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Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, Robert Evans here and I wanted to let

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Speaker 1: you know this is a compilation episode. So every episode

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Speaker 1: of the week that just happened is here in one

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Speaker 1: convenient and with somewhat less ads package for you to

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Speaker 1: listen to in a long stretch if you want. If

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Speaker 1: you've been listening to the episodes every day this week,

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Speaker 1: there's gonna be nothing new here for you, but you

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Speaker 1: can make your own decisions. Uh, welcome to it could

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Speaker 1: happen here a podcast about things falling apart and how

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Speaker 1: to deal with that and hopefully take care of yourself

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Speaker 1: and your people. UM. Today we have a returning guest,

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Speaker 1: Carl Casarda from Enranged TV. UM. Now, Carl, every time

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Speaker 1: you and I have chatted on a show together, it

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Speaker 1: has been about firearms, which is obviously your passion and specialty,

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Speaker 1: well one of your specialties. But today we're not talking

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Speaker 1: at all about guns. UM. I mean maybe here and there,

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Speaker 1: but today we're talking about the thing that is has

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Speaker 1: been your your career, uh for what most of your

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Speaker 1: working life. Fair to UM, you want to kind of

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Speaker 1: walk through your background, he because we're gonna be talking

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Speaker 1: about information security and like sort of the future of

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Speaker 1: threats that are going to be like coming uh throughout

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Speaker 1: like the next few years of our lives. Obviously this

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Speaker 1: year in particular, there's been a bunch of stories about

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Speaker 1: like Russian attacks on digital infrastructure and vice versa. And

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Speaker 1: that's always, like pretty much has been something that's in

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Speaker 1: everybody's backburn since we got the Internet, usually through like

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Speaker 1: questionable films with Sandra Bullock. Um, I think net that

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Speaker 1: was net right? Um? The Net? The Net? Yes, exactly, Yes,

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Speaker 1: where they somehow hacked a car and nineteen or something.

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Speaker 1: You gotta do that when you're flying through cyberspace with

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Speaker 1: your right yea. Um. But yeah, you want to walk

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Speaker 1: everyone through kind of what your actual background is in

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Speaker 1: this industry first. Yeah, totally. So if anyone watches in

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Speaker 1: Rangers watched it for a long time, you'll see this

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Speaker 1: reflected in some of my content because I do deal

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Speaker 1: with some of this intermittently on the channel. It's definitely

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Speaker 1: influenced how I approach my work there with the social

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Speaker 1: media and all that. But so way back when I

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Speaker 1: was like one of those kids that was in the

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Speaker 1: hacker space, and I grew up like trying to make

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Speaker 1: computers and technology do what it wasn't designed to do,

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Speaker 1: and learn to make it do things it shouldn't have

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Speaker 1: done for my own interests or others around me, Not

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Speaker 1: not in any really negative way, but like just a

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Speaker 1: deep curiosity and how does this stuff work? And being

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Speaker 1: part of the early online community. We're talking pre internet,

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Speaker 1: where you have like an acoustic coupling jack modem and

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Speaker 1: you would dial in like war games, yea, literally plug

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Speaker 1: your headset into the fat. I was on boards like

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Speaker 1: that way back when whatever should have gone past those days.

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Speaker 1: Doing things wirelessly was such a mistake, Like I'm so

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Speaker 1: piste off that when I like sit down to research,

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Speaker 1: I'm not like jacking into a gigantic box um like

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Speaker 1: it that makes me live it Like shadow Run promised

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Speaker 1: me that I was going to be like using one

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Speaker 1: hand to shoot at the approaching corporate security guards and

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Speaker 1: have another hand on my like keyboard that I wear

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Speaker 1: around my neck that I like plug into the wall

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Speaker 1: to hack buildings. Well, hey, maybe someday we'll have neurological

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Speaker 1: implants or wet wire implants brought to us by Monsanto

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Speaker 1: that'llually the RM and will just get shut off in

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Speaker 1: our own rooms right from the mouth to God's ears,

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Speaker 1: Carl absolutely, who doesn't want that? Who doesn't want my

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Speaker 1: neural tissue tied directly to a corporation? But that fuck yes?

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Speaker 1: But anyway, so I grew up in that space, and

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Speaker 1: it actually, back then it naturally turned into a career.

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Speaker 1: It wasn't like now nowadays you pretty much have to

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Speaker 1: go get a bunch of certificates and a college degree

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Speaker 1: to even start looking at an infract career. But back then,

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Speaker 1: if you kind of had like skills with a Z

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Speaker 1: at the end of you could get a job. And

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Speaker 1: I landed up doing like help desk at this one company.

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Speaker 1: Landed up they noticed that that's where my interests were,

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Speaker 1: and I ended up becoming their information security architect over

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Speaker 1: a couple of years, and that turned into a multiple

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Speaker 1: decade career pretty much culminating and working at a Tier

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Speaker 1: one Internet backbone provider doing sub seed fiber optic like routing,

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Speaker 1: networking and de DOS mitigation and bought neck control search

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Speaker 1: and destroy. So it really turned into a really wide career,

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Speaker 1: not only like when I started off backbone Internet, but

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Speaker 1: like encryption, firewalls, application layer controls across the board for

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Speaker 1: multiple corporations. So it was a weird and interesting space.

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Speaker 1: But I don't really do that much anymore except on

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Speaker 1: the side, but I've had a pretty exciting career with it.

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Speaker 1: So I think probably a good place to start is

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Speaker 1: just in general, because folks are always interested about this.

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Speaker 1: What what do you What is your recommendation for people

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Speaker 1: ask like, what should I be doing to kind of

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Speaker 1: protect myself as I forced my head under the constant

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Speaker 1: stream of sewer water that is social media these days? Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know, the simplest thing and everything, an infosec is

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Speaker 1: always controversial, just like anything life or any any recommendation

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Speaker 1: makes someone's gonna be like but otherwise or anyways, or

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Speaker 1: there's a better solution, and there always is a better solution.

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Speaker 1: But the realistic thing is when you talk to the

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Speaker 1: average person, the average person isn't gonna sit there and

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Speaker 1: hack a Linux box to have a better social media experience.

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Speaker 1: That's just not realistic. So the best thing anyone can do,

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Speaker 1: the simplest, best thing, is to get one of the

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Speaker 1: trusted password managers. There's a number of them out there.

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Speaker 1: I'm not going to recommend an individual one right now,

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Speaker 1: because anyone I recommend someone's gonna go. But there's another one,

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Speaker 1: but there's a few of them out there. Having a

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Speaker 1: password manager and having a unique, difficult, complex password for

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Speaker 1: every account you log in onto on the internet is

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Speaker 1: the first number one thing you can do as an

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Speaker 1: individual to protect your interest. Because if you're logging in

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Speaker 1: with the same password monkey to Facebook, Twitter, and your

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Speaker 1: bank account, that is a disaster waiting to happen. So

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Speaker 1: the first thing you can do password manager passwords you

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Speaker 1: yourself can't remember. As a result, I allow the password

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Speaker 1: manager to generate like twenty four character long alpha numeric

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Speaker 1: crypto nonsense. You put a gun on my mouth to say,

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Speaker 1: what's your password to your bank and I don't know.

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Speaker 1: I can't give it you. I have no idea. And

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Speaker 1: so that right there is the first thing any basic

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Speaker 1: individual can do to protect themselves on the Internet that,

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Speaker 1: uh is totally sensible. Um, I don't I'm not great

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Speaker 1: at password managers, but I never know what my passwords

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Speaker 1: are and they're all different, and so my life is

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Speaker 1: this constant stream of like needing to figure out what

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Speaker 1: my password was, failing and resetting it. But it does

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Speaker 1: mean that I change passwords regularly, right, But what's so

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Speaker 1: great about password managers. You can have passwords that you

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Speaker 1: could never human remember, and you can have neak ones

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Speaker 1: per website, every website you log in, you could be unique.

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Speaker 1: And by having it in this database that's properly encrypted

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Speaker 1: with a key phrase or even dual factor, then at

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Speaker 1: that point means you literally just can cut and paste

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Speaker 1: your passwords into things you don't yourself know what they

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Speaker 1: are and if depending on your privacy levels, you can

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Speaker 1: do that locally with local solutions with files like on

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Speaker 1: your own machine. But frankly a couple of the cloud

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Speaker 1: based solutions, as much as the cloud freaks people out,

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Speaker 1: is the better one because it'll work on your phone,

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Speaker 1: it'll work on your black top, it'll work on everything everywhere.

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Speaker 1: That makes total sense. Um. I think Another good thing

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Speaker 1: to get into while we're on this subject. We just

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Speaker 1: started talking about passwords, and obviously it is important to

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Speaker 1: keep and secure though is um I think one thing

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Speaker 1: folks don't often think about, especially people who are activists

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Speaker 1: um who who may foresee or have engaged in things

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Speaker 1: that are legally questionable, don't think about enough is social

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Speaker 1: media networking um as, and by which I mean having

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Speaker 1: social media that like it is possible to find your

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Speaker 1: other social media by like knowing you know, like having

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Speaker 1: the same name and Twitter and on Instagram and stuff. Um,

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Speaker 1: having social media that like can be tracked across accounts. Um.

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Speaker 1: Most people would be surprised at how easy it is

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Speaker 1: to do that. A hug and melanct a huge amount

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Speaker 1: of tracking. Nazis tracking even like a ton of the

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Speaker 1: what the work I did not do, but my colleagues

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Speaker 1: did to like doc docs Russian like secret service agents

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Speaker 1: and stuff. Was like, oh, we found them in you

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Speaker 1: know somebody, uh, their their bosses wedding, Like they're tagged

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Speaker 1: in this thing in VK And from that we were

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Speaker 1: able to like find their their account on this other

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Speaker 1: site and like from that, like now we have this

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Speaker 1: like map of everywhere they've been for the last like

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Speaker 1: three weeks, and we can build this social map of

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Speaker 1: their entire life. Yeah. No, by list by just literally

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Speaker 1: existing in modern space, you're constantly leaking some form of metadata,

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Speaker 1: right you are. You are always leaking metadata, And the

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Speaker 1: more of you allow to exist in the world, the

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Speaker 1: more that's the case. So, like there's also you've got

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Speaker 1: to think about what the threat is and what the

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Speaker 1: risk is. Right, there's the risk of the individual having

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Speaker 1: a pair of social relationship with the Internet like I

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Speaker 1: do as a content creator is one thing. People, there's

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Speaker 1: always someone that wants to delve into your private life.

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Speaker 1: But that's a very different risk than a nation state actor. Right,

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Speaker 1: those are two different things. And when it comes to

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Speaker 1: a nation state actor, quite honestly, unless you're real good

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Speaker 1: and I've been doing it for a long time, the

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Speaker 1: individual bluntly is kind of fucked word. As a general rule,

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Speaker 1: your best security as an individual in that situation is

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Speaker 1: the anonymity of the crowd. But when we're also not

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Speaker 1: talking about most people who are threatened to kind of

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Speaker 1: by the state and that situation are not being threatened

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Speaker 1: by the federal government, but they may have they may

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Speaker 1: like be attending protests and not want the Louisville Police

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Speaker 1: to like put together that they're in an affinity group

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Speaker 1: with people and like something you can do for that

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Speaker 1: is make sure you're not like, if you have a

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Speaker 1: personal account that's under your name with your friends, that

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Speaker 1: account shouldn't be liking and sharing things from like a

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Speaker 1: political account that you have, or from the account of

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Speaker 1: like a group that you're a part of, or something

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Speaker 1: like that like, just try to think about and look

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Speaker 1: at your your digital footprint from the outside and think,

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Speaker 1: is it possible to connect me to people I don't

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Speaker 1: want to be publicly connected to through this And the

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Speaker 1: minute you've breached that connection once it's gone forever. Right,

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Speaker 1: this is the forever. Yes, this is the same thing

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Speaker 1: as like with phones, like someone will have like their

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Speaker 1: regular phone, which, by the way, all these smartphones are

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Speaker 1: just surveillance devices in our pocket. Right, Let's let's say

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Speaker 1: you go get a burner so that you don't want

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Speaker 1: to be connected to the device that you normally use

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Speaker 1: on on a level that's one step above the regular

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Speaker 1: individual level. If you ever have those two devices emanating

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Speaker 1: at the same time, they're now connected in a way

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Speaker 1: that like, let's say, the authorities can associate them together

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Speaker 1: because of triangulation and seeing a burner phone and your

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Speaker 1: phone coming from the same house, you've breached all the

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Speaker 1: privacy you would have had from your burner phone for example. Now, Karl,

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Speaker 1: do you have much to say on the subject of

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Speaker 1: because I know one thing I have seen people do

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Speaker 1: people who are you know, having conversations that they're concerned

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Speaker 1: about is put bags in Faraday cages. And I've heard

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Speaker 1: mixed things about how reliable Faraday bags and stuff are

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Speaker 1: for actually stopping signals. Do you have much to say

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Speaker 1: on that matter. My experience with that is not all,

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Speaker 1: not all bags that you can just buy off the

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Speaker 1: internet are made equally um So what you want to

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Speaker 1: do is tested, and you can only test it to

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Speaker 1: a certain degree. But the really simple tests are you

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Speaker 1: put it in the bag and you try to darn

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Speaker 1: dial the darn thing or use any WiFi connections to it.

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Speaker 1: And that's a simple test. Now is it as good

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Speaker 1: as like? Is it as good as not having the

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Speaker 1: thing on you? Of course not leaving or else is

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Speaker 1: always the best answer, but it properly In my opinion,

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Speaker 1: a properly built Faraday box or cage or bag that

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Speaker 1: you've put some testing into is a pretty reliable solution.

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Speaker 1: And it's you know, there are so a problem that

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Speaker 1: you might encounter is um or that I have. So

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Speaker 1: one thing I have heard people talk about it is like, well,

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Speaker 1: in order to have kind of a private conversation, we

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Speaker 1: like drove to a specific location and we left our

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Speaker 1: phones off in the car and then went on a walk.

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Speaker 1: And the problem with that is that Now you have

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Speaker 1: both just driven to a location with those phones, and

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Speaker 1: those phones are associated with each other, right right, Well,

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Speaker 1: so first of all, you got to think of a

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Speaker 1: world where all of this metadata is being collected at

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Speaker 1: all times. So these phones and their associations in physical

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Speaker 1: proximity to one another is stored somewhere at all times,

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Speaker 1: whether or not it's going to be resourced or accessible

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Speaker 1: to the powers that be when they wanted to be.

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Speaker 1: It's all there. My phone next to your phone, next

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Speaker 1: to that guy's phone. Those associations all exist. They're all

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Speaker 1: talking to the same cell phone towers in the same area,

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Speaker 1: giving them not only GPS coordinates but triangulation data, which,

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Speaker 1: by the way, if you go way back to the

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Speaker 1: hacker Kevin Mitnick, that stuff was going on back then

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Speaker 1: before they had triangulation data to get him, right, So

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Speaker 1: that stuff is all still happening, and those association does occur.

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Speaker 1: In regards to saying I turned my phone off, how

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Speaker 1: do you know that's off? Most of the moderate phones,

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Speaker 1: what does off mean? And yeah, okay, pull the battery maybe,

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Speaker 1: But even then, I would not trust any of these

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Speaker 1: devices in the regards to them quote being off, especially

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Speaker 1: things like phones that have unremovable or not removable batteries.

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Speaker 1: Off is more like sleep it is, right, Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: I think one of the worst things that's happened for

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Speaker 1: personal security is the end of the phone where you

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Speaker 1: can remove the battery, Like being unable to actually cut

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Speaker 1: power to it without you know, disassembling it is a

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Speaker 1: real issue. One could argue that there was like that

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Speaker 1: that's a much much more insidious reason they did that,

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Speaker 1: or one could argue that it was just one of

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Speaker 1: design and comfort, And it's like hard to say. It

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Speaker 1: doesn't really matter if it was insidious or not. Reality

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Speaker 1: kind of a poor Knolos dose situation, right totally is

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Speaker 1: so when now that we're talking about phones, here's another

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Speaker 1: thing that's been near and dear, and I think you've

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Speaker 1: seen some posts from me out this um. Everybody really

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Speaker 1: likes the convenience of things like biometrics, thumb authentication, fingerprint

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Speaker 1: i D, facial identification. And here's the reality of that.

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Speaker 1: We know this already and there's legal this exists in

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Speaker 1: legal space already. But the reality is that you can

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Speaker 1: be coerced to provide biometric data against your will. So

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Speaker 1: if your phone is authenticated to you with a fingerprint

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Speaker 1: I D or your facial i D. They can pretty

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Speaker 1: much say you must give us your thumb to unlock

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Speaker 1: this phone, or for that matter, frankly, they could hold

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Speaker 1: the phone in front of your face in certain circumstract circumstances,

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Speaker 1: even against your will, and it will unlock the device,

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Speaker 1: and that is considered not a violation of your rights. So,

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Speaker 1: for example, if you had a long, strong password on

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Speaker 1: the phone, they cannot coerce you to give that up

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Speaker 1: because that would be a violation of your own rights

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Speaker 1: and Fifth Amendment, which is interesting um so. But at

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Speaker 1: the same time, one could also argue that at certain

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Speaker 1: circumstances where there's a lot of cameras that are not

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Speaker 1: necessarily watching everything you do. But you could also consider

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Speaker 1: that pass phrases could be dangerous, like saying an airport

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Speaker 1: because all those members could see you plugging in your

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Speaker 1: pass code. So it's a matter of if, when and

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Speaker 1: where right, So what's the right solution at the best time.

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Speaker 1: But I would say that if you were going to

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Speaker 1: be in a place that was contentious, um it is

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Speaker 1: almost always better to make sure you do not allow

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Speaker 1: for any biometric authentication on device. Yes, I never like

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Speaker 1: never turn on don't even like ever have had it

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Speaker 1: in the like ideally you have never turned on facial

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Speaker 1: recognition on your phone, like even if you like deactivated,

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Speaker 1: I don't know, I don't, I really that was That

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Speaker 1: was one of the first I used to be in

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Speaker 1: tech journalism. Right, obviously I'm not an expert on any

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Speaker 1: of this, but like the worst thing in terms of

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Speaker 1: like my personal comfort with devices was when they were like,

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Speaker 1: everything's gonna read faces and fingerprints. Now I don't. I

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Speaker 1: don't love that, um, but you know it's it's inevitable,

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Speaker 1: right because it is and I had in the past.

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Speaker 1: I did a fingerprint unlock earlier in my life, and

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Speaker 1: I do not have any devices that unlocked that way anymore.

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Speaker 1: But you do like that it is more convenient, right,

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Speaker 1: You miss it when you need to get to your

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Speaker 1: phone quickly and you can't do it. But like, I

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Speaker 1: don't even I don't even let my phone have just

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Speaker 1: like a four phrase like password anymore. Like it's eight

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Speaker 1: characters for me. It's a little bit of a pain

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Speaker 1: in the ass, but it comes with fewer risks and

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Speaker 1: one of the things that's challenging to every individuals, they

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Speaker 1: have to look at what their threat profile is. Right,

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Speaker 1: So like, for example, UM, soccer mom driving her kids

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Speaker 1: to school and stuff, she might be really good, well

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Speaker 1: off with a bottometric authentication on her phone, frankly, because

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Speaker 1: if she didn't use that, maybe she wouldn't even use

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Speaker 1: a proper four character pass phrase. And if she's not

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Speaker 1: concerned about being at a protest, for example, and having

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Speaker 1: some authoritarian take her phone away from her and authenticate

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Speaker 1: to it, maybe she doesn't need to worry about that.

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Speaker 1: But for a lot of us in the world's we

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Speaker 1: live in, that's a different risk profile, right. We got

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Speaker 1: to think about what our risks are as individuals and

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Speaker 1: what makes sense. So if your passphrase is going to

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Speaker 1: be one, two, three, four or use a thumb print

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Speaker 1: I D. For most people they'd be better with the

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Speaker 1: thumb print I D. But for someone like myself, no,

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Speaker 1: it's not a good idea. Yeah, and that's m Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I think that kind of brings us to uh, probably

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Speaker 1: the last part of this, which is UM, do you

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Speaker 1: have specific advice on like VPNs UM? Obviously I recommend

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Speaker 1: everybody you signal I I just firm messages in general,

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Speaker 1: But like a specially stuff that is secure. Don't if

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Speaker 1: you if you like number one first rule of any

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00:16:21,920 --> 00:16:26,880
Speaker 1: kind of this sort of security, don't ever put anything

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Speaker 1: on your phone ever that's legally questionable if you can

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Speaker 1: avoid it, like conversationally, like right, do not don't send

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Speaker 1: it over a phone if it's something you would not

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Speaker 1: be able to survive having read d you in a courtroom. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: for the audience, a lot of the audience may not

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Speaker 1: know what signal even is. Right, So signal ism is

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Speaker 1: a is a text messaging alternative. So like for example,

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Speaker 1: on your phone, you've got regular text or if you've

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Speaker 1: got an iPhone, you've got I message. Signal is an

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Speaker 1: end end encrypted solution that you install as an app.

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Speaker 1: And because it's end end encryption, it means that it

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Speaker 1: passes the wire in theory not decryptible by the parties

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Speaker 1: that are passing the data packets in the middle. So

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Speaker 1: that's a man in the middle the decryption. Right. So

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Speaker 1: for example, I message is encrypted theoretically end to end,

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Speaker 1: but Apple ultimately has the cryptographic keys, so there is

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Speaker 1: while they might say one thing, there is nothing really

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00:17:17,520 --> 00:17:19,399
Speaker 1: preventing them from being man in the middle and being

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Speaker 1: able to read the message in transit from a to

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Speaker 1: be But if the keys are stored on your device,

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00:17:25,480 --> 00:17:28,159
Speaker 1: which are then protected with your passphrase or whatever your

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00:17:28,200 --> 00:17:31,520
Speaker 1: authentication mechanism is, and those keys are not archived or

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00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:35,440
Speaker 1: kept by some hierarchical man in the middle authority, if

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00:17:35,440 --> 00:17:38,679
Speaker 1: it's done right, which Signal is done pretty well, it

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Speaker 1: means that your data in transit is probably not decryptable.

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Speaker 1: And that's why signals a good solution, and it's a

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00:17:44,680 --> 00:17:47,600
Speaker 1: good one for the average person. Install the app. It

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00:17:47,680 --> 00:17:50,359
Speaker 1: works just like testa text messaging, but you can have

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Speaker 1: a pretty good level of a knowledge that the data

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Speaker 1: you're passing is not being decrypted or caught in transmission

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Speaker 1: or in the path. So I would say get get Signal. Um,

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Speaker 1: it's it's your best bet, right Like and again we said,

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Speaker 1: I said, you know, you don't want to ever say

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Speaker 1: anything over a phone that is something that can get

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Speaker 1: you in trouble. But also like life is life, and

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00:18:14,800 --> 00:18:18,919
Speaker 1: that's not always realistic for people in certain situations. So again,

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00:18:19,080 --> 00:18:22,920
Speaker 1: signal is your best bet. Nothing is perfect. And again,

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Speaker 1: if you're putting it on your phone, there's a number

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00:18:25,160 --> 00:18:27,080
Speaker 1: of things that could go wrong every single time you

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00:18:27,119 --> 00:18:30,359
Speaker 1: do that. But um, that that's one of your better

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00:18:30,640 --> 00:18:32,080
Speaker 1: things that you could do. And then of course we

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Speaker 1: talk about VPNs. Yeah, so so VPN to those like,

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Speaker 1: I'm just gonna go with the basic levels because I

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00:18:38,160 --> 00:18:41,320
Speaker 1: don't necessarily know the level of knowledge that people are listening.

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Speaker 1: VPN is a virtual private network. So what that is.

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Speaker 1: You connect to this virtual private network and it passes

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Speaker 1: your data through an encrypted tunnel to an exit point

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Speaker 1: somewhere else on the Internet in theory masking the source

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Speaker 1: and origin of your requests. So like, for example, let's

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Speaker 1: say you were looking up something on the Internet that

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Speaker 1: you didn't necessarily want people to know you're looking up. Yeah, like,

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Speaker 1: let's say you're researching the truth about the assassination of

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00:19:07,880 --> 00:19:11,800
Speaker 1: President John F. Kennedy by Bernard Montgomery Sanders. Um, and

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00:19:11,840 --> 00:19:13,919
Speaker 1: you know that the n s A is looking for

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00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:17,200
Speaker 1: truth seekers who are who are finding out the reality

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00:19:17,240 --> 00:19:19,640
Speaker 1: of that situation. You know, you don't necessarily want them

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Speaker 1: to know that you have have become pilled. Right, So

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00:19:23,640 --> 00:19:25,920
Speaker 1: if you were to do this from your computer at home,

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00:19:26,320 --> 00:19:28,040
Speaker 1: But what happen is to people that don't know how

401
00:19:28,119 --> 00:19:29,760
Speaker 1: this all works, you would be coming from an I

402
00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:33,239
Speaker 1: P address that's associated with your account that you're connecting to,

403
00:19:33,320 --> 00:19:37,040
Speaker 1: whether it's Verizon or Comcast or whatever. And you go

404
00:19:37,119 --> 00:19:39,240
Speaker 1: and search up that truth and the n s A

405
00:19:39,400 --> 00:19:42,600
Speaker 1: finds you with a keyword search for JFK and the truth.

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00:19:42,920 --> 00:19:45,600
Speaker 1: And therefore, because of that keyword search, they go to

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Speaker 1: Comcast or to Verison and say, hey, we are requesting

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Speaker 1: you tell us who did this search. They will get

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Speaker 1: them essentially a request that's a legal request for information,

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00:19:55,680 --> 00:19:58,399
Speaker 1: and then Comcast or Verizon will provide the n s

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00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:00,920
Speaker 1: A this is the IP address account of the person

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Speaker 1: that did that. What VPN does is you connect to

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00:20:04,520 --> 00:20:07,760
Speaker 1: the vp and service first, the connection from your machine

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00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:10,840
Speaker 1: to the VPN services then encrypted. Now does the VPN

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00:20:10,880 --> 00:20:15,000
Speaker 1: service know your IP address? Yes, but when you actually

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00:20:15,040 --> 00:20:16,840
Speaker 1: type in that information or go to the Internet to

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00:20:16,920 --> 00:20:20,000
Speaker 1: request that data, it actually goes through the VPNs Private

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00:20:20,000 --> 00:20:23,520
Speaker 1: Tunneling network and egresses from somewhere else on the Internet,

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Speaker 1: thus masking your actual I P address and in theory

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00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:33,639
Speaker 1: your origin of source. Now that's not true, but what

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00:20:33,760 --> 00:20:35,600
Speaker 1: that does is mean that if someone if say the

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00:20:35,720 --> 00:20:37,600
Speaker 1: n s A I wanted to know who's doing this

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Speaker 1: truth search, they would then find an eat IP address

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Speaker 1: that actually came out of let's say Joe's VPN service,

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00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:47,919
Speaker 1: and they would have to go to Joe's VPN service

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Speaker 1: and go we noticed this emanated from your network? Who

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00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:55,479
Speaker 1: did this? At that point, you have to trust Joe's

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00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:59,040
Speaker 1: VPN service to not disclose their account information about you.

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00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:02,159
Speaker 1: So what you've done is you've changed it. We know

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Speaker 1: the telecoms will communicate with the government or whoever if

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00:21:05,880 --> 00:21:09,119
Speaker 1: they need to, they always will have You don't necessarily

432
00:21:09,160 --> 00:21:12,520
Speaker 1: know if Joe's VPN service will. You've changed your trust

433
00:21:12,560 --> 00:21:16,439
Speaker 1: model from your telecom to your VPN service. So if

434
00:21:16,440 --> 00:21:18,359
Speaker 1: you're gonna pick a VPN, you have to do a

435
00:21:18,359 --> 00:21:20,120
Speaker 1: little bit of research to know that it's a trustworthy

436
00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:23,480
Speaker 1: resource that won't just give you up at the lightest

437
00:21:23,600 --> 00:21:27,320
Speaker 1: form of interrogation. Yeah, and none of them again, there's

438
00:21:27,320 --> 00:21:30,679
Speaker 1: nothing perfect and often like we did find out what

439
00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:33,240
Speaker 1: was it last year that one of popular vpn was

440
00:21:33,280 --> 00:21:36,560
Speaker 1: like run by the FEDS, Like it's yeah, that's not

441
00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:39,480
Speaker 1: an impossible thing. Um. I know a lot of folks,

442
00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:43,320
Speaker 1: particularly journalists, use proton Um, which is I think based

443
00:21:43,320 --> 00:21:46,520
Speaker 1: in Switzerland, and you will get given up if you

444
00:21:46,840 --> 00:21:50,240
Speaker 1: if the Swiss government is angry at you right, you

445
00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:54,440
Speaker 1: brought up a very good point. Uh, services that exists

446
00:21:54,520 --> 00:21:57,840
Speaker 1: outside of the KNUS, the continental US mean that they

447
00:21:57,840 --> 00:22:01,040
Speaker 1: are under different legal jurisdiction the ones that exist wholly

448
00:22:01,080 --> 00:22:04,600
Speaker 1: within the KONUS. So as a result, if something from

449
00:22:04,640 --> 00:22:07,320
Speaker 1: the United States government comes as a request to the

450
00:22:07,359 --> 00:22:11,000
Speaker 1: Swiss company, there's a much like like higher chance that

451
00:22:11,040 --> 00:22:13,400
Speaker 1: a Swiss company would be like, we don't really care

452
00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:17,080
Speaker 1: about your reports. That's worth considering. Also, think about this,

453
00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:18,720
Speaker 1: This actually works in reverse. And I don't want to

454
00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:20,639
Speaker 1: get too deep into this, but when you're working at

455
00:22:20,680 --> 00:22:22,800
Speaker 1: a tier one internet back one provider, you should know

456
00:22:23,520 --> 00:22:27,880
Speaker 1: that sometimes traffic strangely gets pushed offshore and then back

457
00:22:27,920 --> 00:22:30,199
Speaker 1: to the United States for analysis that would normally be

458
00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:34,800
Speaker 1: let's say, not necessarily constitutionally legal in the United States.

459
00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:40,360
Speaker 1: So there's a lot of shenanigans going on. Yeah, and again, like,

460
00:22:40,880 --> 00:22:43,400
Speaker 1: I think protons are generally a pretty good service. I've

461
00:22:43,400 --> 00:22:46,880
Speaker 1: had no problems with it um, But we should should

462
00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:49,120
Speaker 1: be clear here none of these are perfect solutions. There

463
00:22:49,160 --> 00:22:52,440
Speaker 1: is no perfect solution. The only perfect method of digital

464
00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:55,359
Speaker 1: security is not putting things on the Internet or like

465
00:22:55,480 --> 00:22:58,280
Speaker 1: through you know, the mobile networks and stuff like that is,

466
00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:02,159
Speaker 1: if it stays between you someone else, Um, that is

467
00:23:02,160 --> 00:23:05,720
Speaker 1: your best bet of it not being you know, intercepted

468
00:23:05,800 --> 00:23:08,520
Speaker 1: or something. A conversation that you have in the woods

469
00:23:08,560 --> 00:23:11,560
Speaker 1: without phones anywhere near you is the most secure kind

470
00:23:11,560 --> 00:23:14,600
Speaker 1: of conversation. Let me second on proton I agree, it's

471
00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:16,040
Speaker 1: a good service. There are others out there. We're not

472
00:23:16,080 --> 00:23:18,119
Speaker 1: trying to pick on one in particular or pick against

473
00:23:18,119 --> 00:23:20,359
Speaker 1: anyone in particularly. There's a bunch of at work. Yeah.

474
00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:22,560
Speaker 1: Another thing that you need to consider in this sort

475
00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:25,119
Speaker 1: of thing is also what you're dealing with. Like so

476
00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:27,520
Speaker 1: for example, on I put up a post a while

477
00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:29,399
Speaker 1: back because there was a bunch of stuff going on

478
00:23:29,440 --> 00:23:32,440
Speaker 1: in Ukraine with with people posting photos that got their

479
00:23:32,480 --> 00:23:35,919
Speaker 1: locations add things happen that I mean, that's and that

480
00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:38,240
Speaker 1: has been happening for a decade in that war, like

481
00:23:38,280 --> 00:23:40,159
Speaker 1: a well almost a decade as long as it's been

482
00:23:40,160 --> 00:23:42,520
Speaker 1: going on, And I posted something about it. And one

483
00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:44,800
Speaker 1: of the recommendations I made on there was a contentious one,

484
00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:46,119
Speaker 1: but I'm gonna back it up in a minute. As

485
00:23:46,119 --> 00:23:49,159
Speaker 1: I used I mentioned pour the onion relay. So the

486
00:23:49,200 --> 00:23:54,000
Speaker 1: tour is essentially it was originally created as a as

487
00:23:54,040 --> 00:23:58,160
Speaker 1: a way to deal with the dark web quote unquote,

488
00:23:58,160 --> 00:24:01,240
Speaker 1: and to also relay traffic in a way to mask

489
00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,320
Speaker 1: the origins, very much like a VPN service. Now there

490
00:24:04,359 --> 00:24:05,680
Speaker 1: are a bunch of these. So what it was is

491
00:24:05,720 --> 00:24:08,639
Speaker 1: there's these Onion relay nodes all over the Internet, and

492
00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,160
Speaker 1: when you connect to the to the Onion network, your

493
00:24:11,160 --> 00:24:14,159
Speaker 1: traffic bounces through three, four, or five, six, seven of

494
00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:16,520
Speaker 1: these nodes. You can sort of dictate what you want

495
00:24:16,560 --> 00:24:18,600
Speaker 1: depending on the client you have. And so let's say

496
00:24:18,640 --> 00:24:21,840
Speaker 1: you connect to an Onion router network node in Arizona

497
00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:24,960
Speaker 1: and then you egress somewhere in France and you've jumped

498
00:24:24,960 --> 00:24:27,399
Speaker 1: through six nodes in the process. Well, one of the

499
00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:29,520
Speaker 1: things that's a well known fact is that a number

500
00:24:29,560 --> 00:24:32,880
Speaker 1: of these Onion relay routing nodes are owned by nation

501
00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:36,240
Speaker 1: state actors, whether it's the United States or others. So

502
00:24:36,240 --> 00:24:38,480
Speaker 1: so one of the things I got taken to task

503
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:40,199
Speaker 1: for and I want to explain this is people like, well,

504
00:24:40,200 --> 00:24:43,159
Speaker 1: that's not the compromise network. It doesn't mean that it's useful.

505
00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:46,600
Speaker 1: Actually it does, because depending on what you're trying to do,

506
00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:50,240
Speaker 1: may matter. If you're trying to mask the origin of

507
00:24:50,320 --> 00:24:54,879
Speaker 1: your data source or your upload or your search for

508
00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:57,879
Speaker 1: a short duration of time, this will still help you

509
00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:00,800
Speaker 1: jump through six nodes. They've got to relay back six

510
00:25:00,880 --> 00:25:04,120
Speaker 1: nodes to figure out the origin of the person connecting

511
00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:07,280
Speaker 1: to the relay network. And that's assuming that there was

512
00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:10,800
Speaker 1: a compromise node in the process. So that means if

513
00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:13,280
Speaker 1: you're passing data through a compromise node, does that mean

514
00:25:13,320 --> 00:25:17,080
Speaker 1: the data in transit is safe? No? But is the

515
00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:21,160
Speaker 1: Is the anonymity of the origin of the poster safer

516
00:25:21,240 --> 00:25:24,720
Speaker 1: for a longer duration of time? Yes, So these things

517
00:25:24,720 --> 00:25:28,120
Speaker 1: get really complex, real fast, and this is again one

518
00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:30,000
Speaker 1: of the best things you can do, because there's no

519
00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:33,520
Speaker 1: single perfect solution, but stacking, so not just going through

520
00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:35,880
Speaker 1: tour but also tour into VPN at the same time,

521
00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:38,800
Speaker 1: and you're I think one of the better ways to

522
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:42,680
Speaker 1: think about security is kind of the way Sebastian Younger

523
00:25:42,760 --> 00:25:46,200
Speaker 1: describes how insurgent war works, which is it's all about

524
00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:49,640
Speaker 1: creating friction for anybody trying to spy on your ship.

525
00:25:50,080 --> 00:25:52,640
Speaker 1: There's no perfect answer, but the more things you can

526
00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:54,960
Speaker 1: make be a pain in the ass, the better your

527
00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:57,439
Speaker 1: odds that you will not have an issue. Right Like,

528
00:25:57,520 --> 00:26:00,280
Speaker 1: that's all you can do is make it potential really

529
00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:04,679
Speaker 1: more annoying and more difficult for for whoever might be

530
00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:07,959
Speaker 1: looking right like it. The more friction you can create,

531
00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:11,520
Speaker 1: broadly speaking, the more secure you're going to be. Absolutely

532
00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:13,479
Speaker 1: now another thing to think about, and we're getting kind

533
00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:14,840
Speaker 1: of deep in the weeds too. This is above and

534
00:26:14,880 --> 00:26:17,280
Speaker 1: beyond the average person, right, the average person, get a

535
00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:20,680
Speaker 1: password manager, don't use your same passive everywhere, and don't

536
00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:23,040
Speaker 1: use biometrics unless you're forced, like pretty much have to

537
00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:25,720
Speaker 1: and move on with your life. But once you're beyond

538
00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:27,920
Speaker 1: the average person, this is what we're talking about now.

539
00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:29,840
Speaker 1: So like if you're if you have a computer and

540
00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:32,840
Speaker 1: you use it as your normal day to day operating system,

541
00:26:32,840 --> 00:26:35,200
Speaker 1: talking to your friends, doing dot dot dot dot dot,

542
00:26:35,440 --> 00:26:37,359
Speaker 1: but then also need to do something else a little

543
00:26:37,359 --> 00:26:41,160
Speaker 1: more privacy inclined, you should not trust that device. So

544
00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:44,200
Speaker 1: at that point, your web browser may have all sorts

545
00:26:44,240 --> 00:26:47,200
Speaker 1: of cookies and metadata and storage in it that, even

546
00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:50,080
Speaker 1: if you're going through a VPN, still may be able

547
00:26:50,119 --> 00:26:53,239
Speaker 1: to reveal your identity a spell as mac addresses and

548
00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:55,399
Speaker 1: other stuff. So if you really want to get pretty

549
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,119
Speaker 1: into the weeds with this, you have to do something

550
00:26:57,160 --> 00:27:01,359
Speaker 1: like use an ephemeral operating system install that it has

551
00:27:01,359 --> 00:27:05,000
Speaker 1: no legacy data on it. One example of that that's

552
00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,639
Speaker 1: a Linux based when it's called TAILS. You essentially use

553
00:27:07,680 --> 00:27:10,399
Speaker 1: it like a live USB drive. You boot off of

554
00:27:10,440 --> 00:27:12,680
Speaker 1: that only, or you use a machine dedicated for this,

555
00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:15,680
Speaker 1: and you burn the OS down every time you're done,

556
00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:19,159
Speaker 1: because there's no legacy information or data that can be

557
00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:22,639
Speaker 1: pulled out of your web browser or your cookies or

558
00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:25,720
Speaker 1: your Mac dress information that can associate it with you,

559
00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:29,000
Speaker 1: regardless of if you've done everything right to mask your

560
00:27:29,000 --> 00:27:32,880
Speaker 1: IP address of origin. God, that's the hot girl shit. Um,

561
00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:35,000
Speaker 1: when you're when you're when you're doing when you when

562
00:27:35,000 --> 00:27:37,639
Speaker 1: you're doing that kind of stuff. Um. And again I

563
00:27:37,640 --> 00:27:39,639
Speaker 1: think at this point, I think, up through most of this,

564
00:27:39,760 --> 00:27:42,440
Speaker 1: it's been kind of like people being like that's too much,

565
00:27:42,480 --> 00:27:44,560
Speaker 1: and people being like, Okay, yep, this is exactly what

566
00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:47,400
Speaker 1: I already am or need to be doing. Um, this

567
00:27:47,480 --> 00:27:50,600
Speaker 1: is probably very few people need to be concerned about

568
00:27:50,640 --> 00:27:53,720
Speaker 1: that sort of thing, but um, you know it it is.

569
00:27:53,920 --> 00:27:55,840
Speaker 1: I I've know I note Like again, I worked at

570
00:27:55,880 --> 00:27:58,360
Speaker 1: Belling cat Um. I had a number of colleagues who

571
00:27:58,359 --> 00:28:01,200
Speaker 1: were like personal enemies of the Rush in state who

572
00:28:02,320 --> 00:28:06,800
Speaker 1: had to do stuff like this, um, and it's you know, paranoia.

