Speaker 1: Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine came as a shock
Speaker 1: to people around the world, but historically speaking, it's nothing new.
Speaker 1: Under Soviet leadership and now Vladimir Putin, Russia has frequently
Speaker 1: terrorized and invaded sovereign states, violently attempting to force its
Speaker 1: will on neighboring countries and countries all over the world.
Speaker 1: On this special edition of Hold the Line will take
Speaker 1: a look at Russia's history of aggression from Afghanistan to Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Welcome to the special edition of Hold the Line. I'm
Speaker 1: Buck Sexton. Look, the Russians are not new to military incursion,
Speaker 1: invasion of other sovereign countries. We understand that this is
Speaker 1: something they've done numerous times. They've gone into Georgia, They've
Speaker 1: already taken Crimea and much of the Donbass region of
Speaker 1: eastern Ukraine. They've also had a military intervention in Syria
Speaker 1: on behalf of the Assad regime. They've gone into Afghanistan
Speaker 1: back in the end of the Soviet era as well.
Speaker 1: You'd think they might have learned a very painful and
Speaker 1: high casualty lesson from that, but it turns out their
Speaker 1: imperial ambitions continued even after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Speaker 1: Let's take a look at current NATO nations and Russia
Speaker 1: to get a sense of where we stand here. As
Speaker 1: you can see, Russia still views itself as under threat
Speaker 1: from NATO and therefore wants to expand territorially and also
Speaker 1: in terms of its military and economic influence in ways
Speaker 1: to counter what's happening here. Counter the NATO alliance that
Speaker 1: is arrayed was arrayed against the Soviet Union. Back in February,
Speaker 1: Putin gave a speech in which he talked about the
Speaker 1: current situation that's underway here. He said, for thirty years,
Speaker 1: we have persistently and patiently tried to reach an agreement
Speaker 1: with the leading natokas the principles of equal and inviolable
Speaker 1: security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we constantly
Speaker 1: face either cynical deception and lies, or attempts to pressure
Speaker 1: and blackmail. While NATO, despite all our protests and concerns,
Speaker 1: continues to steadily expand. The war machine is moving and
Speaker 1: I repeat, is coming close to our borders. So here's
Speaker 1: Putin trying to explain that he viewsed this, believe it
Speaker 1: or not. He views offensive measures such as what we're
Speaker 1: seeing right now in Ukraine with the war there, but
Speaker 1: also previous offensive measures, whether it's taking the Crimea and
Speaker 1: the Dawn Boss region, the separatist area of Eastern Ukraine,
Speaker 1: Russian backed separatism of course, and also South Ossetia and
Speaker 1: Abkhazia in Georgia. He views all of those maneuvers as
Speaker 1: defensive in nature because they are against the NATO alliance.
Speaker 1: So this is also how he justifies military incursion military
Speaker 1: aggression against countries with which he is not at war.
Speaker 1: Putin is claiming and has claimed, including in his speech
Speaker 1: in February, that the West took Ukraine hostage. What is
Speaker 1: happening today, he said, does not come out of a
Speaker 1: desire to infringe on the interests of Ukraine and the
Speaker 1: Ukrainian people. It is related to the protection of Russia
Speaker 1: itself from those who took Ukraine hostage and are trying
Speaker 1: to use it against our country and its people. This
Speaker 1: is fashionating. This is quite a reversal, isn't it. Here
Speaker 1: you have someone who has engaged in multiple acts of
Speaker 1: aggression against military aggression against neighboring countries and does send
Speaker 1: troops around the world when he decides as necessary, including
Speaker 1: to Syria, in order to expand Russian influence at the
Speaker 1: expense of other countries in the region, at the expense
Speaker 1: of movements determined to either out's dictators or achieved freedom,
Speaker 1: or any number of things. He thinks that whether it's
Speaker 1: the incursion into Czechnia, which the Russians engaged in under
Speaker 1: Putin's Putin's leadership, or the various Russian incursions into neighboring
Speaker 1: territory Georgia and Ukraine, most notably, that this is fine,
Speaker 1: that this is actually defensive in nature, because Russia has
Speaker 1: to stand up for itself and its allies. Quite a
Speaker 1: an experience of reverse psychology here. Putin, By the way,
Speaker 1: I also told the West not to intervene in Ukraine,
Speaker 1: and said to anyone who would consider interfering from the outside,
Speaker 1: if you do, you will face consequences greater than any
Speaker 1: you have faced in history. All the relevant decisions have
Speaker 1: been taken. I hope you hear me. I mean he
Speaker 1: is threatening, certainly major military reprisals against any Western country
Speaker 1: that would try to stop this madness in Ukraine. But
Speaker 1: also in the background, many say he's essentially brandishing his
Speaker 1: nuclear arsenal in order to back up the military aggression
Speaker 1: that he has engaged in in Ukraine. Where is all
Speaker 1: of this heading. Well, we've certainly seen that Russia has
Speaker 1: used previous invasions as a testing ground for both tactics
Speaker 1: and the response from NATO and the West and the
Speaker 1: international community. So what can we learn from those previous
Speaker 1: military military decisions that Russia has made to go into
Speaker 1: foreign countries? Does that give us some template, some insight
Speaker 1: into where this conflict in Ukraine is headed. That's what
Speaker 1: we're going to address tonight in this special We've got
Speaker 1: a great lineup of experts to give us insight into
Speaker 1: Russia's aggressive military policies. Coming up. It was called the
Speaker 1: Soviet Union's Vietnam Moscow's nineteen seventy nine invasion of Afghanistan
Speaker 1: was devastating and devastating for the Afghan people, but it
Speaker 1: might also have been the final nail in the coffin
Speaker 1: of the Soviet Empire. What do we learn from this?
