WEBVTT - Tech News: Investigating Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Heth Aaron, Welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host Joathan

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<v Speaker 1>Strickland of an executive producer with iHeart Radio and all

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<v Speaker 1>of all things tech, and it's time for the tech

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<v Speaker 1>news for Tuesday, October nineteen twenty one. Let's get to it.

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<v Speaker 1>Members of the United States House Judiciary Committee released a

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<v Speaker 1>statement saying they are considering a criminal investigation into Amazon.

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<v Speaker 1>This relates to the report I mentioned last week in

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<v Speaker 1>which Reuters revealed that internal documents from Amazon that Reuters

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<v Speaker 1>had come into possession of showed that the company had

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<v Speaker 1>copied products in India to create Amazon branded versions of

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<v Speaker 1>those same products, and then used Amazon's search algorithm to

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<v Speaker 1>promote Amazon owned versions over the competing brands, so essentially saying,

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon said, this particular product is making a lot of money,

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<v Speaker 1>let's make our own version, and then let's make sure

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<v Speaker 1>that people see that over the industry leader. Reuters published

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<v Speaker 1>that again, this was happening in India, not necessarily in

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<v Speaker 1>other parts of the world, but the five committee members

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<v Speaker 1>of the House Judiciary Committee that we're concerned about this.

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<v Speaker 1>Reached out to Amazon CEO Andy Jesse over this matter,

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<v Speaker 1>saying that these reports contradict sworn testimony that Amazon executives,

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<v Speaker 1>including Jeff Bezos, gave to Congress in the past. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>for its own part, Amazon reps say that the reporting

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<v Speaker 1>that Reuters has published is inaccurate and that the executives

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<v Speaker 1>who provided testimony before US Congress did so truthfully. But again,

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<v Speaker 1>these documents that Reuters says it's received suggest that at

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<v Speaker 1>least two top Amazon executives were aware of the practices

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<v Speaker 1>in India, and they paint a pretty anti competitive picture. Meanwhile,

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<v Speaker 1>in India, a trade group is petitioning the Prime Minister

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<v Speaker 1>of the country to sanction Amazon in light of the

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<v Speaker 1>Reuters report. Facebook is changing how it charges for ads,

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<v Speaker 1>and the news isn't great for advertisers. Okay, so let's

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<v Speaker 1>talk about how Facebook's ads work in a nutshell from

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<v Speaker 1>the advertiser perspective. Usually I'm talking about this from the

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<v Speaker 1>user point of view, but now we're looking at it

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<v Speaker 1>from the other way. So let's say we've got an advertiser.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, let's say we're being super lucky and it's

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<v Speaker 1>a legitimate business, because if you're not lucky, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>scam company that's fleecing customers. I run into those all

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<v Speaker 1>the time on Facebook. They all lead to companies in

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<v Speaker 1>China that ship out cheap knockoffs are sometimes just junk

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<v Speaker 1>two people, and the cost of returning it would be

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<v Speaker 1>more than what you spent on the item. Anyway, that's

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<v Speaker 1>neither here nor there. Facebook doesn't really care one way

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<v Speaker 1>or the other if the company is legit or not,

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<v Speaker 1>because it turns out all that money spends the same

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<v Speaker 1>whether it comes from a legit source or an illegitimate one.

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<v Speaker 1>You can still spend that money anyway. These advertisers set

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<v Speaker 1>down a budget for Facebook and they submit an ad,

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<v Speaker 1>so it costs money right up front to run an

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<v Speaker 1>ad campaign, which makes sense, and the companies tell Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>what actions would represent a successful ad delivery. Maybe the

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<v Speaker 1>brand wants to count every engagement like they're saying, we

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<v Speaker 1>want to see how many likes we can get and

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna pay X amount per like, Or maybe they

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<v Speaker 1>only want to count the times that someone actually clicks

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<v Speaker 1>through on an ad the click through rate, and Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>runs the ad for a certain amount of time, like

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<v Speaker 1>thirty days, and at the end of that campaign, Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>talies up all the hits on that ad based on

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<v Speaker 1>whatever criteria the client had selected at the beginning. Then

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook gives the client a bill by delivering that many hits.

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<v Speaker 1>So this can get pretty expensive if the ad is

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<v Speaker 1>really effective, and if the company is asking for something

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<v Speaker 1>that requires a particularly challenging user behavior like clicking through

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<v Speaker 1>on an AD is typically a pretty big step compared

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<v Speaker 1>to you know, just seeing the ad in your feed.

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<v Speaker 1>So Facebook could charge a few dollars per click, and

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<v Speaker 1>if tens of thousands of people actually click through on

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<v Speaker 1>that ad, that bill can get pretty big. Well, here's

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<v Speaker 1>where things take a turn for advertisers moving forward. Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>has decided that it will now treat Instagram and Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>accounts as separate accounts, even if the same user clicks

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<v Speaker 1>on the same ad both in Instagram and in Facebook.

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<v Speaker 1>So before Facebook would treat these as a single account,

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<v Speaker 1>Like if you have a Facebook and an Instagram account,

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<v Speaker 1>then you were to interact with the same ad on both.

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<v Speaker 1>In the past, Facebook said well, that's just one user,

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<v Speaker 1>so it only counts once. Now they're saying, no, it's

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<v Speaker 1>going to count twice, because you know why not. On

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook's point of view, this strikes a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>is weird because if you're serving the same ADD to

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<v Speaker 1>the same person a couple of different times, it's not

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<v Speaker 1>like you've just created a new customer each time, right.

