Speaker 1: On this episode of News World, how close are we
Speaker 1: to a crisis? With China and the Taiwan Straits. My
Speaker 1: guest today is doctor Waifong Zhong, Senior Advisor for the
Speaker 1: Office for Fiscal and Regulatory Analysis at the America First
Speaker 1: Policy Institute and an affiliate scholar at the Mercada Center
Speaker 1: at George Mason University. He leads the open source Policy
Speaker 1: Change Index PCI project, which uses artificial intelligence and machine
Speaker 1: learning to read large volumes of propaganda text to analyze
Speaker 1: and predict government's actions based on their words. Using PCI,
Speaker 1: doctor Jeong is out with a new paper entitled Predicting
Speaker 1: Taiwan's Straight Crisis using Propaganda, a new open source method.
Speaker 1: Pay Fong, welcome and thank you for joining me again
Speaker 1: on news World.
Speaker 2: Thank you, mister speaker for having me again.
Speaker 1: Before we get into China and Taiwan. I have to
Speaker 1: ask you, because I'm fascinated about the whole process. The
Speaker 1: system you've now built scans how many items a day?
Speaker 1: On average?
Speaker 3: We catch every news article that comes out of the
Speaker 3: Chinese propaganda machine, which by which I mean the People's Statey.
Speaker 3: Not only the people of Statey, the central newspaper, but
Speaker 3: also now many other provincial and ministerial newspapers from China,
Speaker 3: so we collect them every day.
Speaker 1: The system reached Chinese. Yes, do you also monitor Taiwan?
Speaker 3: We also just started monitoring new speed from Taiwan too.
Speaker 3: It takes two parties to take part in the conflict,
Speaker 3: which is a big part of why we are not
Speaker 3: expanding the data collection to Taiwan.
Speaker 1: When you're looking at all this material, how fast does
Speaker 1: your system analyze it?
Speaker 3: Well, we catch all these content as it comes out,
Speaker 3: and then we have in the back end a series
Speaker 3: of models that ingest these data into the algorithms, and
Speaker 3: then we do our calculations for different purposes. And for example,
Speaker 3: we monitor Chinese officials their rights and fall in the
Speaker 3: political fortune in Beijing. Oftentimes we catch ahead of time
Speaker 3: the fall of key officials when they got into trouble
Speaker 3: with the authorities. Which do you thinking that was showed
Speaker 3: up in propaganda too or included a rise sometimes you
Speaker 3: know you see black forces coming up in the scene
Speaker 3: in Beijing. And the same is true for monitoring Chinese
Speaker 3: attitude towards Hong Kong, Taiwan, the US on a number
Speaker 3: of issues.
Speaker 1: Given this kind of quantitative analysis, are you sort of
Speaker 1: looking for word patterns or what are you looking for?
Speaker 3: The most important thing we look for is anomalies, things
Speaker 3: that deviate from the trend or the baseline. And this
Speaker 3: is very unique when it comes to analyzing authoritarian regimes
Speaker 3: propaganda because we are not really talking about news, the
Speaker 3: real fake news, which is propaganda coming out from regimes
Speaker 3: like the Russians and Chinese. And with these regimes, we
Speaker 3: should not think of their let's say, their newspaper or
Speaker 3: their radio broadcast as facts. We should think of them
Speaker 3: as the regime's attitude. So what's really important is to
Speaker 3: measure to catch the moment these attitude changes, because oftentimes
Speaker 3: indicate the intentions, Beijing's intention, mascots, intentions, and intention.
Speaker 1: From that standpoint, how should Americans understand the Chinese Communist
Speaker 1: parties view of Taiwan.