Speaker 1: Stay with us. On December twenty fourth, nineteen seventy nine,
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. That invasion kicked off a
Speaker 1: brutal decade of warfare that would ultimately call as many
Speaker 1: as two million lives. According to some estimates, conflict would
Speaker 1: also mark the last major military operation of the Soviet Union,
Speaker 1: which felt less than three years after the war ended.
Speaker 1: During Now for a closer look at the Soviet invasion
Speaker 1: of Afghanistan, as the director of the Heritage Foundation Center
Speaker 1: from National Defense, retired Army Lieutenant General Tom Sport. Tom,
Speaker 1: thanks for being with us, Thanks for having me, bug. Okay,
Speaker 1: So let's just understand first what was the decision making process,
Speaker 1: and given what we're seeing right now with Putin in Ukraine,
Speaker 1: might be helpful understand the calculations at the time of
Speaker 1: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, what led up to what
Speaker 1: were they trying to achieve? Yeah, and so Afghanistan had
Speaker 1: had a Marxist communist puppet regime if you will, for
Speaker 1: a couple of years prior to their invasion, but that
Speaker 1: regime was kind of under pressure from the Islamist in
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and they were actually losing that war. And so
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union under that Secretary Braznev starting to get
Speaker 1: the sense that Afghanistan was going to collapse. And was
Speaker 1: that that reading of what was going on in Afghanistan
Speaker 1: that ultimately caused them to choose to intervene in Afghanistan?
Speaker 1: How did it go in the early phase as the
Speaker 1: Soviets ramped up military operations there against the Afghan resistance,
Speaker 1: they clearly had air superiority. I mean, how did the
Speaker 1: military operations look in the early phase of what turned
Speaker 1: into a decade long war. Yeah, the Soviets had initially
Speaker 1: a great success. I guess you would say they dropped
Speaker 1: airborne troops right into the capital Kabul. They were successful
Speaker 1: and finding the guy that was acting as president at
Speaker 1: the time and essentially neutralizing him, taking the reins of power,
Speaker 1: and then capturing the major cities of Afghanistan. So you
Speaker 1: think Kandahar and others, those fell relatively quickly to the Soviets,
Speaker 1: unlike you know what we are seeing in the Ukraine today.
Speaker 1: And so I think you'd have to say that the
Speaker 1: first few months the Soviets had to been happy with
Speaker 1: how things went. Now, what were some of the changing
Speaker 1: the tipping points, if you will, or some of the
Speaker 1: momentum shifts that occurred with the Mujahadeen And why was
Speaker 1: it that the course of this conflict sort of to
Speaker 1: turn against the Soviets. Yeah, the Mushadean even before the
Speaker 1: Soviets got there were a powerful fighting force. That's you know,
Speaker 1: that is what they do, that's their history. And so
Speaker 1: they were never a cohesive one group of Muhadeen. They
Speaker 1: were multiple war lords, but they kind of coalesced, and frankly,
Speaker 1: the Soviet invasion of their country really kind of made
Speaker 1: them have a common enemy that they all gathered around.
Speaker 1: And there were at least eighty eight hundred different Muhahadeen
Speaker 1: bases that they worked out of the support of multiple nations,
Speaker 1: including the United States, the UK, Pakistan, and surprisingly enough
Speaker 1: even at the time, China helped keep the Muhadeen supplied
Speaker 1: and they became over time a more and more effective force,
Speaker 1: employing famously Stinger missiles to bring down Soviet hind helicopters
Speaker 1: and the like. So the changing of the advantage that
Speaker 1: the Soviets had from the air specifically, that was I mean,
Speaker 1: this is known to most people as it's depicted in
Speaker 1: the movie Charlie Wilson's War, right that that was actually
Speaker 1: a major tactical shift then away from the complete air
Speaker 1: dominance superiority of the Soviets had had because of those Stingers. Yeah,
Speaker 1: that and plus the Muhadeen really controlled the countryside. So
Speaker 1: the Soviets kept and held the major cities, they really
Speaker 1: never lost any of them to the Muchadeen. But the countryside,
Speaker 1: the roads, the connecting roads, those are really under the
Speaker 1: Muhadein's control. And so in a situation like that, you
Speaker 1: can never really consolidate power if you only can venture
Speaker 1: out of the city's in limited situations. So there was
Speaker 1: almost from the start the Soviets were in trouble in
Speaker 1: that invasion. What was the political calculation like for the
Speaker 1: Soviets towards towards the end of it too, It was
Speaker 1: it just purely casualties in a sense that the military
Speaker 1: wasn't going to accomplish the mission of installing a communist
Speaker 1: puppet regime in Cobble. I mean, what brought about the
Speaker 1: end of the conflict, Yeah, a realization that they were
Speaker 1: not winning. They were just it was just a stalemate.