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<v Speaker 1>You can only become a new customer once. But now,

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<v Speaker 1>if someone engages with an AD on Instagram and on Facebook,

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<v Speaker 1>the company will treat that as if that one person

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<v Speaker 1>is actually two people. So, in other words, add clients

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<v Speaker 1>can potentially get charged twice for the same person seeing

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<v Speaker 1>the same AD on two different platforms, both of which

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<v Speaker 1>are owned by Facebook. Facebook says this will only happen

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<v Speaker 1>if the user hasn't had their Facebook and Instagram accounts

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<v Speaker 1>linked in the account center. Now you might wonder, what's

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<v Speaker 1>the account center, Well, this is an optional way for

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<v Speaker 1>users to connect their Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger accounts together

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<v Speaker 1>from an ad perspective. Uh. By the way, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>fully optional feature. It's up to the user to engage it,

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<v Speaker 1>and that feature has not been fully deployed. Only a

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<v Speaker 1>selection of Facebook users have even had the option to

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<v Speaker 1>activate it, so by default, most folks do not have

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<v Speaker 1>their accounts linked together, and even when this gets rolled

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<v Speaker 1>out in full deployment, it still will mean that users

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<v Speaker 1>will have to take the step to enable that option.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm guessing that Facebook is banking on the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>most people won't bother to do this. Plus, there are

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<v Speaker 1>plenty of folks who already don't like the idea of

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<v Speaker 1>linking their activities together for the purposes of ads, which

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<v Speaker 1>means that companies that are advertising on Facebook can look

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<v Speaker 1>forward to paying twice per user for those who interact

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<v Speaker 1>with an ad on more than one platform. I will

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<v Speaker 1>not be shocked to see UH some opposition to this plan,

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<v Speaker 1>but this is, you know, just the early days for it.

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<v Speaker 1>Speaking of Facebook, over the past few years, the company

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<v Speaker 1>has shifted UH to depend more upon AI algorithms in

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<v Speaker 1>order to detect and potentially remove posts that contain harmful

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<v Speaker 1>content or you know, stuff that just plane violates Facebook's policies,

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<v Speaker 1>and that includes stuff like, you know, depictions of violence,

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<v Speaker 1>hate speech, acts of cruelty, and so forth. But The

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street Journal reports that Facebook's AI just isn't really

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<v Speaker 1>up to the task. Guy Rosen, who is the head

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<v Speaker 1>of integrity at Facebook, says that as recently as this

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<v Speaker 1>past spring, one in every two thousand and posts on

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook still contained hate speech. Facebook started using AI because

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<v Speaker 1>there's so much content that's posted to Facebook that it's

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<v Speaker 1>not really feasible to rely upon human beings to police everything,

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<v Speaker 1>and that makes sense. Unfortunately, the robot police in this

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<v Speaker 1>case aren't really good at their jobs. One senior research

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<v Speaker 1>scientists posted in two thousand nineteen that by his estimation,

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<v Speaker 1>the AI was removing posts that represented about two percent

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<v Speaker 1>of all the hate speech that was actually posted onto Facebook.

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<v Speaker 1>Missing of posts that violate the ban on hate speech

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<v Speaker 1>is pretty darn lousy by any metric, and when the

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<v Speaker 1>AI can't draw a firm conclusion about whether or not

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<v Speaker 1>a particular post violates Facebook's rules, the default response is

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<v Speaker 1>just to reduce how frequently that post will pop up

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<v Speaker 1>in other people's news feeds. You know, you kind of

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<v Speaker 1>emphasize the algorithm, and so it's not muting the post,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not removing the post or banning the user. It's

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<v Speaker 1>just making sure that that particular post that may include

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<v Speaker 1>hate speech doesn't spread quite as much on the platform. That's,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, not good. Facebook reps claim that the company

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<v Speaker 1>is working to improve the algorithms, but based upon the

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<v Speaker 1>posts of other research scientists, it sounds like there isn't

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<v Speaker 1>much cause to be optimistic that any improvement will be

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<v Speaker 1>significant enough to make a serious dent in the spread

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<v Speaker 1>of hate speech on the platform. Things to remember here

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<v Speaker 1>that artificial intelligence is a difficult and complicated discipline. It

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<v Speaker 1>is not always up to the tasks we assigned to it,

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<v Speaker 1>and there are some pretty awful people out there who

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<v Speaker 1>take advantage of this fact and they spread harmful posts

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<v Speaker 1>on platforms like Facebook, knowing that you know, the company

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<v Speaker 1>these own measures aren't really you know, up to the task.

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<v Speaker 1>They have a really good chance of getting that message

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<v Speaker 1>to spread, whether they specifically, you know, adhere to an

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<v Speaker 1>ideology that they really believe in and they're trying to

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<v Speaker 1>promote that, or they're just trying to cause chaos in

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<v Speaker 1>the in the case of things like Russian misinformation trolls.

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<v Speaker 1>So yeah, good things to remember. Speaking of Russia, the

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<v Speaker 1>Russian government is pressuring companies like Facebook and Google to

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<v Speaker 1>comply with orders to delete illegal content from their platforms.

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<v Speaker 1>In Google's case, the government is threatening a fine of

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<v Speaker 1>up to twent of Google's Russian turnover. By the way,

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<v Speaker 1>I actually had to look up the word turnover because

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<v Speaker 1>I think of turnovers as either a baked good or

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<v Speaker 1>the number of employees who leave a business within a

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<v Speaker 1>given amount of time, like that's what turnover is. But

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<v Speaker 1>turnover in this case refers to the amount of any

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<v Speaker 1>business brings in over an amount of time. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>know why we use that instead of the word like revenue.