573
00:28:06,840 --> 00:28:09,440
Speaker 1: I mean, and here's the thing going above. So again,

574
00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:11,640
Speaker 1: like if you're a normal person, you probably don't need

575
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:15,040
Speaker 1: to be you know, doing stacking a VPN, you know,

576
00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:19,399
Speaker 1: getting signal and all this stuff. But also why not, right, Like,

577
00:28:19,440 --> 00:28:22,119
Speaker 1: there's no harm in in the additional security. It is

578
00:28:22,119 --> 00:28:24,919
Speaker 1: a little bit frustrating. But here's one of the things

579
00:28:24,960 --> 00:28:27,600
Speaker 1: I think people don't often think about enough. You're not

580
00:28:28,280 --> 00:28:32,320
Speaker 1: engaging in that kind of security stuff purely because there's

581
00:28:32,359 --> 00:28:35,080
Speaker 1: a threat now, but in part because you don't know

582
00:28:35,119 --> 00:28:37,080
Speaker 1: what the future is going to bring. And one of

583
00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:39,480
Speaker 1: the things that I would point out for that is

584
00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:42,440
Speaker 1: a lot of people right now have been having for

585
00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:46,400
Speaker 1: years conversations about a thing that may soon legally be

586
00:28:46,520 --> 00:28:50,680
Speaker 1: murder on a federal level, you know, um, abortion, right,

587
00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:54,880
Speaker 1: And so it is possible that overnight an awful lot

588
00:28:54,880 --> 00:28:58,720
Speaker 1: of conversations a bunch of people have had legally will

589
00:28:58,760 --> 00:29:01,600
Speaker 1: suddenly be very illegal conversations. And then you may be

590
00:29:01,680 --> 00:29:04,920
Speaker 1: glad that you took greater care with your your personal

591
00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:07,280
Speaker 1: security prior to that point. Yeah, I mean, like, so

592
00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:09,960
Speaker 1: think of the I mean, I'm not a person that menstrates,

593
00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:12,120
Speaker 1: but on menstruation tracking app is very useful to a

594
00:29:12,200 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 1: lot of people who do and those tracking apps, now

595
00:29:15,280 --> 00:29:18,720
Speaker 1: that metadata in there at some point could be extremely

596
00:29:18,840 --> 00:29:23,880
Speaker 1: dangerous or incriminalized or incrim criminalizing, incriminating excuse me, to

597
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:27,320
Speaker 1: someone who otherwise was doing nothing more than trying to

598
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:30,160
Speaker 1: maintain their natural health. And so that is a really

599
00:29:30,240 --> 00:29:32,720
Speaker 1: dangerous concept. So at this point, I mean, within the

600
00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:35,320
Speaker 1: United States, I hate to say this, those apps are

601
00:29:35,320 --> 00:29:38,800
Speaker 1: probably dangerous to the individual because that data could be

602
00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:42,040
Speaker 1: easily used by a government resource to uh, to do

603
00:29:42,120 --> 00:29:45,240
Speaker 1: something bad to someone who's done nothing wrong. So I

604
00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:46,920
Speaker 1: think we should move. I mean, at this point, I

605
00:29:46,960 --> 00:29:49,040
Speaker 1: think we've covered the basis that you could kind of

606
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,280
Speaker 1: responsibly the advice you can responsibly give someone in a podcast.

607
00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:54,880
Speaker 1: And and folks, should it be able to add let

608
00:29:55,080 --> 00:29:57,640
Speaker 1: me throw one thing out real quickly. So you mentioned like,

609
00:29:57,680 --> 00:29:59,760
Speaker 1: for example, we don't you don't necessarily have the risk

610
00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,800
Speaker 1: actor that requires using VPN or signal. Let me see

611
00:30:02,840 --> 00:30:05,200
Speaker 1: this way back when gosh, when I was doing crypto

612
00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:09,280
Speaker 1: work decades ago, I was what you mean cryptography and

613
00:30:09,360 --> 00:30:12,520
Speaker 1: not we should specify these days? Oh yeah, excuse me,

614
00:30:12,520 --> 00:30:16,760
Speaker 1: cryptogracryption work. Yeah, yeah, I I had the opportunity. We're

615
00:30:16,920 --> 00:30:19,200
Speaker 1: Phill Zimmerman of p GP, and actually p g P

616
00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:22,760
Speaker 1: pretty Good Privacy, which was one of the fundamental UH

617
00:30:22,880 --> 00:30:25,840
Speaker 1: security project or projects way back when, was actually written

618
00:30:25,880 --> 00:30:28,400
Speaker 1: for human rights violations. He wrote it because people were

619
00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:32,640
Speaker 1: doing research of like warlords were getting their laptops taken

620
00:30:32,640 --> 00:30:34,120
Speaker 1: away and then finding out who spoke to them and

621
00:30:34,120 --> 00:30:36,560
Speaker 1: getting people killed. So p GP was like this human

622
00:30:36,640 --> 00:30:39,760
Speaker 1: rights thing right from the beginning. And cryptography back when

623
00:30:39,760 --> 00:30:42,360
Speaker 1: I was young and naive, I always thought to myself,

624
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:44,240
Speaker 1: this is what we need. This is the future when

625
00:30:44,280 --> 00:30:47,880
Speaker 1: everyone gets proper crypto will blind the government will blind

626
00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:51,520
Speaker 1: the corporations. We're gonna have this crypto anarchist future where

627
00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:54,520
Speaker 1: the government and corporations can't get us. And the reality

628
00:30:54,640 --> 00:30:57,440
Speaker 1: is most of that God who served. And the truth

629
00:30:57,480 --> 00:30:59,760
Speaker 1: is cryptography is too hard for most people to use,

630
00:31:00,040 --> 00:31:02,000
Speaker 1: and as a result we don't. But here's what I

631
00:31:02,040 --> 00:31:04,520
Speaker 1: will say. The more people that do something simple like

632
00:31:04,800 --> 00:31:08,120
Speaker 1: you signal or use a VPN just to browse the Internet,

633
00:31:08,240 --> 00:31:11,360
Speaker 1: not because they're doing anything various, just because their privacy

634
00:31:11,440 --> 00:31:15,960
Speaker 1: like conscious, because it makes it normalize and that means

635
00:31:16,000 --> 00:31:17,920
Speaker 1: that the person that's using it because they need to

636
00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:21,960
Speaker 1: for like, let's say, to protect human rights doesn't stick

637
00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:25,160
Speaker 1: out like a needle in the haystack, because everybody's already

638
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:28,760
Speaker 1: doing something sane in the first place. Normalizing proper privacy

639
00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:33,280
Speaker 1: and cryptography is better for everyone. Yes, yes, absolutely agreed.

640
00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:35,920
Speaker 1: This is a nice segue because you were just talking

641
00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:40,080
Speaker 1: about the past and how beautiful and bright it seemed. Um,

642
00:31:40,160 --> 00:31:42,280
Speaker 1: let's talk about what you see as kind of the

643
00:31:42,280 --> 00:31:47,760
Speaker 1: future of info security threats. Well, I mean, so there's

644
00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:49,640
Speaker 1: so many levels to that. First of all, if we're

645
00:31:49,640 --> 00:31:52,680
Speaker 1: talking nation state level, I personally strongly believe that all

646
00:31:52,720 --> 00:31:56,640
Speaker 1: of the big players have already compromised everyone's network. Everybody

647
00:31:56,720 --> 00:32:01,160
Speaker 1: got everybody has got us. China's about us, We got China.

648
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:03,880
Speaker 1: Anybody right now could go in and pretty much funk

649
00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:08,200
Speaker 1: up the grid on someone else like that, And there's yeah,

650
00:32:08,280 --> 00:32:10,920
Speaker 1: and that's not actually the least that's that's safer than

651
00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:13,880
Speaker 1: other possibilities, like because there is a level of of

652
00:32:13,960 --> 00:32:16,440
Speaker 1: mutually a shared destruction there where it's like, yeah, man,

653
00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:18,880
Speaker 1: Russia could take down the grid, but like that wouldn't

654
00:32:18,880 --> 00:32:21,960
Speaker 1: be good for them, and vice versa. You know, yeah, no, true.

655
00:32:22,040 --> 00:32:24,600
Speaker 1: So the reality is though everybody's and everybody's network, those

656
00:32:24,640 --> 00:32:27,800
Speaker 1: days are over. Um. When it comes to the individual

657
00:32:27,840 --> 00:32:31,160
Speaker 1: and I'm gonna have a the audience, there might be

658
00:32:31,160 --> 00:32:33,000
Speaker 1: people in the audience to feel differently, and it still

659
00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:34,640
Speaker 1: doesn't mean that we don't try. So one of the

660
00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:36,640
Speaker 1: things I want to say is you're gonna hear some

661
00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:38,760
Speaker 1: skepticism here because I've been doing this career for a

662
00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:41,840
Speaker 1: long time and I've seen things go wrong more than right,

663
00:32:42,160 --> 00:32:44,760
Speaker 1: and so in that regard, this is gonna sound kind

664
00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:46,720
Speaker 1: of cynical. But when it comes to the idea of

665
00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:51,280
Speaker 1: individual privacy, in my opinion, with the exception of when

666
00:32:51,280 --> 00:32:54,840
Speaker 1: you're taking a very active effort in something very specific

667
00:32:54,880 --> 00:32:57,240
Speaker 1: that you want to keep private because that's something you're

668
00:32:57,240 --> 00:33:00,680
Speaker 1: working on personally, the reality is individual to all privacy

669
00:33:00,760 --> 00:33:03,720
Speaker 1: is dead and gone, and we're just starting to smell

670
00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:09,200
Speaker 1: that corpse um. Whether it is credit card data transactions,

671
00:33:09,520 --> 00:33:12,280
Speaker 1: your cell phone history, your phone numbers, what you've done

672
00:33:12,280 --> 00:33:14,840
Speaker 1: on the internet, what you've done on social media or

673
00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:17,160
Speaker 1: not done on social media, whether you have an account

674
00:33:17,200 --> 00:33:20,120
Speaker 1: on Facebook or not, doesn't even matter. The metadata and

675
00:33:20,120 --> 00:33:23,320
Speaker 1: the trailer you're leaving behind you is all aggregated, all

676
00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:26,960
Speaker 1: of it behind big data corporations, all of it compromised,

677
00:33:27,120 --> 00:33:30,240
Speaker 1: all of it searchable. Even stuff the government has on

678
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:32,920
Speaker 1: you has been sold to large corporations because I can

679
00:33:32,960 --> 00:33:35,000
Speaker 1: tell you that some of the data that they kept

680
00:33:35,080 --> 00:33:37,360
Speaker 1: for like let's say D m V or m v D,

681
00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:40,320
Speaker 1: they decided to sell it off to a corporation and

682
00:33:40,360 --> 00:33:43,680
Speaker 1: they themselves access it through a third party when doing

683
00:33:43,720 --> 00:33:46,440
Speaker 1: research on you. So all of that big data, there's

684
00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:48,959
Speaker 1: a law of physics. The more you aggregate, the more

685
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:55,959
Speaker 1: it will get compromised. Um, geez, I'm sorry, that's the truth. No, no, no,

686
00:33:56,040 --> 00:34:02,840
Speaker 1: I mean yeah, you're you're you're like, it's this Uh,

687
00:34:02,920 --> 00:34:05,800
Speaker 1: there's this frustration because I can remember the days when

688
00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:10,239
Speaker 1: the privacy hounds. And I don't say that in a

689
00:34:10,320 --> 00:34:13,799
Speaker 1: negative term. We're like warning everybody about, Hey, you don't

690
00:34:13,800 --> 00:34:16,239
Speaker 1: want to be aggregating all of these different social media

691
00:34:16,280 --> 00:34:17,799
Speaker 1: things together. Hey you don't want to be using all

692
00:34:17,840 --> 00:34:20,239
Speaker 1: of these services. Hey there's actually some like real downsides

693
00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:23,120
Speaker 1: like all of what's happening. Like part of why things

694
00:34:23,120 --> 00:34:25,120
Speaker 1: are so cheap on Amazon is you know that that

695
00:34:25,239 --> 00:34:27,480
Speaker 1: your data there is is one of the assets that

696
00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:31,839
Speaker 1: they have, And um, those people were absolutely right, and

697
00:34:31,880 --> 00:34:37,080
Speaker 1: they lost harder than anyone has ever lost at anything like. So,

698
00:34:37,200 --> 00:34:39,080
Speaker 1: Like when I was back there at that company doing

699
00:34:39,080 --> 00:34:41,840
Speaker 1: all that cryptography work, we were trying to give crypto

700
00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:45,160
Speaker 1: like to the average general population of the Internet, I

701
00:34:45,200 --> 00:34:46,920
Speaker 1: had this, like I said, this naive view of like

702
00:34:47,000 --> 00:34:49,200
Speaker 1: the future that was gonna be this place where we're

703
00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:51,080
Speaker 1: gonna have the Internet where everyone was connected, and it

704
00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:53,719
Speaker 1: was gonna be not only would we have personal privacy

705
00:34:53,719 --> 00:34:56,640
Speaker 1: through cryptography, but we would be able to transfer information

706
00:34:56,680 --> 00:34:58,640
Speaker 1: to one another in a way that would make the

707
00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:01,560
Speaker 1: Shenanigans impossible. Well, to some degree that's been true what

708
00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:04,040
Speaker 1: we've seen some of that, But to another degree we

709
00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:08,400
Speaker 1: also have Snowden dropping the bomb on revelations about what

710
00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:11,040
Speaker 1: the government has done to the individual and how they've

711
00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:13,800
Speaker 1: broken the law with all of our privacy and data

712
00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:16,880
Speaker 1: and what came of that a man in exile in

713
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:22,439
Speaker 1: Russia and pretty much fucking nothing, Yeah right, nothing, And um,

714
00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:26,279
Speaker 1: I was sitting at a Defcon presentation where General Alexander

715
00:35:26,400 --> 00:35:29,040
Speaker 1: was on the screen talking about what they weren't doing,

716
00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:33,040
Speaker 1: while Snowden was dropping revelations proving him to be lying,

717
00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:36,680
Speaker 1: and nothing comes of it, right, nothing really comes of it.

718
00:35:37,080 --> 00:35:40,000
Speaker 1: And one of the things that's so real. And so

719
00:35:40,239 --> 00:35:44,040
Speaker 1: whether it's the tribal level, your neighbors across the street

720
00:35:44,560 --> 00:35:47,600
Speaker 1: or the internet tribe, we as a people in the

721
00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:51,600
Speaker 1: aggregate are always willing to give up our rights to

722
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:54,680
Speaker 1: something bigger for convenience. And we've done that and it's

723
00:35:54,680 --> 00:35:59,239
Speaker 1: called Facebook and Twitter and social media. And in the process,

724
00:35:59,520 --> 00:36:02,760
Speaker 1: what was going to be an amazing resource has become

725
00:36:02,800 --> 00:36:08,000
Speaker 1: the trap. Uh. It's such a it's because you know,

726
00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:11,160
Speaker 1: you know Garrison, I I my my friend who is

727
00:36:11,239 --> 00:36:14,400
Speaker 1: much younger than me, Um has grown up with the

728
00:36:14,440 --> 00:36:19,200
Speaker 1: Internet being being what it is now right like this

729
00:36:19,200 --> 00:36:21,759
Speaker 1: this kind of like nightmare trap. You know that that's

730
00:36:21,760 --> 00:36:24,279
Speaker 1: sucking us all in this like giant squid that has

731
00:36:24,360 --> 00:36:27,520
Speaker 1: us in its tentacles. Um. And it's I get I

732
00:36:27,600 --> 00:36:30,799
Speaker 1: sometimes like dissociate talking with them about certain Internet things

733
00:36:30,840 --> 00:36:35,120
Speaker 1: because in my heart it's still the Promised Land. Yeah,

734
00:36:35,280 --> 00:36:37,799
Speaker 1: I wish, I I guess my I wish I felt

735
00:36:37,840 --> 00:36:39,600
Speaker 1: that way. It doesn't feel like that way to me anymore,

736
00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:41,600
Speaker 1: to be honest, I mean, it's it's not right like

737
00:36:41,640 --> 00:36:44,719
Speaker 1: and what I mean that in like sort of I

738
00:36:44,800 --> 00:36:47,319
Speaker 1: have this I don't know. I've never entirely been able

739
00:36:47,360 --> 00:36:49,160
Speaker 1: to like let go of the vision of like, oh

740
00:36:49,239 --> 00:36:50,960
Speaker 1: it could have been There's so many things that could

741
00:36:51,000 --> 00:36:53,680
Speaker 1: have been. Well, it's like, you know, it's like all technology,

742
00:36:53,880 --> 00:36:56,719
Speaker 1: anything can be remponized, right right, Like an a R

743
00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,480
Speaker 1: fifteen can be used for good or for evil, a

744
00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:01,440
Speaker 1: knife to be used to make a beautiful meal or

745
00:37:01,480 --> 00:37:04,400
Speaker 1: to commit a murder. And the Internet is technology, and

746
00:37:04,400 --> 00:37:07,160
Speaker 1: it has been weaponized. It's been weaponized against us. But

747
00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:09,120
Speaker 1: at the same time, if we just turn a blind

748
00:37:09,120 --> 00:37:11,279
Speaker 1: eye to it and then not learn how to use

749
00:37:11,320 --> 00:37:14,080
Speaker 1: this technology to our advantage, we're allowing them to do

750
00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:16,400
Speaker 1: that unabated. And that's where like the kind of hacker

751
00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:18,399
Speaker 1: mindset comes from, which is like, how do I make

752
00:37:18,440 --> 00:37:20,520
Speaker 1: this thing do what I wanted to do for me

753
00:37:20,920 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 1: while not letting someone else do it for them. And

754
00:37:23,760 --> 00:37:26,920
Speaker 1: unless we take control of the technology for ourselves, like

755
00:37:26,960 --> 00:37:30,920
Speaker 1: I said earlier, normalizing using signal and even basic VPN

756
00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:33,920
Speaker 1: and cryptography, then we're just giving it up. We're not

757
00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:35,960
Speaker 1: even making it a challenge. We're just like here, you

758
00:37:36,239 --> 00:37:38,839
Speaker 1: go have it. And Uh, that's something that I think

759
00:37:38,840 --> 00:37:41,839
Speaker 1: that's more important as a community. Maybe as people grow

760
00:37:41,920 --> 00:37:44,279
Speaker 1: up on the Internet versus seeing it becoming something that

761
00:37:44,600 --> 00:37:49,040
Speaker 1: I saw become something maybe either a they'll just accept

762
00:37:49,200 --> 00:37:51,160
Speaker 1: which I hope isn't the case that the reality is

763
00:37:51,200 --> 00:37:54,560
Speaker 1: privacy is dead, or maybe they'll approach the Internet differently

764
00:37:54,640 --> 00:37:57,440
Speaker 1: than say someone at my age did. We're frankly, we

765
00:37:57,520 --> 00:38:00,600
Speaker 1: kind of messed up and we didn't realize the Primrose

766
00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:04,360
Speaker 1: path was actually trapped, and that's a like that was

767
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:07,440
Speaker 1: a mistake and maybe we can kind of like evolve

768
00:38:07,560 --> 00:38:10,200
Speaker 1: beyond that. But like you're asking, where is info set

769
00:38:10,239 --> 00:38:12,920
Speaker 1: going now, I I don't have good notes for that.

770
00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:15,080
Speaker 1: Like when I first started working in the career, it

771
00:38:15,200 --> 00:38:17,640
Speaker 1: really felt like a great thing. We were doing important stuff.

772
00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:20,000
Speaker 1: We were doing the DOS mitigation. We were going into

773
00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:24,200
Speaker 1: hospitals and making sure that insulin pumps weren't compromised as

774
00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:28,280
Speaker 1: a DIDOS host believe it or not, hospitals are infosect nightmares.

775
00:38:28,480 --> 00:38:31,319
Speaker 1: And we were doing stuff that felt good. And then

776
00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:33,839
Speaker 1: later in the career I realized, wait a minute, I'm

777
00:38:33,840 --> 00:38:37,080
Speaker 1: not doing anything to secure anybody's personal information or make

778
00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:40,400
Speaker 1: the Internet safer. I was just protecting some corporate coffer

779
00:38:40,880 --> 00:38:43,640
Speaker 1: and the reality was that the private information that we

780
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:46,919
Speaker 1: were supposedly protecting. The debate would turn into calls which

781
00:38:47,040 --> 00:38:51,200
Speaker 1: was what's more expensive losing the data or the lawsuit

782
00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:54,920
Speaker 1: for losing the data. Literally, those were the conversations and corporations,

783
00:38:55,120 --> 00:38:58,160
Speaker 1: and those are the conversations that corporations have now about

784
00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:02,799
Speaker 1: each and every one of ours personal information. Now when

785
00:39:02,840 --> 00:39:07,160
Speaker 1: you when you think about because so I obviously I'm

786
00:39:07,200 --> 00:39:09,759
Speaker 1: in a different was in a different field. But when

787
00:39:09,800 --> 00:39:12,000
Speaker 1: I was doing a lot of the research on terrorism

788
00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:14,399
Speaker 1: that I was doing, I had these things that were

789
00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:17,200
Speaker 1: like sort of the this kind of attack is going

790
00:39:17,239 --> 00:39:18,959
Speaker 1: to happen at something I feel that very much about,

791
00:39:19,000 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 1: Like drones. There's going to be like a mass killing

792
00:39:22,040 --> 00:39:25,680
Speaker 1: of civilians not in a war zone by a civilian

793
00:39:25,719 --> 00:39:28,160
Speaker 1: weaponized drone at some point in the not too distant

794
00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:29,799
Speaker 1: futures going to happen. It's going to be done. It's

795
00:39:29,840 --> 00:39:34,719
Speaker 1: absolutely inevitability. Um that kind of stuff. Do you what

796
00:39:34,800 --> 00:39:36,680
Speaker 1: are you when you think about kind of the the

797
00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:42,359
Speaker 1: digital equivalence of that, like, what are you looking towards? Well,

798
00:39:42,400 --> 00:39:43,799
Speaker 1: I agree with you about the drone, Like you can

799
00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:46,320
Speaker 1: see stuff. God, yes, you plot the you plot the

800
00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:48,120
Speaker 1: dots and you know what's going to occur, right, It's

801
00:39:48,160 --> 00:39:51,080
Speaker 1: it's not it's not possible to avoid. We unleashed that

802
00:39:51,440 --> 00:39:55,040
Speaker 1: out of the cage, and it's going to happen. Quite honestly,

803
00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:58,000
Speaker 1: I think we're seeing it already. We're seeing we're seeing

804
00:39:58,040 --> 00:40:01,600
Speaker 1: the level of privates see invasion that I don't think

805
00:40:01,640 --> 00:40:04,719
Speaker 1: people already know has happened. Like I know some of

806
00:40:04,800 --> 00:40:07,200
Speaker 1: us realize that, we talked about that, we rant about it,

807
00:40:07,239 --> 00:40:10,440
Speaker 1: but like, I don't think people realize the level of

808
00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:14,640
Speaker 1: the incursion that has occurred to the point where all

809
00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:16,840
Speaker 1: of this data aggregated to the point they know what

810
00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,279
Speaker 1: toilet paper you prefer to buy. Like I'm talking like

811
00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:24,239
Speaker 1: people like Facebook knowing that um or the size of

812
00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:27,279
Speaker 1: the corporate oligarchy that controls the Internet, whether it's the

813
00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:32,000
Speaker 1: small like Alphabet, Core, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft's becoming a smaller

814
00:40:32,040 --> 00:40:34,680
Speaker 1: player weirdly. But when you think about those big names,

815
00:40:35,600 --> 00:40:39,200
Speaker 1: they kind of like control everything and every piece of

816
00:40:39,320 --> 00:40:43,759
Speaker 1: data about you and everything you move, and say that,

817
00:40:43,840 --> 00:40:45,480
Speaker 1: I think, I think, what's the end of that. I

818
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:47,160
Speaker 1: don't think we got to the end game of that,

819
00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:50,080
Speaker 1: But I don't know how we roll it back. And

820
00:40:50,120 --> 00:40:53,480
Speaker 1: that's the thing. So what's the prediction My prediction is

821
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:56,200
Speaker 1: it's gonna get worse, and we're gonna get to the

822
00:40:56,200 --> 00:41:00,759
Speaker 1: point where there isn't room to move without that surveillance

823
00:41:00,760 --> 00:41:03,080
Speaker 1: tracking you. And like so, for example, you think of

824
00:41:03,120 --> 00:41:06,120
Speaker 1: things like Sci Fi Minority Report, you walk to the

825
00:41:06,160 --> 00:41:09,120
Speaker 1: mall and there's facial idea happening everywhere you go with

826
00:41:09,560 --> 00:41:13,600
Speaker 1: targeted advertising at the mall. Oh, that's coming. I guarantee

827
00:41:13,840 --> 00:41:17,600
Speaker 1: that's coming. And all of that's happening already, and that

828
00:41:17,680 --> 00:41:21,400
Speaker 1: facial recognition stuff that's going on is happening currently now

829
00:41:21,760 --> 00:41:24,919
Speaker 1: we're just not that aware of it happening. The cop

830
00:41:25,000 --> 00:41:28,000
Speaker 1: cars driving down the road and every license plate is

831
00:41:28,040 --> 00:41:32,759
Speaker 1: being measured with the cameras being o CR optical character recognition,

832
00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:35,719
Speaker 1: and that's coming back, and they're tracking every car they're

833
00:41:35,800 --> 00:41:37,920
Speaker 1: driving by on the highway even though there's not a

834
00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:43,880
Speaker 1: GPS unit on your car. The ability to not be

835
00:41:44,000 --> 00:41:50,399
Speaker 1: tracked will soon be impossible. How's that? Yeah, I mean allegedly,

836
00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:55,160
Speaker 1: when I was younger, they were like certain stupid petty

837
00:41:55,239 --> 00:41:58,000
Speaker 1: crimes I would commit just because like people will not

838
00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:00,160
Speaker 1: be able to do this in the future, and I

839
00:42:00,160 --> 00:42:02,839
Speaker 1: have a moral responsibility to steal the light bulbs from

840
00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:04,600
Speaker 1: in front of this bar and throw them in the thread.

841
00:42:04,600 --> 00:42:06,680
Speaker 1: It's like, what, one day that will be a thing

842
00:42:06,680 --> 00:42:09,080
Speaker 1: that people can't do without getting caught. And so like

843
00:42:09,120 --> 00:42:12,040
Speaker 1: I just I had to, you know, there are like

844
00:42:12,120 --> 00:42:14,640
Speaker 1: some bright spots because I I think you're absolutely right,

845
00:42:14,680 --> 00:42:17,800
Speaker 1: there's no on like a broader scale, there's no turning

846
00:42:17,840 --> 00:42:20,520
Speaker 1: back the clock for stuff like facial recognition and how

847
00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:22,279
Speaker 1: funked up it's going to get. There are states like

848
00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:24,400
Speaker 1: where I live in Oregon, where like they have passed

849
00:42:24,440 --> 00:42:27,040
Speaker 1: laws that are just like you, public facial recognition is

850
00:42:27,080 --> 00:42:30,320
Speaker 1: not a thing that is legal in this state. Um.

851
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:34,200
Speaker 1: And I definitely support more attempts like that because again,

852
00:42:34,719 --> 00:42:37,160
Speaker 1: anything you can do to sty me them, to reduce

853
00:42:37,239 --> 00:42:40,080
Speaker 1: the spread of the grid, to reduce the profitability of

854
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:45,520
Speaker 1: these things, even though it's again overall a doomed cause. Right. Um, yeah,

855
00:42:45,560 --> 00:42:47,880
Speaker 1: I don't know. I mean I obviously I think that

856
00:42:47,880 --> 00:42:49,560
Speaker 1: that's a good law, But I don't know that laws

857
00:42:49,719 --> 00:42:53,440
Speaker 1: stop corporations when the corporations have more power than law, yes,

858
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:57,480
Speaker 1: of course. Um. And it's like, I mean, obviously you

859
00:42:57,520 --> 00:43:00,200
Speaker 1: can you can ban it for police to you and

860
00:43:00,239 --> 00:43:03,120
Speaker 1: stuff which does something to the extent that you know

861
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:06,080
Speaker 1: they follow the law, but none of this is I

862
00:43:06,120 --> 00:43:09,000
Speaker 1: don't know, like I That's one of the things that

863
00:43:09,080 --> 00:43:13,040
Speaker 1: makes me most depressed about the future is the thought that, like,

864
00:43:15,360 --> 00:43:18,399
Speaker 1: the space for this is not like a major issue,

865
00:43:18,440 --> 00:43:20,000
Speaker 1: I guess, but like the space for kids just like

866
00:43:20,080 --> 00:43:23,840
Speaker 1: funk around and do dumb ship when they're nineteen is

867
00:43:23,880 --> 00:43:25,839
Speaker 1: going to get so much smaller. I mean, I would say,

868
00:43:25,840 --> 00:43:27,520
Speaker 1: I mean, I think the thing is like, as a

869
00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:30,920
Speaker 1: natural human being, whether you're doing anything wrong, even if

870
00:43:30,960 --> 00:43:34,080
Speaker 1: you're not doing anything wrong, the nature to feel like

871
00:43:34,120 --> 00:43:37,000
Speaker 1: you have a private space that's to you, your private

872
00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:39,600
Speaker 1: community space. I'm not even talking about wrong or right here,

873
00:43:39,600 --> 00:43:42,600
Speaker 1: We're just talking about just that feeling that at this moment,

874
00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:46,400
Speaker 1: this is my space where I'm not being watched. Is

875
00:43:46,440 --> 00:43:51,160
Speaker 1: a natural, healthy need of the human orgasm or organism.

876
00:43:51,440 --> 00:43:56,879
Speaker 1: Um and interesting, uh, but no, it's it's a it's

877
00:43:56,880 --> 00:43:59,239
Speaker 1: a human need. And I think we're gonna find those

878
00:43:59,239 --> 00:44:03,239
Speaker 1: spaces because the smaller and smaller, And I think when

879
00:44:03,239 --> 00:44:04,840
Speaker 1: you said, what's your prediction, I hate to say it,

880
00:44:04,840 --> 00:44:07,520
Speaker 1: but I think the prediction is it will become impossible

881
00:44:07,560 --> 00:44:10,480
Speaker 1: to not be tracked. Now, the bright side of that,

882
00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:13,000
Speaker 1: the bright side of that maybe maybe there's a bright side.

883
00:44:13,520 --> 00:44:17,080
Speaker 1: Maybe at some point when that's the reality, it could

884
00:44:17,120 --> 00:44:21,480
Speaker 1: somehow also affect the people that are powerful and the

885
00:44:21,520 --> 00:44:24,360
Speaker 1: people that are small. And we all realize that humans

886
00:44:24,360 --> 00:44:28,239
Speaker 1: are humans, and therefore the failings that sometimes we have

887
00:44:28,400 --> 00:44:30,800
Speaker 1: as all human beings, we just kind of acknowledge it

888
00:44:30,800 --> 00:44:33,520
Speaker 1: and be like, oh, yeah, of course that's just what

889
00:44:33,560 --> 00:44:36,280
Speaker 1: people do. Like maybe we just realize people are people.

890
00:44:36,600 --> 00:44:38,480
Speaker 1: But the idea that there's never going to be a

891
00:44:38,520 --> 00:44:40,960
Speaker 1: space to not get tracked, I don't know. To me,

892
00:44:41,360 --> 00:44:44,920
Speaker 1: I find darkly disturbing. It is disturbing. I do think

893
00:44:44,960 --> 00:44:47,000
Speaker 1: it kind of to pivot off of what you were saying.

894
00:44:47,000 --> 00:44:49,239
Speaker 1: The other aspect of that that is more positive is

895
00:44:49,280 --> 00:44:53,680
Speaker 1: that all of this stuff, all of this surveillance shiit

896
00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:56,640
Speaker 1: um or at least not all, but quite a bit

897
00:44:56,680 --> 00:45:00,160
Speaker 1: of it is you know, in a way, it's can

898
00:45:00,200 --> 00:45:03,320
Speaker 1: knife fight. There's no way that both parties don't get cut,

899
00:45:03,440 --> 00:45:05,759
Speaker 1: and you know, the ones wielding the knife might get

900
00:45:05,800 --> 00:45:07,799
Speaker 1: cut less, but they're still going to get cut. And

901
00:45:08,200 --> 00:45:10,799
Speaker 1: part of what that means in this situation is that

902
00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:14,200
Speaker 1: the prevalence of all of these different ways to surveil

903
00:45:14,280 --> 00:45:18,799
Speaker 1: and track also allows us to track in the same

904
00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:22,720
Speaker 1: way that like police law enforcement watches people through their phones,

905
00:45:22,760 --> 00:45:24,600
Speaker 1: but also a hell of a lot of cops are

906
00:45:24,600 --> 00:45:29,680
Speaker 1: getting filmed doing fucked up ship now right now. Again,

907
00:45:30,280 --> 00:45:32,640
Speaker 1: the balance of the cuts I don't think is going

908
00:45:32,680 --> 00:45:34,400
Speaker 1: to be work out in our favor, but it's not

909
00:45:34,520 --> 00:45:36,680
Speaker 1: going to be nothing on them either. And and and

910
00:45:36,760 --> 00:45:39,239
Speaker 1: you're right, I think there are there are some things

911
00:45:39,320 --> 00:45:41,879
Speaker 1: that we will learn in the future about the people

912
00:45:41,960 --> 00:45:44,120
Speaker 1: in power in the world that would it wouldn't have

913
00:45:44,160 --> 00:45:46,160
Speaker 1: been possible for us to learn in the past or

914
00:45:46,200 --> 00:45:50,200
Speaker 1: may not be possibly even right now. And that and

915
00:45:50,239 --> 00:45:52,000
Speaker 1: if we learned that about people in power, then they

916
00:45:52,040 --> 00:45:54,000
Speaker 1: can't weaponize it as much against the people that aren't

917
00:45:54,000 --> 00:45:56,120
Speaker 1: in power. Right yeah, Yeah, you know one thing that

918
00:45:56,200 --> 00:45:58,719
Speaker 1: I'm because I'm thinking a lot about the fact that

919
00:45:58,960 --> 00:46:03,080
Speaker 1: a bunch of folks the reproductive healthcare industry have pointed

920
00:46:03,120 --> 00:46:09,120
Speaker 1: out that right wingers have started using drones to follow

921
00:46:09,200 --> 00:46:11,239
Speaker 1: people home from like planted parrot hoods and follow them

922
00:46:11,239 --> 00:46:13,160
Speaker 1: to their cards to like build databases of the people

923
00:46:13,160 --> 00:46:16,960
Speaker 1: who are going to places to potentially like do that

924
00:46:17,040 --> 00:46:21,040
Speaker 1: kind of reproductive healthcare that these folks don't think should exist. Um,

925
00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:23,920
Speaker 1: the other side of it though, is that Um, it

926
00:46:24,120 --> 00:46:28,920
Speaker 1: is also possible to surveil them. Um. And it will

927
00:46:28,960 --> 00:46:32,799
Speaker 1: be possible to track the people doing that sort of thing,

928
00:46:32,840 --> 00:46:34,560
Speaker 1: and it will be possible to do that in terms

929
00:46:34,600 --> 00:46:36,640
Speaker 1: of like legal accountability. And it will be possible to

930
00:46:36,640 --> 00:46:41,120
Speaker 1: do that for the people who embrace h questionably legal

931
00:46:41,239 --> 00:46:46,320
Speaker 1: tactics for for frustrating those efforts, um or illegal tactics

932
00:46:46,360 --> 00:46:50,160
Speaker 1: for frustrating those efforts. They have access to the same technology. Um.

933
00:46:50,520 --> 00:46:53,200
Speaker 1: And again it's it's it is a knife that will

934
00:46:53,280 --> 00:46:57,040
Speaker 1: cut everybody, um. And I guess that's better than just

935
00:46:57,200 --> 00:47:00,320
Speaker 1: one person getting cut in this situation. That's that's the

936
00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:02,319
Speaker 1: concern I have, right, I agree with that. Like I said,

937
00:47:02,360 --> 00:47:05,160
Speaker 1: technology goes it's a weapon and as weaponized in all directions,

938
00:47:05,200 --> 00:47:06,799
Speaker 1: depending on how to use it for good or for bad.

939
00:47:06,920 --> 00:47:08,719
Speaker 1: And so this is the same place I come to

940
00:47:08,800 --> 00:47:10,719
Speaker 1: when it comes to the gun control argument. I mean,

941
00:47:11,400 --> 00:47:16,759
Speaker 1: we can do no, no, no, the same the same problem, right,

942
00:47:17,080 --> 00:47:21,480
Speaker 1: because if we allow only one side to have all

943
00:47:21,560 --> 00:47:23,920
Speaker 1: of the control and power and understanding of the technology,

944
00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:26,640
Speaker 1: then we at ourselves are at a huge deficit. We

945
00:47:26,800 --> 00:47:30,200
Speaker 1: cannot defend ourselves or fight back. So when it comes

946
00:47:30,239 --> 00:47:32,800
Speaker 1: to this kind of data and technology. Knowing the basic

947
00:47:32,880 --> 00:47:35,560
Speaker 1: fundamentals of what you can do to protect yourself, understand

948
00:47:35,600 --> 00:47:38,960
Speaker 1: the reality of what the surveillance state or corporation is,

949
00:47:39,360 --> 00:47:41,319
Speaker 1: and then doing your best to not make it easy

950
00:47:41,440 --> 00:47:43,839
Speaker 1: for them is at least one step forward. But if

951
00:47:43,880 --> 00:47:46,879
Speaker 1: we don't own this technology, if we don't own the tech,

952
00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:50,120
Speaker 1: someone else will, and they will use it against us.

953
00:47:50,200 --> 00:47:52,879
Speaker 1: It's as simple as that. And like they're super simple

954
00:47:52,920 --> 00:47:54,279
Speaker 1: stuff Like I was gonna bring us up with like

955
00:47:54,880 --> 00:47:56,640
Speaker 1: you can't see video because it's a podcast, but like

956
00:47:56,680 --> 00:48:00,160
Speaker 1: there's these cool glasses from doctor are called reflectacles, but

957
00:48:00,239 --> 00:48:03,400
Speaker 1: I'm showing you Robert, and it looked like regular sunglasses.

958
00:48:03,480 --> 00:48:06,880
Speaker 1: But when you put them on, they do they reflect

959
00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:10,920
Speaker 1: i R light and actually mess with cameras in a

960
00:48:10,960 --> 00:48:12,719
Speaker 1: way that your turns are diet face into a ball

961
00:48:12,800 --> 00:48:15,399
Speaker 1: of light. So you can wear these, you can wear

962
00:48:15,400 --> 00:48:17,359
Speaker 1: the cold reflectacles. You can wear them and just walk

963
00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:20,080
Speaker 1: around the mall and all the cameras get blown out

964
00:48:20,160 --> 00:48:23,160
Speaker 1: by your by your glasses. Like doing that just because

965
00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:26,160
Speaker 1: you can. It's kind of fun. That's the hot ship.

966
00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:29,319
Speaker 1: That's the ship I was promised that that at least

967
00:48:29,400 --> 00:48:32,759
Speaker 1: does exist. It's not everything I had hoped it would

968
00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:34,680
Speaker 1: be in terms of its ability, But it is like

969
00:48:34,800 --> 00:48:37,000
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff rules and I will be picking

970
00:48:37,040 --> 00:48:39,520
Speaker 1: up a pair of those. UM. Well, we should probably

971
00:48:39,560 --> 00:48:42,080
Speaker 1: close out. I did want to note because I mentioned this, UM,

972
00:48:42,200 --> 00:48:43,640
Speaker 1: I got something a little wrong when I was talking

973
00:48:43,680 --> 00:48:46,719
Speaker 1: about the facial recognition ban. Um. It is in an

974
00:48:46,920 --> 00:48:50,520
Speaker 1: ordinance in the City of Portland itself. Um. It's the

975
00:48:50,600 --> 00:48:53,000
Speaker 1: first city that has done this, and it prohibits the

976
00:48:53,120 --> 00:48:57,480
Speaker 1: use of public facial recognition technology by all private businesses

977
00:48:57,520 --> 00:49:00,759
Speaker 1: in the city. UM. So that is the scope of

978
00:49:00,840 --> 00:49:02,680
Speaker 1: the band that a band that exists in Portland. I

979
00:49:02,719 --> 00:49:04,600
Speaker 1: recommend looking it up. It is the kind of thing

980
00:49:04,680 --> 00:49:08,399
Speaker 1: that I would support everyone pushing forward in their city. UM.

981
00:49:08,760 --> 00:49:11,759
Speaker 1: Because again, the more holes you can make in this thing,

982
00:49:11,960 --> 00:49:13,960
Speaker 1: the better. Yeah. I don't want to put that down.

983
00:49:14,040 --> 00:49:15,719
Speaker 1: That's a good thing. But the challenge of this is,

984
00:49:15,760 --> 00:49:17,880
Speaker 1: just like I mentioned earlier, moving the data out of

985
00:49:17,920 --> 00:49:20,920
Speaker 1: the konas and back the minute photos from Like I

986
00:49:21,040 --> 00:49:23,120
Speaker 1: take my iPhone and scan the crowd and then put

987
00:49:23,160 --> 00:49:25,880
Speaker 1: that picture up on the internet. It's not under their

988
00:49:25,960 --> 00:49:31,160
Speaker 1: jurisdiction and all that happens on every face in that yep,

989
00:49:31,760 --> 00:49:34,160
Speaker 1: and that is again, well, we'll do another episode at

990
00:49:34,200 --> 00:49:35,920
Speaker 1: some point about things that you can do to just

991
00:49:36,040 --> 00:49:39,480
Speaker 1: get like there. That's a whole different bag of tricks. Um,

992
00:49:39,640 --> 00:49:42,040
Speaker 1: But this has been really useful and really valuable. Carl.

