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Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

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Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to The Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly

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Speaker 2: podcast where we talk about stuff related to money. I'm

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Speaker 2: Matt Levian, and I write the Money Stuff column for

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Speaker 2: Bloomberg Opinion.

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Speaker 1: And I'm Katie Greifel, a reporter for Bloomberg News and

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Speaker 1: an anchor for Bloomberg Television.

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Speaker 2: Katie, we got some news this week.

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Speaker 1: Oh, big time. We're going to talk about Bill Ackman obviously,

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Speaker 1: we're going to talk about Andrew Left, which should be fun.

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Speaker 1: And then we're going to talk about BONDI TFS which

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Speaker 1: maybe will maybe we'll be fun. We'll find out where

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Speaker 1: to start.

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Speaker 2: Three.

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Speaker 1: Oh my gosh. Yeah, So we went from twenty five

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Speaker 1: billion dollars to two and a half to four billion

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Speaker 1: dollars to two billion dollars. Now we're at I think

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Speaker 1: zero dollars.

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Speaker 2: There was kind of a pit's up at ten billion

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Speaker 2: as well.

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Speaker 1: I know I was in there somewhere.

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Speaker 2: There was a hard gap at ten billion, which which

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Speaker 2: they did not hit the hard gap.

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Speaker 1: No, no, So I don't even know what to say.

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Speaker 1: I mean, this was pretty spectacular to follow. We knew

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Speaker 1: that he was road showing this ipo of a closed

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Speaker 1: end funds Pershing Square USA exactly. He has a European

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Speaker 1: version which trades at a big discount, which is a

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Speaker 1: material part of this story, and it kept getting downsized

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Speaker 1: and now it was pulled entirely. They're reevaluating it. And

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Speaker 1: along that path we got a letter that was released

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Speaker 1: which maybe Bi Lackman didn't know was going to be released,

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Speaker 1: and then we had some investors bowing out as well.

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Speaker 2: Right, So the story started with they're doing a road

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Speaker 2: show for this IPO. There was talk of it being

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Speaker 2: twenty five billion dollars, which would be a lot of

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Speaker 2: money for a closed end fund, or just in general,

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Speaker 2: it would be a very very very large IPEA. So

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Speaker 2: he's got all these So he runs a hedgehund called

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Speaker 2: Pushing Square. There's a management company that runs the hedge

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Speaker 2: funds and that like collects the fees from the hedge

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Speaker 2: funds and the clothes end funds. And he recently sold

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Speaker 2: about a ten percents take in the management company to

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Speaker 2: a few institutional and highnight Worth investors. And last week

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Speaker 2: he sent a letter to those guys, those people who

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Speaker 2: were investors in his management company saying essentially, hey, it

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Speaker 2: would be really helpful if you would put in some

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Speaker 2: orders in the Pushing Square USA Closed End Fund IPO.

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Speaker 2: And I read that letter and it seemed to me

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Speaker 2: that that's not a good sign. I probably underplayed this

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Speaker 2: when I wrote about it, because there are other possible interpretations, right,

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Speaker 2: Like one possible interpretation is that Bi Lackman is just

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Speaker 2: unusually candid about how the IPO process works to his

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Speaker 2: management company investors. But it sort of seemed like he

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Speaker 2: was saying, hey, guys, it would really help out a

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Speaker 2: lot if you could put it in order. Yeah. I

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Speaker 2: used to be a capital markets banker and you would

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Speaker 2: do a deal and you would get calls from investors.

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Speaker 2: I would say, how's the deal going, And there's only

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Speaker 2: one answer you can give them. You say, the deal

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Speaker 2: is going great. There's so much demand. You really better

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Speaker 2: put your order in because otherwise you're going to miss

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Speaker 2: out because this deal is going so good, so many

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Speaker 2: people wanted to buy it. You can't like necessarily lie

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Speaker 2: if the dealer is going poorly, but you say things like, oh,

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Speaker 2: there's a lot of interest, we're having a lot of meetings.

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Speaker 2: That feedback is really good. You should put in your

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Speaker 2: order quick, right, You try to create the sense of excitement.

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Speaker 2: If the deal is not going well, then like you

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Speaker 2: might call up your best friend investor and say, hey,

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Speaker 2: it would really help out if you would put in

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Speaker 2: a big order, because that would get us over the line,

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Speaker 2: that would create some momentum. And it sort of seemed

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Speaker 2: like that was what Acman was doing by sending this

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Speaker 2: letter to the people who are already in his management company.

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Speaker 2: Problem is, if you do that publicly, everyone can read it,

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Speaker 2: and no, that's a bad sign. So I do think that,

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Speaker 2: like the letter did not necessarily help very much, because

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Speaker 2: I do think that some people read it and think, well,

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Speaker 2: this suggests that there's not a ton of demand.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and I was just going to bring up bow

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Speaker 1: Post because you did name a few investors in that

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Speaker 1: letter to investors saying hey, it would help if you

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Speaker 1: could invest more. He mentioned that baal Post Capital had

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Speaker 1: previously committed to investing one hundred and fifty million dollars,

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Speaker 1: and then Bloomberg News broke the news that actually they

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Speaker 1: were pulling out. There weren't reasons given, but reportedly he

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Speaker 1: didn't like being named.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, no one wants to be named as

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Speaker 2: the endorser for a deal unless I've sort of explicitly

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Speaker 2: agreed to that. I think the Bloomberg story suggested that

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Speaker 2: there's some political seth Klerman as a Democrat and Bill

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Speaker 2: Lackman has become like a very vocal Trump supporter. But

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Speaker 2: I don't know. I think that either of those are

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Speaker 2: possible explanations. But like, here's another explanation. If you interpreted

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Speaker 2: that letter to mean there's not a ton of demand,

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Speaker 2: then even if you were already in the book, you

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Speaker 2: would take your order out of the book, right, yeah,

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Speaker 2: Because this is the problem with this thing is like

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Speaker 2: you can be a long term investor, right you can

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Speaker 2: say I like Bill Lackman. I think that he's going

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Speaker 2: to compound my money at a high rate, and so

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Speaker 2: I want to be invested in his fund and I'll invest,

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Speaker 2: you know, this month and hold it for ten years

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Speaker 2: and expect Bill Ackman to compound my money for me.

