WEBVTT - Tweedy, Browne’s Spears and Hill on Insider Value

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Inside Active, a podcast about active managers that

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<v Speaker 1>goes beyond sound bites and headlines and looks deeper into

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<v Speaker 1>their processes, challenges and philosophies and security selection. I'm David

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<v Speaker 1>cone I, lead mutual fund and active research at Bloomberg Intelligence.

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<v Speaker 1>Over the last decade, value investing has gone through long

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<v Speaker 1>stretches of underperformance, while markets have been dominated by a

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<v Speaker 1>narrow group of large cap growth stocks. At the same time,

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<v Speaker 1>one signal that's constantly drawn attention, especially during periods of volatility,

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<v Speaker 1>is insider buying. Today, we're going to explore what happens

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<v Speaker 1>when you combine those two ideas, value investing and insider

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<v Speaker 1>behavior into a systematic investment approach. Joining me as my

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<v Speaker 1>guest today are John Spears and Jay Hill, who are

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<v Speaker 1>both managing directors at tweety Brown Company and portfolio managers

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<v Speaker 1>for the Insider Value ETF ticker COPY and the International

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<v Speaker 1>Insider Plus Value ETF ticker ICPY. John, Jay, thank you

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<v Speaker 1>for joining me today.

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<v Speaker 2>Thank you for having the opportunity to be with you.

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<v Speaker 1>David, Thank you very much for having us.

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<v Speaker 3>David, appreciate your interest.

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<v Speaker 1>So to start tweety Brown, you know as a long

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<v Speaker 1>lineage rooted in Benjamin Graham. How is your definition of

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<v Speaker 1>value evolved in today's market environment?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, Benjamin Graham defines in security analysis and in The

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<v Speaker 2>Intelligent Investor he defines basically defines the intrinsic value is

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<v Speaker 2>the value of the business. If all three of us

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<v Speaker 2>owned a company and we hired Goldman Sachs to sell it,

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<v Speaker 2>it'd be that estimated intrinsic value what we'd receive for

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<v Speaker 2>if we sold the business. And there's another way of

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<v Speaker 2>looking at value or undervaluation, and that is yield. J

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<v Speaker 2>Hill at our firm, I think coined the phrase owner

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<v Speaker 2>earnings yield. So it'd be if you own the whole company,

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<v Speaker 2>what kind of return do you get on your investment?

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<v Speaker 2>How much cash could you take out of the business

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<v Speaker 2>every year? So, and you can compare yields on all

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<v Speaker 2>different kinds of things. That higher dividend yield is often

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<v Speaker 2>considered to be a sign of undervaluation. Earnings yield of

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<v Speaker 2>course you can compare of course to treasury bills. But

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<v Speaker 2>that's those are the two I think the two big

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<v Speaker 2>ideas when they add anything to that jay.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, just owner earnings yield. It's a term You're probably

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<v Speaker 3>not going to find it in textbooks, but it's one

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<v Speaker 3>that we use. And the numerator is what I guess

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<v Speaker 3>the financial literature would call NOPAD. So after tax ebit Okay,

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<v Speaker 3>so ebit times one minus the tax rate, and the

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<v Speaker 3>denominator is the enterprise value right the market cap plus

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<v Speaker 3>the net debt is the simple definition. And the basic

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<v Speaker 3>idea is if you bought the whole company and paid

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<v Speaker 3>off all of the debt and then therefore you have

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<v Speaker 3>ebit and no interest expense on an after tax basis,

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<v Speaker 3>if you owned the whole company, how much money could

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<v Speaker 3>you put in your pocket? And generally we're looking for

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<v Speaker 3>owner earnings yields of eight percent or higher.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, Now, if we go step further, you know what

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<v Speaker 1>led you to combine inside of buying with value investing?

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<v Speaker 1>And you know why do you think that combination is

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<v Speaker 1>so powerful?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the key thing I think is is self interest.

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<v Speaker 1>And we.

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<v Speaker 2>Have done a lot of empirical research and it examined

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of empirical research, mostly from academia, and a

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<v Speaker 2>big influence on our process in our empirical research was

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<v Speaker 2>a book written by Nahat Seihan, who's a professor of finance.

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<v Speaker 2>He's chair of the Finance Department at the University of Michigan,

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<v Speaker 2>and he wrote a book called Investment, An Intelligence from

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<v Speaker 2>Insider Trading, And in that book there is a long,

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<v Speaker 2>a long, turned back historical study that he describes. Initially,

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<v Speaker 2>the study began in nineteen seventy eight and ended nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>ninety three. And the fascinating thing is that he had

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<v Speaker 2>a schedule in it where he took all the insider

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<v Speaker 2>transactions and he looked at the stock price in relation

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<v Speaker 2>to book value and earnings, and you rank the stocks

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<v Speaker 2>from cheapest to most expensive. And he found that the

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<v Speaker 2>insiders who were opening up their own wallets and buying

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<v Speaker 2>the stock when the stock was at the cheapest twenty

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<v Speaker 2>percent of stocks ranked on price to book value, the

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<v Speaker 2>cheapest twenty percent of stocks ranked on price earnings again

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<v Speaker 2>from cheapest to dearest, that the excess return using an

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<v Speaker 2>equal weighted index was a little bit more. It was

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<v Speaker 2>around ten to eleven percent in both of those long

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<v Speaker 2>run studies. And that just made our eyes pop out.

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<v Speaker 2>That's as you know, it's tough as the dickens to

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<v Speaker 2>beat the market. The odds are against active management. Long

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<v Speaker 2>run index funds tend to beat most active managers who

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<v Speaker 2>are smart and working hard, et cetera. But here was this,

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<v Speaker 2>here was this great study. So we've had separate individual

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<v Speaker 2>experience of getting ideas from watching insider trades. We've used

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<v Speaker 2>this technique on a one off basis for fifty years,

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<v Speaker 2>and so we thought we see if we could study

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<v Speaker 2>this ourselves and think about looking at other investment carearacteristics

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<v Speaker 2>beyond just price to book value and PE. And our

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<v Speaker 2>studies began in nineteen ninety six and ended in twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty two, and we found similar results the results that

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<v Speaker 2>are described in that booklet called Insider Investment Factor. But

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<v Speaker 2>I think we sent to you. I think Conrad sent

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<v Speaker 2>that to you has some tables, not only professor seance table,

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<v Speaker 2>but our own research. The results were just as good

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<v Speaker 2>as what he found, So that that just motivated us

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<v Speaker 2>to got the idea that if we could package this

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<v Speaker 2>and if it worked as well as the empirical data,

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<v Speaker 2>if we put it in a portfolio and had the

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<v Speaker 2>tax advantages of an ETF, it'd be an attractive thing

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<v Speaker 2>both for our own money and for our outside clients money.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't know if you know this but we were

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<v Speaker 2>fortunate to have about fifty million of our principles and

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<v Speaker 2>employee wealth invested in in copy and in a little

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<v Speaker 2>bit less or less so an I coopy combining, and

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<v Speaker 2>it's at least fifty million.