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<v Speaker 1>But I mean, hey, that's the English language, right, Hey,

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<v Speaker 1>English language. You're confusing. And I say that as a

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<v Speaker 1>native speaker anyway. At least some of the content, this

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<v Speaker 1>illegal content that Google refuses to remove is stuff that's

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<v Speaker 1>critical of the Russian government. So in many ways, this

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<v Speaker 1>is different from the pressure that these same platforms face

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<v Speaker 1>when it comes to spreading hate speech, and it falls

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<v Speaker 1>more in line with a government attempting to suppress any

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<v Speaker 1>resistance to that government's authority. Now I should also add

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know what all the illegal content is that

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<v Speaker 1>Russia alleges Google has failed to remove. Some of that

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<v Speaker 1>could fall into categories like hate speech or misinformation, things

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<v Speaker 1>like that stuff that we would, you know, typically think

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<v Speaker 1>should be removed in general, I don't know how much

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<v Speaker 1>of that falls into those categories versus just plain old

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<v Speaker 1>you know, government censorship that is, you know, designed to

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<v Speaker 1>keep those in power to remain in power. But yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>Google is facing some pretty massive fines in Russia. If

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<v Speaker 1>they don't take those steps, we will have to see

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<v Speaker 1>how that develops. I've got a lot more news to cover,

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<v Speaker 1>but before we get to that, let's take a quick break.

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<v Speaker 1>The green Ridge Generation power plant in New York State

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<v Speaker 1>is the latest to come under the scrutiny of environmentalist groups,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is because that particular facility has partnered with

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<v Speaker 1>bitcoin mining operations. Now, the power plant had shut down,

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<v Speaker 1>it was defunct, but it came back online in two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand seventeen and it houses more than fifteen thousand computer

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<v Speaker 1>services that are engaged in bitcoin mining. Now. As a reminder,

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<v Speaker 1>bitcoin is based off a proof of work mining model,

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<v Speaker 1>and from a very high, high level, just to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of cover this, this means that the system generates what

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<v Speaker 1>amounts to be a number guessing game, and the system

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<v Speaker 1>makes this number increasingly more difficult to guess as more

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<v Speaker 1>computational power joins the system, because the goal is to

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<v Speaker 1>keep the solution time period to about ten minutes, so

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<v Speaker 1>it should take around ten minutes to guess the right answer. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>as the value of bitcoin goes up, more people spend

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<v Speaker 1>more money to put together computer networks that are just

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<v Speaker 1>trying to get the correct answer right, because they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to make a lot of cash in the form of bitcoin. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>that means the system has to make the number harder

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<v Speaker 1>to guess in order to keep that ten minute goal

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<v Speaker 1>in place. And this cycle feeds on itself as long

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<v Speaker 1>as the currency remains really valuable, and right now it's

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<v Speaker 1>you know, around sixty dollars per coin. Meanwhile, all these

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<v Speaker 1>computers need electricity to run, and if the expense of

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<v Speaker 1>running the system is more than what you're getting from mining,

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<v Speaker 1>then the whole thing falls apart. Right, you're spending more

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<v Speaker 1>money than you make in mining. And when you've got

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<v Speaker 1>fifteen thousand servers, you need a lot of electricity. So

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of bitcoin mining operations have looked too defunct.

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<v Speaker 1>Power plants like the green Ridge Generation power Plant had

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<v Speaker 1>been in order to bring them back online, specifically to

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<v Speaker 1>provide electricity for bitcoin mining operations and then perhaps selling

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<v Speaker 1>any additional electricity to the local power grid. Now, bitcoin

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<v Speaker 1>mining operations do this because it brings the cost of

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<v Speaker 1>electricity way down. If the cost is is higher than

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<v Speaker 1>that cuts into your profits, right, And eventually you might

0:15:04.560 --> 0:15:08.240
<v Speaker 1>get to a point where maintaining all the equipment plus

0:15:08.480 --> 0:15:11.080
<v Speaker 1>spending all the money on electricity is more than what

0:15:11.160 --> 0:15:13.400
<v Speaker 1>you get out of mining, and you you've got to

0:15:13.440 --> 0:15:16.840
<v Speaker 1>cut your business or else you'll you'll you know, your

0:15:16.880 --> 0:15:19.960
<v Speaker 1>your costs are greater than your profits, or actually you

0:15:19.960 --> 0:15:22.800
<v Speaker 1>don't have profits. Your costs are greater than your revenue.

0:15:23.400 --> 0:15:27.760
<v Speaker 1>Now that means that these previously defunct fossil fuel power

0:15:27.800 --> 0:15:31.320
<v Speaker 1>plants are coming back online, and thus they're generating more pollution.

0:15:32.080 --> 0:15:35.400
<v Speaker 1>Bitcoin mining operations say that they make sure that they

0:15:35.400 --> 0:15:39.240
<v Speaker 1>purchase carbon offsets in order to remain carbon neutral, but

0:15:39.320 --> 0:15:43.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of environmentalists have said that carbon offsets tend

0:15:43.440 --> 0:15:47.280
<v Speaker 1>to encourage more reliance on fossil fuel and that this

0:15:47.360 --> 0:15:50.120
<v Speaker 1>is harmful behavior. Essentially that companies use it as an

0:15:50.120 --> 0:15:53.880
<v Speaker 1>excuse in order to not make the changes needed to

0:15:54.200 --> 0:15:57.520
<v Speaker 1>get off the dependence on fossil fuels, and in the meantime,

0:15:57.880 --> 0:16:01.000
<v Speaker 1>we just continue to dump more carbon and into the atmosphere.

0:16:01.040 --> 0:16:05.240
<v Speaker 1>And sure, we might use carbon offsets to fund things

0:16:05.320 --> 0:16:09.160
<v Speaker 1>that can remove carbon from the atmosphere, but that's further

0:16:09.240 --> 0:16:12.440
<v Speaker 1>into the future, and the harm that those carbon emissions

0:16:12.480 --> 0:16:17.480
<v Speaker 1>can do is more immediate. So, in other words, carbon

0:16:17.480 --> 0:16:20.760
<v Speaker 1>offsets can be a solution for a long term as

0:16:20.800 --> 0:16:24.120
<v Speaker 1>long as you also are backing off on carbon emissions.