Speaker 3: A good analogy to make it actually to look at
Speaker 3: the CCP's attitude toward the student protesters going back to
Speaker 3: nineteen eighty nine, the Tmn' Square protests, and that's an
Speaker 3: excellent example. I mean, it's a tragedy, but it's also
Speaker 3: a very good example to understand how propaganda operates. Because initially,
Speaker 3: when the students were protesting in Beijing. They were advocating
Speaker 3: for a more open government, open society to some extent,
Speaker 3: beaging knowledge that they said, these people they came on
Speaker 3: with good intention, the protesters, demonstrators, and they all have
Speaker 3: a hope for a better future for the country. But
Speaker 3: then when things got out of hand, it's actually necessary,
Speaker 3: tragically necessary for the regime to change how they describe
Speaker 3: these students, they would say, because if they're good people,
Speaker 3: you can't crack down, you can't send in troops to
Speaker 3: kill them, right, and so they had to become in
Speaker 3: some sense, in the propaganda sense bad people. We saw
Speaker 3: in nineteen eighty nine. Looking back is that the propaganda
Speaker 3: dramatically changed how they describe these students. At the end,
Speaker 3: they became like morons in the newspaper, and that's needed
Speaker 3: before they could actually send in troops. The same logic
Speaker 3: holds here when it comes to the Chinese stitude toward Taiwan,
Speaker 3: because the ordinary Chinese people, they don't really hate the
Speaker 3: people in Taiwan, but war or conflicts connectic. Conflict requires
Speaker 3: negative sentiment, requires popular support for the regime to you know,
Speaker 3: send missiles over. And so this is exactly what we're
Speaker 3: monitoring is how the regime if at any point trying
Speaker 3: to move the public attitude to the negative side toward Taiwan,
Speaker 3: which is something that happened very significantly in nineteen ninety
Speaker 3: five to nineteen ninety six for the last Taiwan stract crisis.
Speaker 3: I know, mister speaker, you had some personal connection to
Speaker 3: this episode, because I know you went to Taiwan the
Speaker 3: year after.
Speaker 2: Is that nineteen ninety seven.
Speaker 1: I think it was in ninety seven, But in ninety
Speaker 1: six I was on TV saying that President Clinton was
Speaker 1: right to send a second aircraft carrier into the streets
Speaker 1: and that we were sending a clear signal to Beijing
Speaker 1: that in fact, we would fight if they tried to
Speaker 1: invade Taiwan. When I visited, it was a fascinating experience.
Speaker 1: But as you look at the data sets you're getting
Speaker 1: what can you tell? For example, the military leaders are
Speaker 1: making predictions, and it seems to me that at times
Speaker 1: they're predicted that oh this is Chinese commiss military leaders
Speaker 1: their predictions would imply some kind of combat in the
Speaker 1: not very distant future.
Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely right, mister speaker. But the same is true
Speaker 3: for American military leaders too. They're all sorts of estimates,
Speaker 3: bry predictions about when something like it would happen some
Speaker 3: set twenty twenty four.
Speaker 2: Luckily that has passed. Now a lot of eyes are
Speaker 2: on twenty twenty seven, twenty twenty nine.
Speaker 3: I think the Chinese witterer leaders did the saying, but
Speaker 3: I think a lot of these military assessments they focus
Speaker 3: more on the capabilities, like when China has the capability
Speaker 3: to overtake Taiwan, but that depends on how much interference
Speaker 3: we see from other parties such as the US, the
Speaker 3: rest of the Western.
Speaker 2: World, and maybe Japan.
Speaker 3: So all these are important variables to the capability portion.
Speaker 3: But I think from again the data, we see more
Speaker 3: of them.
Speaker 1: Do you see the Chinese communists that are showing up
Speaker 1: in your data sets becoming more bella coost and more
Speaker 1: leaning towards a military operation, Not.
Speaker 2: In a very recent month.
Speaker 3: So we developed this AI algorithm to learn from what
Speaker 3: happened back in nineteen ninety six, arguably the most intensive
Speaker 3: crisis in recent times, and then we use what we
Speaker 3: learned from that episode to monitor subsequently former Speaker Pelosi's
Speaker 3: visit to Taiwan a couple of years ago, as well
Speaker 3: as the meeting between the Taiwanese president and former Speaker
Speaker 3: Kevin McCarthy. What appears to be the pattern now is
Speaker 3: that there are strong reactions. I think when how he
Speaker 3: placed US officials visit Taiwan a meet with the Taiwanese leaders.
Speaker 3: But the magnitude has decreased.
Speaker 1: It's almost like what was initially a crisis has now
Speaker 1: begun to be They grumble, but it's now sort of
Speaker 1: normal to have visits. I remember originally, boy, it was
Speaker 1: like a giant crisis. Even to land in San Francisco
Speaker 1: or Los Angeles was a huge deal. Analysis kind of
Speaker 1: background grumbling.
Speaker 3: Right, if you compare from speaker to speaker, right from you,
Speaker 3: mister speaker to Speaker Pelosi, speaker of MC coffee, the
Speaker 3: magnitude of reactions from Beijing has declined, which actually shows
Speaker 3: a lot of value of demonstrating American strength in this situation.
