local captains or pilots who 0:12:29.080 --> 0:12:31.800 would just be on the ship for that one part 0:12:32.000 --> 0:12:34.440 navigating the canal, and then they would get off and 0:12:34.480 --> 0:12:36.839 then the normal crew and takeover. Is it the same 0:12:36.880 --> 0:12:39.360 situation when you said, okay that there was a I think, 0:12:39.440 --> 0:12:41.360 did you say a pilot or what is the role? 0:12:41.440 --> 0:12:43.839 There was a Maryland someone from Maryland? Is it the 0:12:43.880 --> 0:12:47.360 same sort of thing? We're in that specific area, there 0:12:47.360 --> 0:12:49.520 will be people on the ship who just know how 0:12:49.600 --> 0:12:51.800 to navigate that thing, and then they get out after 0:12:51.840 --> 0:12:52.840 the ship leaves the water. 0:12:53.240 --> 0:12:55.920 Exactly, you would have two Chesapeake Bay pilots on board. 0:12:56.160 --> 0:12:58.679 We know there's two on there, so they would provide 0:12:58.720 --> 0:13:01.440 that expertise for the area. They would actually you would 0:13:01.440 --> 0:13:03.439 have a docking pilot who would undock the vessel. The 0:13:03.800 --> 0:13:06.080 docking pilot would probably get back off the vessel once 0:13:06.120 --> 0:13:08.720 it's off the berth, and then the two Bay pilots 0:13:08.720 --> 0:13:11.440 would stay on board until the vessel sailed out of 0:13:11.559 --> 0:13:14.960 Hampton Roads through Chesapeake Bay to come out. They know 0:13:15.040 --> 0:13:16.600 the lay of the land. But if you remember what 0:13:16.760 --> 0:13:20.360 happened with ever forward, the incident that was later determined 0:13:20.400 --> 0:13:23.320 to have caused the grounding was the one pilot who 0:13:23.360 --> 0:13:26.120 was on board at the time was distracted, was on 0:13:26.160 --> 0:13:29.400 his computer and missed a key turn. It's not you. 0:13:29.760 --> 0:13:31.840 I would argue that we don't see an issue here 0:13:31.880 --> 0:13:34.640 with pilot at all. This doesn't seem to be a 0:13:34.679 --> 0:13:37.599 pilot error. It doesn't even seem to be a maneuvering 0:13:37.960 --> 0:13:40.840 or here. Again, we could talk about judgment later on 0:13:40.920 --> 0:13:42.400 about whether or not they should have gone in the 0:13:42.440 --> 0:13:45.160 stern if that's what they did. But this seems to 0:13:45.160 --> 0:13:47.680 be a mechanical issue that has been the issue that 0:13:47.720 --> 0:13:50.120 plagued the vessel. And again, a pilot wouldn't really know 0:13:50.240 --> 0:13:53.280 this coming on board. This is the ship's crew knowing 0:13:53.480 --> 0:13:56.200 what is the status of their vessel, both mechanically and 0:13:56.240 --> 0:13:57.400 the ability of it to sail. 0:14:13.000 --> 0:14:15.840 We have limited information so far, and as you mentioned, 0:14:15.840 --> 0:14:19.120 there is surely going to be a very long and 0:14:19.440 --> 0:14:24.280 ongoing investigation into this particular incident. But it does seem 0:14:24.360 --> 0:14:27.280 like some things were done right. So we know the 0:14:27.320 --> 0:14:29.760 ship dropped anchor. We know they made a may day 0:14:29.840 --> 0:14:33.000 call which seems to have gotten some of the cars 0:14:33.040 --> 0:14:36.800 off the bridge and potentially save lives. But how do 0:14:36.840 --> 0:14:40.040 you sort of stack up the actions of the ship 0:14:40.200 --> 0:14:42.320 from what we know so far or the crew. 0:14:42.720 --> 0:14:45.400 Yeah, I mean again, until we get the full detail, 0:14:45.440 --> 0:14:47.480 it's really hard to say. But you know, based on 0:14:47.880 --> 0:14:50.760 the reports coming in, it sounds like they did everything 0:14:50.840 --> 0:14:53.520 they could have done. You know, the anchor is just 0:14:53.640 --> 0:14:55.800 not going to stop a vessel at that speed. It 0:14:55.880 --> 0:14:57.640 may look like you can do it in movies, but 0:14:57.680 --> 0:14:59.520 it's not in real life because of the momentum of 0:14:59.520 --> 0:15:02.360 the vessel. It's extremely hard. We know the port anchor 0:15:02.400 --> 0:15:04.040 is down because we see the imagery of it, which 0:15:04.080 --> 0:15:06.120 would be the right anchor to drop Because you're trying 0:15:06.120 --> 0:15:08.760 to drag the ship back into the channel to get 0:15:08.800 --> 0:15:11.680 it back in there. The coordination