1 00:00:02,480 --> 00:00:15,880 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 2 00:00:17,880 --> 00:00:20,960 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. 3 00:00:21,000 --> 00:00:22,279 Speaker 2: I'm Tracy Alloway. 4 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:23,240 Speaker 3: And I'm Jill Wisenthal. 5 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:26,880 Speaker 2: So, Joe, this is an emergency episode of Odd Thoughts. 6 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:30,480 Speaker 2: Anyone waking up on Tuesday morning would have seen the 7 00:00:30,640 --> 00:00:33,120 Speaker 2: very very dramatic news coming out of Baltimore. 8 00:00:33,280 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 3: I slept in today and now I'm never going to 9 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:38,839 Speaker 3: make that mistake again, because then I walked into the 10 00:00:38,880 --> 00:00:41,440 Speaker 3: office and I literally asked, Tracy, is there's some sort 11 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:42,559 Speaker 3: of huge port disaster? 12 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:45,559 Speaker 2: And so yes, And I thought you were trolling me initially, 13 00:00:45,560 --> 00:00:48,280 Speaker 2: but it turned out you hadn't actually seen the news. 14 00:00:48,360 --> 00:00:51,960 Speaker 2: So what happened this morning? We are recording on March 15 00:00:52,120 --> 00:00:56,639 Speaker 2: twenty sixth, and a container ship called Dolly crashed into 16 00:00:56,920 --> 00:01:00,440 Speaker 2: the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore. This is the 17 00:01:00,520 --> 00:01:03,800 Speaker 2: Key Bridge in many senses of the word. It is 18 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:08,160 Speaker 2: a vital commuter lane and it is just outside the 19 00:01:08,200 --> 00:01:11,280 Speaker 2: Port of Baltimore, which means ships go under it in 20 00:01:11,400 --> 00:01:13,800 Speaker 2: order to get in and out of the port. What 21 00:01:13,880 --> 00:01:16,800 Speaker 2: we know so far about the ship is it was 22 00:01:16,880 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 2: a Singaporean flagship. It was chartered to Marisk the shipping giant, 23 00:01:21,959 --> 00:01:25,319 Speaker 2: and it's kind of reminiscent a little bit of what 24 00:01:25,520 --> 00:01:29,679 Speaker 2: happened in March twenty twenty two in the Chesapeake Bay 25 00:01:29,760 --> 00:01:32,959 Speaker 2: with the ever forward. But it seems like the results 26 00:01:33,000 --> 00:01:35,240 Speaker 2: of this are much more dramatic. So the bridge is 27 00:01:35,400 --> 00:01:38,720 Speaker 2: entirely collapsed as we are recording this. The search and 28 00:01:38,800 --> 00:01:42,800 Speaker 2: rescue mission is still underway. They're still looking for survivors 29 00:01:42,840 --> 00:01:46,240 Speaker 2: of this tragedy. So clearly a loss of life there. 30 00:01:46,600 --> 00:01:49,520 Speaker 2: But Joe, this opens up a whole bunch of questions 31 00:01:49,560 --> 00:01:53,320 Speaker 2: about how exactly this happened, what it means for shipping 32 00:01:53,480 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 2: and freight, what it means for the wider economy. 33 00:01:56,200 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 3: Let's jump right into it. 34 00:01:57,240 --> 00:01:59,200 Speaker 2: All right, we're gonna be speaking with one of our 35 00:01:59,240 --> 00:02:03,280 Speaker 2: favorite all blaw guess. We're speaking with Salmur Coccliano, professor 36 00:02:03,320 --> 00:02:06,080 Speaker 2: at Campbell University and the host of the What is 37 00:02:06,160 --> 00:02:10,040 Speaker 2: going On with Shipping Show on YouTube. Sal you've become 38 00:02:10,160 --> 00:02:13,320 Speaker 2: the person that everyone calls whenever there's a maritime disaster, it. 39 00:02:13,280 --> 00:02:16,840 Speaker 4: Seems it does, and unfortunately that phone rings a little 40 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:17,760 Speaker 4: too often some days. 41 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:20,280 Speaker 3: Why don't we just start with, as of right now, 42 00:02:20,360 --> 00:02:22,200 Speaker 3: the basics of what you understand happened. 43 00:02:22,720 --> 00:02:25,680 Speaker 4: Yeah, So Dolly was just finishing up an East coast 44 00:02:25,800 --> 00:02:27,680 Speaker 4: run and it hit a couple of East coast ports. 45 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 4: It was leaving the port of Baltimore heading down to 46 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:33,200 Speaker 4: the Panama Canal and was heading over to Sri Lanka 47 00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:36,320 Speaker 4: to the port of Colombo. The ship is owned by 48 00:02:36,360 --> 00:02:38,600 Speaker 4: a company out of Singapore, which is not unusual, and 49 00:02:38,639 --> 00:02:42,520 Speaker 4: it's actually at least an operated for Marisk Lines. The 50 00:02:42,560 --> 00:02:46,160 Speaker 4: ship had on board two Maryland pilots, Chesapeake Bay pilots. 51 00:02:46,400 --> 00:02:48,880 Speaker 4: The ship was doing as it normally would do a 52 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:51,520 Speaker 4: ship just before it had come off the Secrit Terminal. 53 00:02:51,800 --> 00:02:54,519 Speaker 4: This is the Terminal Container terminal just outside of Baltimore, 54 00:02:54,560 --> 00:02:57,240 Speaker 4: but it's inside the harbor. There, the ship had gotten 55 00:02:57,240 --> 00:03:00,000 Speaker 4: into the channel and was heading outbound at about eight 56 00:03:00,120 --> 00:03:02,960 Speaker 4: knots and everything seemed to be normal. Now, there are 57 00:03:03,080 --> 00:03:05,840 Speaker 4: reports that when the ship was coming up the bay, 58 00:03:05,919 --> 00:03:07,640 Speaker 4: and even when the ship was peer side, that the 59 00:03:07,639 --> 00:03:10,800 Speaker 4: ship suffered some engineering issues. There were some issues with 60 00:03:10,840 --> 00:03:13,240 Speaker 4: black smoke, there was some issue with power loss. But 61 00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:15,840 Speaker 4: before the ship ever would have thrown off lines, it 62 00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:18,360 Speaker 4: would have done a series of tests at the dock 63 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:22,320 Speaker 4: to make sure that it had propulsion, it had rudder control, 64 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:24,560 Speaker 4: and it would have been cleared to leave. And a 65 00:03:24,560 --> 00:03:26,760 Speaker 4: matter of fact, this ship was recently inspected by the 66 00:03:26,840 --> 00:03:30,640 Speaker 4: US Coast Guard under a port state agreement. The ship 67 00:03:30,760 --> 00:03:34,040 Speaker 4: headed southbound, and what we have is both the information 68 00:03:34,160 --> 00:03:38,400 Speaker 4: from marine traffic and from video provided from the Port 69 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:41,920 Speaker 4: of Baltimore, and what we see in these two images 70 00:03:42,240 --> 00:03:44,880 Speaker 4: is the ship as it was heading toward the Franciscott 71 00:03:44,960 --> 00:03:48,440 Speaker 4: Key Bridge, lost power. The ship went dark. And as 72 00:03:48,480 --> 00:03:50,920 Speaker 4: a form mariner, I could say this that the worst 73 00:03:50,960 --> 00:03:53,600 Speaker 4: feeling I've ever had on a ship is when everything 74 00:03:53,600 --> 00:03:56,160 Speaker 4: goes quiet. There's always noise. There's always you know, because 75 00:03:56,160 --> 00:03:58,400 Speaker 4: that's a sign that you've dropped the plant. In