Speaker 3: When we show strength, Beijing will think twice about how
Speaker 3: aggressive they want to be. And that's really the purpose.
Speaker 3: I image of your visit to Taiwan too.
Speaker 2: Back in the days.
Speaker 1: You've developed this large language model. Does it actually report
Speaker 1: back to you in Chinese or does it translated into English.
Speaker 3: It reports back to me in Chinese, which is where
Speaker 3: my human intelligence comes in, is that I would interpret
Speaker 3: that in ingresh writing to our audience as our readers.
Speaker 3: But the machine is clellly operating in the Chinese language,
Speaker 3: not only Chinese language, actually the Chinese culture and Chinese
Speaker 3: way of news reporting in the system. Because that's alway
Speaker 3: ingesting to the model.
Speaker 1: As an amateur, did I read about the idea that
Speaker 1: when you have an artificial intelligence model like yours, it
Speaker 1: then has to go through a pret being trained.
Speaker 2: What does that mean?
Speaker 3: Let's start with what's called large language models, which is
Speaker 3: basically models built on every word ever other on the Internet,
Speaker 3: possibly the big companies they can possibly find right which
Speaker 3: include Chinese language. But that gigantic lake up data, if
Speaker 3: you will, it's not particularly helpful when it comes to China,
Speaker 3: for example, of China versus Taiwan, because it's a very
Speaker 3: specific context.
Speaker 2: So the training in.
Speaker 3: This case means if you just ask a question to
Speaker 3: the AI in Chinese, it would respond to you, but
Speaker 3: it will be based on the vast number of Chinese
Speaker 3: language material on the Internet, which included Chinese language that
Speaker 3: were data spoken on the US Internet. Because they are
Speaker 3: Chinese immigrants here, but their Chinese language content is very
Speaker 3: different from Chinese language content coming out from the CCP.
Speaker 3: In our case, when we do these projects, training means
Speaker 3: to steer the AI to focus more on content in
Speaker 3: the propaganda coming up on the propaganda system, So pay
Speaker 3: more attention to those and ignore whoever you know Chinese
Speaker 3: immigrants in San Francisco are talking about in blogs.
Speaker 2: So that's not really rather than to the question at hand.
Speaker 1: So, as I understand it, as you were developing this,
Speaker 1: you actually were training it using the people's daily articles
Speaker 1: during the nineteen ninety five Taiwan Straight Crisis, which led
Speaker 1: to military escalation by China, Taiwan and the US. I'm
Speaker 1: curious as you went through that assessment, did you learn anything.
Speaker 1: Did you see the nineteen ninety five crisis any differently
Speaker 1: after you got the report back from the machine.
Speaker 3: I think what surprised me the most after seeing what
Speaker 3: the machine returns is how much the road the US
Speaker 3: plays in the escalation in the whole crisis. Fundamentally, Taiwan
Speaker 3: is an issue of reunifying with Taiwan is almost a
Speaker 3: requirement for the CCP region. So that in our assessment
Speaker 3: remains the number one most important factor, but the number
Speaker 3: two most important factor was the Chinese attitude toward the
Speaker 3: United States, and that changed drastically during the crisis too.
Speaker 2: So it's not really an issue.
Speaker 3: Taiwan is not really an issue just between the mainland
Speaker 3: China and Taiwan. It's how the Beijing preceved strength of
Speaker 3: the West, which goes back to the point of when
Speaker 3: we demonstrate strength, Beijing's reaction to these, even just bilateral
Speaker 3: visits between the US and Taiwan less and less significantly
Speaker 3: over the years in recent years, I think that should
Speaker 3: be counted as an achievement of our foreign policy rather
Speaker 3: than weakness in any sense.
Speaker 1: So, in a sense, a little bit less Bella Coost,
Speaker 1: a little bit less on the edge of war than
Speaker 1: they were in ninety five ninety six.
Speaker 3: Yeah, if we're just comparing from like a sets from
Speaker 3: speaker to the speaker in the last few episodes, it
Speaker 3: seems to be the case. But I also wonder it's
Speaker 3: hard to distinguish is to what extent the weakness now
Speaker 3: in Beijin comes from the weakness of the Chinese economy
Speaker 3: or the Chinese development stage, so to speak, which really
Speaker 3: has been having a really hard time in the last
Speaker 3: few years too. So the difference between Colosi and mccaffee,
Speaker 3: for example, could be to some extent due to the
Speaker 3: weakness of the Chinese economy that's trending down since the
Speaker 3: COVID lockdown was lifted in much of China.