Speaker 1: They had a change of leadership. Corbetchov came in, you know,
Speaker 1: widely viewed as a reformist kind of leader for the
Speaker 1: Soviet Union. He could see that they were spending billions
Speaker 1: of rubles, had spent thousands of lives, and really had
Speaker 1: nothing to show for it, and so like in other areas,
Speaker 1: Corbetchov decided to reduce their losses in that area and
Speaker 1: started the withdrawal, I want to say, in around nineteen
Speaker 1: eighty seven and it ended in nineteen eighty nine. Did
Speaker 1: you give us a sense of the kind of suppression
Speaker 1: tactics and the level of brutality that the Soviets willing
Speaker 1: to engage into in military parliamce perhaps pacify to two
Speaker 1: oppress the resistance in Afghanistan? We know there was a
Speaker 1: very high civilian casualty account. What were the tactics that
Speaker 1: the Soviets used, What kind of of tactics and maneuvers
Speaker 1: were they deploying? And the Soviets used what are widely
Speaker 1: recognized as war crimes to kind of suppress the Afghans.
Speaker 1: So they slaughtered entire villages that had, you know, had
Speaker 1: the temerity to fight back against the Soviets. They raped
Speaker 1: the women of Afghanistan, they killed millions of Afghans, bombed schools, churches, hospitals,
Speaker 1: and so really the sky is the limit when you
Speaker 1: when you want to think about what went on in
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and what they did to the poor people of
Speaker 1: that country. Still unable to break the back of the
Speaker 1: resistance though, as we know, and the Soviets had an
Speaker 1: ignominious withdrawal at the end of this. Some say that
Speaker 1: the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, if not triggered by,
Speaker 1: was hastened at least by this failed war, this failed
Speaker 1: military invasion of Afghanistan. What do you say to that.
Speaker 1: I think that's very true. And so, you know, we
Speaker 1: think about the big moments, you know, Ronald Reagan saying,
Speaker 1: mister Gorbachev, tear this wall down, and we think about
Speaker 1: the Star Wars initiative. I think you have to put
Speaker 1: the war in Afghanistan and their failure there and all
Speaker 1: the millions of dollars of rubles they spent there that
Speaker 1: really I think helped to bring down that evil regime.
Speaker 1: And as we look today at the situation in Ukraine,
Speaker 1: do you feel that there are lessons learned from the
Speaker 1: international community and from the Western Powers about what happened
Speaker 1: to the Soviets in Afghanistan and what should be applied
Speaker 1: now to Ukraine. Yeah, I think there's a lot of lessons.
Speaker 1: There's a lot of similarities, I mean, and there's a
Speaker 1: lot of differences to the Soviets thought they were going
Speaker 1: to have great I think initial success in the Ukraine
Speaker 1: and underestimated the resistance there. And you can see the
Speaker 1: same thing playing out again in the Ukraine now, and
Speaker 1: so I think that it's hard for the Ukrainian people.
Speaker 1: I think making a difference. We can't see it now
Speaker 1: because we're so close to the conflict. Now, as we
Speaker 1: zoom back and as we see this maybe from a
Speaker 1: little bit more distance, I think we're going to see
Speaker 1: that their bravery is going to make a huge difference. Tenant, Colonel,
Speaker 1: thanks so much for being with us. We appreciate it, sir,
Speaker 1: Thank you, sir. In nineteen ninety two, a small territory
Speaker 1: known as chechney And declared its independence from the Russian Federation,
Speaker 1: a move that would lead to two brutal wars with
Speaker 1: Russia and cost thousands of lives. When we come back,
Speaker 1: Jim Brooke of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Speaker 1: joins us to give his insight into the Chechen Wars.
Speaker 1: Stay with us. A year after the fall of a
Speaker 1: Soviet Union, Chechen, a small territory in Russia's southwestern region,
Speaker 1: declared independence from the Russian Federation. Unlike other republics. At
Speaker 1: the time, Chechny's independence was rejected by Moscow and would
Speaker 1: spark two wars. Of the course of the next decade
Speaker 1: and a half. Chechen separatists waged a brutal guerrilla war
Speaker 1: against Russian forces, and the wars would ultimately cost tens
Speaker 1: of thousands of Russian and Chechen lives. Join me now
Speaker 1: is Russia Ukraine. Fellow at the Foundation for Defensive Democracies
Speaker 1: and former Moscow bureau chief for Bloomberg Jim Brook. Jim,
Speaker 1: thanks for being with us. Thank you so, John. Let's
Speaker 1: start with the first Chechen War, which started in nineteen
Speaker 1: ninety four. What's the background on this and why, for example,
Speaker 1: wouldn't the Russians after the fall of the Soviet Union
Speaker 1: allow cheching us a seed like other territories. Head well,
Speaker 1: Chession is an overwhelmingly Muslim population, a long history of
Speaker 1: mountain guerrillas, fierce fighters, and the Russians are afraid of
Speaker 1: letting Chessnion go because there's a whole swath in Russia.