other words, 76 00:03:58,440 --> 00:04:02,920 Speaker 4: you've lost the engine. And silence is deadly. It just 77 00:04:03,000 --> 00:04:06,240 Speaker 4: means everything has gone wrong. Now you have ae hundred 78 00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:10,400 Speaker 4: thousand ton ship at eight knots roughly about ten miles 79 00:04:10,400 --> 00:04:15,000 Speaker 4: an hour, with no control, and very quickly, within ten 80 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:17,480 Speaker 4: fifteen seconds we see lights come back on, but that's 81 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:20,000 Speaker 4: not clear that the ship's engines had come back on. 82 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:23,919 Speaker 4: That could be the emergency backup engines coming on to 83 00:04:23,960 --> 00:04:26,479 Speaker 4: give you propulsion. We know, and I've talked to a 84 00:04:26,520 --> 00:04:29,760 Speaker 4: tug operator in Baltimore. They heard the ship's pilot and 85 00:04:29,760 --> 00:04:33,080 Speaker 4: then remember ships will have a crew on board. We 86 00:04:33,120 --> 00:04:35,200 Speaker 4: believe this crew to be an Indian crew, So the 87 00:04:35,240 --> 00:04:38,679 Speaker 4: ship's master is ultimately in control of the vessel. Masters 88 00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 4: are ultimately responsible. But there were two Maryland pilots on board. 89 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:46,240 Speaker 4: Pilots assist, they provide expertise, but they don't take command. 90 00:04:46,800 --> 00:04:49,320 Speaker 4: But one of the pilots signaled in may day that 91 00:04:49,360 --> 00:04:52,080 Speaker 4: they had lost propulsion. They were heading for the bridge 92 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:55,400 Speaker 4: and in the background alarms were sounding and that would 93 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:58,360 Speaker 4: have been the loss of power alarms up on the bridge. 94 00:04:58,480 --> 00:05:01,480 Speaker 4: After the ships lights came back on, we see a 95 00:05:01,560 --> 00:05:04,280 Speaker 4: distinct pail of black smoke come out of one of 96 00:05:04,320 --> 00:05:07,920 Speaker 4: the ship's smokestacks. That's usually an indication that not only 97 00:05:08,000 --> 00:05:10,480 Speaker 4: is the engine coming back online, but they're probably trying 98 00:05:10,480 --> 00:05:13,880 Speaker 4: to back down with the engine. They're forcing fuel into 99 00:05:13,920 --> 00:05:17,080 Speaker 4: the engine to get it to go into reverse, and 100 00:05:17,800 --> 00:05:19,719 Speaker 4: looks like what they were trying to do was slow 101 00:05:19,839 --> 00:05:23,960 Speaker 4: down the vessel. Unfortunately, that was not sufficient. There'd be 102 00:05:23,960 --> 00:05:26,880 Speaker 4: a big question during the investigation, which will probably be 103 00:05:26,960 --> 00:05:29,880 Speaker 4: led by the Coast Guard and NTSB, what was the 104 00:05:30,000 --> 00:05:32,279 Speaker 4: orders given up on the bridge. There's a vessel data 105 00:05:32,320 --> 00:05:35,599 Speaker 4: recorder that is independently powered. It has a battery backup, 106 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:38,560 Speaker 4: so we will get this. It'll have the information from 107 00:05:38,560 --> 00:05:41,240 Speaker 4: the ship like a plane's black box, but also the 108 00:05:41,279 --> 00:05:45,280 Speaker 4: recordings from the bridge. Did they order a stern move 109 00:05:45,640 --> 00:05:47,919 Speaker 4: that they tried to steer the vessel. One of the 110 00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:50,160 Speaker 4: things I worry about is they tried to back down, 111 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:52,240 Speaker 4: and when you try to back down a vessel that 112 00:05:52,360 --> 00:05:55,799 Speaker 4: big at that speed, you start to lose helm control 113 00:05:55,839 --> 00:05:58,640 Speaker 4: because you create this disturbance in the water around the propeller. 114 00:05:59,279 --> 00:06:02,560 Speaker 4: And what we do know is the ship then continued 115 00:06:02,680 --> 00:06:05,000 Speaker 4: it's kind of slant to the south. It was being 116 00:06:05,080 --> 00:06:07,159 Speaker 4: pushed by both the wind coming out of the north 117 00:06:07,760 --> 00:06:10,800 Speaker 4: and also the torque of the propeller, and it impaled 118 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:15,240 Speaker 4: itself up against the southern pilon of the Francis Scott 119 00:06:15,279 --> 00:06:18,160 Speaker 4: Key Bridge, and that resulted in the collapse of the 120 00:06:18,200 --> 00:06:20,400 Speaker 4: bridge actually onto the bow of the vessel. We know 121 00:06:20,480 --> 00:06:23,120 Speaker 4: the ship dropped its port anchor because you can see 122 00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:25,719 Speaker 4: it down and it's streaming aft. So they try to 123 00:06:25,760 --> 00:06:28,440 Speaker 4: do it, but an anchor at eight knots is just 124 00:06:28,520 --> 00:06:30,599 Speaker 4: going to drag the bottom. It's not going to stop. 125 00:06:31,120 --> 00:06:34,120 Speaker 2: So the collapse of the bridge is clearly a dramatic 126 00:06:34,160 --> 00:06:38,360 Speaker 2: development and makes this particular incident very different to things 127 00:06:38,440 --> 00:06:41,800 Speaker 2: like the ever forward running aground. But I guess one 128 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:46,839 Speaker 2: question I have is what's a reasonable expectation here for vulnerability? 129 00:06:46,960 --> 00:06:49,760 Speaker 2: And what I mean by that is is the expectation 130 00:06:49,960 --> 00:06:55,159 Speaker 2: that container ships just don't ever go into bridges, which 131 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:57,520 Speaker 2: would seem like a good thing. Or should bridges be 132 00:06:57,680 --> 00:07:01,400 Speaker 2: able to withstand ships running into them? Like are there 133 00:07:01,440 --> 00:07:06,119 Speaker 2: particular protections around bridges? I've seen concrete barriers and things 134 00:07:06,160 --> 00:07:08,560 Speaker 2: like that. I guess in general, it just seems kind 135 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:11,960 Speaker 2: of crazy to think that you have thousands of ships 136 00:07:12,120 --> 00:07:15,520 Speaker 2: going under these giant structures on a day to day 137 00:07:15,560 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 2: basis around the world, and if something goes wrong with 138 00:07:18,840 --> 00:07:21,200 Speaker 2: one of them, then the entire bridge can collapse. 139 00:07:21,720 --> 00:07:24,120 Speaker 4: Right, So I mean, you really come into I say it, 140 00:07:24,200 --> 00:07:27,160 Speaker 4: but it's almost a cost benefit analysis. How much protection 141 00:07:27,320 --> 00:07:30,480 Speaker 4: do you want to put around the pillars of a bridge. 142 00:07:30,560 --> 00:07:34,080 Speaker 4: This ship hit the southern pillar almost head on at 143 00:07:34,080 --> 00:07:37,080 Speaker 4: eight knots to probably about seven knots one hundred thousand tons. 144 00:07:37,280 --> 00:07:39,239 Speaker 4: That's a lot of force. I mean, I'm not sure. 145 00:07:39,360 --> 00:07:41,480 Speaker 4: I'm not an engineer when it comes to building bridges, 146 00:07:41,920 --> 00:07:45,320 Speaker 4: but I'm not exactly sure how much force and area 147 00:07:45,360 --> 00:07:48,560 Speaker 4: you have to build around a bridge for that. The 148 00:07:48,640 --> 00:07:50,960 Speaker 4: pilings were not, you know, right up against the side 149 00:07:50,960 --> 00:07:52,760 Speaker 4: of the channel. This ship came out of the channel, 150 00:07:52,840 --> 00:07:56,840 Speaker 4: so it maneuvered out of what is then the normal channel. 