1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:02,960 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray. 2 00:00:03,240 --> 00:00:08,800 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With 3 00:00:08,920 --> 00:00:14,600 Speaker 1: tech stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hi, welcome 4 00:00:14,640 --> 00:00:16,959 Speaker 1: to the podcast. My name is Chris Poett. I'm an 5 00:00:17,040 --> 00:00:19,599 Speaker 1: editor here and How Stuff Works and with me is 6 00:00:19,720 --> 00:00:24,880 Speaker 1: writer Jonathan Strickland. My computer doesn't feel well. Have you 7 00:00:24,920 --> 00:00:28,360 Speaker 1: taken its temperature? Uh? Actually this is not the one 8 00:00:28,440 --> 00:00:31,360 Speaker 1: that overheated. This This is the new laptop. The old 9 00:00:31,360 --> 00:00:34,120 Speaker 1: one was the one that overheating. That was That was 10 00:00:34,159 --> 00:00:36,920 Speaker 1: my lame attempt to lead into what we're talking about today. 11 00:00:37,200 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: Oh you mean computer viruses. Yes, yes, we recently had 12 00:00:40,800 --> 00:00:43,480 Speaker 1: an article on the feature on the site the ten 13 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:47,760 Speaker 1: worst computer viruses of All Time, and I thought that 14 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:50,680 Speaker 1: would be a clever way to lead in. Obviously, Um 15 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 1: I was wrong. Well, you know, we had a difficult 16 00:00:54,280 --> 00:00:59,840 Speaker 1: time choosing which because you know, there's so many really 17 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:02,520 Speaker 1: are they really are? And the ones that that we 18 00:01:02,640 --> 00:01:06,039 Speaker 1: picked were chosen for different reasons, and some of them 19 00:01:06,040 --> 00:01:09,360 Speaker 1: were more destructive than others, but others broke new ground 20 00:01:09,440 --> 00:01:15,440 Speaker 1: in virus world. Shenanigan's Yeah, yeah, they caused brand new 21 00:01:15,480 --> 00:01:19,280 Speaker 1: headaches for everybody involved. Um, besides the person who wrote them, 22 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:23,040 Speaker 1: I suppose. Well, let let's give a little background here. Okay, So, um, 23 00:01:23,080 --> 00:01:27,640 Speaker 1: so computer viruses date back quite a ways. Uh. In fact, 24 00:01:27,840 --> 00:01:31,240 Speaker 1: there's a scientist by the name of John Van Newman 25 00:01:31,720 --> 00:01:35,920 Speaker 1: who theorized way back in ninety nine that it would 26 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:39,520 Speaker 1: be possible to create a program that could self replicate, 27 00:01:39,680 --> 00:01:42,280 Speaker 1: which is generally what we talk about when we talk 28 00:01:42,280 --> 00:01:47,440 Speaker 1: about computer viruses. There are different kinds of computer viruses. Um. 29 00:01:47,560 --> 00:01:51,200 Speaker 1: The the standard, uh, the original good old computer virus 30 00:01:51,280 --> 00:01:53,720 Speaker 1: that was that would cause a lot of trouble would 31 00:01:53,720 --> 00:01:56,080 Speaker 1: be the kind that would infect your computer and then 32 00:01:56,200 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: overwrite data and and essentially turn your computer into a 33 00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:05,640 Speaker 1: useless pile of junk. Right those were Boy, those were 34 00:02:05,640 --> 00:02:09,200 Speaker 1: the good old days. Yeah. That was really irritating. It 35 00:02:09,280 --> 00:02:11,840 Speaker 1: meant that you'd lose everything. Even if you could, um, 36 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:14,160 Speaker 1: even if you could fix your computer, you there was 37 00:02:14,200 --> 00:02:15,880 Speaker 1: a good chance you weren't going to be able to 38 00:02:15,919 --> 00:02:18,360 Speaker 1: retrieve data that had been stored on that computer up 39 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:21,600 Speaker 1: to that point. Um. Those were nasty. But there are 40 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:26,079 Speaker 1: other kinds as well that are equally evil. Um. There 41 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:29,919 Speaker 1: are the computer worms, uh, and there are the trojan horses. 