993
00:49:42,200 --> 00:49:44,000
Speaker 1: Do you want to plug anything before we roll out here?

994
00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:46,719
Speaker 1: Not much, just my normal thing. If you're interested in

995
00:49:46,760 --> 00:49:49,160
Speaker 1: this kind of content, but with a more firearms oriented thing,

996
00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:51,400
Speaker 1: you can find me an en range dot tv. But

997
00:49:51,520 --> 00:49:54,160
Speaker 1: you'll also find some information security stuff there as well.

998
00:49:54,239 --> 00:49:57,360
Speaker 1: I cover that intermittently when it applies to both topics.

999
00:49:57,440 --> 00:50:00,640
Speaker 1: So if you, if you even if you disagree, but

1000
00:50:00,719 --> 00:50:03,360
Speaker 1: appreciate my approach to this, come check me out. I

1001
00:50:03,440 --> 00:50:07,319
Speaker 1: appreciate it. Awesome, Check out Carl, check out in Range tv,

1002
00:50:08,080 --> 00:50:11,759
Speaker 1: and continue to listen to podcasts because the only thing

1003
00:50:12,960 --> 00:50:16,560
Speaker 1: that will save us is podcasts. When I didn't the

1004
00:50:16,560 --> 00:50:37,919
Speaker 1: same Ryan, but good for business. Oh it could happen here,

1005
00:50:38,320 --> 00:50:41,800
Speaker 1: Um is the podcast. We're talking about things falling apart.

1006
00:50:41,960 --> 00:50:45,560
Speaker 1: And you know a place where things have fallen apart

1007
00:50:45,640 --> 00:50:48,600
Speaker 1: a bit is large chunks of Ukraine due to a

1008
00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:52,920
Speaker 1: Russian invasion. Um. And you know we've chatted about this

1009
00:50:52,960 --> 00:50:54,600
Speaker 1: a bit on the show. We've had some interviews with

1010
00:50:54,680 --> 00:50:56,520
Speaker 1: some folks who are living and fighting over there. And

1011
00:50:56,600 --> 00:51:00,319
Speaker 1: today we're going to talk with Jake Hanrahan Uh friend

1012
00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:03,760
Speaker 1: of the pod Um who has been over a couple

1013
00:51:03,800 --> 00:51:08,120
Speaker 1: of times this year, including since the more expanded conflict began.

1014
00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:10,880
Speaker 1: It has just released a new documentary on the popular

1015
00:51:10,960 --> 00:51:15,040
Speaker 1: front YouTube called Ukraine's Anti Fascist Football Hooligans Fighting the

1016
00:51:15,120 --> 00:51:18,759
Speaker 1: Russian Invasion. Jake, how you doing, Thanks for having me back,

1017
00:51:19,080 --> 00:51:22,560
Speaker 1: Thanks for being on now, Jake. First off, I guess

1018
00:51:22,600 --> 00:51:27,960
Speaker 1: we can get into YouTube censorship stuff, but um, I

1019
00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:30,920
Speaker 1: want to chat about like how this story came about

1020
00:51:31,000 --> 00:51:33,720
Speaker 1: and when you kind of got in contact with these people,

1021
00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:36,840
Speaker 1: because kind of in brief, what you have, you know,

1022
00:51:36,960 --> 00:51:40,440
Speaker 1: the clips notes that you hear from like folks who

1023
00:51:40,640 --> 00:51:42,320
Speaker 1: have kind of an ax to grind is that like

1024
00:51:42,960 --> 00:51:45,960
Speaker 1: you know, Ukraine is all neo Nazis and the government's

1025
00:51:46,000 --> 00:51:47,960
Speaker 1: all run by neo Nazis. And the reality is that

1026
00:51:48,080 --> 00:51:51,560
Speaker 1: Ukraine obviously has a substantial Nazi problem. And as with

1027
00:51:51,719 --> 00:51:55,000
Speaker 1: any country where you have a substantial Nazi problem and

1028
00:51:55,440 --> 00:51:58,239
Speaker 1: some degree of freedom in terms of you know, your

1029
00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:01,719
Speaker 1: ability to organize for their political purposes, you also have

1030
00:52:01,800 --> 00:52:03,839
Speaker 1: a shipload of people who are anti fascists and who

1031
00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:07,240
Speaker 1: have been fighting those fascists in the street, um, often

1032
00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:10,680
Speaker 1: with intense levels of violence. UM. And this is a

1033
00:52:10,760 --> 00:52:13,840
Speaker 1: story about a group of those people, um, who have

1034
00:52:13,960 --> 00:52:17,680
Speaker 1: now kind of retooled their organization and capacity towards fighting

1035
00:52:17,719 --> 00:52:21,400
Speaker 1: the Russian invasion. Yeah, man, exactly that I mean, so

1036
00:52:21,560 --> 00:52:23,320
Speaker 1: what I wanted to do with Popular Front. You know,

1037
00:52:23,560 --> 00:52:27,360
Speaker 1: I've been reporting from Ukraine since sixty and I've been

1038
00:52:27,400 --> 00:52:29,160
Speaker 1: there more than ten times on the ground in the

1039
00:52:29,239 --> 00:52:32,279
Speaker 1: bombas like way before you know, people were focused on

1040
00:52:32,320 --> 00:52:35,000
Speaker 1: the area and before the invasions, so I was very

1041
00:52:35,040 --> 00:52:39,120
Speaker 1: aware of. Yeah, there is a significant fascist element to

1042
00:52:39,320 --> 00:52:42,560
Speaker 1: the militias out there, but it's the same. Any country

1043
00:52:42,560 --> 00:52:44,480
Speaker 1: in Europe that would have a war would have the

1044
00:52:44,560 --> 00:52:46,560
Speaker 1: exact same thing. Trust me, if we had it in Britain,

1045
00:52:46,920 --> 00:52:49,520
Speaker 1: we would have a similar issue. You know, Eastern Europe.

1046
00:52:49,520 --> 00:52:52,920
Speaker 1: Obviously it's a little bit more hardcore, um, but that's

1047
00:52:52,960 --> 00:52:54,800
Speaker 1: the way it is. That's Eastern Europe for you. And

1048
00:52:54,880 --> 00:52:56,520
Speaker 1: I will mention just at the top as well, I

1049
00:52:56,600 --> 00:52:59,600
Speaker 1: would argue that Russia has a much worse neon Nazi problem.

1050
00:52:59,719 --> 00:53:04,799
Speaker 1: They Um, more than fifteen people were killed between by

1051
00:53:04,840 --> 00:53:08,680
Speaker 1: an actual Neo Nazi serial killer gang in Moscow that

1052
00:53:08,840 --> 00:53:12,080
Speaker 1: filmed these attacks. They have a massive neo Nazi party.

1053
00:53:12,800 --> 00:53:15,640
Speaker 1: Um you know they they're they're exporting Nazis all across Europe,

1054
00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:18,560
Speaker 1: and we know there is several, um, you know, well

1055
00:53:18,640 --> 00:53:21,400
Speaker 1: trained neo Nazi battalions fighting for the pro Russian So

1056
00:53:21,440 --> 00:53:23,719
Speaker 1: it's neither here nor there. Yes, there's Nazi problems in

1057
00:53:23,719 --> 00:53:25,719
Speaker 1: the region, but I didn't want to constantly be on

1058
00:53:25,800 --> 00:53:28,279
Speaker 1: this back foot like no, actually, yes there's a Nazi problem,

1059
00:53:28,280 --> 00:53:30,560
Speaker 1: but not this, not that. I was like, how can

1060
00:53:30,640 --> 00:53:32,680
Speaker 1: we do a documentary that's kind of a positive way

1061
00:53:32,719 --> 00:53:35,320
Speaker 1: to be like, well, instead of saying no, not everyone

1062
00:53:35,480 --> 00:53:37,400
Speaker 1: is this, or having to film with a unit and

1063
00:53:37,480 --> 00:53:40,080
Speaker 1: then being like, actually, these guys are fascists. How can

1064
00:53:40,160 --> 00:53:45,000
Speaker 1: I show, you know, like they're uncomfortable. Yeah right, like

1065
00:53:45,160 --> 00:53:49,520
Speaker 1: oh a total cough again. Like it was like, how

1066
00:53:49,640 --> 00:53:51,680
Speaker 1: how can I kind of put a doc out there

1067
00:53:52,160 --> 00:53:54,920
Speaker 1: where it's like, oh, no, actually, like here's a different

1068
00:53:55,000 --> 00:53:57,480
Speaker 1: side to it, and you know, this group obviously as

1069
00:53:57,520 --> 00:54:00,880
Speaker 1: soon as the war started again. Ukraine is a country

1070
00:54:00,920 --> 00:54:03,360
Speaker 1: of forty four million people and it's a very diverse,

1071
00:54:03,680 --> 00:54:08,000
Speaker 1: a very smart, very open country in terms of people

1072
00:54:08,000 --> 00:54:09,879
Speaker 1: will tell you what they think, and they will argue

1073
00:54:09,880 --> 00:54:12,319
Speaker 1: with you and you won't be you know, you can

1074
00:54:12,400 --> 00:54:15,520
Speaker 1: have like really serious discussions with people about politics there

1075
00:54:15,560 --> 00:54:19,080
Speaker 1: and not fall out. You know. Um, so they're very

1076
00:54:19,200 --> 00:54:21,600
Speaker 1: I think, like a very clever people, are really nice people.

1077
00:54:21,640 --> 00:54:24,759
Speaker 1: I love Ukraine. I love Ukrainians, So so it's to me,

1078
00:54:24,880 --> 00:54:26,680
Speaker 1: it was I knew about the players, Like, yeah, of course,

1079
00:54:26,719 --> 00:54:29,640
Speaker 1: there's a massive anti fascist element in Ukraine. Okay, it's

1080
00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:33,320
Speaker 1: definitely smaller than the fascist element, but already since the

1081
00:54:33,400 --> 00:54:36,879
Speaker 1: war started with there's Eco Platform, there's Harky hardcore, there's

1082
00:54:36,920 --> 00:54:40,640
Speaker 1: the Resistance Committee Let's hold towards Klan. There's Operations Solidarity, like,

1083
00:54:41,080 --> 00:54:44,480
Speaker 1: there's a nest the Macno machine gun repair unit, Like,

1084
00:54:44,560 --> 00:54:49,120
Speaker 1: there's so many different anti fascist left wing elements to

1085
00:54:49,200 --> 00:54:50,960
Speaker 1: the to the conflict. They just get a lot less

1086
00:54:51,000 --> 00:54:54,680
Speaker 1: attention because the fascists have got really good at propaganda

1087
00:54:54,760 --> 00:54:57,080
Speaker 1: over the years, and and let's be honest, a lot

1088
00:54:57,160 --> 00:54:59,360
Speaker 1: of the fascist groups are fighting in the East and

1089
00:54:59,520 --> 00:55:03,080
Speaker 1: right now it's kind of can't back. Yeah, well, it

1090
00:55:03,520 --> 00:55:06,040
Speaker 1: all hands on deck, right, It's like everyone's like, yeah, okay,

1091
00:55:06,560 --> 00:55:09,520
Speaker 1: we don't really care, like we just want to not die.

1092
00:55:09,600 --> 00:55:13,879
Speaker 1: Which is understandable. So my point is, Um, I looked

1093
00:55:13,920 --> 00:55:16,239
Speaker 1: at this this group, the Resistance Committee, which is this

1094
00:55:16,360 --> 00:55:21,840
Speaker 1: kind of anti authoritarian um, you know, coalition of various

1095
00:55:21,920 --> 00:55:25,600
Speaker 1: different units. They have Red Deer under their wing, which

1096
00:55:25,719 --> 00:55:27,400
Speaker 1: is an anarchist group in Ukraine that I made a

1097
00:55:27,440 --> 00:55:29,759
Speaker 1: documentary with a few years ago. So I was looking

1098
00:55:29,760 --> 00:55:31,399
Speaker 1: at maybe we'll do a doc n of Deer again

1099
00:55:31,440 --> 00:55:33,400
Speaker 1: now that they're fighting on the front. But then I

1100
00:55:33,440 --> 00:55:36,000
Speaker 1: see this other group with them put towards Klan and

1101
00:55:36,080 --> 00:55:38,239
Speaker 1: it's like what who? Like? Firstly, the name is kind

1102
00:55:38,239 --> 00:55:41,600
Speaker 1: of weird in the US. That brings up some unpleasant

1103
00:55:41,640 --> 00:55:44,879
Speaker 1: connotation in the US. Yeah, I mean it didn't really

1104
00:55:45,080 --> 00:55:47,840
Speaker 1: click to me, But what does what does like hoods?

1105
00:55:48,000 --> 00:55:51,040
Speaker 1: Hoods mean? So basically, when they would go and do

1106
00:55:51,239 --> 00:55:53,279
Speaker 1: you know, when they would go and beat up fascists,

1107
00:55:53,719 --> 00:55:57,400
Speaker 1: they'll be like, right, hood's up because you're you're like

1108
00:55:57,480 --> 00:55:59,360
Speaker 1: putting your hoodie up so you don't get like spotted,

1109
00:55:59,480 --> 00:56:03,279
Speaker 1: right because act the goods up. Um. There's totage of

1110
00:56:03,360 --> 00:56:05,400
Speaker 1: them beating up Nazis as well, chanting they had a

1111
00:56:05,480 --> 00:56:08,319
Speaker 1: chance Dodds, like you know, to put the fucking fear

1112
00:56:08,360 --> 00:56:11,719
Speaker 1: into them like a yeah, yeah, and then clan, I

1113
00:56:11,760 --> 00:56:14,480
Speaker 1: mean the Ukrainian translation of Plan. It's with the K.

1114
00:56:15,080 --> 00:56:19,800
Speaker 1: It's not about the you know, it's just also anglicization

1115
00:56:19,920 --> 00:56:23,720
Speaker 1: can lead to some unfortunate things, right right, But also

1116
00:56:23,840 --> 00:56:26,200
Speaker 1: you know, they're smart guys, and at first I thought

1117
00:56:26,239 --> 00:56:27,600
Speaker 1: this wasn't true, but then I spoke to me it

1118
00:56:27,719 --> 00:56:30,000
Speaker 1: was true. They were kind of aware. They're like, yeah,

1119
00:56:30,160 --> 00:56:33,680
Speaker 1: h h K who towards clan. They're kind of trolling KKK,

1120
00:56:34,000 --> 00:56:36,320
Speaker 1: Like it's like a second meaning because in Ukraine that

1121
00:56:36,400 --> 00:56:38,680
Speaker 1: you know, they've got that culture. They're very cheeky. They

1122
00:56:38,760 --> 00:56:40,759
Speaker 1: think it's very funny to be like ha ha, you know,

1123
00:56:41,040 --> 00:56:43,120
Speaker 1: fuck you. Um, So for them, they were like, yeah,

1124
00:56:43,160 --> 00:56:46,120
Speaker 1: we're basically trolling the fascists, like they hear who towards

1125
00:56:46,160 --> 00:56:49,160
Speaker 1: clan and they're like surprised, Sorry, we're anti fascists, you

1126
00:56:49,200 --> 00:56:52,200
Speaker 1: know what I mean, your head's broken. So it was

1127
00:56:52,280 --> 00:56:54,000
Speaker 1: kind of that vibe, and you know, they didn't really

1128
00:56:54,040 --> 00:56:55,840
Speaker 1: think about it. And when I asked Anton, you know,

1129
00:56:56,160 --> 00:56:58,080
Speaker 1: he's like the kind of the fact old leader. He

1130
00:56:58,239 --> 00:56:59,920
Speaker 1: was like he told me this and then he was

1131
00:57:00,040 --> 00:57:02,480
Speaker 1: I just kind of wanted to piss people off as well. Um,

1132
00:57:02,680 --> 00:57:05,080
Speaker 1: and you you gotta remember these guys started over ten

1133
00:57:05,160 --> 00:57:08,200
Speaker 1: years ago, before you know, politics was as online as

1134
00:57:08,280 --> 00:57:10,760
Speaker 1: it is, um, and they started off in the hardcore

1135
00:57:10,840 --> 00:57:13,040
Speaker 1: punk scene. Now you know, I'm sure you know, Like

1136
00:57:13,120 --> 00:57:15,279
Speaker 1: you know, hardcore punk, especially in Europe is like a

1137
00:57:15,480 --> 00:57:20,040
Speaker 1: very very exciting, very fun, very happy and like Gnari

1138
00:57:20,280 --> 00:57:22,360
Speaker 1: fucking scene. So for them, it was like yeah, with

1139
00:57:22,440 --> 00:57:24,160
Speaker 1: a hood towards clan like you know what I mean.

1140
00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:27,280
Speaker 1: But but unfortunately some people in America like why they

1141
00:57:27,320 --> 00:57:29,200
Speaker 1: go to hood to clan. I don't believe that they're

1142
00:57:29,200 --> 00:57:32,560
Speaker 1: empty fast. It's just like mate, there's over seventy videos

1143
00:57:32,600 --> 00:57:36,880
Speaker 1: of them beating up Nazis successfully. But it's a whole

1144
00:57:36,960 --> 00:57:39,920
Speaker 1: continent that doesn't have the same history as the United States,

1145
00:57:40,040 --> 00:57:42,800
Speaker 1: right you can't. I mean yeah, I mean even if

1146
00:57:42,840 --> 00:57:46,080
Speaker 1: you said in England like KKK, like now, people would

1147
00:57:46,080 --> 00:57:48,520
Speaker 1: be like who oh yeah, like yeah, I've heard of that.

1148
00:57:48,600 --> 00:57:50,640
Speaker 1: It's not like we didn't have it here like that.

1149
00:57:50,760 --> 00:57:52,880
Speaker 1: You know. Yeah, it's one of those So, I mean

1150
00:57:52,960 --> 00:57:55,480
Speaker 1: one of the things that um, that's interesting here that

1151
00:57:55,600 --> 00:57:57,800
Speaker 1: you you hit on a new documentaries like these folks,

1152
00:57:58,200 --> 00:58:01,160
Speaker 1: the that that these are not just like um, anti

1153
00:58:01,200 --> 00:58:04,840
Speaker 1: authoritarian folks, they're they're very much committed to anti racism,

1154
00:58:04,920 --> 00:58:08,240
Speaker 1: which is, um, you know, a place like Ukraine where

1155
00:58:09,640 --> 00:58:12,160
Speaker 1: the history of their being, you know, folks who are

1156
00:58:12,240 --> 00:58:15,080
Speaker 1: not white is not quite as extensive as it is

1157
00:58:15,120 --> 00:58:16,800
Speaker 1: in a lot of places. It's really interesting to me

1158
00:58:16,840 --> 00:58:19,840
Speaker 1: to have people who are kind of organizing specifically for

1159
00:58:19,920 --> 00:58:23,040
Speaker 1: that purpose. Um, and I think, really cool. Yeah, yeah,

1160
00:58:23,120 --> 00:58:24,880
Speaker 1: it is really cool. And it's for them. What I

1161
00:58:25,000 --> 00:58:28,240
Speaker 1: found very fascinating is it's just natural. So, you know,

1162
00:58:28,480 --> 00:58:30,560
Speaker 1: I said, you know, their political I geology. Some of

1163
00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:33,000
Speaker 1: them are like, well, some of us are anarchists, some

1164
00:58:33,160 --> 00:58:35,800
Speaker 1: of us are kind of anti fascists, but otherwise kind

1165
00:58:35,840 --> 00:58:38,840
Speaker 1: of a political and you know, when it's very simple

1166
00:58:38,920 --> 00:58:40,680
Speaker 1: for them, it's like why are you I asked, how

1167
00:58:40,720 --> 00:58:42,520
Speaker 1: come you guys are anti fascists and they're like, well,

1168
00:58:42,840 --> 00:58:44,760
Speaker 1: we just see life differently, like you know, it's like

1169
00:58:45,200 --> 00:58:49,200
Speaker 1: obviously like there was no big political theory. It was

1170
00:58:49,240 --> 00:58:51,240
Speaker 1: just like, no, it's just basically they were like, it's

1171
00:58:51,280 --> 00:58:53,920
Speaker 1: just wrong, you know, like fascism is just wrong. And

1172
00:58:54,040 --> 00:58:57,000
Speaker 1: we're tough guys, you know, and we joined we were

1173
00:58:57,080 --> 00:58:59,040
Speaker 1: we wanted to be the ones that said no, we're

1174
00:58:59,080 --> 00:59:02,280
Speaker 1: not the fascist of the anti fascists, and luckily for them,

1175
00:59:02,360 --> 00:59:05,080
Speaker 1: they had a really good friendship group and a very

1176
00:59:05,200 --> 00:59:07,400
Speaker 1: solid group who were all very good at combat sports,

1177
00:59:07,960 --> 00:59:10,240
Speaker 1: and like in the dock, you know, Anton says, our

1178
00:59:10,360 --> 00:59:13,760
Speaker 1: enemies is almost every other Ukrainian football firm in the

1179
00:59:13,800 --> 00:59:17,240
Speaker 1: whole of the country. But you will ask even their enemies,

1180
00:59:17,440 --> 00:59:20,040
Speaker 1: they will tell you like, yeah, unfortunately, those guys are tough.

1181
00:59:20,200 --> 00:59:24,280
Speaker 1: You know, they can fight. You know, they have to be. Yeah, exactly,

1182
00:59:24,360 --> 00:59:25,840
Speaker 1: they had to be. They were like we had to

1183
00:59:25,920 --> 00:59:28,760
Speaker 1: be you know. So I mean, I I do my research.

1184
00:59:28,840 --> 00:59:32,640
Speaker 1: I found um kind of a fascist football ultras for

1185
00:59:32,840 --> 00:59:37,120
Speaker 1: Hum in Eastern Europe that banned any mention of Houdswood's Klan,

1186
00:59:37,680 --> 00:59:39,480
Speaker 1: and it kind of boiled down to the fact they

1187
00:59:39,520 --> 00:59:42,040
Speaker 1: were just so embarrassed that so many of the fascist

1188
00:59:42,080 --> 00:59:45,640
Speaker 1: groups were getting beaten up like by by anti fascists

1189
00:59:45,640 --> 00:59:47,760
Speaker 1: and often outnumbered. You know. It even got to a

1190
00:59:47,800 --> 00:59:50,760
Speaker 1: point where Hudsward's Clan weren't allowed to they wouldn't even

1191
00:59:50,800 --> 00:59:53,640
Speaker 1: talk to them to do like arranged fights anymore in

1192
00:59:53,680 --> 00:59:56,560
Speaker 1: the field. So instead of quitting, Hudson's Clan said, Okay,

1193
00:59:56,640 --> 00:59:58,200
Speaker 1: then when we see you, we'll just beat you up

1194
00:59:58,240 --> 00:59:59,840
Speaker 1: in the subway, we'll beat you up in the street,

1195
01:00:00,480 --> 01:00:02,280
Speaker 1: you know, And a lot of people might say, oh,

1196
01:00:02,320 --> 01:00:04,480
Speaker 1: well this is violent. So for me, the football Luganism

1197
01:00:04,600 --> 01:00:07,200
Speaker 1: side of it, I don't see an issue with it personally.

1198
01:00:07,280 --> 01:00:10,240
Speaker 1: I mean, they're not attacking anyone innocent, they're not attacking

1199
01:00:10,320 --> 01:00:12,600
Speaker 1: by standards. It was all very contained. It was all

1200
01:00:12,760 --> 01:00:15,240
Speaker 1: very you know, it was that was their thing, you know,

1201
01:00:15,440 --> 01:00:17,600
Speaker 1: so that that to me is whatever. And when you're

1202
01:00:17,640 --> 01:00:20,680
Speaker 1: talking about neo Nazi groups that were i mean in Ukraine,

1203
01:00:20,720 --> 01:00:25,240
Speaker 1: that they've stabbed up the Roma community, they're destroying LGBT events,

1204
01:00:25,840 --> 01:00:27,800
Speaker 1: and you know, the clan were just like, no, we're

1205
01:00:27,800 --> 01:00:29,560
Speaker 1: not about that, we don't we don't think you should

1206
01:00:29,600 --> 01:00:31,800
Speaker 1: do that. And so they formed and for ten years

1207
01:00:31,840 --> 01:00:35,040
Speaker 1: they were fighting. But now they have called a truce

1208
01:00:35,280 --> 01:00:37,640
Speaker 1: because they're like, you know, Anton explains in the dock.

1209
01:00:37,720 --> 01:00:41,280
Speaker 1: He says, look, there's a bigger problem now because Ukraine

1210
01:00:41,320 --> 01:00:44,000
Speaker 1: is actually not a Nazi jump as the Kremlin says.

1211
01:00:44,240 --> 01:00:46,640
Speaker 1: It's actually quite easy to kind of you know, it's

1212
01:00:46,640 --> 01:00:49,560
Speaker 1: a very small subset in the in the relative size

1213
01:00:49,600 --> 01:00:52,240
Speaker 1: of the actual military, so you know, it's actually for them.

1214
01:00:52,280 --> 01:00:53,880
Speaker 1: They said, well, yeah, it makes sense. We put all

1215
01:00:53,920 --> 01:00:57,480
Speaker 1: our other political differences aside, because this is way bigger.

1216
01:00:57,520 --> 01:00:59,720
Speaker 1: You're talking about one of the most powerful militaries on

1217
01:00:59,800 --> 01:01:03,120
Speaker 1: earth invading our country and killing our people. I mean,

1218
01:01:03,160 --> 01:01:06,120
Speaker 1: we've seen the massacres in Boucher and up in Um.

1219
01:01:06,200 --> 01:01:09,880
Speaker 1: You know, people killed civilians, hands behind their back, executed

1220
01:01:09,880 --> 01:01:12,480
Speaker 1: in the street. M thirty of the people killed in

1221
01:01:12,520 --> 01:01:15,880
Speaker 1: Butcher with children, like you know, this is just insane.

1222
01:01:15,960 --> 01:01:17,840
Speaker 1: So for them they were like, yeah, we we can,

1223
01:01:18,200 --> 01:01:20,520
Speaker 1: we can call the truth. You know, we don't like them,

1224
01:01:20,800 --> 01:01:22,440
Speaker 1: but right now we're not going to beat each other

1225
01:01:22,600 --> 01:01:24,960
Speaker 1: up on the front line. Um. But I think it

1226
01:01:25,040 --> 01:01:28,160
Speaker 1: really kind of shows the testament of how serious too

1227
01:01:28,200 --> 01:01:31,040
Speaker 1: towards Clara about the anti fascism that even whilst in

1228
01:01:31,120 --> 01:01:35,840
Speaker 1: the truth, most of them actually still joined the resistance Committee,

1229
01:01:35,840 --> 01:01:39,160
Speaker 1: the anti authoritarian groups, so they're not just directly next

1230
01:01:39,240 --> 01:01:42,520
Speaker 1: to fascist battalions. But again, you know, a lot is

1231
01:01:42,600 --> 01:01:44,360
Speaker 1: changing out there on the front now. I think, yeah,

1232
01:01:44,400 --> 01:01:45,680
Speaker 1: I don't know. Anton said to me, he was like,

1233
01:01:45,680 --> 01:01:47,240
Speaker 1: I'll be honest with you, Like we didn't put this

1234
01:01:47,280 --> 01:01:48,600
Speaker 1: in a DoPT, he said, I'll be honest. I think

1235
01:01:48,640 --> 01:01:51,240
Speaker 1: after this war, a lot of these far right guys

1236
01:01:51,360 --> 01:01:55,520
Speaker 1: might change their minds because now we see what totalitarianism

1237
01:01:55,640 --> 01:01:58,080
Speaker 1: brings death, you know what I mean, whether that whether

1238
01:01:58,160 --> 01:02:00,760
Speaker 1: however that's which we're thinking or not, I'm sure, but

1239
01:02:00,960 --> 01:02:03,560
Speaker 1: you know what I'm saying because obviously, like the I mean,

1240
01:02:03,600 --> 01:02:06,520
Speaker 1: I I would obviously I would hope that that's that's

1241
01:02:06,560 --> 01:02:08,880
Speaker 1: what happens, but I tend to do it. But yeah,

1242
01:02:09,000 --> 01:02:11,040
Speaker 1: the thing that scares me, of course, is there's just

1243
01:02:11,240 --> 01:02:13,720
Speaker 1: as at least as much a chance that you know,

1244
01:02:13,760 --> 01:02:17,080
Speaker 1: they get more powerful. Um, which is again part of

1245
01:02:17,160 --> 01:02:19,880
Speaker 1: why it's important for folks like Hudson's plan to be

1246
01:02:20,080 --> 01:02:24,520
Speaker 1: organizing and getting weapons and being prepared because like, yes,

1247
01:02:25,200 --> 01:02:28,000
Speaker 1: that if that conflict comes after the war, you know,

1248
01:02:28,320 --> 01:02:31,439
Speaker 1: you don't want the fascist militias to be the best

1249
01:02:32,360 --> 01:02:35,880
Speaker 1: armed and most organized. Yeah, and this is the issue,

1250
01:02:35,880 --> 01:02:38,080
Speaker 1: you know. But I think for them it's like, okay,

1251
01:02:38,160 --> 01:02:39,880
Speaker 1: we'll deal with that when it comes, you know. Like

1252
01:02:40,280 --> 01:02:43,560
Speaker 1: I think they're very aware that this war is going nowhere,

1253
01:02:43,760 --> 01:02:46,400
Speaker 1: you know, and you know they say, and our dog, oh,

1254
01:02:46,480 --> 01:02:48,480
Speaker 1: we just want to go and kill Russian pigs. I mean,

1255
01:02:48,640 --> 01:02:51,120
Speaker 1: you know what they mean is I mean some people

1256
01:02:51,160 --> 01:02:52,800
Speaker 1: are like, ooh, that's really bad. I was like mate,

1257
01:02:52,960 --> 01:02:56,320
Speaker 1: you're talking about that. They were It's a war, right,

1258
01:02:56,760 --> 01:03:00,080
Speaker 1: they were. They were guarding the areas where the massacres happened. Know,

1259
01:03:00,520 --> 01:03:03,360
Speaker 1: Hood towards Klan got shelled trying to get civilians out

1260
01:03:03,400 --> 01:03:08,360
Speaker 1: of Boradanka when Russians were shelling. You're talking women and children. Yeah,

1261
01:03:08,360 --> 01:03:11,720
Speaker 1: I'm surprised they said that mildly, you know, like yeah,

1262
01:03:11,800 --> 01:03:13,320
Speaker 1: like you know, it's a woman, it is what it is.

1263
01:03:13,600 --> 01:03:17,680
Speaker 1: And also their football hooligans they're wild people, you know, Yeah,

1264
01:03:17,760 --> 01:03:20,680
Speaker 1: it's it's um. I mean that is kind of interesting though,

1265
01:03:20,720 --> 01:03:24,720
Speaker 1: I'm curious, Um, do you have kind of, ah an

1266
01:03:24,760 --> 01:03:27,480
Speaker 1: assessment of what kind of numbers they're looking at, like

1267
01:03:27,560 --> 01:03:29,800
Speaker 1: how many folks they've actually got in the field on

1268
01:03:29,840 --> 01:03:33,680
Speaker 1: a regular basis. Yeah, so the resistance Committee is I

1269
01:03:33,720 --> 01:03:37,080
Speaker 1: don't know, like fifty hundred right now. Good towards Klan

1270
01:03:37,200 --> 01:03:40,080
Speaker 1: they have like maybe twenty to thirty year there guys

1271
01:03:40,240 --> 01:03:42,760
Speaker 1: in that group. But then they also have other people,

1272
01:03:43,240 --> 01:03:46,440
Speaker 1: um that join different units in the East. So they

1273
01:03:46,480 --> 01:03:48,600
Speaker 1: were like already military, so they didn't have to go

1274
01:03:48,800 --> 01:03:50,920
Speaker 1: you know, former militia, they just joined the military. So

1275
01:03:51,000 --> 01:03:55,760
Speaker 1: there's like quite a strong hood towards Clan Um mortar group. UM,

1276
01:03:55,920 --> 01:03:57,720
Speaker 1: and I know that. So. So one of the footage

1277
01:03:57,760 --> 01:04:00,920
Speaker 1: we included in our documentary where um, a Russian tank

1278
01:04:01,000 --> 01:04:03,040
Speaker 1: gets blown up like very close core as he gets

1279
01:04:03,080 --> 01:04:05,000
Speaker 1: hit with the javelin, he's like a hundred feet away.

1280
01:04:05,320 --> 01:04:07,040
Speaker 1: That was a hood Toude clan attack. That was one

1281
01:04:07,040 --> 01:04:09,560
Speaker 1: of their guys doing it, you know. So yeah, so

1282
01:04:09,720 --> 01:04:12,960
Speaker 1: that there's they're all over the place. Um. Unfortunately, due

1283
01:04:13,000 --> 01:04:15,920
Speaker 1: to various bureaucracy within the Territorial Defense, I do think

1284
01:04:16,000 --> 01:04:19,440
Speaker 1: that the Resistance Committee might have to split up to

1285
01:04:19,560 --> 01:04:21,200
Speaker 1: actually get to the front, you know what I mean,

1286
01:04:21,280 --> 01:04:23,240
Speaker 1: Like they're they're probably gonna have to join other units

1287
01:04:23,440 --> 01:04:26,439
Speaker 1: because there's some issues that the you know, various people

1288
01:04:27,040 --> 01:04:28,720
Speaker 1: they're just not sending them out there. It's not because

1289
01:04:28,720 --> 01:04:30,560
Speaker 1: they're anti fascist or anything. It's nothing to do that.

1290
01:04:30,680 --> 01:04:33,520
Speaker 1: It's it's because you know, it's corruption, man. There, there's

1291
01:04:33,560 --> 01:04:36,600
Speaker 1: there's some corruption emerging. Some some commanders just want to

1292
01:04:36,640 --> 01:04:38,640
Speaker 1: sit sit around and not actually have to go to

1293
01:04:38,720 --> 01:04:42,160
Speaker 1: the front. Um. Whereas you know, the fighters themselves are

1294
01:04:42,200 --> 01:04:44,480
Speaker 1: desperate because they're like, you know, our people are dying.

1295
01:04:44,600 --> 01:04:46,600
Speaker 1: We want to avenge them and we want to stop it.

1296
01:04:46,920 --> 01:04:49,720
Speaker 1: So you know, right, nowhoods Planner essentially on their way.

1297
01:04:49,960 --> 01:04:51,720
Speaker 1: They're doing a lot more training right now. They've been

1298
01:04:51,720 --> 01:04:53,560
Speaker 1: given the go ahead. Yeah, they're going to the east.

1299
01:04:54,000 --> 01:04:55,800
Speaker 1: Um and as far as I know, they're they're kind

1300
01:04:55,840 --> 01:04:58,720
Speaker 1: of on route obviously stopping off doing training. I think

1301
01:04:58,760 --> 01:05:00,840
Speaker 1: they have an upeat. They're going to be an APG unit,

1302
01:05:00,920 --> 01:05:02,720
Speaker 1: so they'll be a very close cause, you know what

1303
01:05:02,760 --> 01:05:04,800
Speaker 1: I'm saying. So it's going to be Narlie for them.

1304
01:05:05,160 --> 01:05:07,000
Speaker 1: These guys, as you stayed at all, kind of started

1305
01:05:07,000 --> 01:05:08,920
Speaker 1: out as a friend group, right, Like they weren't. This

1306
01:05:09,040 --> 01:05:13,200
Speaker 1: isn't a political party, These aren't like these guys didn't

1307
01:05:13,200 --> 01:05:15,640
Speaker 1: start as ideological comrads. They were like buddies who are

1308
01:05:15,720 --> 01:05:18,120
Speaker 1: into the same team and into the same kind of

1309
01:05:18,160 --> 01:05:21,200
Speaker 1: combat sports. And now they're you know, they're going to

1310
01:05:21,320 --> 01:05:23,040
Speaker 1: be some of them are gonna be dying in front

1311
01:05:23,040 --> 01:05:27,240
Speaker 1: of the others, which is like a difficulty I think. Um,

1312
01:05:27,640 --> 01:05:30,680
Speaker 1: I'm interested in kind of how how are they actually

1313
01:05:30,880 --> 01:05:33,440
Speaker 1: organizing sort of in the field or is it just

1314
01:05:33,680 --> 01:05:36,040
Speaker 1: as I've heard of a number of like militia units

1315
01:05:36,120 --> 01:05:38,160
Speaker 1: kind of along the lines of the Ukrainian military, or

1316
01:05:38,200 --> 01:05:41,680
Speaker 1: have they have they kind of adopted different organizational styles

1317
01:05:41,760 --> 01:05:44,040
Speaker 1: in their their hoods, hoods units as befits sort of

1318
01:05:44,800 --> 01:05:48,960
Speaker 1: their unique kind of origins. Yeah, that's a good question. Well,

1319
01:05:49,000 --> 01:05:52,520
Speaker 1: I mean it's kind of trickly because essentially there, you know,

1320
01:05:52,680 --> 01:05:54,640
Speaker 1: I guess, I guess they phoned as a militia. You know,

1321
01:05:54,720 --> 01:05:57,200
Speaker 1: as soon as they stir they got guns. But then

1322
01:05:57,360 --> 01:05:59,560
Speaker 1: you know, Anton was like, we have everything from the

1323
01:05:59,600 --> 01:06:02,560
Speaker 1: anti ashes networks, everything we need apart from the weapons.

1324
01:06:02,880 --> 01:06:05,120
Speaker 1: So they had to sign up as a part of

1325
01:06:05,800 --> 01:06:08,800
Speaker 1: the territorial defense the weapons. So they're under the territorial

1326
01:06:08,840 --> 01:06:11,400
Speaker 1: defense as are you know, a hundreds of different people

1327
01:06:11,480 --> 01:06:14,800
Speaker 1: that did the same thing. Um. So luckily forward towards clan,

1328
01:06:14,880 --> 01:06:17,400
Speaker 1: I think because they're so close friends. I mean you

1329
01:06:17,440 --> 01:06:19,120
Speaker 1: can see it in the Dock, you know. I even

1330
01:06:19,320 --> 01:06:21,360
Speaker 1: the subtitle of our Dock is like, you know, this

1331
01:06:21,480 --> 01:06:25,080
Speaker 1: is a film about friendship, m violence and resistance, because

1332
01:06:25,120 --> 01:06:27,160
Speaker 1: that's essentially what it is, you know. So they're very

1333
01:06:27,200 --> 01:06:30,120
Speaker 1: close friends. So commanders have recognized that that, Yeah, this

1334
01:06:30,280 --> 01:06:32,520
Speaker 1: is a group that is disciplined as well. A lot

1335
01:06:32,560 --> 01:06:35,240
Speaker 1: of them are straight edge, which is actually a discipline

1336
01:06:35,280 --> 01:06:37,600
Speaker 1: in itself, you know what I mean. So they're very

1337
01:06:37,640 --> 01:06:40,120
Speaker 1: well disciplined. They're very good. You know, the training is

1338
01:06:40,240 --> 01:06:42,320
Speaker 1: very good. They know what they're doing. But they have

1339
01:06:42,480 --> 01:06:46,360
Speaker 1: like a commander that is from the Territorial Defense if

1340
01:06:46,400 --> 01:06:48,240
Speaker 1: you like. It's not he's not hood towards clan. He's

1341
01:06:48,440 --> 01:06:51,640
Speaker 1: never been assigned a commander sort of thing. Um, So

1342
01:06:52,080 --> 01:06:54,600
Speaker 1: they're being taught just the same kind of tactics as

1343
01:06:54,600 --> 01:06:57,400
Speaker 1: anybody else. As they're an RPG unit. I think, you know,

1344
01:06:57,520 --> 01:06:59,400
Speaker 1: there will be a lot of close quarters stuff, but

1345
01:06:59,440 --> 01:07:02,480
Speaker 1: they're just doing a lot of a lot of arms training.

1346
01:07:02,880 --> 01:07:05,240
Speaker 1: There's you know, Constantine and the dark. One of them

1347
01:07:05,360 --> 01:07:07,240
Speaker 1: is like, I just want to get better faster. They're

1348
01:07:07,280 --> 01:07:10,720
Speaker 1: just they're very they're very focused on being like not

1349
01:07:10,800 --> 01:07:12,640
Speaker 1: an elite unit, but they want to get it perfect.

1350
01:07:12,640 --> 01:07:14,360
Speaker 1: They're not just like, yeah, let's go and kill. They're like,

1351
01:07:14,440 --> 01:07:16,040
Speaker 1: now we have to be good, you know what I mean.

1352
01:07:16,120 --> 01:07:17,840
Speaker 1: We have to go in there and have the same

1353
01:07:17,920 --> 01:07:20,920
Speaker 1: discipline and organization as we had in the streets when

1354
01:07:20,960 --> 01:07:23,120
Speaker 1: we were fighting. There was a reason that they were

1355
01:07:23,200 --> 01:07:25,800
Speaker 1: renowned as being a good street fight in football, looking

1356
01:07:25,880 --> 01:07:30,520
Speaker 1: firm despite being completely outnumbered. It's because they had good discipline. Um,

1357
01:07:30,840 --> 01:07:33,600
Speaker 1: they're tough, they trained and also because they're good friends.