151 00:07:57,000 --> 00:07:59,840 Speaker 4: You know, when we had discussions about ever given for example, 152 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:02,800 Speaker 4: when it grounded in the Suez or ever forward, when 153 00:08:02,800 --> 00:08:05,040 Speaker 4: it came out of Baltimore, you know, one of the 154 00:08:05,120 --> 00:08:07,320 Speaker 4: questions was, well, maybe it should have tugboats with it 155 00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:09,600 Speaker 4: at all times. It's not exactly clear that even if 156 00:08:09,640 --> 00:08:13,040 Speaker 4: you had tugs it would have prevented this from happening. Plus, 157 00:08:13,160 --> 00:08:16,240 Speaker 4: tugs incur a big cost. Because there are dozens of 158 00:08:16,240 --> 00:08:18,640 Speaker 4: ships a day coming in and out of port at times, 159 00:08:19,200 --> 00:08:21,000 Speaker 4: you would need a lot of assets to do it. 160 00:08:21,000 --> 00:08:24,520 Speaker 4: It would raise costs for it. It's hard to harden 161 00:08:24,560 --> 00:08:28,000 Speaker 4: your infrastructure to the point where everything would be safe 162 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:31,480 Speaker 4: from every eventuality. If the ship had dropped its plant 163 00:08:31,800 --> 00:08:34,400 Speaker 4: a minute earlier, a minute later, this never happens. The 164 00:08:34,440 --> 00:08:37,079 Speaker 4: ship may have you know, lost propulsion, it may have anchored, 165 00:08:37,200 --> 00:08:40,120 Speaker 4: and we probably wouldn't even be talking about this. But 166 00:08:40,440 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 4: because it happened at this key moment. And one of 167 00:08:42,800 --> 00:08:45,240 Speaker 4: the things we've talked about in the past is one 168 00:08:45,280 --> 00:08:47,200 Speaker 4: of the things we've done with global shipping is not 169 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:50,360 Speaker 4: just increase the volume of cargo that's moving around the world, 170 00:08:50,440 --> 00:08:53,440 Speaker 4: but the velocity of it, and so that leaves very 171 00:08:53,480 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 4: little time for what is usually needed for you know, 172 00:08:58,080 --> 00:09:01,280 Speaker 4: you know, repairs and upkeep and all all that aspect. 173 00:09:01,360 --> 00:09:04,720 Speaker 4: We are moving cargo at an ever greater rate, and 174 00:09:04,800 --> 00:09:07,760 Speaker 4: so there's a very small margin of error right now 175 00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 4: that we have, and unfortunately, we're seeing these accidents take place. 176 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:15,640 Speaker 3: When you think in your mental encyclopedia about past disasters, 177 00:09:15,720 --> 00:09:18,360 Speaker 3: obviously our mind goes to the ever forward because it 178 00:09:18,400 --> 00:09:21,600 Speaker 3: was in Baltimore. But are there other incidents that this 179 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:22,280 Speaker 3: reminds you of. 180 00:09:22,679 --> 00:09:24,920 Speaker 4: Oh yeah, go back to the eighties to the Tampa 181 00:09:25,000 --> 00:09:27,560 Speaker 4: bridge incident, where you had a collapse of the bridge 182 00:09:27,559 --> 00:09:30,679 Speaker 4: almost a very similar thing. Vessel was much smaller at 183 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:32,960 Speaker 4: the time, but you had a vessel out of control 184 00:09:33,440 --> 00:09:36,160 Speaker 4: hit the bridge and cause a collapse of the bridge 185 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:39,079 Speaker 4: in Tampa. We saw it in San Francisco in the 186 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:42,400 Speaker 4: early twenty tens where we had a a hit, but 187 00:09:42,520 --> 00:09:45,720 Speaker 4: that was a glancing hit up against the pilings didn't 188 00:09:45,720 --> 00:09:48,480 Speaker 4: really get to the bridge structure. Where we've seen it 189 00:09:48,559 --> 00:09:51,400 Speaker 4: more than anything else is actually in coastal waters, in 190 00:09:51,400 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 4: inland waters where we've seen this on the Mississippi and 191 00:09:53,880 --> 00:09:57,320 Speaker 4: the Ohio River, where we've seen these incidents take place 192 00:09:57,960 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 4: in other places. But again, Baltimore is it is not 193 00:10:00,440 --> 00:10:02,480 Speaker 4: a big port in terms of the United States. It's 194 00:10:02,520 --> 00:10:04,839 Speaker 4: not even in the top ten of ports. But it's 195 00:10:04,840 --> 00:10:08,160 Speaker 4: a port that does seventy four billion dollars of business 196 00:10:08,280 --> 00:10:11,559 Speaker 4: a year. It moves forty three million tons of cargo, 197 00:10:12,200 --> 00:10:14,560 Speaker 4: so there's a lot of cargo moving in and out. 198 00:10:14,679 --> 00:10:17,599 Speaker 4: And you know, we've talked about the idea about infrastructure 199 00:10:17,880 --> 00:10:20,439 Speaker 4: and how much we need to kind of improve infrastructure. 200 00:10:20,480 --> 00:10:22,640 Speaker 4: One of the limitations on the Port of Baltimore has 201 00:10:22,640 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 4: been the Francis Scott Key Bridge because of its height 202 00:10:25,640 --> 00:10:28,199 Speaker 4: and the nature of the bridge. So you know, we 203 00:10:28,360 --> 00:10:32,720 Speaker 4: don't unfortunately spend enough on hardening and improving our infrastructure, 204 00:10:32,800 --> 00:10:34,680 Speaker 4: especially in the maritime environment. 205 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:39,280 Speaker 2: What's the media impact on shipping? So the Dolly is 206 00:10:39,400 --> 00:10:43,080 Speaker 2: still there under the wreckage of the bridge. A bridge 207 00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:46,720 Speaker 2: wreckage itself is obviously absolutely massive and it's going to 208 00:10:46,760 --> 00:10:50,040 Speaker 2: take some time to move that we know there are 209 00:10:50,080 --> 00:10:53,400 Speaker 2: ships still stuck in the Port of Baltimore. What about 210 00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:56,240 Speaker 2: other ships? Do they just get rerouted to New York 211 00:10:56,400 --> 00:10:59,360 Speaker 2: or Norfolk? And how much of a disruption is that? 212 00:10:59,760 --> 00:11:00,240 Speaker 1: Yeah? 213 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:02,199 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean so Port of Baltimore will be closed 214 00:11:02,240 --> 00:11:05,000 Speaker 4: for the foreseeable future. I mean, even once Dolly is 215 00:11:05,080 --> 00:11:08,439 Speaker 4: removed from it. You've got to remove the entire structure 216 00:11:08,520 --> 00:11:11,080 Speaker 4: of the bridge from the main shipping channel, so it 217 00:11:11,160 --> 00:11:14,280 Speaker 4: is effectively closed. So whoever's in Baltimore is staying in Baltimore. 218 00:11:14,800 --> 00:11:17,360 Speaker 4: The ship's going into Baltimore. You can re route some 219 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:19,240 Speaker 4: of them, But the problem is Baltimore is a very 220 00:11:19,240 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 4: well rounded port. It does a little bit of everything. 221 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:24,680 Speaker 4: So you can offload containers in other facilities, that's not 222 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:27,440 Speaker 4: really a big issue, but it's a big car terminal. 