1 00:00:05,600 --> 00:00:09,440 Speaker 1: It could happen here is a podcast, and it is 2 00:00:09,520 --> 00:00:13,960 Speaker 1: kind of happening here because they're just was just an 3 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:17,680 Speaker 1: attack on uh, several power substations in the city of 4 00:00:17,720 --> 00:00:21,400 Speaker 1: North or city in the state of North Carolina. UM, 5 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:25,800 Speaker 1: that left something like forty people without power for several days. 6 00:00:25,880 --> 00:00:28,240 Speaker 1: I believe that at the moment at least one person 7 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:30,840 Speaker 1: died as a result of this. There have been car crashes. 8 00:00:30,920 --> 00:00:33,960 Speaker 1: It's pretty fucked up, and uh, we are going to 9 00:00:34,000 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: be talking about that. Obviously. As a result of this 10 00:00:38,040 --> 00:00:40,239 Speaker 1: number one, there were a lot of immediate suspicions that 11 00:00:40,280 --> 00:00:43,720 Speaker 1: came out that this was tied towards Drag Queen uh 12 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:46,280 Speaker 1: story hour type event that was going to be being 13 00:00:46,320 --> 00:00:48,920 Speaker 1: held UM on the day that the attack was carried out. 14 00:00:49,040 --> 00:00:53,559 Speaker 1: There's suspicions that this is the result of far right activity. UM, 15 00:00:53,600 --> 00:00:55,920 Speaker 1: and uh yeah, we're gonna talk about that and everything 16 00:00:56,000 --> 00:01:00,000 Speaker 1: around that right now. UM. We have on the episode 17 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:04,240 Speaker 1: for today myself, Garrison Davis, James Stout, and we are 18 00:01:04,280 --> 00:01:10,000 Speaker 1: also bringing in friend of the pod researcher and woman 19 00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:13,800 Speaker 1: about town. Um, but not this town, a different town 20 00:01:13,840 --> 00:01:16,520 Speaker 1: because we live on opposite sides of the country. Molly 21 00:01:16,640 --> 00:01:19,479 Speaker 1: Conger Molly, I've been saying your last name wrong for years, 22 00:01:19,520 --> 00:01:22,960 Speaker 1: even though we've been friends for quite a while. I 23 00:01:22,959 --> 00:01:24,640 Speaker 1: don't know why I never said anything. It's come up 24 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:28,360 Speaker 1: so many times. Yeah, um, so, Garrison, you've kind of 25 00:01:28,360 --> 00:01:30,360 Speaker 1: been taking point on putting together this one, So I'm 26 00:01:30,360 --> 00:01:32,640 Speaker 1: gonna let you kind of take the reins unless you 27 00:01:32,680 --> 00:01:35,120 Speaker 1: want me to uh to to to direct this more. 28 00:01:35,160 --> 00:01:36,720 Speaker 1: But I do think kind of the place to start 29 00:01:36,840 --> 00:01:42,479 Speaker 1: is are we watching a gigantic right wing insurgency unfold 30 00:01:43,480 --> 00:01:46,720 Speaker 1: or is this a more complex case? And obviously the 31 00:01:46,760 --> 00:01:49,160 Speaker 1: answer is the latter, as it is anytime someone poses 32 00:01:49,160 --> 00:01:50,840 Speaker 1: a question like that, no is we're gonna We're gonna 33 00:01:50,840 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: We're gonna pick this the simple, more scary, more inflammatary 34 00:01:55,040 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 1: option and leave it at that. Yeah, twet, let's get 35 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:03,040 Speaker 1: said tweet. No so yes. Um. The aftermath of the 36 00:02:03,040 --> 00:02:05,720 Speaker 1: North Carolina attack has kind of it's gotten a lot 37 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:09,000 Speaker 1: of people to learn about infrastructure attacks for the first 38 00:02:09,040 --> 00:02:12,400 Speaker 1: time and get really scared about them and realize that 39 00:02:12,440 --> 00:02:15,800 Speaker 1: this is a problem, and then start bringing up past 40 00:02:15,880 --> 00:02:19,440 Speaker 1: incidents when this has happened and trying to draw this 41 00:02:19,600 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 1: like overall pattern, which isn't entirely incorrect, but the way 42 00:02:24,639 --> 00:02:28,800 Speaker 1: they're going about it is not very responsible nor really 43 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:31,919 Speaker 1: well informed. Yeah. So one of the things we've seen 44 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:36,560 Speaker 1: is like the there have been a lot of attack Like, uh, 45 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:39,520 Speaker 1: it does seem accurate to say that over the course 46 00:02:39,520 --> 00:02:41,359 Speaker 1: of the last year or two there have been more 47 00:02:41,400 --> 00:02:46,280 Speaker 1: attacks on power infrastructure. UM. But that doesn't mean we 48 00:02:46,360 --> 00:02:48,840 Speaker 1: have we have lots of data on this. It has 49 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:52,480 Speaker 1: the past five years there has been a pretty strong 50 00:02:52,680 --> 00:02:56,640 Speaker 1: increase in the number of attacks on power stations. And 51 00:02:56,680 --> 00:02:59,320 Speaker 1: it's also true that this is a thing the right 52 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:02,840 Speaker 1: has been, the far right, like the Nazi right in particular, 53 00:03:02,880 --> 00:03:06,120 Speaker 1: has been trying to get people to do for longer 54 00:03:06,160 --> 00:03:09,520 Speaker 1: than anyone on this podcast has been alive. UM. This 55 00:03:09,600 --> 00:03:13,000 Speaker 1: goes back to the Turner Diaries even pre that stuff. 56 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:15,960 Speaker 1: This is in siege, um, and this is you know, 57 00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:18,480 Speaker 1: there has been very recently this summer a couple of 58 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:23,160 Speaker 1: pieces of fairly well put together Nazi propaganda that was 59 00:03:23,200 --> 00:03:25,840 Speaker 1: advocating for people to carry out attacks like this. And 60 00:03:25,880 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 1: the reason is that it's easy and it's high impact. 61 00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:31,519 Speaker 1: It's very easy to funk up a power substation. All 62 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:34,960 Speaker 1: you need is a gun, um, and it's very easy 63 00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: to get away with it because most of them have 64 00:03:36,760 --> 00:03:40,640 Speaker 1: effectively zero security. Yeah, and it explained how to do 65 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:44,440 Speaker 1: it as well. Right, sorry, like it it was literally 66 00:03:44,440 --> 00:03:47,720 Speaker 1: a guide to fucking up a substation. Yeah, because they're specific. 67 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:49,440 Speaker 1: We're not going to give you guys a guide to 68 00:03:49,480 --> 00:03:52,480 Speaker 1: fucking up power substations on this podcast, but it's not hard. 69 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:56,600 Speaker 1: Next week, Yeah, that's next week in our three partner 70 00:03:56,800 --> 00:03:58,920 Speaker 1: it's on the Patreon. You've got to be on the Patreon. 71 00:03:59,440 --> 00:04:03,280 Speaker 1: That's that's the Patreon special episode, how to Destroy power 72 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:06,720 Speaker 1: Infrastructure for Fun and Profit. No, but I think too, 73 00:04:06,760 --> 00:04:10,240 Speaker 1: if you're trying to propagandize people to take action, you know, 74 00:04:10,280 --> 00:04:13,200 Speaker 1: we've all seen plenty of manifestoes from people who carried 75 00:04:13,240 --> 00:04:16,000 Speaker 1: out mass shootings trying to propagandize people to take action 76 00:04:16,000 --> 00:04:19,480 Speaker 1: in that effect. Um, but we've also seen the chats 77 00:04:19,480 --> 00:04:21,920 Speaker 1: when somebody fails, right, Like, if somebody doesn't get what 78 00:04:21,960 --> 00:04:23,719 Speaker 1: they call it, you know, a high score. If somebody 79 00:04:23,760 --> 00:04:26,040 Speaker 1: carries out a mass shooting that doesn't result in very 80 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:30,760 Speaker 1: many debts, it's embarrassing for them. But this is for 81 00:04:30,920 --> 00:04:34,240 Speaker 1: the perpetrator, relatively low stakes. If you fail, no one 82 00:04:34,279 --> 00:04:37,160 Speaker 1: will know. If you miss, no one will know Um, 83 00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:38,479 Speaker 1: if you hit the you know, if you hit it 84 00:04:38,520 --> 00:04:40,240 Speaker 1: and it just looks like vandalism and the power doesn't 85 00:04:40,279 --> 00:04:42,240 Speaker 1: go out, no one will know that you failed, and 86 00:04:42,279 --> 00:04:45,599 Speaker 1: you can try again later. You don't die. And that's 87 00:04:45,640 --> 00:04:48,120 Speaker 1: that's the title of one of the one of the 88 00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:50,000 Speaker 1: pieces of propaganda that I sent to you, right The 89 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:53,000 Speaker 1: title of it is make It Count, which is an 90 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:57,960 Speaker 1: impredated form of a quote from Siege. I wish it's 91 00:04:58,000 --> 00:04:59,960 Speaker 1: a Nazi and I'm not going to read the film 92 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:04,160 Speaker 1: annual from general. The general gist of the quote is 93 00:05:04,200 --> 00:05:07,919 Speaker 1: that you know, the price of failure is death. So 94 00:05:08,000 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 1: whatever you choose to do, make it count. So this 95 00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:13,520 Speaker 1: is a way to relatively low stakes for the perpetrator, 96 00:05:14,040 --> 00:05:16,240 Speaker 1: way to have a very high impact with low risk 97 00:05:16,279 --> 00:05:19,000 Speaker 1: of personal failure. And what I did find, and we'll 98 00:05:19,040 --> 00:05:22,040 Speaker 1: get off. We'll move to the broader topic in a second, 99 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:24,520 Speaker 1: because I think focusing too much on the Nazis right 100 00:05:24,520 --> 00:05:27,240 Speaker 1: now is going to frame things the wrong way. But 101 00:05:27,240 --> 00:05:28,800 Speaker 1: one of the things I did find interesting about that 102 00:05:28,839 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 1: piece of propaganda was the acknowledgement and the introduction that 103 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:34,520 Speaker 1: like carrying out these mass shootings is not going to 104 00:05:34,520 --> 00:05:37,240 Speaker 1: accomplish our broader goals in part because people have gotten 105 00:05:37,240 --> 00:05:40,960 Speaker 1: and neared to them. Whereas destroying power infrastructure, if you 106 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:43,960 Speaker 1: can funk up the grid, they believe that's going to 107 00:05:44,080 --> 00:05:47,040 Speaker 1: like and I think, obviously this is a silly line 108 00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 1: of thought, but they think it's going to like lead 109 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:50,920 Speaker 1: to the I mean, this is always what I think 110 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:52,400 Speaker 1: it's going to lead to, like the race war that 111 00:05:52,440 --> 00:05:55,880 Speaker 1: they want, right, That's that's the thinking there be. And 112 00:05:55,880 --> 00:05:57,839 Speaker 1: that equation is like a two B two s like 113 00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:02,280 Speaker 1: this and question mark mark race war. Yeah, they're Nazis, 114 00:06:02,320 --> 00:06:04,800 Speaker 1: you know, they're Nazis. They're not right about things. But 115 00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:08,400 Speaker 1: the fact that all this propaganda is out there, the 116 00:06:08,400 --> 00:06:10,280 Speaker 1: fact that they've been talking about this so long, is 117 00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:14,000 Speaker 1: part of why everyone is convinced that, like there's this 118 00:06:14,440 --> 00:06:17,360 Speaker 1: massive new insurgency that's just broken out and that that's 119 00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:19,960 Speaker 1: what all of these attacks are, which doesn't mean that 120 00:06:20,040 --> 00:06:22,560 Speaker 1: none of them are. Um. It's also worth noting that 121 00:06:22,600 --> 00:06:26,200 Speaker 1: the year before this happened in the same state in 122 00:06:26,279 --> 00:06:29,200 Speaker 1: North Carolina, a group of Nazis were arrested by the 123 00:06:29,200 --> 00:06:32,440 Speaker 1: FEDS for trying to attack power infrastructure, and they also 124 00:06:32,520 --> 00:06:35,039 Speaker 1: had plans on the Pacific Northwest, where there have been 125 00:06:35,120 --> 00:06:39,480 Speaker 1: in Washington Portland attacks on some power infrastructure. Um, and 126 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:43,080 Speaker 1: they also they're also just so happens to be a 127 00:06:43,120 --> 00:06:46,240 Speaker 1: lot of Nazis here. Yeah, the both the Carolinias and 128 00:06:46,279 --> 00:06:50,080 Speaker 1: the Pacific and the Pacific Northwest are home to a 129 00:06:50,160 --> 00:06:53,760 Speaker 1: lot of