Speaker 1: It could cut the country and a half that is
Speaker 1: Muslim tartistown, but shorts a stand some of the little
Speaker 1: stands there They happen to be called they're on the Volga,
Speaker 1: and they could literally cut Russia in half. So first
Speaker 1: Yeltsen then Putin wanted to send a very clear message
Speaker 1: to the other Islamic majority republics which are inside Russia
Speaker 1: that they were not going to get independence and the
Speaker 1: country would not be cut in half. And so how
Speaker 1: did hostilities begin and what was the so that the
Speaker 1: Russians went in under what pretext into Chechi in nineteen
Speaker 1: ninety four obviously to stop the stop the secession movement there,
Speaker 1: But how how was it in the early days. Obviously
Speaker 1: we're looking at the situation Ukraine now trying to figure
Speaker 1: out if there are any parallels or you know, strategic
Speaker 1: comparisons in dral Yeah, and your video shows terrible parallels.
Speaker 1: It was basically scorched earth. It started off with the
Speaker 1: ethnic Chechen members of the Red Army basically formed their
Speaker 1: own army and took their own weapons with them, and
Speaker 1: there was a Chech in general who became president. They
Speaker 1: launched their own war genocide against ethnic Russians, and they
Speaker 1: fought Russia into a stalemate. They got independence recognized by
Speaker 1: virtually nobody. And that brings up to about nineteen ninety
Speaker 1: nine two thousand, when Putin was up for the presidency.
Speaker 1: Then things get very sinister. There were three apartment bombings
Speaker 1: in the Russian part of Russia which killed hundreds of people,
Speaker 1: and the third one they discovered some FSB which is
Speaker 1: the later KGB operatives, basically piling fertilizer into the basement
Speaker 1: of a building. These men were detained arrested. But the
Speaker 1: thinking is that Putin and his FSB cohorts planned these
Speaker 1: terrible apartment bombings, I say, killed hundreds of people to
Speaker 1: rally the country behind him and his tough policies. With Chechia.
Speaker 1: I was sort of in and out of Russia around
Speaker 1: that time. By the time I got there, which is
Speaker 1: two thousand and six, the war was still going on.
Speaker 1: And I visited Chesnia Grosny the capitol, in twenty twelve,
Speaker 1: and it was like a disneyland. It was everything was cute.
Speaker 1: Avery's rebuilt. There was even a toy Orthodox church. He
Speaker 1: had leveled Grosny, the capital of Chechia. It looked like Stalingrad.
Speaker 1: It had been totally leveled, and then when he got
Speaker 1: control again of Chesnia, he rebuilt it. So that's a
Speaker 1: scary parallel that he basically destroyed the capitol and destroyed
Speaker 1: this so called country in order to keep it inside
Speaker 1: underneath the Russian umbrella. How did I know? There were
Speaker 1: two Chechen conflicts, and we're trying to give at least
Speaker 1: some background here on both of them. Everybody watching the
Speaker 1: first Chechen War ended, how and why? The church first
Speaker 1: Chester War ended basically with a victory of the guerrillas,
Speaker 1: and Yelson drudgingly kind of gave up, and the gorillas
Speaker 1: announced a independent nation which is recognized by virtually nobody,
Speaker 1: and that lasted for two or three years, and then
Speaker 1: the socially when Putin came back, the Russian side to
Speaker 1: have another go at it and used even tougher strategies,
Speaker 1: including essentially carpet bombing, really destroying the city. So so
Speaker 1: that would be the second, the second conflict. So let's
Speaker 1: say that the first, the first Chechen incursion into Chechen fails.
Speaker 1: Yelson says, all right, and there's a something of a
Speaker 1: day facto independence for chech being during that period, as
Speaker 1: you say, doesn't get everybody to actually recognize in the
Speaker 1: international scene. Then Putin takes charge and nineteen ninety nine
Speaker 1: again in nineteen ninety nine, they roll in and different tactics.
Speaker 1: What's what's the approach? Well, as I said, it scores
Speaker 1: to earth. Now, the Chechens had a lot of Saudi
Speaker 1: Jahadist money, so they were not orphans. Let's say on
Speaker 1: the international scene, they had money and weapons. And I
Speaker 1: think one of the Saudi kings threatened several years ago.
Speaker 1: You know, we can turn Cheching it back on a
Speaker 1: centister threat. But to answer your question, bouten one control
Speaker 1: of Chechi through very vicious brutal methods scored short. I said,
Speaker 1: heavy bombing, tons of civilians were killed and basically batted
Speaker 1: them into submission. And when I moved to Moscow in
Speaker 1: two thousand and six, it went on for several more years.
Speaker 1: But there was a huge amount of sensitivity in Russia too,
Speaker 1: dead soldiers coming back, and there are these committees and
Speaker 1: mothers of soldiers and the burials were hidden, and they
Speaker 1: really did not want to repeat of Afghanistan, although they
Speaker 1: they lost thousands of men in Chess by all accounts.