223 00:11:27,520 --> 00:11:30,080 Speaker 4: So you're talking about having to offload cars in other 224 00:11:30,120 --> 00:11:32,760 Speaker 4: facilities maybe up in New Jersey or up in New England, 225 00:11:33,200 --> 00:11:36,280 Speaker 4: or down in Savannah or Brunswick and Georgia. But then 226 00:11:36,280 --> 00:11:38,520 Speaker 4: you're gonna have to move those cars up to the 227 00:11:38,600 --> 00:11:41,520 Speaker 4: region of Baltimore. The biggest issue here is going to 228 00:11:41,559 --> 00:11:45,040 Speaker 4: be the export of coal. Baltimore is a major port 229 00:11:45,200 --> 00:11:47,720 Speaker 4: for export of coal. And it's not like you can 230 00:11:47,840 --> 00:11:50,760 Speaker 4: just move the coal to another facility, because you need 231 00:11:50,800 --> 00:11:53,800 Speaker 4: specialized facilities for that, and the facilities that do exist 232 00:11:53,880 --> 00:11:56,880 Speaker 4: are largely at capacity. So this is going to be 233 00:11:56,920 --> 00:11:59,240 Speaker 4: a big problem. If you look at imagery of marine 234 00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:02,080 Speaker 4: traffic or any other ais, you'll see just south of 235 00:12:02,120 --> 00:12:05,560 Speaker 4: the Bay Bridge a fleet of vessels waiting to get 236 00:12:05,559 --> 00:12:08,760 Speaker 4: into Baltimore, and then another one larger down to Chesapeake. 237 00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:11,480 Speaker 4: So this shutting down to the port of Baltimore is 238 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:15,520 Speaker 4: going to have a major impact on the transportation of 239 00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:17,800 Speaker 4: energy out of the United States, in this case coal. 240 00:12:18,480 --> 00:12:20,480 Speaker 3: So I remember when we you know, when we talked 241 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:24,360 Speaker 3: about the situation in the Suez several years ago. You 242 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 3: know this idea of specialized local captains or pilots who 243 00:12:29,080 --> 00:12:31,800 Speaker 3: would just be on the ship for that one part 244 00:12:32,000 --> 00:12:34,440 Speaker 3: navigating the canal, and then they would get off and 245 00:12:34,480 --> 00:12:36,839 Speaker 3: then the normal crew and takeover. Is it the same 246 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:39,360 Speaker 3: situation when you said, okay that there was a I think, 247 00:12:39,440 --> 00:12:41,360 Speaker 3: did you say a pilot or what is the role? 248 00:12:41,440 --> 00:12:43,839 Speaker 3: There was a Maryland someone from Maryland? Is it the 249 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:47,360 Speaker 3: same sort of thing? We're in that specific area, there 250 00:12:47,360 --> 00:12:49,520 Speaker 3: will be people on the ship who just know how 251 00:12:49,600 --> 00:12:51,800 Speaker 3: to navigate that thing, and then they get out after 252 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 3: the ship leaves the water. 253 00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:55,920 Speaker 4: Exactly, you would have two Chesapeake Bay pilots on board. 254 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:58,679 Speaker 4: We know there's two on there, so they would provide 255 00:12:58,720 --> 00:13:01,440 Speaker 4: that expertise for the area. They would actually you would 256 00:13:01,440 --> 00:13:03,439 Speaker 4: have a docking pilot who would undock the vessel. The 257 00:13:03,800 --> 00:13:06,080 Speaker 4: docking pilot would probably get back off the vessel once 258 00:13:06,120 --> 00:13:08,720 Speaker 4: it's off the berth, and then the two Bay pilots 259 00:13:08,720 --> 00:13:11,440 Speaker 4: would stay on board until the vessel sailed out of 260 00:13:11,559 --> 00:13:14,960 Speaker 4: Hampton Roads through Chesapeake Bay to come out. They know 261 00:13:15,040 --> 00:13:16,600 Speaker 4: the lay of the land. But if you remember what 262 00:13:16,760 --> 00:13:20,360 Speaker 4: happened with ever forward, the incident that was later determined 263 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:23,320 Speaker 4: to have caused the grounding was the one pilot who 264 00:13:23,360 --> 00:13:26,120 Speaker 4: was on board at the time was distracted, was on 265 00:13:26,160 --> 00:13:29,400 Speaker 4: his computer and missed a key turn. It's not you. 266 00:13:29,760 --> 00:13:31,840 Speaker 4: I would argue that we don't see an issue here 267 00:13:31,880 --> 00:13:34,640 Speaker 4: with pilot at all. This doesn't seem to be a 268 00:13:34,679 --> 00:13:37,599 Speaker 4: pilot error. It doesn't even seem to be a maneuvering 269 00:13:37,960 --> 00:13:40,840 Speaker 4: or here. Again, we could talk about judgment later on 270 00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:42,400 Speaker 4: about whether or not they should have gone in the 271 00:13:42,440 --> 00:13:45,160 Speaker 4: stern if that's what they did. But this seems to 272 00:13:45,160 --> 00:13:47,680 Speaker 4: be a mechanical issue that has been the issue that 273 00:13:47,720 --> 00:13:50,120 Speaker 4: plagued the vessel. And again, a pilot wouldn't really know 274 00:13:50,240 --> 00:13:53,280 Speaker 4: this coming on board. This is the ship's crew knowing 275 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:56,200 Speaker 4: what is the status of their vessel, both mechanically and 276 00:13:56,240 --> 00:13:57,400 Speaker 4: the ability of it to sail. 277 00:14:13,000 --> 00:14:15,840 Speaker 2: We have limited information so far, and as you mentioned, 278 00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:19,120 Speaker 2: there is surely going to be a very long and 279 00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:24,280 Speaker 2: ongoing investigation into this particular incident. But it does seem 280 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:27,280 Speaker 2: like some things were done right. So we know the 281 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:29,760 Speaker 2: ship dropped anchor. We know they made a may day 282 00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:33,000 Speaker 2: call which seems to have gotten some of the cars 283 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:36,800 Speaker 2: off the bridge and potentially save lives. But how do 284 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:40,040 Speaker 2: you sort of stack up the actions of the ship 285 00:14:40,200 --> 00:14:42,320 Speaker 2: from what we know so far or the crew. 286 00:14:42,720 --> 00:14:45,400 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean again, until we get the full detail, 287 00:14:45,440 --> 00:14:47,480 Speaker 4: it's really hard to say. But you know, based on 288 00:14:47,880 --> 00:14:50,760 Speaker 4: the reports coming in, it sounds like they did everything 289 00:14:50,840 --> 00:14:53,520 Speaker 4: they could have done. You know, the anchor is just 290 00:14:53,640 --> 00:14:55,800 Speaker 4: not going to stop a vessel at that speed. It 291 00:14:55,880 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 4: may look like you can do it in movies, but 292 00:14:57,680 --> 00:14:59,520 Speaker 4: it's not in real life because of the momentum of 293 00:14:59,520 --> 00:15:02,360 Speaker 4: the vessel. It's extremely hard. We know the port anchor 294 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:04,040 Speaker 4: is down because we see the imagery of it, which 295 00:15:04,080 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 4: would be the right anchor to drop Because you're trying 