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<v Speaker 3>So that's David. What I would add to that is

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<v Speaker 3>we found that when you combine quantitative cheapness with material

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<v Speaker 3>free will insider buying, that that combination be both just

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<v Speaker 3>cheap stocks on a standalone basis or just looking at

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<v Speaker 3>insider buying in isolation, it's the combination that created the outperformance.

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<v Speaker 3>And that's really what excites us. We think that the

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<v Speaker 3>if you own enough of these that the law of

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<v Speaker 3>large numbers the group averages tend to outperform. There will

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<v Speaker 3>be several individual instances of individual companies where it doesn't work,

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<v Speaker 3>but a large group of these held in a portfolio

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<v Speaker 3>we think provides the opportunity for significant outperformance.

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<v Speaker 1>If we single out just the inside apart. Though, what

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<v Speaker 1>do you think is you know, you mentioned, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you've seen all this research that shows it works, But

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<v Speaker 1>what do you think it's you know, where's the edge

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<v Speaker 1>coming from? Is it just people want to follow what

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<v Speaker 1>the insiders are doing?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean, I think it's undeniable. No one can

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<v Speaker 3>dispute this that insiders know the business better than anyone else.

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<v Speaker 3>They know it better than their investment bankers. They know

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<v Speaker 3>it better than sell side research analysts, they know it

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<v Speaker 3>better than buyside analysts. And insiders have the unique ability

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<v Speaker 3>to influence outcomes. They can create their own catalysts, right, so,

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<v Speaker 3>insiders have the ability to implement a new cost cutting program,

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<v Speaker 3>or introduce new products, or have insight into when industry

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<v Speaker 3>fundamentals maybe bodding them out and might be set to improve.

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<v Speaker 3>They also have the ability to, you know, spin off

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<v Speaker 3>of a business that they think is undervalued. And they

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<v Speaker 3>also have the ability in some cases to put the

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<v Speaker 3>whole company up for sale and sell one hundred percent

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<v Speaker 3>of the business to a to a knowledgeable buyer.

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<v Speaker 2>They can also initiate a dividend increase, and they can

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<v Speaker 2>initiate a share buyback program. In many instances, we see

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<v Speaker 2>share buybacks and insider purchases, and we've done studies that

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<v Speaker 2>we've done empirical studies on share buybacks, which seem to

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<v Speaker 2>us to be an extension of the idea of insiders

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<v Speaker 2>having insight information and taking advantage if the evaluation is

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<v Speaker 2>low enough to enhance the value per for the remaining

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<v Speaker 2>shareholders after the purchases are made and the share account

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<v Speaker 2>is reduced.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I was gonna ask about buybacks in a little bit,

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<v Speaker 1>but I still want to kind of say on the

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<v Speaker 1>theme of the insider activity and how do you kind

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<v Speaker 1>of separate, you know, meaningful insider activity from any potential

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<v Speaker 1>noise because there are a lot of insider transactions.

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<v Speaker 2>There are, indeed, it's a blizzard of information. Well, one

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<v Speaker 2>of the first things is the size of the transaction.

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<v Speaker 2>We just thought that a transaction size of at least

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<v Speaker 2>one hundred thousand dollars would show some conviction. And again

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<v Speaker 2>going back to delving into whether or not the insiders

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<v Speaker 2>are required to buy their own shares, having you know,

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<v Speaker 2>have a certain amount in relation to their salary. That's

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<v Speaker 2>that's common at companies. But we look into that, we'll

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<v Speaker 2>go into the public documents and see if the if

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<v Speaker 2>the purchase is voluntary free will they don't have to

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<v Speaker 2>do it, so they're taking advantage of the price they see,

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<v Speaker 2>they like the investment. There's only one reason why insiders

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<v Speaker 2>by by their own stock. It's it's just to make

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<v Speaker 2>money they think it'll go up. So that's that that

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<v Speaker 2>reduces the the quantity of of of things that are

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<v Speaker 2>of interest to us.

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<v Speaker 3>Another way to say that, David, is if we find

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<v Speaker 3>that the insider by is not free will, meaning it

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<v Speaker 3>was required to meet a minimum ownership guideline, that doesn't

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<v Speaker 3>count the field.

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<v Speaker 2>Is the field is reduced by requiring voluntary or not

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<v Speaker 2>requiring that they be free will purchases and that we

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<v Speaker 2>have cheap valuation.

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<v Speaker 1>So there's part of kind of a behavioral process in this,

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<v Speaker 1>or I should say behavioral factors. Do you see, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>insiders effectively acting as contrariancs during periods of market stress.

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<v Speaker 1>Does that kind of show up in your process?

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely? Absolutely. Insiders often buy after a bad earnings call.

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<v Speaker 2>You'll see sometimes these You'll look at HP and Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 2>and you'll see that, you know, the stock was trading

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<v Speaker 2>at ten the day before the earnings announcements, now it's

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<v Speaker 2>at eight, and there is often a behavioral contrarian reaction

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<v Speaker 2>to that sort of thing. There. Many of the many

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<v Speaker 2>of the purchases are after the end of a quarter.

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<v Speaker 2>In addition, just general market moves when the market as

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<v Speaker 2>a whole is going down. Our experiences that insider transactions

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<v Speaker 2>go up.