people who self described as like militant neo 130 00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:57,280 Speaker 1: Nazi accelerationists. And what I think we should do now 131 00:06:57,320 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: before we get too much off this and we can 132 00:06:59,680 --> 00:07:02,280 Speaker 1: return to this topic, is talk about the fact that, 133 00:07:02,320 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 1: and this is kind of the important context, a lot 134 00:07:04,560 --> 00:07:07,080 Speaker 1: of people who aren't Nazis funk up electrical grids all 135 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:10,120 Speaker 1: the time. It's actually very easy, and people seem to 136 00:07:10,160 --> 00:07:16,880 Speaker 1: just enjoy it americ. I think there's there's there's been 137 00:07:16,920 --> 00:07:20,160 Speaker 1: a lot of missteps people have taken in talking about 138 00:07:20,200 --> 00:07:22,520 Speaker 1: this and kind of you know, some people have gotten 139 00:07:22,720 --> 00:07:26,840 Speaker 1: scared and have kind of you know, uh not not 140 00:07:26,960 --> 00:07:30,360 Speaker 1: looked at this uh fully analytically in a way that 141 00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:33,360 Speaker 1: is actually really helpful, because there's been a lot of 142 00:07:33,600 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 1: kind of retrospective misinformation going around on attacks that have 143 00:07:39,640 --> 00:07:42,320 Speaker 1: happened in the in the past few months that I've 144 00:07:42,480 --> 00:07:45,440 Speaker 1: only really gotten reported on. Are noticed in the wake 145 00:07:45,480 --> 00:07:48,120 Speaker 1: of the North Carolina attack, which is kind of caused 146 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:51,600 Speaker 1: this narrative to come out that since the North Carolina attack, 147 00:07:51,800 --> 00:07:55,280 Speaker 1: there's been like a bajillion of other other attacks happening 148 00:07:55,320 --> 00:08:00,520 Speaker 1: in quick succession, which actually isn't true. So that's I first, 149 00:08:00,720 --> 00:08:02,320 Speaker 1: I want to talk about the types of stuff that 150 00:08:02,400 --> 00:08:04,880 Speaker 1: is that people are generally getting wrong about this because 151 00:08:05,400 --> 00:08:07,480 Speaker 1: it's a good a good deal. People are are are 152 00:08:07,480 --> 00:08:11,880 Speaker 1: misunderstanding some some of what's going on here. Um. So 153 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:15,880 Speaker 1: there was this, you know, pretty pretty viral uh story 154 00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:18,520 Speaker 1: made by a new station in Florida that came out 155 00:08:18,520 --> 00:08:22,360 Speaker 1: a few days ago talking about how it's all caps 156 00:08:22,440 --> 00:08:28,240 Speaker 1: substations targeted. Reports shows intrusions had Duke Energy power stations 157 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:31,120 Speaker 1: in Tampa Bay and elsewhere in Florida. So very scary 158 00:08:31,160 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 1: obviously because Duke Energy is also the place in North 159 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:36,480 Speaker 1: Carolina that was attacked, founded by the guy who invented 160 00:08:36,520 --> 00:08:42,920 Speaker 1: the modern cigarette. By the way, based based yes, but 161 00:08:43,200 --> 00:08:46,280 Speaker 1: if you if you look, if you look at the 162 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:50,960 Speaker 1: actual story, these intrusions that they're talking about happened last September. 163 00:08:51,000 --> 00:08:54,000 Speaker 1: They did not. They did not happen a few days ago. 164 00:08:54,559 --> 00:08:57,760 Speaker 1: And then also similarly, for the first time, there was 165 00:08:57,800 --> 00:09:00,160 Speaker 1: reporting on a whole bunch of substation attacks in the 166 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:04,320 Speaker 1: Pacific Northwest. Uh, that reporting was dropped after the North 167 00:09:04,320 --> 00:09:09,480 Speaker 1: Carolina attacks in part because a memo was was was 168 00:09:09,520 --> 00:09:11,400 Speaker 1: posted by a few different news sites that they probably 169 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:13,760 Speaker 1: did open records requests in the wake of the North 170 00:09:13,800 --> 00:09:16,520 Speaker 1: Carolina attack. They found this memo, reported on it, and 171 00:09:16,559 --> 00:09:19,120 Speaker 1: now people have this, you know, have learn learn about 172 00:09:19,120 --> 00:09:22,400 Speaker 1: this other thing that happened in November. So, but people 173 00:09:22,400 --> 00:09:24,679 Speaker 1: who don't, who really are only looking at headlines or 174 00:09:24,720 --> 00:09:28,920 Speaker 1: only looking at tweets UM or posts wherever, right, Uh, 175 00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:31,560 Speaker 1: they look at these attacks and they look at you know, 176 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:35,240 Speaker 1: the succession of them becoming public after the North Carolina thing, 177 00:09:35,240 --> 00:09:37,360 Speaker 1: and they're kind of drawing this narrative that these things 178 00:09:37,360 --> 00:09:39,320 Speaker 1: have happened one after another and it's part of this 179 00:09:39,720 --> 00:09:43,400 Speaker 1: brand new wave of things, and it is part of 180 00:09:42,720 --> 00:09:45,640 Speaker 1: a wave of things on like the broad sense, but 181 00:09:45,679 --> 00:09:48,800 Speaker 1: it's not all happened within the past two weeks. So 182 00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:53,360 Speaker 1: the first thing is like, when it's super easy for 183 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:57,520 Speaker 1: a disinformation and misinformation to spread very rampantly in the 184 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:01,440 Speaker 1: aftermath of these types of attacks, UM, and these types 185 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:03,679 Speaker 1: of incidents, you know, some of these probably are not 186 00:10:03,800 --> 00:10:09,280 Speaker 1: attacks UM. And it's really easy to kind of glom 187 00:10:09,280 --> 00:10:11,760 Speaker 1: onto an erative that's compelling and scary, and if you 188 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:13,720 Speaker 1: just dig it a little a little bit deeper, deeper, 189 00:10:13,760 --> 00:10:15,959 Speaker 1: you'll realize there's a whole bunch of context that you're missing. 190 00:10:16,040 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 1: So that's always an important first step when when these 191 00:10:18,920 --> 00:10:22,520 Speaker 1: things are happening. Yeah, and it's part of the part 192 00:10:22,559 --> 00:10:24,040 Speaker 1: of the story here. I think part of why it's 193 00:10:24,080 --> 00:10:27,800 Speaker 1: important to understand that, like the surgeon, attacks on power 194 00:10:27,840 --> 00:10:30,920 Speaker 1: infrastructure is a thing, but it's not necessarily tied to 195 00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:34,600 Speaker 1: the fact that Nazis are attacking the power infrastructure is that, 196 00:10:34,640 --> 00:10:37,839 Speaker 1: like it's easy to do, it's easy to do casually. 197 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:40,200 Speaker 1: And this has been known for a while. About a 198 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,040 Speaker 1: decade ago, two thirteen, there was an attack in the 199 00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:45,000 Speaker 1: Bay Area on I think was it was it too 200 00:10:45,120 --> 00:10:51,480 Speaker 1: power substations. Um, yeah, the Metcalf sniper and we don't 201 00:10:51,520 --> 00:10:54,560 Speaker 1: know how many people were involved, but suspected it's it's 202 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:58,600 Speaker 1: it's it's suspected more than one. Yes, yes, sniper. And 203 00:10:58,679 --> 00:11:02,320 Speaker 1: this was a very if if this was a practice attack, 204 00:11:02,320 --> 00:11:05,040 Speaker 1: a training attack, then it was a very effectively carried 205 00:11:05,040 --> 00:11:06,520 Speaker 1: out one. Because we still don't know who did it, 206 00:11:06,640 --> 00:11:10,360 Speaker 1: and regardless of the mode of this incidence of has 207 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:14,200 Speaker 1: been mythologized in a lot of extremist circles as like 208 00:11:14,240 --> 00:11:18,480 Speaker 1: an example of here's a successful thing that is replicable 209 00:11:18,720 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 1: and you can get away with it. This is this 210 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:25,559 Speaker 1: is one of the most highly referenced incidents of infrastructure 211 00:11:25,559 --> 00:11:29,040 Speaker 1: attack on you know, across you know, whether you're like 212 00:11:29,520 --> 00:11:34,160 Speaker 1: uh Anti Siev bloodite or whether you're a neo Nazi accelerationist. 213 00:11:34,240 --> 00:11:38,960 Speaker 1: This is, this specific attack is highly referenced. And we'll 214 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:41,199 Speaker 1: circle back to this towards the end. But because I'm 215 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:43,960 Speaker 1: going to quote from a recent report by the George 216 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:48,280 Speaker 1: Washington University on power substation attacks. Um, they are, they 217 00:11:48,280 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 1: are extremely common. They are they are becoming increasingly common 218 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:55,200 Speaker 1: since white supremacists are not the only ones who do them. 219 00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:59,160 Speaker 1: They were also from from twenty six to nineteen, a 220 00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:05,000 Speaker 1: whole bunch of Isis inspired terrorism also hit some substations 221 00:12:05,040 --> 00:12:08,319 Speaker 1: across the United States. They are, they are, They're not 222 00:12:08,559 --> 00:12:14,000 Speaker 1: exclusively done by wet supremacists, and there's also sometimes they're 223 00:12:14,040 --> 00:12:19,080 Speaker 1: just shot at by random people with guns. And let's 224 00:12:19,080 --> 00:12:23,199 Speaker 1: be honest. So the Metcalf attack, it's not impossible that 225 00:12:23,280 --> 00:12:26,640 Speaker 1: it was just an usually lucky group of ye who's 226 00:12:26,679 --> 00:12:30,000 Speaker 1: who wanted to shoot some power infrastructure. We have no idea. 227 00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,360 Speaker 1: I think the number of rounds fired directly in yeah, 228 00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:38,000 Speaker 1: I probably make that unlikely. Almost every intelligence agency will 229 00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:43,040 Speaker 1: disagree with you on that, Robert. They didn't catch they 230 00:12:43,080 --> 00:12:46,400 Speaker 1: didn't catch ship. But to Robert's point, I think, I 231 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:49,400 Speaker 1: think there is some value in remembering that a drunk 232 00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:51,880 Speaker 1: guy in the woods might love to fire a gun 233 00:12:51,920 --> 00:12:54,360 Speaker 1: at something that's gonna spark. And he's going to shoot 234 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:56,480 Speaker 1: a gun, you might as well shoot it a lot. No, 235 00:12:56,559 --> 00:13:00,280 Speaker 1: I I probably wouldn't shoot it two times. It was 236 00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:03,959 Speaker 1: very It was It was very anyway, I there is 237 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:06,080 Speaker 1: we and we talked about this a bit in our planning. 238 00:13:06,080 --> 00:13:08,679 Speaker 1: There was one attack and Molly, you probably could recall 239 00:13:08,679 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 1: the year better than I was. But it was a 240 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:13,400 Speaker 1: couple of years ago where the guy attacked to power substation. 241 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:16,960 Speaker 1: Because he and he talked about this at length in 242 00:13:17,040 --> 00:13:19,960 Speaker 1: his trial, he thought people were on their phones too much, 243 00:13:20,679 --> 00:13:22,520 Speaker 1: so I said, I sent this one to the other 244 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:27,400 Speaker 1: I loved. I love to find a court record. I'd 245 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:29,560 Speaker 1: love to spend all my all my pocket change on 246 00:13:29,600 --> 00:13:32,160 Speaker 1: pacer And they given me access to the law library. 