296 00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:08,760 Speaker 4: to drag the ship back into the channel to get 297 00:15:08,800 --> 00:15:11,680 Speaker 4: it back in there. The coordination between the pilot on 298 00:15:11,680 --> 00:15:14,520 Speaker 4: the vessel with the bridge and trying to get vehicles 299 00:15:14,520 --> 00:15:17,320 Speaker 4: off is key. Unfortunately, they were not able to stop 300 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:19,920 Speaker 4: all the vehicles on it. But again, you know, one 301 00:15:19,960 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 4: of the big questions that I have going in is like, Okay, 302 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:24,480 Speaker 4: what is the track record of this vessel? Did this 303 00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:29,240 Speaker 4: vessel encounter issues coming up where there systematic maintenance problems 304 00:15:29,280 --> 00:15:31,960 Speaker 4: with the vessel? Did it drop power while coming up 305 00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:34,040 Speaker 4: to Chesapeake Bay? We don't know that for sure. You know, 306 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:36,800 Speaker 4: I've heard reports of the vessel did have some black 307 00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 4: smoke coming out of it, which is not always unusual. 308 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 4: But even if it was up at the berth, whether 309 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:45,440 Speaker 4: instances of that was the vessel ready to go? Unfortunately, 310 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:48,480 Speaker 4: what tends to happen here is unless there's a full 311 00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:51,080 Speaker 4: inspection being done. Not every vessel that comes into the 312 00:15:51,120 --> 00:15:54,480 Speaker 4: US ports are inspected. They are done periodically. They will 313 00:15:54,520 --> 00:15:57,960 Speaker 4: be cleared by Customs and Coastguard, but they won't do 314 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 4: a full inspection of the vessel and even and then 315 00:16:00,920 --> 00:16:04,280 Speaker 4: we rely entirely on the ship and the ship's crew 316 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:06,920 Speaker 4: and the ship's operating company to ensure that ships are 317 00:16:06,960 --> 00:16:10,160 Speaker 4: meeting their standards. We rely on that because that's the 318 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:13,800 Speaker 4: way international shipping operates, and the Singapore flag is a 319 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:16,600 Speaker 4: good registry. It's a very good registry. This ship was 320 00:16:16,720 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 4: under leased to Merisk, but it wasn't a Marisk ship. 321 00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:21,560 Speaker 4: You'll notice there's no name on the side of the vessel, 322 00:16:21,640 --> 00:16:24,640 Speaker 4: no company. This is basically like a rental vessel that 323 00:16:24,680 --> 00:16:27,440 Speaker 4: they used to fill in for surge at the time. 324 00:16:27,600 --> 00:16:29,480 Speaker 4: So there's going to be have to go back to 325 00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:32,640 Speaker 4: Singapore where the company is based to find out what 326 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:35,440 Speaker 4: was the history of this vessel, did it maintain its maintenance? 327 00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:38,800 Speaker 4: The Classification Society, which is that third party that exists 328 00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:42,120 Speaker 4: outside of the registry and the ownership that's supposed to 329 00:16:42,200 --> 00:16:45,280 Speaker 4: ensure that everything is being done. It takes time to 330 00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:48,240 Speaker 4: go through this, and that's what this is going to entail, 331 00:16:48,320 --> 00:16:51,120 Speaker 4: especially because of the loss of life associated with this incident. 332 00:16:51,560 --> 00:16:54,520 Speaker 3: With the stipulation that there's obviously tons we don't know 333 00:16:54,720 --> 00:16:58,160 Speaker 3: currently give us an overview of sort of what maritime 334 00:16:58,280 --> 00:17:02,800 Speaker 3: law says about the like distribution of penalties and fines 335 00:17:02,960 --> 00:17:06,240 Speaker 3: and costs for damages and repairs and things like that. 336 00:17:06,359 --> 00:17:09,639 Speaker 4: Liability, right, and so this is something we had a 337 00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:12,520 Speaker 4: conversation with back with ever Forward at the time. So 338 00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:15,440 Speaker 4: obviously you know the ship has insurance for both the 339 00:17:15,520 --> 00:17:19,960 Speaker 4: ship itself and the cargo, so you can expect that 340 00:17:20,080 --> 00:17:22,440 Speaker 4: the owner of the ship would declare general average, which 341 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:25,760 Speaker 4: would basically spread the cost of liability not just across 342 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:29,119 Speaker 4: the ship but across the cargo. The crew will be held. 343 00:17:29,240 --> 00:17:32,240 Speaker 4: The coast Guard probably almost immediately went on board that 344 00:17:32,359 --> 00:17:36,119 Speaker 4: vessel and would have drug tested, alcohol tested everybody on board. 345 00:17:36,720 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 4: They will get depositions from them, try to find out 346 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:41,800 Speaker 4: there will be liability issues for whether or not there 347 00:17:41,840 --> 00:17:44,679 Speaker 4: was negligence. In the case of what happened back in 348 00:17:44,720 --> 00:17:47,800 Speaker 4: San Francisco in the twenty tens, they actually found the 349 00:17:47,840 --> 00:17:50,000 Speaker 4: pilot to be libel at that time and there was 350 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:53,119 Speaker 4: actually a criminal case against him for his negligence with 351 00:17:53,440 --> 00:17:57,880 Speaker 4: a jail sentence involved. So we can see punishments against 352 00:17:57,880 --> 00:18:01,000 Speaker 4: the crew, We can see issues with the pilots depending 353 00:18:01,000 --> 00:18:04,359 Speaker 4: on whether or not there's culpability, but definitely with the 354 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:06,600 Speaker 4: owners of the company. The question is going to be 355 00:18:07,080 --> 00:18:09,600 Speaker 4: does that go as far as Marisk Lines, who is 356 00:18:09,680 --> 00:18:13,480 Speaker 4: leasing the vessel, or will it be with this Singapore company. 