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<v Speaker 3>David, We have a great recent example of this. There's

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<v Speaker 3>a company called ak LKQ that distributes after market and

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<v Speaker 3>collision auto parts. And this is a company that in

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<v Speaker 3>twenty twenty five had a bad quarter, stock collapsed. Three

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<v Speaker 3>insider stepped up purchased about eight hundred thousand dollars worth

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<v Speaker 3>of stock at an average price of thirty two. This

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<v Speaker 3>was in August of twenty twenty five, and then in

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<v Speaker 3>January of twenty twenty six, company put out a press

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<v Speaker 3>release saying that the board is conducting a strategic review

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<v Speaker 3>of the company and looking to potentially sell the whole business.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, this is a you know, mainly quantitative process. Can

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<v Speaker 1>you walk us through what you screen for? You know,

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<v Speaker 1>what has to be true for a stock to get

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<v Speaker 1>on your radar?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, sure, Well, first it has to be a transaction

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<v Speaker 2>of at least one hundred thousand dollars, and second, it

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<v Speaker 2>has to be a free will you know, voluntary purchase.

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<v Speaker 2>They have to be opportunistically buying the stock. And then

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<v Speaker 2>third we have a proprietary score, we call it the

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<v Speaker 2>value score, and it has to be above a certain level.

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<v Speaker 2>So that that narrows the field and when it is

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<v Speaker 2>when the value score is above a certain level, those

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<v Speaker 2>are the ones we focus on and we will do

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<v Speaker 2>an in person tweety Brown analysts review. Tweety Brown analysts

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<v Speaker 2>are generalists, a great deal of experience. I don't know

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<v Speaker 2>anyone who knows more about the uniform rental businesses than

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<v Speaker 2>Jay Hill and has had insights about how you buy.

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<v Speaker 2>You buy a uniform rental company and and you can

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<v Speaker 2>get rid of all the sgn A because you just

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<v Speaker 2>moved that capacity into an existing plant. Anyway that there

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<v Speaker 2>will be an experienced analyst take a quick look. Typically

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<v Speaker 2>it doesn't take more than a day or two at

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<v Speaker 2>at the particular business and with a lot of diverse

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<v Speaker 2>knowledge of you know, we've studied banks, We've studied oil

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<v Speaker 2>and gas pipelines, oil and gas companies. UH. One one

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<v Speaker 2>of our analysts is experienced and looking at pharmaceutical companies

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<v Speaker 2>and getting ideas that get sort of assessing where they

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<v Speaker 2>are and in UH trials with with the Food and

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<v Speaker 2>Fruit and Drug Drug Administration, so things like that will

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<v Speaker 2>look will look for instances in the in the in

0:15:18.320 --> 0:15:23.080
<v Speaker 2>the pharmaceutical business where they're spending UH as a percentage

0:15:23.080 --> 0:15:25.080
<v Speaker 2>of sales, a lot of money on R and D,

0:15:25.240 --> 0:15:27.040
<v Speaker 2>and we could think of some of that as being

0:15:27.960 --> 0:15:33.040
<v Speaker 2>investment types spending that reduces reported profits but does not

0:15:33.120 --> 0:15:36.400
<v Speaker 2>necessarily reduce the value of the company if it we're sold.

0:15:37.960 --> 0:15:39.600
<v Speaker 3>The only other thing I would add to that, David,

0:15:39.640 --> 0:15:44.160
<v Speaker 3>is we're looking at least that inception when we're thinking

0:15:44.160 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 3>about putting a new portfolio into one of these two

0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:49.400
<v Speaker 3>ETFs that we want to pay roughly the same price

0:15:49.440 --> 0:15:50.600
<v Speaker 3>that the insiders paid.

0:15:52.000 --> 0:15:54.560
<v Speaker 2>Interesting, yeah, yeah, that's very important. Yeah.

0:15:54.880 --> 0:15:57.320
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So there is a you know, once the stock

0:15:57.400 --> 0:16:00.520
<v Speaker 1>passes that quantitative screen that there is sounds like there

0:16:00.560 --> 0:16:04.160
<v Speaker 1>is a fundamental qualitative aspect of this where you know,

0:16:04.400 --> 0:16:07.720
<v Speaker 1>it's not just a pure quant portfolio. There needs to

0:16:07.760 --> 0:16:10.880
<v Speaker 1>be an analyst actually kind of digging into the stock

0:16:10.960 --> 0:16:12.680
<v Speaker 1>once it gets past that screen.

0:16:12.520 --> 0:16:16.080
<v Speaker 2>Right right, Bob Wykov calls it quantamental.

0:16:17.800 --> 0:16:18.960
<v Speaker 1>That's good. I like that.

0:16:19.000 --> 0:16:22.080
<v Speaker 2>So yeah, and the machine when we get we get

0:16:22.080 --> 0:16:27.680
<v Speaker 2>this feed of insider purchases from countries around the world

0:16:27.320 --> 0:16:31.440
<v Speaker 2>and obviously including the United States, but UK companies in

0:16:31.480 --> 0:16:35.280
<v Speaker 2>Europe who shares trade in the Euro, other companies in

0:16:35.360 --> 0:16:42.720
<v Speaker 2>Europe that have their own own currency, Switzerland, Canada, South Korea,

0:16:43.680 --> 0:16:51.520
<v Speaker 2>We've done some in Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, We'll wait

0:16:51.600 --> 0:16:54.520
<v Speaker 2>to look at a Mexican company, South Africa, so a

0:16:54.520 --> 0:16:57.480
<v Speaker 2>lot of a lot of different places. And then once

0:16:57.520 --> 0:17:02.720
<v Speaker 2>we get that information about the insider purchase, we put

0:17:02.720 --> 0:17:05.399
<v Speaker 2>it in, We put it in the meat grinder in

0:17:05.480 --> 0:17:10.000
<v Speaker 2>the and and the meat grinder does a lot of calculations,

0:17:10.160 --> 0:17:13.679
<v Speaker 2>that's more than thirty different calculations and comes up with

0:17:13.800 --> 0:17:17.560
<v Speaker 2>its value score. And that's that's where we focus. The

0:17:17.640 --> 0:17:20.280
<v Speaker 2>human human part human research.

