WEBVTT - SCOTUS Gun Cases & New Focus at SEC

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 2>Securities and Exchange Commissioned Chairman Paul Atkins promised changes at

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<v Speaker 2>the agency when he took over in April.

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<v Speaker 3>So at the helm of the SEC, I can confidently

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<v Speaker 3>say it is a new days signed for the SEC

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<v Speaker 3>to end its waywardness and return to its core mission

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<v Speaker 3>that Congress set for it, investor protection, fair, orderly and

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<v Speaker 3>efficient markets, and capital formation. I will work to protect

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<v Speaker 3>investors from fraud, keep politics out of how our securities

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<v Speaker 3>laws and regulations are applied, and advance clear rules of

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<v Speaker 3>the road that encourage investment in our economy to the

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<v Speaker 3>benefit of Americans.

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<v Speaker 2>And the SEC has paired back enforcement. Indeed, new enforcement

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<v Speaker 2>actions have dropped by about twenty eight percent through September,

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<v Speaker 2>and the focus has changed to more traditionals to securities

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<v Speaker 2>law violations and intentional misconduct. The agency has retreated from

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<v Speaker 2>crypto related litigation and is focusing more on individual offenders

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<v Speaker 2>than household name companies. Nearly thirty percent of enforcement actions

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<v Speaker 2>brought under this administration so far focus on offering fraud

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<v Speaker 2>or insider trading. My guest is securities law expert James Park,

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<v Speaker 2>a professor at UCLA Law School, Can you start by

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<v Speaker 2>sort of broadly describing what Gary Gensler's era at the

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<v Speaker 2>SEC looked like as far as enforcement actions, It was.

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<v Speaker 4>Very vigorous, I think in terms of enforcement, I think

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<v Speaker 4>they brought significant cases that made an impact. I think

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<v Speaker 4>there was a willingness to be entrepreneurial, to bring innovative

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<v Speaker 4>theories in a number of areas, particularly with respec to

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<v Speaker 4>ESG to issues, environmental, social and governance issues. We had

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<v Speaker 4>some very significant cases against companies like Volkswagen, for example,

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<v Speaker 4>which had that emission scandal, and you know Boeing, you

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<v Speaker 4>know cases arising out of misrepresentations relating to the accidents

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<v Speaker 4>that they had before. You had some theories like shadow trading,

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<v Speaker 4>where you're using inside information not to trade in your

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<v Speaker 4>own company, but in another company that you don't owe

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<v Speaker 4>for douciary duties to but you may have a duty

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<v Speaker 4>of confidentiality with respect to that information. And we saw

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<v Speaker 4>record penalties and that's something that the prior enforcement director

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<v Speaker 4>said is he believed that higher penalties are important to deterrence.

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<v Speaker 4>Was a major theme during the Genstler enforcement era. I

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<v Speaker 4>think that's the best way to describe it and.

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<v Speaker 2>How as Chairman Paul Atkins distinguished or tried to distinguish

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<v Speaker 2>his tenure from gancellers, what are his focuses.

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<v Speaker 4>I think he's more focused on the straightforward cases, cases

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<v Speaker 4>where you have clear evidence of intentional wrongdoing, whether that

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<v Speaker 4>be theft by a broker, insider trading, really intentional misconduct.

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<v Speaker 4>I think that's one area of emphasis. Another is that

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<v Speaker 4>I think the SEC may be looking more at individuals

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<v Speaker 4>as opposed to bringing cases against corporations. In that I

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<v Speaker 4>think is a development that we've seen before. Actually, during

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<v Speaker 4>the nineteen seventies, we had a very aggressive enforcement division

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<v Speaker 4>under Stanley Sporken that was bringing innovative cases against corporations

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<v Speaker 4>for accounting fraud, paying bribes to foreign companies. I mean,

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<v Speaker 4>there are questions about whether the SEC was exceeding its authority.

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<v Speaker 4>With Chairman Shad coming in, one of these things he

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<v Speaker 4>emphasized is that we're going to focus more on individuals

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<v Speaker 4>and insider trading. And that's kind of an interesting similarity

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<v Speaker 4>with this era where we're moving from focusing on corporations

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<v Speaker 4>as wrongdoers to individuals. And I think that, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>may be based on sort of the idea that you know,

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<v Speaker 4>most wrongdoing is done by rogue actors, people who are

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<v Speaker 4>just acting on their own. I think that's the approach

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<v Speaker 4>I think that we see Atkins taking versus maybe the

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<v Speaker 4>Gensler position that goes after corporations is more concerned about

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<v Speaker 4>sort of bad corporate cultures, that it's not individuals who

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<v Speaker 4>just decide to do bad things, but because they're in

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<v Speaker 4>bad corporate cultures that they commit fraud.

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<v Speaker 2>According to a Bloomberg Law review, the SEC has brought

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<v Speaker 2>about ninety one new enforcement suits since inauguration Day through

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<v Speaker 2>the end of September. That's down from one hundred and

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<v Speaker 2>twenty six actions filed during the same period in twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty four. Is it because it's a new administration. Is

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<v Speaker 2>it because they're focusing on different things? I mean, why

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<v Speaker 2>do you think there's that drop.

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<v Speaker 4>I think it could be a combination of different things.

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<v Speaker 4>It's very hard to pinpoint the cause, and I think

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<v Speaker 4>certainly the fact that you're in a transition period may

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<v Speaker 4>mean that there are fewer cases that are actually filed.

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<v Speaker 4>You know, we only got a new enforcement director last month,

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<v Speaker 4>Judge Ryan in September, and enforcement moves more slowly without

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<v Speaker 4>clear guidance from the top, and you know, just having

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<v Speaker 4>a leadership transition maybe a reason that you have a

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<v Speaker 4>decline in the number of cases. And you know, I

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<v Speaker 4>took a look at a few numbers, and you know,

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<v Speaker 4>even before this year, if you look at twenty twenty four,

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<v Speaker 4>which was during the Gensler era, that'sa our decline compared

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<v Speaker 4>to twenty twenty three. Five hundred and eighty three actions

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<v Speaker 4>are filed in twenty twenty four. Seven hundred eighty four

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<v Speaker 4>were in twenty twenty three. That's a twenty six percent

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<v Speaker 4>decline within the same administration. Now, the penalties did increase

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<v Speaker 4>in twenty twenty four relative to twenty twenty three, and

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<v Speaker 4>so I think in a few weeks or a few

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<v Speaker 4>months will learn, you know, what the penalties collected are

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<v Speaker 4>and that may tell something additional. And it is finally

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<v Speaker 4>possible that you know, the new administration's less aggressive. You know,

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<v Speaker 4>we have some cases that were dropped that might have settled,

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<v Speaker 4>and probably investigations that were started that could have resulted

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<v Speaker 4>in actions may either be you know, just sort of

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<v Speaker 4>delayed or languishing or maybe even formally closed. So I

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<v Speaker 4>think I think it's a combination of a lot of

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<v Speaker 4>different things.

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<v Speaker 2>And did they drop all the crypto related actions, even

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<v Speaker 2>the ones that were ongoing. Basically they dropped.

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<v Speaker 4>Them, the major ones against exchanges in particular. I have

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<v Speaker 4>seen a few crypto related cases involving outright thefts, and

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<v Speaker 4>so they have not dropped all crypto cases, but the

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<v Speaker 4>cases against you know, exchanges for example, or major developers

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<v Speaker 4>where the argument is that you should have registered, you

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<v Speaker 4>should have registered this as a security. I believe all

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<v Speaker 4>or almost all of those have been withdrawn.