357 00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:15,439 Speaker 4: As you know, in shipping, one of the things that 358 00:18:15,560 --> 00:18:19,560 Speaker 4: happens a lot is ships are incorporated into these kind 359 00:18:19,600 --> 00:18:23,879 Speaker 4: of shadow corporations to basically diffuse liability. You know, the 360 00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:27,080 Speaker 4: ship isn't owned by Marisk, there's no direct connection to it. 361 00:18:27,080 --> 00:18:30,119 Speaker 4: It goes through a series of subcontracts and the question 362 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:33,720 Speaker 4: becomes how much of that liability will be there. It 363 00:18:33,760 --> 00:18:35,879 Speaker 4: will also go to the insurance clubs, the P and 364 00:18:35,920 --> 00:18:39,080 Speaker 4: I for the cargo, the hull and machinery for the vessel, 365 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:43,160 Speaker 4: and they'll be assessing that damage. Plus we can see 366 00:18:43,359 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 4: liability claims come in from those who have been killed 367 00:18:47,119 --> 00:18:49,320 Speaker 4: or wounded on the bridge, and we can also see 368 00:18:49,320 --> 00:18:51,639 Speaker 4: the same thing for cargo. Now that's going to divert 369 00:18:51,720 --> 00:18:55,480 Speaker 4: because of this, because they're going to blame extra costs 370 00:18:55,560 --> 00:18:59,080 Speaker 4: for doing this. The amount of liability that's at play 371 00:18:59,160 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 4: here is I can't even fathom right now. This is 372 00:19:01,960 --> 00:19:04,879 Speaker 4: the thing about maritime cases is that they can just 373 00:19:04,960 --> 00:19:08,160 Speaker 4: blow up into numbers that just really boggle the mind 374 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:11,760 Speaker 4: at times because of the impacts that have the butterfly 375 00:19:11,800 --> 00:19:13,640 Speaker 4: effects down the entire supply chain. 376 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:18,239 Speaker 2: So there's three sort of core a lots concepts that 377 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:22,600 Speaker 2: seem to be involved in the current discussion of this incident. 378 00:19:22,920 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 2: One of them you just mentioned, so the law of 379 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:27,840 Speaker 2: General averages. The other two are the Foreign Dredge Act 380 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:30,920 Speaker 2: of nineteen oh six and of course the Jones Act. 381 00:19:31,119 --> 00:19:33,320 Speaker 2: You knew it was inevitable that we would bring up 382 00:19:33,320 --> 00:19:36,399 Speaker 2: the Jones Act at some point in this discussion. But 383 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:40,359 Speaker 2: how are we seeing those conversations play out in light 384 00:19:40,480 --> 00:19:41,320 Speaker 2: of this tragedy. 385 00:19:41,760 --> 00:19:43,560 Speaker 4: Well, let's go to Dredge Act for a second, because 386 00:19:43,640 --> 00:19:46,199 Speaker 4: one of the big issues. Once we get past the 387 00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:49,119 Speaker 4: rescue and the recovery option here, which is going to 388 00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:52,520 Speaker 4: take time. Seven people still missing, that's going to be 389 00:19:52,520 --> 00:19:56,200 Speaker 4: the priority right now. But once that is accomplished, then 390 00:19:56,320 --> 00:19:59,120 Speaker 4: you're going to have to start talking about salvage and 391 00:19:59,320 --> 00:20:01,320 Speaker 4: you're going to need bring in a lot of salvage equipment. 392 00:20:01,400 --> 00:20:04,280 Speaker 4: You have to dismantle the Francis Scott Key Bridge, you 393 00:20:04,359 --> 00:20:06,520 Speaker 4: have to take it apart. You actually have to get 394 00:20:06,520 --> 00:20:09,280 Speaker 4: the bridge off the bow of the Dolly. So you're 395 00:20:09,280 --> 00:20:11,360 Speaker 4: talking about cranes, you're talking about barges, you're talking about 396 00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:13,480 Speaker 4: all that stuff that operates in the coastal waters that 397 00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:15,760 Speaker 4: would be both under the Dredge Act and under the 398 00:20:15,840 --> 00:20:18,679 Speaker 4: Jones Act. So a lot of those facilities are going 399 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:20,800 Speaker 4: to come in when we watch what happened whatever forward. 400 00:20:20,840 --> 00:20:23,119 Speaker 4: It took time to get cranes and barges in place 401 00:20:23,160 --> 00:20:26,840 Speaker 4: that you needed to offload five hundred containers off of 402 00:20:26,960 --> 00:20:29,000 Speaker 4: ever forward, this is going to be a much more 403 00:20:29,119 --> 00:20:31,600 Speaker 4: laborious process. I don't know if you're going to have 404 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,320 Speaker 4: to dredge as much as get the bridge off the 405 00:20:34,320 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 4: bottom and recover it. We have a lot of salvage 406 00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:40,360 Speaker 4: equipment and material. The problem is it's going to be scattered. 407 00:20:40,400 --> 00:20:43,960 Speaker 4: So you're talking about repositioning, bringing all that equipment and 408 00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:47,320 Speaker 4: material to Baltimore. You're going to have to operate from 409 00:20:47,400 --> 00:20:49,639 Speaker 4: basically one side of the bridge right now until you 410 00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:52,480 Speaker 4: can get under parts of the bridge and certify you 411 00:20:52,480 --> 00:20:55,080 Speaker 4: can cross those sections of the bridge that have not collapsed. 412 00:20:55,560 --> 00:20:58,679 Speaker 4: So this is going to take a long time to do. 413 00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:01,960 Speaker 4: Really didn'tmply at all to this. This ship was in 414 00:21:02,080 --> 00:21:05,399 Speaker 4: international trade, so it stopped at multiple US ports, but 415 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:08,960 Speaker 4: it wasn't moving cargo between US ports. But it is 416 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:11,960 Speaker 4: an issue here because we're going to have to see 417 00:21:12,160 --> 00:21:14,080 Speaker 4: cargo offloaded at other ports. 418 00:21:14,760 --> 00:21:18,199 Speaker 2: Would you expect it to revive a debate over the 419 00:21:18,280 --> 00:21:22,080 Speaker 2: Jones Act, because I think I saw some commentary to 420 00:21:22,200 --> 00:21:25,200 Speaker 2: that effect, people talking about how it's a good thing 421 00:21:25,240 --> 00:21:29,560 Speaker 2: that the Jones Act requires shipping on inland waterways to 422 00:21:29,680 --> 00:21:34,639 Speaker 2: be done with US registered vessels because otherwise there are 423 00:21:34,680 --> 00:21:37,160 Speaker 2: safety issues such as the one we just saw. And 424 00:21:37,440 --> 00:21:40,920 Speaker 2: I'm not necessarily agreeing with that statement, but certainly that's 425 00:21:41,040 --> 00:21:43,680 Speaker 2: a sentiment that we have seen, at least on Twitter 426 00:21:44,119 --> 00:21:47,640 Speaker 2: in less than twenty four hours after this incident occurred. 