1358
01:07:33,720 --> 01:07:35,800
Speaker 1: They will have each other's back. It's it's not hobby

1359
01:07:35,840 --> 01:07:38,920
Speaker 1: for them as a lifestyle, you know. Um, yeah, it's

1360
01:07:38,920 --> 01:07:40,600
Speaker 1: just so much went into it, you know who plan

1361
01:07:40,680 --> 01:07:44,640
Speaker 1: started off the back of um anti fascist punk punk

1362
01:07:44,680 --> 01:07:48,200
Speaker 1: hardcore in Ukraine, and then that itself was a scene,

1363
01:07:48,240 --> 01:07:50,320
Speaker 1: and then the football organism and then yeah, and now

1364
01:07:50,440 --> 01:07:52,680
Speaker 1: it's it's crazy, really, it's it's honestly one of the

1365
01:07:52,760 --> 01:07:56,640
Speaker 1: most fascinating stories I've covered. Now they're fucking frontline unit,

1366
01:07:56,680 --> 01:07:58,720
Speaker 1: you know. It's it's sad and I hope to guard

1367
01:07:58,840 --> 01:08:01,120
Speaker 1: nothing happens to any of them. Probably the nicest guys

1368
01:08:01,160 --> 01:08:04,760
Speaker 1: are filmed with you know. Um and yeah, it's it's, it's,

1369
01:08:04,880 --> 01:08:06,920
Speaker 1: it's it's a good question on it. It's very tricky

1370
01:08:07,000 --> 01:08:08,840
Speaker 1: to know how it's going to happen for them once

1371
01:08:08,920 --> 01:08:11,280
Speaker 1: they're on the front. I mean, Anton, the main guy,

1372
01:08:11,360 --> 01:08:15,040
Speaker 1: he has served before, joined the militia to fight in

1373
01:08:15,080 --> 01:08:17,439
Speaker 1: the dom Bus. So they do have some experience, you know,

1374
01:08:18,200 --> 01:08:20,880
Speaker 1: and it does seem like um kind of their natural

1375
01:08:21,200 --> 01:08:24,479
Speaker 1: the skills that they've been developing, because there's there's broadly

1376
01:08:24,520 --> 01:08:27,560
Speaker 1: speaking from my understanding, kind of two main types of

1377
01:08:27,960 --> 01:08:31,960
Speaker 1: combat going on in Ukraine. There's the what you're seeing

1378
01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:34,560
Speaker 1: a lot in you know, the Don Boss, which is

1379
01:08:35,040 --> 01:08:38,240
Speaker 1: this kind of like meat grinder like frontline ship, and

1380
01:08:38,280 --> 01:08:40,120
Speaker 1: then there's sort of the seek and destroy kind of

1381
01:08:40,160 --> 01:08:42,960
Speaker 1: stuff where you've got people sort of hunting convoys and

1382
01:08:43,120 --> 01:08:45,840
Speaker 1: and doing ambushes. And it does strike me like these

1383
01:08:45,880 --> 01:08:48,680
Speaker 1: guys talents would lend themselves more to the ambushes then.

1384
01:08:48,720 --> 01:08:51,200
Speaker 1: I mean, there's not really any talent that helps you

1385
01:08:51,320 --> 01:08:54,240
Speaker 1: in the in the sitting in a trench meat grinder

1386
01:08:54,320 --> 01:08:56,920
Speaker 1: kind of ship. But obviously you don't have that choice

1387
01:08:57,000 --> 01:09:02,519
Speaker 1: when you're when you're serving under you know, the national military. Yeah, yeah,

1388
01:09:02,600 --> 01:09:04,760
Speaker 1: it's I think you're right, like they would be much

1389
01:09:04,960 --> 01:09:09,920
Speaker 1: better um placed as like you know, I guess like

1390
01:09:10,000 --> 01:09:13,080
Speaker 1: a kind of shooting scoot kind of unit exactly. Yeah,

1391
01:09:13,200 --> 01:09:14,800
Speaker 1: And I think they will be because you know, the

1392
01:09:14,920 --> 01:09:17,880
Speaker 1: train with RPG UM some of their fighters already have

1393
01:09:18,000 --> 01:09:22,479
Speaker 1: javelins on the front um and and laws. So yeah,

1394
01:09:22,520 --> 01:09:24,280
Speaker 1: I think that's where it would be if they just

1395
01:09:24,360 --> 01:09:26,120
Speaker 1: put them in some kind of meat grind of position,

1396
01:09:26,200 --> 01:09:28,479
Speaker 1: which very much could happen, you know. I mean, it's

1397
01:09:28,520 --> 01:09:31,160
Speaker 1: bad for anybody, let's be realistic. It's getting very bad

1398
01:09:31,200 --> 01:09:35,479
Speaker 1: in the don Bass right tonight. Yeah, yeah, yeah, um,

1399
01:09:35,760 --> 01:09:37,479
Speaker 1: I mean, and that's one of the there's been posts

1400
01:09:37,520 --> 01:09:41,080
Speaker 1: and stuff from people talking about like, um, you know,

1401
01:09:41,320 --> 01:09:43,880
Speaker 1: the a lot of the funk ups that are happening

1402
01:09:44,160 --> 01:09:46,800
Speaker 1: because you know, Ukraine started this war with everyone being

1403
01:09:46,880 --> 01:09:50,960
Speaker 1: kind of overwhelmed by the competence of their military effort,

1404
01:09:51,000 --> 01:09:52,920
Speaker 1: and now that things in in the Don Boss have

1405
01:09:53,040 --> 01:09:56,519
Speaker 1: turned into this kind of ugly slug Um, there's been

1406
01:09:56,640 --> 01:09:59,439
Speaker 1: some you know, oh the you know units getting hit

1407
01:09:59,479 --> 01:10:01,240
Speaker 1: by their own our hillary fire, the kind of messy

1408
01:10:01,320 --> 01:10:04,080
Speaker 1: stuff that happens when you have a fight like this,

1409
01:10:04,360 --> 01:10:06,960
Speaker 1: right like it is it is unavoidable, um, when you

1410
01:10:07,080 --> 01:10:10,719
Speaker 1: have like a situation like has developed in the Dan Boss.

1411
01:10:10,800 --> 01:10:15,400
Speaker 1: But that doesn't make it any less unpleasant to endure

1412
01:10:15,479 --> 01:10:18,240
Speaker 1: as an actual soldier. Like it's just it's one of

1413
01:10:18,280 --> 01:10:21,280
Speaker 1: those I mean, there's only so much that like competence

1414
01:10:21,320 --> 01:10:23,759
Speaker 1: and training can do if you wind up getting squeezed

1415
01:10:23,760 --> 01:10:26,960
Speaker 1: into that kind of position. Yeah, And and there's this

1416
01:10:27,160 --> 01:10:30,360
Speaker 1: is why a lot of people are even Ukrainian has

1417
01:10:30,360 --> 01:10:33,760
Speaker 1: actually had a conversation with Ukrainian friend yesterday that was saying, like,

1418
01:10:34,040 --> 01:10:36,200
Speaker 1: you know, the situation is so bad in the East.

1419
01:10:36,960 --> 01:10:40,280
Speaker 1: We really need to be honest about this because you know,

1420
01:10:40,360 --> 01:10:42,320
Speaker 1: if people think it's going better than it is, Okay,

1421
01:10:42,360 --> 01:10:43,960
Speaker 1: it's good for morale, but it's not good for the

1422
01:10:44,000 --> 01:10:45,960
Speaker 1: guys on the ground, like they're not going to get

1423
01:10:46,000 --> 01:10:48,800
Speaker 1: what they need. And the reality is that it's getting

1424
01:10:48,840 --> 01:10:51,680
Speaker 1: really bad and it's not anything to do with incompetence

1425
01:10:51,760 --> 01:10:54,360
Speaker 1: from the fighters. It's just the war. The level is

1426
01:10:54,439 --> 01:10:57,080
Speaker 1: being so hot, and you know, Russia has learned from

1427
01:10:57,120 --> 01:11:00,160
Speaker 1: its mistakes unfortunately from the start where they can be

1428
01:11:00,280 --> 01:11:02,519
Speaker 1: funked up. But now you know, things are getting a

1429
01:11:02,560 --> 01:11:06,360
Speaker 1: little bit Harry, Um, Ukrainians are doing like an incredible effort.

1430
01:11:06,880 --> 01:11:10,600
Speaker 1: But again it's like, yeah, you're talking about decades and

1431
01:11:10,760 --> 01:11:15,759
Speaker 1: decades of armor and you know, um weapons that Russia

1432
01:11:15,840 --> 01:11:17,920
Speaker 1: has and it's all very well, us being like, oh

1433
01:11:17,960 --> 01:11:21,200
Speaker 1: it's their armor is blah blah. I doubt it, you know,

1434
01:11:21,280 --> 01:11:23,920
Speaker 1: I very much doubt that. Um, it doesn't look like that,

1435
01:11:24,120 --> 01:11:26,160
Speaker 1: certainly from when people I'm talking to in the East.

1436
01:11:26,200 --> 01:11:30,040
Speaker 1: You know, so I think again, when when you know

1437
01:11:30,240 --> 01:11:32,599
Speaker 1: Ukrainians are like, well we do need more weapons, it's

1438
01:11:32,600 --> 01:11:34,519
Speaker 1: because they need more weapons, you know what I mean,

1439
01:11:34,600 --> 01:11:36,920
Speaker 1: they really do. Well, this is like one of the

1440
01:11:38,000 --> 01:11:40,759
Speaker 1: This is uh one of the things that's that's difficult

1441
01:11:40,760 --> 01:11:43,599
Speaker 1: to I think get across to people, um, because there

1442
01:11:43,720 --> 01:11:46,280
Speaker 1: is such a you know that we are dealing with

1443
01:11:46,400 --> 01:11:50,240
Speaker 1: the legacy of decades of shipping weapons places, um, and

1444
01:11:50,400 --> 01:11:52,519
Speaker 1: not having that helped the conflict in a lot of

1445
01:11:52,800 --> 01:11:55,759
Speaker 1: in a lot of ways, um, in decades of stories

1446
01:11:55,840 --> 01:11:57,519
Speaker 1: like you know, all the weapons that got sent to

1447
01:11:57,600 --> 01:11:59,800
Speaker 1: the Iraqi government and then wound up in isis is

1448
01:12:00,040 --> 01:12:02,920
Speaker 1: Marie and ship um, which creates kind of an easy

1449
01:12:03,040 --> 01:12:05,439
Speaker 1: narrative for folks who are like, well, you know, you're

1450
01:12:05,479 --> 01:12:07,800
Speaker 1: just trying to prolong the conflict in making it worse

1451
01:12:07,880 --> 01:12:10,880
Speaker 1: by shipping and weapons. But the reality is one side

1452
01:12:10,920 --> 01:12:14,160
Speaker 1: of this war has a substantial percentage of all of

1453
01:12:14,240 --> 01:12:17,439
Speaker 1: the artillery that exists on the planet. Yeah, and the

1454
01:12:17,520 --> 01:12:21,160
Speaker 1: other side does not. Yeah. And I do understand the

1455
01:12:21,280 --> 01:12:24,439
Speaker 1: argument though, Like I totally get it, but it's it's

1456
01:12:25,080 --> 01:12:27,080
Speaker 1: I lived through the early two thousand's as well, I

1457
01:12:27,200 --> 01:12:30,640
Speaker 1: understand it. It's like war isn't a template. It's not

1458
01:12:30,720 --> 01:12:33,719
Speaker 1: like does this happened there, this will happened there or whatever,

1459
01:12:33,800 --> 01:12:35,800
Speaker 1: And it's like you have to weigh up no matter

1460
01:12:35,920 --> 01:12:37,960
Speaker 1: what bad is going to come from this, Do you

1461
01:12:38,040 --> 01:12:41,240
Speaker 1: want the bad to be Okay, there's a problem with

1462
01:12:41,600 --> 01:12:44,720
Speaker 1: arms in Eastern Ukraine, which the Eastern Europe, which there

1463
01:12:44,720 --> 01:12:47,160
Speaker 1: already is, and it gets worse. Or do you want

1464
01:12:47,479 --> 01:12:50,280
Speaker 1: the bad problem to be Russia has taken over the

1465
01:12:50,320 --> 01:12:54,000
Speaker 1: whole country, massacred everybody and is unlike undoubtly going to

1466
01:12:54,080 --> 01:12:57,040
Speaker 1: try and move into other countries. Do you want aids

1467
01:12:57,400 --> 01:12:59,600
Speaker 1: or do you want cancer? I don't know, you know

1468
01:12:59,680 --> 01:13:01,920
Speaker 1: what I mean? Indeed, do you want the Do you

1469
01:13:02,000 --> 01:13:04,599
Speaker 1: want the lesson from this to be that if you're

1470
01:13:04,640 --> 01:13:07,360
Speaker 1: just willing to burn a couple of hundred thousand human

1471
01:13:07,439 --> 01:13:11,639
Speaker 1: lives as a state like Russia or any other state,

1472
01:13:11,800 --> 01:13:15,920
Speaker 1: you can easily gain access to, you know, a pile

1473
01:13:16,000 --> 01:13:18,519
Speaker 1: of wealth right in the shape of a country. Um,

1474
01:13:18,840 --> 01:13:21,880
Speaker 1: which isn't a positive. It's not like a good lesson

1475
01:13:22,040 --> 01:13:23,960
Speaker 1: for anyone to take out of this. But like if

1476
01:13:24,600 --> 01:13:28,639
Speaker 1: if that's the lesson, right, yeah, yeah, no, that's the reality.

1477
01:13:28,760 --> 01:13:31,479
Speaker 1: Like it's all very nice having a fifty tweet Twitter

1478
01:13:31,560 --> 01:13:34,000
Speaker 1: threat about why this that and referred should or shouldn't happen,

1479
01:13:34,720 --> 01:13:37,240
Speaker 1: But that's just completely removed from real life. I mean,

1480
01:13:37,360 --> 01:13:39,160
Speaker 1: a real life is it's going to be very bad,

1481
01:13:39,320 --> 01:13:41,920
Speaker 1: very nasty, no matter what happens, and you just have

1482
01:13:42,040 --> 01:13:44,320
Speaker 1: to weigh. Oh I don't like natso oh I don't

1483
01:13:44,360 --> 01:13:46,599
Speaker 1: like this. Yeah, I mean either, but I care about

1484
01:13:46,640 --> 01:13:49,000
Speaker 1: people that die for no reason, you know, Like I

1485
01:13:49,080 --> 01:13:51,720
Speaker 1: think that's the real issue. Um. I think people need

1486
01:13:51,800 --> 01:13:53,840
Speaker 1: to stand with the people, you know, and if that

1487
01:13:54,000 --> 01:13:57,640
Speaker 1: means okay, use the tools that you have, Okay, Like,

1488
01:13:57,920 --> 01:13:59,519
Speaker 1: oh I don't like nats. We yeah, but they're going

1489
01:13:59,560 --> 01:14:01,640
Speaker 1: to give them. What do you think that Ukrainians like

1490
01:14:01,800 --> 01:14:04,800
Speaker 1: having Russian firearms? Probably not. But they also don't give

1491
01:14:04,800 --> 01:14:07,280
Speaker 1: a ship because they shoot. It's it's that simple, you know,

1492
01:14:07,760 --> 01:14:10,960
Speaker 1: kind of coming back to the subject of your documentary. Um,

1493
01:14:11,360 --> 01:14:13,400
Speaker 1: if weapons are going to be going over there, and

1494
01:14:13,520 --> 01:14:16,439
Speaker 1: by god they are, um I I would hope that

1495
01:14:16,680 --> 01:14:18,680
Speaker 1: as many of them as possible are going into the

1496
01:14:18,760 --> 01:14:23,360
Speaker 1: hands of people like the Hoods Hood's client, right, yeah,

1497
01:14:24,040 --> 01:14:28,080
Speaker 1: um yeah, I mean that is that is a yeah,

1498
01:14:28,200 --> 01:14:31,200
Speaker 1: a lot. There's definitely this isn't from them telling me,

1499
01:14:31,280 --> 01:14:34,240
Speaker 1: but it's just from research I've done. There's definitely a

1500
01:14:34,320 --> 01:14:37,720
Speaker 1: discrepancy in terms of which groups get what weapons. And

1501
01:14:38,360 --> 01:14:40,960
Speaker 1: it's not based on ideology, but it's definitely based on

1502
01:14:41,560 --> 01:14:44,000
Speaker 1: some serious paroxy that needs to be sorted out. You know.

1503
01:14:44,200 --> 01:14:46,720
Speaker 1: I have some some Western volunteers that I know that

1504
01:14:46,800 --> 01:14:49,240
Speaker 1: are on the front right now, and they're saying, like,

1505
01:14:49,439 --> 01:14:51,680
Speaker 1: for some reason, you know, one unit that is not

1506
01:14:51,800 --> 01:14:55,960
Speaker 1: an RPG unit, for example, will have more rockets than

1507
01:14:56,040 --> 01:14:58,560
Speaker 1: the RPG unit, you know, And it's like, what like,

1508
01:14:58,800 --> 01:15:00,360
Speaker 1: And that's not because they've used the more. It's it's

1509
01:15:00,439 --> 01:15:03,799
Speaker 1: it's supply lines are again. It's it's not even corruption.

1510
01:15:03,840 --> 01:15:05,920
Speaker 1: Often it's just supply lines are wrecked or whatever. But

1511
01:15:06,320 --> 01:15:07,880
Speaker 1: it has to be addressed as to be looked at.

1512
01:15:07,880 --> 01:15:09,880
Speaker 1: I mean, I'm no tactician. I don't know anything about

1513
01:15:09,920 --> 01:15:12,160
Speaker 1: that side of things. I'm just basing on what you know,

1514
01:15:12,240 --> 01:15:14,000
Speaker 1: people are telling me, because you know, I like to

1515
01:15:14,040 --> 01:15:16,840
Speaker 1: talk to them and hear what's happening. Yeah. Um, I

1516
01:15:16,880 --> 01:15:19,680
Speaker 1: think we should move into you know, when I when

1517
01:15:19,720 --> 01:15:23,080
Speaker 1: I pull up your documentary on YouTube, which is again

1518
01:15:23,200 --> 01:15:26,599
Speaker 1: for folks at home, titled Ukraine's anti fascist football Hooligans

1519
01:15:26,680 --> 01:15:29,120
Speaker 1: Fighting the Russian Invasion, the first thing that I see

1520
01:15:29,240 --> 01:15:36,280
Speaker 1: is this video maybe inappropriate for some users. Um yeah's yeah, well,

1521
01:15:36,320 --> 01:15:38,880
Speaker 1: and it's We've talked a lot on our various shows

1522
01:15:38,920 --> 01:15:41,519
Speaker 1: on this network about all of the fascist propaganda that

1523
01:15:41,600 --> 01:15:43,720
Speaker 1: you can find and not even find on YouTube that

1524
01:15:43,760 --> 01:15:45,559
Speaker 1: will be like spoon fed. Do you if you wind

1525
01:15:45,640 --> 01:15:49,439
Speaker 1: up like watching a video game review or something. Um, yeah,

1526
01:15:49,640 --> 01:15:51,679
Speaker 1: this is something that you've been dealing with, unpopular front.

1527
01:15:51,720 --> 01:15:53,640
Speaker 1: Somebody seems to have like an ax to grind with

1528
01:15:53,760 --> 01:15:56,000
Speaker 1: you guys. I don't know. Maybe it's just the algorithm,

1529
01:15:56,160 --> 01:15:59,800
Speaker 1: but I'll be honest, I I felt like it was

1530
01:16:00,000 --> 01:16:03,120
Speaker 1: to the algorithm until this recent one. Right. So so yeah,

1531
01:16:03,160 --> 01:16:04,640
Speaker 1: like you said, if people want to fight, I mean

1532
01:16:04,680 --> 01:16:06,880
Speaker 1: the dogs called front Line who looking? But yeah, the

1533
01:16:07,360 --> 01:16:10,479
Speaker 1: for s c O. Um, yeah, it's it's Ukraine's anti

1534
01:16:10,520 --> 01:16:15,320
Speaker 1: fascists fighting Russian invasion. Um. But yeah, the second it

1535
01:16:15,439 --> 01:16:17,680
Speaker 1: was uploaded it got age restricted. Now that to me

1536
01:16:17,880 --> 01:16:19,880
Speaker 1: is very odd. I don't get why there's no gore

1537
01:16:19,960 --> 01:16:22,880
Speaker 1: in it. Um. Okay, yeah, there's violence, but there's a

1538
01:16:22,920 --> 01:16:26,120
Speaker 1: guideline where you can show violence in if it's relative

1539
01:16:26,160 --> 01:16:28,800
Speaker 1: to report in, which obviously it is because it's an

1540
01:16:28,840 --> 01:16:31,880
Speaker 1: anti fascist football looking firm fighting Russia. So of course

1541
01:16:31,920 --> 01:16:33,920
Speaker 1: we're going to show what that looks like. But there's

1542
01:16:33,960 --> 01:16:38,120
Speaker 1: there's no there's no gore. Um, there's no there's there's

1543
01:16:38,200 --> 01:16:41,800
Speaker 1: just it's just lads hanging out talking about their lives

1544
01:16:41,880 --> 01:16:44,040
Speaker 1: now they've been tipped upside down and how they really

1545
01:16:44,160 --> 01:16:46,840
Speaker 1: dislike the far right. Now. To give you an idea

1546
01:16:46,840 --> 01:16:49,240
Speaker 1: of how messed up this is, UM, there's a real,

1547
01:16:49,439 --> 01:16:53,400
Speaker 1: a real parasite YouTuber. It's called Danny Mullen and he

1548
01:16:53,600 --> 01:16:56,720
Speaker 1: has a video on YouTube where him and his his

1549
01:16:56,880 --> 01:17:00,559
Speaker 1: friend both for them scoundrels go to the con border

1550
01:17:00,840 --> 01:17:05,679
Speaker 1: and the whole video is trying to get with quote

1551
01:17:05,800 --> 01:17:09,280
Speaker 1: like hot Ukrainian refugees. Now, it's the most disgusting thing

1552
01:17:09,320 --> 01:17:11,439
Speaker 1: you've ever seen. They're praying on young girls, some of

1553
01:17:11,520 --> 01:17:15,040
Speaker 1: them are very clearly underage. UM. And that is monetized.

1554
01:17:15,160 --> 01:17:18,640
Speaker 1: That is monetized, and it is even on the algorithm.

1555
01:17:18,720 --> 01:17:21,360
Speaker 1: I found it because I was watching Ukraine war stuff

1556
01:17:21,400 --> 01:17:24,640
Speaker 1: and it was put onto my recommended. Now, these are

1557
01:17:24,640 --> 01:17:27,280
Speaker 1: the biggest parasites you've ever seen in your life. UM.

1558
01:17:27,360 --> 01:17:29,920
Speaker 1: And they have hundreds and hundreds of thousands of subscribers

1559
01:17:29,960 --> 01:17:33,320
Speaker 1: and they're making money from content like that that is

1560
01:17:33,439 --> 01:17:36,320
Speaker 1: not age restricted. There is no censorship thing, There is

1561
01:17:36,400 --> 01:17:39,480
Speaker 1: no message saying this might be offensive. But a documentary

1562
01:17:39,479 --> 01:17:44,120
Speaker 1: which is one journalistic covering anti fascists fighting one of

1563
01:17:44,160 --> 01:17:47,920
Speaker 1: the worst invasions we've seen in Europe is suddenly deemed

1564
01:17:48,640 --> 01:17:51,320
Speaker 1: inappropriate and his age restricted on YouTube. Tell me what's

1565
01:17:51,320 --> 01:17:53,560
Speaker 1: going on there that doesn't seem right to me. So

1566
01:17:53,760 --> 01:17:55,840
Speaker 1: basically you tube by doing that as saying we're actually

1567
01:17:55,920 --> 01:17:59,920
Speaker 1: happy to make money off of people that exploit under

1568
01:18:00,080 --> 01:18:03,439
Speaker 1: rage Ukrainian refugees, but we're not happy for people showing

1569
01:18:03,439 --> 01:18:05,600
Speaker 1: the world a different side to the war. That to

1570
01:18:05,720 --> 01:18:08,080
Speaker 1: me is madness, Like it doesn't make any sense to me,

1571
01:18:08,200 --> 01:18:10,559
Speaker 1: you know, And it's nothing but soft censorship. Some people

1572
01:18:10,560 --> 01:18:12,720
Speaker 1: are tell him it's not it's not censorship. Of course,

1573
01:18:12,760 --> 01:18:15,479
Speaker 1: it is censorship. This is the way the world works now, Yeah,

1574
01:18:15,560 --> 01:18:17,840
Speaker 1: because I mean a huge chunk of the success or

1575
01:18:17,880 --> 01:18:20,840
Speaker 1: the visibility of anything that you're putting on YouTube is

1576
01:18:20,920 --> 01:18:23,479
Speaker 1: whether or not the algorithm is going to like suggest

1577
01:18:23,560 --> 01:18:26,120
Speaker 1: it to people, even people who have watched you or

1578
01:18:26,160 --> 01:18:28,519
Speaker 1: other like that. Not even talking about like suggesting it

1579
01:18:28,560 --> 01:18:30,560
Speaker 1: to somebody who's never heard of popular front, but like

1580
01:18:31,000 --> 01:18:33,439
Speaker 1: people who have watched multiple things that you've done and

1581
01:18:33,560 --> 01:18:36,719
Speaker 1: are just on YouTube. The thing that would make sense

1582
01:18:36,920 --> 01:18:38,400
Speaker 1: is for when you put out a new thing them

1583
01:18:38,439 --> 01:18:39,880
Speaker 1: to get like YouTube to be like, hey, we know

1584
01:18:39,960 --> 01:18:41,800
Speaker 1: you've watched the ship check out this, but that's not

1585
01:18:41,880 --> 01:18:43,760
Speaker 1: going to happen for a lot of folks because of

1586
01:18:43,800 --> 01:18:47,320
Speaker 1: this kind of thing, which is yeah fucked up, Yeah

1587
01:18:47,680 --> 01:18:50,240
Speaker 1: yeah right. And it's like it's not just me that

1588
01:18:50,360 --> 01:18:52,639
Speaker 1: like I mean, it's other people it's happening as well.

1589
01:18:53,520 --> 01:18:55,559
Speaker 1: And basically what it is is if we wanted somebody

1590
01:18:55,600 --> 01:18:58,400
Speaker 1: the doc somehow be allowed to be monetized or not

1591
01:18:58,439 --> 01:19:00,439
Speaker 1: even monitored. I don't even want the monetizes the whole

1592
01:19:00,479 --> 01:19:04,160
Speaker 1: channel is demonetized. I just want it to not be restricted,

1593
01:19:04,280 --> 01:19:07,040
Speaker 1: because that is an algorithm torpedo. And you know, it's

1594
01:19:07,040 --> 01:19:09,960
Speaker 1: like I would have to rec the whole documentary essentially

1595
01:19:10,040 --> 01:19:13,040
Speaker 1: sense of myself, my own journalism, make you excuse me,

1596
01:19:13,360 --> 01:19:16,400
Speaker 1: make the integrity of the doc weaker, just to be

1597
01:19:16,560 --> 01:19:19,040
Speaker 1: able people to see it like this is war, this

1598
01:19:19,240 --> 01:19:22,000
Speaker 1: is real life. I just it's just really depressing, you know,

1599
01:19:22,200 --> 01:19:25,360
Speaker 1: And this is something I mean, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook have

1600
01:19:25,439 --> 01:19:27,680
Speaker 1: all been guilty of degrees of this, but there's this

1601
01:19:28,360 --> 01:19:31,599
Speaker 1: of all other things that don't that that are allowed

1602
01:19:31,640 --> 01:19:34,720
Speaker 1: to spread unchecked on those platforms, they have this consistent

1603
01:19:35,720 --> 01:19:38,800
Speaker 1: maybe because it's it's easier to algorithmically go after But this,

1604
01:19:39,040 --> 01:19:43,439
Speaker 1: this consistent pattern of going after war journalism, um, and

1605
01:19:43,600 --> 01:19:46,080
Speaker 1: like your you know, what's happening to your documentary is

1606
01:19:46,160 --> 01:19:48,719
Speaker 1: a piece of this, But like the much scarier pieces,

1607
01:19:48,840 --> 01:19:51,880
Speaker 1: a tremendous amount of documentation of war crimes in places

1608
01:19:51,960 --> 01:19:55,800
Speaker 1: like Syria have been deleted um kind of automatically over

1609
01:19:55,880 --> 01:19:58,559
Speaker 1: the years, which means that like again, evidence of crimes

1610
01:19:58,600 --> 01:20:01,240
Speaker 1: against humanity has been lost forever because of these kind

1611
01:20:01,320 --> 01:20:05,600
Speaker 1: of like purges of of war content that um, I

1612
01:20:05,680 --> 01:20:08,720
Speaker 1: don't think are actually protecting anybody from anything, but are

1613
01:20:08,840 --> 01:20:14,160
Speaker 1: are perhaps even making things worse. Yeah, of course, and

1614
01:20:14,240 --> 01:20:19,000
Speaker 1: it and it allows um, look Russian propaganda or whatever like,

1615
01:20:19,400 --> 01:20:20,960
Speaker 1: people are going to seek that out and they're going

1616
01:20:21,000 --> 01:20:24,200
Speaker 1: to digest it whatever way they can. So then surely

1617
01:20:24,240 --> 01:20:26,880
Speaker 1: you should say, okay, take the brakes off. Let's you

1618
01:20:26,960 --> 01:20:28,680
Speaker 1: know if you care, which I mean YouTube is a

1619
01:20:28,760 --> 01:20:31,240
Speaker 1: media platform. You would think that they would say, okay, well,

1620
01:20:31,600 --> 01:20:34,280
Speaker 1: this is kind of our duty to balance it out,

1621
01:20:34,360 --> 01:20:37,080
Speaker 1: to allow all the free information. I'm not even saying,

1622
01:20:37,439 --> 01:20:40,000
Speaker 1: oh yeah, through all Russian propaganda. I think people have

1623
01:20:40,080 --> 01:20:42,040
Speaker 1: a choice to see whatever they want to see, even

1624
01:20:42,080 --> 01:20:44,720
Speaker 1: if it is completely ridiculous but the fact that they're

1625
01:20:44,920 --> 01:20:48,000
Speaker 1: they're censoring the stuff that you you would think is

1626
01:20:48,080 --> 01:20:51,880
Speaker 1: okay to see because for for for I know, you

1627
01:20:51,920 --> 01:20:53,720
Speaker 1: know our content that you won't find a lie in

1628
01:20:53,800 --> 01:20:56,439
Speaker 1: that documentary. You know, we're very honest, very frank with

1629
01:20:56,520 --> 01:20:59,840
Speaker 1: the situation. We're not white washing fascism in Ukraine. Um.

1630
01:21:00,000 --> 01:21:02,600
Speaker 1: And we're certainly not putting out Russian propaganda. We're just

1631
01:21:02,680 --> 01:21:05,880
Speaker 1: telling an interesting journalistic story. So you would think as

1632
01:21:05,920 --> 01:21:08,120
Speaker 1: a media platform that would be like yeah, right up

1633
01:21:08,120 --> 01:21:10,000
Speaker 1: there street, but it's not really a media platform is

1634
01:21:10,000 --> 01:21:12,360
Speaker 1: a money making platform, and you know, they just they

1635
01:21:12,479 --> 01:21:15,920
Speaker 1: just survived for adverts yep. Um. And I think that

1636
01:21:16,360 --> 01:21:19,080
Speaker 1: is kind of where we're gonna We're gonna leave off

1637
01:21:19,160 --> 01:21:20,559
Speaker 1: for the day unless you have Do you have anything

1638
01:21:20,600 --> 01:21:23,760
Speaker 1: else you wanted to get into on your documentary, Jake, no, man,

1639
01:21:23,840 --> 01:21:25,360
Speaker 1: I just I guess the last thing I would say

1640
01:21:25,400 --> 01:21:28,000
Speaker 1: is I want people to kind of know that there

1641
01:21:28,040 --> 01:21:31,760
Speaker 1: are many different factions out there. This isn't you know.

1642
01:21:31,920 --> 01:21:33,840
Speaker 1: I saw some comment being like, oh, you found the

1643
01:21:33,880 --> 01:21:37,160
Speaker 1: only fascists and anti fascists in Ukraine. It's like, no,

1644
01:21:37,400 --> 01:21:40,200
Speaker 1: there's there's literally I've been documenting them. There's thousands there's

1645
01:21:40,240 --> 01:21:43,519
Speaker 1: so many, you know, and not just like oh, anti fascists, yeah,

1646
01:21:43,560 --> 01:21:46,080
Speaker 1: we this is what we believe, like people forming units.

1647
01:21:46,120 --> 01:21:50,960
Speaker 1: There's a whole pipeline of um anti authoritarian activists there.

1648
01:21:51,080 --> 01:21:55,560
Speaker 1: There's loads and generally like Ukrainians um happy. You know,

1649
01:21:55,640 --> 01:21:57,000
Speaker 1: they'll they'll take that out they can get. It's not

1650
01:21:57,040 --> 01:21:59,840
Speaker 1: like Ukrainians are like god damn those anti fascists. Not

1651
01:22:00,400 --> 01:22:01,760
Speaker 1: they love them. They love them the same way they

1652
01:22:01,800 --> 01:22:04,240
Speaker 1: love anybody that's defending the country. You know. It's it's

1653
01:22:04,280 --> 01:22:06,479
Speaker 1: just normal and I think people should really, you know,

1654
01:22:06,680 --> 01:22:08,240
Speaker 1: if they want to watch our doctor as well, like

1655
01:22:08,360 --> 01:22:10,639
Speaker 1: if they can share it, that would be great because

1656
01:22:11,040 --> 01:22:13,360
Speaker 1: it's just very it's a struggle to get people to

1657
01:22:13,360 --> 01:22:16,080
Speaker 1: watch it now because of because if it's been torpedo

1658
01:22:16,200 --> 01:22:18,280
Speaker 1: on the algorithm. So if they go to YouTube dot

1659
01:22:18,320 --> 01:22:21,479
Speaker 1: com slash popular Front, they'll find it's the first dot there.

1660
01:22:21,520 --> 01:22:23,960
Speaker 1: But yeah, people can share it. I'll be great, all right,

1661
01:22:24,080 --> 01:22:27,200
Speaker 1: We'll check it out again. The title is Ukraine's anti

1662
01:22:27,240 --> 01:22:30,719
Speaker 1: fascist football hooligans fighting the Russian Invasion on the Popular

1663
01:22:30,760 --> 01:22:33,599
Speaker 1: Front YouTube channel. We're also going to have a link

1664
01:22:33,680 --> 01:22:35,960
Speaker 1: in the bio. If you are someone who doesn't like

1665
01:22:36,240 --> 01:22:39,920
Speaker 1: the type things. Yeah, thank you, Jake. All right, everybody,

1666
01:22:40,120 --> 01:22:57,400
Speaker 1: that's the episode. Welcome to Tack. It happen here, a

1667
01:22:57,520 --> 01:23:01,920
Speaker 1: show that is currently taking lace in the death abortion

1668
01:23:02,080 --> 01:23:07,800
Speaker 1: rights in the US. And yeah, it's not good. Um

1669
01:23:08,680 --> 01:23:12,439
Speaker 1: with me to talk about this is sharene Is Sophie,

1670
01:23:13,280 --> 01:23:19,080
Speaker 1: is Garrison, and is Robert Evans And okay, So what

1671
01:23:19,240 --> 01:23:21,200
Speaker 1: one of one of the things that's been happening in

1672
01:23:21,320 --> 01:23:25,559
Speaker 1: the immediate wake of the Supreme Court decision that has

1673
01:23:25,800 --> 01:23:28,519
Speaker 1: destroyed Review Wade is there's been a lot of discussion

1674
01:23:28,520 --> 01:23:31,240
Speaker 1: about the abortion rights movement in Mexico. And by discussion,

1675
01:23:31,360 --> 01:23:34,719
Speaker 1: I mean in sort of classical American fashion. People saw

1676
01:23:34,880 --> 01:23:38,560
Speaker 1: exactly one meme and reposted it and that's now the

1677
01:23:38,720 --> 01:23:42,519
Speaker 1: sum of like all American knowledge about the abortion struggle

1678
01:23:42,560 --> 01:23:45,600
Speaker 1: in Mexico. So to try to get a deeper understanding

1679
01:23:45,720 --> 01:23:48,000
Speaker 1: of what's been going on in Mexico and how the

1680
01:23:48,040 --> 01:23:52,160
Speaker 1: struggle for abortion was one there, we're talking to Erica Yamada,

1681
01:23:52,240 --> 01:23:54,800
Speaker 1: who's a feminist and human rights activist born and raised

1682
01:23:54,840 --> 01:23:58,679
Speaker 1: in Mexico. Erica, thank you so much for joining us. Yeah,

1683
01:23:58,760 --> 01:24:02,800
Speaker 1: thank you, and you so much. Chris sharing so figures

1684
01:24:02,880 --> 01:24:06,560
Speaker 1: and and Robert I'm so honored and excited to be

1685
01:24:06,760 --> 01:24:10,280
Speaker 1: here and very grateful to be considered to share about

1686
01:24:10,360 --> 01:24:15,719
Speaker 1: the struggle for abortion rights in Mexico. So before starting

1687
01:24:15,840 --> 01:24:18,519
Speaker 1: this discussion, I would like to share a little bit

1688
01:24:18,600 --> 01:24:22,360
Speaker 1: about myself and the organization I work in to have

1689
01:24:22,880 --> 01:24:26,920
Speaker 1: some background about the experiences and data I will be

1690
01:24:27,120 --> 01:24:32,200
Speaker 1: communicating in this space. UM I have been involved in

1691
01:24:32,439 --> 01:24:36,479
Speaker 1: many agendas for girls and women's rights for approximately eight

1692
01:24:36,680 --> 01:24:40,679
Speaker 1: years now. I am currently part of the Woman Delivered

1693
01:24:40,760 --> 01:24:43,559
Speaker 1: twenty twenty class and I also work in the non

1694
01:24:43,640 --> 01:24:50,280
Speaker 1: governmental organization Gender Quality, Citizenship, Work and Family that has

1695
01:24:50,360 --> 01:24:54,880
Speaker 1: over twenty five years of experience working for sexual and

1696
01:24:55,120 --> 01:24:59,960
Speaker 1: productive rights in Mexico, particularly for the access to leave

1697
01:25:00,000 --> 01:25:05,840
Speaker 1: goal and safe abortion. Our organization promotes and advocate for

1698
01:25:05,960 --> 01:25:12,960
Speaker 1: the sexual and reproductive health and right of use through

1699
01:25:13,120 --> 01:25:15,720
Speaker 1: that They Said. That They Said is the network for

1700
01:25:15,920 --> 01:25:19,960
Speaker 1: sexual and reproductive rights in Mexico that has presence in

1701
01:25:20,120 --> 01:25:25,880
Speaker 1: tolve states and we focus mainly on marginalized communities. We

1702
01:25:26,000 --> 01:25:32,120
Speaker 1: support children, use women and advocate for change at local, regional,

1703
01:25:32,400 --> 01:25:37,960
Speaker 1: and national level and their access is contributing to the

1704
01:25:38,080 --> 01:25:43,839
Speaker 1: criminalize abortion, guarenting access to to health services and generate

1705
01:25:44,800 --> 01:25:49,880
Speaker 1: a favorable public opinion about women's right to decide. We

1706
01:25:50,000 --> 01:25:54,000
Speaker 1: are also part of the National Court Choice Alliance in

1707
01:25:54,160 --> 01:26:00,880
Speaker 1: Mexico and effort of bi organizations General Equality, the Population

1708
01:26:01,040 --> 01:26:06,679
Speaker 1: Council EPAS Central America, Catholics for the Right to Decide

1709
01:26:07,080 --> 01:26:13,040
Speaker 1: and heat It, each with different expertise regarding abortion. Together

1710
01:26:13,479 --> 01:26:18,280
Speaker 1: we have worked on comprehensive strategies that include the legal,

1711
01:26:18,560 --> 01:26:28,360
Speaker 1: the social, religious, ethical and investigation aspects of abortion and well,

1712
01:26:29,200 --> 01:26:32,560
Speaker 1: I would like to start up like sharing some of

1713
01:26:32,680 --> 01:26:37,560
Speaker 1: the context and the legal situation of abortion in Mexico

1714
01:26:37,720 --> 01:26:44,240
Speaker 1: if it's okay or or in our country, Voluntary abortion

1715
01:26:44,960 --> 01:26:50,599
Speaker 1: UH during the twelve weeks of pregnancy is legalized only

1716
01:26:50,920 --> 01:26:55,800
Speaker 1: in certain states. Mexico City, the capital, was the only

1717
01:26:55,920 --> 01:26:59,840
Speaker 1: state in the whole country that they criminalized abortion into

1718
01:27:00,000 --> 01:27:04,880
Speaker 1: two thousand seven. Twelve years later, in two thousand nineteen,

1719
01:27:05,280 --> 01:27:09,400
Speaker 1: the state of of Wahaca became the second state twenty

1720
01:27:09,439 --> 01:27:15,240
Speaker 1: sure access to this health service. Afterwards, two thousand twenty

1721
01:27:15,320 --> 01:27:20,559
Speaker 1: one was historic. It was a very very historic year.