42 00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:33,320 Speaker 1: And together these kind of make up everything we think 43 00:02:33,360 --> 00:02:36,800 Speaker 1: of when we say computer viruses. The virus is really 44 00:02:37,000 --> 00:02:40,600 Speaker 1: sort of used as a blanket term um by the 45 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:45,040 Speaker 1: security public. I would say, you know, people talk about 46 00:02:45,400 --> 00:02:48,200 Speaker 1: when you hear people talk about viruses, it may actually 47 00:02:48,200 --> 00:02:50,360 Speaker 1: be a worm or a trojan that they're talking about. 48 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:53,720 Speaker 1: Worm is actually a program that can go by itself 49 00:02:53,760 --> 00:02:56,880 Speaker 1: and replicate itself, rather than piggybacking on another program, which 50 00:02:56,919 --> 00:02:58,960 Speaker 1: is what an actual virus is, right right, the old 51 00:02:58,960 --> 00:03:01,840 Speaker 1: computer viruses usually it was well, I mean always it was. 52 00:03:02,040 --> 00:03:04,359 Speaker 1: It was some a little self replicating program that was 53 00:03:04,440 --> 00:03:07,720 Speaker 1: part of a larger program. So for instance, um, you 54 00:03:07,760 --> 00:03:12,160 Speaker 1: could corrupt a macro in Microsoft word in the old 55 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:15,839 Speaker 1: days and create a computer virus that way. But a worm, yes, 56 00:03:15,919 --> 00:03:18,639 Speaker 1: as you say, is its own program, it's own applications. 57 00:03:18,680 --> 00:03:21,040 Speaker 1: So as soon as you execute it, that's when it 58 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:24,840 Speaker 1: activates and and begins to to cause issues. Whereas the 59 00:03:24,880 --> 00:03:29,160 Speaker 1: trojan that gives bad guys the opportunity to really mess 60 00:03:29,160 --> 00:03:31,720 Speaker 1: with your computer, Yeah, it's a it's a program as 61 00:03:31,760 --> 00:03:34,720 Speaker 1: trojan horse you might expect from the name. Uh, it's 62 00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 1: a program that that looks like one thing that actually 63 00:03:37,000 --> 00:03:40,240 Speaker 1: does something else. Entirely. Uh So somebody may say, hey, 64 00:03:40,240 --> 00:03:42,440 Speaker 1: you know, you need to take a look at this file. 65 00:03:42,480 --> 00:03:45,680 Speaker 1: It's the greatest video ever, and you double click on it, 66 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 1: and all of a sudden you're going, hey, wait, this 67 00:03:49,040 --> 00:03:51,880 Speaker 1: isn't really a video file. But by that point, your 68 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:56,040 Speaker 1: computer may be infected with something nasty, right, And the 69 00:03:56,440 --> 00:03:59,880 Speaker 1: really clever ones just make you think that whatever program 70 00:03:59,880 --> 00:04:02,840 Speaker 1: you downloaded just didn't work correctly, and so you may 71 00:04:02,880 --> 00:04:05,200 Speaker 1: not even be aware that your computer has been infected. 72 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:06,600 Speaker 1: You may just think that you've got a hold of 73 00:04:06,760 --> 00:04:09,560 Speaker 1: a faulty file, and and that's that's the worst of it, 74 00:04:09,920 --> 00:04:12,720 Speaker 1: when in reality, someone is using your computer either to 75 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:17,320 Speaker 1: access information or or create a zombie computer army. We've 76 00:04:17,360 --> 00:04:21,960 Speaker 1: talked about that before, or um any number of really evil, 77 00:04:22,279 --> 00:04:27,960 Speaker 1: icky things that you don't want to happen to your computer. Right, So, 78 00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:29,760 Speaker 1: I guess we can just dive on in and talk 79 00:04:29,760 --> 00:04:32,000 Speaker 1: about some of the ones that made the list. I'm 80 00:04:32,000 --> 00:04:35,200 Speaker 1: sure everyone's just chomping up a bit to find out. Well, 81 00:04:35,240 --> 00:04:37,039 Speaker 1: the first one we were going to talk about today 82 00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:44,560 Speaker 1: is as an actual virus. Melissa, Yes, Melissa Melissa, named 83 00:04:44,600 --> 00:04:50,119 