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<v Speaker 2>So there's not a big discussion anymore. I mean, the

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<v Speaker 2>last couple of years, you and I we're discussing what

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<v Speaker 2>is a security? Is this a security? And the judges

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<v Speaker 2>in New York we are having conflicting decisions. So that's

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<v Speaker 2>not happening anymore. They don't have to worry about that, well.

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<v Speaker 4>Not through the sec But there are cases that are

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<v Speaker 4>private litigation that are percolating up, and I expect that

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<v Speaker 4>the issue of whether or not certain digital assets our

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<v Speaker 4>securities will be decided by courts in that context. And

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<v Speaker 4>I've seen a few cases here and there that have

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<v Speaker 4>gone both ways, so I think there still will be

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<v Speaker 4>some litigation about that. For the time being, but it'll

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<v Speaker 4>happen in the context of private litigation rather than SEC

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<v Speaker 4>government enforcement.

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<v Speaker 2>The SEC is making it easier for companies going public

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<v Speaker 2>to force securities fraud claims into arbitration. Why and what

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<v Speaker 2>would be the result of that?

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<v Speaker 4>Well, I think the idea behind this is that shareholders

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<v Speaker 4>should have a choice. Shareholders should be able to decide

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<v Speaker 4>how the company is governed. And there's an argument that

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<v Speaker 4>the way you resolve certain types of shareholder litigation should

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<v Speaker 4>be up to the shareholders and if they accept it.

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<v Speaker 4>You know, while they may not actually have a say

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<v Speaker 4>in deciding whether or not such provisions are put into

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<v Speaker 4>the charter of a company going public, they do have

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<v Speaker 4>a say in that if they're unhappy with the provision,

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<v Speaker 4>they can choose not to buy the stock. They can

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<v Speaker 4>choose to pay less for the stock. This is a

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<v Speaker 4>well established academic idea now, is that that shareholders have

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<v Speaker 4>a choice with respect to corporate governance, and this policy

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<v Speaker 4>decision effectively is signaling a willingness to allow companies to

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<v Speaker 4>try this out if they would like to. I think

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<v Speaker 4>there are some questions about the legality of some of

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<v Speaker 4>these mandatory arbitration provisions. If they are adopted. So I

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<v Speaker 4>think there is some risk that if somebody adopts them,

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<v Speaker 4>this will be litigated. And for now, at least in Delaware,

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<v Speaker 4>Delaware companies would not be able to put these visions

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<v Speaker 4>in their charter because of a Delaware state law. But

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<v Speaker 4>it's you know, it's something that academics have talked about

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<v Speaker 4>for some time, and you know it's consistent with a

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<v Speaker 4>Republican SEC chair to try this out. Now, whether or

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<v Speaker 4>not companies will will do this, how this will work,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, that's still very much up in the air,

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<v Speaker 4>and so I think it'll take a few years before

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<v Speaker 4>it starts having an impact.

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<v Speaker 2>If it does, I'm going to go through just a

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<v Speaker 2>couple of changes. The Division Director no longer has authority

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<v Speaker 2>to issue formal orders of investigation, which allowed Division staff

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<v Speaker 2>to issue to poenas, and so they're going back to

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<v Speaker 2>something that they did prior to two thousand and nine,

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<v Speaker 2>I think, where the commissioners have to approve the orders

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<v Speaker 2>by majority vote.

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<v Speaker 4>It's a significant change. It's a significant change, a procedural

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<v Speaker 4>change that very well will likely affect the pace of

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<v Speaker 4>SEC enforcement. I think it'll be slower, and you know,

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<v Speaker 4>to give a little little background. For a long time,

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<v Speaker 4>this was the policy of the SEC where the five commissioners,

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<v Speaker 4>these five pointees had to sign off on every enforcement subpoena,

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<v Speaker 4>any decision to issue orders that open investigations, those five

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<v Speaker 4>commissioners had to decide this. And you know, I think

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<v Speaker 4>the issue is that these five commissioners are very busy

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<v Speaker 4>right there deciding all sorts of things, looking at new rules,

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<v Speaker 4>and you know, all sorts of other matters, and so

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<v Speaker 4>it will take a while for the subpoena to get

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<v Speaker 4>on the agenda. And you know, I think that's what

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<v Speaker 4>resulted in delays with the SEC and enforcement and even

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<v Speaker 4>opening up an investigation. I mean, so after the Madeoff

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<v Speaker 4>scandal two thousand and nine, one of the reforms is

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<v Speaker 4>we're going to delegate some of this to the staff

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<v Speaker 4>and so investigations could open more quickly, move more quickly,

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<v Speaker 4>and in my view, it's a good change. But I

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<v Speaker 4>think the argument on the other side is that, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>if you want to control enforcement, you want the commissioners

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<v Speaker 4>to get involved from the very beginning, because they're ultimately

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<v Speaker 4>the ones you have to approve and enforcement action being

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<v Speaker 4>brought being settled. And if they're involved at the very beginning,

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<v Speaker 4>they can maybe cut off some investigations that may be

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<v Speaker 4>inappropriate in their mind.

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<v Speaker 2>Jim, you mentioned the dollar amounts of fines. Does it

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<v Speaker 2>matter how much money the SEC brings in through enforcement actions?

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, is that considered a gauge of how well

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<v Speaker 2>the commissioner is doing?

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<v Speaker 4>It's cited and it's something that I think the SEC

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<v Speaker 4>chair in the past, both Republican and Democrat, have highlighted

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<v Speaker 4>when they have a record amount of penalties. It's a

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<v Speaker 4>way to show Congress, Hey, we're doing our job. We're

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<v Speaker 4>vigorous on enforcement.

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<v Speaker 1>Now.

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<v Speaker 4>Is it a great measure? I think that there's some

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<v Speaker 4>questions as to whether or not this might lead to

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<v Speaker 4>artificial inflation of penalties, or even an incentive to settle

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<v Speaker 4>cases more quickly for too little, just to get the

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<v Speaker 4>penalty in your numbers. There's a Wall Street Journal article

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<v Speaker 4>about a year ago that reported that a lot of

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<v Speaker 4>these penalties are actually not collect that they're from bankrupt companies,

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<v Speaker 4>and so that the SEC doesn't actually end up cofflecting

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<v Speaker 4>all the penalties that it imposes. They only announce the

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<v Speaker 4>ones that they've imposed, not necessarily ones that they've collected,

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<v Speaker 4>and so and so. It's an imperfect measure, but it's

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<v Speaker 4>a significant one. And I suspect that if we see

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<v Speaker 4>a consistent decline, then that may be used against this SEC.

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<v Speaker 4>You know, if there's a big crash, that that would

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<v Speaker 4>be oh, you know, look at the penalties they declined

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<v Speaker 4>by you know, fifty percent under Atkins. That's why we

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<v Speaker 4>have a lots of confidence. So the SEC needs to

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<v Speaker 4>be careful because if it's not vigorous and there's a

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<v Speaker 4>market correction and a lot of scandals, everyone asks, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>why was the SEC asleep at the switch?

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<v Speaker 2>Chairman Atkins has also expressed a commitment to notifying businesses

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<v Speaker 2>of technical violations before jumping to enforcement.

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<v Speaker 4>I think that's fine in some cases. If it truly

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<v Speaker 4>is a minor technical infraction that is a mistake, then

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<v Speaker 4>may be faster. It may be faster to simply inform

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<v Speaker 4>the company you know, you need to fix this now.