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Speaker 2: But the problem is that on the first day of trading,

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Speaker 2: this thing is either going to trade up or it's

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Speaker 2: going to trade down. And as you said, his existing

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Speaker 2: clothes unfund trades at a big discount to its net

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Speaker 2: ASSEID value. Most closed un funds traded discounts to their

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Speaker 2: net asset value. And so if you're an investor, instead

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Speaker 2: of buying the shares at fifty dollars in the IPO,

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Speaker 2: you might say, well, I'll just wait until the next

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Speaker 2: day and I'll buy them at a discount. I'll buy

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Speaker 2: them at like forty five or whatever. So it would

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Speaker 2: be sort of silly to buy on the IPO if

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Speaker 2: you could wait to buy at a discount. The whole

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Speaker 2: point in the IPO process is for Bill Ackman to

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Speaker 2: tell people, no, no, it's going to trade it at

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Speaker 2: a premium, right, and so he makes that case in

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Speaker 2: this letter, but he sent these investors and that was

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Speaker 2: then made public sort of by accident. He makes the

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Speaker 2: case that is going to trade at a premium. You know.

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Speaker 2: The essential case is that a lot of retail investors,

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Speaker 2: for one reason or another, aren't going to get shares

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Speaker 2: in the IPA. Like the main one is that most

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Speaker 2: retail investors, most retail brokerages aren't going to get allocated

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Speaker 2: anything in the IPO. Also, there are some European retail

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Speaker 2: investors who would want to buy shares, but who can't

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Speaker 2: buy them in the IPM. So all these retail investors

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Speaker 2: want to buy shares in the bill Ackman IPO. They

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Speaker 2: can't buy it at the time of the IPO, so

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Speaker 2: they'll buy it the next day in the aftermarket, and

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Speaker 2: there'll be so much retail demand and maybe so much

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Speaker 2: institutional demand that the IPA will trade up. And so

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Speaker 2: if you wait to buy in the aftermarket, you'll have

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Speaker 2: to pay fifty five dollars a share instead of fifty

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Speaker 2: dollars a share. But the IPO was so big that

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Speaker 2: the really essential question is is there going to be

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Speaker 2: enough institutional demand in the aftermarket? Is there going to

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Speaker 2: be institutional demand the next day? And they were just

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Speaker 2: kept being indications that there was just not enough institutional

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Speaker 2: demand to like price a really tight large IPO. And

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Speaker 2: so if you thought that there wasn't that much institutional demand,

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Speaker 2: then you'd say, well, it'll trade down to forty five

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Speaker 2: and I'll wait until the buy it the next day,

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Speaker 2: and then there will be no institutional demand. Right, if

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Speaker 2: everyone's going to wait to buy it, then no one

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Speaker 2: will buy it in the idea.

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Speaker 1: Well, two points on that, the first one being this

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Speaker 1: statement that they put out. Did acknowledge that they said

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Speaker 1: that this question.

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Speaker 2: That's the whole thing.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, basically would investors be better served waiting to invest

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Speaker 1: in the aftermarket than the IPO. Yes, it sounds like.

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Speaker 1: I mean if you just look at the history of

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Speaker 1: closed don funds. Also to the point of retail demand,

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Speaker 1: I mean, Bill Lackman has a million something followers on Twitter,

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Speaker 1: which is a lot. That's a huge audience, but it

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Speaker 1: seems quite tricky to turn followers into investors. That's not

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Speaker 1: necessarily guaranteed. And you think about the following that he

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Speaker 1: has on Twitter, I would imagine that the majority of

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Speaker 1: those people, or at least a sizeable portion, aren't necessarily

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Speaker 1: following him for his investing acumen.

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Speaker 2: I mean, I hear you, right. I mean he's courting

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Speaker 2: controversy and a lot of Twitter opinions and not mainly

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Speaker 2: tweeting about. Part of that, by the way, is like

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Speaker 2: he has said that he wants to be able to

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Speaker 2: tweet more about investing, and because of the legal structures

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Speaker 2: that he currently operates, and he can't just go have

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Speaker 2: his tock pics on Twitter, and once he launches Pershing

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Speaker 2: Square USA, he can. But yeah, I hear you right,

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Speaker 2: I mean, like his Twitter following is not purely about investing.

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Speaker 1: What I am wondering is what this means for the

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Speaker 1: overall Pershing Square IPO, because he did sell that ten

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Speaker 1: percent steak for a billion dollars, just over a billion dollars.

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Speaker 1: And I mean they've said that the success of this

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Speaker 1: pie Sus IPO is very important to the eventual IPO

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Speaker 1: of Pershing Square.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I mean he sold a ten percent stake

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Speaker 2: in the management company. The management company is just like

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Speaker 2: the thing that collects fees from the funds that he

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Speaker 2: runs right right now, he runs about eighteen billion dollars

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Speaker 2: worth of funds, and they sold the stake in the

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Speaker 2: management company at a ten billion dollar valuation. It's sort

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Speaker 2: of crazy to imagine that the entity that collects fees

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Speaker 2: on eighteen billion dollars worth of funds is worth ten

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Speaker 2: billion dollars, right. That can't be right, right? That implies

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Speaker 2: that he would take like half of the value from

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Speaker 2: like his investors' funds for himself or for his investors. Now,

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Speaker 2: the only way you can get to a ten billion

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Speaker 2: dollar valuation for the management company is if you think

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Speaker 2: that the management company is very soon going to manage

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Speaker 2: a lot more money. And I think obviously the case

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Speaker 2: that was made to these management company investors, is we

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Speaker 2: are going to transform from a smallish hedge fundition manager

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Speaker 2: to a sort of more institutional asset manager that attracts

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Speaker 2: a lot of retail interest and a lot of institutional

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Speaker 2: interest and runs tens of billions of dollars and has

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Speaker 2: a publicly traded permanent capital vehicle, and has like the

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Speaker 2: steady stream of large earnings from running large amounts of money.

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Speaker 2: And then, you know, I think if you were investing

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Speaker 2: in the measurment company, somewhere in your mind was the

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Speaker 2: notion of a twenty five billion dollar pieces IPO and

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Speaker 2: a zero dollar pieces ipo makes that case more challenging.

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Speaker 2: The other thing I want to say about the management

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Speaker 2: company is so I wrote on Thursday about the problem here,

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Speaker 2: which is that it's very hard to sell the these

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Speaker 2: shares at nav because you expect to close on fund

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Speaker 2: to trade at a discount. Everyone wants a discount. Well,

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Speaker 2: how do you sell the shares at a discount? Because

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Speaker 2: the shares are just it's a pot of money, right,

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Speaker 2: So you can't sell you know, one hundred dollars worth

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Speaker 2: of money at ninety dollars because then you only have

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Speaker 2: ninety dollars. So how do you create a discount? And

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Speaker 2: I wrote about some possible ways to do that, which

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Speaker 2: come down to kind of Pershing Square putting in some money.