427 00:21:48,359 --> 00:21:50,560 Speaker 4: Yeah, I think any talk about Jones Act, whether pro 428 00:21:50,840 --> 00:21:54,520 Speaker 4: con is, actually takes away from this issue entirely. I 429 00:21:54,560 --> 00:21:57,840 Speaker 4: think it's absolutely not a case here at all. This 430 00:21:57,960 --> 00:22:00,560 Speaker 4: is a ship in international trade. Whether you repealed the 431 00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:02,399 Speaker 4: Jones Act and didn't have it, it wouldn't have a 432 00:22:02,440 --> 00:22:06,320 Speaker 4: case here at all. This ship is ship that operates 433 00:22:06,359 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 4: in international trade. And you know, you can have mechanical 434 00:22:09,240 --> 00:22:11,639 Speaker 4: issues on whether it's a Singapore flag vessel or a 435 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:15,199 Speaker 4: US flag vessel, and you know, the big issue here 436 00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:18,840 Speaker 4: is what was done to ensure that this ship was 437 00:22:18,920 --> 00:22:22,760 Speaker 4: meeting its criteria, Whether it's Jones Act or a foreign 438 00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:26,320 Speaker 4: flag vessel, you would have port state control, you would 439 00:22:26,359 --> 00:22:30,280 Speaker 4: have a classification agency, you would have all those elements 440 00:22:30,960 --> 00:22:33,840 Speaker 4: that are there. I mean, it's not clear at all 441 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:36,119 Speaker 4: if this is American flag vessel an American crew that 442 00:22:36,119 --> 00:22:38,240 Speaker 4: you don't have this accident. You know, anyone can have 443 00:22:38,320 --> 00:22:41,080 Speaker 4: an accent. Again, this goes back to a larger issue. 444 00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:43,280 Speaker 4: I would say that's that this takes away from, which 445 00:22:43,320 --> 00:22:47,000 Speaker 4: is our investment in our maritime infrastructure. We talk about 446 00:22:47,040 --> 00:22:50,560 Speaker 4: spending trillions of dollars of infrastructure money in the United States, 447 00:22:50,560 --> 00:22:53,919 Speaker 4: but very little of that is going to ports. And 448 00:22:54,040 --> 00:22:56,119 Speaker 4: that means that, you know, one of the things that 449 00:22:56,200 --> 00:22:58,480 Speaker 4: we could talk about here is you know, what sort 450 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:01,080 Speaker 4: of monitoring are we doing for vessels coming in and 451 00:23:01,080 --> 00:23:04,280 Speaker 4: out of port, so orre requiring them to provide the 452 00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:06,959 Speaker 4: maintenance records of their engines so that we can do 453 00:23:07,040 --> 00:23:10,760 Speaker 4: better port state control. We are overtasking the US Coast Guard, 454 00:23:11,119 --> 00:23:14,080 Speaker 4: which has eleven missions. It identifies. Eleven missions is the 455 00:23:14,119 --> 00:23:16,080 Speaker 4: key of the coast Guard, and one of them is 456 00:23:16,119 --> 00:23:19,440 Speaker 4: inspecting foreign vessels to ensure that they're safe and operating 457 00:23:19,480 --> 00:23:23,040 Speaker 4: in our waters. And when you task an organization smaller 458 00:23:23,080 --> 00:23:25,960 Speaker 4: than the Police Department of New York to do this. 459 00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:28,520 Speaker 4: In ports around the United States, you tend to push 460 00:23:28,560 --> 00:23:31,080 Speaker 4: the extremes, and so I think we need to be 461 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:34,040 Speaker 4: talking about elements of infrastructure, and you're going to see 462 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,000 Speaker 4: that play out when we start talking about the salvage 463 00:23:36,040 --> 00:23:38,280 Speaker 4: of the port and salvage of the bridge and the vessel. 464 00:23:38,920 --> 00:23:42,119 Speaker 4: That's a big issue. Unfortunately, we do not have the 465 00:23:42,160 --> 00:23:46,159 Speaker 4: salvage assets that we probably need invested in our ports. 466 00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:49,159 Speaker 4: Even the Navy doesn't have these vessels anymore. They're building 467 00:23:49,200 --> 00:23:50,960 Speaker 4: new ones, but they're not near completion. 468 00:23:51,600 --> 00:23:54,800 Speaker 3: I've seen the bridge originally took because we're talking about freight, 469 00:23:54,800 --> 00:23:56,840 Speaker 3: but obviously this is going to be a traffic nightmare 470 00:23:56,880 --> 00:24:00,760 Speaker 3: for the citizens of Baltimore and the cities around that that. 471 00:24:00,840 --> 00:24:03,120 Speaker 3: The Francis Scott Key Bridge took five years to build 472 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:05,800 Speaker 3: from nineteen seventy two to nineteen seventy seven. And I've 473 00:24:05,840 --> 00:24:08,440 Speaker 3: seen estimates some I've seen sixty million. I've also seen 474 00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:12,000 Speaker 3: one hundred and ten million. Given you know, it's different. 475 00:24:12,080 --> 00:24:14,600 Speaker 3: We have a difficult time in this country now building 476 00:24:14,680 --> 00:24:18,840 Speaker 3: big infrastructure projects. Could we do it faster? In your view? 477 00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:20,240 Speaker 3: Is there a way to make it so that it 478 00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:22,720 Speaker 3: doesn't take five years and billions of dollars or is 479 00:24:22,760 --> 00:24:26,280 Speaker 3: this going to be extraordinary difficult for rebuilding the bridge? 480 00:24:26,280 --> 00:24:28,800 Speaker 2: Oh and can we do it higher too, given that 481 00:24:28,920 --> 00:24:31,000 Speaker 2: the height of the bridge seems to have been an 482 00:24:31,040 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 2: issue for the port previously. 483 00:24:33,000 --> 00:24:34,359 Speaker 4: The big thing is you don't have a plan for 484 00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:36,359 Speaker 4: a bridge standing by, So I mean you've got to 485 00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:38,520 Speaker 4: design this. Whatever you're going to replace it with, You're 486 00:24:38,560 --> 00:24:41,199 Speaker 4: going to have to design it from scratch because no 487 00:24:41,240 --> 00:24:43,639 Speaker 4: one was planning, I think, on replacing a bridge that 488 00:24:43,800 --> 00:24:46,960 Speaker 4: went in service on of all days, March twenty third 489 00:24:46,960 --> 00:24:49,280 Speaker 4: of nineteen seventy sevens almost forty seven years ago to 490 00:24:49,320 --> 00:24:51,919 Speaker 4: the date. So you're going to have to design a 491 00:24:51,920 --> 00:24:53,600 Speaker 4: new bridge. You're right. You're gonna have to design it 492 00:24:53,680 --> 00:24:56,439 Speaker 4: so that the Port of Baltimore now can handle larger vessels. 493 00:24:56,480 --> 00:24:58,760 Speaker 4: So you're going to talk about a higher bridge. You know. 494 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:00,960 Speaker 4: It was interesting when we saw the fire that closed 495 00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:04,040 Speaker 4: sections of I ninety five. We saw very quickly work 496 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,400 Speaker 4: done to open that bridge up very quickly. You got 497 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:10,040 Speaker 4: a little two lane section and then expand it out 498 00:25:10,200 --> 00:25:12,919 Speaker 4: so we can commit to it and provide it. But 499 00:25:13,080 --> 00:25:16,400 Speaker 4: this is going to be a big infrastructure element right here, 500 00:25:16,400 --> 00:25:18,359 Speaker 4: because you're going to need to obviously steal and design 501 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:21,760 Speaker 4: work being done. The salvage work will take time. It 502 00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:24,840 Speaker 4: can be done faster probably than when it was originally built. 