247 00:13:32,200 --> 00:13:36,280 Speaker 1: So I spent all day today, UM, looking for any 248 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:39,080 Speaker 1: case We're not not just charged, were convicted of any 249 00:13:39,080 --> 00:13:44,560 Speaker 1: case where USC eighteen USC thirteen sixty six was brought up. 250 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 1: So thirteen sixty six is the federal statute for damaging 251 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 1: or conspiring to damage and energy facility. And so energy 252 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:56,600 Speaker 1: facility means power lines, power substations, coal mines, nuclear facilities, 253 00:13:56,800 --> 00:13:59,080 Speaker 1: any place where power is made, right, so it's a 254 00:13:59,080 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: pretty broad atute. And so I looked up a few 255 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:05,280 Speaker 1: dozen cases where that was on the table to sort 256 00:14:05,280 --> 00:14:07,880 Speaker 1: of bring the temperature down and say, like, okay, aside 257 00:14:07,880 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 1: from Nazis trying to cause a race, war, water, some 258 00:14:10,360 --> 00:14:13,440 Speaker 1: other things that lead to somebody getting charged with this, 259 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:18,920 Speaker 1: other motivations, other scenarios. UM. In that case was Jason 260 00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:25,080 Speaker 1: wood Ring, UM. Jason wood Ring in August, he tried 261 00:14:25,160 --> 00:14:28,400 Speaker 1: to use a this is a quote from some news 262 00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:31,960 Speaker 1: coverage the time, tried to lasso a train with a 263 00:14:32,120 --> 00:14:42,440 Speaker 1: cable attached to a high voltage tower. He is still 264 00:14:42,440 --> 00:14:53,200 Speaker 1: in prison righton. Was distracted by their screens, by their phones, 265 00:14:53,280 --> 00:14:55,920 Speaker 1: by their gaming, and he just wanted people to remember 266 00:14:55,920 --> 00:14:59,440 Speaker 1: what's important. So he tried to lack the train high 267 00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 1: voltage wire. Now, I probably yeah, we probably don't need 268 00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 1: to add this. He was a big enthusiast of methamphetamy. 269 00:15:08,440 --> 00:15:12,680 Speaker 1: He has some court ordered substance abuse treatment, and we 270 00:15:12,720 --> 00:15:15,800 Speaker 1: wish him nothing but the best, right. I think he's 271 00:15:15,840 --> 00:15:18,440 Speaker 1: going to be just fine. But so I found some 272 00:15:18,520 --> 00:15:22,560 Speaker 1: other cases where there was an intentional attack with the 273 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:25,600 Speaker 1: you know, with the stated intention of bringing down the grid, 274 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:30,960 Speaker 1: but for like non Nazi reasons. In the early two thousand's, UM, 275 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:33,760 Speaker 1: a bunch of E l F activists were charged with 276 00:15:33,800 --> 00:15:37,920 Speaker 1: thirteen sixty six for arsons to energy facilities. UM, this 277 00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:40,560 Speaker 1: is an odd one. In twenty nineteen, a guy named 278 00:15:40,560 --> 00:15:45,840 Speaker 1: Stephen McCrae was sentenced for attacking one substation by shooting 279 00:15:45,880 --> 00:15:48,120 Speaker 1: out the cooling fins, and as part of his plea agreement, 280 00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:52,080 Speaker 1: he admitted to three other attacks. UM. He got caught 281 00:15:52,120 --> 00:15:54,000 Speaker 1: because he told a friend of his that he'd been 282 00:15:54,000 --> 00:16:00,600 Speaker 1: shooting shipped up. I was concerned and when to the FBI, 283 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 1: and they had his friend record some of theirs bad friends. Yea, 284 00:16:06,320 --> 00:16:09,400 Speaker 1: and so he said things like he stated motive was 285 00:16:09,440 --> 00:16:13,600 Speaker 1: attacking corporate America so some couldn't be done about global warming. 286 00:16:13,640 --> 00:16:16,920 Speaker 1: He wasn't noted as an environmental activist, but he was 287 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: concerned about the corporations, which I don't know, Alex Jones 288 00:16:21,800 --> 00:16:30,200 Speaker 1: code in language. Globalists come from a couple of different places. Yeah, yeah, 289 00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:33,880 Speaker 1: listen people maybe, but he right before his arrest, he 290 00:16:33,960 --> 00:16:36,600 Speaker 1: told his friend that he was planning a brand Daddy 291 00:16:36,640 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 1: event that would make national news and shut down the 292 00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:48,720 Speaker 1: whole West coast. Okay, Okay, that's maybe. That's sometimes kids. 293 00:16:49,080 --> 00:16:53,680 Speaker 1: Don't tell that to your friend. Yeah, anyone, your friend 294 00:16:53,760 --> 00:16:57,000 Speaker 1: is still snitching and that sucks. But like, don't don't 295 00:16:57,000 --> 00:17:00,760 Speaker 1: tell that to your According to the euro of Prisons 296 00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:04,119 Speaker 1: innate locator, which is another tool I really enjoy, he 297 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 1: was released in September. That's yeah. This I think it 298 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:13,840 Speaker 1: helps to make the point that like, this is not 299 00:17:14,040 --> 00:17:17,199 Speaker 1: all are mostly Nazis doing this kind of thing, A 300 00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:20,000 Speaker 1: lot of people trying to make about the you know, 301 00:17:20,040 --> 00:17:22,040 Speaker 1: these sort of I found a third case that sort 302 00:17:22,040 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 1: of fits the same pattern, a guy who shot out 303 00:17:24,240 --> 00:17:28,320 Speaker 1: a transformer for reasons I can't quite discern based on 304 00:17:28,320 --> 00:17:30,800 Speaker 1: the court railings. But again, in all three of these cases, 305 00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:33,000 Speaker 1: the Miles Maynard case in Alabama in two thousand eight, 306 00:17:33,080 --> 00:17:37,600 Speaker 1: Jason woodreyteen Stephen McCrae in twenty nine. They all had 307 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:42,199 Speaker 1: court ordered psyche valves, and in McCrae's case, there were 308 00:17:42,240 --> 00:17:45,040 Speaker 1: questions about his compency to stand trial. Miles Miles Maynard 309 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:48,320 Speaker 1: died shortly after being released from prison. These are people 310 00:17:48,359 --> 00:17:51,800 Speaker 1: who were not well. Yeah, not that not that being 311 00:17:51,880 --> 00:17:54,879 Speaker 1: unwell or having the subs problem makes you shoot a substation. 312 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:59,080 Speaker 1: But these aren't explicitly ideological. These are people who just 313 00:17:59,240 --> 00:18:02,680 Speaker 1: got an idea their head and I didn't control it. Well. Yeah, 314 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:04,920 Speaker 1: And I think part of when you're kind of looking 315 00:18:04,960 --> 00:18:08,080 Speaker 1: at just any of these attacks, you're trying to discern 316 00:18:08,160 --> 00:18:11,080 Speaker 1: as stuff pops into the news, is this likely part 317 00:18:11,160 --> 00:18:15,639 Speaker 1: of an insurgent trend? Or is this like some dudes 318 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:19,320 Speaker 1: fucking around? One of them would be like, what was 319 00:18:19,440 --> 00:18:22,520 Speaker 1: the how much like how much effort and planning does 320 00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:24,720 Speaker 1: it look like when into the Metcalf attack looks like 321 00:18:24,800 --> 00:18:27,240 Speaker 1: quite a lot. I would say the most recent Portland's 322 00:18:27,320 --> 00:18:30,080 Speaker 1: Washington attacks, given the extent to which there were breakings, 323 00:18:30,160 --> 00:18:33,200 Speaker 1: looked like it was very A lot of steps had 324 00:18:33,200 --> 00:18:35,680 Speaker 1: to had to go in. So let's have an ad 325 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:38,360 Speaker 1: break and then we'll go into some more actual details 326 00:18:38,480 --> 00:18:40,439 Speaker 1: of the North Carolina attack and some of the Pacific 327 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:44,680 Speaker 1: Northwest ones, and then kind of circle back to why 328 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:48,280 Speaker 1: people are talking about accelerationism so much. Yeah, you know 329 00:18:48,359 --> 00:18:53,600 Speaker 1: who loves planning a series of infrastructure attacks. The sponsors 330 00:18:53,640 --> 00:18:58,040 Speaker 1: of this show attacks on the infrastructure of your wallet. 331 00:19:08,160 --> 00:19:11,040 Speaker 1: We're bulk And nothing that we said before the break 332 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:15,600 Speaker 1: can legally be called incitement. Um, it's a joke. It's fine. 333 00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:18,959 Speaker 1: So now we're gonna we're gonna talk a little bit 334 00:19:18,960 --> 00:19:21,719 Speaker 1: more about the details of the North Carolina attack and 335 00:19:21,800 --> 00:19:25,400 Speaker 1: some of the attacks in the Pacific Northwest, and yeah, 336 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:27,240 Speaker 1: just getting get into some more of the actual details 337 00:19:27,280 --> 00:19:29,919 Speaker 1: that have been going on with these most recent attacks 338 00:19:29,920 --> 00:19:33,320 Speaker 1: that have kind of caused people to speculate on various things. So, 339 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:38,119 Speaker 1: the agencies involved in investigating the North Carolina More County 340 00:19:38,119 --> 00:19:43,080 Speaker 1: attack have disclosed very little information about what's happened. Uh, 341 00:19:43,119 --> 00:19:46,119 Speaker 1: They've they've said that the equipment was hit by gunfire 342 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:50,360 Speaker 1: and that the shooters appeared to know what they were doing. Uh. 343 00:19:50,400 --> 00:19:53,360 Speaker 1: Investigators have found nearly two dozen shell casings from high 344 00:19:53,359 --> 00:19:59,960 Speaker 1: power rifles in the area around and people lost power 345 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:04,159 Speaker 1: are and uh that power outage lasted for like at 346 00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:07,560 Speaker 1: least five days as as the company tried to replace 347 00:20:07,640 --> 00:20:10,760 Speaker 1: these very large pieces of equipment, many of which were 348 00:20:10,800 --> 00:20:15,879 Speaker 1: damaged beyond repair. So investigators are zoning in on two 349 00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:21,720 Speaker 1: threads of possible motives centered around extremist behavior for the 350 00:20:21,760 --> 00:20:24,400 Speaker 1: for the for the attack that happened last last Sunday. 351 00:20:25,119 --> 00:20:28,760 Speaker 1: One of these. One of these is writings by extremists 352 00:20:28,800 --> 00:20:33,600 Speaker 1: on online forms encouraging attacks on critical infrastructure, as well 353 00:20:33,680 --> 00:20:37,040 Speaker 1: as a series of recent disruptions of lgbt Q plus 354 00:20:37,040 --> 00:20:40,959 Speaker 1: events across the nation by domestic extremists, according to law 355 00:20:41,040 --> 00:20:44,080 Speaker 1: enforcement sources disclosed to CNN. So these these are the 356 00:20:44,119 --> 00:20:49,280 Speaker 1: two things that people are looking into. Initial uh speculation, 357 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:52,920 Speaker 1: like of the night of the shooting centered on right 358 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:54,960 Speaker 1: wing backlash towards a drag show that was set to 359 00:20:55,000 --> 00:20:57,920 Speaker 1: be held that same day at a nearby theater. The 360 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:00,720 Speaker 1: drug show was shut down as it was going on 361 00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:04,080 Speaker 1: because the power went out UM, and there was a 362 00:21:04,720 --> 00:21:08,760 Speaker 1: local a local activist made some cryptic comments on their 363 00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:13,040 Speaker 1: Facebook and they then received a police visit the police 364 00:21:13,680 --> 00:21:18,680 Speaker 1: about it. I also like that the this person who 365 00:21:18,880 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: who made these cryptic posts UM was also an Army 366 00:21:22,880 --> 00:21:30,840 Speaker 1: psychological operations officer, so they literally worked in pop Yeah, 367 00:21:34,680 --> 00:21:37,639 Speaker 1: like her job was psyops. And this was the person 368 00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:40,720 Speaker 1: that that that posted about this big tied to the 369 00:21:40,760 --> 00:21:44,719 Speaker 1: Drag Show. So take that as as you will. Um. 370 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:49,199 Speaker 1: This person's group earlier that day had had a protest 371 00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:54,639 Speaker 1: UH involving armed individuals in military gear to to you know, 372 00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:59,240 Speaker 1: push back against the h the Drag Show. So but 373 00:21:59,240 --> 00:22:02,000 Speaker 1: but yeah, So those are the two threads investigators are 374 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:07,239 Speaker 1: looking into. Is one accelerationist rhetoric and writings that has 375 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:10,800 Speaker 1: gotten more popular the past few years. And then two 376 00:22:10,960 --> 00:22:13,960 Speaker 1: maybe connected to this wave of of of like anti 377 00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:20,400 Speaker 1: queer stuff. Let's see, UM. One what what One interesting 378 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:23,719 Speaker 1: kind of thing of note is that three weeks before 379 00:22:23,760 --> 00:22:28,240 Speaker 1: this attack, another substation was deliberately disabled in eastern and 380 00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:32,800 Speaker 1: North Carolina. This this this stack happened on Friday, November eleventh. 