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Speaker 2: But several readers emailed me immediately to be like, well,

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Speaker 2: here's the obvious way to do it. The obvious way

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Speaker 2: to do it is to put some of the management

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Speaker 2: company into pieces. So instead of really, I've been seating

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Speaker 2: the fund with like a billion dollars of his own

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Speaker 2: money for free, he could see it with ten percent

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Speaker 2: of Pershing Square the management company, for free, and then

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Speaker 2: pieces would have a net asset value more than just

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Speaker 2: the cash that investors put in. And then the investors say, okay,

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Speaker 2: I'm getting a discount and they put in their money.

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Speaker 2: And this is a good idea. And you know, someone

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Speaker 2: drew the analogy to like Vanguard, where Vanguard invest do

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Speaker 2: own a piece of the management company. It's because it's

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Speaker 2: a mutual company. But the problem here is you sort

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Speaker 2: of already promised the management company in an IPO to

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Speaker 2: these other investors, right, so to say we're going to

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Speaker 2: push the management company into pieces is a little bit

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Speaker 2: more challenging. So what does it mean for the for

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Speaker 2: the IPO added, It's like a setback, right, I mean

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Speaker 2: the IPO was I think premised on the Pieces IPO

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Speaker 2: going really well, and with having a hard time raising

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Speaker 2: money for Pieces, it's harder to get to a ten

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Speaker 2: billion dollar valuation for the management company.

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Speaker 1: There's also the question of why does he want to

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Speaker 1: be public, Like why does he want to take the

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Speaker 1: overall hedge fund company public? I mean, there aren't many

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Speaker 1: of them. The obvious example is the Sculptor Rhythm thing,

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Speaker 1: which didn't exactly turn out well, which also had Bill

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Speaker 1: Lackman involvement.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, minor involvement. Yeah, I don't know. You know, the

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Speaker 2: reason for launching the Clothes End Fund is quite straightforward, right,

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Speaker 2: I mean, you have permanent capitical vehicle. You get to

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Speaker 2: go on TV and tweet your stock picks and then

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Speaker 2: hopefully you can create some momentum in your stocks.

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Speaker 1: I mean, he could just launch an ETF. I'll just

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Speaker 1: say it. I know, I know, permanent capital. That's very exciting.

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Speaker 1: I still don't quite understand clothes and funds. I get

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Speaker 1: it from the manager's point of view, permanent capital that

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Speaker 1: seems really great, But from the investor point of view,

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Speaker 1: I don't know why you would do that.

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Speaker 2: No, I think he can make a good case for

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Speaker 2: that here because he is not possibly like takeover inclined investor.

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Speaker 2: Then knowing how much money you have for the long

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Speaker 2: term is actually really important, right. I mean, if you

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Speaker 2: have an ETF and they're withdrawals and you still have

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Speaker 2: of your positions, right. That is easy to do if

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Speaker 2: you are just the index one, right, But it's harder

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Speaker 2: to do if you are doing the kinds of trades

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Speaker 2: that b. Lackmann wants to do, which are like these

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Speaker 2: like long term fundamental equity and trades, but also like

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Speaker 2: you know, derivative trades. I mean, like some of their

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Speaker 2: track record is from CDX beats going into COVID, and

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Speaker 2: again that's harder to do if your capital can vanish

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Speaker 2: every night. So I think that from his perspective, it's

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Speaker 2: obviously to permanent capital, and I think he can make

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Speaker 2: the case to investors that actually, like permanent capital is

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Speaker 2: the way that I create value and ETF doesn't make

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Speaker 2: sense for the kind of investing that I do. I

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Speaker 2: think that's a reasonable case.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: So the question of why does he want to take

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Speaker 2: the management company public? I don't know. I mean, some

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Speaker 2: of it is like I think anyone else, like, you know,

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Speaker 2: you want some legacy, right. I mean there's this perception

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Speaker 2: that with like the sort of famous Hedgehund managers of

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Speaker 2: like Acman's vintage, Like, there's a perception that the management

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Speaker 2: company is like that one guy. And I think that

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Speaker 2: they would like to have a proof of concept that

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Speaker 2: actually it's an institution and really the investing team has

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Speaker 2: kind of transitioned away from him and it's not just him,

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Speaker 2: and it's a permanent entity that will exist forever and

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Speaker 2: provide wealth for him forever, right, instead of like when

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Speaker 2: he quits, the thing vanishes. So I think there's a

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Speaker 2: temptation for anyone who runs a company to take that

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Speaker 2: company public so you can you know, take money off

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Speaker 2: the table and have permanent shares instead of just like

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Speaker 2: your own labor. But right, the track record of it

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Speaker 2: is kind of challenging.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, well let's see if pieces gets off the ground

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Speaker 1: when it comes to the eventual pershing square IPO. Apparently

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Speaker 1: he's already thought of how to make this structure work.

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Speaker 1: That was also in the press release that don't.

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Speaker 2: Get excited, yeah, excited to see like next week's piece

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Speaker 2: of structure. I think putting part of the management company

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Speaker 2: into it, putting some cash into it that doesn't come

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Speaker 2: from investors or or possibilities. Yeah, like I you know,

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Speaker 2: I wrote it like SPACs do kind of provide the

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Speaker 2: technology for this, right, like get spack. At a very

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Speaker 2: high level, is a sponsor puts in some money to

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Speaker 2: pay the startup costs. Then the sponsor kind of sells

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Speaker 2: shares at net asset value to investors, and then if

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Speaker 2: the sponsor does a good job and finds a good deal,

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Speaker 2: the sponsor gets a lot of like free upside. So

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Speaker 2: there's this like Carter, where like if the thing is

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Speaker 2: those kind of met the shareholders get all their money back,

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Speaker 2: so they are protected against the problems of investing at

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Speaker 2: nav and then having the navy go down. If the

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Speaker 2: thing does poorly, then the manager the sponsor eats the loss,

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Speaker 2: and if the thing does really really well, the shareholders

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Speaker 2: give up some of the upside and it goes to

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Speaker 2: the sponsor. And so the sponsor has the sort of

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Speaker 2: asymmetric trade where the sponsor puts in some money that's

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Speaker 2: at risk, but then if it does really well, the

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Speaker 2: sponsor makes a lot of money. You can imagine a

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Speaker 2: structure like that for pieces, where you know, Bill Ackman

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Speaker 2: seeds it with money, and if it trades below net

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Speaker 2: asset value, he kind of bears the first loss so

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Speaker 2: that the investors who buy in the IPO still get

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Speaker 2: at least the amount of money they put in. And

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Speaker 2: then if the thing does really well, he gets warrants

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Speaker 2: or something so that he gets upside to compensate him

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Speaker 2: for that. Like, that's a structure that could work. You

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Speaker 2: could do something like that. That's easy enough.

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Speaker 1: That's some good ideas here.