Speaker 1: after an exotic dancer in Florida. Uh, poetry, really, isn't it? 84 00:04:50,839 --> 00:04:54,039 Speaker 1: So what a nice sentiment. Yeah, this was created by 85 00:04:54,080 --> 00:04:57,240 Speaker 1: a guy named David L. Smith. This is uh back 86 00:04:57,279 --> 00:05:02,240 Speaker 1: in and uh yeah, it's an actual computer virus that 87 00:05:02,320 --> 00:05:05,640 Speaker 1: spread um through email. And it was a it was 88 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:07,960 Speaker 1: a one of the ones we were talking about, like 89 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:11,080 Speaker 1: a piggybacking on the Microsoft word document. Yep, yep. This 90 00:05:11,120 --> 00:05:13,599 Speaker 1: is the reason you get an alert when you open 91 00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:15,560 Speaker 1: a document and word when it and it has a 92 00:05:15,640 --> 00:05:18,440 Speaker 1: macro in it, and it goes, hey, are you sure 93 00:05:18,480 --> 00:05:20,320 Speaker 1: you want to do this because it has macro's. Well, 94 00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:25,159 Speaker 1: now you know why. Melissa really brought our awareness up 95 00:05:25,200 --> 00:05:27,640 Speaker 1: in terms of what a macro. You know what these 96 00:05:27,640 --> 00:05:31,359 Speaker 1: add ons can do to a simple word document or 97 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:34,320 Speaker 1: you know, I guess office document or anything that uses macros. 98 00:05:35,320 --> 00:05:38,080 Speaker 1: And uh, it didn't do that much damage really, It 99 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:41,239 Speaker 1: just it made the list mainly, as you say, because 100 00:05:41,240 --> 00:05:45,320 Speaker 1: it it really raised awareness. Before that point, computer viruses 101 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,160 Speaker 1: were usually spread by someone handing you a floppy disk 102 00:05:49,279 --> 00:05:51,360 Speaker 1: that had a corrupted file on it and you ran 103 00:05:51,400 --> 00:05:54,680 Speaker 1: it that way. Um. You know, that was the pre 104 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:57,720 Speaker 1: internet days, so it was all social engineering. It was 105 00:05:57,760 --> 00:06:00,080 Speaker 1: all hey, I've got this great game on this U 106 00:06:00,080 --> 00:06:02,080 Speaker 1: why don't you run it? And then you screw up 107 00:06:02,080 --> 00:06:06,000 Speaker 1: your computer. So Melissa really took it to the next level, 108 00:06:06,200 --> 00:06:10,240 Speaker 1: you know, mass distribution. Don't take floppy discs from strangers. No, 109 00:06:10,680 --> 00:06:12,599 Speaker 1: And and that kind of leads us to the social 110 00:06:12,640 --> 00:06:15,599 Speaker 1: engineering is not is not just from the old days. 111 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,320 Speaker 1: I mean, it's still happening today. Uh. And the next 112 00:06:18,360 --> 00:06:20,240 Speaker 1: one is a kind of a good example of that. 113 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:24,039 Speaker 1: That's the I Love you bug um, which would spread 114 00:06:24,080 --> 00:06:26,520 Speaker 1: through email and you would get a message saying I 115 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:29,520 Speaker 1: love you, and I think most of us feel warm 116 00:06:29,560 --> 00:06:32,880 Speaker 1: and comforted when we hear those words. Uh, and so 117 00:06:33,040 --> 00:06:36,200 Speaker 1: we you your natural inclination was to open up the 118 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:39,039 Speaker 1: email find out what this little ghili bob was, and 119 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: you click on it, and that's when it activated. The bug. Yeah, 120 00:06:43,800 --> 00:06:46,960 Speaker 1: it copied itself, It added files to your computer's registry, 121 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:50,719 Speaker 1: replaced other files on your computer with copies of itself, 122 00:06:51,000 --> 00:06:53,320 Speaker 1: and then it started sending itself around to other people 123 00:06:53,440 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 1: via email or our Internet relay chat. Yeah I r C. 124 00:06:56,760 --> 00:07:00,600 Speaker 1: Yeah it's pretty bad. And then it downloaded and and 