0:17:20.400 --> 0:17:23.400
<v Speaker 3>Port of the judgment involved here is that the analyst

0:17:23.520 --> 0:17:26.719
<v Speaker 3>goes back and make sure is that our proprietary scoring

0:17:26.760 --> 0:17:29.399
<v Speaker 3>system is working with good data to making sure that

0:17:29.440 --> 0:17:32.960
<v Speaker 3>the data is solid, that it's not garbage in, garbage out,

0:17:33.000 --> 0:17:35.720
<v Speaker 3>so verify the data, verify that the stock.

0:17:35.560 --> 0:17:36.520
<v Speaker 2>Is truly cheap.

0:17:37.680 --> 0:17:39.000
<v Speaker 1>And then when we have that.

0:17:39.000 --> 0:17:42.440
<v Speaker 3>Material free will purchase in excess of one hundred thousand

0:17:42.880 --> 0:17:46.760
<v Speaker 3>with a minimum value score, then that's a candidate to

0:17:46.800 --> 0:17:48.800
<v Speaker 3>go into copy or eye copy.

0:17:49.720 --> 0:17:55.840
<v Speaker 2>And really the rebuttable presumption is that unless we see something,

0:17:55.880 --> 0:18:01.600
<v Speaker 2>you know that the data is wrong or in some

0:18:01.680 --> 0:18:06.080
<v Speaker 2>instances we'll do will delve further into the if the

0:18:06.119 --> 0:18:11.680
<v Speaker 2>company has above average leverage, will delve into the the

0:18:11.720 --> 0:18:16.560
<v Speaker 2>covenants and UH and depending on the particular business, the

0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:21.960
<v Speaker 2>particular industry, will will look at different kinds of disclosures

0:18:21.960 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 2>in public documents that pertain to an analysis of a

0:18:27.040 --> 0:18:29.720
<v Speaker 2>bank or an oil and gas company or whatever.

0:18:30.400 --> 0:18:32.720
<v Speaker 3>The other thing, David were human judgment I think played

0:18:32.760 --> 0:18:35.080
<v Speaker 3>some role is sometimes there's a company that meets all

0:18:35.119 --> 0:18:39.760
<v Speaker 3>the criteria, but there's a conflicting signal. A common conflicting

0:18:39.800 --> 0:18:42.520
<v Speaker 3>signal would be, hey, there's insider buying, but there's also

0:18:42.560 --> 0:18:44.320
<v Speaker 3>been material insiders selling.

0:18:45.280 --> 0:18:48.639
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, mixed, a mixed signal. It doesn't hit you in

0:18:48.640 --> 0:18:54.240
<v Speaker 2>the face. Now, some with some companies in the United States,

0:18:56.600 --> 0:19:01.800
<v Speaker 2>you will some of the data serves as we'll report sales,

0:19:01.840 --> 0:19:07.280
<v Speaker 2>but we have a we we can investigate sales pertaining

0:19:07.280 --> 0:19:11.760
<v Speaker 2>the option exercise. So sometimes we'll we'll overlook the sale

0:19:11.840 --> 0:19:16.879
<v Speaker 2>if the if the insider is exercising the stock option

0:19:18.080 --> 0:19:22.320
<v Speaker 2>way earlier, way way before, way before it the end

0:19:22.359 --> 0:19:27.600
<v Speaker 2>of the option period, and and this is increasing ownership,

0:19:27.680 --> 0:19:30.240
<v Speaker 2>so they're really in a way buying it by exercising

0:19:30.280 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 2>the stock might have to sell some shares to beat Yeah,

0:19:35.160 --> 0:19:37.680
<v Speaker 2>So we'll we'll delve into things like that.

0:19:38.880 --> 0:19:41.679
<v Speaker 1>And you and earlier touched upon share buybacks, and so

0:19:42.760 --> 0:19:45.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm just curious of how you distinguish between, you know,

0:19:45.800 --> 0:19:49.679
<v Speaker 1>value creating buybacks or just pure financial engineering.

0:19:50.359 --> 0:19:54.040
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's that's it's the value score has to be cheap,

0:19:54.480 --> 0:20:00.240
<v Speaker 2>has to be cheap. I think most share buybacks are

0:20:02.200 --> 0:20:05.159
<v Speaker 2>in companies that really are not super cheap. They're not

0:20:06.640 --> 0:20:10.520
<v Speaker 2>high score, high value score type companies. And of course many,

0:20:10.960 --> 0:20:14.000
<v Speaker 2>many big companies will buy back their own own stock

0:20:14.640 --> 0:20:20.360
<v Speaker 2>to offset dilution from exercise of options. Anything to add

0:20:20.400 --> 0:20:21.240
<v Speaker 2>to that, Jay.

0:20:21.800 --> 0:20:24.960
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, just in other words, by definition, what we believe

0:20:25.080 --> 0:20:28.320
<v Speaker 3>share repurchase makes the most sense when you're buying backstock

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:32.800
<v Speaker 3>when when the company is inexpenser and by definition a

0:20:32.840 --> 0:20:35.600
<v Speaker 3>company that has a high value score looking at those

0:20:35.640 --> 0:20:39.800
<v Speaker 3>thirty metrics, it's cheap. It's likely in the bottom two

0:20:39.840 --> 0:20:43.480
<v Speaker 3>death sisles ranked against all companies in terms of cheapness.

0:20:44.359 --> 0:20:47.919
<v Speaker 3>So the odds are that are a significant share repurchase

0:20:48.520 --> 0:20:51.760
<v Speaker 3>with a company that has a high value score, that's value,

0:20:51.800 --> 0:20:54.600
<v Speaker 3>a creative share repurchase, that's the type of share repurchase

0:20:54.960 --> 0:20:58.960
<v Speaker 3>we think makes a lot of sense and adds value

0:20:59.040 --> 0:21:01.720
<v Speaker 3>per share to the non selling shareholders.

0:21:02.200 --> 0:21:04.359
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean if you've got if you've got a

0:21:05.640 --> 0:21:09.840
<v Speaker 2>company that let's let's make the mass simple. It earns

0:21:09.840 --> 0:21:13.480
<v Speaker 2>one hundred dollars and it's got one hundred shares, so

0:21:13.560 --> 0:21:17.600
<v Speaker 2>it's it's earning a dollar a share. Now, leaving aside

0:21:18.640 --> 0:21:22.199
<v Speaker 2>financing costs or loss of interest. If the company buys

0:21:22.240 --> 0:21:25.760
<v Speaker 2>back ten percent of its shares, Let's say, if I've none,

0:21:25.960 --> 0:21:28.240
<v Speaker 2>doesn't have to borrow any money. They just do that.