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Speaker 2: Part of he wants to, you know, quit podcast and

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Speaker 2: then go structure pieces mark two. But most of me,

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Speaker 2: it doesn't. Most of me just wants the podcast about it.

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Speaker 2: Andrew left.

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Speaker 1: Andrew left, So this story broke. I think it was

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Speaker 1: on Friday, that's right, because.

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Speaker 2: I wrote on Friday and then I published on Saturday,

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Speaker 2: because I didn't hit the send button on my email.

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Speaker 1: It's really I that just made mistake.

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Speaker 2: There, amateurs the column on Friday on the web and

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Speaker 2: the terminal, and then I didn't hit send on the email,

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Speaker 2: and no one told me until I told my wife

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Speaker 2: I published the column. She's like, I didn't get it.

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Speaker 1: I feel like there's some arbitrage to do there.

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Speaker 2: If you had the inside information about my column, you

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Speaker 2: could have traded Andrew Left features a day early. I

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Speaker 2: don't know.

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Speaker 1: I bring that up the timeline because it feels crazy

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Speaker 1: that we haven't talked about this yet.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we just missed it last week.

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Speaker 1: So set the scene for us. Set the table.

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Speaker 2: So Andrew Left is a guy on Twitter. There's a

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Speaker 2: lot of people like this who are activist short sellers.

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Speaker 2: So what he does is he finds companies that he

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Speaker 2: thinks are bad, sometimes on valuation, often because he thinks

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Speaker 2: they're frauds, and he shorts their stock and then he

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Speaker 2: publishes angry reports saying what a fraud they are, and

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Speaker 2: then he tweets those reports and then their stock goes down,

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Speaker 2: and that's how he makes money. A lot of these

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Speaker 2: people are guys on Twitter who may or may not

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Speaker 2: have something like a hedge fund or something called a

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Speaker 2: hedge fund. But when Andrew Left got in trouble last

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Speaker 2: week the SEC, one of its complaints about him was

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Speaker 2: that he wasn't really running a hedge fund. He didn't

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Speaker 2: know outside money. He was just a guy investing his

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Speaker 2: personal account. I assume a lot of activists shorts are

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Speaker 2: just guys investing their personal accounts, but it just sounds nicer.

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Speaker 2: So Andrew Left is Andrew Left. But he's also Sitron Research,

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Speaker 2: which just sounds fancier than just being a guy on Twitter.

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Speaker 2: And honestly, I think he's kind of earned it, Like

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Speaker 2: he's had a good track record of spotting frauds. You know,

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Speaker 2: he really was instrumental in spotting big problems at Valiant

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Speaker 2: Pharmaceuticals a few years ago in a way that really

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Speaker 2: took billions of dollars off that market cap and was

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Speaker 2: good investigative work. And he has a good track record

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Speaker 2: of finding companies that will go down. So that's his deal.

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Speaker 2: And last Friday, the SEC and the Department of Justice

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Speaker 2: brought charges against him for doing alleged fraud. And basically

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Speaker 2: they're accusing him of doing a reverse pupping dump. Right

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Speaker 2: instead of like saying hey you should buy the stock

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Speaker 2: and then selling it, he said hey, you should short

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Speaker 2: the stock, and then he bought it. So their accusation

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Speaker 2: is that he would short these stocks, he would publish

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Speaker 2: angry reports calling them frauds, and then kind of the

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Speaker 2: minute he published the stock would go down and he

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Speaker 2: would buy back the stock. So five minutes or an

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Speaker 2: hour a day after he published his report, he was

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Speaker 2: no longer short, so he took all the risk off

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Speaker 2: the table. And the SEC one I think, just doesn't

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Speaker 2: like that because it just seems like, if you're doing

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Speaker 2: it that way, you don't really think the stock is

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Speaker 2: a fraud. You just want to move the stock down

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Speaker 2: so you can make money, and you don't care what

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Speaker 2: happens after that. I don't think that's right. I think

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Speaker 2: the SEC is wrong about that. I think that Andrew

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Speaker 2: Left has a lot of incentive to care about what

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Speaker 2: happens after that first day because this is his livelihood,

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Speaker 2: and if he's always wrong, the stocks will stop going

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Speaker 2: down and this will stop working. The only way this

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Speaker 2: works is that every time he says this company is

402
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Speaker 2: a fraud, there's a good chance the company is actually

403
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Speaker 2: a fraud. And if he keeps having a pretty good

404
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Speaker 2: hit rate, then the stocks will keep going down and

405
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Speaker 2: he can keep collecting profits on the first day and

406
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Speaker 2: he doesn't have to wait until, you know, a year

407
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Speaker 2: later when the company goes bankrupt. But the whole thing

408
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Speaker 2: doesn't work unless he's got a pretty good hit rate.

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Speaker 2: So the SEC doesn't like it for I think some

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Speaker 2: reasons that are wrong. But the SEC also doesn't like

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Speaker 2: it because he lied about it a lot, Like he

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Speaker 2: would go on television and the reporters would say, sorry,

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Speaker 2: you're still short, and he'd say, I'm still short, but

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Speaker 2: he actually had covered. So it's like bad, you can't

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Speaker 2: do that. And you know, you think about like a

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Speaker 2: pumping dump, like a classic pumping dump, there's like nothing

417
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Speaker 2: to it. It's like some guy in a telegram chat

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Speaker 2: room saying you got to buy this microcap stock because

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Speaker 2: it's going to go to the moon, and maybe they

420
00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:04,359
Speaker 2: give some business case for it, but everyone knows they're kidding.

421
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Speaker 2: You know, Yeah, it's discovered a cure for cancer. And

422
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Speaker 2: then the stock goes up a little bit and the

423
00:20:08,800 --> 00:20:11,639
Speaker 2: pump and dumper dumps the stock, and the pump and

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Speaker 2: nupper says, oh, I'm holding on until he gets through

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Speaker 2: one hundred. I'm all in on this, but he's lying

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Speaker 2: and he's already sold the stock, and the SEC sort

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Speaker 2: of sees that in reverse, and Andrew left. But I

428
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Speaker 2: think the difference really is that a pump and dumper

429
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Speaker 2: normally has no basis for recommending the stock other than

430
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Speaker 2: like if we all buy the stock, it'll go up right.