125 00:07:00,640 --> 00:07:03,560 Speaker 1: would execute a password stealing program. So if you started, 126 00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:06,560 Speaker 1: you know, you have all your passwords stored on your 127 00:07:06,600 --> 00:07:10,200 Speaker 1: computer for different different applications, all of a sudden, it's 128 00:07:10,200 --> 00:07:13,280 Speaker 1: sending him back to the originator of the virus, right, 129 00:07:13,360 --> 00:07:17,200 Speaker 1: and this one, the originator of the virus, is one 130 00:07:17,240 --> 00:07:19,400 Speaker 1: of those kind of mysteries we think we know who 131 00:07:19,400 --> 00:07:22,480 Speaker 1: did it, but it's kind of it's impossible to say 132 00:07:22,480 --> 00:07:27,320 Speaker 1: for sure. Now, allegedly the man responsible was Onnell the 133 00:07:27,400 --> 00:07:32,440 Speaker 1: Guzman from the Philippines. But the thing was when when 134 00:07:32,480 --> 00:07:35,800 Speaker 1: he was first being investigated, he was under age and 135 00:07:36,040 --> 00:07:38,280 Speaker 1: so could not be tried as an adult, and uh, 136 00:07:38,320 --> 00:07:40,680 Speaker 1: and it just kind of kind of faded away. And 137 00:07:40,720 --> 00:07:45,200 Speaker 1: then when he became of age, he's sort of in 138 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:48,920 Speaker 1: a circumspect way kind of but not really admitted to 139 00:07:49,040 --> 00:07:54,320 Speaker 1: being to be the perpetrator. So we're fairly certain that 140 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:57,440 Speaker 1: he's the man responsible, But you know, it could just 141 00:07:57,480 --> 00:07:59,400 Speaker 1: be a lot of talk. Well I'll tell you, if 142 00:07:59,600 --> 00:08:02,840 Speaker 1: I had done created a virus that did ten billion 143 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:06,520 Speaker 1: dollars worth of damages over the Internet, I probably wouldn't be, 144 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:08,320 Speaker 1: you know, willing to raise my hand up and go, 145 00:08:08,440 --> 00:08:12,280 Speaker 1: hey I did this right. No, maybe under a handle, yeah, 146 00:08:12,760 --> 00:08:16,360 Speaker 1: but not not with your real name. So I guess 147 00:08:16,360 --> 00:08:18,400 Speaker 1: we can move on to the next one. I've been 148 00:08:18,400 --> 00:08:22,680 Speaker 1: talking about about moving on. Um. This was one that 149 00:08:22,800 --> 00:08:24,560 Speaker 1: I heard a lot about when I worked in the 150 00:08:24,920 --> 00:08:29,400 Speaker 1: computer security industry. UM. It's s QL slammer, also known 151 00:08:29,440 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 1: as sequel slammer. UM. And this, this was a fast 152 00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:37,559 Speaker 1: moving virus. This is this was a classic. In fifteen 153 00:08:37,600 --> 00:08:41,160 Speaker 1: minutes after it was detected, it had already infected nearly 154 00:08:41,200 --> 00:08:45,440 Speaker 1: half of the Internet servers, which uh, in terms of 155 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:47,679 Speaker 1: you compare that to Melissa or I Love you. They 156 00:08:47,679 --> 00:08:50,960 Speaker 1: were they spread and they spread pretty widely, but not 157 00:08:51,080 --> 00:08:54,880 Speaker 1: like this. This was a big old eye opener for 158 00:08:54,960 --> 00:08:58,319 Speaker 1: the industry. Caused about a billion dollars worth of damage. 159 00:08:58,400 --> 00:09:02,920 Speaker 1: And it uh, it exploitedvulnerabilities within the system. It wasn't 160 00:09:02,960 --> 00:09:06,920 Speaker 1: necessarily a program designed. It wasn't like a self replicating 161 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:09,719 Speaker 1: program in the traditional sense. It was one that that 162 00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:15,040 Speaker 1: exploited of vulnerability that the the virus programmer whom who 163 00:09:15,080 --> 00:09:18,959 Speaker 1: knows who this this guy is, we don't know. Um uh. 164 00:09:19,040 --> 00:09:22,560 Speaker 1: He discovered it and took advantage of it. And there 165 00:09:22,640 --> 00:09:24,920 Speaker 1: there are people who do this for a living, who 166 00:09:24,960 --> 00:09:29,240 Speaker 1: actually look for vulnerabilities that can be exploited. UM. Those 167 