0:16:24.160 --> 0:16:27.440
<v Speaker 1>But that's not what we're seeing here, and so the

0:16:27.480 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 1>environmentalists are calling upon New York politicians to deny an

0:16:31.560 --> 0:16:34.480
<v Speaker 1>air permit for Green Ridge and to send an example

0:16:34.520 --> 0:16:36.960
<v Speaker 1>both to the state of New York as well as

0:16:37.040 --> 0:16:40.840
<v Speaker 1>the country overall. They have warned that not doing that

0:16:41.120 --> 0:16:44.600
<v Speaker 1>will seriously undermine state and national efforts to cut carbon

0:16:44.640 --> 0:16:48.560
<v Speaker 1>emissions drastically over the next few years. I'm inclined to

0:16:48.600 --> 0:16:51.760
<v Speaker 1>agree with the activists on this one. And while bitcoin

0:16:51.840 --> 0:16:54.800
<v Speaker 1>miners might argue that their operations bring revenue to the

0:16:54.840 --> 0:16:58.200
<v Speaker 1>state and they create high paying jobs, I would counter

0:16:58.320 --> 0:17:01.920
<v Speaker 1>that when you've got increased carbon emissions, that kind of

0:17:01.960 --> 0:17:04.520
<v Speaker 1>negates those benefits in the long term. I mean, what

0:17:04.680 --> 0:17:07.680
<v Speaker 1>good is money if all the shops end up being

0:17:07.720 --> 0:17:11.960
<v Speaker 1>either underwater or on fire. South Korea has adjusted its

0:17:12.000 --> 0:17:15.679
<v Speaker 1>targets for reducing carbon emissions by twenty thirty. Speaking of

0:17:15.720 --> 0:17:20.000
<v Speaker 1>carbon emissions, previously the country had a goal of reducing

0:17:20.040 --> 0:17:24.399
<v Speaker 1>carbon emissions by twenty six point three by thirty but

0:17:24.520 --> 0:17:27.919
<v Speaker 1>now the country is upping that to a commitment to

0:17:28.080 --> 0:17:32.800
<v Speaker 1>reducing it by forty percent by with the overall goal

0:17:32.880 --> 0:17:36.000
<v Speaker 1>to become carbon neutral by twenty fifty. Now, this is

0:17:36.040 --> 0:17:39.360
<v Speaker 1>a really significant change. South Korea is a country that

0:17:39.440 --> 0:17:44.480
<v Speaker 1>depends heavily on coal power plants. They generate about of

0:17:44.520 --> 0:17:48.160
<v Speaker 1>the electricity that the country relies upon, and it has

0:17:48.200 --> 0:17:51.000
<v Speaker 1>a long way to go to get to those goals

0:17:51.040 --> 0:17:53.879
<v Speaker 1>that it's set. But South Korea's government has created an

0:17:53.960 --> 0:17:56.960
<v Speaker 1>aggressive plan that calls for a coal power generation to

0:17:57.040 --> 0:18:00.840
<v Speaker 1>drop to twenty one eight percent by twenty thirty and

0:18:00.880 --> 0:18:04.639
<v Speaker 1>renewables would go from the current six point two percent

0:18:04.800 --> 0:18:10.959
<v Speaker 1>of power generation to thirty by It is a very

0:18:11.000 --> 0:18:13.399
<v Speaker 1>aggressive green plan. It will be interesting to see if

0:18:13.400 --> 0:18:16.560
<v Speaker 1>the country can follow through. The U s Department of

0:18:16.680 --> 0:18:20.800
<v Speaker 1>Justice has leveled charges against Mark Faulkner, who was the

0:18:20.920 --> 0:18:24.320
<v Speaker 1>chief technical pilot for Boeing. Now, the heart of the

0:18:24.359 --> 0:18:27.800
<v Speaker 1>matter relates to the seven thirty seven Max aircraft. You

0:18:27.880 --> 0:18:31.560
<v Speaker 1>might remember that there were two tragic crashes, one near Jakarta,

0:18:31.640 --> 0:18:36.160
<v Speaker 1>Indonesia and another one in Ethiopia that involved seven thirty

0:18:36.200 --> 0:18:41.280
<v Speaker 1>seven Max aircraft and the aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

0:18:41.440 --> 0:18:44.560
<v Speaker 1>or m CAST, was at fault. Now, the m CAST

0:18:44.800 --> 0:18:48.560
<v Speaker 1>is meant to stabilize flight and the seven thirty seven

0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:52.639
<v Speaker 1>MAX has a design that means that the nose of

0:18:52.680 --> 0:18:57.040
<v Speaker 1>the aircraft tends to go up during flight as you

0:18:57.080 --> 0:19:01.200
<v Speaker 1>are are moving forward, and this can cause the plane

0:19:01.240 --> 0:19:03.679
<v Speaker 1>to climb or even to reach a point where the

0:19:03.720 --> 0:19:10.440
<v Speaker 1>aircraft could you know, suffer a massive stall. Engineers tweaked

0:19:10.800 --> 0:19:14.680
<v Speaker 1>the MCAST system to counteract this tendency and thus force

0:19:14.840 --> 0:19:20.399
<v Speaker 1>the nose back down to a level orientation. But the

0:19:20.440 --> 0:19:22.800
<v Speaker 1>problem was that the system would start pushing the nose

0:19:22.840 --> 0:19:27.240
<v Speaker 1>down prematurely, like during takeoff, it would mistakenly identify that

0:19:27.280 --> 0:19:29.920
<v Speaker 1>the aircraft was in a dangerous angle of attack, that's

0:19:30.000 --> 0:19:32.800
<v Speaker 1>the orientation of the aircraft in relation to the direction

0:19:32.840 --> 0:19:37.040
<v Speaker 1>that it is traveling. Worst, Boeing had failed to include