1722
01:27:20,600 --> 01:27:27,640
Speaker 1: It was for states Evaluo Vera, Cruz Bacca, California and

1723
01:27:27,880 --> 01:27:33,240
Speaker 1: Polyma also the criminalized abortion. Then this year two thousand

1724
01:27:33,360 --> 01:27:38,000
Speaker 1: twenty two, three other states have been added to this

1725
01:27:38,240 --> 01:27:45,320
Speaker 1: list Sinaloa, Guerrero and California. This means nine out of

1726
01:27:45,479 --> 01:27:50,200
Speaker 1: thirty two states have the criminalized abortion. In the other

1727
01:27:50,840 --> 01:27:55,559
Speaker 1: states of the Mexican Republic, abortion is only allowed under

1728
01:27:55,800 --> 01:28:01,800
Speaker 1: certain grounds established by the law of each entity. For example,

1729
01:28:02,040 --> 01:28:06,240
Speaker 1: if it was a companeous abortion, if the pregnancy was

1730
01:28:06,360 --> 01:28:11,479
Speaker 1: due to non consensual insemination, if the woman's life is

1731
01:28:11,560 --> 01:28:17,800
Speaker 1: in danger of death, if the product pas serious genetic alterations,

1732
01:28:18,800 --> 01:28:24,760
Speaker 1: if the pregnancy causes health effects, among other reasons. It

1733
01:28:25,240 --> 01:28:30,519
Speaker 1: depends on each Plano code of each state. And I

1734
01:28:30,600 --> 01:28:34,320
Speaker 1: also must add that pregnancy due to right is the

1735
01:28:34,520 --> 01:28:40,120
Speaker 1: only indication that permits legal abortion in all states. And

1736
01:28:40,360 --> 01:28:44,320
Speaker 1: now coming back to what Chris said that there was

1737
01:28:44,439 --> 01:28:49,040
Speaker 1: like a meme. I think, uh, you refer to the

1738
01:28:49,280 --> 01:28:54,960
Speaker 1: name of the public protests. Yeah, yeah, yeah, the black

1739
01:28:55,040 --> 01:29:00,080
Speaker 1: clad female protesters attacking is it? I couldn't tell. I

1740
01:29:00,120 --> 01:29:02,080
Speaker 1: don't recall it's a city hall or a police station

1741
01:29:02,200 --> 01:29:07,040
Speaker 1: or something. I I have also seen some of these

1742
01:29:07,120 --> 01:29:12,040
Speaker 1: media reports that that they say that we achieve legal

1743
01:29:12,160 --> 01:29:17,600
Speaker 1: abortion thanks to these radical public demonstrations, and well, it

1744
01:29:17,800 --> 01:29:22,720
Speaker 1: is undeniable that among the most significant achievements is the

1745
01:29:22,920 --> 01:29:28,200
Speaker 1: pro mobilization of feminists and women to eradicate violence and

1746
01:29:28,520 --> 01:29:35,520
Speaker 1: learn justice Mexico. Mexico has demonstrated the world the revolutionary

1747
01:29:35,640 --> 01:29:39,760
Speaker 1: progress with the mass feminist protests and this image is

1748
01:29:40,000 --> 01:29:44,959
Speaker 1: from two thousand nineteen. It was a huge feminist protest

1749
01:29:45,520 --> 01:29:50,040
Speaker 1: that are condemned violence against women, especially sexual and feminist

1750
01:29:50,080 --> 01:29:55,519
Speaker 1: side violence, police brutality, and the intunity that permeates the

1751
01:29:55,640 --> 01:30:00,799
Speaker 1: governmental system. We received a lot of internet national media

1752
01:30:00,800 --> 01:30:04,800
Speaker 1: attention and it has been one of the like the

1753
01:30:04,920 --> 01:30:10,720
Speaker 1: recent highlights of the feminist movement in our country. But

1754
01:30:11,240 --> 01:30:16,720
Speaker 1: like the struggle for abortion entails so much more, and

1755
01:30:17,200 --> 01:30:21,120
Speaker 1: yes it did have some influence. For example, in two

1756
01:30:21,240 --> 01:30:26,559
Speaker 1: thousand twenty, feminists in two states, Quintana and Puebla took

1757
01:30:26,720 --> 01:30:31,240
Speaker 1: their local congresses and demanded the discussion of abortion initiatives,

1758
01:30:32,000 --> 01:30:36,320
Speaker 1: and they have put this agenda on the table. It

1759
01:30:36,560 --> 01:30:41,880
Speaker 1: is worth mentioning that the struggle for abortion that it

1760
01:30:42,080 --> 01:30:48,320
Speaker 1: goes back so many years. Feminists have been fighting for

1761
01:30:48,439 --> 01:30:53,160
Speaker 1: reproductive rights, including the access to legal abortion for that

1762
01:30:53,400 --> 01:30:59,040
Speaker 1: it's now the progress regarding this struggle has unfolded historically

1763
01:30:59,360 --> 01:31:04,479
Speaker 1: during the recent years. For many other reasons, One thing

1764
01:31:04,560 --> 01:31:06,880
Speaker 1: I want to go back to a little bit to

1765
01:31:07,000 --> 01:31:11,000
Speaker 1: talk about is you were talking about the protests being

1766
01:31:11,080 --> 01:31:15,439
Speaker 1: pro abortion protests but also talking about antifemicide and anti

1767
01:31:16,640 --> 01:31:18,400
Speaker 1: violent stuff, and I was wondering if you could talk

1768
01:31:18,400 --> 01:31:22,240
Speaker 1: about the anti femicide it campaigns too, because that's been

1769
01:31:22,280 --> 01:31:25,080
Speaker 1: a really big part of this that gets basically no

1770
01:31:25,240 --> 01:31:30,960
Speaker 1: coverage in the US. Well, in Mexico, eleven women are

1771
01:31:31,080 --> 01:31:37,600
Speaker 1: murdered every day. We have a huge femicide problem that

1772
01:31:37,760 --> 01:31:43,160
Speaker 1: has been silenced by the government, even by the president

1773
01:31:43,280 --> 01:31:49,920
Speaker 1: who minimizes this horrible situation. So in two thousand nineteen

1774
01:31:50,479 --> 01:31:58,280
Speaker 1: there was a UH emblematic case where police officers rape

1775
01:31:58,439 --> 01:32:04,320
Speaker 1: and tortured a row and that's how this protest UH

1776
01:32:04,840 --> 01:32:10,200
Speaker 1: started and since all the two thousand nineteen, like most

1777
01:32:11,040 --> 01:32:20,720
Speaker 1: feminist protests, have been regarding the violence against women. But UH,

1778
01:32:21,960 --> 01:32:26,200
Speaker 1: I would also like to add about the struggle for abortion.

1779
01:32:27,360 --> 01:32:31,280
Speaker 1: I think that in the global cells the mare, the

1780
01:32:31,439 --> 01:32:38,680
Speaker 1: green type it played like the most fundamental roles. UH.

1781
01:32:38,960 --> 01:32:42,280
Speaker 1: This movement, which came from Argentina, is one of the

1782
01:32:42,400 --> 01:32:48,120
Speaker 1: main successes that strengthened the struggle for abortion rights and

1783
01:32:48,240 --> 01:32:53,599
Speaker 1: even the feminist movement in Mexico. It expanded in many

1784
01:32:53,720 --> 01:32:58,200
Speaker 1: countries including Mexico. Here we have a national Green Type

1785
01:32:58,320 --> 01:33:01,759
Speaker 1: and many local Green type in all of our space,

1786
01:33:02,840 --> 01:33:07,240
Speaker 1: and these collectives have played a large role demanding social

1787
01:33:07,360 --> 01:33:13,400
Speaker 1: and legal thecuminalization of abortion across the country. And there

1788
01:33:13,560 --> 01:33:20,400
Speaker 1: is also an increase of networks that provides self managed

1789
01:33:20,479 --> 01:33:26,719
Speaker 1: abortion information and accompaniment services, which have contributed to fighting

1790
01:33:26,800 --> 01:33:31,479
Speaker 1: the stigma that still surrounds abortion. And the Green Tide

1791
01:33:31,640 --> 01:33:36,360
Speaker 1: and the feminist movement, it's it has become like how

1792
01:33:36,439 --> 01:33:41,840
Speaker 1: do you say it's been merged merg and like feminist

1793
01:33:41,960 --> 01:33:46,639
Speaker 1: movements and the Green Tide fight for legal and safe abortion,

1794
01:33:46,720 --> 01:33:51,200
Speaker 1: but also to radicate the violence against girls and women. Yeah,

1795
01:33:51,280 --> 01:33:55,400
Speaker 1: that makes that makes sense. And about the Green Tide,

1796
01:33:55,880 --> 01:33:59,200
Speaker 1: I have two questions about the Green Tide. One is

1797
01:34:00,160 --> 01:34:03,280
Speaker 1: what kinds of tactics have Green Tide groups been doing?

1798
01:34:03,520 --> 01:34:08,720
Speaker 1: And also how how linked have the international movement has been?

1799
01:34:08,880 --> 01:34:13,240
Speaker 1: Like how how close how closely have these organization has

1800
01:34:13,280 --> 01:34:19,760
Speaker 1: been communicating across and working together across the different countries? Okay, uh?

1801
01:34:20,080 --> 01:34:24,960
Speaker 1: Since the Green Tide came from Argentina like the most,

1802
01:34:26,960 --> 01:34:31,759
Speaker 1: how do you say the the communication comes from regional

1803
01:34:31,920 --> 01:34:36,479
Speaker 1: countries in Latin America and Mexico has been learning from

1804
01:34:36,720 --> 01:34:41,240
Speaker 1: these Latin American countries the experiences we have seen the

1805
01:34:41,439 --> 01:34:46,920
Speaker 1: feminist movements, the protests also more in the South and

1806
01:34:47,720 --> 01:34:54,080
Speaker 1: the the green handkerchief has this very very powerful symbol

1807
01:34:54,560 --> 01:34:58,800
Speaker 1: of legal and safe abortion, and these have also contributed

1808
01:34:59,000 --> 01:35:03,920
Speaker 1: to the social be communalization of abortion. And wearing the

1809
01:35:04,800 --> 01:35:11,400
Speaker 1: green handkerchiefs and in the protest also means demanding this

1810
01:35:13,200 --> 01:35:18,599
Speaker 1: health service. And one of our tactics is of course

1811
01:35:19,240 --> 01:35:25,840
Speaker 1: pressuring the government. In Mexico. Political will, primarily from the

1812
01:35:26,560 --> 01:35:32,840
Speaker 1: left leaning ruling party, has been fundamental for for the becommunalization.

1813
01:35:34,360 --> 01:35:37,439
Speaker 1: With the new government that I wade in two thousand

1814
01:35:37,560 --> 01:35:47,080
Speaker 1: eighteen headed by Andreo, we have more allies and progressive legislators.

1815
01:35:47,800 --> 01:35:53,519
Speaker 1: So due to the majority uh that this political party

1816
01:35:53,640 --> 01:35:59,559
Speaker 1: has in many local converses, the feminists of each state

1817
01:35:59,760 --> 01:36:04,080
Speaker 1: have been able to pressure and work with these legislators

1818
01:36:04,520 --> 01:36:10,719
Speaker 1: and keep pushing this agenda. That's awesome. I think something

1819
01:36:10,760 --> 01:36:13,080
Speaker 1: that I'm still stuck on is that at the very

1820
01:36:13,200 --> 01:36:18,280
Speaker 1: least all the states agree that abortion is okay if

1821
01:36:18,280 --> 01:36:20,679
Speaker 1: it happened from from rape. Is that what you said earlier?

1822
01:36:20,760 --> 01:36:25,080
Speaker 1: Like that's the one we we have a federal lot.

1823
01:36:25,560 --> 01:36:31,640
Speaker 1: It's the zero forty six met official Mexican norm that

1824
01:36:32,080 --> 01:36:36,519
Speaker 1: states that abortion is legal if the pregnancy is due

1825
01:36:36,600 --> 01:36:41,960
Speaker 1: to rape, and all the states, all the public officials

1826
01:36:42,040 --> 01:36:47,960
Speaker 1: have this obligation to to ensure that this that this happens.

1827
01:36:48,040 --> 01:36:54,000
Speaker 1: But sometimes, um, like we we have so many prejudices

1828
01:36:54,320 --> 01:37:00,320
Speaker 1: that sometimes even doctors don't respect the law. But by

1829
01:37:00,439 --> 01:37:03,559
Speaker 1: not it should be legal. And it's not that they

1830
01:37:03,600 --> 01:37:08,519
Speaker 1: all agree, it's the it's the one. Yeah, it's just so,

1831
01:37:08,960 --> 01:37:12,160
Speaker 1: I mean, it's definitely has its flaws and people with

1832
01:37:12,200 --> 01:37:17,160
Speaker 1: their own biases. But like here, usually the rapists will

1833
01:37:17,160 --> 01:37:19,800
Speaker 1: have more rights and protection than the person that got raped.

1834
01:37:19,880 --> 01:37:21,840
Speaker 1: Like there are the family is allowed to sue the

1835
01:37:21,920 --> 01:37:25,839
Speaker 1: person that got an abortion, for example. It's it's insane,

1836
01:37:26,080 --> 01:37:29,320
Speaker 1: but so for then here, a lot of it, a

1837
01:37:29,400 --> 01:37:32,519
Speaker 1: lot of the biggotry comes from like Christianity and religion.

1838
01:37:32,640 --> 01:37:34,479
Speaker 1: Is it the same, like is that the baseline for

1839
01:37:35,040 --> 01:37:41,520
Speaker 1: the opposition there too? Yes, because Mexico is a predominantly

1840
01:37:41,760 --> 01:37:47,160
Speaker 1: Catholic country and abortion and feels many controversies due to

1841
01:37:47,320 --> 01:37:51,080
Speaker 1: the different positions that are come from this. Religious stances

1842
01:37:51,200 --> 01:37:56,040
Speaker 1: is stances that ignore and deny the access to this

1843
01:37:56,240 --> 01:38:01,440
Speaker 1: service and deny it's a human rights issue. And religious

1844
01:38:01,880 --> 01:38:06,519
Speaker 1: anti rights groups or how how do you say anti

1845
01:38:06,800 --> 01:38:11,960
Speaker 1: choice groups have a powerful presence and are actively hindering

1846
01:38:12,280 --> 01:38:17,920
Speaker 1: law proposals regarding this topic. The prejudices and stigma are

1847
01:38:18,040 --> 01:38:25,400
Speaker 1: present even amongst healthcare providers and sometimes uh the religious people.

1848
01:38:26,080 --> 01:38:31,840
Speaker 1: They pressure these healthcare providers, the legislators. For example, every

1849
01:38:31,960 --> 01:38:36,040
Speaker 1: time there is a line on local congress. There are

1850
01:38:36,280 --> 01:38:42,599
Speaker 1: so many religious groups outside the Congress. They are how

1851
01:38:42,680 --> 01:38:48,200
Speaker 1: do you say, like bothering the legislators. They even get

1852
01:38:48,280 --> 01:38:54,799
Speaker 1: their personal numbers and they are harassing them. Yes, harassing

1853
01:38:55,000 --> 01:39:00,080
Speaker 1: is the work. They're harassing them. So yes, they have

1854
01:39:00,600 --> 01:39:04,280
Speaker 1: a lot of power, a lot of money, and these

1855
01:39:04,400 --> 01:39:11,120
Speaker 1: effects even the states where abortion is legal, because as

1856
01:39:11,160 --> 01:39:17,280
Speaker 1: I said before, sometimes doctors denied it even if it's

1857
01:39:17,360 --> 01:39:24,160
Speaker 1: requested under the legal indications. So yes, it's a problem.

1858
01:39:25,880 --> 01:39:30,000
Speaker 1: I'm curious what you see as kind of the value

1859
01:39:30,080 --> 01:39:33,320
Speaker 1: of the street actions that were carried out as opposed

1860
01:39:33,360 --> 01:39:37,240
Speaker 1: to um kind of the the actual organization on the

1861
01:39:37,360 --> 01:39:40,120
Speaker 1: legislative side of things, Like what what degree do you

1862
01:39:40,200 --> 01:39:44,479
Speaker 1: think both contributed to, you know, the successes that you

1863
01:39:44,479 --> 01:39:50,440
Speaker 1: all have seen. I think both were very very important

1864
01:39:50,520 --> 01:39:58,800
Speaker 1: to the recent successes. The public demonstrations help the feminist

1865
01:39:59,080 --> 01:40:07,200
Speaker 1: movements strengthened. Like it is like yes, this recent protests

1866
01:40:07,280 --> 01:40:11,280
Speaker 1: have been the what do you say? It has been

1867
01:40:11,520 --> 01:40:15,519
Speaker 1: where the most women have gone out to the streets,

1868
01:40:15,840 --> 01:40:19,799
Speaker 1: taken the streets, and it has helped because the government

1869
01:40:19,920 --> 01:40:25,360
Speaker 1: has responded to some of our request. But also it

1870
01:40:25,560 --> 01:40:33,680
Speaker 1: is extremely important too to talk about the organization. And also, Uh,

1871
01:40:34,000 --> 01:40:37,320
Speaker 1: something I didn't mention and that I would like to

1872
01:40:37,400 --> 01:40:42,320
Speaker 1: emphasize is that in two thousand twenty one, the Supreme

1873
01:40:42,400 --> 01:40:47,320
Speaker 1: Court of Justice in Mexico ruled favorably in four abortion

1874
01:40:47,400 --> 01:40:53,400
Speaker 1: related cases, and this provided us with with progressive jurisprudence

1875
01:40:54,040 --> 01:40:59,880
Speaker 1: and legal interpretations in favor of recognizing an increasing abortion right.

1876
01:41:00,640 --> 01:41:05,639
Speaker 1: So this has how do you say, this has served

1877
01:41:05,800 --> 01:41:13,400
Speaker 1: our movement and all the argumentation to push the decriminalizations.

1878
01:41:14,520 --> 01:41:18,799
Speaker 1: And well, about the four cases. In the first case,

1879
01:41:19,240 --> 01:41:26,040
Speaker 1: the Supreme Court declared that limitations to access legal abortion

1880
01:41:26,320 --> 01:41:30,760
Speaker 1: after it must be removed. In the second case, it

1881
01:41:30,920 --> 01:41:40,120
Speaker 1: declared that the absolute criminalization of abortion with consent is unconstitutional. Uh.

1882
01:41:41,520 --> 01:41:47,240
Speaker 1: And in the third case is it declared that the

1883
01:41:47,479 --> 01:41:52,080
Speaker 1: protection of life from the moment of conception is unconstitutional.

1884
01:41:53,520 --> 01:41:58,520
Speaker 1: And in the fourth case, the court ruled that legislative

1885
01:41:58,560 --> 01:42:04,200
Speaker 1: reforms broadening the boundaries of conscientiens objection in that federal

1886
01:42:04,320 --> 01:42:10,160
Speaker 1: health law are unconstitutional. And the Supreme Court is the

1887
01:42:10,640 --> 01:42:16,840
Speaker 1: highest court of justice in Mexico and all judges should

1888
01:42:16,920 --> 01:42:22,920
Speaker 1: respect what they established. And well, unfortunately it doesn't happen

1889
01:42:23,240 --> 01:42:28,360
Speaker 1: in all states. And what it is like the most

1890
01:42:28,439 --> 01:42:32,560
Speaker 1: important president we we have right now, and it is

1891
01:42:32,760 --> 01:42:40,200
Speaker 1: fundamental for our argumentation in local congresses. I have has

1892
01:42:40,240 --> 01:42:42,439
Speaker 1: the national government done anything at all to try to

1893
01:42:42,520 --> 01:42:47,080
Speaker 1: force the states who are like not following the rulings too,

1894
01:42:48,120 --> 01:42:54,519
Speaker 1: like except the rulings. No, because our president uh he

1895
01:42:56,080 --> 01:43:00,920
Speaker 1: he is very neutral in this topic, and he has

1896
01:43:02,120 --> 01:43:08,160
Speaker 1: spoken against feminist movements and he thinks that any protest

1897
01:43:08,439 --> 01:43:15,200
Speaker 1: means like uh, conservators against his liberal government. So now

1898
01:43:15,520 --> 01:43:22,919
Speaker 1: we we don't have this this support from the national government,

1899
01:43:23,120 --> 01:43:27,680
Speaker 1: although assignmenttioned before. We have a lot of allies and

1900
01:43:28,080 --> 01:43:35,200
Speaker 1: in many instances that have helped to pressure state state

1901
01:43:35,439 --> 01:43:39,639
Speaker 1: public officials too to respect a law and to keep

1902
01:43:39,680 --> 01:43:48,439
Speaker 1: pushing this agenda. Is the president. I'm just curious and

1903
01:43:49,280 --> 01:43:52,439
Speaker 1: I'm ignorant that is the president? Like, well, how is

1904
01:43:52,479 --> 01:43:55,320
Speaker 1: he received by the general public, Like what people's like,

1905
01:43:55,800 --> 01:43:57,880
Speaker 1: is he neutral because he needs a coward because there

1906
01:43:57,920 --> 01:44:00,960
Speaker 1: wasn't one of the rockety votes? But what all right,

1907
01:44:01,040 --> 01:44:05,800
Speaker 1: what's the response for the public. He he still has

1908
01:44:06,200 --> 01:44:11,760
Speaker 1: a lot of support from from the majority. He he

1909
01:44:12,080 --> 01:44:17,639
Speaker 1: is one of the the first how do you stay

1910
01:44:17,760 --> 01:44:23,719
Speaker 1: progressive presidents, Although we have been very disappointed by many

1911
01:44:23,840 --> 01:44:29,519
Speaker 1: of his actions, for instance the increase of militarization and

1912
01:44:30,080 --> 01:44:36,559
Speaker 1: the communalization of feminists, of human rights activists, of journalists. However,

1913
01:44:37,400 --> 01:44:41,280
Speaker 1: it is the first time in so many years that

1914
01:44:41,720 --> 01:44:48,960
Speaker 1: a president talks about poor indigenous people that uh sends

1915
01:44:49,000 --> 01:44:53,840
Speaker 1: support to rural communities. So he still has a lot

1916
01:44:53,960 --> 01:45:01,000
Speaker 1: of support. M UM. One thing that I don't know

1917
01:45:01,080 --> 01:45:03,160
Speaker 1: how much. I don't know how much you want to

1918
01:45:03,200 --> 01:45:06,559
Speaker 1: get into it, but UM we talked to some people,

1919
01:45:08,240 --> 01:45:09,840
Speaker 1: Oh god, I don't remember how many months ago now,

1920
01:45:10,040 --> 01:45:12,080
Speaker 1: but we talked to some people a while back who

1921
01:45:12,200 --> 01:45:17,920
Speaker 1: were UM doing trans rights organizing in Mexico, and they

1922
01:45:17,960 --> 01:45:22,960
Speaker 1: were talking a lot about how UM that they were

1923
01:45:22,960 --> 01:45:31,200
Speaker 1: talking about how I guess like anti choice conservative groups

1924
01:45:31,240 --> 01:45:35,080
Speaker 1: have been using UM have been using sort of organized

1925
01:45:35,120 --> 01:45:38,479
Speaker 1: transphobic groups as a way to sort of different attention

1926
01:45:38,520 --> 01:45:41,679
Speaker 1: away from the abortion struggle, in the femicide struggle into

1927
01:45:41,960 --> 01:45:47,000
Speaker 1: stuff that doesn't like challenges that is quo And yeah,

1928
01:45:47,000 --> 01:45:48,439
Speaker 1: and I was wondering, I just wanted to talk about

1929
01:45:48,439 --> 01:45:50,880
Speaker 1: that a little bit. Yes, thank you so much for

1930
01:45:51,200 --> 01:46:00,320
Speaker 1: talking about this transphobia and in the feminist movements is horrible.

1931
01:46:00,520 --> 01:46:10,520
Speaker 1: Like the Transforbaic feminists have been getting to conservative public officials,

1932
01:46:10,840 --> 01:46:16,200
Speaker 1: they have been approaching religious groups, and they have even

1933
01:46:16,520 --> 01:46:21,800
Speaker 1: affected the abortion agenda because some of our laws include

1934
01:46:22,000 --> 01:46:27,960
Speaker 1: people with the capacity to get pregnant. So these health

1935
01:46:28,040 --> 01:46:34,680
Speaker 1: services include ah, trans meant and non binary people. But

1936
01:46:34,920 --> 01:46:40,360
Speaker 1: this Transforbaic feminists have been how do you say, obstaculizing.

1937
01:46:41,240 --> 01:46:47,519
Speaker 1: There's this struggle because of these prejudices, and it is

1938
01:46:47,880 --> 01:46:52,960
Speaker 1: very very sad. And some of are some of the

1939
01:46:53,360 --> 01:47:00,280
Speaker 1: main and most famous reference references and feminism have been

1940
01:47:00,800 --> 01:47:06,320
Speaker 1: signing this transphobic side. And yes, they are approaching to

1941
01:47:06,520 --> 01:47:11,320
Speaker 1: the ultra right, and they they have been hindering not

1942
01:47:11,520 --> 01:47:18,639
Speaker 1: only trans people's rights, but now women's rights. In Gentlemary, Yeah,

1943
01:47:18,680 --> 01:47:22,360
Speaker 1: I think was it. I'm trying to remember off top

1944
01:47:22,400 --> 01:47:23,800
Speaker 1: of my head. I think that there was there was

1945
01:47:23,840 --> 01:47:25,920
Speaker 1: a picture that was going around. That was some of

1946
01:47:26,000 --> 01:47:29,840
Speaker 1: the organizers from one of the Lake trans phobic feminist collectives.

1947
01:47:30,280 --> 01:47:37,320
Speaker 1: I like taking pictures with sleeping held around. Yeah, I

1948
01:47:37,400 --> 01:47:39,479
Speaker 1: think I think it was sleeping held around. Yeah, but

1949
01:47:42,040 --> 01:47:46,560
Speaker 1: I don't know. I haven't seen that. But there was

1950
01:47:46,960 --> 01:47:52,080
Speaker 1: a forum some weeks ago. It was a forum in

1951
01:47:52,200 --> 01:47:56,680
Speaker 1: the National Altonomous University of Mexico, and it was a

1952
01:47:57,160 --> 01:48:02,280
Speaker 1: feminist on discussion and most of the familists who are

1953
01:48:02,600 --> 01:48:06,679
Speaker 1: so so famous in all Latin America started to say

1954
01:48:06,760 --> 01:48:15,040
Speaker 1: some transpulbic points. So, yes, this anti rights movement is

1955
01:48:15,280 --> 01:48:20,320
Speaker 1: very present and in feminism. Yeah, I guess. The other

1956
01:48:20,439 --> 01:48:22,280
Speaker 1: thing on that point that I was wondering is how

1957
01:48:22,360 --> 01:48:26,479
Speaker 1: have like pro trans feminists been sort of fighting back

1958
01:48:26,520 --> 01:48:31,479
Speaker 1: against these people. Has that been happening a lot? Uh, well,

1959
01:48:31,560 --> 01:48:37,080
Speaker 1: we're trying, but it has been very, very difficult because

1960
01:48:38,000 --> 01:48:43,480
Speaker 1: literally there are transpolic people everywhere everywhere, I mean government

1961
01:48:44,320 --> 01:48:50,000
Speaker 1: and non governmental organizations and institutions, and the majority of

1962
01:48:50,120 --> 01:48:57,960
Speaker 1: the people are not well these says um socially conscious

1963
01:48:58,080 --> 01:49:05,080
Speaker 1: about about trans right, so transport with people who have

1964
01:49:05,400 --> 01:49:12,280
Speaker 1: so much more power, but uh, sometimes we we denounce

1965
01:49:12,400 --> 01:49:19,880
Speaker 1: it in social media. We reported to two international organizations

1966
01:49:20,840 --> 01:49:24,640
Speaker 1: and like, we have all the human rights narrative and

1967
01:49:24,880 --> 01:49:30,479
Speaker 1: argumentation in our favor, but it is difficult because there

1968
01:49:30,520 --> 01:49:36,599
Speaker 1: are so many trans transports everywhere. Um. We have also

1969
01:49:38,600 --> 01:49:44,759
Speaker 1: contacted international organizations to to publicly say that, for example,

1970
01:49:44,880 --> 01:49:47,640
Speaker 1: if you want to access a certain grant, you have

1971
01:49:47,840 --> 01:49:55,840
Speaker 1: to have an inclusive position. What other ways, uh, we

1972
01:49:57,280 --> 01:50:02,519
Speaker 1: like the trans movement has strengthened so much since two

1973
01:50:02,640 --> 01:50:09,400
Speaker 1: thousand nineteen because in Mexico City, um uh, the a

1974
01:50:09,600 --> 01:50:18,240
Speaker 1: lot to recognize trans children and adolescents was pushed for

1975
01:50:18,400 --> 01:50:23,439
Speaker 1: the for the first time, like via the ministative way.

1976
01:50:24,520 --> 01:50:30,160
Speaker 1: So there has been how do you say, a commission

1977
01:50:30,240 --> 01:50:38,519
Speaker 1: of of trans organizations collectives. So I think that is

1978
01:50:38,640 --> 01:50:45,200
Speaker 1: the the most noteworthy thing progress. Yeah, I guess there's

1979
01:50:45,240 --> 01:50:47,920
Speaker 1: been a lot of people like looking to the green

1980
01:50:48,000 --> 01:50:51,679
Speaker 1: tide and looking to sort of the broader Latin American

1981
01:50:51,920 --> 01:50:55,720
Speaker 1: feminist movement for sort of inspiration and also for sort

1982
01:50:55,720 --> 01:50:58,960
Speaker 1: of tactical advice. And I was wondering, what, like, what

1983
01:50:59,080 --> 01:51:01,360
Speaker 1: advice would you give people in the US who are

1984
01:51:01,439 --> 01:51:05,240
Speaker 1: coming into this fight now, and where would you send

1985
01:51:05,320 --> 01:51:08,840
Speaker 1: people to learn more stuff about it? Mm hmm. There

1986
01:51:08,960 --> 01:51:14,800
Speaker 1: some some key points I consider relevant is firstly the

1987
01:51:15,520 --> 01:51:20,920
Speaker 1: visibility of the pro choice agenda and the social ecommunalization

1988
01:51:21,080 --> 01:51:25,640
Speaker 1: of abortion. When we talk about Lettle abortion, we we

1989
01:51:25,800 --> 01:51:30,800
Speaker 1: have to emphasize a lot also on the social the communalization.

1990
01:51:31,200 --> 01:51:37,040
Speaker 1: It is very important to work on strategies to to

1991
01:51:37,240 --> 01:51:42,960
Speaker 1: reduce statema and demonstrate that abortion is a common reproductive

1992
01:51:43,200 --> 01:51:48,680
Speaker 1: event that must be approached using gender perspective and the

1993
01:51:48,920 --> 01:51:56,839
Speaker 1: human rights framework. We we encourage public dissemination of the legal,

1994
01:51:57,320 --> 01:52:02,960
Speaker 1: medical and social information with with hard sustained data from

1995
01:52:03,200 --> 01:52:09,200
Speaker 1: international organizations that position abortion as a as a human

1996
01:52:09,360 --> 01:52:14,280
Speaker 1: right and an essential health service. And related to this

1997
01:52:14,640 --> 01:52:21,439
Speaker 1: first point, the narrative and the argumentation, we have to

1998
01:52:21,600 --> 01:52:26,519
Speaker 1: focus um the access to save from legal abortion as

1999
01:52:26,600 --> 01:52:31,440
Speaker 1: a human rights issue, which means it's a governmental obligation

2000
01:52:31,680 --> 01:52:36,360
Speaker 1: to ensure access to this service. On our case Mexico

2001
01:52:36,560 --> 01:52:42,519
Speaker 1: as nationally and international commitments regarding girls and women's rights,

2002
01:52:42,600 --> 01:52:47,120
Speaker 1: and I'm pretty share the United States also has this commitments,

2003
01:52:47,360 --> 01:52:52,000
Speaker 1: so it's their obligation, it's the government's obligation to to

2004
01:52:52,200 --> 01:52:59,200
Speaker 1: ensure and also regarding their narrative, we have to work

2005
01:52:59,400 --> 01:53:05,519
Speaker 1: on naturalizing abortion and encourage people to stop using this

2006
01:53:05,720 --> 01:53:11,360
Speaker 1: word as a crime. Abortion is a human right and

2007
01:53:11,880 --> 01:53:15,960
Speaker 1: it is a reproductive event in the life of women

2008
01:53:16,200 --> 01:53:19,960
Speaker 1: and people with a capacity to get pregnant. And it's

2009
01:53:20,000 --> 01:53:25,240
Speaker 1: a reproductive event that has always existed and will always exist,

2010
01:53:25,400 --> 01:53:33,000
Speaker 1: either naturally or induced. And some of the organizations that

2011
01:53:33,320 --> 01:53:38,479
Speaker 1: I know of here that that can provide information are

2012
01:53:38,920 --> 01:53:45,439
Speaker 1: the Poor Choice Alliance, organizations, Catholics for the Right to Decide.

2013
01:53:45,560 --> 01:53:50,720
Speaker 1: They can give the religious and ethical arguments. UM my

2014
01:53:50,960 --> 01:53:57,760
Speaker 1: organization Gender Quality, we have the social argumentations. We re

2015
01:53:57,880 --> 01:54:02,320
Speaker 1: a company and work with with the girls and women.

2016
01:54:02,600 --> 01:54:05,400
Speaker 1: We we are in twelve states and we are in

2017
01:54:05,479 --> 01:54:10,720
Speaker 1: the mobilizations. We are in the state on the local congresses.

2018
01:54:11,960 --> 01:54:21,880
Speaker 1: Also Heated Heated in Spanish is utiful informers. They have

2019
01:54:22,280 --> 01:54:29,000
Speaker 1: all the legal expertise UH and they worked this reforms

2020
01:54:29,120 --> 01:54:34,760
Speaker 1: and lost with the criminalized abortion. We have EPAS. EPAS

2021
01:54:35,160 --> 01:54:40,280
Speaker 1: is an international organization and they are medical experts and

2022
01:54:40,640 --> 01:54:46,840
Speaker 1: they provide all types of data and information regarding this

2023
01:54:47,080 --> 01:54:53,080
Speaker 1: part and the Population Council. They are the experts on

2024
01:54:53,840 --> 01:55:02,480
Speaker 1: monitoring and investigation and they have many research papers and well.

2025
01:55:03,160 --> 01:55:09,240
Speaker 1: There are also like other pages that that can give

2026
01:55:09,320 --> 01:55:16,080
Speaker 1: information for example about these they self induced abortion the

2027
01:55:17,360 --> 01:55:22,320
Speaker 1: health organization has a protocol. It's a public protocol for

2028
01:55:23,200 --> 01:55:27,560
Speaker 1: for self induced abortion, and it is completely safe to

2029
01:55:27,640 --> 01:55:35,720
Speaker 1: do it at home. Well, I really appreciate all the information.

2030
01:55:36,240 --> 01:55:40,080
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, thank you so much. Yeah, thank you so much.

2031
01:55:40,200 --> 01:55:44,120
Speaker 1: I think it's really helpful to hear um what other

2032
01:55:44,200 --> 01:55:46,520
Speaker 1: countries have done in the same struggle. It's like so

2033
01:55:46,680 --> 01:55:49,440
Speaker 1: similar but different, the say at the same time, because

2034
01:55:49,480 --> 01:55:51,680
Speaker 1: we've dealt with the same similar things like turfs and

2035
01:55:52,600 --> 01:55:56,720
Speaker 1: religious like opposition and everything. So it's really helpful, I think,

2036
01:55:57,680 --> 01:56:01,760
Speaker 1: to see to realize that first of all, it is

2037
01:56:01,840 --> 01:56:04,040
Speaker 1: a basic human right, like it's not even it's like

2038
01:56:04,120 --> 01:56:07,640
Speaker 1: internationally an issue. And then just to see how other

2039
01:56:07,680 --> 01:56:11,840
Speaker 1: people have organized it's really important, I think, yes, And

2040
01:56:12,400 --> 01:56:16,760
Speaker 1: now I believe that we have like kind of a

2041
01:56:16,880 --> 01:56:24,360
Speaker 1: similar situation whether well, it's a situation of legal discrimination

2042
01:56:24,880 --> 01:56:28,880
Speaker 1: in which only women who live or have the resources

2043
01:56:28,960 --> 01:56:32,760
Speaker 1: to travel to the states that have the criminalized abortion

2044
01:56:32,880 --> 01:56:38,080
Speaker 1: can exercise the right who a voluntary legal interruption of

2045
01:56:38,160 --> 01:56:43,920
Speaker 1: their pregnancy? Am I right? Because I like, I don't

2046
01:56:43,960 --> 01:56:47,480
Speaker 1: know much about the situation and the United States, but

2047
01:56:47,600 --> 01:56:52,240
Speaker 1: I know that it is legal in some states, right, yeah, yeah,

2048
01:56:53,880 --> 01:56:57,440
Speaker 1: some states. And then like in contrast to that, it's

2049
01:56:57,520 --> 01:57:02,040
Speaker 1: like legal even in case of rape, and like the

2050
01:57:02,440 --> 01:57:04,480
Speaker 1: people that have been raped can be suited. It's like

2051
01:57:04,520 --> 01:57:08,520
Speaker 1: a very like up and down kind of balance. Um.

2052
01:57:09,240 --> 01:57:11,920
Speaker 1: But yeah, there's definitely both that exists, and I think

2053
01:57:11,960 --> 01:57:16,760
Speaker 1: that's where it becomes really hard to extinguish the bad side.

2054
01:57:17,680 --> 01:57:21,080
Speaker 1: It's part part of our struggle to be criminalized abortion

2055
01:57:21,160 --> 01:57:25,520
Speaker 1: in the other states is because woman who who live

2056
01:57:25,600 --> 01:57:29,840
Speaker 1: in poverty and marginalized conditions, who want to have an

2057
01:57:29,880 --> 01:57:34,720
Speaker 1: abortion but reside in other states where it's illegal, kind

2058
01:57:34,720 --> 01:57:40,680
Speaker 1: of do so under legal circumstances. So it's also a

2059
01:57:41,800 --> 01:57:48,920
Speaker 1: class problem. Its yeah, definitely. And also in Mexico there

2060
01:57:48,960 --> 01:57:53,040
Speaker 1: are some states that even criminalize us contaneous abortion. It

2061
01:57:53,360 --> 01:57:59,360
Speaker 1: it wasn't even induced and instead of calling an ambuments,

2062
01:58:00,040 --> 01:58:03,920
Speaker 1: some people called the cubs when when a woman is

2063
01:58:04,080 --> 01:58:12,280
Speaker 1: dying because of christ containous abortion. So yes, and this

2064
01:58:12,520 --> 01:58:18,680
Speaker 1: has caused also a public health problem affecting girls and

2065
01:58:18,800 --> 01:58:23,000
Speaker 1: women in more vulnerable situations who live in the in

2066
01:58:23,120 --> 01:58:29,880
Speaker 1: the most restrictive context rural and indigenous communities, also migrants,

2067
01:58:31,000 --> 01:58:37,680
Speaker 1: girls and women victims of of sexual abuse, women with disabilities,

2068
01:58:38,040 --> 01:58:45,880
Speaker 1: among others, and always, always, always the most vulnerable. Vulnerable

2069
01:58:46,000 --> 01:58:52,720
Speaker 1: women are more susceptible to get an unsafe contesting abortions,

2070
01:58:52,840 --> 01:59:00,320
Speaker 1: which can get to infections, camorrhaging, uh, injury to to

2071
01:59:00,480 --> 01:59:06,880
Speaker 1: internal organs. And even there there are some places like

2072
01:59:07,160 --> 01:59:11,800
Speaker 1: in communities work there is not even access to to

2073
01:59:12,040 --> 01:59:17,720
Speaker 1: internet or or to basic health services. And m h,

2074
01:59:18,920 --> 01:59:24,800
Speaker 1: you're awesome. Women are still buying betool once safe abortions. Yeah,

2075
01:59:24,880 --> 01:59:31,600
Speaker 1: and they are like a hundred percent preventable this. Yeah, no, totally, yeah,

2076
01:59:32,360 --> 01:59:37,040
Speaker 1: thank you, you're even amazing. Um, but it's interesting because

2077
01:59:37,080 --> 01:59:39,720
Speaker 1: that's true. I think regardless of the country, the most

2078
01:59:39,840 --> 01:59:42,320
Speaker 1: vulnerable are the most affected. Whether it's I mean it's

2079
01:59:42,360 --> 01:59:45,360
Speaker 1: a class issue, it's a race issue, it's a disability issue,

2080
01:59:45,400 --> 01:59:48,960
Speaker 1: it's like all these things that I mean, rich people

2081
01:59:48,960 --> 01:59:52,800
Speaker 1: will get abortions either way, like privileged people will always

2082
01:59:52,840 --> 01:59:56,160
Speaker 1: have a route to take care of themselves. Um. So

2083
01:59:57,160 --> 01:59:59,680
Speaker 1: it's just I don't know, it's unfortunate for seeing how

2084
01:59:59,800 --> 02:00:06,920
Speaker 1: like humans have functioned regardless of the country that they build. Yes,

2085
02:00:07,360 --> 02:00:13,800
Speaker 1: sad and criminalizing abortion does not reduce its practice. I

2086
02:00:13,920 --> 02:00:19,720
Speaker 1: think that prohibiting it will like and its practice, and

2087
02:00:20,080 --> 02:00:25,520
Speaker 1: it only increases the probabilities of decent, safe procedures, and

2088
02:00:25,880 --> 02:00:31,560
Speaker 1: it increases the stigma and prejudices, and it even strengthens

2089
02:00:31,720 --> 02:00:37,320
Speaker 1: this empty rights and choice groups. But when abortion is

2090
02:00:37,440 --> 02:00:41,120
Speaker 1: performed in a in a safe and important matter, it

2091
02:00:41,280 --> 02:00:47,600
Speaker 1: is even less risky that childbirth among other interventions. And

2092
02:00:48,720 --> 02:00:52,720
Speaker 1: us for example, it is much safer for for our

2093
02:00:52,800 --> 02:00:57,360
Speaker 1: goal to have an abortion than to what you said,

2094
02:00:57,520 --> 02:01:02,840
Speaker 1: than to continue with with when when the pregnancy is

2095
02:01:02,920 --> 02:01:08,240
Speaker 1: like threatening her life. Ye yes, um, well, that's why

2096
02:01:08,440 --> 02:01:13,640
Speaker 1: we have to keep fighting for people. I was really

2097
02:01:14,160 --> 02:01:18,760
Speaker 1: getting down there. Yes, and here in Mexico, like bills

2098
02:01:18,880 --> 02:01:24,080
Speaker 1: continue to be promoted in different states, we keep forming

2099
02:01:24,240 --> 02:01:29,720
Speaker 1: and strengthening alliances, and we have to strengthen these alliances

2100
02:01:29,920 --> 02:01:33,960
Speaker 1: with all types of sectors. And that's why the the

2101
02:01:34,080 --> 02:01:39,440
Speaker 1: alliance work, for example, because we are the religious sectors

2102
02:01:39,720 --> 02:01:45,240
Speaker 1: that we work also with legislators, with doctors, health care providers,

2103
02:01:45,880 --> 02:01:52,480
Speaker 1: even in schools, and with the public general. So uh,

2104
02:01:52,880 --> 02:02:01,800
Speaker 1: it is a collective effort and the collective commitments mm hmm, yeah,

2105
02:02:03,200 --> 02:02:06,360
Speaker 1: very true. I have nothing to add. That's a good

2106
02:02:06,400 --> 02:02:09,280
Speaker 1: better than that. Um. So, thank you so much for

2107
02:02:10,520 --> 02:02:14,000
Speaker 1: joining us, and I'm going to step away now. Thank

2108
02:02:14,080 --> 02:02:18,840
Speaker 1: you asually, of course, yeah, and I guess uh. The

2109
02:02:18,960 --> 02:02:20,680
Speaker 1: last thing, well, do you do you have anything else

2110
02:02:20,720 --> 02:02:24,040
Speaker 1: you want to say? And then b I where can

2111
02:02:24,080 --> 02:02:27,000
Speaker 1: people find you on the internet like if they want to?