Speaker 1: So there are reports right now that there are specific
Speaker 1: Chechen fighters men loyal to catterall right, the authority character
Speaker 1: leader of Czechnia that they're going to be fighting that
Speaker 1: they are fighting in Ukraine. What can you tell us
Speaker 1: about that? Well, they're apparently Chechens on both sides. Chechens
Speaker 1: are very brutal fighters. Their national sport is wrestling. They
Speaker 1: really enjoy fighting. They're natural born fighters, knife fighters, gun fighters.
Speaker 1: And the Chechens who lost the war against Putin have
Speaker 1: either been an exile in Europe or elsewhere and they've
Speaker 1: come back to join the Ukrainians. So the Ukrainian government
Speaker 1: has a few Chechens on their side, and then the
Speaker 1: Russian government has said sent Chechens into Ukraine, reportedly to
Speaker 1: assassinate President Zelenski. And we know the Chechens have been
Speaker 1: in the Russian controlled parts of southeastern Ukraine since twenty fourteen.
Speaker 1: Oh further ago, I don't know. There's a very interesting memorial.
Speaker 1: The World War Two Museum in Kiev has a section
Speaker 1: to the foreign volunteers Chechens and Georgians who come to
Speaker 1: fight in Ukraine against the Russians. So this is not
Speaker 1: totally new that men Chechen and Georgian men looking for
Speaker 1: a chance to shoot Russians would go to Ukraine. Jim,
Speaker 1: we want to come back in a second here and
Speaker 1: talk about Georgia. Stay with us if you would please,
Speaker 1: because back in two thousand and eight, Vladimir Putin invaded
Speaker 1: the Republic of Georgia using a lot of the same
Speaker 1: pretexts we're seeing here in Ukraine present day. When we
Speaker 1: come back, we'll be rejoined by Jim Brooke, who's going
Speaker 1: to give insight on the Russo Georgian War and how
Speaker 1: some of those tactics are being replayed right now in Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Stay with us. Many consider it the first European war
Speaker 1: of the twenty first century. In two thousand and eight,
Speaker 1: Russia invaded the Republic of Georgia, a former Soviet state
Speaker 1: which had achieved independence in nineteen ninety one. The war
Speaker 1: would only last two weeks and had ended with Russia's
Speaker 1: recognition of two regions in Georgia as independent of Khazia
Speaker 1: and South Ossetia. Although these two areas are not internationally recognized,
Speaker 1: they become de facto countries closely aligned with Russia, and
Speaker 1: outcome many believe Vladimir Putin wants to repeat in Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Joining once again is Russia. Ukraine fellow at the Foundation
Speaker 1: for Defensive Democracies and former Moscow Bureau chief for Bloomberg
Speaker 1: Jim Brooke, Jim, thanks so much, Thank you buy And
Speaker 1: I was also the VA Voice American bureau chief in Moscow,
Speaker 1: which brought me to places like Georgia and Grosne, which
Speaker 1: you just mentioned. Indeed, so the Russian invasion of Georgia
Speaker 1: Gym is seen by many today as the most analogous
Speaker 1: to Putin's invasion of Ukraine on a number of levels.
Speaker 1: Could he just walk us through what was the pretext
Speaker 1: for Russia's invasion of Georgia. What were the factors at
Speaker 1: play right before and in the run up to this, Yeah, Black,
Speaker 1: very good question. I was in George of the first
Speaker 1: week of the war, just almost by accident, and then
Speaker 1: in the fag of war we really didn't know what
Speaker 1: was going on. But now journalists and historians have put
Speaker 1: together the TikTok the timeline. What happened was that George W.
Speaker 1: Bush went to the NATO summit in Bucharest in April
Speaker 1: and strongly urged Europe to accept Georgia and Ukraine as
Speaker 1: members of NATO. The Germans, of the French and the
Speaker 1: Brits kind of pushed the whole thing off until December.
Speaker 1: The Russians got very alarmed and we now know within
Speaker 1: a week started drawing up a plan to invade Georgia.
Speaker 1: The same time the Russian Duma, as president putin to
Speaker 1: recognize these two separatist areas of separate republics. I bring
Speaker 1: this up because all this happened again with Ukraine. Then
Speaker 1: the Russian railroad troops. When Animajazia reinforced the railroad, which
Speaker 1: and where the Russian railroad troops go, soldiers followed, so
Speaker 1: people should have drawn connections there. Then there were two
Speaker 1: weeks of maneuvers just north of the Georgian border. And
Speaker 1: when the maneuvers are over, they left behind a thousand
Speaker 1: pieces of equipment. They did not go home. I'm talking
Speaker 1: about armored personnel carriers, tank trucks, chiefs, the sort of thing.
Speaker 1: That weekend, and when I was in Georgia that weekend,
Speaker 1: they started to accuse, accused George of genocide, and they
Speaker 1: started to evacuate civilians from South Assetia. And I saw
Speaker 1: these hysterical reports out of South Assetia by Russian correspond
Speaker 1: So they were loading women and children on buses and
Speaker 1: sending them up into the safety of Russia. This is
Speaker 1: exactly what happened in the last two weeks with Ukraine,
Speaker 1: there was the Duma asked Boutin to recognize the separatist
Speaker 1: republics as independent nations. There were maneuvers, the equipment did
Speaker 1: not go home. Boutin accused Georgia, accused Ukraine of genocide,
Speaker 1: and the civilians were evacuated. Then, in the case of Georgia,
Speaker 1: back in August twenty eight, two eight, there's a lot
Speaker 1: of cross border shelling, light across line shelling, and that
Speaker 1: was so the warm up. In that case, the president
Speaker 1: of Georgia, Mihail Sakshavili, fell for the bait and he
Speaker 1: actually attacked. You know, it's the mouth of Royty attacked Georgia.