Speaker 1: The process that we're in the middle of right now,
Speaker 1: Jiji panclearly has faced with. Even before Trump and the Terrified,
Speaker 1: the Chinese economy was in significant trouble, both because the
Speaker 1: one child policy has now led to a dramatic decline
Speaker 1: in the workforce, because they had overbuilt entire towns, not
Speaker 1: just overbuilt buildings, but entire towns. They had over extended
Speaker 1: themselves in terms of internal lending. That could either lead
Speaker 1: him to be more aggressive so people would pay attention
Speaker 1: to and rally around nationalism, or he could lead them
Speaker 1: to be more cautious because he would feel like he
Speaker 1: doesn't have a stable and solid a base. What's your
Speaker 1: handsh of how those two way out well.
Speaker 3: I think in the end, an actual kinetic conflict or
Speaker 3: even an invasion would have to be an outcome of
Speaker 3: two things. One is the Beijing's strength internally, because that
Speaker 3: has to deal with capabilities. But the other intention how
Speaker 3: desperate Shei Jimpin is in overtaking Taiwan.
Speaker 2: Every time I think.
Speaker 3: About this, I go back to the notion of legacy.
Speaker 3: Political legacy a lot in the Chinese context. If you
Speaker 3: compare Cjimpin with his predecessors, including those you met mister
Speaker 3: speaker in Beijing, Jian Jamin and his supportinates at the time.
Speaker 3: So if you compare for something from Janjumin to Hu
Speaker 3: Jintao to announce C. Jimpin, you could name a few
Speaker 3: things as great as a achievements by Janatamine for example,
Speaker 3: right leading China into the wto taking back Hong Kong
Speaker 3: and Macau holding the Beijing Olympics to some extent that
Speaker 3: went to Puljintail as well. But if you think about
Speaker 3: cj he really didn't have much achievements so far. It's
Speaker 3: running the economy down to the ditch and many other
Speaker 3: things down to the ditch too, And so one argument
Speaker 3: to be made is that he is desperate in looking
Speaker 3: for achievements, particularly when his next five year term comes up,
Speaker 3: which is twenty twenty seven. I think that has a
Speaker 3: lot to do with other assessment about why the timeline
Speaker 3: has to be twenty twenty seven, because by twenty twenty
Speaker 3: seven he will be seeking another run, right, And even
Speaker 3: though China does not have democracy, popular support still matters
Speaker 3: to him, and the lack of it matters even more.
Speaker 3: And so one could make the argument that taking back
Speaker 3: Taiwan in the timely manner would matter a lot to
Speaker 3: his political legacy, because so far he has none. So
Speaker 3: that's I think a major factor. But of course he's
Speaker 3: not going to be able to do that if the
Speaker 3: Chinese military power and economic power continue to decline, which
Speaker 3: is why I think it's very important to continue to
Speaker 3: monitor the situation that weighing these two factors over the
Speaker 3: next few years to see which one comes out dominant.
Speaker 1: Do you see in that sense as being almost like
Speaker 1: an American politician in that he wants a way out
Speaker 1: which gives him dignity and makes him important, but he
Speaker 1: may not want to risk the destruction of the regime
Speaker 1: in order to get there.
Speaker 3: Absolutely, I think in the end, as we always say, right,
Speaker 3: foreign policy fundamentally is domestic policy, and domestic policy fundamentally
Speaker 3: is about the legacy or legitimacy. Right in a normal
Speaker 3: democratic country, legacy takes a form of having more votes
Speaker 3: right in the next election and more support for the
Speaker 3: party if you do well.
Speaker 2: But in China, I think the bar is much lower.
Speaker 3: But if the legacy is low enough, it might tricker
Speaker 3: a lot of opposite even from within the leads.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 3: We have seen that actually during the COVID lockdown period
Speaker 3: when people couldn't stand it, you know, we see university
Speaker 3: students coming out to protest too, and that makes people
Speaker 3: think again to look back to find a similarity to
Speaker 3: for example, student protesters in km and Square. So all
Speaker 3: these are very unpleasant images for the CCP.