2112
02:02:27,440 --> 02:02:30,160
Speaker 1: And do you have other organizations and stuff do you

2113
02:02:30,200 --> 02:02:35,080
Speaker 1: want to promote? H? I'm like Erica Yamava. You know

2114
02:02:35,320 --> 02:02:41,040
Speaker 1: my social media and the organization I work in, it's

2115
02:02:41,240 --> 02:02:47,520
Speaker 1: I Giva the Middle Silvavania, Bravai from herere but the

2116
02:02:48,080 --> 02:02:52,400
Speaker 1: the National Network for Reproductive Rights where we are intolves states.

2117
02:02:52,760 --> 02:02:58,600
Speaker 1: It's called they said, but it's B B E, S

2118
02:02:58,880 --> 02:03:03,960
Speaker 1: E R. And you can find those uh in most

2119
02:03:04,040 --> 02:03:10,000
Speaker 1: of these states. And we can provide information regarding abortion

2120
02:03:11,160 --> 02:03:15,040
Speaker 1: if you write to us. And also something I would

2121
02:03:15,080 --> 02:03:19,120
Speaker 1: like to say is that even after it's even nice,

2122
02:03:19,280 --> 02:03:23,560
Speaker 1: one must continue to to ensure that these abortion services

2123
02:03:23,640 --> 02:03:28,160
Speaker 1: are are when they say, our implement that, and that

2124
02:03:28,480 --> 02:03:33,080
Speaker 1: they can reach to all girls and women. That it

2125
02:03:33,200 --> 02:03:40,200
Speaker 1: must be guaranteed in paper and in practice. And yes,

2126
02:03:40,360 --> 02:03:47,560
Speaker 1: the emphasis in reaching the most underserved and vulnerable populations.

2127
02:03:48,360 --> 02:03:52,760
Speaker 1: M hmm all right, well, uh, I think that's probably

2128
02:03:52,800 --> 02:03:54,960
Speaker 1: going to do it for us today. Erica, thank you

2129
02:03:55,120 --> 02:03:59,879
Speaker 1: so much for talking about It's a wealth of information.

2130
02:04:00,000 --> 02:04:05,200
Speaker 1: It's really valuable. Thank you, Yeah, and thank you all

2131
02:04:05,360 --> 02:04:23,440
Speaker 1: for listening. That's your episode for the day. Welcome to

2132
02:04:23,640 --> 02:04:27,520
Speaker 1: it could happen here. I'm Garrison with me today is Chris,

2133
02:04:28,240 --> 02:04:31,240
Speaker 1: and today we'll be talking about something that I was

2134
02:04:31,360 --> 02:04:34,160
Speaker 1: wanting to do for Pride Month but time kind of

2135
02:04:34,240 --> 02:04:38,360
Speaker 1: got away from me. But we'll be talking with Noah Adams,

2136
02:04:38,600 --> 02:04:42,760
Speaker 1: who does research into the kind of crossover between autism

2137
02:04:42,960 --> 02:04:46,040
Speaker 1: and being trans I know we've we've briefly mentioned some

2138
02:04:46,200 --> 02:04:49,400
Speaker 1: like rhetoric around this on our War on trans People

2139
02:04:49,560 --> 02:04:52,920
Speaker 1: series episodes, and Noah was kind enough to reach out

2140
02:04:52,960 --> 02:04:56,120
Speaker 1: to me to be willing to discuss this more in depth.

2141
02:04:56,360 --> 02:05:01,120
Speaker 1: Of greetings, Hello, thank you. It's it's always Pride Months

2142
02:05:01,160 --> 02:05:04,960
Speaker 1: somewhere in the summer. So that's true. That's true. Um So,

2143
02:05:05,280 --> 02:05:07,960
Speaker 1: I guess let's I first want to kind of hear

2144
02:05:08,160 --> 02:05:10,600
Speaker 1: how you how you personally kind of got into this

2145
02:05:10,720 --> 02:05:13,280
Speaker 1: field of research, and then maybe kind of clarify what

2146
02:05:13,600 --> 02:05:19,600
Speaker 1: what exactly your your field of research is? Sure, Um, well,

2147
02:05:19,800 --> 02:05:21,960
Speaker 1: I guess where do you start? I mean, I'm I'm

2148
02:05:22,000 --> 02:05:25,760
Speaker 1: a trans person and I'm also autistic, so it's sort

2149
02:05:25,760 --> 02:05:29,440
Speaker 1: of a natural yeah crossover for me. Um, I got

2150
02:05:29,560 --> 02:05:36,760
Speaker 1: started in trans research uh or transactivism doing suicidality work.

2151
02:05:37,560 --> 02:05:41,720
Speaker 1: Um in such a long time ago now, but in um,

2152
02:05:42,160 --> 02:05:44,560
Speaker 1: I think two thousand and six, myself and my best

2153
02:05:44,600 --> 02:05:49,280
Speaker 1: friend cycled across Canada to bring awareness for trans suicidality

2154
02:05:50,000 --> 02:05:53,480
Speaker 1: um and in memorandum of a person, a friend who

2155
02:05:53,840 --> 02:05:58,320
Speaker 1: who committed suicide. UM. So you know, we went to

2156
02:05:58,360 --> 02:06:02,440
Speaker 1: a lot of different communities in Canon, including Saskatoon, did

2157
02:06:02,560 --> 02:06:05,600
Speaker 1: talks about you know, did talks with local trans communities

2158
02:06:05,600 --> 02:06:09,560
Speaker 1: about suicide, audy prevention and stuff. Uh and met a

2159
02:06:09,600 --> 02:06:13,120
Speaker 1: lot of great people. Um. And then I came back

2160
02:06:13,360 --> 02:06:17,160
Speaker 1: and I did my Master of Social work also on

2161
02:06:17,280 --> 02:06:20,560
Speaker 1: trans suicidality research, kind of looking at how there's a

2162
02:06:20,560 --> 02:06:23,280
Speaker 1: lot of different research out there and who knows, you know,

2163
02:06:23,640 --> 02:06:25,440
Speaker 1: there's a lot of different rates that are given all

2164
02:06:25,560 --> 02:06:28,240
Speaker 1: high and and where are we supposed to you know,

2165
02:06:28,400 --> 02:06:31,560
Speaker 1: fall on that? Um. And then I finished that and

2166
02:06:31,840 --> 02:06:36,360
Speaker 1: I was kind of tired of doing suicidality work. Yeah,

2167
02:06:36,800 --> 02:06:39,600
Speaker 1: speaking it's a little bit a little bit exhausting. UM.

2168
02:06:39,920 --> 02:06:42,800
Speaker 1: And kind I have a I have a much darker

2169
02:06:42,880 --> 02:06:46,760
Speaker 1: sense of humor than I used to. Yeah, um so

2170
02:06:47,800 --> 02:06:51,760
Speaker 1: a friend I was kind of drifting into autism work,

2171
02:06:51,880 --> 02:06:56,240
Speaker 1: and a friend who, uh Jake Pine, who who's a

2172
02:06:56,320 --> 02:07:00,960
Speaker 1: professor now at your university, UM, suggested I kind of

2173
02:07:01,320 --> 02:07:04,320
Speaker 1: move into that area. And and here I am so

2174
02:07:04,560 --> 02:07:07,600
Speaker 1: with the kind of crossover between being trans and have

2175
02:07:07,800 --> 02:07:11,240
Speaker 1: and and uh, I guess I'm not the best I

2176
02:07:11,440 --> 02:07:14,600
Speaker 1: don't I don't know, I consciously don't kind of know

2177
02:07:14,720 --> 02:07:17,800
Speaker 1: all the what the most appropriate languages would you say

2178
02:07:17,800 --> 02:07:20,040
Speaker 1: that you would you prefer to say that you like

2179
02:07:20,360 --> 02:07:24,440
Speaker 1: have autism or you are artistic? Um? I mean I

2180
02:07:24,560 --> 02:07:29,240
Speaker 1: think it's pretty universal in the autism community to uh

2181
02:07:29,480 --> 02:07:32,920
Speaker 1: talk about identity first language. So yeah, exactly, logism kind

2182
02:07:32,960 --> 02:07:36,800
Speaker 1: of leads and and that's yeah. I mean I guess

2183
02:07:36,840 --> 02:07:41,400
Speaker 1: i'd say I'm autistic. Most people don't say person with autism. Yeah. Yeah.

2184
02:07:42,800 --> 02:07:46,200
Speaker 1: So with that, how have you kind of what what

2185
02:07:46,320 --> 02:07:48,840
Speaker 1: initially got you to? You know, because we see a

2186
02:07:48,880 --> 02:07:53,360
Speaker 1: lot of propaganda and stuff trying to almost like take

2187
02:07:53,400 --> 02:07:58,400
Speaker 1: away people's agency around both being trans and and and

2188
02:07:58,840 --> 02:08:02,760
Speaker 1: um with and how and being autistic? Right, there's a

2189
02:08:02,840 --> 02:08:05,560
Speaker 1: lot of a lot of propaganda, especially from the Turfs

2190
02:08:05,600 --> 02:08:09,160
Speaker 1: in the UK really started this out and really accelerated

2191
02:08:09,200 --> 02:08:12,680
Speaker 1: on this point. Um. And I mean we're not. There's

2192
02:08:12,760 --> 02:08:17,000
Speaker 1: a whole bunch of basically autism exterminationist groups out there,

2193
02:08:17,640 --> 02:08:19,040
Speaker 1: um and a whole a whole bunch of other kind

2194
02:08:19,040 --> 02:08:24,600
Speaker 1: of problems around this. How when when these kind of

2195
02:08:24,680 --> 02:08:27,840
Speaker 1: crossovers start happening, where did you kind of what what

2196
02:08:27,960 --> 02:08:29,840
Speaker 1: kind of prompted you to see this and be like, Hey,

2197
02:08:30,120 --> 02:08:32,840
Speaker 1: here's this thing that needs to be researched, and here's

2198
02:08:32,840 --> 02:08:35,200
Speaker 1: how I'm going to go about it. Because you see

2199
02:08:35,200 --> 02:08:37,560
Speaker 1: a lot of people talk about this thing, but it's

2200
02:08:37,600 --> 02:08:41,400
Speaker 1: always generally to like attack trans people, um or attack

2201
02:08:41,440 --> 02:08:45,000
Speaker 1: autistic people. I mean, you know there's a lot there.

2202
02:08:45,120 --> 02:08:47,960
Speaker 1: I mean I would say, you know, my sort of

2203
02:08:48,480 --> 02:08:51,720
Speaker 1: seedling of interest is is I just really don't like injustice.

2204
02:08:52,440 --> 02:08:54,640
Speaker 1: I really, I mean that's such a broad thing to

2205
02:08:54,680 --> 02:08:58,160
Speaker 1: say that I really, you know, injustice against people for

2206
02:08:58,240 --> 02:08:59,600
Speaker 1: the sake of who they are really just kind of

2207
02:08:59,640 --> 02:09:03,400
Speaker 1: pisses me off. Um. And you know, I mean, when

2208
02:09:03,440 --> 02:09:05,400
Speaker 1: you pick a research topic, you've kind of pick something

2209
02:09:05,440 --> 02:09:08,320
Speaker 1: that you're willing to spend hours and hours and hours

2210
02:09:08,360 --> 02:09:12,560
Speaker 1: in a library or you know, um a virtual library.

2211
02:09:12,760 --> 02:09:14,960
Speaker 1: What have you just kind of plowing away at it?

2212
02:09:15,720 --> 02:09:17,960
Speaker 1: And and it seemed like I was piste off enough

2213
02:09:18,000 --> 02:09:20,200
Speaker 1: at the injustice of the way autistic people, in the

2214
02:09:20,240 --> 02:09:22,640
Speaker 1: way trans people are treated, and especially the way I

2215
02:09:22,720 --> 02:09:25,360
Speaker 1: think I think we're ignored by both the theaters, by

2216
02:09:25,440 --> 02:09:29,600
Speaker 1: both you know, for for turfs and trans exclusionary folks. Um.

2217
02:09:31,120 --> 02:09:34,080
Speaker 1: I really feel like we're an easy target where you know,

2218
02:09:34,160 --> 02:09:36,760
Speaker 1: autistic people or or for that matter, people with the

2219
02:09:36,840 --> 02:09:39,840
Speaker 1: volment of disabilities or people with with any kind of

2220
02:09:40,320 --> 02:09:44,600
Speaker 1: um and I'm using having finger pots on as any

2221
02:09:44,680 --> 02:09:48,040
Speaker 1: kind of impairment based disability feel like a soft target

2222
02:09:48,320 --> 02:09:51,640
Speaker 1: for people that just want to attack trans folks, right like,

2223
02:09:51,680 --> 02:09:56,520
Speaker 1: because they're they're a group that are so it's incomprehensible

2224
02:09:56,560 --> 02:09:58,760
Speaker 1: to them that we would be able to speak for ourselves.

2225
02:10:00,280 --> 02:10:03,480
Speaker 1: So so they're you know, I mean, I don't even

2226
02:10:03,600 --> 02:10:08,360
Speaker 1: think that they I don't think they care about autistic people.

2227
02:10:08,400 --> 02:10:11,000
Speaker 1: But I don't think they even even occurs to them

2228
02:10:11,040 --> 02:10:13,880
Speaker 1: that autodic people might have and trans autistic folks might

2229
02:10:13,920 --> 02:10:18,440
Speaker 1: have something to say for themselves. So, what's kind of

2230
02:10:18,640 --> 02:10:22,960
Speaker 1: the scope of your research been the for however however

2231
02:10:23,040 --> 02:10:26,240
Speaker 1: long you've been working on this for it's it's for

2232
02:10:26,880 --> 02:10:31,040
Speaker 1: a PhD program, correct, Yeah, Well, I started doing I

2233
02:10:31,120 --> 02:10:34,280
Speaker 1: wrote a book on trans authentic folks. That's sort of

2234
02:10:34,320 --> 02:10:39,560
Speaker 1: a series that interviews with folks um and you know,

2235
02:10:39,800 --> 02:10:42,160
Speaker 1: I mean I just asked them like about their lives

2236
02:10:42,240 --> 02:10:43,800
Speaker 1: and what it was like to be trans and what

2237
02:10:43,880 --> 02:10:45,520
Speaker 1: it was like to be autistic, and what it's like

2238
02:10:45,640 --> 02:10:48,160
Speaker 1: to you know, try to transition as an autistic person,

2239
02:10:48,200 --> 02:10:50,000
Speaker 1: and a lot of stuff came out of that around

2240
02:10:50,440 --> 02:10:52,600
Speaker 1: you know, how difficult it can be for folks that

2241
02:10:52,680 --> 02:10:55,520
Speaker 1: are their boat to access trans healthcare and to sort

2242
02:10:55,520 --> 02:10:58,360
Speaker 1: of navigate their way in the world. Um. And this

2243
02:10:58,920 --> 02:11:01,200
Speaker 1: is for my PhD work. It's sort of an outgrowth

2244
02:11:01,240 --> 02:11:06,360
Speaker 1: of that. So I'm looking specifically at how trans autistic

2245
02:11:06,520 --> 02:11:10,720
Speaker 1: community groups sort of grassroots group formations are are forming

2246
02:11:10,880 --> 02:11:15,440
Speaker 1: and and what their goals are. How do you, like,

2247
02:11:16,680 --> 02:11:19,160
Speaker 1: how do you go about like ethical research into this topic,

2248
02:11:19,200 --> 02:11:22,360
Speaker 1: because definitely the like, you know, there's a certain way

2249
02:11:22,360 --> 02:11:24,440
Speaker 1: to like, there's a certain way to be like, I'm

2250
02:11:24,480 --> 02:11:28,160
Speaker 1: researching autism and trans people to be like, huh, that's

2251
02:11:28,200 --> 02:11:30,200
Speaker 1: a little bit of a side I right, because because

2252
02:11:30,240 --> 02:11:32,160
Speaker 1: of how some of because of how like the turf

2253
02:11:32,200 --> 02:11:34,760
Speaker 1: groups talk about it. Obviously you're treads and autistic and

2254
02:11:34,840 --> 02:11:38,800
Speaker 1: that's two completely different. But like, definitely Yeah, I was

2255
02:11:38,840 --> 02:11:42,040
Speaker 1: definitely wondering, like, is there, like how what what types

2256
02:11:42,080 --> 02:11:44,960
Speaker 1: of like ways does ethical research go about so that

2257
02:11:45,040 --> 02:11:47,920
Speaker 1: you actually understand people when you're when you're talking to them.

2258
02:11:47,960 --> 02:11:50,880
Speaker 1: It's not it's not about like here, we need to

2259
02:11:51,040 --> 02:11:53,680
Speaker 1: we need to like solve these problems, because they're not

2260
02:11:53,720 --> 02:11:56,560
Speaker 1: problems to be solved, But it's it's research into living

2261
02:11:56,640 --> 02:12:00,600
Speaker 1: people who are like having lives. Yeah, mean, that's that's

2262
02:12:00,600 --> 02:12:03,880
Speaker 1: a great question. Um. I'm sort of starting through that

2263
02:12:04,040 --> 02:12:06,560
Speaker 1: myself right now because I'm just you know, working through

2264
02:12:06,640 --> 02:12:11,840
Speaker 1: my ethical research proposal. Um, but I think you just

2265
02:12:11,920 --> 02:12:14,640
Speaker 1: have to be really honest and open and and really

2266
02:12:14,680 --> 02:12:16,440
Speaker 1: write all this stuff out, like how are you going

2267
02:12:16,480 --> 02:12:18,120
Speaker 1: to contact people and what are you going to talk

2268
02:12:18,160 --> 02:12:20,880
Speaker 1: to them about? And showing other people what you're doing

2269
02:12:21,440 --> 02:12:25,880
Speaker 1: and being very open to that process, if that makes sense. Yeah. Yeah,

2270
02:12:26,840 --> 02:12:30,120
Speaker 1: In what types of ways do you see the crossover

2271
02:12:30,280 --> 02:12:33,720
Speaker 1: kind of between ableism and transphobia and like what how

2272
02:12:33,880 --> 02:12:36,920
Speaker 1: how have you seen that crossover be used to kind

2273
02:12:36,960 --> 02:12:39,480
Speaker 1: of hurt both trans people and people who are artistic

2274
02:12:39,560 --> 02:12:42,880
Speaker 1: and people who are both you know, I mean I

2275
02:12:42,960 --> 02:12:46,880
Speaker 1: think the most explicit way has been I you know,

2276
02:12:46,960 --> 02:12:49,800
Speaker 1: I see a lot of articles by the Guardian or

2277
02:12:49,880 --> 02:12:53,480
Speaker 1: the Daily Mail, you know, bring up the specter of

2278
02:12:53,760 --> 02:12:58,800
Speaker 1: autistic people and being overrepresented, overrepresented again in finger quotes, Uh,

2279
02:12:59,720 --> 02:13:02,880
Speaker 1: I'm the trans population going to gender clinics and and

2280
02:13:03,120 --> 02:13:06,560
Speaker 1: there isn't ever any explanation after you say that that

2281
02:13:06,680 --> 02:13:11,960
Speaker 1: the scaremongering is just saying there's artistic people supposedly overrepresented

2282
02:13:12,120 --> 02:13:16,760
Speaker 1: among trans folks. Oh no, but as if it doesn't

2283
02:13:16,800 --> 02:13:20,880
Speaker 1: need saying. It's it's assumed that that's that's appalling, you know,

2284
02:13:20,960 --> 02:13:24,200
Speaker 1: but I like a little bit more explanation. There's there's

2285
02:13:24,360 --> 02:13:26,760
Speaker 1: there's a lot said by how they how there's how

2286
02:13:26,840 --> 02:13:28,560
Speaker 1: they frame it and how they and like what they

2287
02:13:28,600 --> 02:13:32,200
Speaker 1: don't say, um really fright, Like the it's all framed

2288
02:13:32,320 --> 02:13:36,360
Speaker 1: as if this is, you know, something that everyone recognizes

2289
02:13:36,480 --> 02:13:40,800
Speaker 1: as like a problem. Um, and countering that is really

2290
02:13:40,840 --> 02:13:43,760
Speaker 1: challenging because it is. Yeah, because like again you're you're

2291
02:13:43,760 --> 02:13:46,520
Speaker 1: doing research into this in this into this specific crossover,

2292
02:13:47,120 --> 02:13:49,760
Speaker 1: and what kinds of stuff have you kind of learned

2293
02:13:50,040 --> 02:13:54,600
Speaker 1: throughout your research about about this. I mean it's interesting,

2294
02:13:54,720 --> 02:13:58,440
Speaker 1: like it's that attitude is also represented in the academic literature,

2295
02:13:58,520 --> 02:14:01,400
Speaker 1: like over the last I bet I'd say over the

2296
02:14:01,520 --> 02:14:05,600
Speaker 1: last five years, the literature on the crossover of of

2297
02:14:05,720 --> 02:14:09,240
Speaker 1: autism and trans folks has like skyrocketed, Like in I

2298
02:14:09,320 --> 02:14:13,200
Speaker 1: always say, in to twenty alone, something like a hundred

2299
02:14:13,240 --> 02:14:16,760
Speaker 1: and fifty articles were published, whereas two years before that

2300
02:14:16,960 --> 02:14:21,760
Speaker 1: maybe twenty UM and and the vast majority of them

2301
02:14:22,160 --> 02:14:27,800
Speaker 1: are mentioning the um the co occurrence uh in passing.

2302
02:14:28,080 --> 02:14:30,320
Speaker 1: So they're saying, oh, well, we read these other things

2303
02:14:30,680 --> 02:14:33,960
Speaker 1: where autism and trans identity co occurs, So thus you

2304
02:14:34,000 --> 02:14:37,720
Speaker 1: should be very careful prior to providing trans healthcare because

2305
02:14:37,800 --> 02:14:39,760
Speaker 1: they might be autistic. Yeah, That's the only thing I

2306
02:14:39,800 --> 02:14:43,440
Speaker 1: wanted to talk about was like people medical gatekeeping aspect,

2307
02:14:44,160 --> 02:14:47,560
Speaker 1: and like you especially you see this like turfs. You know,

2308
02:14:47,600 --> 02:14:50,480
Speaker 1: there's a lot of like infantilization with the turf Frederick

2309
02:14:50,560 --> 02:14:53,360
Speaker 1: around this, and then that kind of leads to this

2310
02:14:53,480 --> 02:14:56,760
Speaker 1: type of medical gatekeeping. Yeah, I just think, you know,

2311
02:14:56,880 --> 02:14:58,440
Speaker 1: I see I see this. I saw this in a

2312
02:14:58,520 --> 02:15:01,120
Speaker 1: book with the interview as I did, and I see

2313
02:15:01,120 --> 02:15:04,040
Speaker 1: it in so many other places, and especially conversation with folks.

2314
02:15:04,760 --> 02:15:07,960
Speaker 1: Is that, you know, the problem seems to be if

2315
02:15:08,080 --> 02:15:12,600
Speaker 1: you tell an unexpected narrative to the person in charge

2316
02:15:12,640 --> 02:15:15,480
Speaker 1: of gate keeping you for transgender healthcare, you're going to

2317
02:15:15,560 --> 02:15:18,320
Speaker 1: make them nervous. And if you make them nervous, they're

2318
02:15:18,320 --> 02:15:21,080
Speaker 1: they're not necessarily gonna say no, but they're gonna say

2319
02:15:21,920 --> 02:15:24,400
Speaker 1: to themselves at least, oh, let's wait and see. And

2320
02:15:24,640 --> 02:15:28,960
Speaker 1: for for autistic folks, waiting and seeing might mean forever, right,

2321
02:15:29,000 --> 02:15:31,600
Speaker 1: Like I talked to folks in the book, uh that,

2322
02:15:32,680 --> 02:15:35,760
Speaker 1: you know, without without mentioning actual cities, because of the

2323
02:15:36,320 --> 02:15:39,080
Speaker 1: you know, the particular situation of this person. But let's

2324
02:15:39,160 --> 02:15:42,760
Speaker 1: let's you know, let's say he lived in New Orleans, uh,

2325
02:15:42,880 --> 02:15:45,200
Speaker 1: and he wasn't able to access trans healthcare and New

2326
02:15:45,320 --> 02:15:49,720
Speaker 1: Orleans because it just wasn't available to folks who were autistic,

2327
02:15:50,320 --> 02:15:54,160
Speaker 1: And so he ended up moving to Chicago, which which shows,

2328
02:15:54,280 --> 02:15:57,000
Speaker 1: you know, he moved to Chicago specifically to get trans healthcare,

2329
02:15:57,040 --> 02:16:00,800
Speaker 1: which shows a level of capacity that there implying in

2330
02:16:00,880 --> 02:16:03,080
Speaker 1: the context of trans health care in New Orleans that

2331
02:16:03,200 --> 02:16:05,800
Speaker 1: he's not capable of. But you know, he can upbroot

2332
02:16:05,840 --> 02:16:09,240
Speaker 1: his whole life, move across the country, find a doctor.

2333
02:16:09,280 --> 02:16:12,080
Speaker 1: And then he talked to the doctor in an informed

2334
02:16:12,120 --> 02:16:15,680
Speaker 1: health clinic in Chicago and and they were like, oh, yeah,

2335
02:16:15,800 --> 02:16:17,640
Speaker 1: we knew that you were from this city, and we

2336
02:16:17,720 --> 02:16:19,800
Speaker 1: do that you were autistic before you told us, because

2337
02:16:19,840 --> 02:16:23,080
Speaker 1: there's this whole pipeline of autistic trans folks making the

2338
02:16:23,200 --> 02:16:27,280
Speaker 1: migration to Chicago from this particular city because they can't

2339
02:16:27,280 --> 02:16:31,080
Speaker 1: get healthcare. I mean, like, you know, I'm also thinking

2340
02:16:31,120 --> 02:16:34,680
Speaker 1: about you know, like kids trying to come out as trans,

2341
02:16:35,600 --> 02:16:38,640
Speaker 1: um who have autism or have any other kind of

2342
02:16:39,680 --> 02:16:44,280
Speaker 1: you know, quote unquote developmental disability UM, and like just

2343
02:16:44,760 --> 02:16:47,360
Speaker 1: all of the ways that that can be used to

2344
02:16:47,520 --> 02:16:51,840
Speaker 1: gaslight kids about their gender identity. UM. I know in

2345
02:16:51,959 --> 02:16:54,680
Speaker 1: your book you mentioned stuff around like self discovery and

2346
02:16:55,000 --> 02:16:58,480
Speaker 1: coming out and issues with family. UM, what kind of

2347
02:16:58,600 --> 02:17:00,680
Speaker 1: what kind of things have you heard heard about that

2348
02:17:00,760 --> 02:17:06,160
Speaker 1: in terms of how how kids that that the kids

2349
02:17:06,200 --> 02:17:10,400
Speaker 1: are figuring figuring out gender stuff while also having this

2350
02:17:10,480 --> 02:17:13,400
Speaker 1: whole other thing that people use to kind of, you know,

2351
02:17:13,680 --> 02:17:17,000
Speaker 1: add on to their experience. I mean, I think, you know,

2352
02:17:17,120 --> 02:17:19,800
Speaker 1: one of the things I noticed, especially in you know,

2353
02:17:20,040 --> 02:17:23,600
Speaker 1: sort of trans autistic autobiographies, is that you know, gender

2354
02:17:23,680 --> 02:17:26,280
Speaker 1: doesn't really make an inherent sort of sense do a

2355
02:17:26,320 --> 02:17:28,840
Speaker 1: lot of autistic folks. I mean, it doesn't make sense

2356
02:17:28,879 --> 02:17:31,120
Speaker 1: to do. But I mean I have I have something

2357
02:17:31,200 --> 02:17:33,000
Speaker 1: going on in my brain. I don't know what it is.

2358
02:17:33,040 --> 02:17:36,920
Speaker 1: I don't think it's autism, but yeah, genders never made

2359
02:17:36,959 --> 02:17:40,240
Speaker 1: sense to me either, And I think like where you

2360
02:17:40,879 --> 02:17:43,240
Speaker 1: for autistic people, especially where you come across things that

2361
02:17:43,320 --> 02:17:46,800
Speaker 1: don't make an inherent sort of sense, it's difficult to

2362
02:17:46,879 --> 02:17:49,560
Speaker 1: accept them. Like so much in the world doesn't make

2363
02:17:49,600 --> 02:17:51,840
Speaker 1: inherent sense. But that can be a real sticking point

2364
02:17:51,879 --> 02:17:55,040
Speaker 1: for autistic folks. So, you know, what I see, what

2365
02:17:55,120 --> 02:17:57,480
Speaker 1: I seem to see a lot of is that by

2366
02:17:57,560 --> 02:17:59,720
Speaker 1: the time folks come out, well, first of all, it's

2367
02:17:59,720 --> 02:18:02,200
Speaker 1: see was like, although you know, I don't want to

2368
02:18:02,280 --> 02:18:04,240
Speaker 1: quote any particular kind of research on it because I

2369
02:18:04,280 --> 02:18:06,480
Speaker 1: think the jury is still out, but it seems like

2370
02:18:07,160 --> 02:18:10,400
Speaker 1: autistic people are more likely to identify as non binary

2371
02:18:11,480 --> 02:18:15,040
Speaker 1: um or to just not identify with gender at all. Um.

2372
02:18:15,480 --> 02:18:17,720
Speaker 1: And it does seem like by the time folks come

2373
02:18:17,760 --> 02:18:21,840
Speaker 1: out as trans, whatever you know, permutation of that there

2374
02:18:22,000 --> 02:18:25,200
Speaker 1: is for them, um, They've they've tried just about every

2375
02:18:25,240 --> 02:18:28,320
Speaker 1: other identity they can, you know, they can try out

2376
02:18:28,920 --> 02:18:32,480
Speaker 1: like especially you know, I mean, we're aware that there

2377
02:18:32,520 --> 02:18:37,440
Speaker 1: are social stigmas and and and social expectations around gender.

2378
02:18:38,280 --> 02:18:41,280
Speaker 1: So I think for for a lot of autistic folks,

2379
02:18:41,360 --> 02:18:43,920
Speaker 1: they're going to try to fit that, even though it

2380
02:18:43,959 --> 02:18:45,520
Speaker 1: doesn't make sense to them, They're going to try to

2381
02:18:45,600 --> 02:18:48,160
Speaker 1: fit within that because they know it exists, and that

2382
02:18:48,320 --> 02:18:50,520
Speaker 1: by the time they come out as as trans, like

2383
02:18:52,160 --> 02:18:56,280
Speaker 1: or main or female or what have you, like, we

2384
02:18:56,440 --> 02:19:01,520
Speaker 1: pretty well know. Is there any any kind of sense? Yeah? No,

2385
02:19:01,640 --> 02:19:03,480
Speaker 1: I mean I think that there's a lot of misconceptions

2386
02:19:03,520 --> 02:19:07,160
Speaker 1: people have about about i mean, both being trans and

2387
02:19:07,320 --> 02:19:11,800
Speaker 1: big autistic. Let let a load being both of Is

2388
02:19:11,840 --> 02:19:16,320
Speaker 1: there any like, yeah, like, what's the common misconceptions about this?

2389
02:19:16,440 --> 02:19:18,800
Speaker 1: Only kind of on like a broader level. Would you

2390
02:19:18,879 --> 02:19:23,640
Speaker 1: like to dispel? Um? Sure, Yeah, I mean I think

2391
02:19:23,640 --> 02:19:27,000
Speaker 1: a lot of people get told, you know, you can't

2392
02:19:27,040 --> 02:19:30,200
Speaker 1: you can't be autistic because you're too you're too articulate,

2393
02:19:30,720 --> 02:19:32,440
Speaker 1: or you know, you have too much of an opinion.

2394
02:19:32,480 --> 02:19:35,400
Speaker 1: Autistic people can't have an opinion of themselves, of their

2395
02:19:35,440 --> 02:19:38,720
Speaker 1: own life. And yeah, that's gross. I'm paraphrasing, but I

2396
02:19:38,760 --> 02:19:43,320
Speaker 1: think that's what it is. Yeah, absolutely, Um, And then

2397
02:19:43,840 --> 02:19:46,720
Speaker 1: you know, trans folks get told It's not uncommon to

2398
02:19:46,760 --> 02:19:49,680
Speaker 1: get told, oh, well, you can't be autistic because you're trans,

2399
02:19:50,640 --> 02:19:53,879
Speaker 1: so you're sort of in this this no, no person's land.

2400
02:19:55,640 --> 02:19:59,120
Speaker 1: That's such a it's such like an ontological attack on

2401
02:19:59,240 --> 02:20:03,680
Speaker 1: someone's being. It's so really like that's you know, like

2402
02:20:04,879 --> 02:20:08,240
Speaker 1: you know already like again just being solely trans or autistic,

2403
02:20:08,320 --> 02:20:10,480
Speaker 1: you get some of that, and then together it's like

2404
02:20:10,600 --> 02:20:12,640
Speaker 1: it's just attacking every kind of part of you that

2405
02:20:12,720 --> 02:20:15,760
Speaker 1: you're trying to figure out. Um well, I mean, I

2406
02:20:15,840 --> 02:20:18,760
Speaker 1: mean in terms of attacking people rhetorically, it's sort of

2407
02:20:19,200 --> 02:20:22,120
Speaker 1: the perfect weapon because you can make autistic trans people

2408
02:20:22,160 --> 02:20:27,040
Speaker 1: into whatever you want to be convenient to you. What

2409
02:20:27,320 --> 02:20:30,200
Speaker 1: kinds of stuff do you think people should know about

2410
02:20:30,280 --> 02:20:33,320
Speaker 1: this to help kind of either you know, to help

2411
02:20:33,360 --> 02:20:35,400
Speaker 1: either like counter some of like the rhetoric around this,

2412
02:20:35,840 --> 02:20:39,480
Speaker 1: or just to gain better like personal understanding, right if

2413
02:20:39,520 --> 02:20:41,080
Speaker 1: they have if they have you know, people in their

2414
02:20:41,120 --> 02:20:43,800
Speaker 1: lives who are like this, or maybe they suspect that

2415
02:20:43,959 --> 02:20:47,120
Speaker 1: they're that they're trans and they're autistic. Like how what

2416
02:20:47,240 --> 02:20:48,720
Speaker 1: what kinds of what kinds of stuff would you like

2417
02:20:48,920 --> 02:20:53,160
Speaker 1: people to be more aware of about this intersection? Well?

2418
02:20:53,280 --> 02:20:55,920
Speaker 1: I guess I remember a story someone from the book

2419
02:20:55,959 --> 02:20:59,680
Speaker 1: told me about how you know he was He had

2420
02:20:59,800 --> 02:21:02,000
Speaker 1: his best friend is is trans and autistic as well

2421
02:21:02,200 --> 02:21:05,080
Speaker 1: and has a number of physical disabilities, and he was

2422
02:21:05,160 --> 02:21:07,440
Speaker 1: kind of he's sort of the caretaker for him. Um,

2423
02:21:08,120 --> 02:21:11,000
Speaker 1: and he was kind of talking to him about how, oh, well,

2424
02:21:11,120 --> 02:21:12,720
Speaker 1: I don't know if I'm trans, and I don't know

2425
02:21:12,800 --> 02:21:14,440
Speaker 1: if I should you know, if I should use that

2426
02:21:14,640 --> 02:21:17,680
Speaker 1: label or like, you know, maybe it's not the right

2427
02:21:17,760 --> 02:21:21,080
Speaker 1: thing to do or it's bad or something. And his

2428
02:21:21,200 --> 02:21:23,520
Speaker 1: friend was like, well, you know you're not You're not

2429
02:21:23,640 --> 02:21:25,840
Speaker 1: a hormone of vampire. Like you're not gonna like suck

2430
02:21:26,200 --> 02:21:28,840
Speaker 1: the hormones out of somebody else and and hurt them

2431
02:21:28,879 --> 02:21:31,440
Speaker 1: by taking away their testosterone. Like, oh I wish is

2432
02:21:31,959 --> 02:21:36,959
Speaker 1: I wish it worked like that? Um, you know I would.

2433
02:21:37,000 --> 02:21:41,320
Speaker 1: I would be a trans empire. Um, this is about

2434
02:21:41,360 --> 02:21:43,960
Speaker 1: you and what makes you comfortable. It's not about like

2435
02:21:44,120 --> 02:21:47,120
Speaker 1: you're not hurting anybody else being yourself. And I think

2436
02:21:47,840 --> 02:21:52,959
Speaker 1: you know, autistic folks like anybody else you know, worry

2437
02:21:53,040 --> 02:21:57,760
Speaker 1: about I mean, we're we're just as susceptible to the

2438
02:21:57,879 --> 02:22:01,800
Speaker 1: attacks on trans folks. Yeah, is anybody else right? Like

2439
02:22:01,920 --> 02:22:04,040
Speaker 1: and you worry that, like, well, maybe this isn't the

2440
02:22:04,160 --> 02:22:06,440
Speaker 1: right thing to do, but like what are you hurting

2441
02:22:06,640 --> 02:22:09,800
Speaker 1: by by exploring it? That doesn't mean you have to

2442
02:22:09,879 --> 02:22:12,160
Speaker 1: be trans or you have to transition, or or you

2443
02:22:12,200 --> 02:22:15,120
Speaker 1: can't change your mind like, but it doesn't. It doesn't

2444
02:22:15,160 --> 02:22:18,200
Speaker 1: hurt anybody, even though you to just be open to it,

2445
02:22:18,480 --> 02:22:23,000
Speaker 1: even just like temporarily trying out different names or pronouns. Right,

2446
02:22:23,040 --> 02:22:25,959
Speaker 1: it can can be like such a big deal, um,

2447
02:22:26,800 --> 02:22:30,200
Speaker 1: and it can be very incidental. Like it doesn't. It

2448
02:22:30,240 --> 02:22:33,200
Speaker 1: doesn't need to be so cataclysmic. Right, that's something that

2449
02:22:33,280 --> 02:22:38,000
Speaker 1: you can experiment with and it's fine. Right, you never yeah,

2450
02:22:38,280 --> 02:22:41,320
Speaker 1: you don't lock yourself into anything. Um, but of course

2451
02:22:41,360 --> 02:22:43,840
Speaker 1: you know what it's about, your personal sense of identity.