381 00:22:33,520 --> 00:22:37,760 Speaker 1: It shut down electricity for about twelve thousand homes and businesses. 382 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:40,280 Speaker 1: Power was restored in a few hours, though this one, 383 00:22:40,320 --> 00:22:43,080 Speaker 1: this one was easier to fix. UM. In a statement 384 00:22:43,080 --> 00:22:45,320 Speaker 1: posted on the company's website for a few days after 385 00:22:45,359 --> 00:22:49,800 Speaker 1: the incident, UH, they described it as vandalism, and the 386 00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:52,879 Speaker 1: company said that vandals quote damaged transformers, causing them to 387 00:22:52,920 --> 00:22:57,480 Speaker 1: leak coolant oil, but the statement does not explicitly say 388 00:22:57,560 --> 00:23:00,800 Speaker 1: what the method was. And this is a not uncommon 389 00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:03,200 Speaker 1: because you're trying to like find people who might have 390 00:23:03,400 --> 00:23:05,960 Speaker 1: Like that's part of how you can make a case 391 00:23:05,960 --> 00:23:08,600 Speaker 1: against people is if you can prove they know details 392 00:23:08,640 --> 00:23:10,680 Speaker 1: of the case that aren't publicly possible, Like there's a 393 00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:12,960 Speaker 1: reason why they're not going to say what caliber the 394 00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:15,359 Speaker 1: weapon is or whatever. Yeah, they did say it wasn't 395 00:23:15,400 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: the same as the one used in the Metcalf attack, 396 00:23:19,080 --> 00:23:22,720 Speaker 1: which was seven six too short, So yes, but the 397 00:23:22,840 --> 00:23:24,879 Speaker 1: gun that was used on the December, North Carolina attack 398 00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:30,640 Speaker 1: was different than the case. Things found at at the 399 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:34,120 Speaker 1: doesn't mean much. That does not mean much at all. 400 00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:36,840 Speaker 1: I know there was a lot of initial sort of 401 00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:40,359 Speaker 1: anger and frustration over the use of the word vandalism 402 00:23:40,359 --> 00:23:43,600 Speaker 1: and the initial reporting. Um, I think it's fine to 403 00:23:43,680 --> 00:23:46,720 Speaker 1: use that word because when you don't know what happened, 404 00:23:47,280 --> 00:23:50,240 Speaker 1: all you can see that happened is that someone damaged property. 405 00:23:50,280 --> 00:23:52,320 Speaker 1: We don't know the motivations behind it. We don't know 406 00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:55,560 Speaker 1: that they intended to knock out power because, like we said, 407 00:23:55,840 --> 00:23:58,120 Speaker 1: sometimes people in the woods just shoot it ship because 408 00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:02,320 Speaker 1: it's it's funny. So I think it's fair to not 409 00:24:02,400 --> 00:24:04,399 Speaker 1: want to use that word. But I think in initial reporting, 410 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 1: especially from authorities, especially from people who could get suit 411 00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 1: reliable later down the line, the word vandalism is not incorrect. No, 412 00:24:13,040 --> 00:24:16,199 Speaker 1: and it's this is like I think, if you're at 413 00:24:16,320 --> 00:24:18,760 Speaker 1: if you want to know, like what would immediately set 414 00:24:18,800 --> 00:24:21,560 Speaker 1: someone someone off that like something is likely not vandalism. Well, 415 00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:25,479 Speaker 1: the Metcalf attack is good because so much was fired 416 00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:28,680 Speaker 1: at the transformer. I would say if like the thing 417 00:24:28,680 --> 00:24:30,159 Speaker 1: that would make me think maybe this is just some 418 00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: you who fucking around is if it's thirty rounds are 419 00:24:32,880 --> 00:24:35,400 Speaker 1: less fired and there's no attempt to actually break onto 420 00:24:35,400 --> 00:24:42,960 Speaker 1: the facility kind of a standard capacity magazine. Which the 421 00:24:42,960 --> 00:24:46,600 Speaker 1: reason why because because the North Carolina attack in December 422 00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:49,720 Speaker 1: did not have many rounds. But the reason why it 423 00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:53,160 Speaker 1: isn't we do know it's intentional is two substations were hit, 424 00:24:54,560 --> 00:24:57,160 Speaker 1: like like one person hit one, then travel and went 425 00:24:57,240 --> 00:24:59,119 Speaker 1: to another, and it was like, I just seem like 426 00:24:59,160 --> 00:25:01,200 Speaker 1: a lot of a lot of people's sort of expressing 427 00:25:01,200 --> 00:25:03,280 Speaker 1: this outrage. But you know is we're tying these other 428 00:25:03,359 --> 00:25:05,399 Speaker 1: instance to it, you know, the ones in Florida, the 429 00:25:05,440 --> 00:25:08,520 Speaker 1: ones in Pacific Northwest when we have very little information, 430 00:25:08,560 --> 00:25:11,800 Speaker 1: it's okay to call it vandalism because that's the baseline, 431 00:25:11,880 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 1: right that you don't have to If you start using 432 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:16,680 Speaker 1: terrorism for every minor incident, it it dilutes it. It's 433 00:25:16,680 --> 00:25:18,960 Speaker 1: not helpful, it creates the area. So I just wanted 434 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:24,479 Speaker 1: to on the table. I mean, like so, even in 435 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:29,800 Speaker 1: like November, the FBI was issuing warnings of of of 436 00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:34,240 Speaker 1: reported threats to electricity infrastructure by people espousing racially or 437 00:25:34,280 --> 00:25:39,240 Speaker 1: ethnically motivated extreme ideologies to quote create civil disorder and 438 00:25:39,280 --> 00:25:43,520 Speaker 1: inspire further violence. So FBI was sending bulletins to to 439 00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:48,240 Speaker 1: private industry UM multiple times in the past two months. 440 00:25:48,240 --> 00:25:51,600 Speaker 1: There's been a lot of bulletins being sent out, which 441 00:25:51,600 --> 00:25:54,440 Speaker 1: is I think part of why this in the aftermath 442 00:25:54,480 --> 00:25:56,720 Speaker 1: of the attacks, with all these public record requests and 443 00:25:56,760 --> 00:25:59,360 Speaker 1: more reporting on it, where people are realizing how much 444 00:25:59,359 --> 00:26:02,399 Speaker 1: of a thing is actual The is UM I think 445 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:06,160 Speaker 1: and and and a tax with these on on sub 446 00:26:06,200 --> 00:26:09,560 Speaker 1: stations or other power grain infrastructure are definitely more common 447 00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: than what you might think, and do seem to be 448 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:14,439 Speaker 1: increasing in frequency on in the in the broad sense, 449 00:26:14,960 --> 00:26:18,960 Speaker 1: and some of some of them are certainly have, as 450 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:21,480 Speaker 1: we know from arrest that have taken place are part 451 00:26:21,480 --> 00:26:24,840 Speaker 1: of decentralized right wing attempts at an insurrection. That's not 452 00:26:24,960 --> 00:26:29,119 Speaker 1: wrong to say, it's just the problem is larger and 453 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:32,679 Speaker 1: more complicated than that, and to some extent it's a 454 00:26:32,760 --> 00:26:34,760 Speaker 1: problem of like like I I would, I would be 455 00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:37,119 Speaker 1: shocked if part of the explanation for why this is 456 00:26:37,119 --> 00:26:40,280 Speaker 1: happening so much more is not that Americans have a 457 00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:43,399 Speaker 1: shipload of guns and during the pandemic people were bored 458 00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:47,280 Speaker 1: and kind of going crazy, Like you know, people have 459 00:26:47,359 --> 00:26:50,000 Speaker 1: no chill. Yeah, they have no chill. They're stuck at 460 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:52,000 Speaker 1: home and you're out in the middle of nowhere, and 461 00:26:52,040 --> 00:26:54,280 Speaker 1: it's easy to do and you want to see something spark. 462 00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:56,919 Speaker 1: That's part of the problem, right, yeah, I mean, and 463 00:26:57,119 --> 00:27:01,680 Speaker 1: they have an increasing since there's there were seventy reports 464 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:06,840 Speaker 1: of emergency every electric incidents and disturbances caused by suspected 465 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:12,360 Speaker 1: physical attacks, sabotage or vandalism from January to August two UM. 466 00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:19,639 Speaker 1: That figure represents increase around reports in which is the 467 00:27:19,640 --> 00:27:23,040 Speaker 1: first year that there's comparable data for, and it's it's 468 00:27:23,200 --> 00:27:26,040 Speaker 1: also worth really noting that there is and was as 469 00:27:26,080 --> 00:27:30,760 Speaker 1: soon As this happened in metcalf In, suggestions were made 470 00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:33,280 Speaker 1: as to a really easy way to make it harder 471 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:36,440 Speaker 1: to do this, which would not be wildly expensive, which 472 00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:39,160 Speaker 1: is to put sandbags in front of the coolant systems, 473 00:27:39,440 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 1: which will block most conventional rounds. And at that point, yeah, 474 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:47,800 Speaker 1: not not hard to accomplish, and it would also let 475 00:27:47,800 --> 00:27:51,600 Speaker 1: you know, anyone who is going to get around those 476 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:59,080 Speaker 1: sandbags ideologically committed, right whatever. The reason why there is 477 00:27:59,080 --> 00:28:01,840 Speaker 1: so many of these attacks is because a lot of 478 00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 1: these very important pieces of infrastructure are highly visible and 479 00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:08,879 Speaker 1: really only protected by a channelingk fence. So in a 480 00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:11,720 Speaker 1: lot of cases an attack can be carried out without 481 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:15,240 Speaker 1: even entering any kind of restricted grounds. You can point 482 00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:17,320 Speaker 1: a gun through a channel link fence and and do 483 00:28:17,359 --> 00:28:21,200 Speaker 1: the thing. I mean, you can be yeah, hundreds of 484 00:28:21,240 --> 00:28:24,160 Speaker 1: yards away, right, It's very like a three oh eight. 