0:19:37.119 --> 0:19:41.160
<v Speaker 1>information about im casts in various training manuals. In fact,

0:19:41.160 --> 0:19:43.960
<v Speaker 1>the whole point of the seven MAX was to decrease

0:19:44.000 --> 0:19:46.119
<v Speaker 1>the amount of time that pilots would have to spend

0:19:46.119 --> 0:19:49.920
<v Speaker 1>in training in order to fly the aircraft. So pilots

0:19:49.920 --> 0:19:52.920
<v Speaker 1>had no idea how to shut off the system and

0:19:53.000 --> 0:19:56.200
<v Speaker 1>they lost control the aircraft, thus leading to these tragic

0:19:56.760 --> 0:20:01.160
<v Speaker 1>plane crashes. The d o J says that Wagner presented

0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:06.639
<v Speaker 1>false and incomplete information to various airlines regarding mcasts, and

0:20:06.960 --> 0:20:09.600
<v Speaker 1>again this was in order for Boeing to sell the

0:20:09.640 --> 0:20:14.320
<v Speaker 1>aircraft with the essentially the advertising line of you won't

0:20:14.400 --> 0:20:18.480
<v Speaker 1>have to bring your pilots off duty to complete hundreds

0:20:18.520 --> 0:20:21.640
<v Speaker 1>of hours or dozens of hours of training in order

0:20:21.680 --> 0:20:25.120
<v Speaker 1>to fly this aircraft. They're training and other aircraft will

0:20:25.160 --> 0:20:28.159
<v Speaker 1>be sufficient and they'll just have to complete maybe a

0:20:28.160 --> 0:20:30.159
<v Speaker 1>few hours and that's it, and then they're back in

0:20:30.200 --> 0:20:33.919
<v Speaker 1>the air flying passengers around. So, in other words, it

0:20:33.960 --> 0:20:37.159
<v Speaker 1>was it was being sold as a way to to

0:20:37.400 --> 0:20:41.639
<v Speaker 1>save in a long run while also upgrading your your fleet.

0:20:42.240 --> 0:20:46.399
<v Speaker 1>And now the d o J is saying that Forakner specifically,

0:20:46.760 --> 0:20:50.159
<v Speaker 1>was leaving out critical information that could have saved lives.

0:20:50.600 --> 0:20:54.280
<v Speaker 1>A grand jury has indicted Wargner, who faces multiple accounts

0:20:54.359 --> 0:20:59.040
<v Speaker 1>of wire fraud. The United States Federal Communications Commission, or FCC,

0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:03.200
<v Speaker 1>has already created rules for telecom companies in the United

0:21:03.200 --> 0:21:07.040
<v Speaker 1>States regarding spam phone calls, and the major carriers have

0:21:07.160 --> 0:21:11.880
<v Speaker 1>already reached an obligation to comply to those orders. Smaller

0:21:11.920 --> 0:21:14.960
<v Speaker 1>carriers have a little bit longer. They have un til

0:21:15.160 --> 0:21:17.760
<v Speaker 1>I think June and next year to implement those changes,

0:21:18.400 --> 0:21:21.560
<v Speaker 1>and the goal is to cut down on spam calls.

0:21:21.880 --> 0:21:24.280
<v Speaker 1>Now the FCC is looking to do the same thing

0:21:24.359 --> 0:21:29.000
<v Speaker 1>with text messages. FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosen Warsol says that

0:21:29.080 --> 0:21:32.920
<v Speaker 1>the increase in robotexts aimed at tricking people into downloading

0:21:32.920 --> 0:21:36.600
<v Speaker 1>nolware or sharing personal information has been on the rise,

0:21:37.080 --> 0:21:40.800
<v Speaker 1>and the FCC and telecom companies have an obligation to respond.

0:21:41.400 --> 0:21:44.680
<v Speaker 1>The f CC will propose rules for this response, which

0:21:44.840 --> 0:21:47.520
<v Speaker 1>the public will be able to review and comment upon

0:21:48.040 --> 0:21:51.560
<v Speaker 1>before they are implemented. This is just the normal operations

0:21:51.560 --> 0:21:53.800
<v Speaker 1>for the f c C. You might remember that during

0:21:53.840 --> 0:21:58.399
<v Speaker 1>the whole net neutrality battles, there were times where the

0:21:58.440 --> 0:22:02.119
<v Speaker 1>f CC opened up things for public comment that became

0:22:02.160 --> 0:22:05.159
<v Speaker 1>a whole mess depending upon which administration was in charge.

0:22:05.200 --> 0:22:08.320
<v Speaker 1>There were cases where there were a bunch of uh

0:22:08.520 --> 0:22:13.440
<v Speaker 1>comments that were suspected of being fake, that were intended

0:22:13.480 --> 0:22:17.600
<v Speaker 1>to push one agenda over another. Anyway, the whole point

0:22:17.600 --> 0:22:20.280
<v Speaker 1>of that process is to give the public an opportunity

0:22:20.400 --> 0:22:24.320
<v Speaker 1>to to weigh in and to you know, argue what

0:22:24.400 --> 0:22:27.239
<v Speaker 1>things matter most to them. So in this case, I

0:22:27.280 --> 0:22:30.119
<v Speaker 1>hope that the public response by saying yes, I would

0:22:30.119 --> 0:22:33.240
<v Speaker 1>like to have fewer spam text messages. At this point,

0:22:33.480 --> 0:22:35.440
<v Speaker 1>I just want my phone to work whenever I needed

0:22:35.480 --> 0:22:39.000
<v Speaker 1>to work, and I don't want people to be contacting me. Specifically,

0:22:39.040 --> 0:22:42.320
<v Speaker 1>I don't want spam to be contacting me. We have

0:22:42.400 --> 0:22:45.560
<v Speaker 1>a few more news stories to cover before we get