Speaker 1: One of the things that you came up with that
Speaker 1: I was surprised by is that your analysis of mass
Speaker 1: scale of information shows a real decline in reporting about
Speaker 1: the outside world by the People's Daily that is just
Speaker 1: less and less important than the story. What do you
Speaker 1: think is going on?
Speaker 3: We actually just publish a journal article about this journal
Speaker 3: of Contemporary China, where we actually track how the CCP
Speaker 3: mentions all the different countries including Taiwan, the US and
Speaker 3: everywhere else, versus any content that's purely domestic.
Speaker 2: So the CCP's.
Speaker 3: Vision, I think, in the last almost twenty years now
Speaker 3: has increasingly narrowed, so their eyes are more on domestic
Speaker 3: issues less on the outside world. Initially, I think that's
Speaker 3: because the trading with a lot of outside world, engaging
Speaker 3: with a lot of outside world becomes less critical, Like,
Speaker 3: for example, they used to emphasize Europe a lot, but
Speaker 3: not right now. I think CCP doesn't think Europe is
Speaker 3: relevant because Europe has been in some sort of decline,
Speaker 3: right But in later years, even the attention to the
Speaker 3: US has declined, and I think that it's not really
Speaker 3: an indication of the America in decline, is in indication
Speaker 3: that Hijinpin himself is more and more narrow minded. And
Speaker 3: I think that's a very dangerous situation to be in
Speaker 3: because when you don't even report to the outside world,
Speaker 3: not to say the reporting is accurate, but when you
Speaker 3: report even to a lesser extent, it makes.
Speaker 2: All the elites in the society.
Speaker 3: And everyone else in China more nearrow minded, because that's
Speaker 3: the only source already right to the outside world, and
Speaker 3: even that is not covering a lot.
Speaker 1: It seems to me like they're beginning to move more
Speaker 1: and more inwardly oriented and less or less aggressively trying
Speaker 1: to become a worldwide power because there just have too
Speaker 1: many domestic problems. I mean, does that seem accurate to
Speaker 1: you to.
Speaker 2: A large extent.
Speaker 3: That's not the same to say China's actual activities in
Speaker 3: terms of engaging with the outside world are necessarily in decline.
Speaker 2: We have seen the continued effort to boost.
Speaker 3: Up the Baton Road initiatives for example, right China is
Speaker 3: still trying to forge all these collaborations with the Baton
Speaker 3: Road countries in Asia, in Africa, in South America. But
Speaker 3: the way they approach that this projects has also changed.
Speaker 3: In the past they emphasized more on economic development, but
Speaker 3: now they emphasize more integrating them into the Chinese values
Speaker 3: because they come up with this value system that they
Speaker 3: basically try to turn all these other countries to the
Speaker 3: same way of thinking as the CCP has engaging. So
Speaker 3: that's a narrow minded vision, not necessarily a narrow minded activity.
Speaker 1: It's always struck me that they're so good at running
Speaker 1: into totalitarian system and they've developed all of these cameras
Speaker 1: and facial recognition and massive ability to track a billion
Speaker 1: people that if I were a local dictator, I might
Speaker 1: like to have the Chinese come and show me how
Speaker 1: to make sure that I'm totally secure, and in that sense,
Speaker 1: they may have something to offer that we don't have.
Speaker 3: Well, actually, the Chinese have offered that it's a speaker
Speaker 3: to a lot of developing countries.
Speaker 2: The Chinese technologies had.
Speaker 3: Over the years power to many surveillance systems in African countries,
Speaker 3: and some of these episodes have come up in the
Speaker 3: news reporting on how they helped these non democratic regions
Speaker 3: to monitor their own people. Which is why I think
Speaker 3: in the US is really a justified concern on a
Speaker 3: lot of technologies we have here because they could potentially
Speaker 3: and some did, provide the capabilities for beaging to monitor us.
Speaker 2: And we'll talk about Hawwei. We're talking about TikTok.
Speaker 1: TikTok's a perfect example Huawei, which is one of the
Speaker 1: major failures I had in the first Trump administration. I
Speaker 1: kept trying to warn them that Huawei is very dangerous
Speaker 1: and very powerful and currently very successful worldwide. It provides
Speaker 1: access for the Chinese communist that is I think very sobering.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, and I think there are two layers of the
Speaker 2: dangers here.