2452
02:22:44,120 --> 02:22:47,240
Speaker 1: Of course it feels much bigger. Well, I think I

2453
02:22:47,320 --> 02:22:49,760
Speaker 1: think people worry about what other folks I mean, obviously

2454
02:22:49,800 --> 02:22:52,840
Speaker 1: people worry about what other folks will think and mean

2455
02:22:52,959 --> 02:22:56,040
Speaker 1: for them. Um, I don't know what I mean. It

2456
02:22:56,080 --> 02:22:58,960
Speaker 1: seems like a strange comparison to make. But I don't know.

2457
02:22:59,040 --> 02:23:03,480
Speaker 1: If you've seen Crimes of the Future, I've not yet. Oh,

2458
02:23:03,560 --> 02:23:06,800
Speaker 1: it's it's really good. It's it's the most recent David

2459
02:23:06,840 --> 02:23:10,240
Speaker 1: Cronenberg movie. And there's this great I'm going to give

2460
02:23:10,280 --> 02:23:13,000
Speaker 1: away the end of the movie, so spoiler boilers. I

2461
02:23:13,120 --> 02:23:16,000
Speaker 1: know we're giving this into a movie podcast what I've

2462
02:23:16,000 --> 02:23:19,000
Speaker 1: always wanted. There's this great scene at the end though,

2463
02:23:19,040 --> 02:23:22,120
Speaker 1: where Vigo Mortison is like in this he has this

2464
02:23:22,240 --> 02:23:25,440
Speaker 1: special like very David Cronaberti bone chair that he has

2465
02:23:25,520 --> 02:23:27,480
Speaker 1: to like be in to move him around what he's eating,

2466
02:23:28,200 --> 02:23:31,000
Speaker 1: and he finally is convinced by his partner to like

2467
02:23:31,480 --> 02:23:35,000
Speaker 1: try the plastic chocolate bar that's you know, supposed to

2468
02:23:35,080 --> 02:23:37,440
Speaker 1: be like it's a whole digestive thing. I will get

2469
02:23:37,480 --> 02:23:40,080
Speaker 1: into it. But you know, there's this moment of realization

2470
02:23:40,160 --> 02:23:41,960
Speaker 1: and like he's been avoiding this for the whole the

2471
02:23:42,000 --> 02:23:44,280
Speaker 1: whole movie, and he like tries it and he's eating

2472
02:23:44,320 --> 02:23:48,720
Speaker 1: it and and suddenly there's this this realization moment in

2473
02:23:48,800 --> 02:23:52,280
Speaker 1: his face where he's like, oh, this didn't have to

2474
02:23:52,320 --> 02:23:57,600
Speaker 1: be so difficult, Like, I society doesn't want me to

2475
02:23:57,680 --> 02:23:59,520
Speaker 1: do this, and it's it's seen as a crime, and

2476
02:23:59,600 --> 02:24:02,760
Speaker 1: it's see is as terrible. But actually, when you cross

2477
02:24:02,840 --> 02:24:08,000
Speaker 1: that rubicon, it wasn't as bad as you thought. Yeah,

2478
02:24:08,200 --> 02:24:11,320
Speaker 1: I mean, especially if you if you're even even if

2479
02:24:11,320 --> 02:24:14,200
Speaker 1: you're not like coming out to everybody you know at

2480
02:24:14,200 --> 02:24:16,000
Speaker 1: the same time, right, you can start you start off

2481
02:24:16,040 --> 02:24:17,480
Speaker 1: with a smell group of people that you know are

2482
02:24:17,920 --> 02:24:20,000
Speaker 1: gonna be with you, and you try it out with

2483
02:24:20,080 --> 02:24:22,920
Speaker 1: them and if you like it, then great, that's that's

2484
02:24:23,000 --> 02:24:25,160
Speaker 1: a really good sign if you if you start it

2485
02:24:25,200 --> 02:24:26,840
Speaker 1: and you're like, and this doesn't feel right, then you

2486
02:24:26,920 --> 02:24:28,680
Speaker 1: don't need to commit. Like it's not a thing. Right.

2487
02:24:29,600 --> 02:24:33,480
Speaker 1: That rubicon can feel so big sometimes, yeah, and it

2488
02:24:33,600 --> 02:24:36,680
Speaker 1: feels like you're you're jumping across a giant like the

2489
02:24:36,760 --> 02:24:39,560
Speaker 1: Grand Canyon. But really all it is is you're stepping across,

2490
02:24:40,200 --> 02:24:43,040
Speaker 1: you know, a small stream and you can step right

2491
02:24:43,080 --> 02:24:47,320
Speaker 1: back across there if you didn't like it. Yeah, So

2492
02:24:47,560 --> 02:24:49,440
Speaker 1: what kind of things we like to see happen around

2493
02:24:49,520 --> 02:24:53,119
Speaker 1: like the medical gatekeeping so that it's less fucked up?

2494
02:24:54,040 --> 02:24:56,520
Speaker 1: I mean, I know a lot of I'm actually act

2495
02:24:56,720 --> 02:25:01,840
Speaker 1: a conference in Belgium right now for trans health sort

2496
02:25:01,840 --> 02:25:07,000
Speaker 1: of medical trans health stuff. Um, and you know, I mean,

2497
02:25:07,040 --> 02:25:08,720
Speaker 1: I think one of the things I keep coming back

2498
02:25:08,800 --> 02:25:11,920
Speaker 1: to is you don't need to treat autistic people in

2499
02:25:12,000 --> 02:25:14,280
Speaker 1: the realm of trans healthcare any differently than you do

2500
02:25:14,360 --> 02:25:18,360
Speaker 1: anywhere else, like anyone else, Like, especially in the gate

2501
02:25:18,440 --> 02:25:22,440
Speaker 1: keeper model, we have like either you have the capacity

2502
02:25:22,520 --> 02:25:25,680
Speaker 1: to consent or you don't like that that test is,

2503
02:25:26,280 --> 02:25:29,600
Speaker 1: and I have lots of thoughts about that if that's

2504
02:25:29,640 --> 02:25:32,480
Speaker 1: for another day. But you know, whether you meet those

2505
02:25:32,560 --> 02:25:34,640
Speaker 1: tests or not, it should not be any different just

2506
02:25:34,720 --> 02:25:38,120
Speaker 1: because you're autistic. UM would like to, I guess talk

2507
02:25:38,560 --> 02:25:42,320
Speaker 1: briefly about your book. Um, you know, what's it like? What?

2508
02:25:42,600 --> 02:25:44,320
Speaker 1: What what the scope of it is? Where people can

2509
02:25:44,400 --> 02:25:49,760
Speaker 1: find it? Um, trans and Autistic Stories from Our Stories

2510
02:25:49,760 --> 02:25:53,920
Speaker 1: from Life at the Intersection by Jessica Kingsley Publishers. UM.

2511
02:25:54,440 --> 02:25:57,240
Speaker 1: It was out in I think people can find it

2512
02:25:57,280 --> 02:25:59,760
Speaker 1: on Amazon or wherever you buy books. I'm sure Paul's

2513
02:25:59,800 --> 02:26:05,040
Speaker 1: book store over there in Portland has it. Um. Yeah,

2514
02:26:05,160 --> 02:26:07,360
Speaker 1: it's it's a series of interviews with folks who are

2515
02:26:07,600 --> 02:26:10,640
Speaker 1: trans and artistic. I sat down with folks and and

2516
02:26:10,920 --> 02:26:13,200
Speaker 1: asked them about their life and and what's going on

2517
02:26:13,320 --> 02:26:15,880
Speaker 1: and what that looks like. And then I sort of, uh,

2518
02:26:17,000 --> 02:26:19,879
Speaker 1: you know, try to transcribe that into into a text,

2519
02:26:19,959 --> 02:26:21,959
Speaker 1: into a narrative form and put that in a book.

2520
02:26:22,000 --> 02:26:25,280
Speaker 1: And here we are. That sounds wonderful. Um. I see

2521
02:26:25,320 --> 02:26:27,359
Speaker 1: the I see that, I see the listing on Amazon

2522
02:26:27,520 --> 02:26:31,240
Speaker 1: dot c A for our for our Canadian Canadian folks

2523
02:26:31,280 --> 02:26:35,480
Speaker 1: as well. UM. Yeah, thank you so much for talking

2524
02:26:35,560 --> 02:26:38,240
Speaker 1: about this. Um, is there any other kind of random

2525
02:26:38,320 --> 02:26:39,880
Speaker 1: thoughts that you would like to you would like to

2526
02:26:39,959 --> 02:26:44,480
Speaker 1: mention that we haven't that we haven't brought up yet. Sure. Um.

2527
02:26:45,320 --> 02:26:47,800
Speaker 1: You know, I always like to plug groups Walsh's work,

2528
02:26:47,959 --> 02:26:50,680
Speaker 1: which looks at you know, they do a lot of

2529
02:26:50,760 --> 02:26:54,440
Speaker 1: work in trans autistic stuff too, and they kind of

2530
02:26:54,520 --> 02:26:58,400
Speaker 1: look at why more people may be trans and autistic, uh,

2531
02:26:58,520 --> 02:27:01,520
Speaker 1: And one of the things they've they found is that

2532
02:27:01,640 --> 02:27:06,600
Speaker 1: it may be that uh, autistic people are both less

2533
02:27:06,640 --> 02:27:09,960
Speaker 1: capable of hiding the fact that they're trans and less

2534
02:27:10,640 --> 02:27:14,240
Speaker 1: less capable of caring um or caring about hiding it,

2535
02:27:14,800 --> 02:27:20,720
Speaker 1: so it may be more obvious that there is a concurrence.

2536
02:27:20,760 --> 02:27:25,280
Speaker 1: They're not an actual overage of a concurrence, let's say, yeah,

2537
02:27:25,320 --> 02:27:27,720
Speaker 1: of course. Yeah, that means that was definitely in the

2538
02:27:27,800 --> 02:27:33,080
Speaker 1: back of my mind. Yeah, huh. Well again, no, thank

2539
02:27:33,160 --> 02:27:37,160
Speaker 1: you so much for coming to talk with us. Yeah,

2540
02:27:37,879 --> 02:27:39,440
Speaker 1: can I can I plug a couple of things? Is

2541
02:27:39,560 --> 02:27:46,320
Speaker 1: that plug? Plug away? This is still still your time, okay. Um.

2542
02:27:46,800 --> 02:27:50,640
Speaker 1: So I'm leading a refugee sponsorship group for a group

2543
02:27:50,720 --> 02:27:53,480
Speaker 1: of five for a trans guy from the Middle East,

2544
02:27:53,920 --> 02:27:57,920
Speaker 1: and we're raising funds through the Metropolitan Community Church in Toronto.

2545
02:27:58,360 --> 02:28:00,640
Speaker 1: We got to raise a certain amount before we can

2546
02:28:00,720 --> 02:28:03,760
Speaker 1: put the application in and I can give you that link,

2547
02:28:03,879 --> 02:28:07,360
Speaker 1: but it's at Canada helps dot org. And the Navy

2548
02:28:07,520 --> 02:28:13,760
Speaker 1: is trans Proud, trans Proud, trans and proud you are ill,

2549
02:28:13,840 --> 02:28:15,959
Speaker 1: but it's kind of long. I will I will put

2550
02:28:16,040 --> 02:28:17,400
Speaker 1: if you send me that link, I will put it

2551
02:28:17,480 --> 02:28:21,560
Speaker 1: in the description for people to click on. Awesome and

2552
02:28:21,680 --> 02:28:25,280
Speaker 1: you can find me at no atoms on Twitter because

2553
02:28:25,280 --> 02:28:28,119
Speaker 1: I got in early enough to get my name. Yeah. Wow,

2554
02:28:28,720 --> 02:28:31,520
Speaker 1: March two thousand nine, just right right on the cusp

2555
02:28:32,320 --> 02:28:35,879
Speaker 1: right well again, thank you so much for reaching out

2556
02:28:36,080 --> 02:28:39,520
Speaker 1: to talk about this intersection. Hopefully if anyone was interested

2557
02:28:40,000 --> 02:28:43,199
Speaker 1: what we were talking about, UM, please check out Noah's book,

2558
02:28:43,879 --> 02:28:47,400
Speaker 1: UM to just read a whole bunch of stories from

2559
02:28:47,680 --> 02:28:53,080
Speaker 1: from from people about this. Yeah. Awesome, thank you, Yeah,

2560
02:28:53,200 --> 02:28:55,480
Speaker 1: all right, everyone that does it for us today it's

2561
02:28:55,480 --> 02:29:14,480
Speaker 1: the on the other side. Oh yeah, Sophie, that's how

2562
02:29:14,560 --> 02:29:18,480
Speaker 1: we opened the episode. I didn't think anything could be

2563
02:29:18,640 --> 02:29:20,600
Speaker 1: more appalling than that other thing that you said that

2564
02:29:20,680 --> 02:29:23,240
Speaker 1: I want. What I was talking about, Brett Kavanaugh and

2565
02:29:23,320 --> 02:29:27,720
Speaker 1: Clarence Thomas wrapped together so tightly that they can't tell

2566
02:29:27,800 --> 02:29:33,120
Speaker 1: who's where one person's skin begins in the other. I

2567
02:29:33,280 --> 02:29:37,080
Speaker 1: walked you right into it, just like Neil Gorsch walked

2568
02:29:37,200 --> 02:29:39,440
Speaker 1: right into that and then decided, you know what, in

2569
02:29:39,600 --> 02:29:43,680
Speaker 1: for appendy, in for a pound of um? This is

2570
02:29:43,760 --> 02:29:47,800
Speaker 1: it could happen here the podcast about serious problems, where

2571
02:29:47,879 --> 02:29:51,920
Speaker 1: we talk about them seriously, and sometimes about the Supreme

2572
02:29:52,000 --> 02:29:55,920
Speaker 1: Court having a threesome like that, like that, like that

2573
02:29:56,000 --> 02:29:57,960
Speaker 1: cruise ship where there was a threesome and then a

2574
02:29:58,000 --> 02:30:01,320
Speaker 1: giant six fight. How's everybody doing today? I think the

2575
02:30:01,400 --> 02:30:05,000
Speaker 1: opening will work better if we just believe out and yeah, yes,

2576
02:30:05,160 --> 02:30:09,280
Speaker 1: always bleep outcome um except for right there. So I

2577
02:30:09,320 --> 02:30:12,960
Speaker 1: I feel like today we should chat about one of

2578
02:30:13,040 --> 02:30:16,960
Speaker 1: the many things that's that's a problem, which is a

2579
02:30:17,040 --> 02:30:20,640
Speaker 1: specific piece of disinformation that is spreading and not quite

2580
02:30:20,720 --> 02:30:24,280
Speaker 1: like wildfire. It's more spreading like in the background, like

2581
02:30:24,440 --> 02:30:27,640
Speaker 1: monkey pops on the internet. This is not like the

2582
02:30:27,800 --> 02:30:32,520
Speaker 1: number one piece of of of of like conspiratorial nonsense

2583
02:30:32,600 --> 02:30:34,720
Speaker 1: that's getting around, but it's getting around deeply, and I'm

2584
02:30:34,760 --> 02:30:36,880
Speaker 1: seeing it on the left and the right. You have

2585
02:30:37,080 --> 02:30:39,440
Speaker 1: if you spend any time at all on social media,

2586
02:30:40,080 --> 02:30:44,080
Speaker 1: which statistically you do, you've probably seen a bunch of

2587
02:30:44,240 --> 02:30:49,680
Speaker 1: stories and like freaked out posts about fires and arson

2588
02:30:50,120 --> 02:30:54,560
Speaker 1: at agricultural facilities and factories of food factories is often

2589
02:30:54,600 --> 02:30:57,480
Speaker 1: how it's phrased. I think the post I saw about

2590
02:30:57,560 --> 02:31:01,160
Speaker 1: it that was sort of most emblematic with someone being like, hey,

2591
02:31:01,480 --> 02:31:05,640
Speaker 1: you know, uh, you're probably not aware that some huge

2592
02:31:05,720 --> 02:31:08,040
Speaker 1: number of chickens died in this fire recently and a

2593
02:31:08,080 --> 02:31:11,240
Speaker 1: bunch of cows died in this field. But if you were,

2594
02:31:11,360 --> 02:31:15,280
Speaker 1: it's the only thing you'd be talking about. And the

2595
02:31:15,440 --> 02:31:18,520
Speaker 1: idea kind of that people are pushing when they when

2596
02:31:18,560 --> 02:31:24,720
Speaker 1: they uh, catastrophize this is that there's this massive rash

2597
02:31:24,879 --> 02:31:29,480
Speaker 1: of attacks on American food infrastructure, UM at a year

2598
02:31:29,560 --> 02:31:32,760
Speaker 1: when we're already due for a food crisis because of

2599
02:31:32,840 --> 02:31:36,520
Speaker 1: the Ukraine, and um, it's going to be this this big,

2600
02:31:36,959 --> 02:31:40,160
Speaker 1: like looming disaster and some like shady group is trying

2601
02:31:40,240 --> 02:31:45,080
Speaker 1: to starve everybody. UM. And we brought in a friend

2602
02:31:45,240 --> 02:31:47,600
Speaker 1: to talk about this because it's it is not at

2603
02:31:47,640 --> 02:31:50,720
Speaker 1: all what what people who are kind of catastrophizing or

2604
02:31:50,720 --> 02:31:53,640
Speaker 1: saying UM. And I wanted to introduce Carl to the show. Carl,

2605
02:31:53,959 --> 02:31:57,039
Speaker 1: how are you doing, buddy? You know, living living life

2606
02:31:57,080 --> 02:32:02,039
Speaker 1: in a one party state. Yeah yeah, Um, I don't know, man,

2607
02:32:02,080 --> 02:32:03,960
Speaker 1: there's a lot of parties these days, like the one

2608
02:32:04,000 --> 02:32:07,520
Speaker 1: on that cruise ship. Uh so, or is the Forward

2609
02:32:07,680 --> 02:32:15,440
Speaker 1: Party our our favorite? This is a big Yang Gang podcast. Um. Now, Carl,

2610
02:32:16,000 --> 02:32:17,800
Speaker 1: you and I had buddies on the old Twitter for

2611
02:32:17,879 --> 02:32:20,080
Speaker 1: a while. You were the origin of one of the

2612
02:32:20,280 --> 02:32:24,760
Speaker 1: terms that that that we use a lot on this show. Um,

2613
02:32:26,120 --> 02:32:28,520
Speaker 1: and uh yeah, I wanted to I wanted to talk

2614
02:32:28,560 --> 02:32:31,160
Speaker 1: to you because this is this is a pretty potent

2615
02:32:31,240 --> 02:32:35,440
Speaker 1: piece of weaponized on reality. Um. You have been tracking

2616
02:32:35,520 --> 02:32:38,920
Speaker 1: this for a while on kind of your Own. Yeah, well,

2617
02:32:40,080 --> 02:32:42,480
Speaker 1: this is one of those ones that's it sits in

2618
02:32:42,680 --> 02:32:46,000
Speaker 1: between a lot of the other conspiracies, right so, like

2619
02:32:46,240 --> 02:32:50,880
Speaker 1: you said, it's it's kind of the background operating thing

2620
02:32:51,080 --> 02:32:56,280
Speaker 1: right now. Um. And you know, so when we think

2621
02:32:56,320 --> 02:32:58,920
Speaker 1: of the big conspiracies right now, they kind of revolve

2622
02:32:58,959 --> 02:33:02,200
Speaker 1: around what they always did, depopulation, weird n W. We

2623
02:33:02,480 --> 02:33:07,080
Speaker 1: like secret Society stuff, the Q, the Q brand of that. However,

2624
02:33:07,120 --> 02:33:08,720
Speaker 1: we want to look at this is a little bit

2625
02:33:08,840 --> 02:33:14,720
Speaker 1: different because this is more overtly political, right So, this

2626
02:33:14,959 --> 02:33:19,279
Speaker 1: is this is looking to not just dig the hole

2627
02:33:19,800 --> 02:33:22,920
Speaker 1: of well, everyone's out to get us Bill Gates is

2628
02:33:22,959 --> 02:33:25,520
Speaker 1: buying all the farmland, you know, the crazy stuff we

2629
02:33:25,640 --> 02:33:27,960
Speaker 1: normally I mean, you know that's right in this, but

2630
02:33:28,120 --> 02:33:32,920
Speaker 1: it's not the center part um. And yeah, I've been

2631
02:33:32,959 --> 02:33:36,680
Speaker 1: looking at this for a few months now since I

2632
02:33:37,000 --> 02:33:39,400
Speaker 1: first saw it, and I first saw kind of traces

2633
02:33:39,440 --> 02:33:44,440
Speaker 1: of this right after the invasion of Ukraine started, so

2634
02:33:44,840 --> 02:33:50,040
Speaker 1: early March. Things started to kind of shift and nothing,

2635
02:33:50,520 --> 02:33:53,000
Speaker 1: you know, post here and there that are now missing,

2636
02:33:53,120 --> 02:33:56,160
Speaker 1: stuff like that, the kind of classic Well, let's test

2637
02:33:56,200 --> 02:33:58,800
Speaker 1: the waters. Let's see how people accept the idea that

2638
02:33:58,959 --> 02:34:02,400
Speaker 1: maybe something out you know, in the in the conspiratorial

2639
02:34:02,480 --> 02:34:07,039
Speaker 1: way is going on just asking questions type yeah, exactly exactly.

2640
02:34:07,120 --> 02:34:09,720
Speaker 1: It's the just asking questions It said, just well maybe

2641
02:34:09,760 --> 02:34:13,400
Speaker 1: think about it kind of thing. And those those pique

2642
02:34:13,440 --> 02:34:17,200
Speaker 1: my interest because those tend to be test balloons, and

2643
02:34:18,160 --> 02:34:20,600
Speaker 1: for this kind of thing, I had a weird you know,

2644
02:34:21,040 --> 02:34:23,480
Speaker 1: they're weird feelings you kind of get when you watch

2645
02:34:23,600 --> 02:34:30,960
Speaker 1: some of this as much as we do. Yes, yeah,

2646
02:34:31,520 --> 02:34:33,760
Speaker 1: and you think kind of sense when the thing has

2647
02:34:33,879 --> 02:34:37,560
Speaker 1: enough ingredients to catch on exactly, and especially when they're

2648
02:34:37,600 --> 02:34:41,800
Speaker 1: super kind of inflammatory ingredients, right, you know, the Bill

2649
02:34:41,879 --> 02:34:45,199
Speaker 1: Gates um buying all the farmland is a good example,

2650
02:34:45,320 --> 02:34:49,200
Speaker 1: not quite as inflammatory, but catches on because people, you know,

2651
02:34:49,320 --> 02:34:53,600
Speaker 1: it's it's the social paradelia thing. There's always like, there's

2652
02:34:53,600 --> 02:34:55,720
Speaker 1: always this, I mean, and this is something again that's

2653
02:34:55,760 --> 02:34:57,920
Speaker 1: a broader thing with conspiracies. There's always a germ of truth.

2654
02:34:57,959 --> 02:34:59,800
Speaker 1: The germ of truth with that is that Bill Gates

2655
02:34:59,879 --> 02:35:02,039
Speaker 1: is on a lot of farmland. Now, if you compare

2656
02:35:02,080 --> 02:35:04,800
Speaker 1: it to the total quantity of farmland he has bought,

2657
02:35:04,959 --> 02:35:07,760
Speaker 1: very it's like, yeah, it's a fraction point oh three

2658
02:35:08,320 --> 02:35:10,400
Speaker 1: or something. I mean, it's an absolutely tiny amount of

2659
02:35:10,440 --> 02:35:13,400
Speaker 1: the total, right, Yeah, Because this this country is I

2660
02:35:13,480 --> 02:35:16,680
Speaker 1: don't know, if you've looked at him, appresently pretty sizeable country,

2661
02:35:16,840 --> 02:35:20,040
Speaker 1: the United States of America kind of a big place

2662
02:35:20,720 --> 02:35:23,920
Speaker 1: when you actually look. Yeah, and so the kernel of

2663
02:35:24,040 --> 02:35:28,640
Speaker 1: truth is there there. There are fires right there, industrial accidents,

2664
02:35:28,760 --> 02:35:32,760
Speaker 1: there are weird stuff happens in big industrial situations. We

2665
02:35:32,879 --> 02:35:36,040
Speaker 1: have a large industrial farming situation in this country. So

2666
02:35:36,120 --> 02:35:39,000
Speaker 1: you see it. And I think part of what makes

2667
02:35:39,160 --> 02:35:41,560
Speaker 1: the kind of the idea that oh, this is suddenly

2668
02:35:41,680 --> 02:35:44,960
Speaker 1: happening and it's suddenly like a massive problem easier to

2669
02:35:45,000 --> 02:35:48,360
Speaker 1: sell to people is that most Americans know next to

2670
02:35:48,520 --> 02:35:50,720
Speaker 1: nothing about the food supply and how it works. Like

2671
02:35:50,800 --> 02:35:53,680
Speaker 1: if you have because I grew up in and around farms,

2672
02:35:53,680 --> 02:35:56,040
Speaker 1: I've been a lot of my life in agricultural areas.

2673
02:35:56,920 --> 02:36:01,640
Speaker 1: Farms and things related to farms catch on fire fucking constantly.

2674
02:36:02,200 --> 02:36:05,200
Speaker 1: You may not be Yeah, they're they're like I think

2675
02:36:05,240 --> 02:36:09,120
Speaker 1: they said there are five thousand annually annually, about fifteen

2676
02:36:09,160 --> 02:36:13,840
Speaker 1: a day. I mean, it's it's giant fields of dried grain.

2677
02:36:14,080 --> 02:36:17,000
Speaker 1: It's deeds of dried grain, and it's shipped like silos

2678
02:36:17,080 --> 02:36:19,920
Speaker 1: full of like flour and stuff, which is like there's

2679
02:36:20,040 --> 02:36:25,320
Speaker 1: nothing like, yeah, silos explode like like the like a

2680
02:36:25,480 --> 02:36:29,920
Speaker 1: a silo full of grain is slightly less explosive than

2681
02:36:30,080 --> 02:36:33,560
Speaker 1: like a military like missile or some ship. Like they're

2682
02:36:33,959 --> 02:36:36,560
Speaker 1: like they detonate if you catch them at the right

2683
02:36:36,600 --> 02:36:39,320
Speaker 1: way exactly. And like I know here in Minnesota a

2684
02:36:39,400 --> 02:36:41,600
Speaker 1: few years ago and there's video of a floating around.

2685
02:36:41,640 --> 02:36:43,720
Speaker 1: You know, there was a you know, a corn, a

2686
02:36:43,800 --> 02:36:47,560
Speaker 1: corn silo split and the dust goes out and something

2687
02:36:47,680 --> 02:36:50,040
Speaker 1: you know, a car or engine because it's hot, sparks

2688
02:36:50,080 --> 02:36:52,320
Speaker 1: it off and it's a fireball. You know, So these

2689
02:36:52,360 --> 02:36:56,440
Speaker 1: things happen, and I can remember there was one of

2690
02:36:56,480 --> 02:36:59,000
Speaker 1: the last things I saw and I went and covered

2691
02:36:59,040 --> 02:37:01,560
Speaker 1: in Texas before I moved, was there's this little town

2692
02:37:01,600 --> 02:37:04,280
Speaker 1: called West which is not in West Texas, it's in

2693
02:37:04,360 --> 02:37:09,200
Speaker 1: North Texas. It's in between, um, Dallas and Waco, which

2694
02:37:09,320 --> 02:37:12,800
Speaker 1: is in between Dallas and Austin, because no, Waco is

2695
02:37:12,840 --> 02:37:16,240
Speaker 1: not a destination. And they had this big god it

2696
02:37:16,360 --> 02:37:19,680
Speaker 1: was some sort of what was the I'm gonna google

2697
02:37:19,720 --> 02:37:23,400
Speaker 1: what the facility was, uh, but it was it was

2698
02:37:23,520 --> 02:37:27,160
Speaker 1: this like, um yeah, it was a fertilizer factory and

2699
02:37:27,440 --> 02:37:29,920
Speaker 1: it caught on fire. There's a terrifying video of this

2700
02:37:30,000 --> 02:37:32,400
Speaker 1: guy with his daughter watching it and it goes off

2701
02:37:33,080 --> 02:37:36,600
Speaker 1: like like a fucking fuel air bomb, the massive exploit.

2702
02:37:36,640 --> 02:37:40,040
Speaker 1: It killed the entire town's fire department, like all of

2703
02:37:40,120 --> 02:37:46,240
Speaker 1: them dead in a second. It was basically fucking anfo

2704
02:37:46,400 --> 02:37:49,959
Speaker 1: And because it happens this is like two, I think, um,

2705
02:37:50,160 --> 02:37:52,600
Speaker 1: it never it's just this big tragedy. If it had

2706
02:37:52,600 --> 02:37:54,440
Speaker 1: happened a couple of years later, there would have been

2707
02:37:54,520 --> 02:37:58,080
Speaker 1: like a conspiracy attached to it. It was just yeah,

2708
02:37:58,240 --> 02:38:01,800
Speaker 1: it was just slightly to r a but like this

2709
02:38:01,879 --> 02:38:03,840
Speaker 1: ship happened. I mean, the point of making is that

2710
02:38:04,240 --> 02:38:06,080
Speaker 1: and that we're making here is that like this ship

2711
02:38:06,200 --> 02:38:08,520
Speaker 1: happens all the time, and to the numbers we were

2712
02:38:08,560 --> 02:38:13,000
Speaker 1: quoting earlier, there's no evidence whatsoever that there are a

2713
02:38:13,200 --> 02:38:16,959
Speaker 1: higher number of of these events this year than there

2714
02:38:17,040 --> 02:38:19,800
Speaker 1: ever are. Um. Basically, one of the things that we've

2715
02:38:19,879 --> 02:38:22,160
Speaker 1: seen is as of like the spring of this year,

2716
02:38:23,360 --> 02:38:28,039
Speaker 1: a list has been compiled, um, mainly in places like Gateway,

2717
02:38:28,080 --> 02:38:30,800
Speaker 1: Pundit and zero Hedge, where they've got like a hundred

2718
02:38:30,879 --> 02:38:34,160
Speaker 1: different events too, and and it it looks very compelling

2719
02:38:34,160 --> 02:38:36,440
Speaker 1: when you just see this list of and there's this fire,

2720
02:38:36,480 --> 02:38:38,680
Speaker 1: and this many chickens died here, and this many cows died,

2721
02:38:38,720 --> 02:38:41,199
Speaker 1: and there was this explosion. But again, if you actually

2722
02:38:41,240 --> 02:38:44,240
Speaker 1: look at the number of events that are expected in

2723
02:38:44,320 --> 02:38:47,320
Speaker 1: a year, there's nothing abnormal about this, and in fact,

2724
02:38:47,400 --> 02:38:50,600
Speaker 1: it's pretty middle of the road for any year. And

2725
02:38:50,760 --> 02:38:53,560
Speaker 1: like the bird, the bird calls right, like that's a

2726
02:38:53,600 --> 02:38:57,000
Speaker 1: great example of this being just absolutely out of the

2727
02:38:57,160 --> 02:39:00,120
Speaker 1: park conspiracy land. I mean, there's a massive eight and

2728
02:39:00,240 --> 02:39:03,840
Speaker 1: flu epidemic going on right now that's killed more birds,

2729
02:39:04,160 --> 02:39:08,000
Speaker 1: you know, than the last ten years. And so when

2730
02:39:08,040 --> 02:39:10,360
Speaker 1: you start talking about you know, three hundred you know,

2731
02:39:10,480 --> 02:39:14,720
Speaker 1: three hundred million birds worldwide being called whatever the massive

2732
02:39:14,800 --> 02:39:19,440
Speaker 1: numbers that funny how avian flu does that, and that's

2733
02:39:19,440 --> 02:39:23,040
Speaker 1: a response. But when you get into the zero hedge,

2734
02:39:23,400 --> 02:39:26,920
Speaker 1: who is really pushing this right now world that's one

2735
02:39:26,959 --> 02:39:28,800
Speaker 1: of the top ones on the list. And it also

2736
02:39:28,920 --> 02:39:30,920
Speaker 1: makes you know they have their little maps up right

2737
02:39:30,959 --> 02:39:33,720
Speaker 1: now with all the drop tabs that show right they

2738
02:39:33,879 --> 02:39:37,439
Speaker 1: love doing and there's a you see this in other conspiracies.

2739
02:39:37,440 --> 02:39:39,400
Speaker 1: I think one of the big ones that that kind

2740
02:39:39,400 --> 02:39:42,080
Speaker 1: of was a little I don't know, on the edge

2741
02:39:42,120 --> 02:39:45,640
Speaker 1: of of of getting mainstream recently was like the conspiracy

2742
02:39:45,680 --> 02:39:49,800
Speaker 1: about people disappearing at national parks where it's like mapped, yeah,

2743
02:39:49,959 --> 02:39:58,360
Speaker 1: exactly like it, yeah, and it's like, yeah, man, um people,

2744
02:39:58,520 --> 02:40:01,600
Speaker 1: there's three million p in the United States, Like and

2745
02:40:01,879 --> 02:40:04,280
Speaker 1: also people go missing while hiking and one of the

2746
02:40:04,520 --> 02:40:06,680
Speaker 1: like a bunch of stuff isn't on that list, like

2747
02:40:06,720 --> 02:40:08,800
Speaker 1: the number of those people who were found again and

2748
02:40:08,879 --> 02:40:11,120
Speaker 1: what exactly a lot of people just like slip and

2749
02:40:11,240 --> 02:40:13,360
Speaker 1: fall and never a seat again because they falled out

2750
02:40:13,360 --> 02:40:17,280
Speaker 1: a cliff. Yes, national parks are kind of dangerous, funny

2751
02:40:17,360 --> 02:40:20,880
Speaker 1: enough once you're off, Yeah, that's why they're fun Yeah exactly.

2752
02:40:21,360 --> 02:40:23,480
Speaker 1: There was there was a whole four wh one documentary

2753
02:40:23,520 --> 02:40:25,440
Speaker 1: made a few years ago about this person who went missing,

2754
02:40:25,480 --> 02:40:27,800
Speaker 1: you like were they were They dropped into a secret

2755
02:40:27,840 --> 02:40:31,480
Speaker 1: underground government bunker where they abducted and they like a

2756
02:40:31,600 --> 02:40:33,560
Speaker 1: year later they found his body at the bottom of

2757
02:40:33,600 --> 02:40:36,680
Speaker 1: a cliff. Yeah, and like it it doesn't you know,

2758
02:40:37,000 --> 02:40:40,400
Speaker 1: that doesn't talk about the horrible stuff done with like

2759
02:40:41,000 --> 02:40:44,199
Speaker 1: especially in Canada with all of the missing indigenous women.

2760
02:40:45,360 --> 02:40:47,960
Speaker 1: Is actually it is actually a big problem. But I

2761
02:40:48,040 --> 02:40:49,560
Speaker 1: mean to back to back to the fact, back to

2762
02:40:49,760 --> 02:40:51,640
Speaker 1: the farming thing. I think what all of these you

2763
02:40:51,680 --> 02:40:56,000
Speaker 1: know stories show is just the innate holder of industrial farming.

2764
02:40:56,400 --> 02:41:03,039
Speaker 1: It's actually the scar Yeah, yeah, it is absolutely scary, um,

2765
02:41:03,800 --> 02:41:07,119
Speaker 1: but it's also like normal scary. Like the thing that's

2766
02:41:07,120 --> 02:41:11,120
Speaker 1: scary is that the system of industrial farming is incredibly dangerous.

2767
02:41:11,160 --> 02:41:14,000
Speaker 1: And like, if you actually want to be properly horrified

2768
02:41:14,040 --> 02:41:17,080
Speaker 1: about something relating to food production, look at how many

2769
02:41:17,200 --> 02:41:20,160
Speaker 1: people die because they get sucked into bogs of pigshit

2770
02:41:21,879 --> 02:41:25,560
Speaker 1: or drowning grain stile or drowning grain sile. I mean people, legit,

2771
02:41:27,480 --> 02:41:30,800
Speaker 1: whole families. One person will fall in the grain silo

2772
02:41:30,840 --> 02:41:33,240
Speaker 1: and they'll try to get him out the whole families.

2773
02:41:33,600 --> 02:41:36,200
Speaker 1: I know, I know people who have who have died

2774
02:41:36,240 --> 02:41:40,879
Speaker 1: that way because I grew up in the very agricultural area. Yeah,

2775
02:41:41,560 --> 02:41:43,440
Speaker 1: a lot of this is just like people don't know

2776
02:41:43,560 --> 02:41:46,920
Speaker 1: the country, but sharine, yes, um so industrial. I mean

2777
02:41:47,000 --> 02:41:49,640
Speaker 1: like yeah for me, for me someone that hasn't growed

2778
02:41:49,680 --> 02:41:53,959
Speaker 1: up in any agricultural area at all, and this is yeah.

2779
02:41:54,720 --> 02:41:58,520
Speaker 1: Grain is like so it's like quicksand it sucks you in.

2780
02:41:59,120 --> 02:42:01,320
Speaker 1: It takes you to that bottom. If you don't spread

2781
02:42:01,320 --> 02:42:03,440
Speaker 1: out immediately, you're going down and there's really no way

2782
02:42:03,520 --> 02:42:06,880
Speaker 1: to save somebody. It's stay pretty, stay the funk away

2783
02:42:06,959 --> 02:42:10,080
Speaker 1: from grain silos. Yeah, do not play around grain silos,

2784
02:42:10,879 --> 02:42:13,480
Speaker 1: around with the grain silo. It is it is. It

2785
02:42:13,600 --> 02:42:15,840
Speaker 1: is killed entire families because people will try to save

2786
02:42:15,920 --> 02:42:19,720
Speaker 1: each other then they get sucked down and it's it's pretty. Yeah,

2787
02:42:20,000 --> 02:42:24,520
Speaker 1: it's bad when you have livestock livestock poop, and sometimes

2788
02:42:24,560 --> 02:42:26,480
Speaker 1: that poop is super useful. Chicken ship's one of the

2789
02:42:26,520 --> 02:42:29,720
Speaker 1: best fertilizers ever. You can make. Chicken ship very very useful.

2790
02:42:30,200 --> 02:42:33,600
Speaker 1: Pigshit is like nasty, it's toxic. It is very hard

2791
02:42:33,640 --> 02:42:36,920
Speaker 1: to do anything. It's it's in the ground long enough

2792
02:42:36,959 --> 02:42:39,200
Speaker 1: it's a bio Well theoretically, if you were to like

2793
02:42:39,360 --> 02:42:41,480
Speaker 1: really care about it, you could you could make a

2794
02:42:41,640 --> 02:42:44,360
Speaker 1: use of it given enough time. But there's so many

2795
02:42:44,480 --> 02:42:47,280
Speaker 1: pigs because our hunger for bacon is insatiable that you

2796
02:42:47,360 --> 02:42:51,440
Speaker 1: wind up with this this massive tox of massive toxic sludge.

2797
02:42:51,480 --> 02:42:53,080
Speaker 1: So there's the chunk of the country in which most

2798
02:42:53,120 --> 02:42:56,080
Speaker 1: of the pigs come from. There are these huge pigshit

2799
02:42:56,240 --> 02:42:59,640
Speaker 1: bogs that are like there are countries smaller than bogs

2800
02:42:59,680 --> 02:43:01,520
Speaker 1: of pig ship that we have in the United States,

2801
02:43:01,600 --> 02:43:03,320
Speaker 1: and people die in them all the time. They get

2802
02:43:03,320 --> 02:43:06,720
Speaker 1: sucked down into the big ship or you suffocate because

2803
02:43:06,760 --> 02:43:08,840
Speaker 1: you get one of them bursts. I mean, there's so

2804
02:43:08,920 --> 02:43:11,080
Speaker 1: many weird things because it's a meth their methane and

2805
02:43:11,200 --> 02:43:14,800
Speaker 1: hydrogen sulfide scences. So it's just like bad things around

2806
02:43:14,879 --> 02:43:19,240
Speaker 1: farms all the time, and that's just that's just farming

2807
02:43:19,640 --> 02:43:22,520
Speaker 1: and what we're ultimately what we are seeing here. If

2808
02:43:22,560 --> 02:43:24,680
Speaker 1: you want to like actually analyze the thing that is

2809
02:43:24,720 --> 02:43:29,160
Speaker 1: happening um with all of these conspiracies, it's it's what's

2810
02:43:29,160 --> 02:43:32,360
Speaker 1: called the frequency illusion, which is the idea that like

2811
02:43:32,760 --> 02:43:35,199
Speaker 1: if you've ever I don't know, if somebody when somebody

2812
02:43:35,280 --> 02:43:37,600
Speaker 1: like teaches, like you learn a new word, right, or

2813
02:43:37,600 --> 02:43:39,480
Speaker 1: you like you hear about a historic event, and then

2814
02:43:39,520 --> 02:43:45,160
Speaker 1: you keep seeing everywhere. This is something that's an author

2815
02:43:45,240 --> 02:43:48,160
Speaker 1: that Garrison and I quite like Robert Anton Wilson played

2816
02:43:48,200 --> 02:43:50,280
Speaker 1: with a lot um. It's why, like twenty three is

2817
02:43:50,440 --> 02:43:53,240
Speaker 1: one thing you'll notice in like Hollywood movies and TV

2818
02:43:53,360 --> 02:43:55,960
Speaker 1: shows if you look out for twenty they're fucking everywhere

2819
02:43:56,000 --> 02:43:58,160
Speaker 1: because a whole bunch of people who got into Hollywood

2820
02:43:58,160 --> 02:44:00,879
Speaker 1: are fans of the same guy. And there's this conspiracy

2821
02:44:00,920 --> 02:44:02,720
Speaker 1: with the number of twenty three people sticking. It's all

2822
02:44:02,760 --> 02:44:05,440
Speaker 1: over the fucking wire. It's in a bunch of ship um,

2823
02:44:06,120 --> 02:44:08,840
Speaker 1: and it's it's yeah, at the base of things like right,

2824
02:44:09,080 --> 02:44:12,520
Speaker 1: humans are paradelium, right, So we're looking for patterns and

2825
02:44:12,600 --> 02:44:15,880
Speaker 1: static that's what we do. It's part like in my mind,

2826
02:44:15,920 --> 02:44:19,520
Speaker 1: it's part of our like ancestral uh, you know, deep

2827
02:44:19,560 --> 02:44:23,200
Speaker 1: in the past protection, right, how we cont me? Yeah,

2828
02:44:23,560 --> 02:44:25,920
Speaker 1: exactly what's that? And it's how you look for monsters

2829
02:44:25,959 --> 02:44:28,080
Speaker 1: in the woods, you know. It's like when we're looking

2830
02:44:28,240 --> 02:44:31,480
Speaker 1: for eyes in the dark. That's part of it. And

2831
02:44:31,640 --> 02:44:35,400
Speaker 1: so you know, we tend to find meaning in points

2832
02:44:35,920 --> 02:44:38,600
Speaker 1: and then try and connect them because that's how we work.