0:22:45.600 --> 0:22:57.440
<v Speaker 1>into that. Let's take another quick break. The Sinclair Broadcast Group,

0:22:57.520 --> 0:23:01.320
<v Speaker 1>which operates lots of television station across the United States,

0:23:01.480 --> 0:23:04.960
<v Speaker 1>and which is also known for pushing conservative talking points

0:23:05.000 --> 0:23:09.520
<v Speaker 1>through its numerous regional stations, you know, requiring local staff

0:23:09.600 --> 0:23:13.800
<v Speaker 1>to repeat those particular talking points, it has been hit

0:23:13.960 --> 0:23:17.320
<v Speaker 1>with a ransomware attack. Now, before I get into this story,

0:23:17.440 --> 0:23:19.080
<v Speaker 1>I do want to say that while I do not

0:23:19.320 --> 0:23:23.359
<v Speaker 1>agree with Sinclair's political philosophy, and I definitely don't agree

0:23:23.400 --> 0:23:27.240
<v Speaker 1>with its policy of requiring staff to repeat those talking points,

0:23:27.560 --> 0:23:31.879
<v Speaker 1>I also condemn ransomware attacks in general. Right, I don't

0:23:32.640 --> 0:23:35.400
<v Speaker 1>think that that is the right way to go. Two

0:23:35.480 --> 0:23:39.439
<v Speaker 1>wrongs do not make a right anyway. This attack happened

0:23:39.440 --> 0:23:43.400
<v Speaker 1>this past Saturday and disrupted operations at numerous stations around

0:23:43.440 --> 0:23:47.680
<v Speaker 1>the United States. It affected the station's ability to stream content,

0:23:47.880 --> 0:23:52.000
<v Speaker 1>It disrupted services like email and even telephone service at

0:23:52.040 --> 0:23:55.119
<v Speaker 1>some of these locations. In addition, the hackers appear to

0:23:55.160 --> 0:23:59.560
<v Speaker 1>have access data on Sinclair's systems and locked Sinclair out

0:23:59.560 --> 0:24:02.520
<v Speaker 1>of those systems at the time of this recording, it's

0:24:02.520 --> 0:24:05.640
<v Speaker 1>not entirely clear what data that might be or how

0:24:05.680 --> 0:24:08.960
<v Speaker 1>it will affect Sinclair moving forward. I've not seen any

0:24:09.000 --> 0:24:12.720
<v Speaker 1>reports on how much the hackers have demanded in ransom.

0:24:12.760 --> 0:24:16.080
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if it's a ransomware attack, that's typically part

0:24:16.080 --> 0:24:20.080
<v Speaker 1>of it that I haven't seen any any reference to

0:24:20.119 --> 0:24:23.879
<v Speaker 1>the demands. Uh, nor have I found any information on

0:24:23.960 --> 0:24:27.399
<v Speaker 1>which hacker group is responsible. At least as of the

0:24:27.440 --> 0:24:31.880
<v Speaker 1>recording of this podcast, no group has claimed responsibility. Now,

0:24:31.880 --> 0:24:34.800
<v Speaker 1>it might be tempting to assume that the hackers have

0:24:34.920 --> 0:24:39.159
<v Speaker 1>an ideological beef with Sinclair, but it's also possible that

0:24:39.240 --> 0:24:42.920
<v Speaker 1>this was just an attack of opportunity, unguided by any

0:24:42.960 --> 0:24:47.119
<v Speaker 1>sort of ideological stance. But as always, my advice is

0:24:47.680 --> 0:24:52.560
<v Speaker 1>never pay the ransom. It encourages future attacks. UH. This

0:24:52.640 --> 0:24:55.560
<v Speaker 1>is easier said than done for a lot of organizations

0:24:55.760 --> 0:24:59.360
<v Speaker 1>because it could be critical infrastructure that's affected by the attack,

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:03.120
<v Speaker 1>and if there's not an easy fix to reverse that,

0:25:03.840 --> 0:25:07.840
<v Speaker 1>then what do you do? But paying that ransom it

0:25:07.880 --> 0:25:11.399
<v Speaker 1>really just sends the message of Hey, your tactic worked

0:25:11.680 --> 0:25:13.800
<v Speaker 1>and you made money off of it, so you should

0:25:13.800 --> 0:25:17.440
<v Speaker 1>do it again. Not a great situation for the rest

0:25:17.440 --> 0:25:20.960
<v Speaker 1>of us. Now, on the subject of ransomware, the FBI,

0:25:21.160 --> 0:25:25.840
<v Speaker 1>along with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or CAESA,

0:25:26.080 --> 0:25:28.840
<v Speaker 1>as well as the National Security Agency or n s A,

0:25:29.480 --> 0:25:34.440
<v Speaker 1>have issued a joint advisory about the black Matter ransomware

0:25:34.680 --> 0:25:38.480
<v Speaker 1>gang and how that group works. So the goal is

0:25:38.520 --> 0:25:43.359
<v Speaker 1>to alert various organizations, essentially big businesses, to the tactics

0:25:43.359 --> 0:25:46.879
<v Speaker 1>that this group uses in an effort to bolster cybersecurity

0:25:47.119 --> 0:25:52.560
<v Speaker 1>and prevent future attacks. Black Matter has traditionally offered bribes

0:25:52.760 --> 0:25:56.959
<v Speaker 1>to employees who work for really big organizations, sometimes up

0:25:57.000 --> 0:26:00.920
<v Speaker 1>to a hundred thousand dollars for these emloyees to share

0:26:01.080 --> 0:26:05.080
<v Speaker 1>log in credentials. Essentially, they're saying, if you have a

0:26:05.200 --> 0:26:08.679
<v Speaker 1>key to the vault, we will pay you a hundred

0:26:08.680 --> 0:26:11.919
<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars to let us in. The group does have

0:26:11.960 --> 0:26:16.280
<v Speaker 1>some restrictions, however. They apparently don't want to target nonprofit organizations.