485 00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:26,760 Speaker 1: You could be easily several hundred yards away, out of 486 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:28,640 Speaker 1: the range of any camera, and you could take enough 487 00:28:28,680 --> 00:28:30,399 Speaker 1: pot shots to destroy it. It It has that kind of 488 00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:35,560 Speaker 1: penetrative power. A thirty at six, you know, yeah, not hunting, right, 489 00:28:35,560 --> 00:28:39,480 Speaker 1: whether your granddad has you know, yeah, anyone who shoots 490 00:28:39,520 --> 00:28:42,800 Speaker 1: elk regularly could do this, you know, without any without 491 00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:45,360 Speaker 1: without any realistic way of catching them if you're out 492 00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:49,160 Speaker 1: in a rural area. I'm kind of shocked that these 493 00:28:49,160 --> 00:28:52,920 Speaker 1: people actually didn't like in terms of like I don't know, like, um, 494 00:28:53,040 --> 00:28:55,600 Speaker 1: there's there's this. We can talk about this later. But 495 00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:58,360 Speaker 1: obviously the area they're in has a very high concentration 496 00:28:58,400 --> 00:29:01,960 Speaker 1: of very heavily trained people an unconventional warfare. But oh 497 00:29:02,040 --> 00:29:04,120 Speaker 1: yes we should that is that is a factor in 498 00:29:04,160 --> 00:29:07,520 Speaker 1: North Carolina that all of this is occurring on the 499 00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:10,840 Speaker 1: outskirts of Fort Bragg and a year ago people who 500 00:29:10,840 --> 00:29:14,240 Speaker 1: were active duty Marines attempted to carry out a similar attack, 501 00:29:14,360 --> 00:29:17,040 Speaker 1: and we're not Do we want to talk about a 502 00:29:17,080 --> 00:29:21,760 Speaker 1: little bit about that, specifically about Robin Sage. Yeah, yeah, 503 00:29:22,320 --> 00:29:24,520 Speaker 1: I think it's relevant certainly. Like the first thing I 504 00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:27,240 Speaker 1: thought when I thought about this area was like, oh, ship, 505 00:29:27,320 --> 00:29:30,280 Speaker 1: that's right by Serthern Pines. I think maybe the show 506 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:32,960 Speaker 1: was supposed to happen in Seven Pines, which is kind 507 00:29:32,960 --> 00:29:37,080 Speaker 1: of central to the United States Army Special Forces community, 508 00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:40,880 Speaker 1: and a few times a year there people newly qualifying 509 00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:45,480 Speaker 1: to be SF soldiers will do an exercise called Robin Sage. 510 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:50,520 Speaker 1: It's it's military laping. Yeah, well like them, Yeah, yes, 511 00:29:50,760 --> 00:29:54,040 Speaker 1: it's the military doing lapping, but also not the military, right, 512 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:56,960 Speaker 1: So like people I'm sure will be familiar, and people 513 00:29:56,960 --> 00:29:59,240 Speaker 1: who enjoy Twitter dot com will be familiar in the 514 00:29:59,280 --> 00:30:02,520 Speaker 1: fact that they the United States have sometimes helped rebel 515 00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,120 Speaker 1: movements across the world to overthrow a government. So it's 516 00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:07,560 Speaker 1: the thing that it likes to do. It's yeah, it's 517 00:30:07,560 --> 00:30:11,120 Speaker 1: shocking that the yeah, they every revolution in fact has 518 00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:13,880 Speaker 1: been fermented by the United States and the CIA specifically 519 00:30:14,240 --> 00:30:18,040 Speaker 1: because people can't think for themselves, and so they what 520 00:30:18,160 --> 00:30:21,120 Speaker 1: they do in robin stage is they practice training a 521 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:25,400 Speaker 1: rebel movement that's comprised to civilians, right or untrained fighters. 522 00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:28,280 Speaker 1: So these people will go out in small teams in 523 00:30:28,360 --> 00:30:30,960 Speaker 1: pil and then they'll meet a bunch of people who 524 00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:33,560 Speaker 1: are not soldiers. They might be former soldiers, they might 525 00:30:33,600 --> 00:30:37,040 Speaker 1: be local volunteers, there might be people from the area, um, 526 00:30:37,560 --> 00:30:39,600 Speaker 1: and they will train them for a few days, right, 527 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:41,560 Speaker 1: just like they would if they were actually training up 528 00:30:41,600 --> 00:30:43,720 Speaker 1: like a gorilla army. And then they'll do a simulated 529 00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:48,320 Speaker 1: attack which you might recognize us potentially a bad idea 530 00:30:48,600 --> 00:30:51,360 Speaker 1: which which we now might be seeing as an issue 531 00:30:51,360 --> 00:30:55,080 Speaker 1: because someone someone didn't attack. So like you have in 532 00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:58,920 Speaker 1: that area a ton of SF troops, right, and who 533 00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: span the artical spectrum, and a ton of randos who 534 00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:06,479 Speaker 1: have been trained by SF troops in guerrilla warfare, right, 535 00:31:06,520 --> 00:31:09,320 Speaker 1: unconventional warfare is what they call it. And if you 536 00:31:09,360 --> 00:31:12,920 Speaker 1: were doing unconventional warfare, this would be a very effective 537 00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:15,240 Speaker 1: thing to do, right. That's why there's been this massive 538 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:18,240 Speaker 1: panic about cyber attacks on the grid, especially since the 539 00:31:18,280 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 1: start of the war in Ukraine. Very funny we panicked 540 00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:22,720 Speaker 1: about cyber attacks from the fact you could just go 541 00:31:22,800 --> 00:31:25,080 Speaker 1: shoot it. You don't need to be that complex. But 542 00:31:25,440 --> 00:31:28,360 Speaker 1: that's right, it's a weak point and and you would 543 00:31:28,480 --> 00:31:31,840 Speaker 1: know that if you've been practicing unconventional warfare, and so 544 00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:35,600 Speaker 1: like this happening in this very specific area kind of 545 00:31:35,640 --> 00:31:38,800 Speaker 1: racing flags from me. It's not super weird that this 546 00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:41,000 Speaker 1: is the second time in the course of a year 547 00:31:41,080 --> 00:31:44,000 Speaker 1: that there's been an attempt or successful attack on North 548 00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:48,560 Speaker 1: Carolina power infrastructure, right, Like, it's not suprised. This is 549 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:53,760 Speaker 1: at the very least the DHS is not surprised about this. 550 00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:57,600 Speaker 1: Earlier this year, they've they've issued many alerts warning that 551 00:31:57,640 --> 00:32:00,400 Speaker 1: domestic right and extremists are gonna are planning to target 552 00:32:00,440 --> 00:32:03,600 Speaker 1: the power grid. UM. In February three, people like to 553 00:32:03,640 --> 00:32:07,520 Speaker 1: plead guilty, which we already talked about. UM. There was 554 00:32:07,560 --> 00:32:11,880 Speaker 1: those people arrested in Idaho. They were planning attacks on 555 00:32:11,880 --> 00:32:17,240 Speaker 1: on power stations and highlighting, highlighting locations of transformers and 556 00:32:17,320 --> 00:32:20,960 Speaker 1: other substations and other power infrastructure and planning to take 557 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:22,680 Speaker 1: them out and then using the black oats to go 558 00:32:22,760 --> 00:32:28,200 Speaker 1: do other crimes, including assassinating ideological opponents. So like, there's 559 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:30,360 Speaker 1: there's been a lot of there's been a lot of 560 00:32:30,360 --> 00:32:34,000 Speaker 1: extra focus on people's plans to do infrastructure attacks and uh, 561 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:37,320 Speaker 1: you know, plans on like, hey, this seems like a problem, 562 00:32:37,320 --> 00:32:39,680 Speaker 1: and people have been talking about it more because it 563 00:32:39,720 --> 00:32:42,880 Speaker 1: does seem to there isn't at least increasingly high, high 564 00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:47,360 Speaker 1: high profile cases UM and at least in the case 565 00:32:47,440 --> 00:32:50,120 Speaker 1: of this past one in North Carolina, the d the 566 00:32:50,240 --> 00:32:53,280 Speaker 1: DHS is currently saying that it does appear to be 567 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:57,680 Speaker 1: deliberate UM, and they're they're investigating to see if it's 568 00:32:58,160 --> 00:33:02,160 Speaker 1: if it is tied to ideological motive UM. But again 569 00:33:02,200 --> 00:33:04,120 Speaker 1: it's it is worth emphasizing that not all of these 570 00:33:04,120 --> 00:33:07,360 Speaker 1: things are are these types of incidents. Like an example 571 00:33:07,400 --> 00:33:10,160 Speaker 1: of something that I think has been misreported on is 572 00:33:10,480 --> 00:33:14,280 Speaker 1: this recent attack or it's not an attack, but it's 573 00:33:14,280 --> 00:33:17,520 Speaker 1: been reported as an attack. In South Carolina, UM on 574 00:33:18,080 --> 00:33:20,520 Speaker 1: December seventh, there was an individual in a truck that 575 00:33:20,560 --> 00:33:25,120 Speaker 1: opened fire near a a Dooke Energy facility. UM employees 576 00:33:25,160 --> 00:33:29,120 Speaker 1: witnessed the struck pull up. It was around five thirty pm. UH. 577 00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:31,640 Speaker 1: This guy opened fire and what appeared to be a 578 00:33:31,640 --> 00:33:34,440 Speaker 1: long gun and then sped away. No one was hurt, 579 00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:37,880 Speaker 1: there was no outages, there was no reported property damage. 580 00:33:38,440 --> 00:33:42,280 Speaker 1: UM and currently sheriffs are saying that this was that 581 00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:45,480 Speaker 1: this was a completely random act that was that wasn't 582 00:33:45,520 --> 00:33:47,920 Speaker 1: even targeted at the power station. They said that the 583 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:52,160 Speaker 1: only connection between this shooting and the power station was 584 00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:55,120 Speaker 1: their proximity. This wasn't an actual attack on a power station. 585 00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:58,240 Speaker 1: This was just a coincidence. But because this was a 586 00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:00,840 Speaker 1: few days after this attack in North Carolina, people can 587 00:34:00,840 --> 00:34:03,720 Speaker 1: read headlines about someone shooting outside of power station in 588 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:06,000 Speaker 1: South Carolina and get turned into this big thing and 589 00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:07,840 Speaker 1: you're like, that's actually not what's going on. You need 590 00:34:07,880 --> 00:34:10,760 Speaker 1: to look a little bit closer. Similarly with this stuff 591 00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:14,520 Speaker 1: in Florida, UH, you know, there's been a lot of retroactively, 592 00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:19,480 Speaker 1: you know, trying to apply this this this accelerations idea 593 00:34:19,520 --> 00:34:23,280 Speaker 1: onto those onto those instances as well, when there's simply 594 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:27,480 Speaker 1: not the evidence. Yeah, it's um. One of the things 595 00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:29,840 Speaker 1: you have to, like, as talking about the fat the 596 00:34:29,880 --> 00:34:33,399 Speaker 1: folks who are like insurrection ary, one of the force 597 00:34:33,520 --> 00:34:36,120 Speaker 1: multipliers they have is that the United States has a 598 00:34:36,160 --> 00:34:41,400 Speaker 1: tremendous amount of people who are just assholes and have guns, um, 599 00:34:41,480 --> 00:34:44,120 Speaker 1: and that that's just their own guns, guns they stole 600 00:34:44,200 --> 00:34:47,280 Speaker 1: from the military. That that is also a factor specific 601 00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:50,640 Speaker 1: James's point about the proximity to Fort Bragg though, you 602 00:34:50,640 --> 00:34:53,880 Speaker 1: know for Bragg in Campball June obviously different branch of 603 00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:55,720 Speaker 1: the military, different parts of the state of North Carolina. 604 00:34:55,760 --> 00:34:57,120 Speaker 1: But you know there was that attack last month. It 605 00:34:57,160 --> 00:34:58,680 Speaker 1: was near Camp La June. We have the Camp La 606 00:34:58,760 --> 00:35:02,400 Speaker 1: June sell that was wrapped up. They're actually still awaiting 607 00:35:02,440 --> 00:35:06,000 Speaker 1: trial on the third superseding indictment. And they were stealing guns, right, 608 00:35:06,040 --> 00:35:09,239 Speaker 1: or at least they got cons from the military. The 609 00:35:09,280 --> 00:35:15,120 Speaker 1: initial indictment was for illegal for trafficking any illegal guns. Yeah. Yeah, 610 00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:17,880 Speaker 1: the Marine cort lost a ton of plastic explosive at 611 00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:22,520 Speaker 1: twenty nine palms last year as well, like a very 612 00:35:22,600 --> 00:35:27,880 Speaker 1: large amount, which is is concerning, Yeah, a startling quantity 613 00:35:27,920 --> 00:35:31,200 Speaker 1: of high explosives. Right, And so I was combing comers 614 00:35:31,239 --> 00:35:34,400 Speaker 1: for anything mentioning Fort Bragg looking for other cases related 615 00:35:34,480 --> 00:35:36,840 Speaker 1: to this specific geografo area because the More County is 616 00:35:37,239 --> 00:35:40,960 Speaker 1: literally right outside Fort Brag, which is where the U. S. 617 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:45,520 Speaker 1: Army Special Horses um are are hanging out. And so 618 00:35:45,560 --> 00:35:47,400 Speaker 1: this would not be the first time we had radicalized 619 00:35:47,400 --> 00:35:49,319 Speaker 1: soldiers out of Fort Bragg. I mean, you go back 620 00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:51,759 Speaker 1: to the eighties, Michael Tubbs, a founding member of the 621 00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:54,360 Speaker 1: League of the South, did his first terrorism when he 622 00:35:54,440 --> 00:35:58,080 Speaker 1: and some other Special Forces buddies committed armed robbery of 623 00:35:58,200 --> 00:36:01,960 Speaker 1: machine guns from the Army for the clan. Yeah, with 624 00:36:02,040 --> 00:36:05,200 Speaker 1: the intention of using them to start a race war. Yeah. 625 00:36:05,640 --> 00:36:09,240 Speaker 1: But then in August of this year, a Special Forces 626 00:36:09,280 --> 00:36:13,680 Speaker 1: soldier named Killian Ryan was indicted for lying on his 627 00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:18,120 Speaker 1: security clearance application. He had already been granted a security clearance. 