Speaker 3: TikTok is a speaker, it's one the proper ganda through content,
Speaker 3: so to create a pro China content right to try
Speaker 3: to influence online. But HAWA is a vulnerability where information
Speaker 3: itself could be tapped into by the CCP, and we
Speaker 3: actually have that with TikTok too, because the way TikTok
Speaker 3: collects information is down to your fingertip, like how you
Speaker 3: scroll on your screen and how you select content. And
Speaker 3: in my opinion, it's actually very damaging in the longer
Speaker 3: term because when apps are able to monitor our behavior,
Speaker 3: it would be able to learn our preferences to how
Speaker 3: we think about things, or how American voters think about
Speaker 3: different niches, and knowing that it's incredibly valuable because that's
Speaker 3: a huge intelligence.
Speaker 2: It has a huge value on intelligence.
Speaker 1: I buy a lot of books on Amazon, and it
Speaker 1: now in two it's what I might be interested in
Speaker 1: based on my behavior. So the giantic system that Amazon
Speaker 1: has is sort of studying me and figuring out what
Speaker 1: to offer me in a way that is on the
Speaker 1: one hand, is very practical and very helpful. On the
Speaker 1: other end, and it's a little scary.
Speaker 3: It's actually very scary. Even Amazon could potentially learn your schedule,
Speaker 3: mister speaker, like when you would scroll on the app
Speaker 3: to shop they would figure out your sleep patterns, you
Speaker 3: know when you couldn't sleep in the middle of the
Speaker 3: night and you're trying to buy some gadget on Amazon.
Speaker 3: Now imagine all that that every company in the world
Speaker 3: is doing that. But imagine a world where every company
Speaker 3: submits that information to the CCP. That's their vision of governance,
Speaker 3: the global governance, and we should try very hard to
Speaker 3: prevent that from happening.
Speaker 1: So do you think you'll extend this new methodology to
Speaker 1: looking at other countries?
Speaker 2: We have.
Speaker 3: Last year we put out an algorithm that monitors came
Speaker 3: young to North Korea, So we have gathered the North
Speaker 3: Korean content and we made the similar algorithm to detect
Speaker 3: whether kingdom or is thinking differently.
Speaker 1: Given how closed the dictatorship is. Is that very revealing
Speaker 1: doing it that way? I mean, do you pick up
Speaker 1: queues and indications?
Speaker 2: Yeah?
Speaker 3: I wasn't sure when I started the project, but it
Speaker 3: performs surprisingly well. For example, we picked up signs of
Speaker 3: significant nuclear weapon tests shortly before in some ways that
Speaker 3: you somehow just changed the tone anten on their front page.
Speaker 2: So that model we did was as off last year.
Speaker 3: So this year we're going to random the model live
Speaker 3: in the sense that we'll be like getting the content
Speaker 3: from opinion every day and updating the algorithm every day.
Speaker 2: So that's one of our next projects too.
Speaker 1: Ye when you're doing some fascinating stuff, and I hope
Speaker 1: maybe an ear we can come back and you'll read
Speaker 1: us into all the different things you're learning, because you've
Speaker 1: found a way to really have a big impact.
Speaker 3: I think thank you, mister Seeker for saying that I'd
Speaker 3: love to come back. Also, let me clarify the AI
Speaker 3: is doing most of the work now, it's no longer me,
Speaker 3: which is a very reassuring development.
Speaker 1: I am personally happy to still believe that the human
Speaker 1: had a role in this thing. Makes me feel better.
Speaker 1: Waite Fun, I want to thank you for joining me
Speaker 1: and helping us better understand both your system, which is amazing,
Speaker 1: and how to analyze and think about China's plans for
Speaker 1: the Taiwan Straits. Our listeners can follow your work by
Speaker 1: visiting the America First Policy Institute's website at America First
Speaker 1: Policy dot com. And it's really been very enlightening and
Speaker 1: I really appreciate you visiting us again.
Speaker 2: Thanks again for having me Missless speak here.
Speaker 1: Thank you to my guest doctor Waifong Zhong. You can
Speaker 1: read his new paper predicting Taiwan's straight crisis using propaganda,
Speaker 1: a new open source method on our show page at
Speaker 1: newtsworld dot com. Newtworld is produced by Ganglish three sixty
Speaker 1: and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guernsey Sloman. Our researcher
Speaker 1: is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was created
Speaker 1: by Steve Penley. Special thanks the team at Gangwish three sixty.
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