00:09:29,280 --> 00:09:32,000 Speaker 1: we usually call white hats. And then we've got the 168 00:09:32,080 --> 00:09:35,840 Speaker 1: people who look for vulnerabilities in order to exploit them 169 00:09:35,920 --> 00:09:38,200 Speaker 1: and actually take advantage of them, not to fix them. 170 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:41,800 Speaker 1: Those are the black hats, so good old cowboy imagery 171 00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 1: there um from the you know, the wild wild Internet. Yeah. Actually, 172 00:09:48,160 --> 00:09:52,240 Speaker 1: in general, a virus or you know whatever malware if 173 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:54,719 Speaker 1: you will, um, it's going to take advantage of some 174 00:09:54,840 --> 00:09:59,120 Speaker 1: vulnerability in your system. Basically, when they when the developers 175 00:09:59,240 --> 00:10:01,480 Speaker 1: right code, whether at your operating system or a program 176 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:03,720 Speaker 1: that runs on your operating system, there's a hole in 177 00:10:03,760 --> 00:10:06,440 Speaker 1: there somewhere and somebody can go in a white hat 178 00:10:06,520 --> 00:10:08,920 Speaker 1: or black hat or both. A lot of times they'll 179 00:10:08,920 --> 00:10:12,439 Speaker 1: publish these vulnerabilities. They're they're picking apart the code and going, 180 00:10:12,480 --> 00:10:15,439 Speaker 1: you know what, if I did this here at this 181 00:10:15,559 --> 00:10:19,440 Speaker 1: right time, I could gain control the entire computer. And 182 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:22,600 Speaker 1: that's uh, that's why you you know, look down and 183 00:10:22,679 --> 00:10:26,520 Speaker 1: you see your even Mac computers or Windows computers both 184 00:10:26,720 --> 00:10:28,679 Speaker 1: have these things, and they go, hey, there's a new 185 00:10:28,720 --> 00:10:31,840 Speaker 1: software security update. You need to download this update your system. Well, 186 00:10:31,840 --> 00:10:34,880 Speaker 1: that's that's why these these vulnerabilities come to light and 187 00:10:34,920 --> 00:10:38,480 Speaker 1: then you end up patching your system. Well, I guess 188 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:40,720 Speaker 1: we can move on to the next one. The the 189 00:10:40,920 --> 00:10:50,600 Speaker 1: Sasser virus. Um. Yeah, the speaking of underage hackers. Um. 190 00:10:50,679 --> 00:10:54,800 Speaker 1: The person that developed Sasser and net ski worms was 191 00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:59,040 Speaker 1: a seventeen year old German who never actually spent any 192 00:10:59,080 --> 00:11:03,280 Speaker 1: time in jail because he was under age. But Sasser, 193 00:11:03,760 --> 00:11:06,920 Speaker 1: he apparently wrote both of these worms. But sassor would scan, 194 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:10,560 Speaker 1: would get on your computer and scan random addresses Internet 195 00:11:10,600 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 1: addresses to find other vulnerable computers that it could download 196 00:11:14,200 --> 00:11:17,280 Speaker 1: and copy itself to. So it actively was seeking out 197 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:20,320 Speaker 1: other machines that it could could do that too, and 198 00:11:20,520 --> 00:11:22,600 Speaker 1: would actually make it impossible for you to turn off 199 00:11:22,640 --> 00:11:26,360 Speaker 1: your machine, right, so it didn't want you to stop 200 00:11:26,360 --> 00:11:28,280 Speaker 1: it from doing its work. You had to unplug your 201 00:11:28,280 --> 00:11:30,520 Speaker 1: computer if you wanted to uh to get it to 202 00:11:30,520 --> 00:11:33,640 Speaker 1: cut it out. And this is a Microsoft Windows virus, 203 00:11:33,679 --> 00:11:36,800 Speaker 1: we should say. It was specifically looking at Windows vulnerabilities. 