431
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Speaker 2: It's just a pure social market dynamic thing. And the

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Speaker 2: only thing that that the audience cares about is that

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Speaker 2: this pump and nupper is buying the stock. And if

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Speaker 2: the pump and number is actually selling the stock, then like, yeah,

435
00:20:40,840 --> 00:20:43,160
Speaker 2: it looks like frat with Andrew Left. I don't think

436
00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:45,200
Speaker 2: that's how it works. Like, I don't think people were

437
00:20:45,200 --> 00:20:47,639
Speaker 2: shorting those stocks or selling those stocks because they're like, oh,

438
00:20:47,720 --> 00:20:50,040
Speaker 2: Andrew Left is short, I'd better be short too. I

439
00:20:50,080 --> 00:20:52,720
Speaker 2: think they were short in the stocks because Andrew Left

440
00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:55,400
Speaker 2: published reports saying this company is a fraud, and they

441
00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:58,080
Speaker 2: thought that's probably true, and often it was true. The

442
00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:01,359
Speaker 2: SEC complains about this coming called Kronoscrip, which is like

443
00:21:01,359 --> 00:21:05,000
Speaker 2: cannabis company, and it was trading like nine or ten dollars.

444
00:21:05,359 --> 00:21:08,760
Speaker 2: And Andrew Left said, I think this is a fraud,

445
00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:10,720
Speaker 2: and I have a price target of three dollars and

446
00:21:10,720 --> 00:21:13,760
Speaker 2: fifty cents, and then like the next minute, you know,

447
00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:15,919
Speaker 2: the stock goes down and he covers his short and

448
00:21:15,960 --> 00:21:17,480
Speaker 2: he never waits for it to get to three dollars

449
00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:19,160
Speaker 2: and fifty cents and he gets out of the trade,

450
00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:21,080
Speaker 2: and then you know, he lies about it and says

451
00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:23,600
Speaker 2: I'm still short even though he's he's actually not short.

452
00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:28,560
Speaker 2: But that stuff got to like two dollars and settled

453
00:21:28,560 --> 00:21:31,840
Speaker 2: an SEC's case for a fraud. He was not wrong. Yeah,

454
00:21:31,920 --> 00:21:34,320
Speaker 2: So like there's a lot of that where the SEC

455
00:21:34,359 --> 00:21:37,439
Speaker 2: focuses on what he said about his own trading, but

456
00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:41,080
Speaker 2: it doesn't focus on whether his reports were honest or accurate.

457
00:21:41,160 --> 00:21:43,800
Speaker 2: And to me, this is not the law. But to me,

458
00:21:43,960 --> 00:21:46,159
Speaker 2: like if the reports were honest and he was you know,

459
00:21:46,240 --> 00:21:48,040
Speaker 2: largely right, then like, yeah, no harm.

460
00:21:47,880 --> 00:21:51,000
Speaker 1: No fel So let's talk about what the bright red

461
00:21:51,040 --> 00:21:53,879
Speaker 1: bad thing was. Was it that he was lying about

462
00:21:54,119 --> 00:21:57,360
Speaker 1: his actual position in the stock? Had he not said, oh,

463
00:21:57,359 --> 00:21:59,879
Speaker 1: I'm still short when he actually had closed out his position,

464
00:22:00,040 --> 00:22:01,520
Speaker 1: would be be having this conversation.

465
00:22:02,080 --> 00:22:04,000
Speaker 2: I think not. I mean the actual stuff that he's

466
00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:07,359
Speaker 2: accused of lying about is mostly that, and then a

467
00:22:07,400 --> 00:22:11,879
Speaker 2: lot of like he occasionally did deals with other investors

468
00:22:11,880 --> 00:22:14,760
Speaker 2: where they would pay him for research or there he

469
00:22:14,800 --> 00:22:17,400
Speaker 2: would you know, he would give them idea, they'd they

470
00:22:17,400 --> 00:22:21,320
Speaker 2: have profit share. There was some like economic deals with

471
00:22:21,359 --> 00:22:26,360
Speaker 2: other investors where he would deny He would go around saying,

472
00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:28,520
Speaker 2: we've never been paid for research, We never like partner

473
00:22:28,600 --> 00:22:30,880
Speaker 2: with any hedge fund, we're always independent, And in fact

474
00:22:30,880 --> 00:22:33,480
Speaker 2: that wasn't really true. And again the SEC really did

475
00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:36,520
Speaker 2: get mad at him for saying he was a hedge fund.

476
00:22:36,760 --> 00:22:38,280
Speaker 2: He would like tweet things like you know, we want

477
00:22:38,280 --> 00:22:40,840
Speaker 2: to reassure our investors that blah blah blah, and I say, oh,

478
00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:43,880
Speaker 2: you don't have investors, right, Like yeah, Like that's dishonest,

479
00:22:44,200 --> 00:22:47,480
Speaker 2: and like some pumpin' uppers like do sort of create

480
00:22:47,560 --> 00:22:49,399
Speaker 2: the impression that they run a lot of money for

481
00:22:49,400 --> 00:22:52,760
Speaker 2: outside investors in order to like gin up an audience.

482
00:22:53,160 --> 00:22:55,840
Speaker 2: But I don't know. I feel like everyone kind of

483
00:22:55,880 --> 00:22:58,480
Speaker 2: knew he was a guy on Twitter with like airs

484
00:22:58,560 --> 00:22:59,720
Speaker 2: and like that's normal.

485
00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:02,000
Speaker 1: I loved what you had in your column about like

486
00:23:03,200 --> 00:23:06,360
Speaker 1: him tweeting that about like we want to re ensure investors,

487
00:23:06,440 --> 00:23:08,480
Speaker 1: and you compared that to you know, you want to

488
00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:11,760
Speaker 1: reassure your furroh one k investors as the manager of

489
00:23:11,760 --> 00:23:14,280
Speaker 1: your four oh one k. I did lol in my

490
00:23:14,359 --> 00:23:14,840
Speaker 1: car at that.

491
00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:16,520
Speaker 2: I love it. By the way, you were reading my

492
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:18,880
Speaker 2: column in your car, which I know means listening to your.

493
00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:20,080
Speaker 1: Robot read it, and you're exactly.

494
00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:21,879
Speaker 2: I just feel like there's a lot of people in

495
00:23:21,920 --> 00:23:25,760
Speaker 2: financial markets who are like I bought an ETF in

496
00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:29,120
Speaker 2: my personal account one, so like I basically a fund manager. Yeah,

497
00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:31,639
Speaker 2: you know, anyone could be a fund manager. Those are

498
00:23:31,640 --> 00:23:33,080
Speaker 2: the things that the SAC is mad about. And I

499
00:23:33,119 --> 00:23:35,000
Speaker 2: think if he didn't do any of those things, which

500
00:23:35,040 --> 00:23:37,600
Speaker 2: are all really ancillary to like what people were reading

501
00:23:37,680 --> 00:23:40,040
Speaker 2: him for, then I think he probably wouldn't get in trouble.