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<v Speaker 4>The problem is if this becomes an excuse to you know,

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<v Speaker 4>avoid enforcement of more serious matters, more serious matters where

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<v Speaker 4>there is repeated violations, where there's harmed investors and customers,

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<v Speaker 4>whether you know, sometimes technical rule violations signal a more

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<v Speaker 4>corrupt corporate culture, and that's something that I'd be worried if,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, if the SEC is not looking into this

0:13:30.760 --> 0:13:33.199
<v Speaker 4>and following up on some of these minor rule violations.

0:13:33.240 --> 0:13:35.480
<v Speaker 4>Now on the other side is maybe it's a better

0:13:35.559 --> 0:13:38.440
<v Speaker 4>use of SEC enforcements which have become more limited. You know,

0:13:38.440 --> 0:13:41.240
<v Speaker 4>there's a lot of staff decline. You know, SEC's always

0:13:41.240 --> 0:13:43.720
<v Speaker 4>have limited enforcement resources. This may be a way of

0:13:44.240 --> 0:13:48.480
<v Speaker 4>quickly resolving matters without fully investigating. But I would be

0:13:48.520 --> 0:13:52.440
<v Speaker 4>concerned about over using this particular method. But I do

0:13:52.480 --> 0:13:54.719
<v Speaker 4>think used properly, it could be a good thing.

0:13:55.679 --> 0:13:59.839
<v Speaker 2>You mentioned to focus sort of more on individuals. The

0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:04.079
<v Speaker 2>powerhouse public companies then breathe a sigh of relief and

0:14:04.240 --> 0:14:07.319
<v Speaker 2>maybe relax their compliance programs or not.

0:14:07.520 --> 0:14:09.760
<v Speaker 4>I hope not. I hope they don't see that as

0:14:09.800 --> 0:14:13.280
<v Speaker 4>the message. A lot of the large companies have already

0:14:13.320 --> 0:14:17.120
<v Speaker 4>invested in substantial amounts of compliance and so they have

0:14:17.200 --> 0:14:20.000
<v Speaker 4>the infrastructure in place. I would be surprised if they

0:14:20.240 --> 0:14:23.480
<v Speaker 4>abandoned that, because we could have a different SEC in

0:14:23.520 --> 0:14:26.080
<v Speaker 4>the next you know, if there's a transition in a

0:14:26.120 --> 0:14:29.760
<v Speaker 4>few years. And also it's good business to have strong compliance.

0:14:29.800 --> 0:14:32.800
<v Speaker 4>In my view that it's a way of controlling misconduct

0:14:32.800 --> 0:14:35.400
<v Speaker 4>within your organization that you know, you would not want,

0:14:35.400 --> 0:14:40.000
<v Speaker 4>the shareholders would not want as well, but it would

0:14:40.080 --> 0:14:42.680
<v Speaker 4>you know, probably send a signal that on some issues

0:14:42.720 --> 0:14:46.040
<v Speaker 4>we can maybe be a little bit less worried. And

0:14:46.120 --> 0:14:49.760
<v Speaker 4>so the danger there is that you know, corporate manager

0:14:49.760 --> 0:14:52.600
<v Speaker 4>has become a little bit too complacent, and so they

0:14:52.640 --> 0:14:55.520
<v Speaker 4>may get the signal where we can take more risk

0:14:55.600 --> 0:14:58.040
<v Speaker 4>with respect to misconduct, and they may not listen to

0:14:58.040 --> 0:14:59.960
<v Speaker 4>the lawyers who are telling them. If you do this,

0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:02.360
<v Speaker 4>the sec could come knocking and they may see that

0:15:02.400 --> 0:15:05.560
<v Speaker 4>as less credible if you have less vigorous enforcement on

0:15:05.640 --> 0:15:09.880
<v Speaker 4>the on the corporate side, and you know, cases against individuals,

0:15:09.960 --> 0:15:13.400
<v Speaker 4>I think the reality is they're very expensive, they're very

0:15:13.440 --> 0:15:16.720
<v Speaker 4>hard to develop. You have to be very very thorough

0:15:16.760 --> 0:15:21.560
<v Speaker 4>and sometimes the evidence to really establish liability against individuals

0:15:21.840 --> 0:15:25.120
<v Speaker 4>may take years and years to develop, and so it

0:15:25.160 --> 0:15:28.360
<v Speaker 4>will provide some deterrence, I think. But I think that

0:15:28.800 --> 0:15:32.320
<v Speaker 4>you know, sometimes if you have a substantial wrongdoing by

0:15:32.320 --> 0:15:35.360
<v Speaker 4>a big corporation that gets a lot of publicity, that

0:15:35.400 --> 0:15:37.840
<v Speaker 4>generates a lot of deterrence in the corporate world.

0:15:38.280 --> 0:15:41.960
<v Speaker 2>Finally, a noticeable decrease in the use of press releases

0:15:42.320 --> 0:15:45.800
<v Speaker 2>in September, only one press release this is a Gorina routers.

0:15:46.080 --> 0:15:49.560
<v Speaker 2>Only one press release announce an enforcement action compared to

0:15:49.680 --> 0:15:52.480
<v Speaker 2>forty three in September of twenty twenty four.

0:15:53.160 --> 0:15:56.400
<v Speaker 4>What's a big decline actually, And you know, I watch

0:15:56.440 --> 0:15:59.800
<v Speaker 4>those press releases very carefully. The blogs do as well.

0:15:59.800 --> 0:16:03.160
<v Speaker 4>That's how we learn about the big cases. And I

0:16:03.160 --> 0:16:06.800
<v Speaker 4>hope they will issue more press releases with notable cases

0:16:06.840 --> 0:16:10.200
<v Speaker 4>because that's how we law professors and attorneys get a

0:16:10.240 --> 0:16:13.320
<v Speaker 4>sense of what the SEC thinks is important. It keeps

0:16:13.320 --> 0:16:17.480
<v Speaker 4>the SEC visible. But I think it's understandable. With the transition,

0:16:17.760 --> 0:16:21.000
<v Speaker 4>I expect they will ramp up their press releases over the.

0:16:20.960 --> 0:16:23.520
<v Speaker 2>Next year, so I'm sure they'll put out at least

0:16:23.520 --> 0:16:25.720
<v Speaker 2>more than one a month. Do you have any concerns

0:16:25.720 --> 0:16:27.960
<v Speaker 2>about enforcement that we haven't addressed?

0:16:28.400 --> 0:16:28.600
<v Speaker 3>You know.

0:16:28.720 --> 0:16:30.920
<v Speaker 4>The other point I would make is that, you know,

0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:34.960
<v Speaker 4>with AI technology becoming so important, I hope the SEC

0:16:35.320 --> 0:16:40.160
<v Speaker 4>really keeps a close eye on fundraising by AI companies

0:16:40.200 --> 0:16:43.280
<v Speaker 4>because it's a very opaque technology. I think there are

0:16:43.280 --> 0:16:45.760
<v Speaker 4>a lot of opportunities for fraud in this space. It's

0:16:45.760 --> 0:16:49.280
<v Speaker 4>an important part of our economic boom, and I think

0:16:49.320 --> 0:16:52.800
<v Speaker 4>that if we lose some confidence in those valuations, investors

0:16:52.840 --> 0:16:54.960
<v Speaker 4>will lose a lot of money. So I hope the

0:16:55.000 --> 0:16:59.920
<v Speaker 4>SEC is continuing those initial efforts to look at AI companies.