2833
02:44:38,760 --> 02:44:41,840
Speaker 1: And so this is a great example of this because

2834
02:44:41,879 --> 02:44:44,800
Speaker 1: it hasn't gone full Q level yet where it's just

2835
02:44:46,440 --> 02:44:50,280
Speaker 1: absurd to be absurd. The shield itself, like you can

2836
02:44:50,360 --> 02:44:54,000
Speaker 1: see where people are trying to pick together points that

2837
02:44:54,320 --> 02:44:58,320
Speaker 1: normally are just industrial accidents. And you know, some of

2838
02:44:58,360 --> 02:45:01,240
Speaker 1: the stuff I saw early on, for like the cow

2839
02:45:01,360 --> 02:45:05,160
Speaker 1: death posts and the stuff related to climate change, what

2840
02:45:05,320 --> 02:45:09,520
Speaker 1: you really were seeing was people trying to make order

2841
02:45:09,959 --> 02:45:13,320
Speaker 1: out of what is just chaotic accidents and now and

2842
02:45:13,440 --> 02:45:19,640
Speaker 1: now yeah, yeah, no, it's it's it's something you rarely

2843
02:45:19,720 --> 02:45:24,119
Speaker 1: actually see in the cascade of you know, conspiracy theory

2844
02:45:24,200 --> 02:45:27,560
Speaker 1: like this so overtly and it's been really interesting for

2845
02:45:27,640 --> 02:45:31,640
Speaker 1: me watching that because you know, as someone who's far

2846
02:45:31,800 --> 02:45:36,400
Speaker 1: too into watching people melt their brains. UM. This this

2847
02:45:36,600 --> 02:45:39,120
Speaker 1: kind of lays out some of the ways that this

2848
02:45:39,280 --> 02:45:42,480
Speaker 1: works for all of us, UM, and I think it

2849
02:45:42,520 --> 02:45:45,720
Speaker 1: also offers a roadmap in certain ways to like see

2850
02:45:45,800 --> 02:45:48,640
Speaker 1: past it and be able to correct it for yourself

2851
02:45:48,760 --> 02:45:51,480
Speaker 1: so you don't get into the same Oh there are

2852
02:45:51,480 --> 02:45:55,320
Speaker 1: a thousand points a light here, let's fall all of them. Yeah,

2853
02:45:55,640 --> 02:45:57,960
Speaker 1: it's UM. One of the things that's interesting. So, like

2854
02:45:58,480 --> 02:46:03,160
Speaker 1: we just called it the the recency bias or the

2855
02:46:03,240 --> 02:46:06,120
Speaker 1: frequency illusions, is also the recency illusion, which is like

2856
02:46:06,200 --> 02:46:09,400
Speaker 1: the belief that things that you have like noticed only

2857
02:46:09,520 --> 02:46:12,280
Speaker 1: recently are a recent phenomena rather than things that go

2858
02:46:12,400 --> 02:46:14,640
Speaker 1: back a long time. There these are kind of inter related.

2859
02:46:14,720 --> 02:46:17,720
Speaker 1: But this, this sort of phenomena that we're seeing is

2860
02:46:17,760 --> 02:46:22,120
Speaker 1: often called the bottom mine off phenomena. And that's so

2861
02:46:22,440 --> 02:46:25,560
Speaker 1: so the bottom I'm pretty yeah bottom the bottom mine

2862
02:46:25,560 --> 02:46:29,360
Speaker 1: Off group was a it's also called the German Red Army. UM.

2863
02:46:29,520 --> 02:46:33,120
Speaker 1: It was a yeah, it was a West German terrorist

2864
02:46:33,280 --> 02:46:37,600
Speaker 1: organization from like seventy years ago. Like this is not

2865
02:46:37,879 --> 02:46:41,720
Speaker 1: a recent thing, but there was an article about them

2866
02:46:41,879 --> 02:46:45,680
Speaker 1: in like a Minnesota St. Paul newspaper in nineteen four

2867
02:46:45,840 --> 02:46:47,680
Speaker 1: that happened to be one of the first newspapers with

2868
02:46:47,720 --> 02:46:53,280
Speaker 1: an online comment page. Oh no, well yeah, so this

2869
02:46:53,440 --> 02:46:55,199
Speaker 1: is like you'll always here referred to as the bottom

2870
02:46:55,200 --> 02:46:57,040
Speaker 1: mine off phenomena. It has nothing to do with this

2871
02:46:57,200 --> 02:46:59,800
Speaker 1: terrorist group other than the fact that one commenter on

2872
02:47:00,480 --> 02:47:03,720
Speaker 1: saw an article about them, um within a couple of

2873
02:47:03,800 --> 02:47:06,520
Speaker 1: hours of someone else in their life telling them about

2874
02:47:06,560 --> 02:47:09,080
Speaker 1: the group, and so they named it in the common

2875
02:47:09,120 --> 02:47:12,320
Speaker 1: section the bottom mine off phenomena because yeah, like it's

2876
02:47:12,360 --> 02:47:16,200
Speaker 1: it's which is an example of the phenomena. Um, but

2877
02:47:16,440 --> 02:47:19,400
Speaker 1: like that's it is. It is. It's a thing that

2878
02:47:19,480 --> 02:47:22,880
Speaker 1: people do for again good reason. Like like you said,

2879
02:47:22,959 --> 02:47:26,640
Speaker 1: like if you're a fucking hunter gatherer and you notice that, like, oh,

2880
02:47:26,760 --> 02:47:29,560
Speaker 1: after a rainstorm is when the big cats come out

2881
02:47:29,640 --> 02:47:31,600
Speaker 1: and hunt. And like if somebody, if one of your

2882
02:47:31,640 --> 02:47:34,800
Speaker 1: friends gets eaten by like a tiger, it's probably after

2883
02:47:34,959 --> 02:47:38,720
Speaker 1: a rainstorm. You associate after the rainstorm with danger, which

2884
02:47:38,760 --> 02:47:43,359
Speaker 1: is like good, right, Like I live inside urban environments,

2885
02:47:43,480 --> 02:47:46,960
Speaker 1: the usually usually less. This becomes useful as relating to

2886
02:47:47,040 --> 02:47:52,080
Speaker 1: more of our like instinctual practices. Learning to recognize this

2887
02:47:52,280 --> 02:47:56,520
Speaker 1: like first step of delusion is really important. Um, I

2888
02:47:56,560 --> 02:48:00,560
Speaker 1: don't think decisions in the future, right, But I think

2889
02:48:00,600 --> 02:48:03,119
Speaker 1: it's much more similar than we realized to like how

2890
02:48:03,200 --> 02:48:09,120
Speaker 1: people think of religion, because even religions people are Yeah,

2891
02:48:09,160 --> 02:48:12,600
Speaker 1: like what you're saying is like there's so much chaos.

2892
02:48:12,720 --> 02:48:15,040
Speaker 1: People can't make sense of the world. And just like religion,

2893
02:48:15,080 --> 02:48:18,360
Speaker 1: you're trying to make order out of disorder and look

2894
02:48:18,400 --> 02:48:20,320
Speaker 1: for signs, to look for patterns. It's like an element

2895
02:48:20,360 --> 02:48:23,760
Speaker 1: of magical thinking where yes, you look for reasons that

2896
02:48:23,959 --> 02:48:27,080
Speaker 1: this has meaning, so I understand where they're coming from.

2897
02:48:29,000 --> 02:48:31,240
Speaker 1: And so the problem, again, the problem is not with

2898
02:48:31,360 --> 02:48:33,800
Speaker 1: your brain, because this is not like a bad thing

2899
02:48:33,920 --> 02:48:35,520
Speaker 1: your brain is doing. It's just a thing your brain

2900
02:48:35,680 --> 02:48:38,840
Speaker 1: is doing. The problem is that this is one of

2901
02:48:38,920 --> 02:48:42,560
Speaker 1: the easiest ways that bad faith actors can take advantage

2902
02:48:42,600 --> 02:48:45,240
Speaker 1: of you and other people, and so in terms of

2903
02:48:45,320 --> 02:48:49,040
Speaker 1: protecting yourself and others from it. And again, one of

2904
02:48:49,080 --> 02:48:50,640
Speaker 1: the problems with this and one of the things that

2905
02:48:50,760 --> 02:48:54,840
Speaker 1: makes it so so much more difficult twenty years ago

2906
02:48:55,040 --> 02:48:57,439
Speaker 1: the batter mind how obviously the bottom line how phenomenon

2907
02:48:57,560 --> 02:48:59,200
Speaker 1: was as much of a thing as that dude in

2908
02:48:59,240 --> 02:49:03,440
Speaker 1: the fucking Commons page that Minnesota paper proves, But there

2909
02:49:03,560 --> 02:49:06,120
Speaker 1: was less ship coming at you, so you kind of

2910
02:49:06,200 --> 02:49:08,080
Speaker 1: had even if you might get caught for a little

2911
02:49:08,120 --> 02:49:10,040
Speaker 1: bit and they're like, oh, is there something weird going

2912
02:49:10,080 --> 02:49:14,000
Speaker 1: on with this this German terrorist group. Um, you kind

2913
02:49:14,040 --> 02:49:16,840
Speaker 1: of had the space in your head and the space

2914
02:49:16,920 --> 02:49:19,720
Speaker 1: in your media diet to like actually parse that out

2915
02:49:19,840 --> 02:49:22,960
Speaker 1: and calm down. But today it all comes with you

2916
02:49:23,040 --> 02:49:24,959
Speaker 1: with a flood. There's like three new fucked up Supreme

2917
02:49:25,000 --> 02:49:27,480
Speaker 1: Court decisions. Oh, and now all of the food factories

2918
02:49:27,520 --> 02:49:29,480
Speaker 1: are on fire and all of the chickens are dead,

2919
02:49:29,520 --> 02:49:33,400
Speaker 1: and this war in Ukraine is actually elevating the food prices,

2920
02:49:33,440 --> 02:49:36,600
Speaker 1: and it all compounds on itself. If you when you

2921
02:49:36,800 --> 02:49:40,800
Speaker 1: start seeing something new like this come into your media

2922
02:49:40,879 --> 02:49:43,640
Speaker 1: diet that seems scary, one of the first things you

2923
02:49:43,680 --> 02:49:46,760
Speaker 1: should do is just try to get a handle on

2924
02:49:47,600 --> 02:49:52,520
Speaker 1: the raw numbers this Well, this is a complexity Yeah,

2925
02:49:52,600 --> 02:49:54,720
Speaker 1: you know, you know, this is a complexity issue. That's

2926
02:49:54,720 --> 02:49:56,640
Speaker 1: how I like to look at it. And that's exactly

2927
02:49:56,680 --> 02:49:59,039
Speaker 1: one of the great ways to to kind of get

2928
02:49:59,200 --> 02:50:02,560
Speaker 1: disrupt the complex nature of this and the amount of

2929
02:50:02,600 --> 02:50:05,240
Speaker 1: it you're taking in is just to start breaking it down.

2930
02:50:05,360 --> 02:50:07,720
Speaker 1: Numbers are great, right, Like if you can look and

2931
02:50:07,800 --> 02:50:12,520
Speaker 1: see their eighteen thou instances of industrial accidents leading to X,

2932
02:50:12,720 --> 02:50:15,360
Speaker 1: y or z and five thousand fires, you start to

2933
02:50:15,440 --> 02:50:18,800
Speaker 1: really get yourself into a better position to understand what's

2934
02:50:18,800 --> 02:50:21,680
Speaker 1: being thrown at you. Yeah, but I don't think most

2935
02:50:21,720 --> 02:50:26,080
Speaker 1: people can actually understand what those numbers mean. Like there's

2936
02:50:26,200 --> 02:50:28,680
Speaker 1: like they're large numbers, but I don't think people understand

2937
02:50:28,800 --> 02:50:30,879
Speaker 1: like that means a lot of that stuff is happening

2938
02:50:31,040 --> 02:50:33,560
Speaker 1: versus just like one or two things you hear about

2939
02:50:33,640 --> 02:50:35,920
Speaker 1: and you don't realize that probability wise, that it's like

2940
02:50:36,040 --> 02:50:39,480
Speaker 1: insignificant because I don't think those numbers makes sense. I

2941
02:50:39,480 --> 02:50:42,040
Speaker 1: mean even to me sometimes I can't. I can't picture

2942
02:50:42,200 --> 02:50:45,320
Speaker 1: so many things, So I think it's I don't know,

2943
02:50:45,520 --> 02:50:48,400
Speaker 1: maybe it's just like a deficit and how our brains

2944
02:50:48,440 --> 02:50:50,640
Speaker 1: would you be able to understand why the numbers exist.

2945
02:50:50,760 --> 02:50:54,920
Speaker 1: But you can try to compare them two previous years, right,

2946
02:50:54,959 --> 02:50:58,560
Speaker 1: you can't exactly, you can't expand what you're relating to,

2947
02:50:58,760 --> 02:51:00,760
Speaker 1: right if you're if you're looking from is everything from

2948
02:51:00,840 --> 02:51:04,360
Speaker 1: March to June two, you're like, whoa, this is a

2949
02:51:04,400 --> 02:51:06,320
Speaker 1: lot of stuff just in these few months that if

2950
02:51:06,320 --> 02:51:08,800
Speaker 1: you compare that to every preceding year for the past

2951
02:51:08,840 --> 02:51:11,680
Speaker 1: few years, like, oh, this actually isn't a regular this

2952
02:51:11,879 --> 02:51:14,280
Speaker 1: is this is this is still fucked up, but it's

2953
02:51:14,280 --> 02:51:17,520
Speaker 1: actually kind of normalized. Um, and it's not. It's not

2954
02:51:18,400 --> 02:51:22,000
Speaker 1: an abnormal phenomenon right now. And so even if you

2955
02:51:22,120 --> 02:51:24,360
Speaker 1: can't like understand what the numbers are, you can still

2956
02:51:24,400 --> 02:51:27,080
Speaker 1: compare them to previous things. But but yeah, I mean

2957
02:51:27,200 --> 02:51:29,360
Speaker 1: that does require more work than just like looking at

2958
02:51:29,400 --> 02:51:31,240
Speaker 1: a meme, right, And the reason why this stuff works

2959
02:51:31,280 --> 02:51:33,880
Speaker 1: is because people know how to exploit this part of

2960
02:51:33,920 --> 02:51:36,960
Speaker 1: our brains really well. Not not not not not in

2961
02:51:37,040 --> 02:51:41,160
Speaker 1: this part of this brain is useless, right, It has uses, um,

2962
02:51:41,400 --> 02:51:44,279
Speaker 1: you can play with it, but it's also is exploitable.

2963
02:51:44,520 --> 02:51:46,440
Speaker 1: And and that's the thing that you want to be

2964
02:51:47,000 --> 02:51:50,520
Speaker 1: aware of, is trying to be cognizant of if the

2965
02:51:50,640 --> 02:51:54,080
Speaker 1: information you're taking in is exploiting this pathway and then

2966
02:51:54,400 --> 02:51:58,680
Speaker 1: choosing how how you want to be be circumvent some

2967
02:51:58,800 --> 02:52:01,000
Speaker 1: of those mental effects act like well, and we have

2968
02:52:01,160 --> 02:52:03,360
Speaker 1: such I mean, as humans, we have a real issue

2969
02:52:03,400 --> 02:52:06,440
Speaker 1: with this kind of brain hacking, and it's something we're

2970
02:52:06,520 --> 02:52:09,400
Speaker 1: just all kind of getting up to right now and understanding.

2971
02:52:09,520 --> 02:52:11,800
Speaker 1: And we still don't fully understand some of this. But

2972
02:52:12,000 --> 02:52:15,160
Speaker 1: you know, I UM a lot of the stuff I

2973
02:52:15,440 --> 02:52:18,440
Speaker 1: I kind of initially worked off of for the concept

2974
02:52:18,520 --> 02:52:21,920
Speaker 1: of weaponized unreality kind of talks about social engineering in

2975
02:52:22,000 --> 02:52:24,520
Speaker 1: the way that like freaking was done and hacking back

2976
02:52:24,560 --> 02:52:27,280
Speaker 1: in the day was done, and this is so similar

2977
02:52:27,320 --> 02:52:30,120
Speaker 1: to that in certain ways that it's kind of shocking, right,

2978
02:52:30,240 --> 02:52:34,080
Speaker 1: Like it's a conspiracy, but it's also a management tool

2979
02:52:34,400 --> 02:52:37,240
Speaker 1: and it's a it's a memory management and and you know,

2980
02:52:37,360 --> 02:52:41,840
Speaker 1: ultimately a reality management tool and giving it numbers looking

2981
02:52:41,879 --> 02:52:44,520
Speaker 1: at context like that does take time, but some of

2982
02:52:44,600 --> 02:52:47,959
Speaker 1: these are like gonna gonna be hard and fast rules

2983
02:52:48,000 --> 02:52:52,680
Speaker 1: probably going forward to like interact with the digital world,

2984
02:52:52,840 --> 02:52:54,560
Speaker 1: because this is gonna be how it is for a

2985
02:52:54,720 --> 02:52:58,640
Speaker 1: long while. There's a book that was kind of considered

2986
02:52:58,680 --> 02:53:01,400
Speaker 1: to be like the foundational text of or at least

2987
02:53:01,400 --> 02:53:04,720
Speaker 1: strategic document of the Islamic State, called The Management of

2988
02:53:04,800 --> 02:53:08,040
Speaker 1: Savagery Um. And the title gives away what what you're doing, right,

2989
02:53:08,080 --> 02:53:11,400
Speaker 1: you're carrying out You're you're engaging in acts of savagery,

2990
02:53:11,560 --> 02:53:14,920
Speaker 1: terrorist attacks that that that kill innocent people, that are

2991
02:53:15,120 --> 02:53:19,120
Speaker 1: that exists to disrupt um the state that you're in

2992
02:53:19,400 --> 02:53:22,640
Speaker 1: in order to and you're attempting to like you're attempting

2993
02:53:22,720 --> 02:53:25,880
Speaker 1: to build kind of a melieu of savagery, which then

2994
02:53:26,040 --> 02:53:29,120
Speaker 1: provides you the opportunity to take an exert power. And

2995
02:53:29,240 --> 02:53:32,560
Speaker 1: what we're seeing here is like the management of cognitive biases,

2996
02:53:32,720 --> 02:53:36,600
Speaker 1: right exactly, the management of like these weird little evolutionary

2997
02:53:37,200 --> 02:53:42,480
Speaker 1: holdovers in your brain, um that that don't quite work

2998
02:53:42,600 --> 02:53:46,720
Speaker 1: in the modern world. But if you understand what what's happening,

2999
02:53:46,800 --> 02:53:48,920
Speaker 1: you can take advantage of them, and you can you

3000
02:53:49,040 --> 02:53:52,000
Speaker 1: can trick people into thinking things are happening that aren't.

3001
02:53:52,040 --> 02:53:54,600
Speaker 1: It's the same. You know, you can see this. The

3002
02:53:54,760 --> 02:53:56,800
Speaker 1: right does this very effectively in a lot of the

3003
02:53:56,840 --> 02:54:01,240
Speaker 1: anti trans stuff they've been doing, obviously with gay you know,

3004
02:54:01,360 --> 02:54:03,560
Speaker 1: if you look at the population trans and of gay people,

3005
02:54:03,959 --> 02:54:07,360
Speaker 1: some number of people in that community are going to

3006
02:54:07,520 --> 02:54:10,480
Speaker 1: do things that are bad, right, because it's a population

3007
02:54:10,560 --> 02:54:14,440
Speaker 1: of human beings, um, and because the country is large enough.

3008
02:54:14,480 --> 02:54:17,320
Speaker 1: If you get people hyper focused on here's a story,

3009
02:54:17,440 --> 02:54:19,600
Speaker 1: here's another story, here's two, here's three stories. Now, is

3010
02:54:19,680 --> 02:54:21,720
Speaker 1: that does that mean that there's any kind of actual

3011
02:54:21,760 --> 02:54:25,080
Speaker 1: systemic problem. No. Um, that community is no more likely

3012
02:54:25,160 --> 02:54:27,240
Speaker 1: to do things that are bad than any other community.

3013
02:54:27,480 --> 02:54:29,560
Speaker 1: But if you get people focused on each of those

3014
02:54:29,640 --> 02:54:33,080
Speaker 1: stories in their head, they feel like there's they feel

3015
02:54:33,120 --> 02:54:35,040
Speaker 1: like there's an epidemic, and like, well, we have to

3016
02:54:35,080 --> 02:54:36,920
Speaker 1: get a handle. It's the same thing that that gets

3017
02:54:36,959 --> 02:54:39,760
Speaker 1: done with like Islamic terrorism, right where it's like, yes,

3018
02:54:39,840 --> 02:54:42,920
Speaker 1: since nine eleven, actually not that many acts of Islamic

3019
02:54:43,040 --> 02:54:46,080
Speaker 1: terrorism in the United States extremely fucking uncommon, much less

3020
02:54:46,120 --> 02:54:49,600
Speaker 1: common than right wing terrorism like homegrown terrorism, but the

3021
02:54:49,720 --> 02:54:52,680
Speaker 1: media doesn't really cover one of those kinds of terrorism

3022
02:54:52,760 --> 02:54:54,879
Speaker 1: and loves to cover the other. So you get people

3023
02:54:55,000 --> 02:54:58,440
Speaker 1: periodically tricked into thinking that they're under direct threat from

3024
02:54:58,480 --> 02:55:01,280
Speaker 1: the Islamic State or whatever. The right well, and I

3025
02:55:01,360 --> 02:55:03,800
Speaker 1: think it's you know, I think going to that point right,

3026
02:55:03,840 --> 02:55:07,360
Speaker 1: like it's almost u I mean, it's a reality filter, right, so,

3027
02:55:07,560 --> 02:55:10,280
Speaker 1: like it's a way to selectively filter out things that

3028
02:55:10,320 --> 02:55:14,160
Speaker 1: would counter the narrative that you're trying to overall push.

3029
02:55:14,240 --> 02:55:17,200
Speaker 1: And I think that that's something that's what's interesting me

3030
02:55:17,280 --> 02:55:19,119
Speaker 1: about this in a lot of ways is that we're

3031
02:55:19,320 --> 02:55:23,040
Speaker 1: seeing a filter being set up that only allows people

3032
02:55:23,080 --> 02:55:26,560
Speaker 1: into one lane of this thought. And we've seen what

3033
02:55:26,680 --> 02:55:29,440
Speaker 1: the end result of that is with radicalization and things

3034
02:55:29,680 --> 02:55:33,560
Speaker 1: that come along with these kind of conspiracies. But it's

3035
02:55:33,600 --> 02:55:37,840
Speaker 1: really it's been very wild to watch since the you know,

3036
02:55:37,959 --> 02:55:42,240
Speaker 1: the nineteen April till now where we're seeing it. You know,

3037
02:55:42,360 --> 02:55:45,040
Speaker 1: Serovich is doing it, every any one of the guys

3038
02:55:45,080 --> 02:55:48,280
Speaker 1: you can think of doing it, Yeah, exactly. Tucker ran

3039
02:55:48,720 --> 02:55:51,119
Speaker 1: a couple of things on this and kind of interspersed

3040
02:55:51,160 --> 02:55:54,720
Speaker 1: it with his you know, white male virility ship. It's

3041
02:55:54,760 --> 02:55:56,840
Speaker 1: the we're we're we're in a weird place where these

3042
02:55:57,080 --> 02:55:59,080
Speaker 1: are starting to be able to be played with and

3043
02:55:59,280 --> 02:56:02,840
Speaker 1: on each other, and that kind of filtering, you know,

3044
02:56:03,000 --> 02:56:08,600
Speaker 1: starts to get people onboarded from a conspiracy into you know,

3045
02:56:08,720 --> 02:56:10,880
Speaker 1: what we're seeing now is kind of the white nationalist

3046
02:56:11,000 --> 02:56:16,280
Speaker 1: Christian nationalist movement. That's that's become that that thing. And

3047
02:56:17,000 --> 02:56:19,560
Speaker 1: you know, for me, that's where my interest stems from

3048
02:56:19,680 --> 02:56:22,320
Speaker 1: because of this idea of weaponizing on reality, seeing what

3049
02:56:22,440 --> 02:56:25,520
Speaker 1: happened in Russia when that happened, and seeing this kind

3050
02:56:25,560 --> 02:56:28,600
Speaker 1: of thing which is so similar to that filtering and

3051
02:56:28,800 --> 02:56:32,680
Speaker 1: that narrative shift and building that goes on in that world.

3052
02:56:32,800 --> 02:56:38,040
Speaker 1: It's it's been you know, staring into a void feels bad.

3053
02:56:38,160 --> 02:56:40,040
Speaker 1: Sometimes this is just one where it's like, oh this

3054
02:56:40,200 --> 02:56:43,680
Speaker 1: is terrible, and it's just the beginning of it. Every

3055
02:56:43,720 --> 02:56:45,800
Speaker 1: once in a while, the void stares back and you're like,

3056
02:56:45,920 --> 02:56:48,720
Speaker 1: oh boy, oh yeah no, and that's exactly I mean,

3057
02:56:48,840 --> 02:56:51,520
Speaker 1: that's uh, that's the problem is sometimes it just stares

3058
02:56:51,560 --> 02:56:54,200
Speaker 1: you right in the eyes and tells you, yeah, I'm here,

3059
02:56:54,760 --> 02:56:59,080
Speaker 1: and that's a bad feeling. Yeah. Well, I think that's

3060
02:56:59,120 --> 02:57:02,600
Speaker 1: more or less we needed to talk. That would be like,

3061
02:57:02,800 --> 02:57:04,480
Speaker 1: you know, like one of the one of the ways

3062
02:57:04,520 --> 02:57:07,160
Speaker 1: to combat this, if you can, is honestly, creating your

3063
02:57:07,200 --> 02:57:11,240
Speaker 1: own memetic graphs is really useful because these things spread

3064
02:57:11,280 --> 02:57:15,080
Speaker 1: so fast when they're in images. Images of of dates

3065
02:57:15,160 --> 02:57:18,680
Speaker 1: and instances spread like wildfire. Um So, if you can

3066
02:57:18,920 --> 02:57:22,440
Speaker 1: make your own which compares it to previous years, say hey,

3067
02:57:22,840 --> 02:57:25,200
Speaker 1: this actually isn't a new pattern, that's something that's been

3068
02:57:25,280 --> 02:57:27,560
Speaker 1: this is this is just what happens in industrial farming.

3069
02:57:28,280 --> 02:57:31,800
Speaker 1: I think spreading it via memetic images is one of

3070
02:57:31,879 --> 02:57:34,720
Speaker 1: the if there is a way to combat it, that's

3071
02:57:34,760 --> 02:57:37,000
Speaker 1: probably one of the core ways to go about it,

3072
02:57:37,520 --> 02:57:40,680
Speaker 1: just to get how fast those things spread. And again

3073
02:57:40,800 --> 02:57:43,240
Speaker 1: you can see I've seen some useful people have been

3074
02:57:43,240 --> 02:57:45,600
Speaker 1: trying to push back against you know, this idea that

3075
02:57:45,680 --> 02:57:49,000
Speaker 1: there's been this like massive crime surge in San Francisco

3076
02:57:49,000 --> 02:57:52,320
Speaker 1: and stuff, and they it's uses the same tactics, right, yeah. Absolutely.

3077
02:57:52,680 --> 02:57:55,000
Speaker 1: You have like a couple of videos of people shoplifting

3078
02:57:55,160 --> 02:57:57,520
Speaker 1: or something, and then you make and and is there

3079
02:57:57,680 --> 02:57:59,880
Speaker 1: is that kind of crime actually up? Well no, it

3080
02:58:00,040 --> 02:58:03,920
Speaker 1: really isn't. But like it doesn't matter because um or

3081
02:58:04,040 --> 02:58:06,080
Speaker 1: is it any higher there than it is in someplace

3082
02:58:06,160 --> 02:58:08,440
Speaker 1: like Duluth where no videos are coming out like no,

3083
02:58:08,640 --> 02:58:12,840
Speaker 1: it's not, but um, it's uh. If you have to

3084
02:58:12,879 --> 02:58:14,520
Speaker 1: be aware, the first thing you have to be aware

3085
02:58:14,560 --> 02:58:16,920
Speaker 1: of is the phenomena is like the way in which

3086
02:58:16,959 --> 02:58:20,120
Speaker 1: they're taking advantage of you. And then you have to

3087
02:58:20,760 --> 02:58:22,160
Speaker 1: you have to kind of deter and you have to

3088
02:58:22,320 --> 02:58:24,680
Speaker 1: use the tactics they're using against them. And one of

3089
02:58:24,760 --> 02:58:28,080
Speaker 1: the things that is effective is these these graphs with

3090
02:58:28,240 --> 02:58:30,520
Speaker 1: kind of like numbers and dates and ship on them.

3091
02:58:30,840 --> 02:58:36,880
Speaker 1: People love to feel like they're looking at research. But yeah,

3092
02:58:37,040 --> 02:58:39,520
Speaker 1: at the same time though not to not to be like,

3093
02:58:40,120 --> 02:58:43,200
Speaker 1: I don't know negative about this at all, but in

3094
02:58:43,320 --> 02:58:46,040
Speaker 1: my mind, this is like a modern day version of

3095
02:58:46,080 --> 02:58:48,480
Speaker 1: someone starting your religion and make people like making the

3096
02:58:48,560 --> 02:58:51,320
Speaker 1: sheep of this like following and then having them turn

3097
02:58:51,360 --> 02:58:54,040
Speaker 1: into like whatever it is, whether it's Christian nationalism or whatever.

3098
02:58:54,520 --> 02:58:57,279
Speaker 1: But just like in religion, if people are presented with science,

3099
02:58:57,280 --> 02:58:59,680
Speaker 1: they don't care, you know what I mean, You'll present

3100
02:58:59,720 --> 02:59:02,160
Speaker 1: them with like, I don't know's there's some people that

3101
02:59:03,680 --> 02:59:06,040
Speaker 1: it's it's it's not science. It's about everyone wants to

3102
02:59:06,120 --> 02:59:11,320
Speaker 1: have access to special, secretive, secret knowledge. Everyone wants to

3103
02:59:11,360 --> 02:59:14,039
Speaker 1: have esoteric knowledge that no one else has so these

3104
02:59:14,080 --> 02:59:16,120
Speaker 1: graphs are still compelling in the first place because you're like, oh,

3105
02:59:16,560 --> 02:59:18,520
Speaker 1: no one else knows all of these things. No one

3106
02:59:18,520 --> 02:59:20,200
Speaker 1: else has laid it out in this manner. So if

3107
02:59:20,240 --> 02:59:23,320
Speaker 1: you could present your information in that same style, say hey,

3108
02:59:23,840 --> 02:59:25,720
Speaker 1: no one knows that this is actually part of this

3109
02:59:25,959 --> 02:59:28,880
Speaker 1: overall thing that's been going on for years and it's

3110
02:59:28,879 --> 02:59:31,440
Speaker 1: about industrial farming, then you hope that that will spread.

3111
02:59:32,200 --> 02:59:34,840
Speaker 1: That Then that spreads because because it infects the same

3112
02:59:34,920 --> 02:59:37,640
Speaker 1: point in someone's brain. Right, want to we want to

3113
02:59:37,680 --> 02:59:39,680
Speaker 1: feel smart, we want to feel unique, we want to

3114
02:59:39,760 --> 02:59:42,480
Speaker 1: have like esoteric knowledge. So if you can, if you

3115
02:59:42,560 --> 02:59:45,720
Speaker 1: can frame it to to fit that same mold, then

3116
02:59:45,800 --> 02:59:49,039
Speaker 1: it's not science. It's just playing with the same tactics

3117
02:59:49,160 --> 02:59:52,359
Speaker 1: that got them convinced of this in the first place. Exactly.

3118
02:59:52,879 --> 02:59:58,280
Speaker 1: People that's different. Yeah, I think I think it's true that, like,

3119
02:59:58,440 --> 03:00:01,160
Speaker 1: if somebody is a committed believer in in whatever, like

3120
03:00:01,560 --> 03:00:05,680
Speaker 1: like Mike Sernovitch or something, you're not convincing them. The

3121
03:00:06,080 --> 03:00:08,520
Speaker 1: danger The thing that they're doing that's dangerous is there.

3122
03:00:08,600 --> 03:00:11,199
Speaker 1: They're quote unquote pilling a lot of like random people

3123
03:00:11,240 --> 03:00:15,200
Speaker 1: into the problem that scares those people. And when those

3124
03:00:15,240 --> 03:00:18,360
Speaker 1: people get scared, they're willing to accept ship they wouldn't

3125
03:00:18,360 --> 03:00:22,800
Speaker 1: otherwise scare. And I think those people you can push

3126
03:00:23,320 --> 03:00:25,840
Speaker 1: get to step down from the ledge because one thing

3127
03:00:25,920 --> 03:00:28,120
Speaker 1: we do want this is also a problem. But like

3128
03:00:28,200 --> 03:00:30,400
Speaker 1: you think about like climate change, right, and how much

3129
03:00:30,480 --> 03:00:33,760
Speaker 1: of the denial of climate change is not based around

3130
03:00:33,800 --> 03:00:37,400
Speaker 1: getting people to reject the idea entirely, but getting like

3131
03:00:37,600 --> 03:00:40,080
Speaker 1: when people bring up a specific problem being like, well,

3132
03:00:40,360 --> 03:00:42,720
Speaker 1: but look at this weird new piece of technology that

3133
03:00:42,840 --> 03:00:44,880
Speaker 1: some kid developed, and like, this is going to fix it,

3134
03:00:44,920 --> 03:00:46,720
Speaker 1: and then you get to not worry about it. Right,

3135
03:00:47,160 --> 03:00:51,400
Speaker 1: So if somebody suddenly starts freaking out about agricultural fires

3136
03:00:51,440 --> 03:00:53,440
Speaker 1: for the first time and you're like, actually, they're lower

3137
03:00:53,520 --> 03:00:55,680
Speaker 1: than they are in normal years, this isn't a problem,

3138
03:00:56,040 --> 03:00:58,720
Speaker 1: then maybe their brain, maybe you can get their brain

3139
03:00:58,800 --> 03:01:00,480
Speaker 1: to go like, Okay, that I won't worry about that

3140
03:01:00,560 --> 03:01:02,960
Speaker 1: because I don't want more things to worry about. I

3141
03:01:03,080 --> 03:01:07,320
Speaker 1: just have been given them. Um, that's targeting the ledge people.

3142
03:01:07,800 --> 03:01:11,160
Speaker 1: We're talking. Yeah, you're not getting to true believers. You're

3143
03:01:11,160 --> 03:01:13,280
Speaker 1: not getting to true believers at this point of any

3144
03:01:13,320 --> 03:01:15,120
Speaker 1: of this stuff. For the most part, you know that

3145
03:01:15,240 --> 03:01:17,840
Speaker 1: takes a wholly different level of work. I mean, that's

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Speaker 1: that's in the ballpark in my mind of the radicalization, right,

3147
03:01:21,000 --> 03:01:24,000
Speaker 1: like you're you're in a wholly different ballpark. And if

3148
03:01:24,040 --> 03:01:26,240
Speaker 1: you can target the people who are thinking about jumping

3149
03:01:26,280 --> 03:01:30,000
Speaker 1: into the pool too, they tend to if you do

3150
03:01:30,240 --> 03:01:34,599
Speaker 1: change their mind, they become some of the biggest proponents

3151
03:01:34,879 --> 03:01:37,200
Speaker 1: of trying to get other people off the ledge that

3152
03:01:37,360 --> 03:01:44,520
Speaker 1: they might know. And that's something well, it's something, yeah,

3153
03:01:44,600 --> 03:01:47,520
Speaker 1: it's it's it's it's very similar, and it's something I've

3154
03:01:47,520 --> 03:01:49,600
Speaker 1: seen even in my friends circles, you know, talking to

3155
03:01:49,680 --> 03:01:52,640
Speaker 1: people who five years ago, we're fully you know, in

3156
03:01:52,760 --> 03:01:55,240
Speaker 1: the all let's do Donald Trump for the lulls thing.

3157
03:01:55,760 --> 03:01:57,640
Speaker 1: You know. Now those are the same people who are

3158
03:01:57,680 --> 03:02:01,200
Speaker 1: telling their friends, oh shit, we have a Christian nationalist

3159
03:02:01,280 --> 03:02:04,280
Speaker 1: movement that's trying to overthrow democracy. And that's a huge

3160
03:02:04,400 --> 03:02:08,840
Speaker 1: you know, like that's a huge help, um to everyone. Right.

3161
03:02:08,959 --> 03:02:11,720
Speaker 1: You want more people saying the truth to people who

3162
03:02:11,840 --> 03:02:15,520
Speaker 1: might not hear it from someone like us um and

3163
03:02:15,920 --> 03:02:21,600
Speaker 1: can internalize it and infiltrate. There's you know, the truth

3164
03:02:21,680 --> 03:02:25,480
Speaker 1: takes a lot more work than fiction, unfortunately, but once

3165
03:02:25,520 --> 03:02:28,760
Speaker 1: it starts to work, it's a compounding thing. And the

3166
03:02:28,840 --> 03:02:32,480
Speaker 1: truth tends to really set people free. As corny as

3167
03:02:32,560 --> 03:02:35,360
Speaker 1: that is. If people find out they've been lied to,

3168
03:02:36,000 --> 03:02:39,040
Speaker 1: they get they want to know why it worked, and

3169
03:02:39,160 --> 03:02:41,800
Speaker 1: that works in our favor and the truth's favor, and

3170
03:02:42,879 --> 03:02:45,879
Speaker 1: reality is the thing we you know, we gotta protect

3171
03:02:45,920 --> 03:02:50,000
Speaker 1: this at all costs because we're getting tidle weight by

3172
03:02:50,720 --> 03:02:53,320
Speaker 1: unreality and that's a problem for all of us for

3173
03:02:53,400 --> 03:02:58,560
Speaker 1: different reasons. That's the more uplifting note I think than

3174
03:02:58,800 --> 03:03:02,760
Speaker 1: a couple of minutes ago. Yeah, all right, well there

3175
03:03:02,879 --> 03:03:10,720
Speaker 1: there we go. Um go, I don't know, fix it. Yeah,

3176
03:03:11,480 --> 03:03:14,840
Speaker 1: go fix things. Yeah, go fix things. Don't go swimming

3177
03:03:14,920 --> 03:03:19,360
Speaker 1: in grain silos, and uh, avoid grain silos. Always avoid

3178
03:03:19,440 --> 03:03:26,040
Speaker 1: grain silos. Hey, we'll be back Monday with more episodes

3179
03:03:26,200 --> 03:03:28,680
Speaker 1: every week from now until the heat death of the Universe.

3180
03:03:29,280 --> 03:03:31,600
Speaker 1: It Could Happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media.

3181
03:03:31,879 --> 03:03:34,520
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

3182
03:03:34,560 --> 03:03:36,640
Speaker 1: cool zone media dot com, or check us out on

3183
03:03:36,720 --> 03:03:39,240
Speaker 1: the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you

3184
03:03:39,320 --> 03:03:41,800
Speaker 1: listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It Could

3185
03:03:41,800 --> 03:03:44,760
Speaker 1: Happen Here, updated monthly at cool zone media dot com

3186
03:03:44,879 --> 03:03:46,720
Speaker 1: slash sources. Thanks for listening,