502
00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:42,840
Speaker 2: I would caveat that by saying, again, I really do

503
00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:47,520
Speaker 2: think that a lot of people really, really really dislike

504
00:23:47,840 --> 00:23:52,000
Speaker 2: the business model of shorting a company, publishing bad stuff

505
00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:54,720
Speaker 2: about the company, and then immediately covering. Like even if

506
00:23:54,720 --> 00:23:56,760
Speaker 2: he never lied about that, even if he said in

507
00:23:56,760 --> 00:23:58,760
Speaker 2: the fine print of his report like I could cover

508
00:23:58,800 --> 00:24:01,159
Speaker 2: at any time, and then he went on TV and

509
00:24:01,200 --> 00:24:03,760
Speaker 2: they said have you covered, he said no comment or

510
00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:07,080
Speaker 2: even yes, Like, I think that people would still be

511
00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:10,720
Speaker 2: really mad about that, because it just seems like that

512
00:24:10,960 --> 00:24:13,560
Speaker 2: it's dishonest, and I don't think it is, but I

513
00:24:13,640 --> 00:24:17,600
Speaker 2: do realize that people find it upsetting. Yeah, people think

514
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:20,320
Speaker 2: that if you're doing that, you can't really believe that

515
00:24:20,359 --> 00:24:22,520
Speaker 2: the company is a fraud. And to me, it's just

516
00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:24,639
Speaker 2: there's like a division of labor where he is in

517
00:24:24,680 --> 00:24:27,600
Speaker 2: the business of spotting the frauds, calling attention to them,

518
00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:30,480
Speaker 2: profiting from that first day move and then moving on

519
00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:32,159
Speaker 2: to the next thing, and other people will provide the

520
00:24:32,160 --> 00:24:34,200
Speaker 2: long term capital to be short the frauds all the

521
00:24:34,240 --> 00:24:34,960
Speaker 2: way down or whatever.

522
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:37,520
Speaker 1: Yeah, and we should probably point out that he has

523
00:24:37,600 --> 00:24:39,679
Speaker 1: pleaded not guilty to fraud charges.

524
00:24:39,840 --> 00:24:42,360
Speaker 2: Oh, I think he might win. I think you might win.

525
00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:45,520
Speaker 1: Like, well, yeah, his lawyer is basically I mean, he's

526
00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:48,880
Speaker 1: making similar arguments to what you're saying that Left had

527
00:24:48,880 --> 00:24:51,600
Speaker 1: no duty to disclose his personal trading intentions. He also

528
00:24:51,680 --> 00:24:55,879
Speaker 1: added that the government wasn't accusing Left of publishing false information,

529
00:24:56,000 --> 00:24:57,160
Speaker 1: and that feels important.

530
00:24:57,240 --> 00:24:59,760
Speaker 2: That's true, and it's so important. You know, it's not important,

531
00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:01,919
Speaker 2: I think to the secs, like to the government's like

532
00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:05,000
Speaker 2: analysis of its legal case, but it's so important to

533
00:25:05,040 --> 00:25:07,400
Speaker 2: everyone else. It's so important to me. Right, if he's

534
00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:10,119
Speaker 2: publishing reports saying these companies are frauds and they're all frauds, Like,

535
00:25:10,280 --> 00:25:11,359
Speaker 2: what is the problem with that?

536
00:25:11,640 --> 00:25:13,919
Speaker 1: Maybe he should just be a journalist. I mean, he

537
00:25:14,119 --> 00:25:15,200
Speaker 1: make a lot less money.

538
00:25:15,240 --> 00:25:15,800
Speaker 2: That's the thing.

539
00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:21,800
Speaker 1: He'd win the moral moral argument every time, would you.

540
00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:22,640
Speaker 1: That's true.

541
00:25:23,080 --> 00:25:26,360
Speaker 2: Journalists here and they don't you know That's that's a.

542
00:25:26,280 --> 00:25:28,960
Speaker 1: Good question to propose to the broader public. Which do

543
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:32,320
Speaker 1: you dislike more journalists or short sellers. I don't know

544
00:25:32,359 --> 00:25:35,199
Speaker 1: who would win or lose, however you want to phrase it.

545
00:25:48,320 --> 00:25:53,600
Speaker 1: Robin Wigglesworth had a really long and interesting piece on

546
00:25:54,320 --> 00:25:57,080
Speaker 1: fixing comme ETFs basically eating the bond market. He wrote

547
00:25:57,080 --> 00:25:59,840
Speaker 1: it with Will Schmidt, and I have to say that

548
00:26:00,359 --> 00:26:03,440
Speaker 1: the headline ETFs are eating the bond market. I thought

549
00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:05,320
Speaker 1: this was going to be a negative story, but I

550
00:26:05,320 --> 00:26:07,879
Speaker 1: don't think this is necessarily a negative piece.

551
00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:10,120
Speaker 2: So he quotes me a little bit because I used

552
00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:11,240
Speaker 2: to have a running gag.

553
00:26:12,080 --> 00:26:13,120
Speaker 1: That's the important part.

554
00:26:13,640 --> 00:26:17,480
Speaker 2: People are worried about bond market liquidity, and the notion

555
00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:19,720
Speaker 2: was like there was the I don't know, a four

556
00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:25,239
Speaker 2: year period where financial journalists kept saying bond ETFs are

557
00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:29,000
Speaker 2: eating the bond market, and it's so bad because in

558
00:26:29,040 --> 00:26:32,240
Speaker 2: a crisis, people will be so used to the liquidity

559
00:26:32,280 --> 00:26:35,040
Speaker 2: of bond ETFs and then when they get their bonds out,

560
00:26:35,080 --> 00:26:37,159
Speaker 2: they won't be able to sell them and bond prices

561
00:26:37,160 --> 00:26:39,440
Speaker 2: will go down. And I never understood this concern and

562
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:41,639
Speaker 2: thought it was very silly, And now it seems to

563
00:26:41,640 --> 00:26:44,440
Speaker 2: have gone away, and Raban now has this piece saying

564
00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:46,600
Speaker 2: that bond ETFs are eating the bond market and that's good,

565
00:26:46,680 --> 00:26:48,640
Speaker 2: and I think that I agree. It seems right.

566
00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:52,360
Speaker 1: It does seem good. I mean there is, or there

567
00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:54,560
Speaker 1: used to be, and maybe there still is, but now

568
00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:56,080
Speaker 1: it just seems a little bit silly. A lot of

569
00:26:56,119 --> 00:26:59,120
Speaker 1: doom and gloom about bond ETFs. We talked a little

570
00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:03,679
Speaker 1: bit about the liquidity mismatch last week. I feel like

571
00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:07,200
Speaker 1: all of those fears were put to rest in March

572
00:27:07,240 --> 00:27:10,679
Speaker 1: twenty twenty when the FED started buying ETFs. Specifically, they

573
00:27:10,720 --> 00:27:14,119
Speaker 1: started buying corporate bond ETFs, and they didn't buy that many,

574
00:27:14,560 --> 00:27:18,080
Speaker 1: but they bought bond ETFs. So you have the FED

575
00:27:18,160 --> 00:27:21,720
Speaker 1: stamp of approval on the structure and everything turned out fine.