0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:03.320
<v Speaker 2>That will certainly keep them busy. Thanks Jim. That's Professor

0:17:03.400 --> 0:17:07.280
<v Speaker 2>James Park of UCLA Law School. The Supreme Court has

0:17:07.320 --> 0:17:11.560
<v Speaker 2>agreed to rule on the constitutionality of the federal law

0:17:11.640 --> 0:17:16.159
<v Speaker 2>that bans firearm possession by drug users and addicts. It

0:17:16.200 --> 0:17:18.840
<v Speaker 2>will be the second test this term of the Second

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:23.160
<v Speaker 2>Amendment's gun rights protections. Earlier this month, the Supreme Court

0:17:23.160 --> 0:17:26.440
<v Speaker 2>agreed to hear a gun case testing the right to carry.

0:17:26.920 --> 0:17:30.560
<v Speaker 2>My guest is Andrew Willinger, executive director of the Duke

0:17:30.680 --> 0:17:34.200
<v Speaker 2>Center for Firearms Law. Andrew tell us about the federal

0:17:34.280 --> 0:17:37.480
<v Speaker 2>law at issue here in the Hamani case.

0:17:38.080 --> 0:17:42.280
<v Speaker 1>This section of federal law might sort of sound familiar

0:17:42.359 --> 0:17:45.560
<v Speaker 1>to people who have been following the Court's Second Amendment

0:17:45.600 --> 0:17:49.879
<v Speaker 1>jureisprudence over the past couple of years. This is eighteen

0:17:50.000 --> 0:17:54.159
<v Speaker 1>US Code nine twenty two, and specifically nine twenty two G,

0:17:55.080 --> 0:18:00.600
<v Speaker 1>which lists a number of prohibited statuses groups of people who,

0:18:00.640 --> 0:18:04.280
<v Speaker 1>because of their status, are prohibited under federal law from

0:18:04.320 --> 0:18:08.439
<v Speaker 1>possessing firearms or ammunition and one of those groups. One

0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:11.560
<v Speaker 1>of those subsections under nine twenty two G was an

0:18:11.600 --> 0:18:14.440
<v Speaker 1>issue in the Rahimi case. That's individuals who are subject

0:18:14.520 --> 0:18:17.600
<v Speaker 1>to a domestic violence restraining order that meets certain criteria.

0:18:17.760 --> 0:18:20.840
<v Speaker 1>But there are other groups as well, felons for example,

0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:24.400
<v Speaker 1>and then, as relevant to the Harmani case, individuals who

0:18:24.440 --> 0:18:28.960
<v Speaker 1>are considered unlawful users of or addicted to a controlled substance.

0:18:29.440 --> 0:18:34.119
<v Speaker 1>So that's the specific revision of criminal law that's at

0:18:34.200 --> 0:18:37.880
<v Speaker 1>issue in this case is a ban on unlawful drug

0:18:37.960 --> 0:18:39.800
<v Speaker 1>users possessing firearms.

0:18:40.119 --> 0:18:44.120
<v Speaker 2>The Fifth Circuit said that the blanket ban is unconstitutional,

0:18:44.640 --> 0:18:48.000
<v Speaker 2>but the ban could be used against people accused of

0:18:48.040 --> 0:18:51.439
<v Speaker 2>being high and armed at the same time. Explain the

0:18:51.480 --> 0:18:53.119
<v Speaker 2>logic of that.

0:18:53.119 --> 0:18:56.600
<v Speaker 1>That's basically right. It is a little bit confusing because

0:18:56.880 --> 0:18:59.800
<v Speaker 1>there are a number of different cases in the Fifth Circuit,

0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:01.960
<v Speaker 1>and so if you look back at the Harmoni case,

0:19:02.000 --> 0:19:06.080
<v Speaker 1>there really isn't a lengthy decision because the Circuit had

0:19:06.119 --> 0:19:08.879
<v Speaker 1>decided in an earlier case called Connolly, and all the

0:19:08.960 --> 0:19:11.480
<v Speaker 1>judges said in this specific case is that you know,

0:19:11.520 --> 0:19:14.760
<v Speaker 1>we're applying our ruling in Connolly and therefore find that

0:19:15.000 --> 0:19:19.480
<v Speaker 1>as applied to this individual HARMIONI the provision is also unconstitutional.

0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:22.679
<v Speaker 1>But basically the approach that the Fifth Circuit has taken

0:19:22.880 --> 0:19:26.600
<v Speaker 1>in these drug cases is to say that, as a

0:19:26.800 --> 0:19:31.880
<v Speaker 1>historical matter, that judges believe that their support for applying

0:19:31.960 --> 0:19:35.440
<v Speaker 1>this provision when somebody is under the influence of drugs

0:19:36.119 --> 0:19:39.800
<v Speaker 1>and at the same time in possession of guns or ammunition,

0:19:40.560 --> 0:19:43.920
<v Speaker 1>but when there's no proof that those two things were contemporaneous,

0:19:43.960 --> 0:19:47.080
<v Speaker 1>that they occurred at the same time, then the judges

0:19:47.119 --> 0:19:49.920
<v Speaker 1>have said that the provision cannot be applied. And that's

0:19:49.960 --> 0:19:52.080
<v Speaker 1>what they decided in the Harmonic case.

0:19:52.400 --> 0:19:55.520
<v Speaker 2>And this is the same provision that a jury convicted

0:19:55.800 --> 0:19:57.040
<v Speaker 2>Hunter Biden on.

0:19:57.560 --> 0:19:59.560
<v Speaker 1>That's correct, that is correct.

0:19:59.359 --> 0:20:03.840
<v Speaker 2>That's where its fame. So the Justice Department is arguing

0:20:04.119 --> 0:20:07.520
<v Speaker 2>that the law is valid. So they're arguing then, for

0:20:07.640 --> 0:20:11.480
<v Speaker 2>a law that restricts Second Amendment rights, that's right.

0:20:11.560 --> 0:20:14.720
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's a little bit of an interesting posture, as

0:20:14.760 --> 0:20:17.280
<v Speaker 1>you know. But again, I think what this comes back

0:20:17.320 --> 0:20:20.080
<v Speaker 1>to is the distinction between a facial challenge and it

0:20:20.119 --> 0:20:24.520
<v Speaker 1>has applied challenge. So the Hamani case deals with an

0:20:24.560 --> 0:20:28.119
<v Speaker 1>has applied challenge, and the government is saying, you know,

0:20:28.160 --> 0:20:30.280
<v Speaker 1>we think the Fifth Circuit got it wrong, but on

0:20:30.400 --> 0:20:33.200
<v Speaker 1>these specific facts. So I think it's going to be

0:20:33.280 --> 0:20:35.840
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of a delicate dance throughout this case

0:20:35.880 --> 0:20:37.879
<v Speaker 1>as it works its way through the briefing and the

0:20:38.000 --> 0:20:41.639
<v Speaker 1>oral argument before the Supreme Court, where I actually don't

0:20:41.760 --> 0:20:46.720
<v Speaker 1>think that the current administration believes that nine twenty two

0:20:46.840 --> 0:20:50.920
<v Speaker 1>G Three has the language has been interpreted, is constitutional

0:20:50.960 --> 0:20:52.879
<v Speaker 1>in all of its applications, right. I don't know that

0:20:52.920 --> 0:20:55.480
<v Speaker 1>they would say that this is constitutional as applied to

0:20:55.520 --> 0:20:59.240
<v Speaker 1>somebody who's just, you know, using marijuana on a regular basis.