between the pilot on 0:15:11.680 --> 0:15:14.520 the vessel with the bridge and trying to get vehicles 0:15:14.520 --> 0:15:17.320 off is key. Unfortunately, they were not able to stop 0:15:17.360 --> 0:15:19.920 all the vehicles on it. But again, you know, one 0:15:19.960 --> 0:15:22.480 of the big questions that I have going in is like, Okay, 0:15:22.480 --> 0:15:24.480 what is the track record of this vessel? Did this 0:15:24.600 --> 0:15:29.240 vessel encounter issues coming up where there systematic maintenance problems 0:15:29.280 --> 0:15:31.960 with the vessel? Did it drop power while coming up 0:15:32.000 --> 0:15:34.040 to Chesapeake Bay? We don't know that for sure. You know, 0:15:34.040 --> 0:15:36.800 I've heard reports of the vessel did have some black 0:15:36.800 --> 0:15:39.440 smoke coming out of it, which is not always unusual. 0:15:39.800 --> 0:15:41.720 But even if it was up at the berth, whether 0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:45.440 instances of that was the vessel ready to go? Unfortunately, 0:15:45.480 --> 0:15:48.480 what tends to happen here is unless there's a full 0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:51.080 inspection being done. Not every vessel that comes into the 0:15:51.120 --> 0:15:54.480 US ports are inspected. They are done periodically. They will 0:15:54.520 --> 0:15:57.960 be cleared by Customs and Coastguard, but they won't do 0:15:58.040 --> 0:16:00.480 a full inspection of the vessel and even and then 0:16:00.920 --> 0:16:04.280 we rely entirely on the ship and the ship's crew 0:16:04.320 --> 0:16:06.920 and the ship's operating company to ensure that ships are 0:16:06.960 --> 0:16:10.160 meeting their standards. We rely on that because that's the 0:16:10.200 --> 0:16:13.800 way international shipping operates, and the Singapore flag is a 0:16:13.840 --> 0:16:16.600 good registry. It's a very good registry. This ship was 0:16:16.720 --> 0:16:19.400 under leased to Merisk, but it wasn't a Marisk ship. 0:16:19.640 --> 0:16:21.560 You'll notice there's no name on the side of the vessel, 0:16:21.640 --> 0:16:24.640 no company. This is basically like a rental vessel that 0:16:24.680 --> 0:16:27.440 they used to fill in for surge at the time. 0:16:27.600 --> 0:16:29.480 So there's going to be have to go back to 0:16:29.520 --> 0:16:32.640 Singapore where the company is based to find out what 0:16:32.800 --> 0:16:35.440 was the history of this vessel, did it maintain its maintenance? 0:16:35.640 --> 0:16:38.800 The Classification Society, which is that third party that exists 0:16:38.800 --> 0:16:42.120 outside of the registry and the ownership that's supposed to 0:16:42.200 --> 0:16:45.280 ensure that everything is being done. It takes time to 0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:48.240 go through this, and that's what this is going to entail, 0:16:48.320 --> 0:16:51.120 especially because of the loss of life associated with this incident. 0:16:51.560 --> 0:16:54.520 With the stipulation that there's obviously tons we don't know 0:16:54.720 --> 0:16:58.160 currently give us an overview of sort of what maritime 0:16:58.280 --> 0:17:02.800 law says about the like distribution of penalties and fines 0:17:02.960 --> 0:17:06.240 and costs for damages and repairs and things like that. 0:17:06.359 --> 0:17:09.639 Liability, right, and so this is something we had a 0:17:09.640 --> 0:17:12.520 conversation with back with ever Forward at the time. So 0:17:12.760 --> 0:17:15.440 obviously you know the ship has insurance for both the 0:17:15.520 --> 0:17:19.960 ship itself and the cargo, so you can expect that 0:17:20.080 --> 0:17:22.440 the owner of the ship would declare general average, which 0:17:22.440 --> 0:17:25.760 would basically spread the cost of liability not just across 0:17:25.760 --> 0:17:29.119 the ship but across the cargo. The crew will be held. 0:17:29.240 --> 0:17:32.240 The coast Guard probably almost immediately went on board that 0:17:32.359 --> 0:17:36.119 vessel and would have drug tested, alcohol tested everybody on board. 