576
00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:24,119
Speaker 1: Like I can't imagine a better test.

577
00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:26,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think that. I mean it's not just the FED, right,

578
00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:30,280
Speaker 2: I mean, it's like in that period of crisis, it

579
00:27:30,359 --> 00:27:33,679
Speaker 2: was hard to trade bonds, I think, because it's always

580
00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:35,919
Speaker 2: hard to trade bonds in a crisis, but it was

581
00:27:36,119 --> 00:27:38,840
Speaker 2: very easy to trade ETFs. And so I think the

582
00:27:38,920 --> 00:27:43,439
Speaker 2: perception is that most market participants felt that the ETFs

583
00:27:43,480 --> 00:27:47,120
Speaker 2: were adding to liquidity rather than subtracting, because at least

584
00:27:47,160 --> 00:27:49,199
Speaker 2: you could trade the ETF right, which allowed you to

585
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,880
Speaker 2: do some sort of like macro positioning around credit, even

586
00:27:52,960 --> 00:27:55,119
Speaker 2: if it was hard to get off individual bond trades.

587
00:27:56,119 --> 00:27:57,840
Speaker 2: But I think the other point of Robin's piece is

588
00:27:57,840 --> 00:28:02,600
Speaker 2: that the ETFs have largely made it easier to get

589
00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:05,720
Speaker 2: off actual bond trades for a combination of reasons, one

590
00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:09,040
Speaker 2: of which is that there are all these new dealers

591
00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:11,200
Speaker 2: who you know, the sort of Jaane Streets of the world,

592
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:13,639
Speaker 2: who are big ETF market makers, And if you're a

593
00:28:13,680 --> 00:28:16,880
Speaker 2: big ETF market maker, then those bond ETFs get bigger.

594
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:18,960
Speaker 2: You have to get into bond ETF market making, and

595
00:28:18,960 --> 00:28:21,040
Speaker 2: if you're an ETF market maker, you have to trade

596
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:23,399
Speaker 2: both the ETF and the underlying and so Jane Street

597
00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:25,120
Speaker 2: and all the other infloat trading, and all the big

598
00:28:25,160 --> 00:28:29,160
Speaker 2: ETF firms have gotten into bond trading, and so that's

599
00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:32,520
Speaker 2: another source of liquidity and another set of market makers,

600
00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:35,680
Speaker 2: another set of balance sheets. And as banks have retreated

601
00:28:35,760 --> 00:28:38,800
Speaker 2: from market making and a lot of financial products, you

602
00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:42,160
Speaker 2: have new bond traders that have made bond trading a

603
00:28:42,200 --> 00:28:45,760
Speaker 2: little bit more liquid and He also talks about portfolio trading,

604
00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:49,080
Speaker 2: where instead of trading one bond at a time, you

605
00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 2: can call up Jaine Street and say I have four

606
00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:53,160
Speaker 2: hundred bonds I want to sell, and they're like, yeah,

607
00:28:53,200 --> 00:28:55,200
Speaker 2: we could probably stuff most of those into an ETF.

608
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:57,080
Speaker 2: So it's fine, Yeah, we'll take them all. And so

609
00:28:57,200 --> 00:29:00,320
Speaker 2: instead of kind of paying four hundred bit asks, you

610
00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:02,560
Speaker 2: kind of pay a tighter bit ask spread on a

611
00:29:02,600 --> 00:29:06,760
Speaker 2: single portfolio. And that's I think improved liquidity for a

612
00:29:06,800 --> 00:29:09,440
Speaker 2: lot of actual bond managers. So it's a very rosy

613
00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:13,120
Speaker 2: story of like bond ETFs have made bond market liquidity nicer.

614
00:29:13,880 --> 00:29:16,640
Speaker 1: It's really a beautiful tale and I love listening to

615
00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:19,400
Speaker 1: it and reading it over and over again. I am

616
00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:24,400
Speaker 1: interested to see how it evolves. Colo ETFs. I remember

617
00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:27,240
Speaker 1: when those launched sometime in the past three to four years.

618
00:29:27,280 --> 00:29:29,640
Speaker 1: There was a lot of pearl clutching about that. And

619
00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:31,320
Speaker 1: there's one ETF.

620
00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:33,920
Speaker 2: In Pertarit is going to lead to some pearl clutching.

621
00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:37,480
Speaker 1: Oh definitely. It's a very scary three letter acronym. But

622
00:29:37,560 --> 00:29:40,520
Speaker 1: there's this one colo ETF. The ticker is j triple A.

623
00:29:40,760 --> 00:29:43,320
Speaker 1: It is so big. I think it recently got to

624
00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:47,160
Speaker 1: ten billion dollars. It's by far the biggest, and there's

625
00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:50,720
Speaker 1: some people who have pointed out that there's so much

626
00:29:50,760 --> 00:29:55,200
Speaker 1: demand for this specific ETF, and you know, some of

627
00:29:55,240 --> 00:29:57,440
Speaker 1: the flow is starting to increase to the other ETFs

628
00:29:57,440 --> 00:30:02,080
Speaker 1: as well, that it's starting to potentially tightened spreads on

629
00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:04,360
Speaker 1: clos just because all this money keeps pouring in, the

630
00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:07,840
Speaker 1: ETF has to keep buying clos and that's actually having

631
00:30:07,840 --> 00:30:11,880
Speaker 1: an impact in the cash markets as well, which is interesting.

632
00:30:11,920 --> 00:30:13,920
Speaker 1: Like the question that that raises in my mind is

633
00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:18,960
Speaker 1: you know, now you have this super accessible wrapper, maybe

634
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:23,240
Speaker 1: it's introducing a new class of investors into that asset

635
00:30:23,240 --> 00:30:26,240
Speaker 1: class who didn't want to take the time to figure

636
00:30:26,240 --> 00:30:28,240
Speaker 1: out how to do the mechanics of it before, but

637
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:31,440
Speaker 1: now it's super easy, and now you're seeing the ETFs

638
00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:33,800
Speaker 1: potentially impact that market.