0:20:59.640 --> 0:21:02.480
<v Speaker 1>But they want to say in this case because there

0:21:02.480 --> 0:21:06.720
<v Speaker 1>are maybe exacerbating factors not just marijuana. There's potentially other

0:21:07.160 --> 0:21:11.119
<v Speaker 1>legal drugs at issue, and there's a connection to allegedly

0:21:11.160 --> 0:21:15.080
<v Speaker 1>to foreign terrorism that's not really relevant to the Second Amendment.

0:21:15.320 --> 0:21:18.359
<v Speaker 1>But they're going to, I think, focus a lot on

0:21:18.440 --> 0:21:21.960
<v Speaker 1>the as applied nature and on the specific facts of

0:21:22.000 --> 0:21:22.520
<v Speaker 1>this case.

0:21:23.080 --> 0:21:26.919
<v Speaker 2>The Supreme Court in twenty twenty two, in the Bruin case,

0:21:27.440 --> 0:21:31.200
<v Speaker 2>rule that any restrictions on firearms have to be consistent

0:21:31.480 --> 0:21:37.399
<v Speaker 2>with the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation. What is

0:21:37.440 --> 0:21:40.800
<v Speaker 2>the history and tradition that the government is saying supports

0:21:40.840 --> 0:21:41.920
<v Speaker 2>their position here?

0:21:42.480 --> 0:21:45.520
<v Speaker 1>The government at least below in these cases in the

0:21:45.560 --> 0:21:51.080
<v Speaker 1>Fifth Circuit has basically rested on three categories of historical

0:21:51.720 --> 0:21:55.639
<v Speaker 1>statutes or restrictions. So the first is the historical treatment

0:21:55.680 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 1>of the mentally ill, and that's sort of an argument

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:02.199
<v Speaker 1>that maybe drug users are analogous in some way to

0:22:02.200 --> 0:22:04.280
<v Speaker 1>those who are mentally ill, that this is this is

0:22:04.280 --> 0:22:08.760
<v Speaker 1>some form of a temporary incapacitation. The second is more

0:22:08.880 --> 0:22:13.000
<v Speaker 1>generally just laws that we're based on a legislative determination

0:22:13.040 --> 0:22:15.560
<v Speaker 1>that some group of people is dangerous. So that could

0:22:15.640 --> 0:22:18.359
<v Speaker 1>be you know, political dissonance for example, it could be

0:22:18.400 --> 0:22:20.760
<v Speaker 1>any group where the determination is that you know, this

0:22:20.760 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 1>group is dangerous and we're not going to allow them

0:22:23.800 --> 0:22:26.960
<v Speaker 1>to have guns. And then the third is and this

0:22:27.200 --> 0:22:29.679
<v Speaker 1>kind of you know, goes in sequential order. You know,

0:22:29.720 --> 0:22:32.919
<v Speaker 1>the mental illness and the dangerousness laws are earlier, and

0:22:32.960 --> 0:22:35.520
<v Speaker 1>then eventually you start you start to see laws that

0:22:35.640 --> 0:22:39.200
<v Speaker 1>talk about alcohol and being intoxicated with alcohol, and those

0:22:39.200 --> 0:22:42.159
<v Speaker 1>are also a category that the government has come forward

0:22:42.200 --> 0:22:44.720
<v Speaker 1>with in these cases. And again, I think for each one,

0:22:44.840 --> 0:22:47.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's going to depend on this level of

0:22:47.840 --> 0:22:51.639
<v Speaker 1>generality issue that that courts have really been wrestling with

0:22:51.920 --> 0:22:55.960
<v Speaker 1>under Bruin, which is how close do the historical statutes

0:22:56.000 --> 0:22:58.840
<v Speaker 1>really need to be in order to uphold the modern law?

0:22:59.359 --> 0:23:02.600
<v Speaker 2>And the historic statutes go back to the seventeenth and

0:23:02.800 --> 0:23:06.639
<v Speaker 2>eighteenth century, do they go back to the nineteenth century?

0:23:06.960 --> 0:23:09.640
<v Speaker 2>What does the court consider acceptable history?

0:23:10.000 --> 0:23:11.840
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, Well, that's one of the really interesting aspects of

0:23:12.080 --> 0:23:14.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of both of these cases that the Court has

0:23:15.160 --> 0:23:18.439
<v Speaker 1>granted now, which is that in some sense there are

0:23:18.560 --> 0:23:22.040
<v Speaker 1>narrow questions, but I think they're in the background. You

0:23:22.119 --> 0:23:25.240
<v Speaker 1>have this doctrinal uncertainty, and we're going to start to

0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:28.400
<v Speaker 1>get some clues about questions like the one you raise,

0:23:28.440 --> 0:23:30.159
<v Speaker 1>which is what's even the time period?

0:23:30.240 --> 0:23:30.400
<v Speaker 2>Right?

0:23:30.440 --> 0:23:33.200
<v Speaker 1>How far back do you go? You know, if something's

0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:35.960
<v Speaker 1>enacted in the nineteenth century, is that too new? Like

0:23:36.000 --> 0:23:38.639
<v Speaker 1>does that not really inform the original meaning of the

0:23:38.640 --> 0:23:42.080
<v Speaker 1>Second Amendment? In the Bruin case, the Court seems to

0:23:42.119 --> 0:23:46.520
<v Speaker 1>at least leave the door open to considering historical laws

0:23:46.560 --> 0:23:48.919
<v Speaker 1>anywhere from around the time of the founding all the

0:23:48.920 --> 0:23:52.520
<v Speaker 1>way up through about nineteen hundred. But there's really been

0:23:52.560 --> 0:23:55.640
<v Speaker 1>a divergence in the courts of appeal in terms of

0:23:56.000 --> 0:23:59.200
<v Speaker 1>what courts have done with this later in time history

0:23:59.320 --> 0:24:02.639
<v Speaker 1>and how much emphasis they're putting on Reconstruction era history,

0:24:02.760 --> 0:24:04.200
<v Speaker 1>and that's going to come up. I think in both

0:24:04.200 --> 0:24:05.760
<v Speaker 1>of these cases actually.

0:24:05.920 --> 0:24:08.560
<v Speaker 2>Tell us about the argument of the plaintiffs.

0:24:09.119 --> 0:24:13.879
<v Speaker 1>It's really an argument for this contemporaneousness requirement as to

0:24:14.000 --> 0:24:17.359
<v Speaker 1>nine twenty two G. Three. So the argument is that

0:24:17.720 --> 0:24:21.760
<v Speaker 1>the historically correct way to think about this type of

0:24:21.800 --> 0:24:26.320
<v Speaker 1>prohibition is that legislatures had the power to say if

0:24:26.359 --> 0:24:29.040
<v Speaker 1>you are if you're actively under the influence of some

0:24:29.119 --> 0:24:32.720
<v Speaker 1>intoxicating substance and you're you know, you're not acting in

0:24:32.720 --> 0:24:35.280
<v Speaker 1>your right mind at that point in time, you can

0:24:35.280 --> 0:24:38.320
<v Speaker 1>be prohibited from having guns. But otherwise just sort of

0:24:38.400 --> 0:24:41.240
<v Speaker 1>evidence that you may have used drugs in the past

0:24:41.560 --> 0:24:43.679
<v Speaker 1>isn't enough, And I think that's what they're going to

0:24:43.680 --> 0:24:46.240
<v Speaker 1>say here. There probably also will be a lot of

0:24:46.280 --> 0:24:50.400
<v Speaker 1>back and forth about how much work these other facts

0:24:50.440 --> 0:24:53.959
<v Speaker 1>are doing. You know, the connection to the terrorist organization,

0:24:54.160 --> 0:24:56.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, that shouldn't really be relevant. But I think

0:24:56.640 --> 0:24:59.280
<v Speaker 1>what's happened. You mentioned the Hunter Biden case. You know,

0:24:59.560 --> 0:25:02.879
<v Speaker 1>the federal government doesn't charge this provision a lot, so

0:25:02.960 --> 0:25:05.800
<v Speaker 1>they tend to charge it in sort of egregious cases.