0:21:30.200 --> 0:21:33.640
<v Speaker 2>You'll have ninety shares divided into one hundred in earnings,

0:21:33.680 --> 0:21:36.240
<v Speaker 2>so your your your earnings per share are going to

0:21:36.240 --> 0:21:39.280
<v Speaker 2>go up about eleven percent just by doing that. So

0:21:40.840 --> 0:21:43.080
<v Speaker 2>it can it can really make a huge difference if

0:21:43.440 --> 0:21:46.560
<v Speaker 2>if the company is cheap. And there's one that we

0:21:46.840 --> 0:21:53.240
<v Speaker 2>recently went in the portfolio company called Verssan Media, VS

0:21:53.680 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 2>and Tea, and it came across the insider buy a

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:03.719
<v Speaker 2>wire when director and a nine year director of Comcast,

0:22:03.800 --> 0:22:07.439
<v Speaker 2>his name is David Novak, who had been previously the

0:22:07.480 --> 0:22:10.119
<v Speaker 2>founder of Young Brands. He bought he opened up his

0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:13.320
<v Speaker 2>wall and bought about five point two million dollars worth

0:22:13.359 --> 0:22:17.440
<v Speaker 2>of stock. And I think that their buyback program is

0:22:19.160 --> 0:22:23.080
<v Speaker 2>twenty percent of the outstanding shares. I don't know over

0:22:23.160 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 2>what period, but that's a very significant amount. And the

0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:28.800
<v Speaker 2>stock is at five and a half times earning, so

0:22:28.960 --> 0:22:33.359
<v Speaker 2>call it a twenty percent earnings yield. So, assuming the

0:22:33.359 --> 0:22:38.360
<v Speaker 2>business doesn't fall apart, it's in broadcasting, the own cnpc ms.

0:22:38.400 --> 0:22:42.959
<v Speaker 2>Now they own rotten Apples and what's the fan Dango

0:22:43.080 --> 0:22:46.520
<v Speaker 2>and they own a bunch of stuff. Yeah, the golf channel,

0:22:46.640 --> 0:22:52.520
<v Speaker 2>right right, yeah, sports channels exactly. So if the business doesn't,

0:22:52.560 --> 0:22:56.919
<v Speaker 2>if the earning power doesn't fall apart, that those buybacks

0:22:57.119 --> 0:22:59.680
<v Speaker 2>at such a low valuation could be very accreative.

0:23:00.000 --> 0:23:03.439
<v Speaker 1>I mean, okay, okay, I do want to ask you about,

0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:05.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, the portfolio, and you know, if we just

0:23:05.600 --> 0:23:09.240
<v Speaker 1>look at copy, you know, it's really diversified, about maybe

0:23:09.240 --> 0:23:12.560
<v Speaker 1>one hundred and seventy holding somewhere around. Then how do

0:23:12.600 --> 0:23:15.120
<v Speaker 1>you balance diversification with conviction?

0:23:17.520 --> 0:23:22.639
<v Speaker 2>I would say we don't have that much conviction in

0:23:22.640 --> 0:23:26.640
<v Speaker 2>individual names. I mean, I'm saying I'm saying that myself. Jay,

0:23:27.520 --> 0:23:30.959
<v Speaker 2>there's certainly stocks that each of us like more than

0:23:31.000 --> 0:23:34.560
<v Speaker 2>others that are in the portfolio. But the whole big

0:23:35.040 --> 0:23:39.800
<v Speaker 2>strategy idea is to try to mimic the studies which

0:23:39.840 --> 0:23:45.160
<v Speaker 2>we're all equal weighted studies, and the averages that are

0:23:45.440 --> 0:23:49.800
<v Speaker 2>reported for those studies are all equal weighted, and at

0:23:49.880 --> 0:23:54.520
<v Speaker 2>least in a Seihun study they used they used an

0:23:54.520 --> 0:23:59.840
<v Speaker 2>equal weighted index to measure out performance. But again it's

0:23:59.880 --> 0:24:02.520
<v Speaker 2>a law of the Irige numbers idea that hopefully if

0:24:02.520 --> 0:24:05.720
<v Speaker 2>we have a big sample of these, we'll get we'll

0:24:05.720 --> 0:24:10.320
<v Speaker 2>get it'd be great if we'd get anything near what

0:24:12.520 --> 0:24:15.240
<v Speaker 2>the studies have shown. In the studies, of course, are

0:24:15.400 --> 0:24:20.640
<v Speaker 2>just they're factor studies. The studies are not portfolios. They're

0:24:20.800 --> 0:24:25.680
<v Speaker 2>just how this stock with this characteristic and you've got

0:24:25.720 --> 0:24:30.040
<v Speaker 2>a lot of how that did on average, So.

0:24:29.080 --> 0:24:32.000
<v Speaker 1>It's the portfolio in terms of you know, position sizing,

0:24:32.040 --> 0:24:33.199
<v Speaker 1>it's equal weighted.

0:24:34.040 --> 0:24:36.919
<v Speaker 3>It's equal weighted. So in copy there's roughly, you know,

0:24:37.119 --> 0:24:38.800
<v Speaker 3>like you said, one hundred and eighty to one hundred

0:24:38.800 --> 0:24:42.080
<v Speaker 3>and ninety nains, each new position comes in at roughly

0:24:42.119 --> 0:24:46.919
<v Speaker 3>fifty basis points. And then in eye copy, which is

0:24:46.960 --> 0:24:51.760
<v Speaker 3>the international component of copy, so non US stocks and

0:24:51.920 --> 0:24:55.320
<v Speaker 3>I copy, that's about one hundred and twenty stocks. So

0:24:55.400 --> 0:24:59.840
<v Speaker 3>each new position is roughly a seventy five basis point position.