204 00:11:37,120 --> 00:11:40,160 Speaker 1: So if you were using a different operating system, um 205 00:11:40,320 --> 00:11:45,000 Speaker 1: you were, you were okay, uh from this particular kind 206 00:11:45,000 --> 00:11:48,439 Speaker 1: of worm. UM. That's that's actually an interesting point we 207 00:11:48,480 --> 00:11:50,400 Speaker 1: should make too. I guess we can make it right here. 208 00:11:50,920 --> 00:11:54,520 Speaker 1: You hear a lot about viruses attacking PCs and not 209 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:57,760 Speaker 1: as many attacking max uh, and you might think, well, 210 00:11:57,840 --> 00:12:00,360 Speaker 1: does that mean that the mac is is autumn etically 211 00:12:00,360 --> 00:12:04,120 Speaker 1: a more secure machine. Well, that's that's not necessarily the case. 212 00:12:04,600 --> 00:12:09,560 Speaker 1: There's this concept called security through obscurity. UM. Part of 213 00:12:09,600 --> 00:12:12,440 Speaker 1: that is if you if not that many people are 214 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:15,800 Speaker 1: using your system, then there's lesson than incentive to create 215 00:12:15,880 --> 00:12:18,720 Speaker 1: an attack that targets that system. I mean, you're not 216 00:12:18,720 --> 00:12:21,880 Speaker 1: going to hit as many people, So why spend that 217 00:12:22,040 --> 00:12:25,200 Speaker 1: time and energy developing an attack when you could do 218 00:12:25,240 --> 00:12:26,800 Speaker 1: it for a different system that's going to hit a 219 00:12:26,800 --> 00:12:30,440 Speaker 1: lot more people. Yeah, and part of the uh, I'm 220 00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:34,040 Speaker 1: just guessing that part of the reason that hackers create 221 00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:36,320 Speaker 1: these viruses in the first place is to gain the 222 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:39,120 Speaker 1: notoriety and you know, be the person that took down 223 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:41,640 Speaker 1: the Internet. So I mean, if you're only gonna take 224 00:12:41,679 --> 00:12:46,120 Speaker 1: down you know, five million computers versus the entirety of 225 00:12:46,160 --> 00:12:48,760 Speaker 1: the Internet, you know, why would you go after the 226 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,200 Speaker 1: small batch? Why wouldn't you try to get as much 227 00:12:51,440 --> 00:12:54,679 Speaker 1: damage as you're you know, you can possibly do if 228 00:12:54,720 --> 00:12:57,240 Speaker 1: you have another ulterior motive, like let's say you've got 229 00:12:57,320 --> 00:13:01,400 Speaker 1: a personal vendetta against a specific website and you want 230 00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:04,600 Speaker 1: to create a zombie network to attack that website and 231 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:06,920 Speaker 1: bring it down. Obviously you want to try and go 232 00:13:07,040 --> 00:13:11,480 Speaker 1: for whichever system has the widest audience because that will 233 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 1: make it more effective attack in the long run. Because 234 00:13:13,800 --> 00:13:16,079 Speaker 1: a lot of these viruses, that's exactly what the end 235 00:13:16,080 --> 00:13:20,680 Speaker 1: goal is is to to try and bring down specific entities. 236 00:13:21,040 --> 00:13:24,240 Speaker 1: So we've seen this happened to websites like Yahoo and 237 00:13:24,240 --> 00:13:28,440 Speaker 1: and CNN. Uh, it's it's not unusual, which kind of 238 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:30,719 Speaker 1: brings us up to the uh. The last one we're 239 00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:35,600 Speaker 1: gonna talk about right now, the the the infamous storm worm. Yeah. 240 00:13:35,640 --> 00:13:39,200 Speaker 1: This Uh. Jonathan is saying that this is my my 241 00:13:39,240 --> 00:13:42,320 Speaker 1: pet worm, if you will. But I think it's because 242 00:13:42,440 --> 00:13:45,600 Speaker 1: it's interesting to me. Um. It's it's not really called 243 00:13:45,600 --> 00:13:48,960 Speaker 1: the storm worm. There's actually another pretty mild worm called 244 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:51,960 Speaker 1: the storm worm, but it's it's known as its real name, 245 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 1: if you will. These are named by the security firms, 246 00:13:55,640 --> 00:13:57,920 Speaker 1: so um. One of them calls it pea Calm, another 247 00:13:58,000 --> 00:14:01,720 Speaker 1: calls it new War. Uh. But basically it's called the 248 00:14:01,720 --> 00:14:06,959 Speaker 1: storm warm because it propagates through email primarily. UM, it's 249 00:14:06,960 --> 00:14:10,480 Speaker 1: a trojan. So you think you were downloading the newest 250 00:14:10,600 --> 00:14:15,280 Speaker 1: video or some other kind of file. And actually one 251 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:18,160 Speaker 1: of the original subject lines was, you know, a huge 252 00:14:18,200 --> 00:14:21,560 Speaker 1: storm kills millions in China, and so it was the 253 00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:24,320 Speaker 1: idea was to try and trick you into clicking on 254 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:28,880 Speaker 1: a on a specific thing within the email um by 255 00:14:29,000 --> 00:14:31,600 Speaker 1: masking it as a news story. Yeah, that's that's your 256 00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:34,280 Speaker 1: social engineering at work again. They're trying to convince you 257 00:14:34,360 --> 00:14:38,080 Speaker 1: that this is a very topical moment. Uh. There were 258 00:14:38,120 --> 00:14:41,239 Speaker 1: some that went out a few months ago about the Olympics. 259 00:14:41,680 --> 00:14:43,800 Speaker 1: You know, they were news headlines, and they're trying to 260 00:14:43,840 --> 00:14:46,320 Speaker 1: get you to do this, or they'll they'll use uh, 261 00:14:46,920 --> 00:14:52,160 Speaker 1: you know, particularly um inflammatory comments, so things like political 262 00:14:52,360 --> 00:14:57,440 Speaker 1: statements like Obama punches Clinton. See the video now and 263 00:14:57,440 --> 00:14:59,600 Speaker 1: you go, oh my gosh, really did that really happen? 264 00:14:59,640 --> 00:15:02,040 Speaker 1: And you go click on it. Then you've downloaded the trojan. 265 00:15:02,760 --> 00:15:05,840 Speaker 1: But the really weird thing about this one is this 266 00:15:05,880 --> 00:15:09,480 Speaker 1: trojan can actually carry different payloads. It could turn your 267 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:13,160 Speaker 1: computer into a zombie. Uh, it could actually set use 268 00:15:13,280 --> 00:15:16,160 Speaker 1: your computer to send spam to create a denial of 269 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:20,760 Speaker 1: service attack, and it has been known to carry spam 270 00:15:20,920 --> 00:15:25,320 Speaker 1: denial of service attack payloads that attack specific sources. So 271 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:29,200 Speaker 1: you know, if there's somebody that speaks out against this 272 00:15:29,320 --> 00:15:31,360 Speaker 1: storm warm and tries to draw attention to it it 273 00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:33,760 Speaker 1: has been I read an article several months ago about this, 274 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:36,640 Speaker 1: how it has been known to go after those sites 275 00:15:36,640 --> 00:15:40,600 Speaker 1: to try to to shut them up, which is pretty sophisticated, 276 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: very insidious. Yeah right, well, that's that's gonna wrap up 277 00:15:44,800 --> 00:15:47,920 Speaker 1: our discussion about the computer viruses for today. But but 278 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:51,440 Speaker 1: the article does mention others um the code read viruses, 279 00:15:51,480 --> 00:15:55,920 Speaker 1: the klass virus, nimda uh leap a or up as 280 00:15:56,320 --> 00:16:00,000 Speaker 1: mac mac mac virus, and my doom is also on there. 281 00:16:00,560 --> 00:16:04,720 Speaker 1: So certainly go over to how stuff works and check 282 00:16:04,760 --> 00:16:07,920 Speaker 1: out the ten worst computer viruses of all time. You'll 283 00:16:07,960 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: definitely learn something that's live right now on how stuff 284 00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:15,480 Speaker 1: works dot com. We'll talk to you again soon. For 285 00:16:15,640 --> 00:16:18,160 Speaker 1: more on this and thousands of other topics, visit how 286 00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:21,240 Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. Let us know what you think. 287 00:16:21,560 --> 00:16:28,440 Speaker 1: Send an email to podcast at how stuff works dot com. 288 00:16:28,560 --> 00:16:31,160 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 289 00:16:31,440 --> 00:16:32,680 Speaker 1: It's ready, are you