0:25:06.119 --> 0:25:08.240
<v Speaker 1>Do you know Hunter Biden, he's not just somebody who's

0:25:08.280 --> 0:25:10.760
<v Speaker 1>using marijuana and happens to have a gun, he's going

0:25:10.800 --> 0:25:12.639
<v Speaker 1>out and writing a memoir where he admits it to

0:25:12.680 --> 0:25:14.639
<v Speaker 1>this type of product. So I think, you know, there

0:25:14.680 --> 0:25:16.399
<v Speaker 1>will be some discussion of the sort of how the

0:25:16.480 --> 0:25:20.040
<v Speaker 1>provisions actually used, with the government maybe saying, look, we're

0:25:20.080 --> 0:25:23.320
<v Speaker 1>not intending to really bring this type of charge, you know,

0:25:23.400 --> 0:25:29.200
<v Speaker 1>if somebody's just without any aggravating circumstance occasionally using marijuana.

0:25:29.280 --> 0:25:33.520
<v Speaker 2>The court did uphold a federal law that bars guns

0:25:33.560 --> 0:25:38.119
<v Speaker 2>for domestic abusers, even though there was no such domestic

0:25:38.160 --> 0:25:42.439
<v Speaker 2>abuse law on the books at the nation's founding. Do

0:25:42.520 --> 0:25:44.800
<v Speaker 2>you think that that's where they're going with this, That

0:25:44.840 --> 0:25:47.879
<v Speaker 2>they took this case to reverse the Fifth Circuit and

0:25:48.080 --> 0:25:49.960
<v Speaker 2>find the ban constitutional.

0:25:50.480 --> 0:25:52.800
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so my best guess is that they did that.

0:25:52.840 --> 0:25:56.080
<v Speaker 1>They took it tending to reverse the Fifth Circuit. I

0:25:56.080 --> 0:25:59.080
<v Speaker 1>think actually the calculus might have been influenced by the

0:25:59.119 --> 0:26:02.119
<v Speaker 1>earlier grand in Wolford, which we can maybe talk about.

0:26:02.400 --> 0:26:04.720
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, I expect them to reverse and I think

0:26:04.760 --> 0:26:08.080
<v Speaker 1>it could be close to unanimous decision again resting on

0:26:08.160 --> 0:26:11.520
<v Speaker 1>this facial versus as applied issue, which was a similar

0:26:11.560 --> 0:26:13.639
<v Speaker 1>issue in the Rahemi case. Right where they're sort of

0:26:13.680 --> 0:26:16.960
<v Speaker 1>getting these cases with bad facts and saying, look has

0:26:17.000 --> 0:26:20.400
<v Speaker 1>applied here, this provision's okay. But we're not necessarily going

0:26:20.440 --> 0:26:24.280
<v Speaker 1>to say that the unlawful user ban is okay if

0:26:24.320 --> 0:26:27.280
<v Speaker 1>somebody is just a medical marijuana user and has a gun.

0:26:27.680 --> 0:26:30.560
<v Speaker 1>So that would be my guest that Dell reverse here.

0:26:30.960 --> 0:26:34.120
<v Speaker 2>The joys of originalism, which is for another day, but anyway,

0:26:34.200 --> 0:26:36.560
<v Speaker 2>coming up next on the Bloomberg Law Show, I'll continue

0:26:36.560 --> 0:26:40.560
<v Speaker 2>this conversation with Andrew Willinger of the Duke Center for

0:26:40.680 --> 0:26:45.280
<v Speaker 2>Firearms Law. The Supreme Court will also consider a Hawaii

0:26:45.359 --> 0:26:48.480
<v Speaker 2>law over the right to carry. I'm June Grosso and

0:26:48.520 --> 0:26:54.639
<v Speaker 2>you're listening to Bloomberg. The Supreme Court's conservative super majority

0:26:54.680 --> 0:26:57.800
<v Speaker 2>has expanded the right to bear arms starting in twenty

0:26:57.840 --> 0:27:02.040
<v Speaker 2>twenty two, with the landmark Ruined case holding the Second

0:27:02.080 --> 0:27:05.360
<v Speaker 2>Amendment protects the right to carry a handgun in public.

0:27:05.920 --> 0:27:09.480
<v Speaker 2>The test the Court established was that any restrictions of

0:27:09.600 --> 0:27:14.280
<v Speaker 2>firearms must be consistent with the national history and tradition.

0:27:14.680 --> 0:27:17.760
<v Speaker 2>The lower courts have been struggling with that test, and

0:27:17.800 --> 0:27:20.720
<v Speaker 2>the Supreme Court is taking up two gun cases this

0:27:20.920 --> 0:27:24.840
<v Speaker 2>term that may help to clarify the test. I've been

0:27:24.880 --> 0:27:28.120
<v Speaker 2>talking to Andrew Willinger, the executive director of the Duke

0:27:28.200 --> 0:27:32.280
<v Speaker 2>Center for Firearms Law. The court earlier this month also

0:27:32.359 --> 0:27:35.760
<v Speaker 2>agreed to hear a challenge to Hawaii law that prohibits

0:27:35.800 --> 0:27:40.880
<v Speaker 2>people from carrying guns onto another person's private property without

0:27:40.920 --> 0:27:44.720
<v Speaker 2>that person's consent, And in this case, the Trump administration

0:27:44.960 --> 0:27:47.280
<v Speaker 2>is backing the challengers to the law.

0:27:47.760 --> 0:27:50.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so this law is part of a group of states,

0:27:50.760 --> 0:27:54.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, the the year or two after that Bruined

0:27:54.000 --> 0:27:56.480
<v Speaker 1>decision that we talked about in twenty twenty two, which

0:27:56.960 --> 0:28:01.280
<v Speaker 1>set out this new test and also ruled that discretionary

0:28:01.520 --> 0:28:05.480
<v Speaker 1>concealed carry permitting was unconstitutional. So, in other words, basically

0:28:05.520 --> 0:28:09.560
<v Speaker 1>said that states that had these stricter laws for determining

0:28:09.560 --> 0:28:12.240
<v Speaker 1>whether somebody can have a concealed carry permit had to

0:28:12.320 --> 0:28:15.240
<v Speaker 1>relax them. And so the group of you know, six

0:28:15.320 --> 0:28:17.639
<v Speaker 1>or eight states that had those laws, I think most

0:28:17.680 --> 0:28:23.000
<v Speaker 1>of those states reacted ultimately by enacting new statutes. They

0:28:23.040 --> 0:28:27.400
<v Speaker 1>got rid of the discretionary language, but they also instituted

0:28:27.480 --> 0:28:33.720
<v Speaker 1>new application requirements and they restricted as relevant here, they

0:28:33.800 --> 0:28:37.479
<v Speaker 1>restricted where permit holders can carry their guns. So it's

0:28:37.560 --> 0:28:39.480
<v Speaker 1>kind of this idea of recognizing, you know, we're going

0:28:39.520 --> 0:28:42.760
<v Speaker 1>to have more people who get these permits, but you know,

0:28:42.800 --> 0:28:45.520
<v Speaker 1>as a result, we want to limit where those permit

0:28:45.560 --> 0:28:49.600
<v Speaker 1>holders can can carry. And so typically what these laws

0:28:49.600 --> 0:28:51.840
<v Speaker 1>look like and what they look like in New York,

0:28:51.880 --> 0:28:54.480
<v Speaker 1>California and then Hawaii was that they would have a

0:28:54.520 --> 0:28:58.400
<v Speaker 1>long list of what's called sensitive places, so locations where

0:28:58.440 --> 0:29:02.000
<v Speaker 1>guns are absolutely prohibited. You can't carry your firearm in

0:29:02.040 --> 0:29:05.400
<v Speaker 1>a school, a government building, and a courthouse and so on.