628 00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:20,640 Speaker 1: Mind you, he had been granted this clearance um, but 629 00:36:20,719 --> 00:36:23,640 Speaker 1: it turns out he was a Nazi. I don't know 630 00:36:23,640 --> 00:36:26,480 Speaker 1: how the security clearance process didn't catch the fact that 631 00:36:26,560 --> 00:36:31,040 Speaker 1: his email address was Nazi ace fourteen eight at gmail 632 00:36:31,080 --> 00:36:41,560 Speaker 1: dot com that he and sometimes sometimes it's sometimes it's 633 00:36:41,640 --> 00:36:44,000 Speaker 1: it's hard to check. You know, there's lots of simple 634 00:36:44,040 --> 00:36:47,400 Speaker 1: mistakes that anyone could make. Anybody can make this kind 635 00:36:47,400 --> 00:36:48,879 Speaker 1: of this thing. So you know, you see, this wasn't 636 00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:51,560 Speaker 1: a surprise to DHS and it shouldn't be. These are 637 00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:54,680 Speaker 1: the mistakes. UM. I also did want to note, as 638 00:36:54,719 --> 00:36:58,560 Speaker 1: we're talking about these Special Forces guys and the potential 639 00:36:58,640 --> 00:37:03,200 Speaker 1: of them being radical, there's also Timothy McVeigh. Well, Timothy 640 00:37:03,239 --> 00:37:06,800 Speaker 1: McVeigh was regular army, Um, but he washed out a 641 00:37:06,840 --> 00:37:10,799 Speaker 1: Special Forces. Yeah, he didn't quite make it. Um. But 642 00:37:12,239 --> 00:37:17,520 Speaker 1: what's his name? Yeah? Um, yeah, there's this is this 643 00:37:17,600 --> 00:37:21,279 Speaker 1: is like not a this is not an uncommon thing. 644 00:37:21,840 --> 00:37:25,200 Speaker 1: Currently writing a story that includes a large section about 645 00:37:25,239 --> 00:37:31,200 Speaker 1: a marine that tried to steal equipment, uh from military 646 00:37:31,200 --> 00:37:36,800 Speaker 1: bases to then go do a mass shooting at a synagogue. Um, 647 00:37:36,840 --> 00:37:39,759 Speaker 1: and this guy has what was a Nazi before he 648 00:37:39,840 --> 00:37:43,200 Speaker 1: joined the Marines, and he shot on the Marines until 649 00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:45,480 Speaker 1: we figured out what's going on. We have got to 650 00:37:45,520 --> 00:37:48,439 Speaker 1: shut this down until we figured out what's going on. 651 00:37:48,719 --> 00:37:51,799 Speaker 1: So um, Yeah, and you've got Eric Rudolph, the guy 652 00:37:51,800 --> 00:37:55,760 Speaker 1: who carried out the Olympic Park bombings in nineties six 653 00:37:55,960 --> 00:37:58,560 Speaker 1: was was with the first Airborne Division. He was an 654 00:37:58,600 --> 00:38:02,040 Speaker 1: air Assault specialist UM and he carried out the bombing 655 00:38:02,120 --> 00:38:04,359 Speaker 1: of the Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, and then went 656 00:38:04,360 --> 00:38:07,560 Speaker 1: on the run for months. I think, yeah, and he 657 00:38:07,600 --> 00:38:10,120 Speaker 1: was a Nazi by the way, Oh it was. He 658 00:38:10,160 --> 00:38:13,840 Speaker 1: was on the run for a long time. He detail 659 00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:16,839 Speaker 1: all the squirrel and nothing he did in the woods. Yes. Uh. 660 00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:18,640 Speaker 1: And by the way, he carried out a number of 661 00:38:18,680 --> 00:38:21,880 Speaker 1: other bombings, including he carried out a bombing of an 662 00:38:21,880 --> 00:38:25,520 Speaker 1: abortion clinic. He carried out the bombing of a lesbian bar. Um. 663 00:38:25,719 --> 00:38:29,160 Speaker 1: We talked about this earlier this year on Yeah. We 664 00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:32,840 Speaker 1: we did part of one of our mini series we 665 00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:34,960 Speaker 1: talked about this guy. We had we had, we had 666 00:38:34,960 --> 00:38:38,040 Speaker 1: a whole episode dedicated to him. I I do want 667 00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:40,080 Speaker 1: to briefly talk about some of the stuff happening in 668 00:38:40,080 --> 00:38:42,799 Speaker 1: the Pacific Northwest as well, and how this ties in 669 00:38:42,840 --> 00:38:45,279 Speaker 1: and how there is as opposed to some of the 670 00:38:45,280 --> 00:38:48,040 Speaker 1: incidents that were like the incident in South Carolina. Stuff 671 00:38:48,040 --> 00:38:51,399 Speaker 1: in the Pacific Northwest, while happening previous to the North 672 00:38:51,440 --> 00:38:54,680 Speaker 1: Carolina attack, does seem to be deliberate, UM and has 673 00:38:54,880 --> 00:38:57,880 Speaker 1: there has been some interesting pieces of information that have 674 00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:00,840 Speaker 1: come out in the past few days. So the electrical 675 00:39:00,880 --> 00:39:03,680 Speaker 1: grid has been physically attacked at least six times in 676 00:39:03,760 --> 00:39:08,120 Speaker 1: Oregon and western Washington since mid November. Attackers used firearms 677 00:39:08,160 --> 00:39:09,800 Speaker 1: and at least some of the incidents in both states, 678 00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:13,040 Speaker 1: and some power customers in Oregon and Washington experienced at 679 00:39:13,080 --> 00:39:17,760 Speaker 1: least brief service disruptions as a result of the attacks. 680 00:39:17,800 --> 00:39:21,320 Speaker 1: Just two days before the North Carolina attacks, the FBI 681 00:39:21,480 --> 00:39:24,600 Speaker 1: and Organs Tighten Fusion Center issued a memo that warned 682 00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:29,280 Speaker 1: utilities about this about both these recent attacks and how 683 00:39:29,320 --> 00:39:32,320 Speaker 1: there could be more of them, UH, saying quote, power 684 00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:35,319 Speaker 1: companies in organ Washington have reported physical attacks on substations 685 00:39:35,400 --> 00:39:40,960 Speaker 1: using hand tools, arson, firearms, and metal chains, possibly in 686 00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:45,000 Speaker 1: response to an online call for attacks on critical infrastructure. 687 00:39:45,640 --> 00:39:49,800 Speaker 1: UH continuing to say that in recent attacks, criminal actors 688 00:39:49,840 --> 00:39:53,640 Speaker 1: by passed security fences by cutting the fence links, lighting 689 00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:57,160 Speaker 1: nearby fires, shooting equipment for my distance, or throwing objects 690 00:39:57,200 --> 00:40:00,839 Speaker 1: over the fence and on too. The equipment and the aim, 691 00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:05,000 Speaker 1: according to memo is quote violent anti government criminal attack, 692 00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:08,160 Speaker 1: which is kind of a catch all term that these 693 00:40:08,200 --> 00:40:11,799 Speaker 1: people use for a whole bunch of kind of white 694 00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:16,000 Speaker 1: supremacists affiliated accelerationist violence. It's kind of a silly term 695 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:19,200 Speaker 1: because these people really aren't anti government. They just they 696 00:40:19,239 --> 00:40:24,799 Speaker 1: just want they're anti this government because they think this 697 00:40:24,880 --> 00:40:28,879 Speaker 1: government is too liberal. Um. But but yeah, so there 698 00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:31,200 Speaker 1: was there was an attack on a substation in Clackumus 699 00:40:31,239 --> 00:40:34,680 Speaker 1: County on Thanksgiving morning. The power company calls this a 700 00:40:34,680 --> 00:40:38,120 Speaker 1: deliberate physical attack. Um. This is the one where two 701 00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:41,200 Speaker 1: people cut through fences and use firearms to shoot up 702 00:40:41,480 --> 00:40:45,480 Speaker 1: and disabled numerous pieces of equipment. A security specialist for 703 00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:48,400 Speaker 1: the company wrote this kind of brief on it and 704 00:40:48,400 --> 00:40:52,520 Speaker 1: and and has mentioned how that there are local people 705 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:55,759 Speaker 1: who are affiliated with you know, larger networks of extremist 706 00:40:55,760 --> 00:40:59,120 Speaker 1: groups that have called for such attacks and have provided 707 00:40:59,160 --> 00:41:02,720 Speaker 1: instructions on how to do these types of things, um 708 00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:05,600 Speaker 1: and saying, quote, there's been a significant uptick in incidence 709 00:41:05,680 --> 00:41:10,040 Speaker 1: of break ins related to copper and tool or materials theft, 710 00:41:10,320 --> 00:41:15,640 Speaker 1: but now we are dealing with quickly escalating incidents of sabotage. Um. 711 00:41:15,760 --> 00:41:17,960 Speaker 1: So that's the kind of that that's that's the brief 712 00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:20,919 Speaker 1: from the security security specialist who works at this power 713 00:41:20,960 --> 00:41:24,120 Speaker 1: company UM. Four days after that Thanksgiving morning attack, there 714 00:41:24,160 --> 00:41:27,040 Speaker 1: was another incident at a Portland General Electric substation, also 715 00:41:27,040 --> 00:41:28,920 Speaker 1: in the clack of this area. So these things happened 716 00:41:28,960 --> 00:41:31,480 Speaker 1: pretty close to one another in the same county. Some 717 00:41:31,520 --> 00:41:33,960 Speaker 1: of the same people were affected. A few details on 718 00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:37,320 Speaker 1: this one have been released UM, but the PG and 719 00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:39,640 Speaker 1: E team said that quote, our teams have assessed the 720 00:41:39,719 --> 00:41:43,720 Speaker 1: damage and have begun to repair the impacted facilities. Knocking 721 00:41:43,760 --> 00:41:46,319 Speaker 1: out the lights is it can be an end goal, 722 00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:49,080 Speaker 1: right that everyone it's it's dark, and if everyone's inconvenience, 723 00:41:49,120 --> 00:41:53,000 Speaker 1: and there's an idea that you know, making things worse 724 00:41:53,320 --> 00:41:56,839 Speaker 1: will help fence sitters radicalized towards towards the right and 725 00:41:57,200 --> 00:42:01,280 Speaker 1: become accelerations themselves. But that darkness it's not its own 726 00:42:01,520 --> 00:42:03,160 Speaker 1: end goal for some of these people, you know, in 727 00:42:03,200 --> 00:42:06,000 Speaker 1: the the Campbell of June cell in the Collins case, 728 00:42:06,440 --> 00:42:09,480 Speaker 1: they specifically spelled out in some of their planning discussions 729 00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:13,319 Speaker 1: that the darkness was stepped one once the lights were out, 730 00:42:13,440 --> 00:42:17,080 Speaker 1: Once UM infrastructure was damaged, the police were distracted, communications 731 00:42:17,080 --> 00:42:19,359 Speaker 1: were down, people couldn't use their cell phones. They would 732 00:42:19,440 --> 00:42:22,000 Speaker 1: use that period of chaos to carry out a series 733 00:42:22,000 --> 00:42:25,880 Speaker 1: of targeted assassinations. And that's not a new idea either. UM. 734 00:42:25,920 --> 00:42:31,000 Speaker 1: I found a case from the nineties even UM, this 735 00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:34,120 Speaker 1: case from the late nineties, the North American Militia. It 736 00:42:34,160 --> 00:42:38,080 Speaker 1: was a splinter group from the Michigan Militia Wolverines Randy 737 00:42:38,120 --> 00:42:41,319 Speaker 1: Graham and Ken Carter went down in this case. UM. 738 00:42:41,400 --> 00:42:45,719 Speaker 1: They were reconning targets including power stations, TV stations, and 739 00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:49,120 Speaker 1: military based federal buildings, and their plan was to knock 740 00:42:49,160 --> 00:42:52,360 Speaker 1: out communications and power and use that period of chaos 741 00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:55,319 Speaker 1: to kill several federal judges and politicians. So this is 742 00:42:55,640 --> 00:42:57,719 Speaker 1: a recurring theme. You know that this case was in 743 00:42:57,719 --> 00:42:59,239 Speaker 1: the nineties, and then we have that recent case, the 744 00:42:59,239 --> 00:43:02,560 Speaker 1: Collins case. The Skuyes haven't even been tried yet, UM, 745 00:43:02,560 --> 00:43:05,000 Speaker 1: and the stated intention is to use that period of 746 00:43:05,040 --> 00:43:09,120 Speaker 1: chaos to do additional crimes of terrorism. And I