0:26:16.720 --> 0:26:20.199
<v Speaker 1>They don't want to target hospitals or healthcare companies in

0:26:20.240 --> 0:26:25.000
<v Speaker 1>that space. Uh. They say that government organizations are off limits.

0:26:25.119 --> 0:26:27.479
<v Speaker 1>Companies that are in the defense industry are off limits

0:26:27.520 --> 0:26:30.359
<v Speaker 1>stuff like that, so they're really looking to target like

0:26:30.480 --> 0:26:33.359
<v Speaker 1>big businesses that are outside of those industries. You know,

0:26:33.400 --> 0:26:38.280
<v Speaker 1>like financial institutions could be totally on target. Uh, big

0:26:38.320 --> 0:26:41.280
<v Speaker 1>telecommunications companies, that kind of stuff, like any of those

0:26:41.280 --> 0:26:45.199
<v Speaker 1>other companies could be considered fair game. And their attack

0:26:45.320 --> 0:26:48.720
<v Speaker 1>methods include good old standbys, such as using compromise log

0:26:48.760 --> 0:26:52.160
<v Speaker 1>incredentials to gain unauthorized access to a system. That's why

0:26:52.160 --> 0:26:55.600
<v Speaker 1>they will offer that like hundred thousand dollar payout in

0:26:55.680 --> 0:26:59.000
<v Speaker 1>order to get access to what are considered to be

0:26:59.080 --> 0:27:02.200
<v Speaker 1>really high value targets. This is the sort of thing

0:27:02.240 --> 0:27:07.280
<v Speaker 1>that the average person can prevent. So first, you know,

0:27:07.520 --> 0:27:10.240
<v Speaker 1>you don't give into the temptation to sell out a

0:27:10.320 --> 0:27:13.520
<v Speaker 1>company for a hundred thousand dollars. That kind of stuff

0:27:13.760 --> 0:27:18.600
<v Speaker 1>can be tracked. It's more likely to get you into

0:27:18.640 --> 0:27:21.080
<v Speaker 1>serious trouble than that hundred grand is worth. I mean

0:27:21.119 --> 0:27:24.439
<v Speaker 1>a hundred thousand dollars. That's a lot of money, and

0:27:24.480 --> 0:27:27.520
<v Speaker 1>I can see where the temptation would be. But uh

0:27:27.680 --> 0:27:32.160
<v Speaker 1>not many people have any idea of how to hide

0:27:32.920 --> 0:27:36.679
<v Speaker 1>a sudden flow of a hundred thousand dollars into their

0:27:36.720 --> 0:27:40.200
<v Speaker 1>bank accounts. So really, for those who want to try

0:27:40.200 --> 0:27:43.080
<v Speaker 1>and keep things safe, they need to set strong passwords.

0:27:43.160 --> 0:27:46.000
<v Speaker 1>They need to keep those passwords safe. One thing you

0:27:46.000 --> 0:27:48.840
<v Speaker 1>should not do, for example, is write your password down

0:27:48.880 --> 0:27:51.280
<v Speaker 1>on a sticky note and attach that sticky note to

0:27:51.320 --> 0:27:55.080
<v Speaker 1>your computer monitor. Not that I've personally seen that happen.

0:27:56.680 --> 0:28:00.119
<v Speaker 1>The agencies revealed that the black Matter group also is

0:28:00.160 --> 0:28:02.440
<v Speaker 1>something that a lot of other groups will not do.

0:28:03.560 --> 0:28:06.960
<v Speaker 1>Instead of encrypt data backups, that's what a lot of

0:28:07.200 --> 0:28:09.840
<v Speaker 1>ransomware groups will do, though, and cry crypt the backups

0:28:09.880 --> 0:28:12.960
<v Speaker 1>so that the backups are not accessible, black Matter goes

0:28:12.960 --> 0:28:18.080
<v Speaker 1>a step further. They will overwrite the data backup systems,

0:28:18.119 --> 0:28:22.679
<v Speaker 1>so they will essentially erase all that backup data. That

0:28:22.720 --> 0:28:26.399
<v Speaker 1>means that companies are left with encrypted systems and no backups.

0:28:26.760 --> 0:28:29.280
<v Speaker 1>Whether those are backups are encrypted or otherwise. It's a

0:28:29.280 --> 0:28:32.520
<v Speaker 1>pretty brutal attack, and obviously the best approach is to

0:28:32.560 --> 0:28:35.439
<v Speaker 1>try and prevent an attack from happening in the first place.

0:28:36.080 --> 0:28:38.880
<v Speaker 1>There are more details, and I would urge anyone out

0:28:38.880 --> 0:28:41.760
<v Speaker 1>there who oversees large and critical networks to read the

0:28:41.840 --> 0:28:45.280
<v Speaker 1>Joint Advisory. You can find it at the ces A website.

0:28:45.640 --> 0:28:49.960
<v Speaker 1>It is alert A A to one DASH to nine

0:28:50.280 --> 0:28:55.440
<v Speaker 1>one a catchy right, But seriously, if you are at

0:28:55.440 --> 0:28:59.200
<v Speaker 1>all responsible for those sorts of networks, I highly recommend

0:28:59.240 --> 0:29:02.520
<v Speaker 1>you read the advice ory. It could potentially save you

0:29:02.600 --> 0:29:06.480
<v Speaker 1>and your organization a lot of trouble. Finally, as part

0:29:06.480 --> 0:29:09.920
<v Speaker 1>of the Artemis program, which is the NASA program that

0:29:09.960 --> 0:29:12.880
<v Speaker 1>includes sending astronauts back to the Moon for the first

0:29:12.880 --> 0:29:16.600
<v Speaker 1>time since the early nineteen seventies, NASA plans to establish

0:29:16.680 --> 0:29:21.560
<v Speaker 1>a communications network that it is currently calling Luna net Now.