Speaker 1: Georgia attacked Russia, and that led to the Russians whacking
Speaker 1: back very severely, and they poured through the only tunnel
Speaker 1: through the Caucass mountains, and they cut Georgia and a
Speaker 1: half Georgia's an east west country, and they cut the railroad,
Speaker 1: they cut the highway, they bombed gory Or the birthplace
Speaker 1: of Stalin, and then they started moving east and stopped
Speaker 1: about twenty five miles short of the capitol, which is Tabilisi.
Speaker 1: So they did it. Um you can pick nits with
Speaker 1: how the military behave, but they basically took Georgia in
Speaker 1: about ten days, as you say, and then they had
Speaker 1: to sue for peace. So these two j ash sorry,
Speaker 1: these two areas of Georgia that were, as I understand it,
Speaker 1: largely Russian speaking south pasttia An Abkhazia, they were the
Speaker 1: separate They're the separatist enclaves that was over what over
Speaker 1: a decade ago. Now where do those countries or separatist
Speaker 1: enclaves whatever we call them, currently stand. Have they been
Speaker 1: formally absorbed into the Russian Federation. No, they claim to
Speaker 1: be independent countries. And I've visited up Ahazia for Voice
Speaker 1: of America and it was kind of a creepy place
Speaker 1: because the population is half of what it was before
Speaker 1: the war. Now, the Georgians had done their own bit
Speaker 1: of ethic cleansing, so they're not totally innocent in this,
Speaker 1: but the population of one hundred and fifty thousand compared
Speaker 1: to three hundred thousand before the war. It's a beautiful part.
Speaker 1: All these rivers that come down, they're wonderful beaches. It's
Speaker 1: it's subtropical, it's lovely, but it's this kind of phony country.
Speaker 1: And I got in hot water with VA and Washington
Speaker 1: because I dateline my stories. You know, Sumi or Sakumi Abhazia,
Speaker 1: and they said, Wellias is not a country recognized by
Speaker 1: the United States or anyone in Europe, so you cannot
Speaker 1: put that dateline on your story. So these two areas
Speaker 1: continue to claim their independent they have their own flag,
Speaker 1: but they're one subsidized by Russia. The basic extension of
Speaker 1: Russian power south of the Russian border. There are thousands
Speaker 1: of Russian troops primarily station in both places. So is
Speaker 1: your expectation then in Ukraine, the Georgia secession or Georgia
Speaker 1: separatist enclave playbook is going to be what the Russian
Speaker 1: strategy is, at least in the east, in the dawn
Speaker 1: Boss region. I mean, how does that play out in
Speaker 1: your mind? Yeah, but kids already happened in the Duma
Speaker 1: recommended that the two separatist regions of Ukraine be recognized
Speaker 1: as countries, and Putin did just that last week. He
Speaker 1: recognized these two areas of separate countries, and then he
Speaker 1: made his big invasion like the next day. I don't
Speaker 1: know what's going to happen in Ukraine. My fear, on
Speaker 1: one level, Russia's losing on the ground. My fear is
Speaker 1: that Putin will lose patients and come back with the
Speaker 1: air war and flatten a couple of Ukrainian cities to
Speaker 1: give them a lesson, so to speak. Jim, you go ahead,
Speaker 1: go ahead, No, I mean this is Boutin did. That's
Speaker 1: one way he won in Zechiam, and it's what he
Speaker 1: did more recently in Syria. He flattened much of this
Speaker 1: Idlib province without hitting a hospital's, department, buildings, whatever. And
Speaker 1: he is ruthless and has no compunction about killing civilians.
Speaker 1: And unless there's a note fly zone over Ukraine, which
Speaker 1: the US you don't really want to do, and it
Speaker 1: would be the US that have to maintain it, he
Speaker 1: will be fairly free to bomb the heck out of Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Jim Brooke, thanks so much for joining us today. Appreciate
Speaker 1: the expertise and perspective. Thank you. In twenty fifteen, is
Speaker 1: Bashar al Assad, president of Syria, fought for his life
Speaker 1: during the Syrian Civil War. Russian force is intervened to
Speaker 1: help prop up his regime. We come back. Bill Rogio
Speaker 1: of the Foundation for Defensive Democracy stopped by to give
Speaker 1: his insight into Russia's intervention in Syria. They right there.