0:25:00.640 --> 0:25:04.320
<v Speaker 3>You talked about, you know, diversification. We don't have any

0:25:04.400 --> 0:25:07.119
<v Speaker 3>set in stone rules, but I think in general we

0:25:07.160 --> 0:25:10.440
<v Speaker 3>don't want any more than twenty to twenty five percent

0:25:10.640 --> 0:25:15.520
<v Speaker 3>in any one particular industry. And also we don't outside

0:25:15.520 --> 0:25:18.080
<v Speaker 3>of the United States, So the United States is a

0:25:18.119 --> 0:25:20.760
<v Speaker 3>separate category. It's the largest capital market in the world.

0:25:20.800 --> 0:25:23.280
<v Speaker 3>But in other countries, we want no more than twenty

0:25:23.320 --> 0:25:26.640
<v Speaker 3>percent in any particular country. And again that's not set

0:25:26.720 --> 0:25:31.480
<v Speaker 3>in stone, but those there's parameters that we've set in

0:25:31.520 --> 0:25:34.919
<v Speaker 3>place that we think add to diversification.

0:25:35.680 --> 0:25:40.320
<v Speaker 1>So do you do rebalancing to keep the portfolio equal weighted,

0:25:40.520 --> 0:25:43.399
<v Speaker 1>you know, over a certain time periods.

0:25:44.200 --> 0:25:47.760
<v Speaker 2>Well, no, I would, I would say we're doing we're

0:25:47.800 --> 0:25:55.880
<v Speaker 2>doing valuation improvement. Well, well we'll a stock that has

0:25:56.680 --> 0:26:00.520
<v Speaker 2>a higher value score can get a higher values score

0:26:03.760 --> 0:26:06.399
<v Speaker 2>excuse me exactly, as a lower value score gets a

0:26:06.440 --> 0:26:09.359
<v Speaker 2>lower value score as a result of increase in the

0:26:09.560 --> 0:26:11.840
<v Speaker 2>in the price of the stock goes up, so the

0:26:12.840 --> 0:26:19.560
<v Speaker 2>valuation is not as cheap or the earnings the fundamentals

0:26:19.680 --> 0:26:23.920
<v Speaker 2>fall apart. So those and we're always trying to get

0:26:24.040 --> 0:26:28.439
<v Speaker 2>new cheaper stuff into the portfolio, stuff with higher value

0:26:28.480 --> 0:26:34.280
<v Speaker 2>scores in and we will sometimes replace it. Well, but

0:26:34.800 --> 0:26:38.440
<v Speaker 2>if something as a high value score goes in and

0:26:38.640 --> 0:26:44.280
<v Speaker 2>a lower value score goes out, so we're opportunistically refreshing

0:26:44.320 --> 0:26:45.880
<v Speaker 2>the inventory.

0:26:46.640 --> 0:26:51.000
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, David, I mean you asked about sell discipline, and effectively,

0:26:51.119 --> 0:26:55.800
<v Speaker 3>each new idea that passes our criteria right material free

0:26:55.840 --> 0:27:00.920
<v Speaker 3>will insider by combined with a high value score, we

0:27:01.119 --> 0:27:04.960
<v Speaker 3>approve that investment. It comes into the portfolio, and then

0:27:05.000 --> 0:27:08.240
<v Speaker 3>we need to reduce a stock that's in sell a

0:27:08.240 --> 0:27:11.840
<v Speaker 3>stock that's in the portfolio, and they the selling criteria

0:27:11.920 --> 0:27:16.480
<v Speaker 3>is what John mentioned. Effectively, it's it's really a combination

0:27:16.640 --> 0:27:20.639
<v Speaker 3>of eliminating the companies that have the lowest value score

0:27:20.840 --> 0:27:26.359
<v Speaker 3>today and or are the oldest vintage insider buys. In

0:27:26.400 --> 0:27:29.840
<v Speaker 3>other words, if if a stock that's in the portfolio

0:27:30.800 --> 0:27:33.520
<v Speaker 3>the insider by happened two to three years ago, where

0:27:33.520 --> 0:27:36.119
<v Speaker 3>there's been a long time period since that inside that

0:27:36.200 --> 0:27:41.280
<v Speaker 3>triggering insider purchase occurred, we'll look to move that stock

0:27:41.320 --> 0:27:44.240
<v Speaker 3>out and replace it with newer vintage insider buys.

0:27:45.040 --> 0:27:49.560
<v Speaker 2>And sometimes we'll reset the clock. We'll well, we'll that

0:27:49.600 --> 0:27:52.200
<v Speaker 2>can happen when the value score is still pretty good

0:27:52.680 --> 0:27:56.199
<v Speaker 2>and insiders continue to buy it. So it might be

0:27:56.560 --> 0:27:59.840
<v Speaker 2>two years pass and and the stock still has a

0:28:00.200 --> 0:28:03.040
<v Speaker 2>good value score and they're they're continuing to buy it.

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:06.120
<v Speaker 2>We'll treat that in a way as a fresh as

0:28:06.119 --> 0:28:09.200
<v Speaker 2>a fresh thing, and and we'll give it more time.

0:28:10.440 --> 0:28:12.879
<v Speaker 1>So there isn't you'd say, a typical holding period. It

0:28:13.040 --> 0:28:16.239
<v Speaker 1>just really entirely depended on its you know, valuation and

0:28:16.320 --> 0:28:17.240
<v Speaker 1>insider behavior.

0:28:18.400 --> 0:28:21.240
<v Speaker 2>Well, there's not. I would say that that based on

0:28:21.320 --> 0:28:26.040
<v Speaker 2>the empirical data. Our our empirical data, it looks like

0:28:26.160 --> 0:28:31.200
<v Speaker 2>the excess returns UH peak two to three years after

0:28:31.240 --> 0:28:35.359
<v Speaker 2>the date of the insider purchase. Now, Professor sayan study

0:28:35.560 --> 0:28:39.200
<v Speaker 2>just had an assumption of a one year holding period,

0:28:39.640 --> 0:28:42.120
<v Speaker 2>so he didn't go beyond that, but we went we

0:28:42.160 --> 0:28:45.520
<v Speaker 2>went out three years and and and it just seemed

0:28:45.560 --> 0:28:49.080
<v Speaker 2>that way. So and it may sort of makes sense

0:28:49.480 --> 0:28:52.280
<v Speaker 2>if you could get anything like the excess returns in

0:28:52.320 --> 0:28:58.120
<v Speaker 2>the studies. Those excess turn returns generally indicate that the

0:28:58.120 --> 0:29:01.600
<v Speaker 2>the share price the valuation account is probably going up

0:29:01.600 --> 0:29:06.280
<v Speaker 2>at a much faster rate than the companies at real value.