0:29:21.600 --> 0:29:24.080
<v Speaker 1>According to NASA, the goal is to have a system

0:29:24.120 --> 0:29:27.320
<v Speaker 1>that will allow for communications on and around the Moon

0:29:27.720 --> 0:29:30.200
<v Speaker 1>in a way that's similar to how WiFi works here

0:29:30.240 --> 0:29:34.000
<v Speaker 1>on Earth. Now, I'm using vague language to describe this

0:29:34.560 --> 0:29:38.520
<v Speaker 1>because what NASA has done involves setting the goals of

0:29:38.560 --> 0:29:41.760
<v Speaker 1>what this system should be capable of doing, rather than

0:29:41.840 --> 0:29:44.920
<v Speaker 1>laying out the design of the system itself. And this

0:29:45.000 --> 0:29:48.160
<v Speaker 1>is because the agency has released a specification on what

0:29:48.240 --> 0:29:51.240
<v Speaker 1>the system should be able to do, and it's looking

0:29:51.280 --> 0:29:56.280
<v Speaker 1>to engage in technical discussions with various telecommunication and internet

0:29:56.640 --> 0:29:59.480
<v Speaker 1>experts in an effort to design a system that will

0:29:59.600 --> 0:30:02.600
<v Speaker 1>make those goals a reality. The system will need to

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:05.680
<v Speaker 1>take into account stuff that isn't necessarily as big a

0:30:05.720 --> 0:30:10.240
<v Speaker 1>concern here on Earth, like solar flare activity. So it

0:30:10.360 --> 0:30:15.160
<v Speaker 1>is possible for a particularly powerful solar flare to be

0:30:15.200 --> 0:30:18.160
<v Speaker 1>strong enough to affect electrical systems here on Earth and

0:30:18.200 --> 0:30:22.240
<v Speaker 1>to disrupt systems. It's it's like an electromagnetic pulse that

0:30:22.320 --> 0:30:24.800
<v Speaker 1>can wipe out things like a power grid if it

0:30:24.840 --> 0:30:28.120
<v Speaker 1>were really powerful and it hit Earth at just the

0:30:28.200 --> 0:30:33.080
<v Speaker 1>right time. But our magneto sphere and Earth's atmosphere protect

0:30:33.160 --> 0:30:36.080
<v Speaker 1>us quite a bit here on Earth. Out in space,

0:30:36.120 --> 0:30:39.720
<v Speaker 1>it's a different story. You don't necessarily have that protection,

0:30:39.840 --> 0:30:44.160
<v Speaker 1>So the system needs to be resilient. More importantly, the

0:30:44.240 --> 0:30:47.520
<v Speaker 1>system should be able to alert astronauts of an impending

0:30:47.720 --> 0:30:50.760
<v Speaker 1>solar flare ahead of time, and it gives them the

0:30:50.840 --> 0:30:53.720
<v Speaker 1>chance to prepare for that faster than they would if

0:30:53.760 --> 0:30:57.080
<v Speaker 1>the news first had to come from mission control on Earth,

0:30:57.520 --> 0:31:00.520
<v Speaker 1>and any delay at all can be disaster risks in

0:31:00.720 --> 0:31:05.040
<v Speaker 1>these sort of events. Assuming that lunar net all comes together,

0:31:05.200 --> 0:31:07.200
<v Speaker 1>the astronauts of the future will be able to use

0:31:07.200 --> 0:31:10.959
<v Speaker 1>the network to communicate with each other, just as some

0:31:10.960 --> 0:31:13.800
<v Speaker 1>some of the folks water around the Moon and others

0:31:13.880 --> 0:31:17.560
<v Speaker 1>remain in lunar orbit or beyond. It should also allow

0:31:17.640 --> 0:31:21.480
<v Speaker 1>astronauts to conduct more extensive operations on the Moon's surface,

0:31:22.000 --> 0:31:25.120
<v Speaker 1>using the network to aid in navigation so that they

0:31:25.120 --> 0:31:29.520
<v Speaker 1>can range further from home base and still return easily. Right,

0:31:29.680 --> 0:31:32.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, they don't get lost on the Moon's surface.

0:31:32.680 --> 0:31:34.960
<v Speaker 1>There's not a whole lot of landmarks that you can

0:31:35.000 --> 0:31:38.080
<v Speaker 1>look at besides things like craters and stuff. So the

0:31:38.120 --> 0:31:42.920
<v Speaker 1>idea is that this communication system will allow for more

0:31:44.080 --> 0:31:48.000
<v Speaker 1>robust and extensive lunar operations and that could help with

0:31:48.160 --> 0:31:50.880
<v Speaker 1>science that could help with establishing moon bases and that

0:31:50.960 --> 0:31:54.000
<v Speaker 1>sort of stuff in the future. So we will have

0:31:54.040 --> 0:31:57.000
<v Speaker 1>to wait and see how this unfolds. I think it's

0:31:57.000 --> 0:32:00.840
<v Speaker 1>pretty cool and um I look word to hearing about

0:32:00.840 --> 0:32:05.640
<v Speaker 1>the Looney Communications Network. All right, that is it for

0:32:05.720 --> 0:32:08.680
<v Speaker 1>the tech news I have for you today, Tuesday, October

0:32:08.760 --> 0:32:12.120
<v Speaker 1>ninety one. If you have suggestions for topics I should

0:32:12.120 --> 0:32:15.960
<v Speaker 1>cover in future episodes of tech Stuff, whether it's a technology,

0:32:16.160 --> 0:32:20.000
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0:32:20.320 --> 0:32:22.080
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0:32:22.120 --> 0:32:25.120
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0:32:25.320 --> 0:32:29.400
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0:32:34.880 --> 0:32:37.880
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