Speaker 1: It's now day seven of the war in Ukraine. Russia
Speaker 1: continues to bombard the country with pomps and missiles targeting
Speaker 1: crowded population centers, and the capital city is for now
Speaker 1: still uncaptured by Putin. But we'll see. Our next guest
Speaker 1: says that sympathy for the outnumbered and outgun defenders of
Speaker 1: Kiev has led to the exaggeration of Russian setbacks, misunderstanding
Speaker 1: of Russian strategy, and even basis claims from amateur psychoanalysts
Speaker 1: that Putin has lost his mind. Bill Roggio, senior fellow
Speaker 1: at the Foundation for Defensive Democracies, joins now to explain, Bill,
Speaker 1: thanks for being with us, Thanks for having me Buck.
Speaker 1: So let's just start with what's the latest today with
Speaker 1: the Russian advance. How is this going? Yeah, in the
Speaker 1: north at Kiev, the capitol, Russians are preparing their encirclement
Speaker 1: that could happen within days, and they're preparing to link
Speaker 1: up with I'm seeing I think this is close to happening,
Speaker 1: cutting off two provinces north of Kiev, and that would
Speaker 1: secure the entire border between Ukraine and Russia, as well
Speaker 1: as elders. But more importantly in the south, the city
Speaker 1: of Kerson, which is in the Black Sea on the
Speaker 1: coast of the Black Sea, city of three hundred thousand
Speaker 1: people has just fallen to the Russians. The mayor of
Speaker 1: Kerrison said that ten Russian officers have come to the
Speaker 1: building and he's handed over control. The Ukrainian troops have
Speaker 1: retreated to a nearby city, and the Russians continue their advance.
Speaker 1: So let's look at what Biden said last night in
Speaker 1: general about this Russian invasion of Ukraine. I want to
Speaker 1: have your respond to it. Play. Six days ago, Russia's
Speaker 1: Vladimir Putin sought to shake the very foundations of the
Speaker 1: free world, thanking he could make it bend to his
Speaker 1: menacing ways. But he badly miscalculated. He thought he could
Speaker 1: roll into Ukraine and the world would roll over. Instead,
Speaker 1: he met with a wall of strength he never anticipated
Speaker 1: or imagined he met Ukrainian people. Now that he's acted,
Speaker 1: the three Free world is holding him accountable. Putin is
Speaker 1: now isolated from the world more than he has ever been.
Speaker 1: Putin has unleashed violence in chaos, But while he may
Speaker 1: make gains on the battlefield, he'll pay a continuing high
Speaker 1: price over the long run. What's your assessment of Biden
Speaker 1: the Commander in chiefs analysis of Ukraine in that speech. Well,
Speaker 1: you know again, I do agree with the Ukrainian people
Speaker 1: had put up a hell of a fight, but it's
Speaker 1: just not enough. And I think he's overly optimistic. He
Speaker 1: claimed that Russia sought a quick victory. And one of
Speaker 1: the things that I analyzed in that Daily Mail article
Speaker 1: is that in fact, the Russians have a plan, and
Speaker 1: this is a plan that will take time to execute.
Speaker 1: It's not it was never going to be a quick victory. Um,
Speaker 1: we'll see how how the West, the West and the
Speaker 1: international community holds up. Is it willing to do Sanctions
Speaker 1: are easier today, what about next week, next month? What
Speaker 1: about next winner when Germany needs that fifty percent of
Speaker 1: its gas comes from Russia. UM. I think this is
Speaker 1: a you know, he is It's not as overly optimistic
Speaker 1: as I expected. Um, it's him to be. I expected
Speaker 1: to hear him say things like the Russians are failing,
Speaker 1: But I think it's this is certainly the best case scenario.
Speaker 1: The rosy glasses scenario that he painted. Um. The reality
Speaker 1: is the West needed to do far more months prior
Speaker 1: to this invasion to both deter the Russians and prepare
Speaker 1: the Ukrainians for war that didn't happen. And by the way,
Speaker 1: this does not make him a wartime commander in chief.
Speaker 1: This country is not at war with Russian and does
Speaker 1: not have plans to go to war with Russia. So
Speaker 1: there's a lot of reporting on this forty mile long
Speaker 1: Russian military convoy that is on the way to Kiev.
Speaker 1: Is the the basic strategy here that they will be
Speaker 1: deploying soon to just encircle the city and demand the
Speaker 1: government and Zelenski effectively, you know, resign, give up, call
Speaker 1: for surrender. How do you think this plays out? Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think that's exactly right. I think this this formation,
Speaker 1: it's already pushing west, south and west of Kiev, and
Speaker 1: I do believe it is being um It's goal main
Speaker 1: purpose is to surround the city and forced the catipulation
Speaker 1: of the government. I also think that it will look
Speaker 1: to link up with troops that are currently in the
Speaker 1: south and this would split Ukraine in half. This would
Speaker 1: and this really would be endgame. You'd have much of Ukraine,
Speaker 1: Ukraine's military trapped behind enemy lines. If there troops and
Speaker 1: the Caucuses can link up with the troops in Kiev,
Speaker 1: then I really think that we'd be talking end game
Speaker 1: here for Ukraine as a viable state. You might get
Speaker 1: a drop kra Ukrainian state or who may decide to
Speaker 1: take the whole thing and push to the post border.