0:29:08.040 --> 0:29:14.040
<v Speaker 2>It's unusual to get twenty thirty type an your returns

0:29:14.040 --> 0:29:14.800
<v Speaker 2>for very long.

0:29:16.160 --> 0:29:20.160
<v Speaker 3>It is possible, though, David, because the portfolio tarover is

0:29:20.280 --> 0:29:23.400
<v Speaker 3>largely a function of the number of new ideas that

0:29:23.440 --> 0:29:26.520
<v Speaker 3>meet our criteria. So if there was let's say, a

0:29:26.560 --> 0:29:29.400
<v Speaker 3>big market sell off and a ton of insider buy

0:29:29.640 --> 0:29:34.200
<v Speaker 3>amongst cheap stocks, it's entirely possible that we could replace

0:29:34.880 --> 0:29:38.680
<v Speaker 3>really the whole portfolio in a year or less. If

0:29:38.720 --> 0:29:41.280
<v Speaker 3>there's a bunch of new names that meet our criteria

0:29:42.240 --> 0:29:44.400
<v Speaker 3>that would come in, and then we'd have to move

0:29:44.440 --> 0:29:48.480
<v Speaker 3>out the older names and the names with lower value scores.

0:29:48.480 --> 0:29:50.240
<v Speaker 2>Right, yeah, yeah.

0:29:50.280 --> 0:29:54.000
<v Speaker 1>Do you ever in counter situations where the signals look great,

0:29:54.400 --> 0:29:56.680
<v Speaker 1>but the investment might just not pan out, you know,

0:29:56.720 --> 0:29:59.120
<v Speaker 1>where the fundamentals just kind of just don't follow.

0:30:00.040 --> 0:30:04.000
<v Speaker 2>Fundamentals do tend to follow the value score. I can

0:30:04.040 --> 0:30:10.200
<v Speaker 2>think of well leveraged, too much leverage, and events that

0:30:10.360 --> 0:30:17.880
<v Speaker 2>happened verly soon after the insider purchase that kind of

0:30:18.720 --> 0:30:22.320
<v Speaker 2>make the data we were looking at stale. Such as

0:30:23.040 --> 0:30:27.720
<v Speaker 2>a company you buy the stock, you know, in March,

0:30:27.800 --> 0:30:34.800
<v Speaker 2>and by September the company announces a major, very very

0:30:34.880 --> 0:30:42.240
<v Speaker 2>large acquisition that requires really leveraging up the existing balance sheet,

0:30:42.960 --> 0:30:47.440
<v Speaker 2>and they paid a very high price for this company.

0:30:48.320 --> 0:30:50.440
<v Speaker 2>They should have used the money or the borrowing power

0:30:50.480 --> 0:30:53.280
<v Speaker 2>to buy back their own stock much better deal, and

0:30:53.400 --> 0:30:58.360
<v Speaker 2>they did that. So something like that might say, using

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:02.440
<v Speaker 2>sort of zero based budgeting this thing, I think, you know,

0:31:02.480 --> 0:31:06.400
<v Speaker 2>the value score has gone down pro forma given this

0:31:08.160 --> 0:31:11.200
<v Speaker 2>wild acquisition. And as you may know, a lot of

0:31:11.280 --> 0:31:14.800
<v Speaker 2>acquisitions don't work out. There have been academic studies of that,

0:31:17.120 --> 0:31:20.080
<v Speaker 2>or Warren Buffett often writes about that.

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:24.280
<v Speaker 3>I mean, I think, David, a lot of the names

0:31:24.280 --> 0:31:27.080
<v Speaker 3>are not going to work out. That's just the truth.

0:31:27.880 --> 0:31:33.280
<v Speaker 3>Our little methodology here, combining insider buying and quantitative cheapness,

0:31:33.400 --> 0:31:36.280
<v Speaker 3>is not going to work in every instance. What we're

0:31:36.320 --> 0:31:39.880
<v Speaker 3>trying to capture is the group result of a large,

0:31:40.600 --> 0:31:44.560
<v Speaker 3>broadly diversified group of companies. In copies case, it's almost

0:31:44.560 --> 0:31:47.000
<v Speaker 3>two hundred stocks. In the other portfolio it's one hundred

0:31:47.000 --> 0:31:50.480
<v Speaker 3>and twenty stocks. What we're looking is for the group result,

0:31:50.600 --> 0:31:56.160
<v Speaker 3>a little bit like insurance underwriting. Right, not all clients

0:31:56.200 --> 0:31:59.720
<v Speaker 3>are going to be profitable. What we expect to happen, though,

0:31:59.800 --> 0:32:03.920
<v Speaker 3>is the group result the law of large numbers to

0:32:04.040 --> 0:32:09.240
<v Speaker 3>develop to UH to generate a significant outperformance. But with

0:32:09.640 --> 0:32:11.960
<v Speaker 3>lots of individual names that don't.

0:32:11.680 --> 0:32:16.760
<v Speaker 2>Work, there's skewedness there there. It's humbling and surprising to

0:32:16.800 --> 0:32:21.160
<v Speaker 2>see see some of the some of the big, big winners.

0:32:21.160 --> 0:32:24.040
<v Speaker 2>I mean that what we've had, we've had gold miners

0:32:25.240 --> 0:32:28.920
<v Speaker 2>up through the roof UH, we've had good, excellent results

0:32:28.920 --> 0:32:32.280
<v Speaker 2>from the South some of the South Korean UH companies

0:32:32.280 --> 0:32:34.840
<v Speaker 2>that just hit you in the face in terms of

0:32:34.920 --> 0:32:38.040
<v Speaker 2>how cheap they were. They're not as cheap anymore. But

0:32:39.920 --> 0:32:42.640
<v Speaker 2>it's stuff we couldn't have. I don't think anyone had

0:32:43.320 --> 0:32:46.200
<v Speaker 2>a crystal blonde. Which ones would be the big winners,

0:32:46.360 --> 0:32:50.200
<v Speaker 2>which ones would have the skewness that makes makes the

0:32:50.240 --> 0:32:51.960
<v Speaker 2>average good, that.