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:09.040
<v Speaker 1>And then a few states also did as a y

0:29:09.240 --> 0:29:12.160
<v Speaker 1>did what you can think of it as switching the

0:29:12.280 --> 0:29:16.800
<v Speaker 1>default rule for private property. So the default has always

0:29:16.880 --> 0:29:20.720
<v Speaker 1>been and I think every state that you are allowed

0:29:20.760 --> 0:29:24.440
<v Speaker 1>to carry a firearm onto private property unless you are

0:29:24.440 --> 0:29:28.200
<v Speaker 1>told otherwise. And that's when you think about businesses posting

0:29:28.200 --> 0:29:30.400
<v Speaker 1>a sign that says no guns allowed, right, That's why

0:29:30.400 --> 0:29:33.200
<v Speaker 1>they do that, because they have to specify if they

0:29:33.200 --> 0:29:35.920
<v Speaker 1>don't want people to carry. But what these states have

0:29:36.080 --> 0:29:39.480
<v Speaker 1>done is to say, we're going to flip that and

0:29:39.480 --> 0:29:43.040
<v Speaker 1>we're going to make the default that no carry is allowed.

0:29:43.400 --> 0:29:45.760
<v Speaker 1>And if a business, for example, would like to allow

0:29:45.840 --> 0:29:48.240
<v Speaker 1>a permit holder to carry their gun, they need to

0:29:48.280 --> 0:29:50.720
<v Speaker 1>post a sign or otherwise say yes, you're allowed to

0:29:50.760 --> 0:29:52.880
<v Speaker 1>do that, but as a default that they do nothing,

0:29:53.440 --> 0:29:55.440
<v Speaker 1>a permit holder is not allowed to carry there.

0:29:55.960 --> 0:29:59.600
<v Speaker 2>So the Administration in its papers told the High Court

0:29:59.640 --> 0:30:03.840
<v Speaker 2>that people could bring bicycles, roller skates, protest banners, muddy shoes,

0:30:03.920 --> 0:30:08.240
<v Speaker 2>dripping umbrellas, melting ice cream cones into private stores without permission.

0:30:08.800 --> 0:30:11.120
<v Speaker 2>Only if someone wants to carry a gun must he

0:30:11.200 --> 0:30:16.640
<v Speaker 2>obtain express authorization under the arbitrary presumption that all property

0:30:16.640 --> 0:30:19.840
<v Speaker 2>owners would view guns differently. It seems absurd to me

0:30:19.920 --> 0:30:23.480
<v Speaker 2>to compare bicycles, melting ice cream cones, and muddy shoes

0:30:23.520 --> 0:30:24.880
<v Speaker 2>with a gun.

0:30:25.160 --> 0:30:27.440
<v Speaker 1>Right, And there is at least some pulling on this

0:30:27.760 --> 0:30:32.240
<v Speaker 1>that suggests that people do prefer more than fifty percent

0:30:32.360 --> 0:30:36.400
<v Speaker 1>prefer the no carry default that depends. I mean, that's

0:30:36.440 --> 0:30:39.080
<v Speaker 1>different as you might imagine for these laws to reach

0:30:39.160 --> 0:30:42.480
<v Speaker 1>private property generally. So people are very strongly in favor,

0:30:42.480 --> 0:30:44.520
<v Speaker 1>as you can imagine a rule that says, as a

0:30:44.600 --> 0:30:47.960
<v Speaker 1>default is someone can't carry a firearm into my home.

0:30:48.320 --> 0:30:51.600
<v Speaker 1>They're less in favor when it comes to private property

0:30:51.600 --> 0:30:53.560
<v Speaker 1>that's open to the public, and they still are, but

0:30:53.600 --> 0:30:56.720
<v Speaker 1>it's closer. And that's what this case deals with, is

0:30:56.760 --> 0:30:59.520
<v Speaker 1>private property that's open to the public, as you mentioned.

0:30:59.760 --> 0:31:03.560
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, I mean, I think it's certainly true that

0:31:03.760 --> 0:31:07.400
<v Speaker 1>the articles that you mentioned are very different. But under

0:31:07.440 --> 0:31:11.480
<v Speaker 1>the Second Amendment cases and Ruin, the question is really

0:31:11.520 --> 0:31:15.760
<v Speaker 1>simply whether this type of innovation, this specifically, is a

0:31:15.800 --> 0:31:17.560
<v Speaker 1>new legislative intervention.

0:31:17.720 --> 0:31:17.840
<v Speaker 4>Right.

0:31:17.840 --> 0:31:21.680
<v Speaker 1>We don't have laws exactly like this anywhere in American history, because,

0:31:21.720 --> 0:31:24.000
<v Speaker 1>as I've said, the default was always as a general matter,

0:31:24.200 --> 0:31:27.360
<v Speaker 1>to allow guns to be carried. The question is whether

0:31:27.640 --> 0:31:32.000
<v Speaker 1>there's nevertheless a tradition of some kinds of restrictions that

0:31:32.080 --> 0:31:33.640
<v Speaker 1>could support this innovation.

0:31:34.160 --> 0:31:36.840
<v Speaker 2>The Ninth Circuit had ruled that nothing in the text

0:31:36.840 --> 0:31:40.280
<v Speaker 2>to the Second Amendment or otherwise suggests that a private

0:31:40.320 --> 0:31:43.800
<v Speaker 2>property owner, even owners who open their private property to

0:31:43.840 --> 0:31:47.200
<v Speaker 2>the public, must allow persons who bear arms to enter.

0:31:47.440 --> 0:31:49.960
<v Speaker 2>There was a contrary opinion from the Second Circuit, was.

0:31:49.960 --> 0:31:54.120
<v Speaker 1>It, Yeah, that's right on this specific question of flipping

0:31:54.160 --> 0:31:57.680
<v Speaker 1>the default approach. There is a direct circuit split between

0:31:57.680 --> 0:32:00.000
<v Speaker 1>the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, and the Second

0:32:00.080 --> 0:32:03.239
<v Speaker 1>con Circuit found that New York could not do this

0:32:03.680 --> 0:32:07.040
<v Speaker 1>under the Second Amendment. The Ninth Circuit says Hawaii can't.

0:32:07.320 --> 0:32:10.880
<v Speaker 1>And it really comes down to a handful of historical

0:32:10.960 --> 0:32:14.360
<v Speaker 1>laws that are being parsed in these cases. There's some

0:32:14.400 --> 0:32:17.840
<v Speaker 1>suggestion that there may be sort of anti poaching laws's

0:32:18.080 --> 0:32:21.280
<v Speaker 1>laws that governed, you know, farms or plantations that you

0:32:21.280 --> 0:32:24.160
<v Speaker 1>can't bring guns onto somebody else's land. But they may

0:32:24.160 --> 0:32:26.320
<v Speaker 1>have gone broader than that in some instances. And so

0:32:26.360 --> 0:32:30.440
<v Speaker 1>that's going to be the debate is exactly what types

0:32:30.480 --> 0:32:33.600
<v Speaker 1>of private property those historical laws covered.