Speaker 1: That's that's really the next level question there. So how
Speaker 1: much do you think the air campaign, the Russian air
Speaker 1: strikes and also long range artillery strikes, missile strikes is
Speaker 1: going to escalate and play a major role in this
Speaker 1: in the days ahead, Because up to this point there's
Speaker 1: a lot of footage of Russian convoys getting you know,
Speaker 1: getting hit looks like getting hit pretty hard with some
Speaker 1: of those anti tank munitions that the Ukrainians now have
Speaker 1: because of Western partners, and I've been they've been getting
Speaker 1: those for a while. So there is this view that
Speaker 1: people have of, well, it's just going to continue to
Speaker 1: be a hard slog on the ground for the Russians.
Speaker 1: Do you think they're just going to take to the
Speaker 1: air much more heavily and start pounding Ukrainian positions in
Speaker 1: a way that the Ukrainian defenses aren't really able to
Speaker 1: handle at all. Well, I think they can't do that.
Speaker 1: And if they can do that via the air and
Speaker 1: via artillery and rocket rocket munitions as well, I mean, look,
Speaker 1: we just saw a city surrender after a couple of
Speaker 1: days of fighting, to basically surrender without a fight. Do
Speaker 1: the Ukrainians have this kind of fight? By the way,
Speaker 1: the Russians are taking casualties, that's without a doubt. The
Speaker 1: Russian military doctrine is the old Soviet military doctrine. You
Speaker 1: throw a lot of force at it, you expect to
Speaker 1: take losses, but in the end you win. But the
Speaker 1: Ukrainians themselves are also being depleted of munitions. Why is
Speaker 1: that convoy, that forty mile long convoy that is just
Speaker 1: north of twenty miles north of Kiev and advancing westward,
Speaker 1: why is that not being strike to The Ukrainians have
Speaker 1: the capability and munitions to do this. The Karrainians are
Speaker 1: being bound down as well, you know, And I think
Speaker 1: the example set at curse On maybe one, and particularly
Speaker 1: if the Russians are able to rule a city like
Speaker 1: curse On and not have reprisals against civilians, which I
Speaker 1: don't think is in their interest anyway. They want to
Speaker 1: ruled the country, not dominate and crush it. You know,
Speaker 1: it sends a message to Kiv, the people a Kive
Speaker 1: that you may want to surrender this one. It's you know,
Speaker 1: it's better than being you know, better to live than
Speaker 1: being crushed. What do you think that Putin's strategy looks
Speaker 1: like as it plays out over the Weeks Ahead Bill?
Speaker 1: At this point, I think Putin has calculated that as
Speaker 1: far as sanctions go, that there's probably a time limit
Speaker 1: on these. I think that his calculation. I don't know
Speaker 1: whether he's made the correct calculation or not. Militarily, I
Speaker 1: think that you know what I described earlier, that pushed
Speaker 1: from the south from from Crimea is looking the link
Speaker 1: up with Kiev that'll sever the country and have trap
Speaker 1: a large number of Ukrainian forces. And if Kivan takeover
Speaker 1: Kiev and a couple of major cities and show the
Speaker 1: Ukrainian people that you know, the Russians are in control,
Speaker 1: they've won this work, then the only real question is
Speaker 1: does he want the whole country or is he looking
Speaker 1: for a rump state that is neutral or is governed
Speaker 1: by a crony of his I think that's what you know.
Speaker 1: That's what we're looking at here in the next days
Speaker 1: and months. The real big question for me again is
Speaker 1: does he want at all? Or is he happy with
Speaker 1: half of Ukraine and then appliable state to the West Bill.
Speaker 1: What could be done, if anything, to stop that? In
Speaker 1: your mind of this, it's just really all all the
Speaker 1: Ukrainians or their outside sanctions, economic activity, economic actions that
Speaker 1: could be taken to make him change his calculation. I
Speaker 1: think short of a NATO military intervention, which I do
Speaker 1: not advocate for, that concreases the risk of direct what
Speaker 1: it would be, direct war with Russia and increases the
Speaker 1: risk of a nuclear war. Short of that, I think
Speaker 1: what you're going to see and I don't can't tell
Speaker 1: you if it takes days, weeks, or months, that the
Speaker 1: Russians will conquer most, if not all, of the Ukraine.
Speaker 1: And I don't think there's sanctions won't stop this, Diplomatic
Speaker 1: actions won't stop this, prevention of flights, Russian flights, things,
Speaker 1: so that that's not enough. Putin has put all of
Speaker 1: his cards on the table. He has gone all in
Speaker 1: on taking Ukraine. He can't turn back now he would
Speaker 1: he would no longer be president of the country. If
Speaker 1: he did, he's playing to win, while I think the
Speaker 1: West is just playing to get a best case scenario
Speaker 1: out of this, get some type of rump Ukrainian government
Speaker 1: out of this. At this point, Bill, I agree with you.
Speaker 1: I think I hope we're both wrong, but I think
Speaker 1: you're right. Thanks for being with us as always. Good
Speaker 1: to see. If that's all the time we have for
Speaker 1: this special edition of Hold the Line, like, thank my
Speaker 1: guest Tom Sport, Jim Brooke, and Bill Rogio for sharing
Speaker 1: your expertise. Bill O'Reilly comes up next, Shield Tige