503 00:25:25,040 --> 00:25:28,560 Speaker 4: But again, who's going to be paying for this? Right 504 00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:30,720 Speaker 4: off the initial element, we know the state of Maryland 505 00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:33,040 Speaker 4: is declared a state of emergency. FEMA is un scene, 506 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:36,840 Speaker 4: so we'll see federal assistance. This is in technically not 507 00:25:37,040 --> 00:25:40,439 Speaker 4: in Maryland waters. It's in it's US waters because the 508 00:25:40,560 --> 00:25:43,680 Speaker 4: US controls the waterway, so it's a federal issue for 509 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:46,320 Speaker 4: clearing this up. So it's going to have to be 510 00:25:46,400 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 4: a large commitment. So envision seeing Congress when it gets back, 511 00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:54,760 Speaker 4: hopefully do an emergency appropriation to start the process of 512 00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:57,720 Speaker 4: designing the bridge and start starting that work to get 513 00:25:57,760 --> 00:25:59,879 Speaker 4: it done. But this is going to be years and 514 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:03,560 Speaker 4: until you see a new bridge coming across. I think 515 00:26:03,560 --> 00:26:05,600 Speaker 4: it's going to be weeks, if not at least a 516 00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:08,399 Speaker 4: month or two before you clear the debris out of 517 00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:11,480 Speaker 4: the river to fully open up the Port of Baltimore. 518 00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:13,960 Speaker 4: You may be able to get part of it open quickly, 519 00:26:14,480 --> 00:26:17,360 Speaker 4: but it's going to take time to clear all that material. 520 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:20,560 Speaker 2: All right, Salmer Cocleiano. Thank you so much for making 521 00:26:20,600 --> 00:26:22,399 Speaker 2: the time to come on Odd Lots. That was a 522 00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:27,080 Speaker 2: fantastic overview of what is clearly an ongoing situation. And 523 00:26:27,119 --> 00:26:31,080 Speaker 2: if anyone's interested, definitely go check out Sal's YouTube show 524 00:26:31,119 --> 00:26:33,920 Speaker 2: what is going on with Shipping? Sal, thank you so much, 525 00:26:34,200 --> 00:26:35,760 Speaker 2: thanks for having me, Tracy, Jef. 526 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:48,480 Speaker 4: So Joe. 527 00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:52,240 Speaker 2: Clearly this is a developing event and I expect we're 528 00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:54,840 Speaker 2: going to see lots more information coming out on what 529 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:58,320 Speaker 2: exactly happened. But I thought Sal did an amazing job 530 00:26:58,560 --> 00:27:01,320 Speaker 2: of putting it all together there what we know at 531 00:27:01,320 --> 00:27:02,800 Speaker 2: this exact moment totally. 532 00:27:02,840 --> 00:27:05,960 Speaker 3: You know, obviously this is audio only, but listeners really 533 00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:08,639 Speaker 3: should check out sales page where he like sort of 534 00:27:08,680 --> 00:27:11,399 Speaker 3: goes through the video frame by frame of what he 535 00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:15,119 Speaker 3: sees going on. It's really excellent stuff. It's interesting, you know. 536 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:17,840 Speaker 3: Obviously the first question many people will have will be 537 00:27:17,840 --> 00:27:22,400 Speaker 3: about economic effects beyond these sort of immediate human disaster. 538 00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:25,560 Speaker 3: It's interesting this idea that like Baltimore isn't that big, 539 00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:28,159 Speaker 3: but there are certain areas of specialty. Yeah, you mentioned 540 00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:31,240 Speaker 3: coal exports, He mentioned car imports and the sort of 541 00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:34,480 Speaker 3: non fungibility of those supply chains. So yes, maybe they 542 00:27:34,520 --> 00:27:37,280 Speaker 3: could be dropped off elsewhere, but the infrastructure is not 543 00:27:37,400 --> 00:27:40,080 Speaker 3: designed for that cargo, so that'll be an interesting thing 544 00:27:40,119 --> 00:27:40,560 Speaker 3: to watch. 545 00:27:40,640 --> 00:27:42,800 Speaker 2: Yeah. I also thought it was interesting the point about 546 00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 2: maybe making the next bridge when that actually happens, and 547 00:27:46,520 --> 00:27:48,640 Speaker 2: it seems like it'll be a very very long time, 548 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:51,960 Speaker 2: but making that one higher to handle the very very 549 00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:55,560 Speaker 2: large ships that we have nowadays. Shall we leave it there? 550 00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:56,880 Speaker 3: Let's leave it there, all right. 551 00:27:56,960 --> 00:27:59,560 Speaker 2: This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. 552 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:02,720 Speaker 2: I'm Trey Away. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. 553 00:28:02,600 --> 00:28:05,360 Speaker 3: And I'm joll Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. 554 00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:09,639 Speaker 3: Follow our guest sel Marcagliano. He's at mercagliano S. Follow 555 00:28:09,640 --> 00:28:13,520 Speaker 3: our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Arman, Dashel Bennett at 556 00:28:13,600 --> 00:28:16,439 Speaker 3: Dashbot and kel Brooks at kel Brooks. Thank you to 557 00:28:16,480 --> 00:28:19,480 Speaker 3: our producer Moses Onam and from our Oddlots content. Go 558 00:28:19,520 --> 00:28:22,440 Speaker 3: to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, where we have transcripts, 559 00:28:22,440 --> 00:28:25,200 Speaker 3: a blog and a newsletter and you can chat about 560 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:27,840 Speaker 3: these topics twenty four to seven in the discord with 561 00:28:27,880 --> 00:28:30,760 Speaker 3: fellow listeners. In fact, there's already tons of conversation going 562 00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:34,000 Speaker 3: on right now about the bridge collapse. Go check it 563 00:28:34,000 --> 00:28:36,320 Speaker 3: out discord dot gg slash, odd Lots. 564 00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:38,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, the discord was one of the first places I 565 00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:40,720 Speaker 2: went to this morning to see what people were saying 566 00:28:40,800 --> 00:28:43,480 Speaker 2: about this. And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you 567 00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:47,760 Speaker 2: appreciate when we do these emergency episodes about developing news, 568 00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:50,640 Speaker 2: then please leave us a positive review on your favorite 569 00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:54,880 Speaker 2: podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, 570 00:28:54,960 --> 00:28:58,440 Speaker 2: you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free. 571 00:28:58,600 --> 00:29:01,040 Speaker 2: All you need to do is connect your Bloomberg subscription 572 00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:03,520 Speaker 2: with Apple Podcasts. Thanks for listening.