0:17:36.720 --> 0:17:39.040 They will get depositions from them, try to find out 0:17:39.160 --> 0:17:41.800 there will be liability issues for whether or not there 0:17:41.840 --> 0:17:44.679 was negligence. In the case of what happened back in 0:17:44.720 --> 0:17:47.800 San Francisco in the twenty tens, they actually found the 0:17:47.840 --> 0:17:50.000 pilot to be libel at that time and there was 0:17:50.040 --> 0:17:53.119 actually a criminal case against him for his negligence with 0:17:53.440 --> 0:17:57.880 a jail sentence involved. So we can see punishments against 0:17:57.880 --> 0:18:01.000 the crew, We can see issues with the pilots depending 0:18:01.000 --> 0:18:04.359 on whether or not there's culpability, but definitely with the 0:18:04.400 --> 0:18:06.600 owners of the company. The question is going to be 0:18:07.080 --> 0:18:09.600 does that go as far as Marisk Lines, who is 0:18:09.680 --> 0:18:13.480 leasing the vessel, or will it be with this Singapore company. 0:18:13.480 --> 0:18:15.439 As you know, in shipping, one of the things that 0:18:15.560 --> 0:18:19.560 happens a lot is ships are incorporated into these kind 0:18:19.600 --> 0:18:23.879 of shadow corporations to basically diffuse liability. You know, the 0:18:23.920 --> 0:18:27.080 ship isn't owned by Marisk, there's no direct connection to it. 0:18:27.080 --> 0:18:30.119 It goes through a series of subcontracts and the question 0:18:30.200 --> 0:18:33.720 becomes how much of that liability will be there. It 0:18:33.760 --> 0:18:35.879 will also go to the insurance clubs, the P and 0:18:35.920 --> 0:18:39.080 I for the cargo, the hull and machinery for the vessel, 0:18:39.720 --> 0:18:43.160 and they'll be assessing that damage. Plus we can see 0:18:43.359 --> 0:18:47.040 liability claims come in from those who have been killed 0:18:47.119 --> 0:18:49.320 or wounded on the bridge, and we can also see 0:18:49.320 --> 0:18:51.639 the same thing for cargo. Now that's going to divert 0:18:51.720 --> 0:18:55.480 because of this, because they're going to blame extra costs 0:18:55.560 --> 0:18:59.080 for doing this. The amount of liability that's at play 0:18:59.160 --> 0:19:01.960 here is I can't even fathom right now. This is 0:19:01.960 --> 0:19:04.879 the thing about maritime cases is that they can just 0:19:04.960 --> 0:19:08.160 blow up into numbers that just really boggle the mind 0:19:08.200 --> 0:19:11.760 at times because of the impacts that have the butterfly 0:19:11.800 --> 0:19:13.640 effects down the entire supply chain. 0:19:14.280 --> 0:19:18.239 So there's three sort of core a lots concepts that 0:19:18.400 --> 0:19:22.600 seem to be involved in the current discussion of this incident. 0:19:22.920 --> 0:19:24.840 One of them you just mentioned, so the law of 0:19:24.880 --> 0:19:27.840 General averages. The other two are the Foreign Dredge Act 0:19:27.880 --> 0:19:30.920 of nineteen oh six and of course the Jones Act. 0:19:31.119 --> 0:19:33.320 You knew it was inevitable that we would bring up 0:19:33.320 --> 0:19:36.399 the Jones Act at some point in this discussion. But 0:19:36.520 --> 0:19:40.359 how are we seeing those conversations play out in light 0:19:40.480 --> 0:19:41.320 of this tragedy. 0:19:41.760 --> 0:19:43.560 Well, let's go to Dredge Act for a second, because 0:19:43.640 --> 0:19:46.199 one of the big issues. Once we get past the 0:19:46.320 --> 0:19:49.119 rescue and the recovery option here, which is going to 0:19:49.119 --> 0:19:52.520 take time. Seven people still missing, that's going to be 0:19:52.520 --> 0:19:56.200 the priority right now. But once that is accomplished, then 0:19:56.320 --> 0:19:59.120 you're going to have to start talking about salvage and 0:19:59.320 --> 0:20:01.320 you're going to need bring in a lot of salvage equipment. 0:20:01.400 --> 0:20:04.280 You have to dismantle the Francis Scott Key Bridge, you 0:20:04.359 --> 0:20:06.520 have to take it apart. You actually have to get 0:20:06.520 --> 0:20:09.280 the bridge off the bow of the Dolly. So you're 0:20:09.280 --> 0:20:11.360 talking about cranes, you're talking about barges, you're talking about 0:20:11.400 --> 0:20:13.480 all that stuff that operates in the coastal waters that 0:20:13.480 --> 0:20:15.760 would be both under the Dredge Act and under the 0:20:15.840 --> 0:20:18.679 Jones Act. So a lot of those facilities are going 0:20:18.720 --> 0:20:20.800 to come in when we watch what happened whatever forward. 0:20:20.840 --> 0:20:23.119 It took time to get cranes and barges in place 0:20:23.160 --> 0:20:26.840