0:32:51.920 --> 0:32:54.560
<v Speaker 1>Actually brings you in the next question. You know that

0:32:54.760 --> 0:32:57.920
<v Speaker 1>it's the same investment philosophy for both copy and eye copy.

0:32:58.000 --> 0:33:00.760
<v Speaker 1>But are you seeing like different types of companies if

0:33:00.800 --> 0:33:03.400
<v Speaker 1>you compare, you know what's in the what's domestic and

0:33:03.640 --> 0:33:06.600
<v Speaker 1>what's international? Are there, you know, different sectors that seem

0:33:06.680 --> 0:33:09.200
<v Speaker 1>to be coming up more in one versus the other.

0:33:10.240 --> 0:33:12.400
<v Speaker 2>I don't notice that, do you, Jake?

0:33:12.520 --> 0:33:15.480
<v Speaker 3>I don't either. No, No, I mean I think we

0:33:15.560 --> 0:33:18.160
<v Speaker 3>mentioned this earlier. I mean I copy is really just

0:33:18.320 --> 0:33:22.680
<v Speaker 3>the the non US names within copy, so that there's

0:33:22.720 --> 0:33:25.480
<v Speaker 3>a lot of overlap. But but no, I don't. I

0:33:25.480 --> 0:33:30.120
<v Speaker 3>don't think we've noticed any significant differences in the like

0:33:30.200 --> 0:33:33.560
<v Speaker 3>say the companies or the industries in I copy versus copy.

0:33:34.280 --> 0:33:37.680
<v Speaker 1>Okay, and this is my last question. If an investor

0:33:37.720 --> 0:33:41.040
<v Speaker 1>could take away one lesson from your approach, what would.

0:33:40.800 --> 0:33:51.680
<v Speaker 2>It be, follow the money to make money and buy cheap.

0:33:53.960 --> 0:33:56.440
<v Speaker 3>What I would say, David, is that look we we

0:33:56.440 --> 0:33:59.000
<v Speaker 3>we came up with the ticker symbol co O p

0:33:59.280 --> 0:34:03.959
<v Speaker 3>Y copy right is like upon on. We're copying the insiders,

0:34:05.360 --> 0:34:10.760
<v Speaker 3>and we just think that adding insider buying to value investing.

0:34:11.320 --> 0:34:15.120
<v Speaker 3>We're long term believers in value investing and adding this

0:34:15.320 --> 0:34:21.560
<v Speaker 3>simple common sense qualitative, I guess metric insider buying just

0:34:21.640 --> 0:34:26.320
<v Speaker 3>makes perfect common sense. And I'll reiterate with John said earlier.

0:34:26.920 --> 0:34:30.920
<v Speaker 3>If there's a free will buy, insiders only buy their

0:34:30.960 --> 0:34:34.600
<v Speaker 3>stock for one reason, they think it's going up. And

0:34:34.719 --> 0:34:40.880
<v Speaker 3>insiders uniquely have the ability to effectuate change, to catalyze change,

0:34:40.920 --> 0:34:43.920
<v Speaker 3>to become their own catalyst. And we think that that

0:34:44.000 --> 0:34:45.160
<v Speaker 3>combination's powerful.

0:34:45.360 --> 0:34:49.440
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we call it in insight information, not insider.

0:34:50.040 --> 0:34:50.680
<v Speaker 1>That's pretty good.

0:34:52.239 --> 0:34:56.319
<v Speaker 2>And I think they also from us the standpoint of

0:34:56.320 --> 0:34:59.279
<v Speaker 2>a tax paying investor, and we're all tax paying investors

0:34:59.520 --> 0:35:03.000
<v Speaker 2>at tweety brown, some more than others. Living if they

0:35:03.040 --> 0:35:09.720
<v Speaker 2>live in New York City, that it's very attractive being

0:35:09.760 --> 0:35:16.239
<v Speaker 2>able to essentially avoid most capital gains taxes. We've done

0:35:17.040 --> 0:35:20.120
<v Speaker 2>one big distribution and kind of some of some of

0:35:20.160 --> 0:35:23.760
<v Speaker 2>the stocks with large unrealized gains that were no longer

0:35:25.880 --> 0:35:29.000
<v Speaker 2>high valuation scores. Evaluation scores that going down because the

0:35:29.000 --> 0:35:31.479
<v Speaker 2>stocks had gone out, and I think we were able

0:35:31.480 --> 0:35:35.879
<v Speaker 2>to eliminate about forty five percent or something like that

0:35:35.960 --> 0:35:39.520
<v Speaker 2>of the total unrealized gain in the in the portfolio.

0:35:39.640 --> 0:35:42.720
<v Speaker 2>So nice. It was amazing, and it's it's.

0:35:42.520 --> 0:35:47.040
<v Speaker 3>Worth reiterating, David, we believe in this strategy, and the

0:35:47.840 --> 0:35:51.960
<v Speaker 3>partners at tweety Brown have roughly fifty million dollars invested

0:35:52.040 --> 0:35:54.240
<v Speaker 3>right along aside our client.

0:35:54.680 --> 0:35:57.279
<v Speaker 1>Well, it's it's a great place to end. But this

0:35:57.320 --> 0:35:58.680
<v Speaker 1>is a lot of fun. I want to thank you

0:35:58.719 --> 0:36:02.800
<v Speaker 1>both for joining Meg Well, thank you for the opportunity. David,

0:36:02.800 --> 0:36:08.200
<v Speaker 1>you have quite a reputation. You're the guru of active investing.

0:36:08.280 --> 0:36:10.080
<v Speaker 1>It I appreciate that.

0:36:10.160 --> 0:36:11.000
<v Speaker 2>Thank you very much.

0:36:11.200 --> 0:36:12.280
<v Speaker 3>We appreciate your Andrew.

0:36:12.320 --> 0:36:14.120
<v Speaker 1>Thank you, David. I also want to thank our listeners.

0:36:14.160 --> 0:36:16.600
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0:36:16.680 --> 0:36:18.440
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0:36:18.480 --> 0:36:21.520
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