mean 747 00:43:09,280 --> 00:43:11,880 Speaker 1: there has been more incidents that definitely do seem to 748 00:43:11,880 --> 00:43:14,480 Speaker 1: be intentional, Like beyond the ones in Oregon, there was 749 00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:18,080 Speaker 1: also ones in western Washington UM that that included setting 750 00:43:18,120 --> 00:43:21,440 Speaker 1: the control houses on fire force entry and sabotage of 751 00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:25,760 Speaker 1: intricate electrical control systems causing short circuits by tossing chains 752 00:43:25,760 --> 00:43:29,239 Speaker 1: over the overhead bus work and a ballistic attack with 753 00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:32,400 Speaker 1: small caliber firearms, And so that's that's a lot of 754 00:43:32,400 --> 00:43:36,480 Speaker 1: stuff going into uh of like like in terms of 755 00:43:37,040 --> 00:43:40,440 Speaker 1: planning and preparation going into something that's happening. That's a 756 00:43:40,480 --> 00:43:43,480 Speaker 1: perfect example. Yeah, And if you're, as a general rule, 757 00:43:43,520 --> 00:43:45,920 Speaker 1: if you are encountering one of these stories and you're 758 00:43:45,920 --> 00:43:48,680 Speaker 1: trying to determine should I put this in my head 759 00:43:48,719 --> 00:43:51,880 Speaker 1: as something that is maybe part of something bigger or 760 00:43:51,920 --> 00:43:54,719 Speaker 1: something that might be people fucking around? That's the kind 761 00:43:54,719 --> 00:43:57,000 Speaker 1: of stuff to look for, is like how much effort 762 00:43:57,040 --> 00:43:59,839 Speaker 1: went into it, how elaborate was it? Does it seem 763 00:44:00,120 --> 00:44:02,279 Speaker 1: planning was involved? I would say. Another thing is like 764 00:44:02,719 --> 00:44:06,319 Speaker 1: does it seem is it timed for something like Thanksgiving? Right? Like, 765 00:44:06,440 --> 00:44:09,200 Speaker 1: it's not an accident that they picked Thanksgiving to attack 766 00:44:09,239 --> 00:44:12,359 Speaker 1: a substation. Because if you're trying to do something that's 767 00:44:12,360 --> 00:44:14,160 Speaker 1: going to have an impact doing it on a day 768 00:44:14,160 --> 00:44:16,520 Speaker 1: like that where everybody's at home, people are and there's 769 00:44:16,560 --> 00:44:19,360 Speaker 1: also a higher power draw in general, Like, there's a 770 00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:21,239 Speaker 1: lot of reasons why someone would want to do that, 771 00:44:21,320 --> 00:44:24,200 Speaker 1: but it all points towards this is something that's part 772 00:44:24,239 --> 00:44:28,319 Speaker 1: of an organized set of actions. As opposed to the 773 00:44:28,440 --> 00:44:32,279 Speaker 1: normal thing of Americans attacking their own power infrastructure for 774 00:44:32,320 --> 00:44:37,239 Speaker 1: no good reason. Yeah, which we love to do. Do 775 00:44:37,560 --> 00:44:38,920 Speaker 1: you do you know? Do you know what else we 776 00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:43,399 Speaker 1: we love to do? Robert consume goods and services. That's right. 777 00:44:43,440 --> 00:44:48,000 Speaker 1: We love, we loves and our hero based Lasso King 778 00:44:48,040 --> 00:45:01,520 Speaker 1: would say, that's part of the problem. Hey, we're back, 779 00:45:02,560 --> 00:45:06,000 Speaker 1: all right, Garrison, take us take us home, which hopefully 780 00:45:06,120 --> 00:45:11,120 Speaker 1: is not Fort Bragg No, yeah, yeah, okay, but this 781 00:45:11,160 --> 00:45:16,080 Speaker 1: podcast is run by the usual Yeah, hopefully hopefully not 782 00:45:16,680 --> 00:45:20,280 Speaker 1: so so. Yeah. The past year, we've seen federal authorities 783 00:45:20,360 --> 00:45:23,480 Speaker 1: multiple times worn about these types of threats to critical infrastructure. 784 00:45:23,840 --> 00:45:28,200 Speaker 1: There was a local bulletin posted in late November after 785 00:45:28,239 --> 00:45:31,480 Speaker 1: the attacks in Oregon and Washington, UH saying that the 786 00:45:31,560 --> 00:45:36,399 Speaker 1: targets of potential violence includes public gatherings, faith based institutions, 787 00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:40,800 Speaker 1: l g B, t Q plus communities, UM schools, racial 788 00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:45,520 Speaker 1: and religious minorities, government facilities and personnel, and US critical infrastructure. 789 00:45:45,840 --> 00:45:49,480 Speaker 1: So it's it's definitely, it's definitely something that are the 790 00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:53,520 Speaker 1: people are talking about more as incidents have have do 791 00:45:53,520 --> 00:45:56,520 Speaker 1: do seem to be getting more common. Um, now I'm 792 00:45:56,520 --> 00:46:00,000 Speaker 1: gonna I'm gonna gonna use some of the research from 793 00:46:00,080 --> 00:46:03,400 Speaker 1: a not an article, but I guess not quite a 794 00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:05,880 Speaker 1: study like this. Uh, I don't know how to describe 795 00:46:05,920 --> 00:46:09,240 Speaker 1: it in an analysis piece. I guess from George Washington 796 00:46:09,680 --> 00:46:14,279 Speaker 1: University's program on Extremism entitled Mayhem a Murder and Misdirection 797 00:46:14,560 --> 00:46:18,920 Speaker 1: Violent extremist attack plots against critical infrastructure in the United States. 798 00:46:19,320 --> 00:46:24,840 Speaker 1: So since twenty nineteen we spremacist attacks and plots against 799 00:46:24,880 --> 00:46:29,920 Speaker 1: critical infratructure. Uh, you do seem to have distinctly increased 800 00:46:29,960 --> 00:46:35,320 Speaker 1: between two white spermacis plots targeting energy systems dramatically increased 801 00:46:35,320 --> 00:46:40,319 Speaker 1: in their frequency. Thirteen individuals associated with the overall white 802 00:46:40,360 --> 00:46:43,200 Speaker 1: spermacist movement were arrested and charged in federal court with 803 00:46:43,280 --> 00:46:46,520 Speaker 1: planning attacks on the energy sector. Eleven of these attack 804 00:46:46,560 --> 00:46:51,360 Speaker 1: planners were charged after the rise of eccelorationist ideology and 805 00:46:51,400 --> 00:46:54,680 Speaker 1: doctor in during the past decade did likely fuel these 806 00:46:54,719 --> 00:46:58,719 Speaker 1: increased attacks. Um within the white spermacist mill use that 807 00:46:58,760 --> 00:47:01,800 Speaker 1: are targeting critical infratruc sure and and the energy sector 808 00:47:01,840 --> 00:47:04,640 Speaker 1: in particular. So if if you look at the data 809 00:47:04,640 --> 00:47:08,120 Speaker 1: from twenty two, if you look at ninety four cases 810 00:47:08,160 --> 00:47:11,880 Speaker 1: of individuals who are alleged to have planned quote violent 811 00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:18,000 Speaker 1: extremist attacks. UH. Fifty of those people identified as white supremacists, 812 00:47:18,040 --> 00:47:21,839 Speaker 1: and thirty seven percent of those incidents involved some level 813 00:47:21,880 --> 00:47:27,359 Speaker 1: of planning UH, specifically planning attacks on critical infrastructure. Now, 814 00:47:27,520 --> 00:47:32,960 Speaker 1: six of those sixteen white supremacist plotters had discernible tangible 815 00:47:33,040 --> 00:47:36,920 Speaker 1: connections to named groups and organizations like the base Attamwafen 816 00:47:37,000 --> 00:47:40,920 Speaker 1: Division and the National Socialist Movement. And but in fourteen 817 00:47:41,040 --> 00:47:44,440 Speaker 1: out of the sixteen people were known participants in a 818 00:47:44,520 --> 00:47:49,840 Speaker 1: greater kind of online network that connects various like cells 819 00:47:50,040 --> 00:47:53,680 Speaker 1: or even just aesthetic styles common among the neo Nazis 820 00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:58,319 Speaker 1: accelerationist movement. So and one of the more kind of 821 00:47:58,560 --> 00:48:01,880 Speaker 1: interesting data points is the number of white sermacist plots 822 00:48:01,880 --> 00:48:05,239 Speaker 1: that are specifically focused on the energy sector, relating to 823 00:48:05,400 --> 00:48:09,759 Speaker 1: nuclear reactors, materials, um with the waste sector, and of 824 00:48:09,800 --> 00:48:14,239 Speaker 1: course power substations. UH. There's thirteen thirteen cases of individuals 825 00:48:14,239 --> 00:48:17,560 Speaker 1: who reportedly planned to conduct attacks on a variety of 826 00:48:17,920 --> 00:48:21,000 Speaker 1: energy infrastructure, from small assaults on local on local power 827 00:48:21,040 --> 00:48:24,080 Speaker 1: lines to potentially devastating attacks on power grids or even 828 00:48:24,160 --> 00:48:28,680 Speaker 1: nuclear facilities and UH and those represent eight seven percent 829 00:48:28,760 --> 00:48:31,600 Speaker 1: of the white sermacist related cases in which critical infstructure 830 00:48:31,600 --> 00:48:35,440 Speaker 1: was targeted. So most of that is specifically on power grids. 831 00:48:35,480 --> 00:48:37,920 Speaker 1: Like that's that is, that is what these focus on. 832 00:48:38,440 --> 00:48:41,560 Speaker 1: And the first case within this data point range of 833 00:48:41,560 --> 00:48:46,760 Speaker 1: two UH dates back to seventeen when a former Florida 834 00:48:46,840 --> 00:48:50,840 Speaker 1: National Guardsman and the founder of Adam Often Division was 835 00:48:50,920 --> 00:48:54,280 Speaker 1: arrested in Florida and charged with um, you know, unlawful 836 00:48:54,280 --> 00:48:58,719 Speaker 1: possession of FLOSIT advices and FLICA materials. Uh. They one 837 00:48:58,760 --> 00:49:01,239 Speaker 1: of one of one of the guy's roommates, who was 838 00:49:01,320 --> 00:49:05,839 Speaker 1: also a member of Adam Often told told jurors that 839 00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:08,640 Speaker 1: this guy intended to target a number of different locations 840 00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:12,000 Speaker 1: for explosive attacks using this material, including a Jewish synagogue, 841 00:49:12,000 --> 00:49:16,319 Speaker 1: power lines, and a new and a nearby nuclear reactor site. Um. 842 00:49:16,560 --> 00:49:19,919 Speaker 1: And this guy in his apartment had had a propaganda 843 00:49:20,040 --> 00:49:23,640 Speaker 1: and and book materials on the functioning of nuclear reactors 844 00:49:23,719 --> 00:49:27,000 Speaker 1: and other power supply stuff. So like you know, that's 845 00:49:27,160 --> 00:49:29,759 Speaker 1: these types of things that people study on and then 846 00:49:29,960 --> 00:49:32,440 Speaker 1: plan out to do. And what we're seeing more commonly 847 00:49:32,480 --> 00:49:36,960 Speaker 1: now is of very intensive propaganda team putting together kind 848 00:49:36,960 --> 00:49:39,880 Speaker 1: of manuals on how to do these types of things. 849 00:49:39,920 --> 00:49:42,840 Speaker 1: Both both like both for like to inspire you to 850 00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:45,400 Speaker 1: do it, but also like instruction manuals and like here's 851 00:49:45,400 --> 00:49:48,040 Speaker 1: here's where you should shoot. Here's like here's how to 852 00:49:48,080 --> 00:49:52,680 Speaker 1: actually do it, and it's it's there unfortunately designed quite well. 853 00:49:54,239 --> 00:49:58,720 Speaker 1: And that's something that is newer, that is a direct 854 00:49:58,760 --> 00:50:03,520 Speaker 1: product of the types of aesthetically driven UH propaganda that 855 00:50:03,560 --> 00:50:07,520 Speaker 1: has flourished on sites like Telegram, and they're they're getting 856 00:50:07,840 --> 00:50:10,759 Speaker 1: quite good at making propaganda. It's not just it's not 857 00:50:10,840 --> 00:50:16,000 Speaker 1: just you know, random random books strewn upon your apartment anymore. 858 00:50:16,160 --> 00:50:22,120 Speaker 1: It's very well made documents online. So the three, the 859 00:50:22,160 --> 00:50:24,960 Speaker 1: three men who just pleaded guilty in February for their 860 00:50:25,080 --> 00:50:29,080 Speaker 1: their conspiracy to attack power facilities. One of those men, 861 00:50:29,200 --> 00:50:33,520 Speaker 1: Jackson Saywall. In the the original complaint, it says, you know, 862 00:50:34,239 --> 00:50:37,160 Speaker 1: Um Cook had recruited his friends, say Well to join 863 00:50:37,200 --> 00:50:40,520 Speaker 1: the cause. From the outset. Cook believed say walls graphic 864 00:50:40,600 --> 00:50:43,640 Speaker 1: design skills could be an asset to the group's propaganda effort, 865 00:50:44,080 --> 00:50:46,680 Speaker 1: so he was recruited to the cell because he was 866 00:50:46,719 --> 00:50:49,160 Speaker 1: good at graphic design. Now I read these manifestos, I 867 00:50:49,160 --> 00:50:51,279 Speaker 1: would not say the graphic design is good, but it's 868 00:50:51,320 --> 00:50:53,799 Speaker 1: certainly better than sort of a cut and paste scene. Right, 869 00:50:53,960 --> 00:50:57,160 Speaker 1: there's a clear digital design element here, um, and that's 870 00:50:57,239 --> 00:50:59,719 Speaker 1: on purpose and they know that that's how they're going 871 00:50:59,760 --> 00:51:01,480 Speaker 1: to get eyes on this stuff. I mean, Robert, we 872 00:51:01,520 --> 00:51:04,160 Speaker 1: both read all those manifestos in the last couple of days. 873 00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:07,759 Speaker 1: They are certainly a step up. They are what they 874 00:51:07,760 --> 00:51:10,320 Speaker 1: what they make me think of is when I first 875 00:51:10,400 --> 00:51:13,160 Speaker 1: when I first got into reporting on extremism, it was 876 00:51:13,200 --> 00:51:16,080 Speaker 1: because I went through every issue of like ISISS magazine 877 00:51:16,080 --> 00:51:21,160 Speaker 1: debat right after the BOTA clon attacks and it's number one, 878 00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:23,719 Speaker 1: Like there was when that Adam Waffan guy killed his 879 00:51:23,800 --> 00:51:26,759 Speaker 1: roommates and had he had converted to Islam and was 880 00:51:26,800 --> 00:51:29,920 Speaker 1: like very much um into isis There was this like 881 00:51:30,040 --> 00:51:32,480 Speaker 1: surprise from people who don't think a lot about this stuff. 