639
00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:36,360
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, Like a CLO is a relatively painful thing

640
00:30:36,400 --> 00:30:39,760
Speaker 2: to hold compared to a ETF, which is the stock. Right,

641
00:30:39,800 --> 00:30:41,480
Speaker 2: So like if you're a retail investor and you want

642
00:30:41,480 --> 00:30:45,000
Speaker 2: cl exposure, you can buy a CLO ETF. But also

643
00:30:45,000 --> 00:30:47,560
Speaker 2: if you're an institution, it's an easier thing to get

644
00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:50,680
Speaker 2: your head around, and it's an easier thing to trade too. Right,

645
00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:54,440
Speaker 2: if you want one day of CLO exposure, you can

646
00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:56,000
Speaker 2: buy the ETF in the morning and sell it in

647
00:30:56,040 --> 00:30:58,960
Speaker 2: the afternoon, which you can't do as easily with a

648
00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:02,360
Speaker 2: big diversified board. Oh have clos the story that you

649
00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,200
Speaker 2: told the spreads coming in, it's just in any product,

650
00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:11,080
Speaker 2: if liquidity is improved, you should expect the valuation of

651
00:31:11,080 --> 00:31:12,680
Speaker 2: the product to go up, right, and the spreads to

652
00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:17,280
Speaker 2: come in. And the ETF technology just improves the liquidity

653
00:31:17,360 --> 00:31:20,720
Speaker 2: of anything it wraps. And so if you have some

654
00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:22,680
Speaker 2: audience that would have said out it's like a pain

655
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,720
Speaker 2: to hold whatever, but we can hold it in ETF form.

656
00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:27,720
Speaker 2: And you put an ETF form, then the liquidity of

657
00:31:27,720 --> 00:31:30,680
Speaker 2: that product, of the underlying product goes up and the

658
00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:33,360
Speaker 2: spreads go down. And obviously, you know, the example that

659
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,760
Speaker 2: we've talked about before is bitcoin, right, I mean Bitcoin

660
00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:39,000
Speaker 2: was for some subset of investors a pain to hold,

661
00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:41,360
Speaker 2: and then you put in an ETF and Bitcoin prices

662
00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:44,040
Speaker 2: go up. So I think that it's a sort of

663
00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:45,600
Speaker 2: general use technology. Yeah.

664
00:31:45,640 --> 00:31:48,320
Speaker 1: I feel like the story of ETF so much of

665
00:31:48,360 --> 00:31:50,480
Speaker 1: it just comes back to convenience. Like there's a few

666
00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:53,920
Speaker 1: ETFs out there that just hold two year treasuries, and

667
00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:56,640
Speaker 1: I remember when those launched there are a lot of

668
00:31:56,760 --> 00:31:59,520
Speaker 1: crank saying, like, why bother, why would I pay someone

669
00:31:59,560 --> 00:32:02,200
Speaker 1: to do this for me? It's like, because it's easy.

670
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:04,280
Speaker 1: It's the easiest thing on earth to just click a

671
00:32:04,280 --> 00:32:06,000
Speaker 1: button you buy an ETF and then you don't have

672
00:32:06,040 --> 00:32:09,080
Speaker 1: to worry about buying those bonds yourself. You know, it's

673
00:32:09,080 --> 00:32:10,960
Speaker 1: about to say, I wonder how we're going to fit

674
00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:14,400
Speaker 1: ETFs into next week's episode. But I'm going to Paris,

675
00:32:14,880 --> 00:32:16,000
Speaker 1: so oh yeah, that's.

676
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:20,080
Speaker 2: An important programming note. KT in Paris and what is

677
00:32:20,120 --> 00:32:21,720
Speaker 2: the podcast will be off next week?

678
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:23,880
Speaker 1: Right? Yeah, I'm so excited for me.

679
00:32:24,240 --> 00:32:26,960
Speaker 2: Are you watching horse Olympics?

680
00:32:27,160 --> 00:32:29,400
Speaker 1: I am going to the Olympics. I am definitely going

681
00:32:29,440 --> 00:32:33,520
Speaker 1: to see track and field. I'm so excited, right yeah, your.

682
00:32:33,400 --> 00:32:36,800
Speaker 2: Other sporting love? Is there best check and field event

683
00:32:36,840 --> 00:32:38,800
Speaker 2: to watch other than like just running around? Like? Is

684
00:32:38,840 --> 00:32:40,800
Speaker 2: there like is like javelin really exciting?

685
00:32:40,880 --> 00:32:44,520
Speaker 1: Or My favorite event to watch is probably the eight

686
00:32:44,640 --> 00:32:50,120
Speaker 1: hundred meters because that's what I ran very averagely in college.

687
00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:53,560
Speaker 1: So I really like the middle distance events. Everyone loves

688
00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:56,560
Speaker 1: the sprints though obviously like the one hundred two hundred

689
00:32:56,560 --> 00:33:00,160
Speaker 1: meter relays are fun because it feels like Team us, say,

690
00:33:00,280 --> 00:33:02,959
Speaker 1: manages to drop the baton a lot, So hopefully we

691
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:04,760
Speaker 1: don't do a lot of that this time around.

692
00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:09,280
Speaker 2: We'll see enjoy your time in Paris and we will

693
00:33:10,680 --> 00:33:13,520
Speaker 2: be back here in two weeks with more stuff Love.

694
00:33:15,720 --> 00:33:17,240
Speaker 2: And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.

695
00:33:17,600 --> 00:33:19,880
Speaker 1: I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.

696
00:33:20,120 --> 00:33:22,200
Speaker 2: You can find my work by subscribing to The Money

697
00:33:22,240 --> 00:33:24,120
Speaker 2: Stuff newsletter on Bloomberg.

698
00:33:23,680 --> 00:33:26,360
Speaker 1: Dot com, and you can find me on Bloomberg TV

699
00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:30,240
Speaker 1: every day on Open Interest between nine to eleven am Eastern.

700
00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:32,800
Speaker 2: We'd love to hear from you. You can send an

701
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:36,240
Speaker 2: email to Moneypot at Bloomberg dot net ask us a question.

702
00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:37,760
Speaker 2: We might answer it on the air.

703
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:41,040
Speaker 1: You can also subscribe to our show wherever you're listening

704
00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,440
Speaker 1: right now and leave us a review. It helps more

705
00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:44,320
Speaker 1: people find the show.

706
00:33:44,840 --> 00:33:47,720
Speaker 2: The Money Stuff Podcast is produced by Anna Maserakis and

707
00:33:47,840 --> 00:33:50,720
Speaker 2: Moses on Dam and special thanks this week to cal Brooks.

708
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:54,200
Speaker 1: Our theme music was composed by Blake Maples.

709
00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:57,240
Speaker 2: Brandon Francis Nudam is our executive producer.

710
00:33:57,280 --> 00:33:59,520
Speaker 1: And Sage Bouman is Bloomberg's head of podcasts.

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00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:02,560
Speaker 2: Thanks for listening to the Money Stuff podcast. We'll be

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00:34:02,600 --> 00:34:04,040
Speaker 2: back next week with more stuff