0:32:33.840 --> 0:32:36.600
<v Speaker 2>And Andrew, are they just going to look at the

0:32:36.680 --> 0:32:40.680
<v Speaker 2>history and tradition of the states on the mainland, or

0:32:40.680 --> 0:32:45.040
<v Speaker 2>are they going to consider the history and tradition specifically

0:32:45.040 --> 0:32:49.000
<v Speaker 2>of Hawaii. Wear It's attorney said, Hawai has a long

0:32:49.120 --> 0:32:54.000
<v Speaker 2>history of reasonable gun regulation dating back to the eighteen fifties,

0:32:54.320 --> 0:32:56.920
<v Speaker 2>well before it was even a state. Is it why

0:32:57.000 --> 0:32:59.120
<v Speaker 2>going to get credit for that or not?

0:33:00.040 --> 0:33:03.000
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, what you raised a very interesting issue, which is that,

0:33:03.160 --> 0:33:06.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, Hawaii I think has been at the forefront

0:33:07.240 --> 0:33:11.880
<v Speaker 1>of pushing back against this history and tradition approach and

0:33:11.920 --> 0:33:14.880
<v Speaker 1>by the Supreme Court, so that the Hawaii Supreme Court

0:33:15.160 --> 0:33:17.960
<v Speaker 1>had a decision in a case called Wilson I think

0:33:18.080 --> 0:33:20.800
<v Speaker 1>maybe a couple of years ago where they really took

0:33:20.800 --> 0:33:23.040
<v Speaker 1>some shots at the Supreme Court and said you know, look,

0:33:23.080 --> 0:33:25.040
<v Speaker 1>this is not how we do things in Hawaii. We're

0:33:25.040 --> 0:33:27.320
<v Speaker 1>rejecting this history and tradition approach. You know, this is

0:33:27.360 --> 0:33:30.440
<v Speaker 1>not consistent with the spirit of aloha. And so I

0:33:30.480 --> 0:33:33.280
<v Speaker 1>think that's that's kind of in the background here, a

0:33:33.320 --> 0:33:36.000
<v Speaker 1>little bit of Hawaii, you know, really feeling like like

0:33:36.040 --> 0:33:39.680
<v Speaker 1>they shouldn't be constrained by what the Supreme Court is

0:33:39.800 --> 0:33:43.240
<v Speaker 1>saying and doing in the Second Amendment context. But as

0:33:43.280 --> 0:33:46.280
<v Speaker 1>the Bruin test has been applied, I think the inquiry

0:33:46.400 --> 0:33:50.040
<v Speaker 1>is is it's not Hawaii specific, right, and the courts

0:33:50.040 --> 0:33:52.320
<v Speaker 1>that have dealt with these challenges haven't treated it that way.

0:33:52.360 --> 0:33:55.960
<v Speaker 1>They're looking generally at the national historical tradition and seeing

0:33:55.960 --> 0:33:59.960
<v Speaker 1>if they can find any type of analogous restriction in this.

0:34:00.040 --> 0:34:03.560
<v Speaker 2>They're not challenging the parts of the law that banned

0:34:03.600 --> 0:34:08.160
<v Speaker 2>firearms and so called sensitive locations like government buildings, public

0:34:08.200 --> 0:34:11.600
<v Speaker 2>parks and beaches, etc. Why not challenge at all.

0:34:12.160 --> 0:34:15.040
<v Speaker 1>What we saw in this case below is that the

0:34:15.080 --> 0:34:18.120
<v Speaker 1>court kind of split the difference with some of these

0:34:18.160 --> 0:34:21.640
<v Speaker 1>sensitive place bands. They upheld some of them, they reversed

0:34:21.680 --> 0:34:24.600
<v Speaker 1>some of them. I think this is a strategic choice

0:34:24.640 --> 0:34:28.319
<v Speaker 1>by the plaintiffs that they think that this private property

0:34:28.520 --> 0:34:31.760
<v Speaker 1>rule is their best shot. It's one where we've seen

0:34:31.960 --> 0:34:35.920
<v Speaker 1>some more liberal judges at the circuit level have some

0:34:35.960 --> 0:34:38.839
<v Speaker 1>suspicion about it, and so I think that's why they've

0:34:38.920 --> 0:34:42.239
<v Speaker 1>chosen to focus on it. But I do believe that

0:34:42.280 --> 0:34:46.160
<v Speaker 1>the sensitive place question, it will be really important to

0:34:46.480 --> 0:34:49.319
<v Speaker 1>sort of watch how it's influencing the justices thinking in

0:34:49.320 --> 0:34:53.080
<v Speaker 1>this case, because you could imagine I think even some

0:34:53.160 --> 0:34:57.520
<v Speaker 1>of the liberal wing of the Court being maybe okay

0:34:57.640 --> 0:35:01.640
<v Speaker 1>with reversing the Ninth Circuit here if the sort of

0:35:01.800 --> 0:35:04.080
<v Speaker 1>payoff of that, or the trade off is that you

0:35:04.160 --> 0:35:07.520
<v Speaker 1>get a statement from the Supreme Court saying it's okay

0:35:07.840 --> 0:35:11.000
<v Speaker 1>under the Sensitive Places doctrine to ban guns in a

0:35:11.000 --> 0:35:13.279
<v Speaker 1>lot of different locations, right, but you just can't do

0:35:13.640 --> 0:35:17.200
<v Speaker 1>the private property switch. So there's kind of some hydraulics

0:35:17.200 --> 0:35:20.160
<v Speaker 1>there where I wonder whether that's going to be going

0:35:20.200 --> 0:35:23.480
<v Speaker 1>on behind the scenes. Frankly, you know, it may be

0:35:23.640 --> 0:35:27.240
<v Speaker 1>that we get something, you know, in the opinion that says,

0:35:27.320 --> 0:35:30.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, look, this is not casting doubt on sensitive

0:35:30.400 --> 0:35:34.120
<v Speaker 1>place laws even outside of the limited categories the Court

0:35:34.160 --> 0:35:35.239
<v Speaker 1>has already recognized.

0:35:35.560 --> 0:35:38.040
<v Speaker 2>I do think that the oral arguments in these cases

0:35:38.080 --> 0:35:41.400
<v Speaker 2>are going to be interesting. Thanks for joining me, Andrew.

0:35:41.680 --> 0:35:45.000
<v Speaker 2>That's Andrew Willinger, executive director of the Duke Center for

0:35:45.120 --> 0:35:47.920
<v Speaker 2>Firearms Law. And that's it for this edition of The

0:35:47.960 --> 0:35:50.920
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest

0:35:50.960 --> 0:35:54.080
<v Speaker 2>legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find

0:35:54.080 --> 0:35:58.680
<v Speaker 2>them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot Bloomberg

0:35:58.719 --> 0:36:02.279
<v Speaker 2>dot com, slash podcas cast slash Law, and remember to

0:36:02.320 --> 0:36:05.160
<v Speaker 2>tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every week night at

0:36:05.200 --> 0:36:08.680
<v Speaker 2>ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're

0:36:08.760 --> 0:36:09.960
<v Speaker 2>listening to Bloomberg