882 00:51:32,840 --> 00:51:34,400 Speaker 1: But a lot of these guys had a lot of 883 00:51:34,440 --> 00:51:36,480 Speaker 1: admiration for the way that ICE has put together their 884 00:51:36,480 --> 00:51:41,320 Speaker 1: propaganda campaign, which included a lot of very detailed guides 885 00:51:41,360 --> 00:51:43,640 Speaker 1: for how to do things like carry out rent vehicles 886 00:51:43,680 --> 00:51:47,919 Speaker 1: and carry out vehicular attacks. Right like this is um, 887 00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:51,480 Speaker 1: you know, we're this is the way terrorism works. And 888 00:51:51,600 --> 00:51:53,560 Speaker 1: these guys are taking a little bit of a different tack. 889 00:51:53,640 --> 00:51:56,279 Speaker 1: But again, not that like as as Molly pointed out, 890 00:51:56,640 --> 00:51:59,040 Speaker 1: there were a number of ISIS inspired attacks on power 891 00:51:59,080 --> 00:52:02,560 Speaker 1: infrastructure just did get a ton of of of play. 892 00:52:02,640 --> 00:52:04,839 Speaker 1: But like, none of this is like, all of this 893 00:52:04,960 --> 00:52:07,239 Speaker 1: is is in line with the trends that we have 894 00:52:07,360 --> 00:52:11,840 Speaker 1: seen globally in the way in which insurgent movements function. 895 00:52:12,640 --> 00:52:15,600 Speaker 1: And I think you know this well produced easily spread 896 00:52:15,719 --> 00:52:19,440 Speaker 1: propaganda and these online networks they created to spread this propaganda. 897 00:52:19,560 --> 00:52:21,400 Speaker 1: I mean that we're not just you know, we have 898 00:52:21,480 --> 00:52:24,680 Speaker 1: these cases of these organized cells that got caught, but 899 00:52:24,719 --> 00:52:26,840 Speaker 1: it's not just organized cells that have the capacity to 900 00:52:26,840 --> 00:52:29,400 Speaker 1: carry out these attacks. Because any idiot in the telegram 901 00:52:29,400 --> 00:52:33,279 Speaker 1: group can open that manifesto with the detailed instructions for 902 00:52:33,400 --> 00:52:38,640 Speaker 1: carrying out an identical attacked disseminates and becomes contagious. There's this. 903 00:52:38,840 --> 00:52:41,480 Speaker 1: There's this. People who talk about a lot online now 904 00:52:41,520 --> 00:52:44,680 Speaker 1: about stochastic terrorism, and some of us here might be 905 00:52:44,719 --> 00:52:46,719 Speaker 1: a little bit to blame to that, but a lot 906 00:52:46,760 --> 00:52:50,200 Speaker 1: of times they're they're getting it wrong. Um, because what's 907 00:52:50,280 --> 00:52:53,680 Speaker 1: what what these Nazis are doing. This is inspirational terrorism, 908 00:52:53,680 --> 00:52:55,680 Speaker 1: which has been a thing for as long as terrorism 909 00:52:55,680 --> 00:52:58,960 Speaker 1: has existed. I mean, that's why they have their calendar 910 00:52:59,000 --> 00:53:01,160 Speaker 1: of Saints, you know, yeah, exactly. And there's a lot 911 00:53:01,160 --> 00:53:03,520 Speaker 1: of debate about, like Whendy you stochastic terrorism, but kind 912 00:53:03,520 --> 00:53:05,239 Speaker 1: of in my mind, when I tend to think it's 913 00:53:05,239 --> 00:53:08,120 Speaker 1: appropriate is when the attempt is to kind of use 914 00:53:08,200 --> 00:53:11,480 Speaker 1: the way algorithms on various sights on the Internet work 915 00:53:11,560 --> 00:53:15,080 Speaker 1: to spread propaganda that's meant to cause that's meant to 916 00:53:15,120 --> 00:53:19,000 Speaker 1: inspire attacks, because that is it's a type of inspirational terrorism. 917 00:53:19,040 --> 00:53:21,440 Speaker 1: But it's it's it's clearly a new evolution of it 918 00:53:21,800 --> 00:53:24,080 Speaker 1: because of its reliance on those networks. But this is 919 00:53:24,080 --> 00:53:26,040 Speaker 1: again we're getting into the weeds. Is there anything else 920 00:53:26,080 --> 00:53:28,640 Speaker 1: you wanted to kind of get into here, Garrison? I 921 00:53:28,640 --> 00:53:30,239 Speaker 1: mean no, I kind of I kind of wanted to 922 00:53:30,239 --> 00:53:33,000 Speaker 1: wrap up by talking about some of the terrogram stuff. 923 00:53:33,080 --> 00:53:34,440 Speaker 1: So I think we we kind of we kind of 924 00:53:34,520 --> 00:53:36,360 Speaker 1: hit on a lot of stuff that I that I 925 00:53:36,360 --> 00:53:39,279 Speaker 1: wanted to mention. I mean, in twenty nineteen, two years 926 00:53:39,280 --> 00:53:43,080 Speaker 1: after that first uh that that that first attack of 927 00:53:43,080 --> 00:53:48,480 Speaker 1: twenty seventeen, two years later, uh Bew Maryman was was 928 00:53:48,600 --> 00:53:52,239 Speaker 1: arrested for planning to blow up power grid substations. He 929 00:53:52,280 --> 00:53:55,520 Speaker 1: was member of Adam offen um, and we already are 930 00:53:55,600 --> 00:53:57,839 Speaker 1: we already talked about We already talked about the two 931 00:53:57,840 --> 00:54:00,640 Speaker 1: other kind of main instance that are well known of 932 00:54:01,239 --> 00:54:04,560 Speaker 1: from and then stuff that is that that just got 933 00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:08,120 Speaker 1: um uh, there was there was court cases as recently 934 00:54:08,360 --> 00:54:11,759 Speaker 1: February two. We also mentioned in terms of the their 935 00:54:11,880 --> 00:54:14,720 Speaker 1: their plans to take out power stations to then carry 936 00:54:14,719 --> 00:54:17,640 Speaker 1: out assassinations. So those are two other insidents that I 937 00:54:17,680 --> 00:54:22,680 Speaker 1: wanted to mention, um, But yeah, I mean it's I 938 00:54:22,680 --> 00:54:25,600 Speaker 1: think the the other kind of aesthetic similarity I think 939 00:54:25,840 --> 00:54:27,400 Speaker 1: is that I think we actually are seeing some of 940 00:54:27,440 --> 00:54:31,040 Speaker 1: the some of the recent telegram stuff also take cues 941 00:54:31,160 --> 00:54:34,600 Speaker 1: from not only like isis and is not terrorism, but 942 00:54:34,640 --> 00:54:37,600 Speaker 1: also some of the types of anarchist writing that have 943 00:54:37,880 --> 00:54:42,400 Speaker 1: that have has gotten more popular since you know, uh, 944 00:54:42,560 --> 00:54:44,640 Speaker 1: the left type stuff Like where I think we're seeing 945 00:54:45,160 --> 00:54:49,080 Speaker 1: some of some of the aesthetic stylings feels very reminiscent 946 00:54:49,120 --> 00:54:52,480 Speaker 1: of like early crime think um, some of it, some 947 00:54:52,560 --> 00:54:55,719 Speaker 1: of it is is similar to things around um the 948 00:54:55,760 --> 00:54:59,040 Speaker 1: types of like eco sabotage manuals that that were that 949 00:54:59,080 --> 00:55:02,399 Speaker 1: were very popular in the nineties and two thousands. Um. 950 00:55:02,400 --> 00:55:05,440 Speaker 1: You know, some of the techniques are very similar because 951 00:55:05,640 --> 00:55:11,359 Speaker 1: both eco terrorists and UH excelration accelerationist nazis both find 952 00:55:11,440 --> 00:55:15,000 Speaker 1: value and attacking things like powers and powers of power 953 00:55:15,480 --> 00:55:19,400 Speaker 1: substations UM or you know, burning down five G towers. 954 00:55:19,480 --> 00:55:23,040 Speaker 1: That's a big emphasis of this recent like almost three 955 00:55:23,120 --> 00:55:27,440 Speaker 1: hundred page manifesto and instruction manuals. They focus a lot 956 00:55:27,480 --> 00:55:32,360 Speaker 1: on how, you know, in early regular people felt inspired 957 00:55:32,400 --> 00:55:34,799 Speaker 1: to burn down five G towers, people who are not 958 00:55:34,880 --> 00:55:38,480 Speaker 1: otherwise extremists, and how how do we get people who 959 00:55:38,480 --> 00:55:41,799 Speaker 1: are regular people to get to that point where they're 960 00:55:41,800 --> 00:55:45,719 Speaker 1: willing to damage public infrastructure? And that's kind of a 961 00:55:45,760 --> 00:55:48,680 Speaker 1: lot what a lot of what that three hundred page 962 00:55:48,800 --> 00:55:52,200 Speaker 1: kind of manifesto slash manual tries to talk about mm 963 00:55:52,320 --> 00:55:58,839 Speaker 1: hm an it's uh, if we want to end on 964 00:55:58,840 --> 00:56:01,480 Speaker 1: on a hopeful note, I have at least sort of 965 00:56:01,520 --> 00:56:04,239 Speaker 1: a small bright spot for us UM. It's in the 966 00:56:04,280 --> 00:56:08,240 Speaker 1: original UM affidavit for the search warrant into Liam Collins, 967 00:56:08,280 --> 00:56:12,520 Speaker 1: the head of the Camp Lejune cell Um so that 968 00:56:12,680 --> 00:56:15,360 Speaker 1: a original affidavit for the search warrant um in his case. 969 00:56:16,600 --> 00:56:19,240 Speaker 1: The FBI agent writing the affidavit says that they first 970 00:56:19,239 --> 00:56:22,400 Speaker 1: started looking into Collins because he was docked in the 971 00:56:22,440 --> 00:56:25,719 Speaker 1: Iron March leagues. So they were we were reading those 972 00:56:25,800 --> 00:56:28,520 Speaker 1: dockses and they said, oh wow, a marine who's a Nazi. 973 00:56:28,880 --> 00:56:32,279 Speaker 1: We should talk to him. So, you know, when doing 974 00:56:32,320 --> 00:56:34,800 Speaker 1: this work in identifying these people from these leagues and 975 00:56:34,880 --> 00:56:37,759 Speaker 1: sort of the slog of picking through, like maybe this 976 00:56:37,760 --> 00:56:40,239 Speaker 1: guy's a fucking nobody, but we will identify them so 977 00:56:40,280 --> 00:56:42,760 Speaker 1: their communities can keep an eye on them. That work matters. 978 00:56:42,960 --> 00:56:45,759 Speaker 1: That work made it into Newsweek, and it made it 979 00:56:45,800 --> 00:56:49,160 Speaker 1: to the FBI. It's a weird filter system, but eventually 980 00:56:49,280 --> 00:56:52,719 Speaker 1: this guy got caught before he committed a massive nationwide 981 00:56:52,719 --> 00:56:56,480 Speaker 1: active terror. So keep doxy Nazis and it works. In 982 00:56:56,680 --> 00:56:59,480 Speaker 1: a similar incident, there was an officer of the Lafayette 983 00:56:59,480 --> 00:57:03,000 Speaker 1: Police depart MINT that joined I believe this this exact 984 00:57:03,080 --> 00:57:07,640 Speaker 1: same terrorist cell that was then he was he was 985 00:57:07,800 --> 00:57:11,720 Speaker 1: he was docked by anti fascists and then he turned 986 00:57:11,719 --> 00:57:16,800 Speaker 1: and snitched on his fellow Nazis. Um So the investigation 987 00:57:16,880 --> 00:57:19,040 Speaker 1: opened because of the docks and they've got a powerful 988 00:57:19,080 --> 00:57:22,440 Speaker 1: cooperating witness because of another docks. It makes them nervous 989 00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:25,800 Speaker 1: if eyes are on them, they can't conduct covert operations. 990 00:57:25,880 --> 00:57:28,000 Speaker 1: So keep docs in your local Nazis like it can 991 00:57:28,040 --> 00:57:32,240 Speaker 1: it can literally be like in terms of these cells 992 00:57:32,240 --> 00:57:35,520 Speaker 1: planning to do assassinations of people, it can actually save 993 00:57:35,560 --> 00:57:37,920 Speaker 1: people's lives if these people are actually serious and are 994 00:57:37,920 --> 00:57:41,200 Speaker 1: willing to carry out their plans that they are you know, 995 00:57:41,240 --> 00:57:45,320 Speaker 1: actively training for actively preparing materials for um. This type 996 00:57:45,320 --> 00:57:48,240 Speaker 1: of work is is some of the most solid anti 997 00:57:48,240 --> 00:57:51,160 Speaker 1: fascist research that people of that people have done. It 998 00:57:51,200 --> 00:57:54,720 Speaker 1: absolutely saved lives, I've no doubt about that, will continue 999 00:57:54,720 --> 00:57:59,360 Speaker 1: to save lives. So docs Nazis, and you know, if 1000 00:58:00,000 --> 00:58:02,160 Speaker 1: if you're drunk out in the woods and one of 1001 00:58:02,200 --> 00:58:05,120 Speaker 1: your buddies says, hey, why don't we shoot a power substation, 1002 00:58:05,560 --> 00:58:09,920 Speaker 1: don't do it. You can just shoot can stop signs. 1003 00:58:09,920 --> 00:58:13,880 Speaker 1: It's the America stop signs, expired fire extinguishers. Those are 1004 00:58:13,880 --> 00:58:16,720 Speaker 1: fun to shoot. Let me make all of the people 1005 00:58:16,760 --> 00:58:21,120 Speaker 1: turn off this podcast in a bit of rage and 1006 00:58:18,920 --> 00:58:25,200 Speaker 1: then and then have a mortal crisis. So yeah, uh 1007 00:58:25,240 --> 00:58:27,440 Speaker 1: to the anti cit people who have built a radio 1008 00:58:27,520 --> 00:58:34,600 Speaker 1: out of sticks, I realized that podcasts don't come out 1009 00:58:34,600 --> 00:58:38,080 Speaker 1: through the radio. Tragic anyway, the episode so you think 1010 00:58:42,800 --> 00:58:45,200 Speaker 1: it could happen here is a production of cool Zone Media. 1011 00:58:45,400 --> 00:58:48,080 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool zone Media. Visit our website 1012 00:58:48,120 --> 00:58:50,240 Speaker 1: cool zone media dot com, or check us out on 1013 00:58:50,280 --> 00:58:52,800 Speaker 1: the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 1014 00:58:52,880 --> 00:58:55,640 Speaker 1: listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It could 1015 00:58:55,640 --> 00:58:58,640 Speaker 1: happen here, updated monthly at cool zone media dot com. 1016 00:58:58,720 --> 00:59:00,640 Speaker 1: Slash sources, then us for listening